The United States is on the verge of war with a critical world as the peanut gallery. Right or wrong, in the world’s eyes, success will not be measured by the disarmament of an unpredictable menace, but by the stability in and around Iraq following any conflict. In many ways, history has not smiled upon the termination of most conflicts. However in this instance, it is only the United States who will be criticized as unable to learn from past mistakes.

Sadly, factors contributing to successive conflicts often develop from poor resolution of problematic issues following the last conflict. Too often, operational commanders are simply trying to end bloodshed without considering necessary conditions that must follow. These requisite conditions are not given necessary attention with potentially precarious results.

In order to best understand the combatant commander’s challenges to this end, we will analyze historical examples as well as current obstacles faced by General Franks for a stable post-war Iraq. We will then recommend planning considerations, which General Franks and his staff should address. These include methods to integrate elements of national power specifically for the pre-hostilities, hostilities and post-hostilities phases of conflict.
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COMBATANT COMMANDER’S CHALLENGES FOR WAR TERMINATION:
CENTCOM AND OPERATIONAL DESIGN FOR POST IRAQ STABILITY

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract of

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The United States is on the verge of war with a critical world as the peanut gallery. Right or wrong, in the world’s eyes, success will not be measured by the disarmament of an unpredictable menace, but by the stability in and around Iraq following any conflict. In many ways, history has not smiled upon the termination of most conflicts. However in this instance, it is only the United States who will be criticized as unable to learn from past mistakes.

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In order to best understand the combatant commander’s challenges to this end, we will analyze historical examples as well as current obstacles faced by General Franks for a stable post-war Iraq. We will then recommend planning considerations, which General Franks and his staff should address. These include methods to integrate elements of national power specifically for the pre-hostilities, hostilities and post-hostilities phases of conflict.
INTRODUCTION

...the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state
often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be
found in political conditions at some later date.

Clausewitz, *On War*

To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The blood of shattered peace stains the halls of world history. Sadly, factors
contributing to successive conflicts often develop from poor resolution of problematic issues
following the last conflict. Too often, operational commanders simply try to end bloodshed
without considering the necessary conditions that must follow. These requisite conditions
are not given necessary attention with potentially precarious results.

The Bismarckian military mind would welcome blinders which would allow it to
simply destroy the opposing force with no concern for post war consequences. Many
strategists are guilty of thinking that war termination should remain a discrete post-war
process falling in the political leader’s bailiwick.¹ Fred Ikle, a noted military history scholar,
states that “military men . . . remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the
outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it that determines how well
their plans serve the nation’s interest.”² In conflicts common today—regional scale,
relatively short duration, and often having a somewhat controllable start date—significant
effort should be made from the President to the combatant commander to define the desired
endstate in terms of post-war government, desired military capacity, and economic direction.
Such clarity would allow the combatant commander to design the required supporting
military operation, optimizing not just military victory, but focused on winning the peace to
follow. As the goal of the political decision maker is to resolve the political issues for which
the war began, then the emphasis of military strategy should shift from a narrow
preoccupation with destroying enemy forces to a consideration of how military means should
be used to resolve political issues.³

**Thesis**

What termination challenges should the combatant commander anticipate and how
should he plan operations for optimal strategic positioning? To achieve such a cohesive
strategy, the combatant commander must consider a host of variables and integrate several
governmental and non-governmental agencies into his own military plans to efficiently
accomplish the desired endstate. This integration poses significant challenges to the
combatant commander. To better understand these challenges, this study will analyze
historical examples, as well as current obstacles faced by General Franks in building his own
war plans to foster a stable post-war Iraq. Recommended planning considerations, will then
be offered which General Franks and his staff could consider.

**ANALYSIS**

On the brink of a second conflict with Iraq, the United States faces significant
challenges. A global magnifying glass is focused on General Franks and U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM). They are challenged with dismantling a global threat and
improving stability in a perpetually unstable region. Few question the U.S. military’s ability
to disarm Iraq or even to remove Saddam Hussein from power. What the looking glass fails
to reveal is what will—or should—the situation look like when the shooting stops? The
United States returns to the region because previous efforts of diplomacy, economic
sanctions and military action have not removed this continued threat to regional and global
stability. The circumstances beg the question: if nothing has worked thus far, what options
does General Franks have to create success this time? Operationally, what could CENTCOM do to facilitate lasting peace?

