Hybrid Operations for US Army Conventional Forces

A Monograph
by
MAJ Gregory G. Boyd
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 02-03
Hybrid Operations for US Army Conventional Forces

Boyd, Gregory G

US Army School of Advanced Military Studies
Eisenhower Hall
250 Gibbon Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

This monograph examines the feasibility of Army conventional units embedding special operations capability in order to remain relevant in the changing strategic and operational environment. The monograph uses historical examples of conventional units conducting special operations type missions in order to examine historical precedence of the feasibility. The monograph examines the MEU (SOC) as a possible starting point for an Army conventional unit that has certain inherent special operations capabilities. The monograph then details the concept of hybrid operations: those operations that can fall into the realm of conventional units or SOF. Based on the review of these areas, the author recommends the Army further examine the possibility of select conventional units becoming hybrid operations units. With a hybrid unit, the Army would continue its ability to fight along the complete spectrum of operations, assist ARSOF when required, and provide rapid response to the regional combatant commanders.

United States; Army; Special operations; Special Forces; Current operational environment; Strategic environment; Embedding; MEU (SOC); Hybrid operations; Hybrid unit

Bo seeker, Kathy
kathy.buker@us.army.mil

International Area Code
Area Code Telephone Number
913758-3138
DSN
585-3138
Title of Monograph: Hybrid Operations for US Army Conventional Forces

Approved by:

_________________________________________ Monograph Director
COL Jonathan Brockman, MMAS

_________________________________________ Director, School
COL James K. Greer, MMAS of Advanced
of Advanced
Military Studies

_________________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program
Abstract


In the early 1980s, the United States’ Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, ordered that all services re-emphasize special operations in their organizations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) took this as a challenge to make changes. The USMC determined that they should add certain maritime special operations missions to the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and commissioned a study to research the proposal. The study ended in 1985 by the USMC activating the MAU Special Operations Capable (SOC) units. The USMC decided that the nature and use of these forces should remain resident in the USMC and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should not consider them as sole assets. The units did work with USSOCOM to provide the regional combatant commanders a special operations capability if needed. In 1987, the units were re-designated as the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC). Since the attack on the World Trade Center in September of 2001, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who work in special operations have been extremely busy fighting terrorism worldwide.

The United States Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has greatly increased the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of all special operators. This is especially true in the case of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The President of the United States, George W. Bush, publicly stated the GWOT will be a campaign of long duration. The war has expanded the roles of SOF units. This expansion places the Army into a position where certain stages of the campaign will require greater SOF-type missions instead of conventional operations. This will certainly dictate the expansion of certain special operations missions into heretofore strictly conventional units.

This monograph examines the feasibility of Army conventional units embedding special operations capability in order to remain relevant in the changing strategic and operational environment. The monograph uses historical examples of conventional units conducting special operations type missions in order to examine historical precedence of the feasibility. The monograph examines the MEU (SOC) as a possible starting point for an Army conventional unit that has certain inherent special operations capabilities. The monograph then details the concept of hybrid operations: those operations that can fall into the realm of conventional units or SOF. Based on the review of these areas, the author recommends the Army further examine the possibility of select conventional units becoming hybrid operations units. With a hybrid unit, the Army would continue its ability to fight along the complete spectrum of operations, assist ARSOF when required, and provide rapid response to the regional combatant commanders.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of the Study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Operating Environment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of SOF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Research</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: Historical Vignettes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosby’s Rangers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrill’s Marauders</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eben Emael</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: MEU (SOC)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of MEU (SOC)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU (SOC) Organization</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU (SOC) Missions</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU (SOC) Training</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of Similar Army Organizations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Airborne Force Mission and Capabilities</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Airborne Infantry Battalion Organization</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranger Battalion Mission and Capabilities</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranger Battalion Organization</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: Hybrid Operations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Consider Hybrid Operations?</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Hybrid Operations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Mission Set for Hybrid Force</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A-MEU (SOC) Mission Essential Tasks</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B-FORCES Cost Model (FCM) Annual Operations Comparison</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C-FORCES Cost Model (FCM) Acquisition Comparison</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

The Problem

In the early 1980s, the United States’ Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, ordered that all services re-emphasize special operations in their organizations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) took this as a challenge to make changes in order to remain a viable fighting force. The USMC determined that they should add certain maritime special operations missions to the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and commissioned a study to research the proposal.\(^1\) The study ended in 1985 by the USMC activating the MAU Special Operations Capable (SOC) units.\(^2\) The USMC decided that the nature and use of these forces should remain resident in the USMC and not become an element of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The units did work with USSOCOM to provide the regional combatant commanders a special operations capability if needed.\(^3\) In 1987, the units were re-designated as the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC).\(^4\) The MEU (SOC) is a brigade-sized equivalent, with 2500 personnel assigned, with both conventional and special operations capability.\(^5\) The USMC model of the MEU (SOC) may have some relevance on force structure and mission changes for the United States Army.

This monograph examines the feasibility of Army conventional units embedding special operations capability in order to remain relevant in the changing strategic and operational environment.

---

1 Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3120-9, Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)),* (Washington, DC, 1994), 1.


3 *Marine Corps Order 3120-9,* 1.

4 Walker, 77.

5 C800 United States Marine Corps Operations Briefing.
Relevance of the Study

Two areas are especially relevant in whether or not Army conventional units should adopt special operations capabilities in addition to their conventional missions. The areas of the operating environment and the status of special operations forces (SOF) are forcing agents for the change in Army organization.

The Operating Environment

The current strategic and operational environments provide a catalyst for the monograph concept. The United States of America’s National Security Strategy (NSS) provides a key point, which explains why this study should be undertaken. In the preface of the NSS, President of the United States, George W. Bush, states, “The war against terrorist of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” This provides a basis that the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will be of long duration so we can expect our military forces will continue to have responsibilities, which may outpace their capabilities. The United States’ National Military Strategy (NMS), currently in draft form, provides a link to why this study should be undertaken. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, states, “Achieving the defense policy goals also requires the transformation of US forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend US military superiority well into the future and leverage US asymmetric advantages including C4ISR, technology, and superior training.” This quote from the draft NMS provides a roadmap in which our military transformation not only includes equipment but also capabilities, such as embedding special capabilities into the conventional force. The US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) adds some further insight in a paper describing the contemporary operating environment (COE). The COE states future operations will be “extremely diverse” and to meet this diversity forces “should be designed and prepared to meet a myriad of contingencies


ranging from SASOs through SSCs and regional conflicts to MTWs. The three documents reviewed in this section provide a common picture requiring US forces to transform capabilities in order to meet the challenges of the current and future operating environments. The GWOT and enemies, such as the Taliban, reinforce the concepts and ideals behind the NSS and NMS. Along with reinforcing the concepts and ideals, the GWOT has placed greater demands on the finite resource of US special operations.

**Status of SOF**

The GWOT has stretched the United States’ national SOF assets to their limits. Several news articles and studies prove this point. In a *New York Times* article, military correspondents James Risen and Eric Schmitt assert key leaders in the SOF community are pushing to free Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) units from the hunt of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, in order to pursue terrorists in other parts of the world. A *Washington Times* article shows how current operations are stretching SOF so much that there are not enough troops to conduct all the missions required. In a subsequent *New York Times* article, Ronald Smothers provides details on how Navy SEALs conducted shipboard inspections in efforts to find atomic material arriving in New York harbors. These few examples show current operations are stretching SOF units to the breaking point.

The increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of special operations is not an aberration of current operations. In a US General Accounting Office (GAO) report completed in 1997, a survey conducted with officers and noncommissioned officers serving in SOF showed sixty

---


percent of Army leaders, fifty-six percent of Navy leaders, and eighty-six percent of Air Force leaders perceived the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) was threatening readiness.\textsuperscript{12} This study alone proved SOF operators truly believe that the high OPTEMPO is having an adverse effect on their ability to accomplish global missions. This new resurgence in the need for SOF dictates that the US Army should review mission sets of conventional units to provide possible relief to SOF and provide a more flexible force.

**Methodology**

The methods for evaluating the research question are as follows:

- Provide historical vignettes that describe how conventional forces have been successful conducting missions that fall into the realm of special operations.
- Review of the MEU (SOC) organization, capabilities, and missions to provide a possible baseline for how Army conventional units can be organized and trained for special operations missions. Along with the review of the MEU (SOC) an examination of similar Army conventional units is done in order to determine adaptability to a special operations mission set.
- Description of hybrid operations and how they may apply to Army conventional units.

