REDUCING DUPLICATION ACROSS THE SERVICES TO CREATE A TRANSFORMED JOINT MILITARY ORGANIZATION

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Reduction Duplication Across the Services to Create a Transformed Joint Military Organization

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The future roles and missions of the military services are inextricably intertwined and together they must maintain the Department of Defense’s (DOD) constrained resources, while meeting requirements and preparing for the future. As we strive to operate jointly, commanders will expect and demand a consistent level of support across all spectrums. Transformation must unite unique service capabilities into a seamless joint framework to accomplish the joint force commander’s objectives and create a better joint military force.

There are many functional similarities across the services, particularly among support occupations. Currently, the services are participating in consolidated training programs and developing common operating systems. Yet, the common support skills and functions that receive this training and will use the common operating systems currently reside separately within each branch of the services. Could these support skills and functions be consolidated into a single joint organization, such as a DOD Support Command? A consolidated support organization could potentially lead to resource savings, more efficient processes, and improved readiness. This paper will examine some existing commonalities within DOD and propose an option for reducing duplication across the services with the intended result of a transformed joint military organization.
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“Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.”

— Giulio Douhet

The world is changing faster than can be imagined. Defense demands of today and the future clearly point to the need for significant change or transformation. The critical motivation for this defense transformation is that the United States could otherwise find itself unable to protect its interests and meet its responsibilities in a world of hostile states with growing access to dangerous technologies. Given the anticipated rate of change and the resulting challenges that will undoubtedly arise, it is imperative that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) future goals be achieved as quickly as possible. This may require fundamental change in the processes, policies and procedures by which DOD operates. Defense leaders, subordinates, and their successors must dedicate their efforts consistently towards achieving these goals rapidly. The time to begin is now.

The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), released in September 2002, delineates that all the major institutions of American national security must be transformed to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The DOD is certainly not exempt from that mandate. This forthcoming defense transformation will involve much more than just the purchase of new weapons or hardware since DOD has determined that it should undergo a host of transformations, including precision, surveillance, network communications, robotics, and information processing. What is not completely clear is how DOD will achieve those objectives of transformation. The current initiative of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) examines transforming the military by reducing duplication in all areas across the services and prioritizing the allocation of resources to best support DOD’s needs. Clearly, in today’s dynamic world, no single branch of the armed services can accomplish its mission alone. The future roles and missions of all the branches of armed services are inextricably intertwined and together the armed forces must face the profound challenge of maintaining DOD’s current resources, while adeptly meeting all the requirements and preparing for the needs of the future. In the future, it will be critically important to strategic readiness to maximize the capabilities of all the services. In the future, as we strive to operate jointly, commanders will expect and demand a consistent
level of support across all spectrums. Transformation must unite unique service capabilities into a seamless joint framework to accomplish the joint force commander’s objectives. The result of transformation must be a dramatically better joint military force.

This paper will look at some existing commonalities within DOD and propose an option for reducing duplication across the services with the intended result of a transformed joint military organization. Given the need to change to become a better military, it makes sense to question the way certain functions are organized within DOD. There are many functional similarities among the different branches of the military, particularly among those occupations that are commonly characterized as support. Currently, the services are participating in consolidated training programs and sharing information in order that common operating systems can be developed. Yet, the common support skills and functions that receive this training and potentially use the common operating systems currently reside separately within each branch of the armed services. Could these support skills and functions be combined into a single organization that could benefit all the armed services? A more unified DOD team might be one result of the increased efficiency and effective utilization of resources that could result from consolidation. A joint organization could potentially lead to resource savings, a more efficient administrative process, and improved readiness. If there does appear to be value from some measure of consolidation, further study of this concept would be recommended in order to support DOD’s transformational goals and determine the magnitude of the benefit. The time is right to pose the question, “Could there be benefit from a consolidation of the military support functions of the different armed services into one team: a Department of the Defense Support Command?”