**Historical Lessons Learned?**

In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville presciently wrote, “There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult—to begin a war and to end it.”\(^4\) A quick review of past American military tendencies illustrates obstacles to avoid when trying to end wars. Henry Kissinger points out that as World War II drew to a close, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff ignored British pleas to consider political implications of the chosen U.S. courses of action.\(^5\) Throughout history, the American military tended “to postpone any discussion of the postwar world until after victory had been achieved.”\(^6\) In Korea, only a few years following WWII, attempts to shorten the Korean conflict, by agreeing to a ceasefire prior to negotiations, resulted in two more years of sporadic fighting and many more casualties. Soon, the conflict in Vietnam followed, and the United States became ensnared, both politically and militarily, in an escalating war with unclear political and operational objectives that resulted in withdrawal and apparent defeat. In 1991, the Gulf War was terminated, for various reasons, under conditions inadequate for post-conflict stability. Ikle stated, “The Gulf War was clearly won by the United States—if judged in military terms. In political terms, though, the verdict must wait.”\(^7\) Today, following Bosnia and Kosovo, the military retains 4,700 troops in country as stability forces in the Balkans.\(^8\) In Afghanistan, 10,150 U.S. forces remain heavily involved in what is developing into a “reconstruction” phase for that country.\(^9\) Into the future, there will consistently remain a need for post-conflict military presence. The challenge is how to plan in advance to do so in the most efficient manner.
Liddell Hart writes, “If war be a continuation of policy . . . it must necessarily be conducted with a view to post-war benefit.”\textsuperscript{10} Clausewitz stated three requirements for successful conflict termination. First, opposing fighting forces must be destroyed. Second, the country must be occupied to prevent rearmament and another conflict. Third, the enemy government must be driven to feel that conditions proffered for peace are more beneficial than continuing the conflict.\textsuperscript{11} Comparable conditions apply in gaining lasting peace. Interesting insights appear when past U.S. military actions are measured against these three conditions. In 1991 not one of these conditions was satisfied. Lasting peace does not demand that all three be strictly followed. However, we must consider the consequences of not destroying enemy forces, not requiring disarmament, and not compelling Iraq to prefer peaceful cooperation over defiance.

**Doctrinal Progress to Assist the Combatant Commander**

Criticizing previous operational design is unfair with the advantage of hindsight as evidence. To be fair to operational planners, we must understand the tools they possessed at the time. Ikle argues that although “the way in which war is brought to an end has the most decisive long-term impact . . . historians, foreign affairs experts, and military strategists have devoted far more thought to the question of how and why wars begin.”\textsuperscript{12} Those who planned Desert Storm were hampered by the lack of doctrinal guidance on planning for post-war stability.\textsuperscript{13} Since the inconclusive end of Desert Storm, the military has authored doctrine to assist in avoiding these past oversights. However, these principles are scattered throughout numerous joint publications. Also, since the end of Desert Storm, combatant commanders have available Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP), which detail various tools of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) that are available to assist
in maintaining stability within their assigned region. Additionally, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is in place. This system integrates various agencies, previously overlooked, who can assist in post-conflict problems.

Varied challenges arise post-conflict. If the combatant or task force commander had the ability, the apparently easy solution was to rely upon military tools to address post hostilities headaches. Too often, the result was a quagmire. Now, U.S. joint doctrine recommends many other resources at the combatant commander’s disposal. Joint pubs, JOPES and the TSCP detail these resources. While developing operational plans, the commander greatly benefits by being able to fully integrate these agencies and termination concepts into his plans. This integration takes advantage of a multitude of skill sets outside of military sourcing that are available from pre-hostilities through the conflict and beyond.

General Franks Post-War Challenges

The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq . . . A regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power . . . The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine.

President Bush to the United Nations

General Franks faces a daunting task. Liddell Hart described the challenge well. “Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view—for its problem is the winning of the peace.” Joint Pub (JP) 3-0 declares, “Conflict termination objectives should include the military objective that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim . . . . (emphasis added)” I emphasize “include” because termination objectives should include objectives beyond the standard “military” ones. Termination objectives must allow for balancing the elements of national power with resources and strategies interwoven with military plans. As discussed previously, this concept is just now being written into our joint doctrine.
President Bush’s address to the United Nations outlines commander’s intent with considerable challenges. Simply stated, national objectives are that the current regime lose power and that Iraq gain political and economic liberty. General Franks faces significant obstacles. “Any future tyrant who would launch a war of aggression, regardless of cost or consequences, will have to be deprived of mass destruction weapons before he uses them.”