**Criteria**

Using the above methodology the criteria to determine the feasibility of the proposal are:

(1) Are changes in force structure required; (2) Are changes in training types and cycles required; and (3) Do other areas that are impacted affect the proposal?

**Scope of Research**

Due to the limitations of a monograph of this length, the scope of the research is limited to comparing MEU (SOC)s to Army battalion-sized elements in order to keep consistency in

comparison. Specific maritime missions of the MEU (SOC) will not be compared to Army units due to the inherent nature of maritime operations for the USMC. Before examining what possible special operations missions may be added to the conventional force mission set some concepts need to be defined. The first to be addressed is special operations. *JP 3-05* defines special operations as:

> Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.\(^\text{13}\)

*JP 3-05* defines Special Operations Forces (SOF) as:

> Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.\(^\text{14}\)

*JP 3-05* defines direct action (DA) as:

> Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, SOF or special operations capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations.\(^\text{15}\)

---


\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., II-3.
JP 3-05 defines special reconnaissance (SR) as:

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance.¹⁶

The monograph accepts the SOF Truths as stated in JP 3-05:

- Humans are more important than hardware.
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies arise.
- SOF cannot be mass produced
- Quality is better than quantity.¹⁷

The background and methodology for the monograph have been explained. To further provide insight into the monograph research, a review of historical vignettes will show that conventional units can and have accomplished missions that are considered special operations.

CHAPTER TWO: Historical Vignettes

Recent history provides several examples of military leadership tasking conventional units to perform special operations missions. These operations demonstrate that with proper training, leadership, and resourcing conventional units are more than able to execute missions that are considered to be in the realm of special operations. This analysis provides the framework for the concept of hybrid operations and answers the question whether or not conventional units can conduct special operations.¹⁸ In order to provide the most intellectually honest examination, the selected operations must be viewed using the historical context of the time. What leaders considered a special operations mission during the American Civil War or World War II are not

---

¹⁶ Ibid., II-5.

¹⁷ Ibid., II-3.

¹⁸ Hybrid operations are explained in detail in Chapter Four.
necessarily considered a special operations mission by today’s standard. The vignettes selected provide a description of conventional forces conducting special operations during their particular historical environment. The actions of John Singleton Mosby’s unit during the American Civil War, Merrill’s Marauders operations in Burma during World War II, and the German attack of Eben Emael in 1940 are examples of conventional units conducting special operations type missions. All three of these examples prove that conventional units with proper training, leadership, and resources are very capable of completing special operations missions.

**Mosby’s Rangers**

Mosby’s unit conducted operations in Virginia during the American Civil War. Formed under the Partisan Ranger Act of 1862, Mosby’s unit conducted several successful operations against the North. The area the Rangers operated in was one of thick forests, wetlands, and hills. This area provided “an outstanding base of operations for irregular units.”

The unit can trace its origin back to the conventional forces of the Confederate Army. Mosby enlisted in 1862 and was later recognized by his regimental commander for his talents. This recognition led to his selection as the regimental adjutant. Later, Major General J. E. B. Stuart recognized Mosby for his “aggressiveness and competence” and this began his irregular

---

19 *JP 3-05* defines Special Operations as operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.


21 Ibid., 156.

22 Ibid., 160.
service. Mosby had early success as a lead cavalry scout, which facilitated his selection to lead what became Mosby’s Rangers.

The men Mosby recruited where from the conventional cavalry force but the carte blanche given to him to recruit the best had a great impact on the success of the Rangers. This certainly had a direct effect on the ability of the unit to begin operations almost immediately after being formed. As the operations continued, Mosby replaced some of the veteran soldiers initially picked for the unit with volunteers from Mosby’s area of operations due to increasing casualties.

Mosby conducted several operations during the war. One of the most daring and successful was the capture of a Union general officer. In the same month, March 1863, Confederate leaders gave Mosby the directive to raise his force; Mosby conducted the operation that captured Brigadier General Edwin Stoughton. With information gained from a Union deserter, Mosby initiated a plan to capture a British officer, Colonel Sir Percy Wyndham. Wyndham was a key commander of Union cavalry elements. The plan was to capture the colonel in order to humiliate him. Mosby used the deserter as a lead scout in order to find a route through the Union pickets for the twenty-nine man raiding party. The party maneuvered through several thousand Union soldiers in their efforts to locate the British colonel. Unfortunately, Mosby’s men discovered Wyndham was in Washington and not in the camp. In a strange twist, the deserter was able to capture his former commanding officer and brought him to Mosby. The Rangers ability to capture the officer led Mosby to conceive a plan to capture the commanding general of the unit, BG Stoughton. Mosby used a ruse to gain access to the general’s headquarters. Mosby’s men captured Stoughton and several of staff officers without firing a shot. The party was able to depart the area without incident. Due to darkness and the large number of prisoners versus the small number of Rangers, some prisoners were able to escape; however, the general officer did not. Mosby returned to his commander and turned the prisoners over. An

23 Ibid.
interesting point is Mosby and his men did not receive praise but received a rather unceremonious reception. Mosby’s leadership during the operation was later recognized by a promotion to major.  

Mosby provides a personal quote about the success of the mission to GEN Stuart:

The fruits of this expedition are 1 brigadier-general (Stoughton), 2 captains, and 30 men prisoners. We also brought off 58 horses, most of them being very fine, belonging to the officers; also a considerable number of arms. We left hundreds of horses in the stable and other places, having no way of bringing them off, as I was already encumbered with more prisoners and horses than I had men. I had 29 men with me; sustained no loss. They all behaved admirably.

In his dissertation, Mackay points out the elements making this a successful irregular operation:

- The raid used cavalrymen, locals, and the Union deserter.
- Mosby’s leadership allowed him complete control over his men.
- Mosby made little contact with the civilian population.
- Mosby’s men controlled their actions, which led to no Union or Confederate soldiers killed during the operation.

These elements demonstrate the special operations nature of Mosby’s unit and missions.

Mosby’s unit is a classic example of a conventional force evolving into a special operations force. While today’s doctrine does not translate into Civil War operations, doctrine must be considered to argue that while this unit conducted special operations, it was nonetheless a conventional cavalry unit. This unit is not considered a special operations unit because the majority of the tactics the Rangers used were conventional cavalry tactics of the time. What set them apart from the conventional forces was the Rangers conducted operations during times of

---

24 Ibid., 164.

25 To read about the operation and some quotes from Mosby see Mackay’s dissertation pages 174-176.


27 Mackay, 177.
limited visibility and used rapid, violent attacks. Another similar example of conventional units conducting operations behind enemy lines is the 5307th Composite Unit.

**Merrill’s Marauders**

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), known as Merrill’s Marauders provides a case study of an ad-hoc conventional unit charged with conducting special operations. The 5307th was a regimental-sized unit formed to conduct deep operations behind the Japanese lines in Burma. The unit began recruiting in September 1943 and deployed to India in October 1943. The unit began combat operations in Burma in February 1944 and disbanded in August of 1944. The Army leadership recognized the Marauders for their accomplishments by an award of the Distinguished Unit Citation. The unit took extremely high casualties during its brief history. The unit began with 2750 men on their first operation and by the time they disbanded only 200 original members were present. The genesis of the unit was proposed not by the United States but by the British.

British General Orde C. Wingate, a leader with guerrilla warfare experience in Palestine and Ethiopia, conceived the idea for the unit because of the challenge of how to “free Allied units from the reliance on roads.” Wingate’s concept was a highly mobile unit that could be inserted by glider and supplied by airdrop. The intent was to provide the unit with more mobility than their Japanese counterparts, facilitating the interdiction of Japanese lines of communication. General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, endorsed the concept. Marshall agreed to send 3000 infantrymen to form a unit codenamed Galahad; this unit was destined to become

---

28 Mackay, 171.


30 Ibid., 2.

31 Ibid., 6.
Merrill’s Marauders. The United States Air Force formed a special aviation unit, Number 1 Air Commando, as a direct support unit to Galahad.\textsuperscript{33} During the inception of the unit, tension rose between the Wingate and his US counterpart.