BACKGROUND

During the Cold War era, the United States was willing to do whatever it had to do to win the long battle with the Soviet Block. Therefore, as the country pursued a strategy of containing the Soviet Union during most of the Cold War years, DOD was structured to fight and win a global world war. Then, the world witnessed rapid and dramatic change as the Soviet empire disintegrated, the Iron Curtain dissolved, and the Berlin Wall was dismantled. Not long after this, DOD determined it must begin to transform to ensure the United States remained at the forefront in a rapidly changing world and was able to respond to the challenges ahead. The Cold War enemies of the past were no longer considered to be viable threats and the United States military realized it must restructure and refocus to meet the threats and enemies of the future. This notion of transformation, however, was not new to the military. The United States
military has a long tradition of experimentation and change, from the fleet problems of the United States Navy in the 1930s, that gave birth to the concept of using aircraft carriers, to the Army’s famous Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, that developed the doctrine for combined arms air/ground operations. The military has also undergone several structural reorganizations in the last century as a result of various pieces of legislation, including the 1947 National Security Act, the 1973 All-Volunteer Forces Act and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. More recently, the United States responded to the vast global changes in the early 1990’s by drastically downsizing the military in budget, force structure and procurement programs. After reducing, restructuring, and reengineering throughout the years that followed, DOD found itself burdened with portions of the defense organization that failed to effect sufficient changes in order to best face the challenges of the future. Current doctrine still had the military conducting operations similar to those from World War II and Desert Storm. By the beginning of the year 2000, all the military services had slowly begun the process of transforming their force structure to meet the expected challenges and threats of the twenty first century. When the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was released in September 2001, it detailed with some urgency the necessity for DOD and the military to transform. The QDR marked a complete departure from Cold War planning, articulating a more sophisticated appreciation of the 21st-century strategic environment, the challenges to United States interests, and what military capabilities would be needed in the future. The United States monopoly on the latest and most sophisticated capabilities was gone. United States’ engagement in the world in the future would require the ability and will to project power decisively wherever and whenever needed. With the end of the Cold War and fewer conventional threats facing the United States, the challenge of fighting new enemies was certain to demand new ways of thinking. The overall future readiness of DOD would depend on the decisions made for the course that transformation will take over the next several decades.

TRANSFORMATION

The notion of transformation has become the catalyst for the development of many new concepts and ideas, including the consolidation initiative considered in this paper. SECDEF himself is leading the defense transformation, striving to drastically reshape the military to adapt to new requirements and respond to the challenges of a new century. By dramatically refocusing and redirecting the defense organization to be more productive, adaptive and efficient, transformation within DOD will change the way wars are fought. According to the SECDEF, transformation “is a process. It involves a mind set, an attitude, a culture. It involves
new ways of thinking, new ways of operating, new ways of doing business. For DOD, the
desired end-state is a military beyond any challenge and redesigned to focus on how an
adversary might fight, rather than on where and when a war might occur. Work is well
underway to more accurately define that desired end-state. This transformation initiative may
require changing the form or structure of the forces, the nature of the military doctrine
supporting those forces, and streamlining the warfighting functions to more effectively meet the
complexities of the new threats challenging the United States in the new millennium. Compared
to changes of the past, this transformation may seem much more significant and dramatic and
all areas of DOD will certainly be impacted.

One challenge will be identifying the resources needed to effect the changes desired. Currently in all parts of DOD, constrained budgets are under-resourcing and under-funding
critical mission requirements. It is becoming more difficult to balance day-to-day operational
readiness and the modernization necessary to ensure that United States military forces are
properly poised to meet future requirements and threats. If this manner of operating continues,
it could potentially undercut DOD’s long-term future. More efficient utilization of resources must
be identified, given the current scope and pace of DOD operations and the need to apply
attention to future investments and the effects of transformation. One of the goals of any
transformational initiatives must be to eliminate redundancy and consolidate related functions,
eliminate obsolete activities, and transfer operational and program management functions to
operational activities. If this could be accomplished, then the increased synergy between the
services could provide smart savings both in dollars and in personnel.

Another challenge in transforming DOD is that, historically, each military service has tried
to maximize its own importance, largely at the expense of the other services. Such competition,
however, has not been all bad. It has kept pressure on the services to manage resources
economically and produce useful capabilities. Moreover, inter-service rivalry has not precluded
better learning within each service, based on its own dissemination of knowledge, germination
of ideas, and tolerance of risk. Yet, DOD as a whole cannot be a cohesive, joint organization as
long as any barriers exist to separate the services from each other and from the outside world.
While it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate these barriers completely, they
must be made more porous.