Hitler’s defiant statement of sixty years ago could very easily resonate from Baghdad today: “We will never capitulate, never. . . . We might be destroyed, perhaps; but we will drag a world with us—a world in flames.”

Operational Vision

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.

Clausewitz, *On War*

*U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0* refines the above wisdom in doctrinal guidance.

“Commanders and staffs consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans. If the end state is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infrastructure. . . . Effective campaign plans account for more than military objectives. . . .” Requisite military operations may extend well past the end of the “shooting” conflict. To better understand potential obstacles, operational planners must consider the nature of the conflict itself. Conflict origin can be grouped into two generic categories. The first stems from competing interests. This includes disagreements on territory, international roles, armaments, economics, etc. The second is value based. This is more deep rooted, since it evolves from ideology, which is not negotiable and can take generations or even longer to ease. General
Franks faces a conflict with both challenges. He must design operational plans which not only address disarming a regime, but which maintain regional stability amidst potentially incendiary anti-western ideology.

Historically, the military plans meticulously for contingencies during hostilities. Comparable praise is not due for post hostilities planning.Combatant commanders must acknowledge that contingency considerations do not end with a ceasefire. Pending headaches include regional balance of power shifts, fractures along ethnic and religious lines (civil war), economic collapse, humanitarian challenges, displaced persons/refugees, public lawlessness, repatriating prisoners of war, lack of a recognized civil government and so forth.

Military forces should not address these problems alone. Domestic and international agencies are more than willing to assist in planning and providing critical expertise. The challenge is prior planning.

Concerning two of General Franks most looming challenges, democracy and economics, two insights bear consideration. Democracy is a western vision largely alien to many cultures. Kissinger warned America of the problems of dealing with societies who are in the process of developing open states for the first time. Considerable problems arise when attempting to stand up governmental institutions amongst people who have no concept of cooperation nor balance of power. Likewise, following World War II, Churchill preferred Germany “fat but impotent.” He explained, “We take the view that impoverished neighbors are bound to be bad neighbors.” Agencies world-wide understand the challenges of rebuilding a shattered country and stand willing to assist. The commander’s challenge is to ask the hard questions and find the right agencies with appropriate skill sets for optimal integration.
RECOMMENDATIONS for Operational Design

Integrating the Elements of National Power

Any military action with a strategic objective and intended to end hostilities requires the determination of a desired endstate by the highest national leadership. Such guidance should state in clear terms what political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational and other conditions should exist in theater after the end of the hostilities.

Milan Vego, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

In 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger defined a framework that came to be known as the “Weinberger Doctrine.” An overarching theme contained therein was that military objectives be clearly defined and that the military should know precisely how to accomplish them. That was necessary and timely guidance, but now begs amplification. As stated above by Dr. Vego, objectives must not be limited to military in nature. All elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic–DIME) need to be optimized to increase the possibility of stability and lasting peace.

The intent is that all of these elements of DIME need to be integrated from well before hostilities begin, through conflict and continue until the desired end state is achieved. One element or another may assume a dominant role during any given phase, but all must be continually assessed for optimal utility and long-term effects. At first glance, this may appear above the combatant commander level. Although a shared military and civil responsibility, the combatant commander is uniquely positioned to integrate and focus these efforts. Also, current doctrine and planning tools now place this responsibility directly on his shoulders. When campaign planning, it is up to him to take the lead in determining how each of the other elements can complement operations toward achieving the desired end state. Requests for resources and capabilities need be developed, prioritized and requested by the combatant commander for integration at his level. Joint Pub (JP) 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint
Operations, specifies: “Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations . . . assign tasks . . . synchronize . . . operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, non-governmental operations, and even United Nations operations.” Most of these agencies are not military, but civil in nature and are currently under-utilized in military campaign planning.

Considerations During Pre-Hostilities

A war can be won or lost based on preparations made prior to the conflict. Before the stress of combat begins, it is imperative that the commander and his staff “stack the deck” in the United States favor for as many potential problems as they may likely face. Even results with dominant military victory can result in standoffs due to unresolved termination issues. The combatant commander has much on his plate to prepare. A few pertinent areas that may assist in post-conflict success are presented.

