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The Service Liaison Officer: Transformed into Relevance

By

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A Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The Service Liaison Officer: Transformed into Relevance

Since the mid 1940s the United States Military has struggled with the operational interoperability of the separate services. Joint planning and the exchange of liaison officers between components and the joint force headquarters have been the prescribed methods of coordinating the efforts of the joint force. Standardized formal training for joint planning exists but there is no formalized training for liaison officers. Ad hoc assignment to and training for liaison billets have created problems for the joint force and have hindered interoperability. The time is now to discontinue the practice of filling these billets in a haphazard manner. The current Revolution in Military Affairs and our defense establishment’s transformation efforts has placed us in a position that requires us to take action to correct this oversight.
Preface

This topic was selected from a list of operations paper topics compiled by the Joint Military Operations Department of the U.S. Naval War College. The question it addresses is as follows:

As exercises and missions have become more complex, it has become service practice to assign liaison personnel and teams at various nodes in the joint command structure. Should this practice continue on an ad hoc basis or should it be formalized?
In an effort to facilitate the smooth conduct of joint operations, the services have adopted the practice of placing liaison officers at critical points in the joint force structure. Born out of necessity, these billets have origins in the vast differences in our service missions and cultures. They represent an attempt to minimize interservice friction by providing a conduit for coordination.

**A Historical Trend**

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If we ever again should be involved in war, we will fight with all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort...There is a need for a school which will conduct short courses of approximately five months’ duration in joint staff techniques and procedure in theatres and joint overseas operations.¹

General Eisenhower, memo to Adm. Nimitz

General Eisenhower’s prescient observation proved to be accurate as Joint Military Operations have surely become the hallmark of our nation’s application of military force. Based upon his memorandum, the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) was established in 1946. General Eisenhower’s foresight and proactive direction did little, however, to change the manner in which our military services were employed and even less to affect the manner in which they thought. Instead of nurturing the concept of “jointness,” each service played its own particular role in ushering in a dark period of parochialism.² The stunning joint success of Operation Chromite, during the Korean conflict stands out as the lone interservice triumph among such joint debacles as the botched 1975 U.S.S. Mayaguez rescue and the failed 1980 Iranian hostage raid (Operation Eagle Claw). Yet it was during the somewhat successful Grenada operation in 1983 (Urgent Fury) that the services’ inability to effectively work together reached an obvious and alarming crescendo.³ By 1985 many authors were researching and writing
about joint operations and operational art, and in 1986, forty years after General Eisenhower’s initiative, the U.S. Congress acted to steer the military back on the joint course by passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA). Among the issues of authority and command that GNA sought to address was the goal of increasing the operational efficiency and interoperability of the services. There is little debate that it has succeeded in accomplishing its strategic and policy level goals. In a 1998 Harvard University study “The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card” it received praise from numerous sources such as former Defense Secretary, William Perry, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, and several independent journals and publications. Notwithstanding this much accepted success, there is much to suggest that there is considerable work to be accomplished to optimize the operational interoperability of our services.

Not a lone critic, Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor convincingly argues that service parochialism, not cooperation, remains the watchword of the day. Defining “jointness” as the means through which the National Command Authorities (The President and Secretary of Defense) achieve unity of effort from diverse service competencies, he posits that today’s military lacks a joint operational framework and remains four single service warfighting establishments. Buttressing his claim are the observations in 2000 of all four regional CINCs (combatant commanders) who were each highly critical of persistent service parochialism and urgent about the need for genuine jointness among the services. If we concede the veracity of the Colonel’s argument, the paramount question for the joint force commander to answer remains: What is to be done to remedy the problem? Clearly, congress has acted out of a critical need just as General Eisenhower
did four decades prior. What can be done then to bring about this joint operational framework and ensure that the spirit of The Goldwater-Nichols Act becomes a complete reality? Any remedy for the problem must be based on a clear understanding of its dynamics carefully avoiding the temptation to treat symptoms instead of focusing on the cause.