DOD has many challenges ahead in this transformation process. In the effort to change,
DOD must become more productive, more intelligent, and more adaptable. If these things can
be accomplished, one must then ask if DOD will really be able to capitalize on efficiencies that
can be gained. Achieving only part of the desired transformation will not be good enough, The
DOD must fully achieve its goals in order for transformation to be a success. Given the need for transformation and the best utilization of resources, any areas within DOD that exhibit duplication across each of the military branches should be examined for possible consolidation. The support organizations of the military branches certainly deserve this level of scrutiny. Although they are undeniably similar by virtue of their missions, functions, and structure, they have remained distinctly separate within each of their respective services. Therefore, as part of the transformation process, support organizations within DOD must consider consolidating similar functions to optimize the outputs, achieve possible savings, and increase efficiency.

Ultimately, transformation within DOD will only be as valuable as the impact it has to better the work environment for the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines and enable a more effective end-state to military efforts. As the military takes steps towards addressing what will be required to contain the future threats and capabilities, the seamless integration of some or all of the support organizations in each of the separate military branches should be considered. Duplication across the services can not be afforded and will likely not have a place in DOD in the future. Therefore, the case for a merger of these common defense support elements is strong.

CONSOLIDATED TRAINING

As DOD fully analyzes this proposal, it must consider measures already in existence that supports this consolidation. DOD has been exploring ways to reduce the costs of education and training while sustaining military preparedness and effectiveness, in response to shrinking budgets and smaller numbers of military personnel. Consolidated training among the services is one such measure. Training education, experience and exercises, cooperative planning, and skilled liaison at all levels of DOD will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and differing priorities, but will teach members of the joint team to appreciate the full range of service capabilities available to them. Unifying the training programs for the military support MOSs could be one way to reduce costs and would have great impact on this proposed consolidation of the DOD support force. Training resource integration could have significant economic, efficiency and perhaps, even, cultural benefits. In terms of the economic benefits, a more fully integrated joint training program could provide a required level of training at reduced cost. Efficiency could be realized from combining training resources that currently can not be accomplished to their full extent due to budget reductions. Cultural benefits would be gained across the services as a result of the increase of cross-service contact and learning. Such
contact would strengthen understanding and achieve the necessary understanding desired across the joint arena.

In order for real benefit to be gained, two main goals would need to exist for unifying training. First, cross-service training should enhance the ability to integrate service and mission across the services. Second, there should be cost savings from this initiative. The first goal would be achieved by having common curricula at training schools that all services could benefit from and utilize. Cost savings would be gained if programs (schools, locations, etc) were consolidated as well as the curriculums, allowing for the elimination of overhead and infrastructure. Additionally, outsourcing training or tapping into existing civilian training that meets the needs of the military services would definitely be another way to possibly achieve savings. However, this kind of consolidation initiative is a politically sensitive issue.

Congressmen often agree that consolidation is logical and necessary as long as it is not the military installation within their district that would be impacted or closed. When changes to the military impact the jobs and livelihood of the voters within their congressional district, however, the Congressmen are not apt to support the measures that would result in government savings.

As a point of example that supports this consolidation initiative, there are currently many joint or consolidated training schools within DOD that have common curriculum and teach members of all the services. Some examples of this joint consolidated training include the Public Affairs, Broadcaster, Photography, and Journalist courses taught at Fort Meade, the Law Enforcement/Physical Security and Master-at-Arms courses taught at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), the Postal Operations course taught at Fort Jackson, the Cryptology training courses taught at Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) Corry Station, the Joint Logistics course taught at Fort Lee, and the Food Service/Messman courses taught at Lackland AFB. Many of these training courses are in the functional areas considered for consolidation in this paper and thus would support this consolidated DOD support force proposal.