What capabilities are available? The best resources are useless unless the right people know they exist and understand how to request their support. Once hostilities end, military forces, too often, get mired down with tasks not previously considered. Sometimes this is unavoidable. However, this may result from poor staff planning. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide instructs that “CINCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and informational options.” Knowledge of available resources is crucial. JP 3-08, vol. II, on interagency coordination, cites twelve private volunteer organizations, fourteen non-governmental or international organizations and eighteen government agencies which exist to provide such aid while also identifying 20 “tasks” with designated agencies ready to assist in each. These tasks include providing food and water, sanitation, clothing, shelter,
emergency and routine health care, communications, transportation, refugee services, fire fighting, civil engineering, hazardous material support, financial support, energy infrastructure assistance, and agricultural development to name a few. General Franks should identify which organizations can provide requisite manpower and skills, thus relieving the military of unnecessary commitments.

*JP 3-08, vol. II* continues by being even more specific and identifies agencies within dozens of countries, all of which reside there on a “permanent” basis. In Iraq, there are ten domestic, international or foreign agencies already in-country and will most likely still be present long after the conflict ends. In Iraq, these include Direct Relief International, International Aid, and Doctors Without Borders among others.26 Both the military and these agencies would greatly benefit from a coordinated and cooperative effort towards common objectives.

One note of caution is provided in *JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multi-National Operations*. There are regulatory and fiscal constraints guiding what the military can promise external organizations. One must always consult with a judge advocate general prior to making any domestic commitments. Likewise, combatant commanders must ensure that the Department of State is involved when working with foreign or United Nations organizations.27

**C3 Is Now Communicate, Coordinate, and Cooperate.** A well grounded fear for any military commander is the nightmare of “herding cats.” Non-military agencies flooding his area of responsibility (AOR), although intending to help, can exacerbate problems. It may help combatant commanders to think of post-hostilities operations as operations other than war (OOTW). *JP 3-16*, in discussing OOTW, emphasizes that “it is imperative that any
interagency structure relationship be clearly defined with respect to military support before commencement of operations”. It further states that the “US NCA should provide clear guidance regarding the relationship between US military commanders and US governmental agencies.” If clarity is not forthcoming, the combatant commander must request guidance. Most likely, external agencies will not operate according to a chain of command that the military can direct. However, if relationships are established and priorities delineated, then much can be accomplished through relationships of cooperation.

As for integrating these agencies into planning, increasing the numbers of non-essential players only increases planning difficulty and potentially weakens operational security. *JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*, acknowledges this. Referencing the joint after action report for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the pub provides flexibility to planners by acknowledging that “there is a trade-off between limiting the personnel involved in the planning process and operational security. . . . Planners must assess constantly the timing for bringing other organizations into the planning process.”

**Planning the Post-Conflict Handoff.** It is in the combatant commander’s best interest to plan for efficient relief from tasks that are not unique to their capabilities. *JP 3-16* states, “A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing to PVOs, NGOs, and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations.” Proper coordination will also reduce duplicity of effort. Further doctrinal guidance states, “Close coordination and cooperation with these groups may reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry and improve results.” As budgets and resources dwindle, many organizations are looking for justification of legitimacy. These agencies can and will provide critical manpower if requested.
CMOC Utility. Given the weight that post hostilities problems play in defining operational success, the commander must determine how to staff this planning effort. This doesn’t mean that a whole new staff be created at the combatant commander level. *JP 3-57* recommends that the combatant commander have a civil affairs staff element at his level who oversees the necessary integrated operations for effective post conflict planning.\(^\text{32}\) Current doctrinal recommendation is the creation of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) which would fall under the supervision of the commander’s civil affairs representative.

