Given the timeframe which has passed since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, we are beginning to see the first generation of “joint qualified” Flag officers produced with respect to the by-products, or intent, of that and subsequent legislation. Due to training and experience requirements set forth, one could assume that the leaders of the United States Armed Forces are not only well versed in Joint Doctrine, but that they are capitalizing on the varied and valuable virtues of “Jointness”…or are they?

This paper is a case study examination of Operation Anaconda, its commander MG Franklin L. Hagenbeck, his qualifications, existing Flag Officer requirements, and whether there is a systemic problem inherent in developing future joint force commanders. This thesis will show that the building blocks necessary for developing a future joint commander are present and are generally capable of producing the desired qualifications needed in a leader, however enhancements to the process should be formalized in order to help guarantee future successes. Enhancements which include working with USJFCOM to further institutionalize joint training from pre-commissioning throughout an individual’s military career, reorganizing the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, expanding the Joint Operations Module within the CAPSTONE curriculum, and integrating new training concepts like the Standing Joint Force Headquarters will increase future joint force commander efficiency.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

“JOINT QUALIFIED” FLAG OFFICER DEVELOPMENT:
IS PRODUCTION BROKEN?

by

Archibald E. Bruns

Major, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:_______________________________

3 February 2003
Abstract of

“JOINT QUALIFIED” FLAG OFFICER DEVELOPMENT:
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Given the timeframe which has passed since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, we are beginning to see the first generation of “joint qualified” Flag officers produced with respect to the by-products, or intent, of that and subsequent legislation. Due to training and experience requirements set forth, one could assume that the leaders of the United States Armed Forces are not only well versed in Joint Doctrine, but that they are capitalizing on the varied and valuable virtues of “Jointness”...or are they?

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I. Introduction:

The Joint Officer Management Program, which is the system of policies and procedures that the Department of Defense enacted in order to implement and manage the directives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, began a revolution in the way joint officers are developed and trained. Given the timeframe which has passed, we are beginning to see the first generation of “joint qualified” Flag officers produced with respect to the by-products, or intent, of that and subsequent legislation. Due to the training and experience requirements set forth, one could assume that the leaders of the United States Armed Forces are not only well versed in Joint Doctrine, but that they are capitalizing on the varied and valuable virtues of “Jointness”…or are they?

In a recent interview the Commander of Operation Anaconda was quoted concerning criticism about the air component’s support of troops on the ground. He and a member of his staff asserted problems with timely close air support (CAS) and its direction of munitions, air tasking order (ATO) cycle unresponsiveness, and inflexible self-imposed restrictions on air assets. This criticism was crucial in bringing to light the lack of timely coordination with the other service component commanders during the Operation’s planning stages until just prior to the onset of hostilities. By keeping the planning Army-centric and either the deliberate or inadvertent lack of attention given to the other service’s capabilities and requirements, the question is raised of just how successful the US military is at producing joint officers. Of particular concern are those that attain the Flag officer rank and are awarded the reigns of leadership for Combatant or Joint Task Force commands.

This paper is not intended as an indictment of the Operation Anaconda commander, rather, it will examine whether there is a possible systemic problem inherent in developing
joint commanders and to provide an analysis of current and future enhancements to the process. It will show that the building blocks necessary for developing a future joint commander are present and are generally capable of producing the desired qualifications needed in a leader, however enhancements to the process should be formalized in order to help guarantee future successes. The circumstances of Operation Anaconda will be used as an illustrative example of this thesis and defines the scope of this investigation with a very limited view. As such, the joint community should consider this study as an initial indicator and that broader investigations into the topic should be embraced. As the US continues to wage the global war on terrorism, and as US military presence and involvement around the world becomes the norm rather than the exception, its resources are being transformed into leaner and meaner fighting forces. Therefore, now more than ever, the US needs to bring to bear every aspect of its fighting force and produce the personnel necessary to accomplish it.