An advocate to get Galahad out of the hands of the Wingate and into the hands of the Americans was LTG Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the Chinese Army of India (CAI). Stilwell believed Galahad would operate better under the control of an American command and had serious doubts about Wingate’s ability to properly employ the unit. At the Sextant Conference, a coalition conference between the United States, Britain, and China, Stilwell convinced Marshall to assign Galahad to him. In turn, Stilwell assigned command of the 5307th to the G3 of the China-Burma-India Theater of War (CBI), Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. Merrill assumed command on 4 January 1944 and almost immediately notified Stilwell the unit was ready for combat.\textsuperscript{34}

In late February 1944, the Marauders began their first combat mission. Stilwell conceived a plan where the Chinese 22\textsuperscript{nd} and 38\textsuperscript{th} Divisions would move down the Kamaing Road and attack the 7000-man Japanese 18\textsuperscript{th} Division near Maingkwan. Simultaneous with the Chinese movement, the Marauders were to move in a wide arc to the east and establish blocking positions south of the Japanese and conduct attacks into the rear of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{35} The Marauders began the operation on 24 February with a five-day movement to Tanja Ga where the unit was to await word from LTG Stilwell for final movement to the objective. The Chinese units made faster progress than expected and upon Merrill’s arrival in Tanja Ga on 28 February, Stilwell ordered the Marauders to continue movement to the objective near Walawbum, forty miles away. The

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 20.
Marauders began moving and by 3 March finalized routes to the battalion objectives in the Japanese rear area.

The arrival of an American combat unit deep in the rear area was a complete surprise to the Japanese.\(^{36}\) Over the next five days, the Marauders conducted operations against the Japanese in order to block their supply routes. The Japanese conducted attacks repeatedly against the Marauders but Merrill's unit remained victorious. One reason for Marauders the success was the use of Nisei interpreters. The Nisei were Japanese-Americans who joined the US Army to fight during World War II. On one occasion, an interpreter was able to translate the shouting of a Japanese commander who was screaming orders to his men. With the information gained, the Americans were able to shift the effort in time to blunt the Japanese attack.\(^{37}\) Another example is when Merrill’s 2\(^{nd}\) Battalion tapped into an enemy landline and was able to intercept a message sent by a guard force at an enemy ammunition dump. The message gave details of the Marauder’s location but also gave the location of the ammunition dump. The Marauders relayed the information to support aircraft, which attacked the ammunition supply.\(^{38}\)

On 5 March, the Japanese commander was able to find an escape route between the advancing Chinese and Merrill's force.\(^{39}\) Had the enemy not been able to find this seam, the Japanese casualties would have most probably been much greater. On 7 March, the Chinese forces reached Walambum, linked-up with the 5307\(^{th}\), and relieved them.\(^{40}\)

During this first operation for the Marauders, the unit killed 800 Japanese soldiers with eight Marauders killed and thirty-seven wounded. The Marauders provide an example of how


\(^{37}\) Ibid., 38.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 39.

\(^{39}\) Bjorge, 22.

\(^{40}\) See Bjorge pages 19 to 23 also see U.S. War Department, *Merrill’s Marauders (February – May 1944)* (Washington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Division, 1945), 31-43.
conventional infantrymen through short-duration, intensive training and competent leadership can execute special operations type missions with unparalleled results. Another example of World War II era conventional unit that undertook a special operations mission is the German assault of Eben Emael.

**Eben Emael**

As Germany began planning the invasion of France, surprise attacks into the countries of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg were conceived. The Germans named their operations plan, PLAN YELLOW. A key element of the plan was securing three bridge sites along the Albert Canal in eastern Belgium, just over the border from Holland. Securing the bridge sites would allow rapid movement through Belgium in order to attack France. To seize the crossing points, the Germans had to seize the decisive point of Fort Eben Emael. The fort had long-range artillery able to fire on all three bridge sites, which would hinder the rapid movement into and through Belgium.

Adolf Hitler, the German political and military leader, proposed a plan to secure the bridge sites to the commander of the 7th Airborne Division, General Kurt Student. Student assigned the mission to CPT S. A. Koch's detachment. The detachment was comprised of one company of paratroopers, one platoon of airborne engineers, a group of transport aircraft, and gliders. Koch broke the detachment into four assault elements focused on the three bridge sites and the fort. Koch assigned the engineer platoon to the fort, one airborne platoon was assigned the Vroenhoven Bridge, one platoon was assigned the Veldwezelt Bridge, and one was assigned the Canne Bridge. The elements were code named respectively, Granite, Concrete, Steel, and

---


43 Ibid., 34.
Iron. The map below shows the objectives and units assigned to seize them. The detachment began training in November 1939 by rehearsing the key task of the glider insertion and objective seizure. The basic plan called for the unit to depart from airfields located in Ostheim and Butzweilhof. The assault units separated into their four groups of ten gliders. The transport aircraft were to tow the gliders to a release point twenty kilometers from their objectives. Koch assigned the engineers to land on the fort and destroy the guns over watching the bridges. Stuka support aircraft were assigned to assist the engineers in preventing the Belgian defenders from leaving the fort. The remaining units were to seize the three bridges and disable the charges emplaced by the Belgians to destroy the bridges. The leader of the engineers, LT Rudolf Witzig, believed the mission had three objectives: "The first objective was to take out the machine guns on the surface so we could go in safely. The second objective was to take out the casemates, and the third was to survive." Unit training continued in complete secrecy. The leaders did not allow the soldiers to send mail or make calls unless approved by the detachment commander. As the unit moved from one location to another, the German leadership would rename the unit in order to prevent anyone knowing the unit’s identity.

44 Ibid., 37.
45 Ibid., 32.
46 Ibid., 41.
It was also purported at one training location the local populace recognized some of the soldiers, which forced the relocation of the entire unit.\textsuperscript{48} The training continued in complete secrecy until early May, on 10 May 1940 the operation began.

The insertion was not without mishaps. The engineer platoon leader's glider broke free from its tow plane shortly after take-off. He was able to eventually get into the fight after his platoon had successfully begun the assault on the fort. Additionally, the main body reached the release point early and not at an altitude that would ensure landing on the assigned objectives. The squadron commander realized this and took the squadron into Dutch airspace in order to gain the correct altitude. This event drew fire from Dutch antiaircraft batteries but the gliders were all released without any catastrophic loss of aircraft.\textsuperscript{49} Although the mishaps could have caused severe problems for the operation, they had only a minor impact.

The gliders destined for the fort, manned with a complement of 600 Belgian soldiers, reached their targets, and began seizure and destruction of the guns over watching the bridges.\textsuperscript{50} The engineers fought for the fort for almost two days. The Belgians attacked the Germans with artillery. The Belgian soldiers trapped in the fort were able to mount limited attacks on the German invaders.\textsuperscript{51} While the Belgians fought to prevent the destruction of the fort, their hasty defense was in grave danger of being overrun by the Germans. At 1227 on 11 May, the Belgian commander officially surrendered the fort.\textsuperscript{52} The glider troops assigned to secure the bridges

\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Rudolf Witzig quoted in McRaven, 41.

\textsuperscript{48} McRaven, 37.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 46.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 36.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 54.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 55.
were also successful. The combined efforts of all four assault forces kept the route clear for the advancing armor forces.\(^53\)

The sixty-nine engineers defeated a Belgian force of over 600 and the troopers kept the bridge sites intact to provide routes for the German armored forces. This vignette is slightly different from the previous two by virtue of the time available to train. While Germans had over five months to train, it still provides an example of a conventional force executing a special operations mission of World War II.

All three historical vignettes described are examples of direct action missions.\(^54\) Mosby’s unit conducted deep raids behind enemy lines, the Marauders conducted raids and attacks deep in the enemy rear area, and the Germans at Eben Emael conducted a raid on a highly defended complex of the fort and bridges. The units fulfilled the current definition of direct action, “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel.”\(^55\) Another reason the operations can be considered direct action is that they were conducted outside the range of conventional tactical weapons systems such as ground-based artillery. In both the Marauder and German historical example, the main support was from the air. In the Mosby example, no additional fire support, other than the organic weapons carried by the Rangers was available. These conventional units were able to conduct special operations missions due to extensive training and excellent leadership. The units conducted classic hybrid operations. Hybrid operations are those missions that can be conducted by SOF or conventional units.\(^56\) These examples prove that conventional units, with the right resources, can conduct certain

\(^{53}\) Deighton, 203.

\(^{54}\) Direct action is defined in Chapter One.

\(^{55}\) _JP 3-05_, II-3.

\(^{56}\) Chapter Four provides detailed analysis and explanation of hybrid operations.
special missions and display that these hybrid operations have been conducted throughout history. Hybrid operations are not just from history, the USMC has a current organization that is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct hybrid operations. Hybrid operations are the cornerstone of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC).