COMMON SERVICE INITIATIVES

Another measure to be considered would be common service initiatives or common operating systems. These initiatives could affect every part of the defense infrastructure from flight training to staff and support functions to common assets. However, with consolidation comes possible competition as each service seeks control of existing and emerging missions for fiscal as well as political reasons. The services have historically opposed consolidation if it means that their service will lose control over a certain function or mission. On the other hand, if a particular service is in a position to gain from consolidation they are more willing to take on
the added responsibility, since more responsibility over a particular area means more budget dollars with which to exercise authority. Several common service initiatives which illustrate commonality between the services and lend themselves to supporting this consolidation are currently in development or early implementation. The two examples which support this DOD support force initiative are a unified military health care system and a joint operating system called the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).^{10}

UNIFIED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Since the end of World War II, the issue of whether to create a unified military health system has arisen repeatedly. Some observers have suggested that a joint organization could potentially lead to reduced costs, better integrated health care delivery, a more efficient administrative process, and improved readiness. The military health care system provides medical services and support to the armed forces during military operations and involves deploying medical personnel and equipment as needed to support military forces throughout the world in wartime, in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and in military training. Additionally, it provides medical services and support to members of the armed forces, their dependents, and others entitled to DOD medical care. Currently the medical services within the separate branches of service are distinctly separate although their functions and skills are undeniably similar. Therefore, this consolidation to create a unified health care system would return some significant gains in resources and service provided.

JOINT HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM

An example of a DOD initiative currently under development is the joint consolidated Human Resources Management program called DIMHRS. This program was established in 1996 by the Defense Science Review Board to overcome shortcomings in existing pay and personnel systems throughout the DOD. The purpose of DIMHRS is to provide fully integrated personnel and pay capability for all components of the military services of DOD as well as personnel and pay support throughout the life cycle of a Service member's career. This initiative will provide support across the full operational spectrum; peacetime and war, through mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment. Data will be collected on every aspect of the service member's career. This multi-dimensional project will enhance readiness by providing mission support to the war fighter and military departments, place personnel and pay functional requirements and 'best business' practices, technical requirements, and costs into the overall development strategy, and deliver a system that optimizes technology and
incorporates improved business practices for the Department of Defense. Both of the common service initiatives listed above would support the proposal for consolidation of the services’ support functions.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES

Conflicts of the last decade have brought together more closely each of the services and highlighted not only the successes of common operating practices and systems in the joint arena, but the failures as well. Lessons learned must be taken from these past experiences. In the future, it will be imperative that the military branches operate jointly, across all spectrums. The result must be a seamless joint force. One of the challenges to this type of consolidation proposal is to determine a baseline for comparison that could be used to equate jobs and skills across the services. For the purpose of this paper and in order to achieve the fair comparison of enlisted occupational specialties, the information contained in DOD’s occupational index (DOD instruction 1312.1-1) will be considered as a fair and equitable baseline.

Maintaining a strong defense encompasses such diverse activities as running a hospital, commanding a tank, programming computers, operating a nuclear reactor, and repairing and maintaining a helicopter. The military's occupational diversity provides educational opportunities and work experience in many different occupations. There are more than 2,000 basic and advanced enlisted military occupational specialties. Enlisted personnel hold managerial and administrative jobs; professional, technical, and clerical jobs; construction jobs; electrical and electronics jobs; mechanical and repair jobs; and many others. There are many existing similarities between skills resident in each of the branches of the armed services. Reducing duplication by consolidating similar skills that are considered support in nature could yield a better and more joint military organization.

Due to differing structure in each of the service branches, comparison of the of the skills between the branches of service might appear to be complicated. Just the nomenclature used by the different services can be confusing. In the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps, an enlisted job is called a Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). In the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard, an enlisted job is called a Rating. In the United States Air Force, an enlisted job is known as an Air Force Specialty (AFS). For the purpose of this paper and to reduce any confusion, this analysis of military occupational specialties will use MOS when referring to all the branches of the service. This instruction is published in order to maintain a DOD occupation coding structure that groups similar service occupations from one or more populations into a logical and consistent structure suitable for a
variety of analytical purposes. The index compiles DOD officer and enlisted occupational specialties and Civil Service “white collar” and “blue collar” occupations under two similar grouping structures. In this paper only the enlisted occupational specialties will be compared. The information on General Schedule and Wage Grade civilians and military officers will not be included nor discussed.