Anatomy of a Problem

There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support each other. Team play wins.

GEN George S. Patton, Jr., USA

It would be cynical to the point of implausibility to suggest that our services’ several-decades-long struggle towards team-play has been impeded by deliberate acts of resistance. Suffice it to say that each service is steadfastly, though somewhat selfishly, focused on mastering its own roles and missions. This can only be understood as healthy. We do not want General Patton’s rifleman overly concerned with the proper application of artillery fire. We want him focused on his mission in the same manner that we want our services focused on their respective core competencies. This has resulted in our nation possessing an Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps that are without peer in the world today—hardly a disadvantage. According to most accounts, each service has singularly performed in an admirable manner during all applications of force since Goldwater-Nichols; it is the harmony, which General Patton speaks of, the ability to be a two-handed puncher, on an operational level, that is the problem.

Within the defense establishment, there is little to no question about the legitimacy of each service’s roles and missions. We seem to have evolved past the post world war II era of the services questioning each other’s existence. Barring the beliefs of
a few radicals who ascribe to the notion that one military arm can singularly achieve the nation’s objectives, there is virtual consensus within the military as to the requirement and need for our services to work together, on an operational level, to accomplish our nation’s objectives in future warfare. It is here, on this operational level, where the claims of parochialism, be they indisputably valid or not, seem to lose their resonance and applicability. Irrespective of pervasive parochial attitudes, the reality is that GNA has diminished the ability of service parochialism to affect the operational employment of our forces.  

The combatant commander (COCOM) is, in theory and most often in practice, indeed the final arbiter of what transpires on the battlefield. Inherent in his authority is full the ability to organize and employ commands and forces as he considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Though tensions may exist between COCOMs and service headquarters on the strategic, and indeed possibly operational and tactical levels, it is the COCOM who is by law vested with the authority to control the battlefield. As depicted in (figure 1) the COCOM's authority is all
encompassing and represents considerable power. According to the GNA 10 year report card, the Gulf War demonstrated the improved power of the COCOM:

A crucial example occurred when General Norman Schwarzkopf…denied the Marines’ request to mount an amphibious assault on Kuwait. The Marine commandant, General Al Gray, wanted to send hovercraft and helicopters through the Gulf’s heavily mined waters and onto the beachhead. When General Schwarzkopf said no, General Gray tried an unsuccessful end-run direct to the CJCS, General Powell. Before GNA, a service chief probably could have got his way, but no longer.⁹

Commanders of Joint Force commanders other than COCOMs will always possess Operational Control (OPCON) which is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.¹⁰ It includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Like the COCOM they too possess the authority to mold the joint forces into a cohesive operational team.

Clearly, each joint force commander (COCOM or JTF) recognizes the value of the services’ assets and seeks to employ them in the most efficient and beneficial manner. That said, and lacking neither authority nor means, it would seem that he could employ them with seamless efficiency. What then could be the problem? The fact that he, the controller of the battlefield assets, will likely be the person who decries our ability to harmonize suggests that we are not dealing with an insidious problem of attitude.¹¹ The current command framework allows for the commander to properly direct his forces thus allowing us to deduce that it is not a structural problem. Logic would dictate that we look at this as a training and education problem; more specifically, a training problem
A Closer Look

LNOs facilitate communication between elements of a joint task force (JTF) to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.

NWP 5-02

In view of the persistent problems our military has had in operationally applying our services in a synergistic manner, it is perplexing that more attention has not been paid to the tool of the LNO. The LNO has four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.

Monitor. The LNO must monitor the operations of both the JTF and the sending organization and understand how each affects the other. As a minimum, the LNO must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and be sensitive to the desires of both the component commander and the JTF commander.

Coordinate. The LNO facilitates synchronization of current operations/future plans between the sending organization and the JTF. The LNO is also an important catalyst, facilitating effective coordination between staffs. It is in the active performance of this function that the LNO directly contributes to the joint force’s synergy.

