OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE
U.S. Land Forces in Europe

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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# Overseas Military Presence: U.S. Land Forces in Europe

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ABSTRACT

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The security of Europe is a vital U.S. national interest and for over fifty years, America has contributed to that security by stationing forces on the European continent. The objective of U.S. overseas presence in Europe has evolved from containment, deterrence, and escalation control to a visible posture of US forces and infrastructure strategically positioned forward to promote stability, help prevent conflict and ensure protection of US interests. U.S. overseas presence demonstrates American determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly interests. The enlargement of NATO, demise of the Russian threat, cost of overseas presence, appearance of new threats, and competing military stationing requirements has altered the justification for maintaining a large force structure in Europe. The key question is whether the composition and disposition of the current European force structure is well suited to meet the nation’s strategic security needs. The crux of the issue is whether the forces currently stationed in Europe, given the plethora of both conventional and unconventional, as well as asymmetric threats, specifically meet U.S. national and military security strategies for the region and American foreign policy interests overall. This paper examines the American overseas presence concept as it specifically relates to the ground forces assigned to the U.S. European Command and analyzes potential alternatives to that policy.
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If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less.

— General Eric K. Shinseki.

On October 12, 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki addressed the members of the Association of the United States Army and laid out his vision for our Army. He spoke of Secretary of War Elihu Root and MG Nelson Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, a hundred years earlier trying to divine and define what the future might hold for them and what their Army needed to be ready to do. He told of Root and Miles assessing the Army of 1899 “scattered from Cuba to Puerto Rico to the Philippines… with soldiers maintaining the peace, rebuilding nations, handling refugees…The Army was overseas, and things looked like they were going to stay that way for a while.”¹ He told the audience that today he is also concerned as he attempts to divine and define the Army of Tomorrow. The Chief laid out a vision that will transform the Army into a “strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations.”² His message was simple: to remain relevant, change was necessary.

There is no question that the Chief’s vision has had and continues to have a tremendous impact on our Army as it transforms to the Objective Force. The Army’s transformation strategy depicts a three-pronged approach comprised of legacy, interim and objective forces. The legacy force is that force that provides the Combatant Commanders with the ‘here and now’ land force capability to execute their missions. The interim force is that force that will close the capabilities gap between the Legacy force and the Objective Force. The Army’s transformation will affect all aspects of the institutional and field armies: its doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities. It is an expensive resource proposition. As the Department decides how to allocate its resources across the three axes, there will be many stakeholders that will influence the resource allocation decisions. Shifting resources to transformation will likely have ramifications on the Department’s ability to provide trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commanders as they execute their daily missions. Looking to garner resources to fund transformation, the Army’s leadership will have to analyze its business processes, force structure, headquarters manning, and the numerous commitments and treaty obligations to harvest savings that can be applied to the transformation efforts. One such prime commitment for analysis is overseas presence.
Army forces deployed overseas, including the Army in Europe, are categorized as legacy forces. As the Army and Department of Defense (DoD) begin to analyze costs and reallocate resources, the strategy of overseas presence, and the forces deployed overseas implementing that strategy, will once again have to be justified for its benefits and relevance.

Since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, many believe that there is no significant security threat to the European continent and the current American military presence in Europe far exceeds the security requirements. The issue of overseas presence in Europe thus deserves a thorough analysis; an analysis that should focus on the usefulness of the present overseas presence strategy and the corresponding forces as an instrument of national security required to achieve European Security. As in any debate, there are many stakeholders that have equities, especially an issue with such significant political consequences. Among others are numerous Congressmen concerned with the affects of the next round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) who will argue for closing overseas bases before closing bases in their district, and those NATO allies concerned with maintaining a strong trans-Atlantic link, along with new NATO members looking for security assurances who will argue for physical military presence within their borders. The military services will have internal debates over their overseas presence strategies and the ways and means to meet that strategy in Europe. Decision makers analyzing the current force structure will conduct cost/benefit analyses in an attempt to establish whether or not the current overseas force structure sufficiently meets the nation’s strategic security requirements. The question will be one of opportunity costs; would the resources currently earmarked for overseas presence be better applied to transformation, readiness or the current War on Terrorism? The enlargement of NATO, demise of the Russian threat, cost of overseas presence, appearance of new threats, Army transformation issues, competing military stationing requirements, and future costing issues in general have impacted the justification for maintaining a large force structure in Europe.

The security of Europe is a vital U.S. national interest and America has contributed to that security by stationing forces for over fifty years on the European continent. U.S. overseas presence demonstrates America’s determination to defend U.S., allied and friendly interests while ensuring its ability to rapidly concentrate combat power. The objective of U.S. overseas presence in Europe has evolved from containment, deterrence, and escalation control to a visible posture of US forces and infrastructure strategically positioned forward to promote stability, help prevent conflict and ensure protection of US interests. The current European force structure composition and disposition is well intended to meet the nation’s strategic security needs. The issue at stake for the 21st Century is, given the spectrum of the threats,
both unconventional and asymmetric, the ability of U.S. European-based forces to best support American national and military security strategy. Thus, the follow-on question is how these factors will affect the Army’s force structure in Europe.