II. BACKGROUND:

On 2 March 2002, Army Major General (MG) Franklin L. “Buster” Hagenbeck, launched what turned out to be a 17-day offensive called Operation Anaconda which, from a US perspective, resulted in some of the bloodiest fighting to date in the war against terrorism. As the Commanding General, Coalition Joint Task Force Mountain, he was responsible for the planning and conduct of the operation designed to take out remaining pockets of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters that were forming near the mountains of eastern Afghanistan in the Shah-e-Kot Valley. His command was made up of over 1400 US ground forces, including: forces from the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), about 1,200 infantrymen with the 10th Mountain and 101st Air Assault Divisions, twenty four Army cargo utility and attack
helicopters, and Air Force, Marine, and Navy aviation assets. He also coordinated coalition forces from Afghanistan, Canada, England, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand.

MG Hagenbeck’s military experience reflects a background specializing primarily in light infantry and includes tours with the 25th Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, and currently as the Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light) at Fort Drum, New York. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in June 1971 from the US Military Academy and was subsequently promoted through the ranks. He was promoted to Brigadier General (BG) in July 1998 and then to MG on 1 November 2001. He’s also a graduate of the US Army’s Command and General Staff and War Colleges. His joint qualifications, which will be discussed later in this paper, coupled with the remainder of his background, seemed sufficient to prepare him to lead a combined joint task force. In fact, all initial indications after the completion of Operation Anaconda also led to this conclusion. Without delving too deeply into the actual conduct of Anaconda, it was lauded by many including General Tommy Franks, Chief of U.S. Central Command, as “an unqualified and absolute success.”

Since then, however, information has come to light that calls into question the degree of success that Anaconda really had. There were mistakes made that had serious consequences during its conduct. First of all the Army planners underestimated how fiercely the enemy would fight and this took them by surprise. In fact, Anaconda was originally planned to only last for 72 hours. The resulting casualties included eight U.S. service members killed and dozens more wounded. But more relevant to the issue of this paper was the lack and timing of pre-planning coordination that the Army planners made with their service counterparts.
The first public accounts of planning problems with the Operation came after an interview with MG Hagenbeck conducted by *Field Artillery* magazine. In the published report, he was quoted as criticizing air power in its role of supporting troops on the ground. Included was a statement that, “It took anywhere from 26 minutes to hours (on occasion) for the precision munitions to hit the targets.” He went on to say it was a real problem when used in conjunction with fleeting targets. In another interview, Lt Col Christopher Bentley, MG Hagenbeck’s fire support coordinator during the operation, further fanned the flames of controversy by stating: “Increasing the flexibility of the ATO cycle is imperative to responsiveness in today’s operational environment” and he also suggested the possibility that the Air Force was reluctant to initiate steps that would foster better close air support. These comments generated a hailstorm of activity starting with the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper launching a review of his service’s performance during the Operation. Thus, the reality concerning the lack of pre-planning coordination and a definite lack of understanding of sister service requirements, and maybe even their capabilities, on the part of Anaconda’s planners surfaced. According to unnamed officials in a recent *Inside the Pentagon* article, “…it was not until 24 hours before Anaconda was launched the CENTCOM’s land component officially notified the air component of the operation’s details—and that Navy and Air Force aircraft were expected to be vital players.” The Navy and Marine elements involved were similarly affected.

Now that these revelations are public information, there has been a definite shift on the part of senior service officials to close ranks, address the issues, and foster a spirit of teamwork in order to alleviate potential problems. A response from the Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC) stated that MG Hagenbeck’s assertions may have brought to
light the lack of pre-planning involvement, however the services should focus on that aspect and not on any potentially divisive and damaging inter-service conflicts. He stated that he spoke with MG Hagenbeck and, “Aside from an initial lack of joint planning, Anaconda is a story of superior teamwork, not division; and a textbook case of soldiers and airmen working together as members of a joint team, not as individual players.”

MG Hagenbeck even tried to reduce the tension by either retracting or restating the words he used during the Field Artillery interview.

There’s an underlining question that still needs to be answered. What caused the breakdown in communication between the services and how did MG Hagenbeck allow it to happen? Was it a lack of understanding and training of how to effectively organize and plan a Joint Operation or was it an intentional act carried out in order to give the Army a chance to go it alone? Based on his interview statement about not bringing M119 105-mm howitzers (and the reported conversation with COMACC) it appears MG Hagenbeck did not deliberately intend to leave the other services out of the planning and was in fact relying on CAS. He stated, “With the limited number of assets we brought into Afghanistan, it was clear we could capitalize on our mortars as well as on the Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy aviation assets.”