Advise. The LNO is the JTF’s expert on the sending organization’s capabilities and limitations. The LNO must be available to answer questions, or quickly find the answers, for the JTF staff and other units. As such, the LNO advises the JTF commander and staff on the optimum employment of the sending organization’s capabilities. Simultaneously, the LNO advises the sending commander on any JTF HQ issues.
Assist. The LNOs must assist on two levels. First, they must act as the conduit between their command and the JTF. Second, by integrating themselves into the JTF as a participant in the JTF battle rhythm they can answer questions from various groups (joint targeting coordination board, joint planning group, etc.) to ensure that informed decisions are being made.

A fully integrated and competent LNO will have the effect of integrating the sending unit into the JTF. In fact, there is a direct correlation between the degree of a subordinate unit’s integration and the effectiveness of the LNO. As a result of the planning process, staffs tend to focus on their own command’ objectives and view other components of the JTF as either higher or adjacent units. Although they are cognizant of how their actions affect the overall Joint Force objective, they are nonetheless focused on attaining the objective assigned to their particular unit. Only the LNO can provide the on-site presence necessary to ensure the separate components of the JTF are fully coordinated.

Problems with LNOs.

Reports from past joint military operations chronicle frequent deficiencies with joint interservice cooperation. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) is replete with examples of these deficiencies which are most often attributed to the improper employment of Service Liaison Officers.

During Uphold Democracy a shortage of Liaison Officers was identified as a hindrance to the joint planning process and full service integration:

The two main reasons for this shortfall were organizational strength shortages and a large number of commitments world-wide. All three services were concerned that they were unable to ensure full joint integration of their services. Both the Air Force and the Navy were represented by O-5s at Fort Drum. In both cases, they were the team chiefs of their
divisions. These team chiefs were forced to close their offices at home station and go personally to Fort Drum due to a shortage of Liaison Officers (LNO). The services were able to cover most of the planning at Fort Drum, but they were unable to maintain continuity with the 10th Mountain Division during the planning and execution phases. Additionally, due to their participation at Fort Drum, their home station offices were closed and unable to support and coordinate for their deployed teams.¹²

Reports from Operation Unified Endeavor 97-1 identified several problems relating to the understanding of LNO roles, responsibilities, working arrangements:

When the component LNO teams reported to JTF 780 there was some confusion concerning who they would work for, where they would work, and what the JTF envisioned as their roles and responsibilities. Because there was no space set aside for the LNOs, their work area became the Joint Operations Center (JOC) this arrangement tended to isolate the LNOs, since the Joint Planning Group (JPG) was meeting and working in an area separate from the JOC. The JTF Chief of Staff met with the LNOs on day three of the exercise and established guidelines. LNOs were instructed to focus on planning, work with the J5, and attend/participate in JPG meetings.

Aside from a concluding observation was that the LNOs were not effectively integrated into and fully employed by the joint task force headquarters, it is clear that the LNOs for this operation were also not properly trained.¹³ Numerous other JULLS submissions cite additional problems with LNO training and instances of them arriving too late to be of any useful purpose.¹⁴

The evidence is overwhelming that the Liaison Officer is critical to operational interoperability and would strongly suggest that there is indeed cause to emphasize the importance of this billet and change our procedures for manning it. This importance has not gone unnoticed and as a result, the four services published “JTF LNO Integration: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Joint Task Force Liaison Officer Integration (Final Coordination Draft)” in July 2002. This landmark document, encapsulates the accumulated lessons of recent operations to prescribe roles, functions,
responsibilities, considerations and instructions for Liaison officer, gaining units, and sending units. While these MTTP provide an excellent roadmap for enhanced unity of effort, they will not by themselves affect change. There are at least two persisting realities that combine to prevent the joint force from making progress in assigning competent LNOs. The first is the easier problem to fix.

Misconceptions about the LNO’s role.