General Shinseki’s comments apply not only to the US Army’s relevance, but are also germane to the question of the Army’s commitment to its forces overseas in terms of modernization, structure, and stationing. This paper examines the American overseas presence concept and raison d'être as it specifically relates to the land forces assigned to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and analyzes potential alternatives to that policy.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: OLD ROLES/NEW ISSUES

To understand the current stationing of U.S. Army forces in Europe, it is important to understand its genesis. The current United States overseas presence policy is a reaction to threat-based planning during the Cold War. The end of the Second World War found the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe with close to 2 million American soldiers and a European continent lying in ruins. From 1947 until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the United States created a system of overseas military bases as a means to contain aggression by the Soviet Union, and to perpetuate its foreign policy goals worldwide. During this period, U.S. defense strategy and overseas presence policies (ways) were primarily guided by “the objectives of containment, deterrence, and escalation control.” USAREUR provided the means to initially contain and deter an attack from the Warsaw Pact. The United States, as a charter member of the NATO alliance, stationed an Army in Europe to show American commitment, to serve as a reception, staging, and onward movement station for strategic reserves and as a deterrent to an attack from the Warsaw Pact. To balance the geo-strategic advantage and mass of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact’s military, the US forward deployed heavy armored formations to the continent. At its height in the early 1980s, the US had deployed over 217,000 soldiers to Europe, a force structure of 17 brigades. The US Army in Europe included two armored Corps, four divisions and two Armored Cavalry Regiments plus a sundry of combat service and combat service support units. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe presence was 9.25 fighter wing equivalents, consisting of approximately 650 combat aircraft. Additionally, the U.S. Navy maintained a forward presence of at least one carrier battle group with its accompanying cruisers, destroyers, frigates and supply ships all year round.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, U.S. defense strategy evolved and emphasized the importance of providing a credible overseas presence in peacetime to deter aggression and advance U.S. interests because “forces present overseas
promote stability, help prevent conflict and ensure the protection of U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{6} As U.S. policy in Europe shifted from occupation and containment to engagement, the Army’s strength in Europe oscillated from a Constabulary Force of 86,000 in 1950 to over 277,000 in 1961.\textsuperscript{6} By the 1990 – 1991 time frame, America sought to reduce the size of its military forces to 100,000 in Europe. The Army in Europe was to be reduced from 235,000 to 62,000 active duty soldiers, 3,000 reserve forces, 11,000 civilians and 16,000 host-nation employees.\textsuperscript{7} These forces would include a Corps comprised of two divisions with two brigades each. Both divisions were assigned to a multinational corps created by NATO as part of the implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept. One division would be commanded by the U.S. V Corps Commander as part of a US-German Corps and the second division (1st Armored) would be dual-tasked; a participant in the German-American multinational corps and assigned to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Like the multinational corps, the ARRC was created as part of the military implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept. Its purpose is to provide NATO the ability to quickly respond in force with a broad coalition of Allied militaries.\textsuperscript{8} The force structure would remain a predominately heavy-oriented force, primarily populated with armor and mechanized formations in response to the uncertainties of the security environment after the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, the new force structure in Europe soon found itself deeply engaged in operations other than war. The force structured to fight the high intensity conflict of the Cold War slightly modified itself to meet the uncertainties of the European security environment and the new threats envisioned along NATO’s southeastern border. The Bonder study validated USAREUR’s heavy force structure requirements to meet these new threats while reducing the risk of an uncertain Soviet Union. But, the military forces structured for high intensity conflict soon discovered that they would participate in military operations beyond the traditional boundaries of NATO and on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. As an example, the Naval, Air and Ground forces assigned to USEUCOM deployed forces 51 times to 30 countries after the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991.\textsuperscript{9} Operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, SHARP GUARD, PROVIDE PROMISE, DENY FLIGHT, ABLE SENTRY, SUPPORT HOPE, and JOINT FORGE along with Partnership for Peace (PfP) and numerous other security cooperation programs clearly demonstrated that the forces in Europe would maintain a high operational tempo as they executed these operations.
NEW ROLES AND MISSIONS

The driving forces behind the increased operational tempo have been emerging security and humanitarian requirements. The land forces assigned to the U.S. European Command, with an Area of Responsibility which includes the Middle East Littoral, Africa, as well as Europe, soon found itself conducting the majority of its missions beyond the “Central Region,” in places like Rwanda, Poland, Northern Iraq, Sierra Leon and Albania, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The Army’s forces in Europe are being tasked to conduct a spectrum of both peace support operations and security cooperation activities. These included traditional peace enforcement missions, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), along with the many different types of events and engagement activities contained in the security cooperation realm; Partnership for Peace (PfP) and “In-the Spirit-Of” Partnership for Peace Exercises, Military-to-Military contacts, Foreign Exchanges, Security Assistance and Exercise Programs, and Arms Control requirements. Additionally, and most importantly, the new War of Terror has become a major focus for the Command. Clearly, the function of the land forces in Europe has evolved over the last decade and the requirement for rapidly deployable forces are evident.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN EUROPE

The Cold War is over. The threat from Communism has ended. Yet, America still maintains military forces in Europe. Has the enlargement of NATO, demise of the Russian threat, cost of overseas presence and competing military stationing requirements altered the justification for maintaining a large ground force structure in Europe? An understanding of the American national interest in Europe is the first step in comprehending the rationale behind the overseas presence posture in Europe. This will lead to understanding how US ground forces contribute to the U.S. security requirements on the continent.