CHAPTER THREE: MEU (SOC)

Evolution of MEU (SOC)

The evolution of the MEU (SOC) can be traced to the early 1980s. On 24 April 1980, the United States attempted to rescue fifty-three American hostages held in Iran. While on the ground, two aircraft collided and ended the attempt. This failed attempt was the culminating event in over a decade of decline of US Special Operations Forces (SOF). While the event was a tragedy for the US military, it spurred a resurgent focus on SOF. The Defense Department began an investigative committee under the lead of Admiral James L. Holloway. For the Army, the resurgence affected a change by the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Myers, to place all Army SOF units under a single command, the 1st Special Operations Command.57 The resurgent focus caused the Marine Corps to rethink their SOF status. In a 1985 article, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Paul X. Kelley, explained his thoughts and goals for SOF. General Kelley related that in October 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense published a memorandum that stated, “U.S. national security requires the maintenance of Special Operations Forces (SOFs) capable of conducting the full range of special operations on a worldwide basis, and the revitalization of those forces must be pursued as a matter of national urgency.”58 In the article, General Kelley stated his position on SOF:

57 United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command History, (September 1998), 3.

First, we should examine in detail the full range of missions that are appropriate within the definition of special operations. Only then will we understand their scope and magnitude.

Second, we should look within all the four Services to see what special operations missions can be accomplished by existing conventional units.

And, third, for those special operations mission that are beyond the capabilities of existing conventional units, we should organize, train, and equip appropriate special purpose units. General Kelley tasked the Marine Corps to review what special operations missions the USMC could assume. He directed these missions should not be duplicates of other SOF units but compliment those units and missions already established. He provided a framework for how the process of determining the feasibility of embedding special operations capability into the MEU was to begin with the following parameters:

- The optimum organizational structure of the MAU to conduct appropriate special operations missions.
- A training syllabus that ensures that our forward-deployed MAUs are fully capable of accomplishing appropriate special operations missions.
- An augmentation troop list to satisfy unique special operations functions beyond what the MAU may normally accomplish.
- Special equipment not currently in the Marine Corps inventory or not normally carried by a MAU deployed with the fleet.
- A concept of employment for appropriate special operations missions that is in accordance with our established doctrine and principles and accommodates the inclusions of other Service SOFs, when appropriate.

Kelley’s article and subsequent study was the beginning of the current MEU (SOC) organization.

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 23.
61 Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) was the predecessor organization of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
62 Ibid.
MEU (SOC) Organization

The MEU (SOC) is the standard Marine Corps forward-deployed expeditionary unit. The Marine Corps maintains MEU (SOC)s in the Mediterranean Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean or Arabian Gulf region. The MEU (SOC) is a self-contained force capable of missions of limited scope. In *Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12D*, the MEU (SOC) employment concept is explained:

The MEU (SOC) mission is to provide the NCA and the combatant commanders with a forward deployed, sea-based, rapid crisis response capability to execute a full range of military operations. It is organized, trained, and equipped as a self-sustaining, general-purpose expeditionary MAGTF that possesses the capability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, from military operations other than war, to amphibious and other conventional operations in support of various contingency requirements, including selected maritime special operations such as—

- Reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Specialized demolitions.
- Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP).
- Seizure/recovery of offshore energy facilities.
- Seizure/recovery of selected personnel or materiel.
- Visit, board, search, and seizure of vessels.
- In-extremis hostage recovery.

The publication goes on to explain the MEU (SOC) is embarked aboard a Navy amphibious ready group (ARG) and provides the combatant commander or operational commander with a “quick, sea-based reaction force for a wide variety of situations.” The MEU (SOC) can be the first unit on the scene of a crisis and conduct shaping operations for follow-on forces. The MEU (SOC)s are organized into seven standing MEU (SOC) command elements. Within the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEU (SOC)s. Within the II MEF are the 22nd, 24th and 25th MEU (SOC)s. Lastly, the III MEF has the 31st MEU (SOC).

---


64 Ibid., 2-5.

65 Ibid., 2-5.

66 Ibid., 2-4.
Several Marine Corps publications explain the current organization of the MEU (SOC). A colonel is in command of the MEU (SOC) and they deploy with 15 days of sustainment. The normal configuration of a MEU (SOC) is:

- A command element (CE) that is comprised of a command and control element, a force reconnaissance company, and signals intelligence section.
- A ground combat element (GCE) that has an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, engineer assets, tanks, light armored reconnaissance units, and assault amphibian units.
- An aviation combat element (ACE) that has a combat assault transport helicopter squadron reinforced with utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and landing fixed-wing attack aircraft, air refuelers/transport aircraft, and other attachments as required.
- A combat service support element (CSSE) that is task-organized around a MEU service support group. This element has engineering, supply, transportation, landing support, medical, and maintenance capabilities. \(^67\)

Below is an organization chart providing further resolution of a MEU (SOC) organization \(^68\):


\(^68\) *MCRP 5-12D*, 2-4.
The approximate number of personnel for all units is as follows:

- Command Element: 169
- Ground Combat Element: 1200
- Aviation Combat Element: 417
- Combat Service Support Element: 275
- Total Force: 2061

The major systems of the MEU (SOC) are as follows:

- Command Element: 1 LAV and 14 HMMVVs.
- Ground Combat Element: 7 LAVs, 15 AAVs, 4 M1s (as required), 6 M198s, 20 CRRCs, 15 5-ton trucks, 8 81mm mortars, 8 TOW launchers, 64 HMMWVs, and 7 IFAVs.
- Aviation Combat Element: 12 CH46s, 4 CH53s, 4 AH1s, 3 UH1Ns, 6 AV8Bs, 2 KC130s (OPCON), 2 Avengers, 3 Stinger Tms, and 5 HMMWVs.
- Combat Service Support Element: 2 ROWPUs, 5 Refuelers, 1 M88A1, 18 5-ton trucks, 1 AAVR7, 18 HMMWVs, 2 ACEs, 1 D7, and 1 SEE.

The organization, location, and equipment of the MEU (SOC) provide it a wide range of options to accomplish required missions.

**MEU (SOC) Missions**

The Marine Corps claims that several characteristics reside within the MEU (SOC):

1. Forward presence with operational flexibility. The ability to provide continuous presence and credible, but non-provocative, combat power, for rapid employment as the initial response to a crisis. Signals U.S. commitment to the region and is a visible reminder to those who would threaten U.S. interests. Includes engagement activities that shape and promote regional stability.

2. Rapid response. The ability to plan and commence execution of a mission within six hours of receiving an alert, warning or execute order. Includes the ability to enable the introduction of follow-on MAGTF (e.g., MPF operations, MEB, etc.) and joint and or combined

---

69 Department of the Navy, *Marine Corps Order 3120.9B, “Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)(MEU(SOC))”*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2001), Enclosure 1. This enclosure breaks down personnel by unit. It also displays balance between enlisted and officer personnel as well as USMC and USN personnel.
forces by securing staging areas ashore, providing critical command, control, and communication or conducting supporting operations.

3. Task organized for multiple missions. The ability to execute a full range of conventional operations, from amphibious assault to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, as well as selected maritime special operations, across the entire spectrum of conflict, as an integral part of a joint and/or combined campaign, and transition between operational environments on a moment’s notice.

4. Sea-based, strategic reach with inherent force protection. The ability to operate from ships (independent of established airfields, basing agreements, and over-flight rights) provides unimpeded and politically unencumbered access to potential trouble spots around the world. Includes the ability to remain on station, over the horizon of a potential adversary, without revealing exact destinations and/or intentions. Also includes the ability to withdraw rapidly at the conclusion of operations.71

These characteristics enable the MEU (SOC) to accomplish their core capabilities:

- Amphibious Operations. An attack launched from the sea by U.S. Navy and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious operations include the following phases: planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault.

- Maritime Special Operations. Selected direct action missions conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized MEU(SOC) forces.

- MOOTW. Operations encompassing the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.