Each military service has placed its occupations within this DOD occupational index. All the military services are tasked to provide information and input to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in order to maintain a DOD occupation coding structure that groups similar service occupations into a logical and consistent structure suitable for a variety of analytical purposes. This standardized information provides a common crosswalk between military jobs and skills and various civilian occupational classifications in order to provide comparable data. Therefore, the mechanism of comparison has already been established.

The enlisted section catalogs ten occupational areas, that are further divided into 69 occupational groups and 170 occupational subgroups. Although the conversion index does not represent a binding policy on the similarity of the occupations, each military service has placed its occupational areas within the index to allow for approximate equivalence across DOD. Table one lists the enlisted DOD Occupational areas as detailed in the DOD Occupational Index.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Occupational Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Electronic Equipment Repairers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Communication and Intelligence Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Health Care Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Other Technical and Allied Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Functional Support and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Crafts workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Service and Supply Handlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Non-Occupational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1. ENLISTED DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREAS**

For adequate comparison, since each of the military branches has a uniquely different role and mission that they provide in the defense of the United States, DOD should first determine which MOSs, core competencies, and skills are inherently military and should reside within specific services, based on their specific roles and missions. Within the military, there will
always be the requirement for separate services with unique, distinct missions and certain numbers of personnel with the specific skills to be the deployable fighting force on the ground, in the air and on the ships. The Army and Air Force prepare for defensive and offensive operations, on land and in the air, respectively. The Navy organizes and trains forces primarily for sea operations, while the Marine Corps prepares for land invasions in support of naval or amphibious operations. The Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation enforces Federal maritime laws, rescues distressed vessels and aircraft at sea, operates aids to navigation, and prevents smuggling. It makes sense for individual services to maintain the training and control of those specific functional areas and their respective training. A majority of the specific occupational skills that are necessary within the military ranks are considered to be inherently military and require specialized training. Training requires a huge investment of time and resources, but, is undoubtedly invaluable and necessary. In many of these inherently military MOSs, civilian training is often not available and the military manages skill training for those warfighting positions and skills. Because there is no civilian equivalent, there are not similar case studies available for comparison to corporate organizational changes and better business practices that have been accomplished. Because of the uniqueness of those warfighting MOSs, they will not be considered in this paper for any consolidation measures.

But what of those other specialized skills that could be considered to be not inherently military? There is question about whether the military support functions need to be distinct and separate. For those support MOSs, core competencies, and skills that are not inherently military and service specific, it makes sense to consider initiatives to reduce duplication, utilize resources smartly, and take advantage of civilian and joint training. These more common specialties are found across all the military services and in the civilian sector as well. Furthermore, there are many of these support positions whose training is equivalent to that in civilian occupations. In fact, the military sends many of its personnel to civilian organizations to receive training and certifications. In these positions and skills, there are areas within the corporate environment that have faced similar challenges to reshape their organizations and the lessons learned from those case studies should be used for comparison and learning. Paramount to any consolidation or integration would be common administrative and operating systems. As the technologies required in the future are developed, the rest of the military force must be transformed in dramatic ways to achieve success and efficiencies.

Of the Occupational Areas listed above in Table 1., some are inherently military or service branch specific based on mission or equipment used and, therefore, do not seem good areas of comparison for consolidation. Other areas, though, appear to be likely candidates for further
analysis. The areas to be considered in this paper as viable for consolidation are Occupational Area 12 (Communications and Intelligence Specialists), Occupational Area 13 (Health Care Specialists), Occupational Area 15 (Functional Support and Administration), and Occupational Area 18 (Service and Supply Handlers).

COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS

Information, information processing, and communications networks are at the core of every military activity. Information superiority is fundamental to the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force. Table two lists the Communications and Intelligence Specialists as detailed in area 12 of the DOD Occupational Index.\(^\text{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Radio and Radio Code</td>
<td>Included operators of radio, radio teletype, and visual communications equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Sonar</td>
<td>Includes specialists in the operation of sonar and related detection equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Radar and Air Traffic Control</td>
<td>Included the operation of surveillance, target acquisition and tracking radars, fore distribution devices, and air traffic control visual and electronic navigational aids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>Includes the intercept, translation, and analysis of foreign communications, and the operation of electronic countermeasures equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Includes the gathering, receipt, and analysis of non-signal intelligence data, the interrogation of prisoners, other language translators and interpreters, image interpretation, and specialists in counterintelligence and investigative activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Combat Operations Control</td>
<td>Includes specialists in forward area tactical operations and intelligence and in command post control activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Communications center Operations</td>
<td>Includes the receipt and distribution of messages, the operation of communications center equipment, and the operation of major field communications systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. DOD ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL AREA 12 (COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS)
Therefore, the Communications and Intelligence Specialists occupational area includes personnel from each of the military services who are proficient in the operation and monitoring of radio, radio teletype, radar, sonar and allied communications and intelligence consoles. Additionally, this area includes those who gather and interpret photographic, electronic and documentary intelligence. Enlisted personnel work as computer programmers, air traffic controllers, interpreters and translators, and radio, radar, and sonar operators. In order for the joint force to be able to take advantage of superior information to achieve decision superiority, organizational and doctrinal adaptation are necessary. Interoperability will be key in this functional area and will be the foundation of effective joint operations. Common joint systems of the future will undoubtedly support consolidation considerations in this area.

HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS

The military health care system operates one of the largest and most complex health care organizations in the nation. The Health Care Specialists occupational area includes specialists in patient care, treatment, ancillary medical support, administration and related medical and dental services. Enlisted personnel are trained to work as medical laboratory technologists and technicians, radiological technologists, emergency medical technicians, combat medics, dental assistants, optical assistants, pharmaceutical assistants, sanitation specialists, and veterinary assistants. Table three lists the Health Care Specialists as detailed in area 13 of the DOD Occupational Index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Medical Care</td>
<td>Includes all medical care and treatment, surgical, and therapy specialists. Dental Care Specialists are excluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Ancillary Medical Support</td>
<td>Includes specialists in medical laboratory, pharmacy, and x-ray.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Biomedical Services and Allied Health</td>
<td>Includes specialists in environmental health/preventive medicine, veterinary medicine, optometry, physiology, diet therapy, medical equipment maintenance and other biomedical science and allied health specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Dental Care</td>
<td>Includes specialists in dental care and treatment and in dental laboratory services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Medical Administration and Logistics</td>
<td>Includes specialists in health care, medical logistics and patient administration and management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. DOD ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL AREA 13 (HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS)
Pursuing a joint military medical organization could potentially lead to reduced costs, better integrated health care delivery, a more efficient administrative process, and improved readiness.

FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION

Functional Support and Administration is the backbone of every organization. These occupations in military service require the same skills as similar jobs in private businesses and government agencies. Table four lists the Functional Support and Administration Specialists as detailed in area 15 of the DOD Occupational Index.\(^\text{17}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Includes specialists in personnel administration, personnel and manpower management, and recruiting and counseling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Includes clerks, typists, and stenographers and legal and medical administrative specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>Clerical/Personnel</td>
<td>Includes combined personnel and administrative specialists and senior enlisted personnel whose primary responsibilities are non-technical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Data Processing</td>
<td>Includes computer operators, analysts, and programmers and electric accounting machine operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Accounting, Finance, and Disbursing</td>
<td>Includes audit and budget specialists, disbursing clerks and other related specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Other Functional Support</td>
<td>Includes specialists who provide support in the functional areas of supply accounting and procurement, transportation, flight operations and related areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Religious, Morale, Welfare</td>
<td>Includes chaplains’ assistants and specialists in theater, arts, sports and related activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Information and Education</td>
<td>Includes specialists in public affairs, radio/TV, other types of information and education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4. DOD ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL AREA 15 (FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION)

This occupational area includes general administrative, clerical and personnel specialists. Also this area includes administrative specialists in data processing, information, and related areas, and functional support specialists in areas such as supply, transportation, and flight
operations. Enlisted personnel in this category work as accounting clerks, payroll clerks, personnel clerks, computer programmers, computer operators, chaplain assistants, counseling aides, typists, stenographers, storekeepers, and other clerks.