The LNO is an official representative of the sending organization commander and remains in the chain of command of the sending organization. They should be authorized direct face-to-face liaison with the JTF commander and should be empowered to make decisions. Frequently, LNOs are mistakenly identified as augmentees, full time planners or watch officers. Augmentees are individuals assigned to a specific billet with various staff directorates. Planning is but one function performed by LNOs and must not preclude accomplishment of other LNO functions. Likewise, a LNO will often work out of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) for convenience but should not be expected to fulfill the responsibilities of a full time watch officer within the JOC. It is these common misconceptions that usually result in the devaluation of the LNO billet and subsequently assigning the wrong person to fill it. As we have already seen, sending the wrong LNO is generally counterproductive and can be detrimental to both commands. A LNO must not lack the essential mix of experience, rank, communicative skills, leadership, and attitude to accomplish his mission.
LNO positions involve manpower costs.

Personnel shortages are a concern for commanders at all levels. Today’s military is one that struggles to do more with less. Unfortunately, most commanders who are tasked to provide LNOs find themselves short of highly qualified officers and will need those best qualified to serve as LNOs to supervise critical functions or serve in key billets within their commands. LNO positions will quite naturally receive a lower priority as it is a rare commander that possesses such acute joint vision to send their best and brightest to serve elsewhere. Even the most joint oriented commander will find it difficult to reconcile the various competing demands for talent to properly fill LNO billets. When establishing a joint force, the JTF commander has several options available by which to organize (figure- 2). He will always include service components and may also elect to establish functional components. Should he establish functional components (for example maritime or aviation components), the possibility exists that liaison officers will be exchanged between both service and functional components, thus placing greater demands on scarce manpower resources.
These problems, though serious, are still relatively minor as compared to some of the greater challenges facing the joint force. However, in light of these new challenges they become amplified and too dangerous to ignore. The face of warfare is changing so quickly that we cannot afford the inefficiency of a dysfunctional JTF. In confronting these challenges, the LNO will be key to our success.

**The New Relevance**

**RMA and Transformation.**

A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organization concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. As described in *Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues*, a book published by the Air University, the United States is currently in the middle of an RMA. Dramatic developments in space warfare, dominating maneuver, precision strike and information warfare are heralding in an era that will require our joint force to be more nimble, interoperable, cohesive, and responsive. Operational decisions will have to be made more quickly and the demand for coordination between joint components will increase significantly if the joint force is to capitalize on the RMA. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s drive to transform the military is based in part on the RMA and is aimed at providing a more “interoperable, responsive, agile and lethal” force. Articulating his desire for service members to “think joint” he states that he wants the military focused on goals that are nation-centric rather than service-centric. His vision of the battlefield provides insight into the challenges on the road ahead:
In the past, working in a joint environment meant the services taking separate pieces of the action – the Navy stays on the water; the Army on land; the Air Force handles bombardment in this area; and the Marines engage in another area. Those days are gone.\textsuperscript{17}

One of the purposes of exercise \textit{Millennium Challenge} 02 was to determine the extent to which the joint force can conduct simultaneous joint tactical actions throughout the battlespace. It appears that we are indeed moving towards a warfare that is destined to reform our present constructs of boundaries and areas of operations. Given an organizational model other than functional components, separate commands of a JTF will face considerable challenges sharing battlespace in the manner that the secretary describes. Thus, the requirements of transformation and the implications of the RMA have placed unique coordinating demands between the JTF commander and his components that elevate LNO billet to a position of critical importance and new relevance.

\textbf{The Global War on Terrorism.}

If you’re fighting a different kind of war, the war transforms the military.

\begin{quote}
Sec. Rumsfeld, USMC War Room Report 47-02
\end{quote}

With the advent of asymmetrical warfare we are seeing many changes in the way we are employing our joint force. CENTCOM’s use of Navy P-3 Orions to hunt and target ground forces in the mountains of Afghanistan is just one example of a new and innovative way that the JTF is responding to new threats. In another example, the Department of Defense proposes to restructure the U.S. Special Operations Command to become a supported warfighting combatant command.\textsuperscript{18} Secretary Rumsfeld’s goal is to give Special Operations Forces (SOF) a global role; untied to geographic areas and
COCOMs. Again, both of these examples highlight the increased importance of liaison officers.