America desires a free, prosperous, democratic, and secure Europe; a Europe capable and willing to provide the necessary political, military, economic and diplomatic power to help build a safe and secure world. The Commission on America’s National Interests identified two vital and four important interests for the United States. America’s vital interests in Europe are that its “European allies survive as free and independent states” and that the “North Atlantic Alliance remain a powerful and effective political-military alliance linking Europe and North America, with increasing geographic scope and mission beyond Europe.” The Commission also indicates that containing the conflict in Yugoslavia is an extremely important interest. The other important interests include the integration of the post-communist states into the European and Atlantic institutions, the European Union as a responsible free trading partner and that
“conflicts in the Balkans are settled with NATO and US credibility intact and at a sustainable long-term cost.”

America’s vital interest (ends) requires using all the elements of national power (means), diplomatic, informational, economic, and military to achieve these objectives. America’s overseas military presence in Europe supports the accomplishment of many of these objectives in a variety of ways. Military forces and their activities help shape the international environment and are capable of responding to security threats by promoting regional stability; protecting access to critical lines of communication while building relations with foreign militaries; deterring aggressors; and, if deterrence fails, conducting military operations to protect and defend US and Allied interests. America demonstrates commitment to European allies by physically stationing military forces on the continent. Overseas presence underscores our national will to deter or defeat aggression, since “we will not place our service members in harm’s way” without the determination to come to their aid.

Europe buys 30 percent of U.S. Exports. Our trade amounts to $250 billion annually and accounts for over 3 million domestic jobs in the US. Fifty-six percent of our foreign investment occurs in Europe. US companies employ 3 million Europeans. Conversely, European Union (EU) owned companies based in America employ one out of every twelve factory workers. EU companies form the largest investment block in 41 of the 50 US states.

Economically, America’s interests in Europe are enormous. The economic viability and prosperity of America depends upon free and open trading partners, and Europe is its most important economic trading partner. Europe is America’s largest world wide trading and investment partner. In 2001, over half of America’s overseas investments were in Europe with over $725 billion dollars split between the US and the European Union. To ensure that Europe remains a strong economic partner and continues to expand two-way trade with America requires a safe, secure environment. By committing forces to the continent, America demonstrates commitment and resolve with physical presence.

U.S. military presence in Europe strengthens America’s ability to achieve the other important national interest by engaging with foreign militaries and assisting their transformation to democratic forms of government. Military activities such as Military-to-Military Contacts, Partnership for Peace, Joint Combined Exchange Training program and the Marshall Center’s College of International and Security Studies (CISS) have enabled post-communist Central and East European states to assimilate into the European and Atlantic institutions. The Marshall
Center’s College of International and Security Studies is responsible for developing a diverse group of graduates who “share a common background and experience in international security and democratic defense management.”

In the Balkans, US military forces in concert with its NATO allies and other troop contributing nations are deployed as members of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Forces (KFOR) to establish and maintain a secure environment in Europe’s southern region.

UNITIED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND (EUCOM)

One of the elements of national power to achieve America’s interest in Europe is its military, represented by the United States European Command (USEUCOM). USEUCOM is a unified combatant command whose mission is: to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support to NATO; to promote regional stability; to counter terrorism; and to advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. To accomplish this mission, USEUCOM shapes the strategic environment and enhances U.S. interests “through active security cooperation and through readiness, and when necessary, to fight and win across the spectrum of conflict, alone or with allies and coalition partners.”

Theater Security Cooperation creates conditions to deter and dissuade aggression or coercion using military activities with foreign nations to expand pre-conflict options. Security Cooperation is a means to gain access for U.S. forces to foreign bases, increase interoperability and intelligence sharing and bolster our allies’ and friends’ capabilities. USEUCOM security cooperation activities include combined exercises, training, and education, military contacts; humanitarian assistance visits, security assistance and arms control compliance.

Headquarters, USEUCOM located in Stuttgart, Germany is the headquarters element that provides the command and control to its assigned forces. To accomplish its missions, USEUCOM relies on forces from all the services. The DoD apportions the different Services’ forces to the regional Combatant Commanders to accomplish their missions and, in the case of Europe, approximately 107,000 Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines are stationed with their families in Europe. The European headquarters for Naval forces (NAVEUR) is in London, England. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) is headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, while the Marines’ (MARFOREUR) and Special Forces’ (SOCEUR) headquarters are in Stuttgart, Germany. The headquarters for the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) is located in Heidelberg, Germany.
CURRENT USAREUR CONTRIBUTION

Militarily, combat forces are deployed to perform the important mission of waging war, but they can also be stationed overseas for the purpose of working with forces of friendly and allied countries to influence the behavior of other countries and to help shape the international environment. USAREUR supports the National Military Strategy and the “U.S European Command’s security cooperation effort by supporting operations ranging from ‘partnership for peace’ exercises, and military-to-military contact programs to international training missions like the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program and Operations Focus Relief, while simultaneously supporting the war on terrorism and enhancing regional stability through peacekeeping in the area of responsibility.” On a typical day, with less than 13% of the Army stationed in Europe, USAREUR supports 62% of the Army’s deployed forces with over 14,000 soldiers and civilians operating in 14 countries and engaging with 36 individual countries. USAREUR’s daily tasks include operational engagement such as Task Forces Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Falcon in Kosovo, Military-to-Military contacts like the Joint Contact Team Program and Project Partnership, Host Nation Relations such as the Host Nation Relationship Council and conferences like the Conference of European Armies and Army-to-Army staff talks. USAREUR’s presence provides the means to build strong relationships between foreign military forces by teaching American and Western values and democratic principles through a subset of the engagement activities listed above.