Additional multi-dimensional operating projects, like DIMHRS, will support consolidation in this functional area and enhance readiness by providing mission support to the war fighter and military departments, place personnel and pay functional requirements and ‘best business’ practices, technical requirements, and costs into the overall development strategy, and deliver a system that optimizes technology and incorporates improved business practices for the Department of Defense.

SERVICE AND SUPPLY HANDLERS

Military personnel in service and supply occupations handle food service, security, and personal services and supply. Table five lists the Service and Supply Handlers as detailed in area 18 of the DOD Occupational Index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>Food Service</td>
<td>Includes specialists in the handling, preparation and serving of food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>Motor Transport</td>
<td>Includes the operation of wheeled and tracked vehicles (except construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>equipment) and railway equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>Materiel Receipt, Storage and Issue</td>
<td>Includes specialists in the receipt, storage, issue, and general and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>specialized classes of supplies, excluding ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Includes military police, protective and corrections specialists, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>criminal and non-criminal inspectors and investigators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>Personnel Service</td>
<td>Includes laundry, dry cleaning, and related services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>Auxiliary Labor</td>
<td>Includes unskilled laborers and their supervisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>Forward Area Equipment Support</td>
<td>Includes specialists in parachute packing and repair, in aerial delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5. DOD ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL AREA 18 (SERVICE AND SUPPLY HANDLERS)

The Service and Supply Handlers occupational area includes personnel involved in protective and personal services and non-clerical personnel involved in warehousing, food handling, and motor transportation. Enlisted personnel include military police, correction
specialists, detectives, firefighters, and food preparation and other service workers. They operate transportation equipment such as trucks, ships, boats, airplanes, and helicopters, and act as quartermasters, supply specialists, and cargo specialists.

The goal of consolidation in this functional area would be to reduce operating support costs through the elimination of unnecessary management layers, duplicative overhead and redundant functions and create robust, consolidated service providers that are capable of utilizing state-of-the-market business practices and technologies to improve processes and increase efficiency. Information flow and learning will also be improved. A comprehensive reorganization of these service and supply functions would not only make a more credible joint organization, but would significantly reduce costs, provide greater opportunity to capitalize on successful support practices, and make better use of limited resources.

CONSOLIDATION

Since their creation, the service support areas and skills within the military branches have remained separate, despite the similarity and redundancy of their missions and functions. This consolidation proposal is an effort to reshape DOD’s support structure to better attain the mission and more efficiently utilize valuable, but limited resources. The goal of merging the support functions from each of the military services would be to increase efficiency, reduce cost, and clearly focus on the organizational mission. A consolidated organization could utilize the strengths from all the DOD support organizations, and yet reduce the overall support organization required to accomplish necessary functions. There is no specific disadvantage to maintaining a status quo as the support organizations currently exist. However, the possibility of achieving benefits from combined training and deployment, as well as positive resource savings from consolidating DOD support functional areas that are similar in so many respects, cannot be overlooked.

In any proposed consolidation, the goal of merging portions of different organizations must be to build on the strengths of each and create a more efficient and stronger/unified organization. A consolidated military support organization could utilize the strengths from all the current service support resources, and yet potentially reduce the overall numbers of personnel and infrastructure required to accomplish necessary functions. The primary goal of consolidating the DOD support functions would be to organize all of those skills under a single commander and to facilitate DOD-wide support force management and decisions. Certainly, a secondary goal would be to achieve the additional benefit of resource savings. Any consolidation would facilitate blending the service orientation of each individual with a dedication
to learning and improving operational performance. Because of the duplication that exists in these functional areas, support occupations should be analyzed and compared to determine whether if some of these skills could be consolidated. Careful consideration would have to be given so that any changes were accomplished in a manner that would minimize workforce disruption and preserves continuity in operations. More synergy between the military services support organizations could provide smart savings – both in dollars and in personnel.