The GWOT has obliterated the normal modus operandi and has demanded that we adopt a more free-wheeling style of warfare that applies all instruments of national power to accomplish the operational objective. An example of this is the Department of State’s actions in acquiring basing and over-flight rights in support of operations on Afghanistan. In the following excerpt from Bush at War, CIA Director George Tenet’s description of his agency’s actions in the GWOT provides a view of its operational involvement: “…and we’re working between the military and our covert people side by side,” he added, “with transparency between them, deconflicting and viewing both in a global context. Deconflicting meant keeping their forces from shooting each other.”

The President in the National Security Strategy has declared the GWOT as not only the interagency effort that it is, but has also committed to fighting it within a multi-national framework. Interagency operations themselves require considerable coordination, but when put in a multi-national and global context, coordination will be daunting. The Joint Force Commander’s task of maintaining the requisite situational awareness in this dynamic environment must not compete with his ability to effectively command his subordinates. In this regard liaison officers must play a critical role in maximizing the efficiency of the Joint Force.

Liaison Officers are more relevant today than they have ever been. We cannot afford to continue to futilely submit post-operation JULLS. It is time to discontinue the haphazard manner in which we treat this billet and set standards for formalized training.
Solution

During Operation Just Cause, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit’s capabilities, and make recommendations.

Lieutenant General C.W. Stiner  
Commander, Joint Task Force, South  
Operation Just Cause

It is clear that the time has come to discontinue the practice of filling LNO billets on an ad hoc basis. Formalizing the education process and assigning those educated to serve in LNO billets will greatly reduce the problems encountered with LNOs and increase interservice cooperation and integration. The mandate for this action is found in the GNA and is reiterated in the purpose of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 2010 study:

define joint professional military education requirements and identify an educational process/system that will prepare officers for current and future challenges. The study will result in a proposed course of action that will deliver a joint education program that prepares leaders to meet the demands of current and future joint, interagency, and multinational environments, such as described in Joint Vision (JV) 2010\textsuperscript{22}.  

There are three basic approaches to finding a solution for this problem.

Using Existing Education.

The first idea is to use existing education as a pre-requisite for assigning officers to LNO billets. Despite all that has been accomplished towards educating our officers for joint duty, there remains a gap that does not address this need to educate LNOs. GNA has prescribed JPME requirements for officers who are to be designated Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). This normally consists of a two-phase education process and completion of a full Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)\textsuperscript{23}. Phase I JPME focuses on the
fundamentals of joint operations planning and is designed to provide officers with a joint framework of thought. It is included in the curricula at the services Command & Staff Colleges and War Colleges. Phase II JPME is a course conducted at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) designed to educate officers and other leaders in the deployment, employment, synchronization, and support of unified and multinational forces; with emphasis placed on areas essential to joint force commanders; in order to develop a primary commitment to joint teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives, while reinforcing knowledge of individual service core competencies. In view of these qualifications it seems as though this is ideal training and it would be reasonable to expect that most officers that are designated (JSOs) could very satisfactorily serve as LNOs. This is not however a remedy due to a shortage of JSOs. According to the report of the JPME 2010 Requirements Team’s overall assessment, there is a “lack of proficiency in JTFs among many officers.” A portion of this problem is the difficulty in getting officers to attend Phase II training which, by congressional mandate, is twelve weeks in duration. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that ninety-two percent of Phase II graduates serve in joint billets at the strategic level in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and CINC Headquarters. In view of this, using existing education to train LNOs is not a workable solution.

**Identifying permanent LNOs.**

A second proposal is to appoint permanent LNOs. This recommendation was recognized as a solution and articulated as early as 1992:

Liaison personnel need to be permanently identified within both the CINC and major component staffs so that they can be deployed quickly. The CINC staffs particularly need to consider the addition of officers from all four services as augmentees to any staff assigned JTF responsibilities, even if immediate tasking does not require across service
Conversion of an existing billet can be …an administrative change to the requesting agency’s Joint Manpower Program. Adding a permanent billet can be accomplished by the CINC or commander concerned as an action under MOP 173.