FORWARD PROJECTION PLATFORM

To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.

Europe is an ocean closer to many of the world’s trouble spots. The Secretary of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report provides strategic guidance to the Department of the Army by directing the Army that it will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe… which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies… Along with the ability to shape the European security environment through engagement activities, U.S. overseas presence also provides the necessary bases and infrastructure to support force projection operations. Maintaining bases and infrastructure in Europe provides an intermediate staging base for strategic airlift to South Asia and the Middle
East. Overseas presence provides another source of supply for deploying forces and greatly reduces airlift requirements because the transcontinental leg is eliminated. During Operation Enduring Freedom, USAREUR “palletized more than 2.4 million humanitarian rations and prepared 550 containers containing 2.3 million pounds of wheat… in the early days of the operation.”\(^\text{22}\) Obtaining these assets from forward based forces in Europe reduced the transient time of critical airlift assets and greatly improved sustainability responsiveness to forces conducting combat operations.

The Army plans to shift one of the two Ft. Lewis, Wash.-based Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to Europe by FY ’07 to meet a recommendation in the FY ’01 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), according to senior Army officials… Such an assignment would mean either retasking one of the six already-planned BCTs, or adding a seventh brigade. The Army would convert one of the current five Europe-based brigades to a BCT by FY ’07.\(^\text{23}\)

Stationing quick reaction forces an ocean closer to potential trouble spots enhances the U.S. ability to rapidly respond to contingencies with sufficient combat power. Stationing the Stryker Brigade in Germany gives the U.S. the ability to rapidly respond to crisis in Africa and the Middle East. Overseas military presence provides a means to contend with uncertainty in distant locations. To meet the requirements of rapidly deployable forces, USAREUR’s force structure is evolving to address the Army’s transformation initiatives and the lessons identified during the deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. USAREUR initiatives include: creating Immediate Ready Forces capable of deploying a brigade sized element within 96 hours; adaptable command and control systems; strategic responsiveness; infrastructure enhancements; and innovations in training such as the recent Victory Strike exercises in Poland.

**Evolving role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

USAREUR’s formations are duel apportioned to both USEUCOM and, in case of an Article 5 declaration, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the “preeminent security mechanism for the continent.”\(^\text{24}\) The Washington Summit of 1999 was a seminal event for the NATO Alliance as it redefined its role as a power projection force. Recognizing a changing security environment, the Alliance agreed to a new NATO Force Structure (NFS). The new force structure will provide the Alliance with “rapidly deployable, mobile, sustainable and flexible multinational forces and their command and
control capabilities… the new NFS is fundamental and far reaching for NATO’s future operational capabilities…and will have its largest impact on land forces.25

Most of NATO’s land based assets “have been rather static and have had limited (strategic) mobility. In the new structure, land forces should also become highly deployable and should have tactical and strategic mobility.”26 As the Alliance transforms to address the requirements of a changing security environment, it will have to address the issues of mobility, sustainment, logistics, interoperability and training requirements for these quick reaction forces. These are the same fundamental issues confronting the U.S. Army’s “legacy force” in Europe.

Currently, USAREUR’s forces are integrated throughout the NATO command structure and any force structure initiatives or stationing would impact American NATO force contributions. USAREUR’s Commanding General commands NATO’s Joint Sub-Regional Command-Centre in Heidelberg on a rotational basis with a German General officer. The U.S. V Corps is assigned a German Division for Article 5 operations and transforms into a US-GE Corps. Also, under Article 5, the U.S. transfers a division to the 2nd GE-US Corps under the command of a German Lieutenant General. Changes would require significant political and diplomatic maneuvering to ensure America’s allies of its commitment to the transatlantic alliance. USAREUR must provide a force structure capable of meeting the treaty obligations to NATO and ability of conducting unilateral actions if required.

Four new land-based, rapidly deployable headquarters capable of commanding forces of up to 60,000 personnel on operations were today designated as NATO international military headquarters. This brings to five the number of Corps-sized headquarters that are placed under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in peacetime. “These additional deployable, tailored higher readiness headquarters are a significant new asset for NATO,” said Gen. Joseph Ralston, the SACEUR. “European nations collectively have invested more than one billion euros to develop these capabilities. The fact that nations are prepared to put them under NATO command is a key element of our reform effort to develop more relevant structures and capabilities for the Alliance.”27

But as the force structure in NATO evolves, the United States is opting not to formally participate. Alliance members are investing significant amounts of energy and resources into a new force structure and distancing themselves from the old command structure. NATO’s 1997 agreed upon command structure, with strategic regional and sub-regional commands, was established to control the Alliance’s joint operational requirements. By 2003 their usefulness has come into question and the alliance focus has shifted to a force structure to meet the
changing security environment. This new structure initially labeled the “High Readiness Forces” would be those forces with a higher state of readiness and training coupled with the capability to rapidly respond to crisis. These forces, with their deployable headquarters capable of commanding and controlling up to a Corps size force, are to be able to rapidly deploy to a crisis area and sustain operations in support of both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 requirements. It is envisioned that these forces would be available to strategically deploy outside of NATO’s landmass. There are six High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters candidates, to include: the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps with the United Kingdom as the framework nation, the Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps, the Rapid Deployable Italian Corps, the Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps, the Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps, and the hybrid EUROCORPS with France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg as the framework nations. The U.S. has chosen not to provide a High Readiness Force Corps Headquarters.