Each of the occupational specialty groups listed above in Tables 2 – 5 are considered supporting MOS’s that should be analyzed for regrouping within the military into an organization that is not service specific. This type of initiative would potentially reduce duplication, utilize resources more wisely and take advantage of combined training programs and operating systems. All of these initiatives would be a benefit for the military. The DOD can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining separate and distinct infrastructures to accomplish the support mission. Any consolidation would need to be thoroughly planned and additional study required to develop, at a minimum, the planned change of structure, physical locations of commands, and information processing and flow. A pilot consolidation of one functional area is one method of conducting a phased implementation and developing lessons learned to minimize possible disruption of the entire support mission. Timing of any in-depth review and follow-on consolidation is critical. The military support structure must be seriously considered for transformation concurrently with the all other elements of DOD. The transformation to the proposed support command structure requires additional study to develop, at a minimum, the planned change of structure, physical locations of commands, and information processing and flow. Milestones and a phased implementation would help to reduce structural turmoil.

Given the current initiatives to consolidate training and develop common operating systems, it makes sense to consider consolidating a portion of the DOD support structure that is duplicative across the branches of the armed services. It is proposed that DOD can no longer maintain separate support functional areas within the armed services that have virtually identical missions and extensive duplication in the support structure. The benefits possible from this proposal would be saved manpower and resources, sharing of successful practices, and the creation of a more efficient and stronger DOD organization. Therefore, it is recommended that DOD study this initiative in order to support DOD’s transformational goals and determine the magnitude of the benefit.
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the importance of a strong well-trained and well-equipped joint military has never been greater. The dissipation of the Cold War threat and the development of numerous diverse threats represent current and future challenges to the United States and our national interests. Ever-changing global crises ultimately take immediate attention away from planning efforts for DOD’s future. The defense budgets of the future will require more to be done with less. As we rapidly gain the required technological capabilities and move towards fighting the threats of the future, the military must embrace transformation and new ideas. This is critical to ensuring the relevance of DOD in the future and providing the national confidence that the United States military will continue to be able to defend national interests both at home and abroad. The past ways of doing business are a luxury no longer available. The individual services can not maintain their parochial attitudes and go it alone. Synergy is required. Therefore, DOD must strive for a better way to do business. Reducing duplication across the services by creating a DOD support command would help create a better and more joint military.

This paper was exploratory rather than definitive, and has developed nearly as many questions as it attempted to answer. In order to better attain transformation goals and more efficiently use valuable but limited resources, all ideas must be considered. If the proposal in this paper was studied and then adopted, with it would come the necessity for all the services to change the manner in which they do business. Some of the supporting initiatives for this consolidation are currently under development and there are certainly other areas within the military where additional common systems could be effectively deployed. Once a joint system is employed DOD wide for all service members, there will be that much more reason to examine whether support specialists should remain separate within their own service. If further analysis determines benefit would be derived from this proposal, key functions should be identified quickly and requirements defined in order to begin reengineering those functional areas within the DOD organization that appear to offer the best opportunities for transformation and savings. Consolidating the support structures of the different military services into one DOD support organization would not be easy, given the fierce protection of individual service roles and missions. However, allowing each of the separate services to conduct their own individual transformations will undoubtedly result in stove-piped organizations, such as those which exist today. Therefore, DOD must be actively involved in this transformation effort to eliminate the duplication that resides across the individual services.
This initiative in this paper is not just a downsizing effort, but the effort to reshape the military services. It reflects the intent of the SECDEF’s proposal for a more unified DOD team. In a time when all facets of the military are being scrutinized for potential transformation and resource savings, it makes sense to consider a consolidation proposal that would build on the strengths of each service and create a more efficient and unified organization. Can the military completely and correctly address all the transformation challenges it will face in the future? Probably not. But it certainly can approach organizational challenges in a smart, proactive manner in order to better accomplish DOD’s goals for the future.
ENDNOTES


5 Wolfowitz.

6 Rumsfeld.


8 Rumsfeld.

9 Suzanne Ray <suzanne-d.ray@cnet.navy.mil>, “List of Interservice Courses,” electronic mail message to CDR Anne Hammond <anne.Hammond@carlisle.army.mil>, 11 March 2003.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

15 DOD Occupational Conversion Index.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
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