The CMOC has been described as a “bridge” between military civil affairs and outside agencies.\(^\text{33}\) Doctrinal guidance directs that this agency formulate recommendations for civil-military operations (CMO) policy, coordinate support from external agencies, develop Annex “A” (Civil Affairs) of operation plans, and coordinate associated legal issues.\(^\text{34}\) It must be stated that there is no joint doctrinal structure for a CMOC. However, *JP 3-07* does reference the Army’s “Handbook for CMOC Operations”, published by and available from the JFK Special Warfare Center.\(^\text{35}\)

When employed, CMOC operations have received high praise. During Operation AVID RESPONSE (1999 disaster relief in Turkey), a CMOC was rapidly stood up and performed admirably.\(^\text{36}\) By executing daily liaison with government, military, political, and NGO officials, it provided critical coordination among multiple agencies and greatly increased operations efficiency. Conversely, CMOC functions were not considered while planning DESERT SHIELD/STORM. After DESERT STORM, an ad hoc staff was thrown together at the request of the Kuwaiti government to assist in civil affairs. This Kuwaiti Task Force was effective but was not integrated well with ongoing military operations. Lessons learned
suggest that prior focus and an integrated command organization with current operations may greatly enhance success.\textsuperscript{37}

For a civilian perspective on CMOC effectiveness, Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stated, “The most practical mechanism for ensuring that some coherent strategic design and planning does take place is the system of civil military and operations centers (CMOCs), developed to establish and maintain operational contact among the military and humanitarian participants in a complex operation.”\textsuperscript{38}

Considerations During Hostilities

During hostilities, military objectives take center stage. However, there are a few considerations which play prominent roles in determining the timing of when to terminate hostilities. These include how to limit the scope of the conflict, how to sustain adequate leverage on the enemy, and how to negotiate without weakening your position. In operational design, it is critical that the combatant commander carefully think through these, and implement them into his campaign plan.

Controlling the Scope. Wars need not be fought to absolute destruction of the enemy. Even Clausewitz acknowledged, “Not every war need be fought until one side collapses.”\textsuperscript{39} Liddell Hart also felt that military damage should “inflict the least possible permanent injury, for the enemy of today is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future.”\textsuperscript{40} However, in Iraq, there may be other reasons to exercise caution. Ikle predicted: “A despotic ruler will not sue for peace merely because his soldiers or his civilians suffer pain and death.”\textsuperscript{41} Saddam Hussein’s primary chance of retaining power is to turn global opinion against the conflict. That could be done by causing maximum suffering of his own people and blaming
it on the coalition. The use of human shields and GPS jammers are but two identified methods he will probably use for this effect. It appears that General Franks will counter this “informational” aspect of DIME by allowing unprecedented media access to combat operations. This is critical to influence global support. Not only must the world remain informed of actual events, but General Franks must ensure that the Iraqi people are informed of how Hussein will sacrifice them for his personal gain. The more clearly the Iraqis understand that the war is against their leader, and not them, the quicker that internal division may end the conflict.

Maintaining Leverage Through Military Operations. During branch planning, General Franks should consider circumstances where pre-determined military objectives are accomplished and political objectives are not yet satisfied. General Franks needs to have branches which allow for maintaining and even increasing leverage on Iraq until political goals are met. Likewise, during combat, it may appear that political objectives have been met while military objectives are not yet achieved (such as Iraqi forces withdrawn from Kuwait City yet the Republican Guard still intact). General Franks needs to ensure that he has established practical measures of effectiveness which are clearly understood by his subordinates to determine success.

Concurrently, with today’s expectations of instant news, CENTCOM needs to stand prepared to explain to the American people, and the world, the necessity of specific operations. As long as CENTCOM has a plan to keep the public informed, the American people should remain supportive of required action.

Negotiations. Ikle notes that foreign policy considerations receive “short shrift” once the fighting commences.\(^{42}\) No one starts a war simply to fight one—but to attain political
goals. Therefore, logic would dictate that combat continue until either the enemy has agreed to your goals or you are in a position militarily and politically to enforce your objectives. Kissinger advises, “Countries striving for stability and equilibrium should do everything within their power to achieve their basic peace terms while still at war.” In other words, General Franks must not relax pressure until terms are agreed upon. History is replete with countries who attempted negotiations after ceasefires. General Franks recommendation for ceasefire must be cautious, having identified and accepted risks of such action.

Diplomacy of DIME does not stop when firing commences. Bismarck understood perfectly the strength of diplomacy while conflict rages. CENTCOM and the Administration must carefully game out timing and conditions to be proffered well ahead of time. For instance, campaign plans may require that certain events have to occur prior to the offer for talks. Likewise, the plans must include what operations will continue as talks proceed. Additionally, careful consideration must anticipate the difficulties of negotiating with a decapitated government. Regardless, conditions communicated should be unambiguous and consistent. Although the Department of State should conduct such communication, plans for negotiations must be carefully interwoven into General Franks operational designs.