The only American involvement would be its participation in the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) High Readiness Force with the 1st Armored Division. With the U.S. decision not to provide the U.S. V Corps headquarters for this new force structure construct, the U.S. is able to maintain its unilateral flexibility to deploy the Corps Headquarters ‘out of sector’ with one of its organic divisions. The U.S. does not have to request NATO’s permission to do so, as evidenced by the U.S. V Corps’ deployment to the Middle East.

Evolving Role of the Europeans in Security

Even though the NATO alliance remains the “preeminent security mechanism for the continent,”28 with the U.S. land forces in Europe as an integral part of the NATO structure, many European countries strive for a European security arrangement that is completely independent from the trans-Atlantic link. As a result of the Balkan conflicts, Europeans both recognize and resent their dependence on U.S. political leadership and military power in dealing with security issues within their sphere of influence. Recognizing that they lack the military capabilities to resolve these conflicts on their own, and noting the difficulties they experienced in involving the U.S. and, once involved, the assertiveness of the U.S. in determining and executing “alliance” strategy, the Europeans embarked upon a security architecture to resolve these issues.29 The European Union believed it needed an autonomous capability to act when NATO would not. The European Union member states believed if they had a more cohesive voice in matters of security and a greater military capability, they would have a greater influence in Europe as a whole, to include the NATO organization, and they would be able to resolve crises on their terms. In December 2000, the European Union (EU) formalized a common ESDP through
treaty amendments and the establishment of supporting political and military structures; the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). These EU establishments provide the Europeans with the necessary security structures to develop an autonomous capability to make decisions and, when NATO refuses to act, to plan, resource and execute EU-led military operations. Not wanting to create a European Army or duplicate NATO assets, the Europeans wanted to create the capability to conduct crisis management operations and Peace Support Operations at a level defined as the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping operations and the use of combat forces in crisis management). These tasks exclude collective defense, but are interpreted as covering the “full range of conflict preventions and crisis management.”

The EU agreed on a series of measures, known as the Headline Goals that would provide the EU with the capability of deploying a force in 2003 of up to a Corps level (15 brigade equivalents, or between 50,000 and 60,000 personnel), capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. The EU also declared that the required capabilities would be mutually reinforcing of NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative, limit deployment of forces to situations in which NATO as a whole would not engage, and specified that the process would avoid unnecessary duplication. In a joint statement by President Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on a Transatlantic Vision for the 21st Century, it is clear the U.S. seeks a relationship with the EU that strengthens transatlantic security and leads to an increase in the military capability of the EU, as long as it is complementary and interoperable with NATO.

This new EU capability is important to the U.S. as it crafts a military overseas presence strategy for Europe. With the EU willing to partner with the U.S. in responding to security requirements on the lower end of the conflict spectrum, logic would dictate that the U.S. should focus its overseas military forces on the higher end of the conflict spectrum and complement the EU’s initiative. However, the EU has been unable to muster the political will necessary to make action possible on the agreed upon capabilities by 2003. The EU is an untried and unknown entity and the U.S. should be wary in the development of any new overseas force posture based on the good intentions of the EU. This is in contrast to the NATO alliance that has proven itself over time as an integrated force in terms of standardization, interoperability, compatibility, doctrine and command and control structure, and can provide a reasonable assurance of providing niche capabilities.

At the November 2002 Prague Summit, individual Allies made firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas in eight fields, including: “chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-
to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units. The U.S. should carefully consider the political commitments of our NATO allies at the Prague Summit and continue to pressure allies to militarily meet their political commitments. If the military capabilities agreed upon from the Prague Capabilities Commitment, coupled with the niche capabilities of newly invited members, become realities, it could result in the U.S. adjusting force structure to eliminate duplication of force capabilities.

**ISOLATIONISM AND CURRENT U.S OVERSEAS PRESENCE STRATEGY**

Traditional American foreign policy from George Washington until involvement in World War II was Isolationism. A continent separated from Europe by two large oceans provided the means to insulate the United States from their conflicts. After World War I, the doughboys returned and the Congressional defeat of the League of Nations Treaty ensured maintenance of the isolationist policy. “Isolationism has been the most influential principle guiding American foreign policy, evinced by the egregious lapse of engagement in any international treaties of alliance, a span of time between the U.S. treaty with France in 1778 and the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942.”

Today with the numerous international treaties and alliances, America will probably never return to a true Isolationist policy. But a “widely expressed view among policymakers and journalists is that the public is going through a phase of wanting to disengage from the world. Some even describe it as a phase of isolationism. This view has contributed to the trend in US foreign policy toward international disengagement.”

The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.

America’s commitment to station forces overseas is a key strategic tool for protecting its interests and demonstrating America’s resolve. President Bush’s recent release of the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America addresses
overseas presence and states that deploying forces overseas is an important symbol of the American international commitment: A nation’s willingness to station forces in another country clearly demonstrates its commitment to the security of that nation’s security. The United States’ commitment to station a large number of forces on the European continent clearly demonstrates that resolve.