70 Ibid., Enclosure 2.
• Supporting Operations. Operations encompassing the use of military capabilities that support the spectrum of potential joint/combined operations.\(^{72}\)

The MEU (SOC) has twenty-three mission essential tasks (MET) (see Appendix A for greater explanation on each mission):\(^{73}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amphibious Assault</th>
<th>Amphibious Raid</th>
<th>Amphibious Demonstration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Withdrawal</td>
<td>Direct Action Operations</td>
<td>Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Operations</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
<td>Provide Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)</td>
<td>Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Operations</td>
<td>Airfield/Port Seizure</td>
<td>Employ Non-Lethal Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Deception Operations</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terrorism</td>
<td>Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The training required to maintain proficiency in all missions requires a very active, standardized systems approach training program.

**MEU (SOC) Training**

The training required for a MEU (SOC) is similar to Army ground combat units but their inherent global deployment nature adds different facets to this training. *MCO 3502.3A* explains how the MEU (SOC) trains and provides some essential requirements in stabilization, standardization, and integrated training:

• **Stabilization:** All key personnel in Command Element (CE) are stabilized 240 days before embarkation. All battalion level commanders and company grade officers are

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 3.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 3-5.
stabilized 210 days before embarkation, and the remainder of personnel are stabilized 180 days prior to embarkation.

- Standardization: Due to the global requirements for the organization, all MEU (SOC) training is standardized. This standardization is mandated across the Marine Corps, which results in all MEU (SOC)s being able to operate globally.

- Integration: The MEU (SOC) training plan is focused to ensure interoperability and integration throughout all units of the MEU. According to the MCO 3502.3A, "this enables the ARG/MEU to fully realize its inherent combat powers." This process has a four-fold integration enhancement goal:
  1. To enhance the rapid decision process during crisis operations.
  2. To enhance the participation and integration into JTF exercises.
  3. To enhance the interoperability with Naval Special Warfare Units.
  4. To enhance interoperability with external agencies such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.\(^74\)

USMC doctrine states the predeployment training program (PTP) should be:

---

\[\text{...a rigorous, aggressive and focused training program that builds upon individual and unit capabilities of the MEU Command Element (CE) and its major subordinate elements (MSEs). The program should allow sufficient time for planning, execution, and critique of all major training events.}\] \(^75\)

---

The USMC focuses the training plan into three areas: the initial training phase, the intermediate training phase, and the final training phase. The complete process takes approximately twenty-six weeks. The initial training phase focuses on the individual Marine and small unit tactics of all the MSEs. Key events for this phase are: ARG/MEU (SOC) staff planning course, operations and intelligence seminar, MEU Command Element Situational


\(^75\) Ibid., 4.
Training Exercise (STX), initial training at sea, and special skills courses (scout swimmer, explosives, reconnaissance, and urban sniper). The intermediate training phase focuses on collective MEU training designed to build on the unit capabilities. The key events in this phase are: intermediate training at sea, long-range night raids, training in an urban environment (TRUEX), and a combined exercise for all the MEU. The final training phase focus is on the culmination of training with final preparations for the Special Operations Capable Exercise (SOCEX). Key events in the final training phase are: a maintenance stand-down, advanced amphibious training, a supporting arms coordination exercise (SACEX), the SOCEX, and a crisis interaction requirements exercise (CIREX). An important facet during the training is the documentation of training. This documentation allows the USMC to distribute the lessons learned throughout the USMC. This documentation process allows the USMC to distribute the lessons learned to other MEU (SOC)s quickly and efficiently in order for the units to incorporate the lessons into upcoming training and deployments.

No specific organizations in the unit are inherently special operators, the training and organization lends itself to conducting certain essential special missions in extreme conditions. The US Army has several units that could be modeled after the MEU (SOC) to provide complementary but not redundant capabilities to regional combatant commanders.

**Comparison of Similar Army Organizations**

In order to set a baseline for whether or not the Army should adopt certain special operations missions for their conventional forces, the difference between mission sets for the conventional forces and special operating forces must be addressed. Due to length of this monograph only two Army units will be compared, a conventional airborne infantry battalion and a Ranger battalion. When examining the units, they are being compared to the ground combat

---

76 *MCO 3502.3A* describes what exact training is accomplished in each training phase. *MCO 3502.3A* details the training on pages 8 to 10.

77 Ibid., 11.
element of the MEU (SOC) not the complete MEU (SOC) due to organic aircraft and CSS assets not being resident in US Army battalions.

**Conventional Airborne Force Mission and Capabilities**

The mission for an airborne infantry battalion is "to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or repel his assaults by fire, close combat, and counterattack."

The Table of Organization (TOE) narrative gives several capabilities resident within the unit:

- Tactical movement to close with the enemy and means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him.
- Tactical maneuvers to seize and hold terrain.
- Independent operations on a limited scale.
- Mortar fire support for organic and attached units.
- Patrolling operations.
- Antiarmor protection for organic and attached units.
- Field feeding for organic and attached units.
- Capability to participate in air transported (airmobile) operations when provided sufficient transportation.
- Capability to maneuver in all types of terrain under all climatic conditions.
- Capability for frequent airborne assaults by parachute or assault aircraft with minimum marshalling and planning.
- HSS for organic and attached units.
- Capability to participate in counterinsurgency operations as part of a brigade size force.
- Participation in operations other than was which may require augmentation.
• Reconnaissance support for organic and attached units.

The missions and capabilities of the airborne battalion dictate a certain organization in order to accomplish tasks.

**Conventional Airborne Infantry Battalion Organization**

This airborne infantry battalion is organized into the following:

• Headquarters Company: Responsible to provide command, control and supervision of assigned at attached units.

• Three Rifle Companies: Responsible to close with and destroy the enemy by means of fire and maneuver.

• Anti-Armor Company: Responsible to provide heavy anti-armor fire support for the Airborne Infantry Battalion.78

The total troop strength of the battalion is 40 officers, a warrant officer, and 634 enlisted soldiers for a total of 675 paratroopers.

**Ranger Battalion Mission and Capabilities**

The mission as dictated by the TOE narrative for a Ranger Battalion is to "plan and conduct special military operations in support of the United States policies and objectives."

The capabilities for a Ranger Battalion include:

• Establishment of a credible American military presence in any area of the world to demonstrate the US interest and resolve.

• Rapid deployment in order to conduct operations in all types of terrain and weather by parachute, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft.

• Infiltrating and exfiltrating capability in an area of operation while assaulting an objective area by land, sea, and air.

---

78 Mission statements, capabilities, and organization come from the TOE narrative section of TOE 07035L000. The TOE was downloaded from the USAFMSA website: <https://www.usafmsardd.army.mil>.
• Overt strike operations.
• Light infantry operations in support of conventional and special operations.

The mission and capabilities of the Ranger Battalion force the organization to be slightly different from a conventional airborne battalion.

**Ranger Battalion Organization**
This Ranger battalion is organized into the following:

• Headquarters Company: Responsible to provide command, control, and supervision of the operations of the Ranger Battalion and attached units. The headquarters company provides administrative, logistical, and personnel support for the battalion staff sections. The headquarters company also provides administration and logistical support to organic and attached units.

• Three Rifle Companies: Responsible to close with by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture the enemy, to repel enemy assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack, and conduct special military operations in support of United States policy and objectives.

The total troop strength of the battalion is 40 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 534 enlisted soldiers for a total of 576 Rangers.79

The Army Ranger Battalion appears to resemble most closely, in mission sets, the MEU (SOC). The contention this monograph is in order for the Army to conduct select special operations missions it is not necessarily required for those missions to be conducted by Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). A conventional unit may be able to conduct the missions in extreme conditions when ARSOF units are not available. A properly trained, led, and resourced conventional Army unit can conduct hybrid operations.

---

79 This information is derived from TOE 07085L000, Infantry Battalion (Ranger) downloaded from <www.usafmsardd.army.mil>. This is just an overview of the capabilities. TOE has specific examples of missions.
CHAPTER FOUR: Hybrid Operations

“…The level of initiative, individual training, and weapon skill required in, say, a commando, is admirable; what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do; in the Fourteenth Army they could and did.”

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

The term “hybrid operations” refers to those operations that may be done by either SOF units or conventional units. These operations occur along the seam between conventional and special operations. Borrowing concepts used in statistical analysis, the assumption is that both special and conventional operations have a bell shaped curve. As those operations lie along the spectrum of conflict, the two curves slightly overlap along a seam. This overlap is the realm of hybrid operations. Both SOF and conventional forces can conduct these operations.