Considerations During Post-Conflict

Once shooting stops, the most challenging events will occur. Kissinger warns, “The more extensive the eradication of existing authority, the more its successors must rely on naked power to establish themselves. For in the end, legitimacy involves an acceptance of authority without compulsion; its absence turns every contest into a test of strength.” In this “test of strength”, General Franks must manage task saturation, manpower limitations, rules of engagement and transition to civilian authority.
Tasking and Manpower. CENTCOM will be task saturated. *JP 3-07* lists tasking to military units. These include support to negotiations, civil affairs support to reestablish a civilian government, psychological operations to foster improving peaceful relations, mine clearing operations and others as required. Reserve forces and National Guard are uniquely qualified for this form of tasking. However, these forces are already stretched thin elsewhere in the world. Priority of tasking is going to have to determine how General Franks manages already over-extended specialty personnel.

**Transition.** We must retain the ability to enforce all conditions agreed upon. This will require global and domestic support. Transitions from war to peace transitions are never tidy and will always require patience and flexibility of mind from both military and civilian leaders.⁴⁵ Civilian agencies will require some degree of protection as the transition commences. Protection will be required for relief convoys, distribution centers, stockpiles, ports, airfields and other places where numerous support agencies will operate.⁴⁶ Planning these critical details needs to start long before requirement for execution.

History unfavorably reflects past attempts to establish peace where it has not previously existed.⁴⁷ It is incumbent upon General Franks to have thoroughly prepared every aspect of DIME for this end. The manner in which the U.S. military terminates their involvement will influence the perception of legitimacy of the entire operation.⁴⁸

**CONCLUSION:**

General Franks has many tools at his disposal which General Schwarzkopf did not enjoy. Doctrine and planning tools are now in place to provide guidance through the precarious months ahead. Operational design must fully account for the requisite endstate of a stabilized region. The military alone cannot do this. General Franks is positioned to
initiate operations where all elements of national power are fully integrated across all phases of conflict and well into the time that will follow. CENTCOM has a chance to show the world how to integrate as a global community—as government agencies, non-government organizations, private volunteer organizations, civilians and military—as a force that can shape and stabilize global concerns.

CENTCOM must use these operations as a crucible to refine newly developed joint doctrine. With the numbers of joint pubs rapidly increasing, these doctrinal publications need to be scrubbed, cross referenced and organized to allow planners to rapidly filter useful and pertinent information from a myriad of sources. These lessons need to be captured for action so that future operations will benefit from their experience. It is imperative that the scattered principles now written are practiced, refined and consolidated for more practical application beyond the Iraqi conflict.

The United States is on the verge of war, with a critical world as the peanut gallery. Right or wrong, in the world’s eyes, success will not be measured by the disarmament of an unpredictable menace, but by the stability in and around Iraq following any conflict. In many ways, history has not smiled upon the termination of most conflicts. However in this instance, it is only the United States who will be criticized. These are NOT reasons why Saddam Hussein should not be removed from power and Iraqi forces disarmed. However, they ARE reasons why General Franks should pay special heed to past mistakes and apply all the tools at his disposal to stack the cards fully in our favor for a stable post-conflict region. There will be many who will try to destabilize the area simply to discredit the United States as a failed global stabilizing force. We must be ready and we must succeed.
6 Ibid, 405.
7 Ikle, viii.
11 Clausewitz, 90.
12 Ikle, viii.
14 Liddell Hart, 362.
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 Sep 2001), B-1.
16 Ikle, xv.
17 Ibid., 118.
18 Department of the Army, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: June 2001), 6-21.
20 Kissinger, 624.
26 Ibid., B-A-38.
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multi-National Operations, Joint Pub 3-16, (Washington, DC: 5 April 2000), II-15
28 Ibid., II-14.
31 JP 3-57, III-5.
32 Ibid., III-6.
33 Allotey, 92.
34 JP 3-57, III-6.
37 Allotey, 68.
38 JP 3-57, III-5.
39 Clausewitz, 91.
40 Liddell Hart, 363.
41 Ikle, xi.
42 Ibid., 18.
43 Kissinger, 395.
44 Ibid., 655.
47 Allotey, 60.
48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, IV-12.
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