However as the CJTF Commander, he apparently left out a very important part of his responsibilities concerning planning. According to Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, “It is important that the CJTF keeps the JTF components informed of planning initiatives—the CJTF should strive to have JTF components assigned for planning as early as feasible.” In this respect, the lack of timely coordination raised issues of his effectiveness. Was the lack of coordination and resulting criticism indicative of a joint officer system that failed to produce a qualified JTF
commander or was it simply an unfortunate oversight? To answer this question, we first need to understand what it means to be a “joint qualified” officer, and what training requirements are expected of an individual once they attain the grade of a Flag officer including the ramifications of that respective training.

III. ANALYSIS:

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) and subsequent studies including the Report of the Panel on Military Education of The One Hundredth Congress by the committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 1989 (commonly known as the Skelton Report or Panel) were the main contributors responsible for shaping the way the services look at developing joint officers. They were instrumental in establishing joint requirements for education, duty, and promotion. Their requirements helped create a joint mindset within the DOD and have directed each of the services to establish procedures for joint duty assignment (JDA) management and joint professional military education (JPME) that were instrumental in determining whether an individual was “joint qualified”. A JDA is defined as “an assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multi-national command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments.”

Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) defines Professional Military Education as, “The systematic instruction of professionals in subjects which will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war.” It also says, “Each service operates its officer educational system primarily to develop officers with expertise and knowledge appropriate to their grade, branch, and warfare specialty.” With this in mind and taken one step further, JPME supports the educational requirements for the joint world. It’s divided up into two phases.
Phase I is “incorporated into the curricula of intermediate- and senior-level colleges and the Joint Forces Staff College” and Phase II completes the joint educational requirements at this level and “is taught at Joint Forces Staff College to both intermediate- and senior-level students”. If an officer completes the milestones of a full credit JDA and both phases of JPME then that officer can be designated by the Secretary of Defense as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and be eligible to fill critical billets within joint units.

It’s important to understand the fundamental aspects of a “joint qualified” officer since they are the building blocks for the next potential evolution in a military career which is a promotion to the Flag officer level. In fact, the education and experience derived at the earlier levels of a military career are essential for developing a Flag officer. A sentiment clearly stated in the Skelton Report where it reads, “The higher officers progress in rank, whether they serve in joint duty or service positions, the greater their need to understand the other services, joint operations and support, and ultimately national-level policy and strategy.”

There are mandated joint requirements at this level as well. In Title 10 of the United States Code, Section 619a it states, “An officer on the active-duty list of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps may not be appointed to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.” There are some exceptions and waivers to this rule, however they are becoming harder and harder to obtain and ultimately the goal for each service is to ensure they steer their potential promotion eligible officers in the direction of joint duty prior to selection for the grade of 07. The other mandated requirement of Title 10, which can be found in Section 663, requires all officers selected for 07 to attend a CAPSTONE course, designed to prepare them to work in the joint community with forces from the other services,
within approximately two years after Senate confirmation of selection.\textsuperscript{21} CAPSTONE is a six week course and is administered by National Defense University. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability, and key allied nation issues. A portion of this course, termed the Joint Operations Module (JOM), will be discussed later in this paper as a suggested area for expansion. A graphical depiction of the current lifecycle of joint and service specific PME is enclosed as an Appendix.\textsuperscript{22}

A requirement set forth within the GNA established the necessity for a yearly status report on just how the services are doing with respect to developing Flag officers with joint duty credit. In the Secretary of Defense Annual Reports to the President and the Congress, the following numbers have been reported concerning compliance with GNA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2001</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
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<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1995</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows an overall increase in the percentages of Flag officers with the required joint credit, but there is definitely room for improvement.