U.S. LAND FORCES OVERSEAS PRESENCE ISSUES

The top commander of NATO laid out his vision today for a radical overhaul of how United States forces are deployed in Europe, which would reduce the American presence in Germany in favor of smaller, less costly bases in Eastern Europe. The commander, Gen. James L. Jones, said the plans, which were still at an “embryonic stage,” would shift the weight of American forces from Western Europe to eastern countries, like Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, which are closer to the post-cold-war conflicts of today.

Recently, there have been numerous newspaper articles reporting DoD’s intent of reshaping of land forces in Europe to a “leaner, meaner force;” and shifting to a rotational unit basis of presence eastward. The concept of reshaping or re-stationing the land forces on the European continent has numerous issues that require careful consideration. Inadequate land, facilities, and time restrictions for training argues for the stationing of land forces outside of Germany. Along with restrictions in training, there is also an argument that the “American Perimeter” has drastically changed from central Europe (Germany) and that our new front lines should advance eastward or in southern Europe. On the other hand, there are many arguments to maintain the current stationing of land forces in Germany to include the costs associated with building new installations and facilities, the proven stability of our traditional European allies, their strategic transportation capabilities when coupled with U.S. airlift assets, treaty obligations and the unintended political consequences of stationing forces in close proximity of the Russian Federation. Most important, is the potential political cost of removing forces from the territory of some of America’s most long-term, reliable allies.

LEADERSHIP

We met skepticism at first that there would really be 25,000 American troops committed on the ground, which was a major change in U.S. policy, to be sure. In fact, The American willingness to commit ground troops was the decisive factor in winning support. Without this pledge the plan would never have gotten to first base without Allies.
U.S. leadership within the alliance helps influence issues such as national missile
defense, NATO’s enlargement, the ABM treaty, and NATO’s newly found willingness to commit
forces for “out of sector” missions. But this willingness comes with an understanding that the
United States is an active participant willing to commit forces to the potential fight. An excellent
example is the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, which clearly demonstrated Europe’s inability to
solve regional problems without US involvement. It took a commitment of American ground
forces to persuade our European allies to finally stop the killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To
guarantee continued leadership positions within the alliance, the U.S. must maintain a strong
commitment of forces to the alliance.

NATO wasn’t supposed to work that way. Going back to the days of General
Eisenhower and Field Marshall Montgomery in World War II, Allied commands
were distributed on the basis of who provided the troops. It wasn’t a “beauty
contest” between potential commanders; rather, the nation that contributed the
most forces usually got the most significant positions. There was a sound logic
to this, because the nation that contributes the most has the most to lose. And
commandership is about not only accomplishing the mission but also managing
risks.40

U.S. overseas presence provides us a creditable leadership role in European security
affairs. U.S. officers hold most of the important leadership positions within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military alliance with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) as the top military position. Due to the US’ large commitment of forces (USAREUR)
to the NATO alliance and continued presence on the continent, the U.S. has enjoyed
extraordinary influence on the direction the alliance takes to better accommodate our own
national interests.

TRAINING

As nations in Western Europe no longer fear a Soviet attack, they have restricted
USAREUR’s training opportunities by refusing to tolerate the noise and pollution caused by
aviation and mechanized force training. As a result, USAREUR is beginning to move many of
its training exercises eastward to accomplish its training requirements in a less restrictive
environment. As USAREUR looks towards the former Warsaw Pact Nations to conduct training,
logic would indicate that the U.S. should analyze moving forces from central Europe, specifically
Germany to new bases in eastern or southeastern Europe like, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria or
Hungary. The 2002 Victory Strike exercise in Poland is just one of many examples of shifting
training from Germany to the east. The new site offered more space and fewer restrictions than in the training sites in Germany. As the United States gears toward war with Iraq, it is again more eastern European countries that provide the training land and ranges for military operations. Also, Hungary granted the United States ‘permission to use a base in Hungary ‘to train up to 3,000 Iraqi and Arab volunteers…’41

SECURITY PERIMETER

Since the introduction of forces in Bosina, U.S. land forces have been moving southward and eastward to provide security and engage with former Eastern Block countries to help shape their military forces. Although the initial U.S. involvement in Bosnia was a one-year commitment, seven years and twelve rotations later, the introduction of forces and construction of Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo clearly indicates an expansion of the security perimeter. The Balkans forms the southern boundary of the new European security perimeter. Although the facilities in the Balkans are temporary and forces are currently deployed on a rotational basis, it is probably time to acknowledge the need to permanently station forces in the region. USAREUR provides the forces in the Balkans with the necessary sustainment and infrastructure. Integration of the newest NATO invitees and USEUCOM’s security cooperation activities deploys USAREUR’s soldiers to many of the Eastern European countries, pushing the security perimeter eastward.