![Diagram of Special Operations, Hybrid Operations, and Conventional Operations]

In order to understand hybrid operations, the definitions of special and conventional operations must be considered. According to joint doctrine, special operations are defined as:

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional,

---


81 Robert G. Walker provides an explanation of hybrid warfare in his NPS Thesis, "SPEC FI: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations.” In his thesis, he contends the United States used hybrid warfare as early as the American Revolution. He uses the example of Major General Nathanael Greene use of both conventional and unconventional forces to win the American campaign in the south. Walker goes on to explain hybrid operations conducting from the Seminole Wars through the USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP) during the Vietnam conflict. This monograph only slightly expands on his model and uses the model to describe a possible new organization for the US Army.
non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{JP 1-02} distinguishes the key differences between special operations and conventional operations, “Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{JP 3-05} continues with the distinction, “Conventional units are normally not specially trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO; any wholesale change in their capabilities would restrict their ability to respond to a broad range of threats. The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities.”\textsuperscript{84}

The definitions categorize special and conventional operations into two distinct categories by using the level or training, type of equipment, and organization.

\textbf{Why Consider Hybrid Operations?}

The status of ARSOF is and will continue to be greatly stretched with possible large-scale operations in Iraq and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. The concept of conventional Army units adding select special operations missions is designed to take some of the burden off ARSOF during critical times and extreme conditions. The possibility of increasing the size of ARSOF, adding additional units, is an obvious long-term solution to the problem but an assumption of this monograph is that time and budgetary concerns preclude that course of action. Two of the SOF Truths are, “Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies arise” and “SOF cannot be mass produced.”\textsuperscript{85} This doctrine demonstrates mass-producing SOF in the near future is not a viable

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{JP 1-02}, 396.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{JP 3-05}, II-1.
answer to relieve the burden.\textsuperscript{86} An example that training additional ARSOF personnel after a crisis is not tenable is the training time. The table below shows the timeline required to produce an 18B Weapons Sergeant. The timeline shows just training a soldier for Special Forces can take up to 65 weeks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Duration (weeks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Training</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18B Special Forces Weapons Sergeant</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF Basic Military Language (Spanish)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Time</strong></td>
<td><strong>65 Weeks</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training is not the only discriminator to quickly producing SOF, budgetary constraints also have an impact.

The cost to add new Special Forces battalions or Ranger battalions would be cost prohibitive. Using the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center Force Cost Estimate Model, the estimated annual operations cost can be projected. The cost for annual operations of a Special Forces battalion is $123 million. The cost for acquisition of a complete set of equipment for the battalion is $93 million. The cost for annual operations of a Ranger battalion is $146 million. The cost for acquisition of a complete set of equipment for the battalion is $74 million.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{85} All SOF Truths are provide in Chapter One of this monograph and are found in \textit{JP 3-05}.

\textsuperscript{86} While mitigating the need for SOF units cannot be fixed in the short term, long-term additions to SOF are being addressed within current budget appropriations. According to an \textit{Army Times} Vol. 63, No. 23 article, for FY 2004 the Pentagon plans to add $1 billion dollars to the SOF budget. The majority of the money will go to acquire additional soldiers for the 160\textsuperscript{th} Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), aircraft for the SOAR, and additional personnel for psychological operations.

\textsuperscript{87} Information found in \textit{DA Pam 351-4, U.S. Army Formal Schools Catalog}. Assumptions made are soldier initialed enlisted as 11B, Infantryman and soldier was assigned a unit where Spanish was the language requirement (if other language is required a longer duration of training may be required. This table does not take into account time required to serve in grade before attending any school (PLDC or 18B course), time serving in SF unit prior to being considered fully trained at current pay grade, or other specialty schools such as Military Freefall or Scuba.
The FORCES Cost Model does not address some key areas that would also increase expenditures for activation and stationing costs of new units. These additional costs include but are not limited to:

- Military construction for headquarters, dining facilities, motor pools, and soldier housing.
- Construction of Army Family Housing.
- Monetary impact on training infrastructure such as specialty schooling. This impact goes to building of new facilities and possible requirement for additional instructors and training equipment.
- The appropriations timeline.
- Secondary effects of other force structures if the Army must determine what units or programs the Army cannot fund due to funds being diverted for the new units.

The basic concept of hybrid operations and inability to quickly establish additional SOF units demonstrate the need for conventional hybrid units. One major aspect that defines a hybrid unit is the training philosophy.

**Training for Hybrid Operations**

Current Army doctrine dictates training done in three cycles. These cycles are Green-Amber-Red cycles. The training conducted during in each cycle is as follows:

**Green Cycle-Prime Time Training**

- Focus is on soldier, leader, and collective tasks integrated across multi-echelons.
- Soldiers attend mission essential training.
- Coincides with availability of major resources.

---

88 The FORCES Cost Model (FCM) Version 2001.a.031302 generated these cost estimates. The model is from the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center in Arlington, VA. Appendix B has the by line cost comparison of annual operations for a SF and Ranger Battalion. Appendix C has the by line cost comparison of acquisition of resources for a SF and Ranger Battalion. Annual cost include items such as training operations, indirect support costs, personnel costs, and defense health costs. Acquisition cost includes items such as weapons, organizational clothing, and PLL/ASL.
• Maximum elimination of tertiary elements such as, administrative requirements, appointments, leaves and passes.

**Amber Cycle-Mission**

• Section, squad, crew leader, and solider training are emphasized.
• Time provided for soldiers to attend education and training courses.
• Certain sub-organization collective training.
• Periodic maintenance performed.
• Some soldiers may be diverted to support requirements.

**Red Cycle-Support**

• Support mission and details are accomplished with unit integrity.
• Leaves and passes maximized.
• Routine medical and administrative appointments accomplished.
• OCs, evaluators, and OPFOR for units in Green Cycle.  

This training cycle is adequate for the majority of units in the conventional Army force, additional training and evaluation must be accomplished to ensure the units conducting hybrid operations are ready to execute missions as required. The proposed training is similar in duration and scope to the MEU (SOC). The proposed training system for these units is a six phases approach:

• Phase I, Ten-week duration: Individual training in areas such as Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); sniper; terminal guidance operations; airborne; pathfinder; air assault; and MOS specific training.
• Phase II, Ten-week duration: Collective training at the squad, company, and battalion task force along with staff planning exercises.

---

89 Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), Figure 4-6.
• Phase III, Ten-week duration: Integrated training with complete task force to include joint integration training with air, naval, and SOF units.

• Phase IV, Five-week duration: Integrated evaluation at CTCs. This phase includes integration of joint assets and is to be conducted at both the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to provide evaluation in different types of terrain and conditions to provide a more flexible force. This phase results in certification for mission assumption.

• Phase V, Ten-week duration: Mission Assumption. During this phase, limited off-site should be conducted but the unit could participate in an EDRE.

• Phase VI, Ten-week duration: Support Phase. During this cycle, the unit would provide OCs for assistance in units participating in Phase II and III. They may also provide augmentation support to the CTCs. Unit could integrate a block leave during this phase.

This training proposal is very intensive and requires assets not normally apportioned for conventional unit training. To undertake hybrid operations successfully, it is imperative to conduct the joint integrated training to ensure the unit is prepared for global deployment and mission execution. This change in training would help mitigate the condition of conventional units being "normally not specially trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO." Another change in conventional thinking is the loss of the post support aspect of the Green-Amber-Red model. This loss would affect the post of assignment for the unit but a majority of these activities could be taken over by the use of commercial, contract personnel. Key activities such as funeral detail could be accomplished during Phase VI as required. The chart below provides timeline detail on the training plan for a regimental-sized element:

---

90 JP 3-05, II-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week #</th>
<th>1-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
<th>61-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BN 1</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Phase V</td>
<td>Phase VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN 2</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Phase V</td>
<td>Phase VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN 3</td>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>Phase V</td>
<td>Phase VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proposed organization and training for the conventional hybrid unit is the foundation of the force. The organization and training concepts allow the unit to take on missions not normally assigned to regular conventional units.

**Proposed Mission Set for Hybrid Force**

The discussion of hybrid operations does not preclude the unit from doing conventional operations along the complete spectrum of conflict. In fact, before the Army considers a unit for hybrid operations the unit must be extremely proficient in conventional operations. Once a unit is proficient in these tasks, they can go on to integrate hybrid operations into their mission essential task list (METL). In nominating what missions the hybrid force can conduct, analysis of what missions they are capable of executing must be done.