With this production of Flag officers, the services are producing the inventory needed to appoint JTF commanders, including MG Hagenbeck. This brings us to what is expected of a joint force commander. According to Joint Publication 3-0, \textit{Doctrine for Joint Operations}, “Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) synchronize and integrate the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through
integrated, joint campaigns and major operations.”²⁴ They are normally designated by Combatant Commanders and established for missions of a limited nature. Joint Publication 5-00.2 also outlines the basic organization principles of a JTF. Included in these are unity of effort, unity of command, centralized planning, decentralized execution, common doctrine, a command emphasis on interoperability, and other factors of the mission.²⁵ A good JTF commander needs to make the right decisions when it comes to these factors and these decisions will be shaped by their experience, training and education. According to Joint Vision 2020, “Decision superiority results from superior information filtered through the commander’s experience, knowledge, training, and judgment; the expertise of supporting staffs and other organizations; and the efficiency of associated processes.”²⁶ The role for future joint forces will become increasingly complex and their commanders will need a broad understanding of service, multinational, and interagency capabilities and requirements.

So did MG Hagenbeck have the right joint background? According to his biography, prior to going to Operation Anaconda, he completed three joint tours:

- United States Army Exchange Officer, New South Wales, Australia from July 1985 to January 1987
- Deputy Director for Current Operations, J-33, The Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington DC from November 2000 to August 2001

He held these last two tours as a BG and MG respectively and on the surface depicts the background and experience one would look for in a “joint qualified” officer. He received JPME Phase I credit for his completion of Army War College. Although a search with the Registrar at the Joint Forces Staff College and the Army General Matters Office determined he never received Phase II credit. Current requirements dictate that Phase I coupled with the
type and length of joint service experienced by MG Hagenbeck is sufficient to obtain Flag-level rank. Yet, can we do better?

**IV. CAN, AND HOW DO WE BETTER PREPARE FUTURE JTF COMMANDERS?:**

What is “jointness” and how do we better prepare our officers for it? Specialization and Synergism are the two competing views of what jointness is. Specialization says that the services should stick to the roles for which they were established. Synergism says that military capabilities of various services should be balanced in response to a given contingency (in other words…existing capabilities versus generated capabilities).²⁷

Based on the published reports on Operation Anaconda (although no formal unclassified lessons learned have been disseminated), MG Hagenbeck seems to have followed the specialization course of action. While he did not totally neglect the other services, his lack of pre-planning coordination exhibited an unwillingness or ignorance to embrace the required synergistic effects of employing each service’s battlefield specialization. Prevailing opinions on these two views do not necessarily portray one is better than the other, but history shows a balanced approach has better results. MG Hagenbeck may have understood this better had he completed either Phase II of JPME or, as will be discussed later in this paper, through more or expanded joint Flag officer training.

By instituting joint training throughout an officer’s military career, from pre-commissioning to retirement, the ability of individual service members to think “jointness”, and to reason it for themselves, seems more likely. That persistent exposure to all the services capabilities and requirements would pay off large dividends in years to come. According to the former president of National Defense University, LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA, (Ret.), “Military education, especially joint professional military education (JPME),
must be seamless, continuous, and career-long.”  This was also a conclusion shared by the JPME 2010 study. Some criticism to this perspective is that this much joint training, especially early in a military career, would lead to a degradation of service culture and reduce positive inter-service competitiveness. While competitiveness links the services to innovation, too much may breed the kind of bias and parochialism that in excess is detrimental to all the armed forces. By reducing this, critical comments like those of MG Hagenbeck could be seen in a more constructive and less spiteful light. As was pointed out in a recent article concerning his comments, “The comments come at a time when Army leaders are fighting a rear-guard action in Washington against what they see as the Defense Department’s trend toward over-reliance on precision-guided munitions in shaping the future U.S. military.”  Surely each of the services can derive a balance in training in order to create the needed experts of service core competencies and culture while still engendering a trust and appreciation of the other services to ensure the conduct of joint operations. According to Joint Vision 2020, “The integration of core competencies provided by the individual services is essential to the joint team, and the employment of the capabilities of the total force increases the options for the commander and complicates the choices of our opponents.”