Additionally, the security perimeter is shifting towards the Caucasus and Central Asia region. Even before September 11, 2001, the U.S. was involved in extending the security perimeter into this region. Diplomatic ties, economic assistance, and military engagement through the Partnership for Peace program and bilateral cooperation activities provided engagement opportunities to build mutual security relationships. The success of these activities varied from state to state, but it was significant with several countries. In the Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan hoped that U.S. and NATO engagement would help offset Russian influence and pressure. In Central Asia, the U.S. provided assistance and support to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in an effort to achieve a security arrangement that would assist with the challenges posed by “Al Qaeda and the Taliban-supported insurgency groups that sought to destabilize their governments.”42 The relationships established with these security cooperation activities helped the U.S. establish forward operating bases in which to strike the terrorists in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attack. As the U.S. fights the War on Terrorism and promotes its interest in the South Caucasus and Central Asia region, the U.S. will likely increase its military presence in the region. The continual deployment of forces to shape the strategic
and military environment in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus may require a “cavalry-on-the-
frontier analogy” to meet these demands for security.\textsuperscript{43}

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although there are many factors that would justify stationing forces in central and
southeastern Europe, there are two major political factors against stationing forces in Eastern
Europe; deterioration of our relationship with Germany and mutual security cooperation with the
Russian Federation. The major legal stumbling block to moving forces permanently eastward is
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in 1990 by the first President
Bush. This treaty, designed to diminish tension between Moscow and the West, reduced levels
of military forces and equipment in Europe. Designed to block any military buildup on Russia’s
front stoop, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty inhibits the stationing of major
western ground forces in close proximity to the Former Soviet Union. The treaty effectively
reduces America’s stationing options. Secondly, we would have to expect a negative reaction
from one of America’s closest European allies, Germany. Pulling forces out of Germany in the
near future will appear to be a retaliatory reaction for opposing the President’s policy against
Iraq. Germany’s counter-reaction would surely be hostile and obstructionist to the U.S. Since
Germany is a critical member of the NATO alliance, future NATO support for U.S. security
endeavors would be more difficult to obtain. Finally, pulling American permanent bases out of
Germany could severely reduce the effectiveness of the NATO alliance.

COSTS

Excluding the cost of personnel, equipment and deployment, the additional or marginal
cost of maintaining a worldwide overseas military presence is estimated to be between $10 and
$15 billion dollars annually.\textsuperscript{44} The incremental cost of the land forces in Europe represents an
estimated 1.6 billion dollars. In other words, overseas presence consumes 4 to 6 percent of the
Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) budget and 15 percent of its total, active-duty military
manpower. Many argue that overseas presence imposes turbulence on DoD’s personnel
policies, makes it difficult for the services to develop common doctrine and procedures, reduces
the procurement budget and burdens personnel readiness since priority personnel fills usually

goto overseas’ units. They argue that overseas presence “imposes a significant opportunity
cost… [and that] to be justified, it must produce strategic returns that are commensurate with its
expense and the sacrifice of other defense assets.\textsuperscript{45} With the demise of the Soviet Union,
many critics specifically argue that the level of today’s permanently based U.S. forces in Europe
grossly exceeds the requirements and threats. However, the opening and closing of overseas bases is also expensive.

Re-stationing forces within the theater requires construction at the new base. A current USAREUR (Efficient Basing – East) initiative to close numerous installations in the Giessen area north of Frankfurt and move a single brigade into a single installation at Grafenwohr is estimated to cost over $650 million dollars in new facilities alone. This excludes the costs of family housing, which is estimated to cost more than 400 million for new construction which would be amortized over twenty-seven years, or for a more palatable leased housing option.

The concept to close several older installations and move a brigade to Grafenwohr was based on a cost and benefit analysis which demonstrated that the Government could save money by relocating a brigade from numerous old, neglected installations to a single installation. The cost savings associated with the sustainment, restoration and maintenance of the Giessen installations, coupled with the existence of relatively new facilities built in the early nineties for the stationing of a brigade at Vilseck, were the key factors for a positive return in the cost/benefit analysis. The Army’s cost analysis of moving the Stryker Brigade from Ft Lewis, Washington to Europe had a rough order of magnitude cost of over 500 million dollars. These two examples would indicate that any decision to move a brigade sized element would have as its lower estimate, a cost of at least a half-billion dollars.

OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL TEMPO

The cavalry-on-the-frontier analogy or ‘lily-pad’ approach to meeting the demands of an expanding security frontier can cause personnel and operational tempo problems. Recent experience has shown that forces assigned to USAREUR have maintained a proportionately high operational tempo during the last several years. USAREUR, with about a sixth of the Army’s fighting structure, “sustained about forty percent of the Army’s deployment activity, much of that aimed at security cooperation with new NATO Armies and peacekeeping.” With family housing and base support facilities and services available in the western European countries, soldiers assigned to USAREUR are stationed overseas with their families on a three-year tour. The daily activities of soldiers are like those found at any other Army post in the U.S. Much like duty at most divisional installations, soldiers deploy for short periods of time to the local training areas or an occasional six-month deployment to the Balkans or Middle East. Removing our bases from Germany would save the cost of family housing and infrastructure. While establishing training areas in Eastern Europe to which soldiers are rotated for six-month tours seems monetarily cheaper and provides an expanded security perimeter, cavalry-on-the-frontier
analogy, it would also result in soldiers assigned overseas alone and unaccompanied, away from their families. This unit rotation concept/policy would have a negative impact on the families of soldiers. With both Europe and Korea on a six-month unit rotation policy, the number of soldiers deployed to the numerous long-term deployments; such as those in the Balkans, Sinai, Kuwait would increase the Army’s personnel deployment tempo. Many families would see moving to a rotational structure in Europe and its obvious implications as a breach of faith. These deployments would put “a great deal of strain on soldiers and their families… and that sentiment would undermine our ability to keep professionals in the Service.”

RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. LAND PRESENCE IN EUROPE

U.S. European overseas presence should maintain its Legacy Force while continuing to adapt to the changing political realities and requirements. It is vital to the U.S. interests to maintain a rapidly deployable force in Europe to maintain the flexibility to meet the needs as they rise. To this end, USAREUR continues to make changes to its force structure in response to the changing strategic environment. The present land force structure serves as an excellent departure point for suggesting marginal capabilities improvements for its future force structure. USAREUR has been successful in contributing to the security of the U.S. and Europe for over fifty years. Given its current force structure, USAREUR continues to provide the necessary forces to conduct engagement activities and shape the international environment. Its strong leadership role in NATO is reaffirmed. It continues to support rotations to the Balkans and it provides a strategic Quick Reaction Force positioned an ocean closer to many of the world’s trouble spots.

The forces assigned to USAREUR are heavy forces, relegated to serve as part of the Army’s Legacy Force. Not as well known is the fact that over the last several years, USAREUR has changed its troop formation to a lighter force structure. USAREUR headquarters is evolving from that of a Major Command with a primary focus on its Title X responsibilities as an overseas deployed Army to an Army Service Component Command and 7th Army structure. This organization will be leaner and more importantly, more rapidly deployable. USAREUR has postured its forces for rapid deployment outside of Europe with the establishment of the Deployment-Processing Center (DPC), collocated with the Air Forces’ theater lift assets located at Ramstein Air Base. USAREUR’s rapid deployment requirements and the subsequent creation of its Immediate Ready Forces (IRF), also collocated at the DPC at Ramstein Air Base, provide the EUCOM Commander a heavy force capability, deployable within 24 hours. The Immediate Ready Force is an armored or mechanized infantry company sized unit that is pre-
positioned at the DPC ready for immediate deployment upon alert notification. Coupling this force with another USAREUR initiative to increase the size of its rapid reaction airborne infantry force provides USAREUR the capability to meet the Army Chief of Staff’s vision of deploying a brigade sized element within 96 hours. By reorganizing units and eliminating functions USAREUR doubled the number of airborne battalions assigned to the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) without increasing personnel authorizations. This initiative provides a credible force projection capability.

USAREUR provides more than combat forces. Its 21st Theater Support Command provides theater level sustainment and reception, staging, onward movement and integration activities (RSOI). These are ‘enabler’ forces that open ports, transport men and materiel, provide logistics support, and procure materiel. Reorganizing from a Theater Army Support Command (TAACOM) into a Theater Support Command (TSC), USAREUR’s 21st TSC is a leaner, more agile unit trained and ready to support world wide contingency missions by providing the ‘enabling’ forces necessary to leverage Europe as a Power Projection Platform. The power projection platform enables the U.S. to project power from an ocean closer thereby reducing the strain on airlift assets and transit times. With Europe as a staging base, forces and materiel deployed from Europe are approximately 3200 miles closer to their destination. As an example, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the 21st TSC prepared over 2.2 million humanitarian daily rations, 1.7 million pounds of wheat, and nearly 69,000 blankets for airdrop to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan. A majority of this materiel was procured and packaged for delivery to Afghanistan in Europe. To move these supplies from the U.S. would have had an enormous impact on U.S. strategic airlift assets. The current force structure and presence provides the necessary capabilities to ensure a viable security environment for Europe and America.

A decrease in the force size and capabilities correspondingly reduces USAREUR’s ability to fulfill USEUCOM’s mission and would “not be an able servant of U.S. policy and strategy.” If forces were reduced or re-stationed eastward, U.S. relationships with our German ally would be harmed. It would severely derogate NATO as a viable organization. This action would increase the operational personnel tempo of our already strained forces and increase family separation. It would reduce the ability to rapidly project forces because this option weakens America’s alliances with stable European countries that have the infrastructure to support deployments (rail and airports), and minimizes the benefits gained from the many security cooperation activities and engagements.
An increase in the force’s capabilities and structure, assuming USAREUR continues to transform into a rapid reaction projection force, provides the U.S all the benefits associated with maintaining the current force structure option plus the ability to venture into Southeastern Europe, Middle East, the Caucasus, and Africa. Of course, the costs associated with overseas presence discussed earlier apply to each of the options. Additional presence necessitates additional costs while less presence results in fewer dollar costs in the near term. But, what of the cost to the future?

CONCLUSION

The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world’s most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.

The optimal size and capability of the U.S. Army’s forces in Europe is difficult to determine because much depends on a future that is impossible to predict. America’s land forces are not stationed in Europe to defend against a threat, but rather to pursue a larger strategic security purpose. Today’s U.S. European-based forces spend as much time training for combat as they do teaching, mentoring, and coaching America’s European allies and friends. They also provide the strategic basing infrastructure to support military operations outside the region. The forward based posture of these forces provides the U.S. the opportunity and rationale to help maintain a leadership role on the continent in the NATO alliance. The current USAREUR force structure and its evolution towards a power projection platform provide the U.S. with the necessary infrastructure and combat power to influence the strategic environment within and outside the region.

As the U.S. adjusts its portfolio of security options to meet the post 9/11 realities and requirements, it should not forget that its ‘overseas presence’ assets have paid huge dividends in maintaining a secure Europe while providing the staging base for military operations in far off lands. Overseas presence is the indispensable asset that provides the U.S. with the flexibility to respond to the uncertainties of tomorrow. As it was yesterday, as it is today, and as it should be tomorrow, the U.S. Army in Europe continues to be an important asset in America’s security portfolio.

WORD COUNT = 8,823
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