Due to the inherent infantry focus of the hybrid unit, direct action (DA) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions are operations the hybrid force could conduct. These missions are extensions of the current patrolling proficiency that the Army expects from its infantry units. The direct action missions that are easily integrated into a hybrid force operations are raids, ambushes, mine emplacement with remote detonation, and terminal guidance of munitions. Where these missions differ from the usual employment of a conventional unit is that they are done outside the range of conventional tactical weapons systems such as ground-based artillery. This is similar to the support required by Merrill’s Marauders and the German raiders atEben Emael. They relied solely on close air support during their operations. This reliance on air support requires detailed planning in all aspects of the mission such as, insertion into denied territory, actions on the objective, and extraction. According to Army doctrine, direct action missions are “inherently
risky” and “resource intensive.” The majority of resource expenditure is due to the insertion and extraction into the denied area.\(^91\) Another mission that could be integrated into the hybrid unit is special reconnaissance (SR). SR is conducted by “employing battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance. Battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance involve the use of standard long-range patrolling tactics and techniques outside the main battle area or areas in nonlinear, noncontiguous operations.”\(^92\) Like DA missions, SR is an extension of the combat patrols in which infantry units are expected to be proficient. As evaluation of these missions for the hybrid unit is done, what must not be assumed is that DA and SR missions can be conducted by regular conventional units. For a unit to become proficient in the operations the unit must conduct intensive training. This intensive training is accomplished through the proposed training cycle for the hybrid unit. While training for these long-range missions would require resources not usually given to conventional units, this training would cost less than activating additional ARSOF units. After more in depth analysis, other missions could be assigned to the hybrid force such as foreign internal defense (FID). Recently SOF was conducting a FID mission in the Republic of Georgia, this mission was later handed over to the USMC.\(^93\) A FID mission may well be an operation the hybrid unit can perform. The training plan and proposed mission set could be accomplished with limited changes to select current organizations within the US Army.

**Organization of Hybrid Force**

The proposal for the organization is similar to an airborne battalion task force or MEU (SOC). The organization is designed to provide the unit with the greatest flexibility and unit

---


\(^92\) Ibid., 2-15.

\(^93\) Vince Crawley, "Green Berets shift anti-terror training to Marines, Pentagon wants to lighten load on Special Forces" *Army Times*, 16 December 2002. The article explains how the USMC has been handed the mission in order to take burden off SOF. The article states, “Training foreign armies has been a leading role of special-operations troops since the Green Berets first reached prominence in Vietnam. But top Pentagon planners are re-examining this worldwide training mission in light of the recent war in Afghanistan and the increasing demands being placed on special-operations forces in the war on terrorism.”
integrity. Units assigned to the task force would include a headquarters company\textsuperscript{94}, three rifle companies, an anti-armor company, a light artillery battery, an air defense platoon, an engineer platoon, a military intelligence platoon, and a military police section. Additional units not always associated at the battalion level that should be added to the task force are a signal platoon or company to insure global communications and a forward support company to provide sustainment for the force. A departure from traditional unit structure is to assign these units to battalion task force. They soldiers would not only train together but also live together. This would complement and reinforce a cohesive fighting force. To ensure the low-density MOS soldiers maintain proper training in their specific occupation, during Phase I training the soldiers integrate into the training of higher-level organizations. An example of this is the signal unit would revert to the division signal battalion for training on MOS specific tasks. This flexible organization and training allows for a tailored force when required. The unit could be tailored for specific missions and certain elements left at home station or moved to an intermediate staging base to provide needed support to the deployed unit. The intent is to keep unit integrity wherever possible but not sacrifice security in order to maintain integrity.

In order to ensure adequate training and employment of the hybrid unit personnel stabilization is required. The model used mimics that of the MEU (SOC). The Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) would have to stabilize key personnel in order for them to complete training and mission assumption for a complete six-phase cycle. The optimum would be stabilizing the leaders for two training cycles. This would keep key leaders in place for just over two years. Stabilization of other soldiers in the unit should be at least one six-phase cycle. This requires the personnel system to change some of their procedures but is necessary to maintain the unit at high readiness with trained personnel. One area that PERSCOM would have to study in greater depth is sending soldiers to key schools. These key schools include the Basic

\textsuperscript{94} The Headquarters Company would have conventional unit capabilities such as a mortar platoon, a scout platoon, and administrative operations.
Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), the 1st Sergeants Course, Officer Advanced Courses, and CGSC. Assignment to a hybrid unit should not be career-damaging assignment. Along with personnel stabilization, materiel procurement is a key element to ensure the unit is prepared for a wide-range of missions.

The usual organic equipment given to conventional units may not be enough or the right type for the hybrid unit. Equipment that would have to be added to unit are advanced communications equipment with global reach, advanced communications for internal command and control, certain special weapons such as silenced firearms, equipment used in terminal guidance operations, lighter and more portable logistics equipment, and organizational clothing. Lastly, some type of mobility asset must be added to the unit. An example would be the up-armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The HMMWV would give the force higher mobility and greater survivability. The HMMWV allows for more rapid deployment on strategic aircraft due to its weight than other heavier combat systems. This list is not all-inclusive but does provide a starting point for equipping the unit.

This proposal for assigning a hybrid mission set to conventional units is not without increased costs for the Army but the concept is less expensive than activating new Special Forces or Ranger Battalions. In a political environment that requires the military to do more with fewer assets, the hybrid unit concept is one that is feasible.

CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion

This monograph examined the feasibility of Army conventional units embedding special operations capability; much like the Marine Corps has done with certain Marine Expeditionary Units, in order to remain relevant in the changing strategic and operational environment. The monograph demonstrated the current SOF requirements are burdening SOF to a point where they may become ineffective. The monograph then examined the dynamics of the Contemporary
Operating Environment (COE). Examination of these topics validated that the monograph proposal was one that required further study. The validation of the question led to a critical review of history to determine if any previous conventional units had conducted special operations missions.

The monograph used the historical examples of Mosby’s Rangers operating during the American Civil War, Merrill’s Marauders in the Second World War’s Pacific Theater, and the German’s operation at Eben Emael during the Second World War to provide examples of conventional units being tasked to conduct special operations missions in the context of their times. This review of history demonstrated recruiting, leadership, and training greatly influenced the organizations and provided the core for their success. The analysis proved that conventional units can and have conducted select special operations missions. Currently, the US has a conventional force that conducts select special operations missions, the USMC’s MEU (SOC).

An analysis and explanation of the MEU (SOC) was conducted. This analysis was done in order to provide a framework of what an Army unit with similar missions might look like. The examination of the MEU (SOC) described its evolution, the organization, training requirements, and missions. While the MEU (SOC) was used as a framework, it is not intended for the Army units to take over any missions of the Marine Corps. The MEU (SOC) provides a model for what an Army unit could emulate in some aspects.

The model proposed was a conventional unit capable of conducting hybrid operations. Hybrid operations are operations along the mission spectrum that can be done by either SOF or conventional units. The basis for the consideration of hybrid units evolved around two aspects: time and money. The monograph displayed that the training time required prohibited a rapid expansion of SOF. The analysis showed that training a SF soldier could take up to sixty-five weeks. The examination then turned to the cost for activating a new SF or Ranger battalion, which would cost approximately $123 million and $146 million, respectively. The cost for the
Army to accomplish this task appears prohibitively extreme. The study proved that a viable and integral part of the hybrid model was the training philosophy.

Training the hybrid force requires changes to the current doctrine in order to provide an adequate system. The current training model of Green-Amber-Red cycles was reviewed. The review determined that while this model is adequate for the conventional force it is not for the hybrid force. The hybrid force model is a six-phase process. The process has the following six phases: individual training, collective training, integrated training with the joint force, integrated evaluation at CTCs, mission assumption, and support. This model provides adequate training time and focus to ensure the unit is ready to assume mission cycle. Lastly, an example training cycle for a regiment was proposed. The training is directly linked to missions the hybrid force can accomplish.

The missions evaluated for the hybrid force were select direct action and special reconnaissance operations. The monograph determined these missions are extension of current patrolling expertise expected of conventional light infantry. The discussion displayed while these missions are an extension of conventional operations; they are not an exact match in terms of resources and training. In order for the hybrid unit to become proficient in the missions, the Army must give these units the resources and training required. The training model and philosophy does not dictate a major change in current Army organization.