The result of adopting this measure would most assuredly create more qualified LNOs and significantly contribute to the joint effort. It is a workable solution; however, it is unlikely that such an action would be undertaken in light of today’s ubiquitous manpower deficiencies. As we have already seen, the COCOMs cannot usually spare officers for 12 weeks of Phase II.

**Create an LNO Course.**

A feasible solution must not be costly from either a manpower or time standpoint. This can be accomplished by establishing a two-week service LNO course to be conducted by and at the JFSC. Nominees for the course would have to possess the requisite service specific experience that would enable them to act independently on behalf of their components. This would require that quotas for the school be controlled by the COCOM service component and approved by the JFSC. The course should be designed to ensure that officers possessed the requisite knowledge and abilities to properly function as a LNO. Upon successful completion of the course the LNO would be awarded a designation (specialty) required to fill LNO billets. Each COCOM service component should be required to maintain a cadre of trained LNOs. This proposal represents a simple low-cost remedy that is easy to implement. It directly addresses the major pitfalls that have been responsible for our problems. Currently there are forty-four Joint Task Force individual training courses available. Only one, the Special Operations Liaison Element Course, focuses on coordinating the efforts of JTF components. All of the others are geared towards a particular JTF function (C2, JFACC,
Intel, etc.) and are not broad enough in scope to address the requirements of a LNO—this must change.

**Conclusion**

Interoperability between the services has been a topic of much discussion for several decades. This issue has become so frustrating that it has twice prompted acts of congress. These grand actions however, have failed to provide the desired results. By now it should be clear that it is impossible to legislate coordination. Coordination is the result of human interaction. The best way to attain this simple interpersonal act is to educate and train people to do it. We have reached a point in warfare that has made coordination a critical requirement. Through all of our complaining about lack of cooperation, we have not been serious enough to train a cadre of officers to ensure that it happens. Joint Vision 2010 clearly described where our military was heading. It highlighted impending dynamic changes and forcefully drove home the “imperative of jointness.” It states:

..we will need to wring every ounce of capability from every available source. That outcome can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of service capabilities. To achieve this integration while conducting military operations we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.\(^{29}\)

General Shelton expressed much the same message in 2000 in Joint Vision 2020:

The complexity of future operations also requires that, in addition to operating jointly, our forces have the capability to participate effectively as one element of a unified national effort… Although technical interoperability is essential, it is not sufficient to ensure effective operations. There must be a suitable focus on procedural and organizational elements, and decision makers at all levels must understand each other’s capabilities and constraints. Training and education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and skilled liaison at all levels of the joint force will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to appreciate the full range of Service capabilities available to them.\(^{30}\)
These remarks by our last Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could have just as well been uttered by General Eisenhower in 1946. Clearly, it is time that we do more to bring about this seemingly elusive interoperability that we have been coveting for so many years. The simple and cost effective proposal contained herein will do much towards that end.
NOTES


7 Besson, 34-35

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), II-6.

9 Besson. pg. 34

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-8, 9.

11 Priest.


14 from numerous JULLS submissions Matador 98, Eligible Receiver 92-1, BA-97, Omar Response, Tandem Thrust-95 and multiple Cobra Gold exercises.

15 Navy Department, Joint Task Force Liaison Officer Integration NWP 5-02 (Washington, DC: 10 July 2002), I-12

16 ibid. I-8


19 Woodward, Pg. 173

20 Woodward, pg. 135


23 Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, JFSC Pub 1, (Norfolk, VA: 2000), I-54

24 Joint Professional Military Education Course of Action Report 2010


26 ibid. pg. 8

27 Ballard, JULLS (unnumbered) NIEX, 28 Aug 92

28 NWP-5-02, Appendix D


31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, DC. 2000)
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