The organization proposed is a battalion task force model with an addition of select units. The additional units that were recommended are a signal platoon and a forward support company. The integration of these additional units into the task organization is necessary to provide global communications and sustainment. A critical difference from current Army organizations is organically assigning all the units to the battalion. This concept allows unparalleled unit cohesion and unity of command. The organization section went on the elaborate on the need to stabilize key personnel and a brief discussion on what affect the stabilization would have on the personnel
Lastly, the monograph discussed the need to change certain types and items of equipment for the hybrid force.

The chain of analysis provides insight into why hybrid units are needed; historical precedence of hybrid operations; current USMC hybrid organizations; and training, organization, and missions of the Army hybrid unit.

**Recommendations**

The recommendation of the monograph is for the Army to establish hybrid units as part of the interim force in order to evaluate their utility in the objective force. To provide detailed recommendations, the TRADOC DTLOMS model is used. The DTLOMS model looks at the key areas of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and the soldiers.\(^5\)

- **Doctrine**: In the realm of doctrine, the Army should develop doctrinal techniques and manuals for the training, employment, and sustainment of the hybrid force. Taking current doctrine and adapting the doctrine for the hybrid unit could streamline this doctrine development. This is a practical course of action because the unit is not a completely new organization, it takes current units and current mission sets and melds select missions into the conventional force.

- **Training**: Training methodology should be approached as detailed in the monograph. The training should focus from the individual soldier through the integrated joint team. An important aspect in the joint training is employment of air assets because unlike a MEU (SOC) there are no organic air assets assigned to the unit.

- **Leader Development**: Leader development for the hybrid force should be integrated from the basic officer and noncommissioned officer course through senior leader training.

---

\(^5\) Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Force Development Requirements Determination* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1999). Provides details on how the areas of DTLOMS affect requirements determination. The purpose of the pamphlet is, “This pamphlet implements the Army’s requirements determination process as described in Army Regulation 71-9. It details the process Army personnel should follow in all DTLOMS domains in TRADOC, other major and separate Army commands,
Leader development is key to ensure that the leaders understand the capabilities and employment of the unit in order to make sure the unit is used to fullest potential.

- Organization: The organization of the unit should be as detailed in the study. The organization proposals are required to provide the unit with flexibility for missions along the complete spectrum of conflict. The organization also keeps the inherent nature of the conventional force in order to maintain their employment in a conventional fight.

- Materiel: The monograph does not completely develop this area of DTLOMS but it is essential this area be examined in detail. One aspect that may mitigate friction in the materiel acquisition is that no equipment proposed by this monograph is foreign to the Army. The equipment proposed is equipment that is currently in the conventional or special operations forces inventory.

- Soldier: In the realm of soldier, the personnel system needs to be examined in greater detail in order to provide the best balance for the hybrid force. The key area in this section is how to assign the right soldiers to this unit without the assignment being a detriment to career progression.

The world will increasingly provide the Army with complex problems and environments. The addition of the hybrid force will not only give the conventional force more flexibility but will provide the regional combatant commander with a versatile force for employment in future conflicts. The hybrid force should become a part of the US Army organization.

**APPENDIX A-MEU (SOC) Mission Essential Tasks**

This is from Marine Corps Order 3120.9B, Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)(MEU(SOC)).

1. Amphibious Assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

   and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) to determine, document, and process concepts, future operational capabilities, and DTLOMS requirements.”
2. Amphibious Raid. An amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal.

3. Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action unfavorable to him.

4. Amphibious Withdrawal. An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in U.S. Navy ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

5. Direct Action Operations. Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive action to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, units may employ raid, ambush or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. A required sub-task is Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) Operations. VBSS is the conduct of vessel boarding/seizure in support of Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) on a cooperative or uncooperative vessel, whether it is pier-side, at anchor or underway.

6. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP). Rescue or extraction, by surface or air, of downed aircraft and/or personnel, equipment, aircraft sanitization, and provide advanced trauma life support in a benign or hostile environment.


8. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). Assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Normally these operations are limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities and/or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

9. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Operations directed by the Department of State whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries to safe havens or to the U.S., when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.

10. Peace Operations. Encompasses peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

11. Provide Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Provide an integrated system of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Includes providing initial C4 connectivity as the initial entry force of a larger MAGTF, joint and/or combined operation.

12. Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint/Combined Environment. Plan, control and coordinate fires from naval, air and ground assets in support of U.S. and/or designated allied/friendly forces.
13. Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations. Tactical air operations from austere locations including short-field, unimproved runways.

14. Terminal Guidance Operations. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an aircraft pilot or surface waves to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air/beach landing or airdrop facility.

15. Enhanced Urban Operations. Encompasses advanced offensive close quarters battle techniques used on urban terrain conducted by units trained to a higher level than conventional infantry. Techniques include advanced breaching, selected target engagement, and dynamic assault techniques using organizational equipment and assets. This is primarily an offensive operation where noncombatants are or may be present and collateral damage must be kept to a minimum.

16. Enabling Operations. Operations designed to facilitate the smooth transition of follow-on forces into the area of operations. May include chemical/biological assessment, C4 for MAGTF for Joint Task Force higher headquarters and offensive and security operations to seize and secure terrain and/or facilities.

17. Airfield/Port Seizure. Secure an airfield, port or other key facilities in order to support MAGTF missions, receive follow-on forces or enable the introduction of follow-on forces (e.g., MPF operations).

18. Employ Non-Lethal Weapons. Operations planned with intent to minimize fatalities or permanent injuries and limit collateral damage by augmenting forces with non-lethal weapon systems.

19. Tactical Deception Operations. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly capabilities, intentions, and operations; thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles, engagements, and MOOTW.

20. Information Operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. A required sub-task is Electronic Warfare (EW): any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum and/or to attack the enemy.

21. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). Collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret available information concerning foreign countries, areas and/or adversaries relative to the mission and area of interest.

   a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S). A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics of a particular area.

   b. Counterintelligence (CI). Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, adversarial intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted by or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.
c. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals.


22. Anti-Terrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment.

23. Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2). The planning process that enables the commander and his staff to conduct the following steps (Mission Analysis, COA Development, COA Wargame, COA Comparison/Decision, Order Development, Transition to Begin Mission Execution (launch of forces)) within six hours of receipt of a warning, alert, or execution order.

### APPENDIX B-FORCES Cost Model (FCM) Annual Operations Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>SF Battalion</th>
<th>Ranger Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Operations</td>
<td>32.191</td>
<td>38.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Equipment Parts &amp; Fuel Cost</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>4.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Operations</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Operations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparables</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground/Afloat Operations</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparables</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-OSMIS Equipment Operating Cost</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ammunition &amp; Missiles</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>4.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Support Cost</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>1.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation of Things</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and Equipment</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual Services - Field</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Travel</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Leases</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual Services</td>
<td>2.716</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased Equipment</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Travel</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Labor</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>22.39</td>
<td>25.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement Personnel Training</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>1.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Through Initial MOS</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay Funded</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M Funded</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Funded</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element</td>
<td>SF Battalion</td>
<td>Ranger Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing Initial Issue</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS Travel: Military &amp; Dependents</td>
<td>1.176</td>
<td>1.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>21.063</td>
<td>22.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Pay and Allowances</td>
<td>20.495</td>
<td>21.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special/Incentive/Hazardous Duty P</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>1.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Unit Support</td>
<td>3.608</td>
<td>6.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Operations</td>
<td>1.789</td>
<td>4.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Family Housing Operations &amp; M</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Ctl</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>1.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>1.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Management</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Health Program</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in millions of dollars</td>
<td>123.594</td>
<td>146.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX C-FORCES Cost Model (FCM) Acquisition Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>SF</th>
<th>Ranger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of Resources</td>
<td>25.96</td>
<td>22.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel Acquisition</td>
<td>25.96</td>
<td>22.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>22.748</td>
<td>17.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons &amp; Tracked Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>2.576</td>
<td>4.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Procurement</td>
<td>16.797</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical &amp; Nontactical Vehicles</td>
<td>3.413</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecomms &amp; Other Comms</td>
<td>9.932</td>
<td>8.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Support Equipment</td>
<td>3.452</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M Major End Items</td>
<td>3.341</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Initial Issue</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>2.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Clothing &amp; Individual</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTA Field Equipment &amp; Medical Items</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLL/ASL</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLL</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASL</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1,2,3 (Packaged) Basic Load</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reparables</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumables</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in millions of dollars</td>
<td>92.876</td>
<td>73.529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46
BIBLIOGRAPHY


_____. *Marine Corps Order 3120-9, “Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC))"*. Washington, DC, 1994.