The services can look for assistance in training and educating its members, especially at the Flag level, with the assistance of US Joint Forces Command. A huge part of USJFCOM’s mission is now centered on training senior military leaders to plan and manage joint and combined operations. According to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, USJFCOM’s mission is, “to lead the way in transforming the services, develop innovative concepts, test those concepts through rigorous experimentation, educate military leaders and
train their forces to operate jointly, and make recommendations on how the services can better integrate their war-fighting capabilities.” By ensuring the lessons learned from joint operations, including Operation Anaconda, USJFCOM can prepare our future joint leaders in joint warfighting concepts for joint operations still to come.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2002 has already instituted a re-look at the management of the joint world, including JPME, and the DOD has initiated an independent study to look at it. Another look at the existing JPME infrastructure is forthcoming from USJFCOM. In a pre-decisional draft recently distributed and dated 27 November 2002, it recommended moving a course that currently falls under Air University and is called the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC) to JFCOM and to increase the number of attendees by making it a part of CAPSTONE. This course is designed to prepare two-star officers for the responsibilities of theater-level combat leadership and to give them a broad perspective of the strategic and operational levels of war. It’s a two-week course offered twice a year for up to 18 flag officers. This would be a tremendous step in reestablishing the significance of this course and not only sounds reasonable, but necessary. It seemed especially disturbing that in the latest copy of the OPMEP, a change was outlined from its previous version with the removal of the JFOWC from the overall framework. This was definitely a step in the wrong direction and flies in the face of what USJFCOM is trying to do by formalizing senior officer professional development.

Another improvement to Flag officer development includes increased specialized training by JFCOM during CAPSTONE. This would be done by further expanding the previously mentioned JOM, which is the three (soon to be four) day part of the CAPSTONE course taught at the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in Suffolk, VA. It specializes in teaching
joint doctrine and the Joint Operational Art and according to the JWFC, “The JOM exposes
the group to joint operations using the life cycle of a JTF with a previous exercise scenario as
backdrop.” Since the life cycle of a JTF is the basis for this training, the benefits garnered
by further developing the lessons learned from previous operations and teaching them in this
forum would expand the education and training for future JTF commanders and remove
potential barriers to their success, an opportunity that may have helped MG Hagenbeck with
his pre-planning coordination.

The JOM could also incorporate formalized training with the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters (SJFHQ) concept to increase JTF commander efficiency. In an article in
National Defense magazine, Army Colonel Arthur M. Bartell, deputy joint force trainer at the
JWFC, stated, “USJFCOM is testing a concept for a standing joint force headquarters that the
Pentagon plans to have embedded in the staff of every combatant commander by fiscal year
2005.” This effort, and the subsequent training of it at JFCOM, would have the effect of
streamlining the planning process for a JTF and would assist an assigned commander with
integrating into it. The operational planners and command-and-control personnel would be
ready to jump into a JTF situation and already be trained and ready to ensure that all aspects
of joint planning, including utilizing and coordinating with each service, are accomplished
and done so in an efficient manner.

The bottom-line in these recommendations is to increase, or at the least formalize further
training and education at the Flag officer level with as many opportunities as possible. This
benefit would have positive implications in all future operational scenarios. As stated by
Frederick the Great, “War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study and
meditation is necessary to conduct it well.”
V. CONCLUSION:

Through the research for this paper, numerous courses of general and specific joint study were found which are offered over the lifetime of a military career. The problem lies in getting the right person to the right course at the right time. Whether through the pre-commissioning, basic, intermediate, senior, or even Flag officer levels, it’s important to emphasize the necessity of learning the appropriate lessons. In the dynamic, ever-changing environment of the future, new generations of JTF commanders will need all the available joint and service tools at their disposal in order to further the likelihood of their success.

Implementation of the suggested recommendations in this paper will improve Flag officer level professional military education from a service and joint perspective and will directly impact the future joint-warfighter.

MG Hagenbeck’s frustrations with airpower support and the subsequent identification of problems with planning pre-coordination, including knowledge of the requirements and capabilities for service inter-operability, portray at least one circumstance when either the system broke down or it was ignored. It’s still too early to be positive which is the appropriate determination in this instance and overarching generalities should not be derived from just one case study, however one hopes that once the lessons learned from Operation Anaconda are published, they will be used for future positive results and help create conditions of joint effectiveness.

The overall goal of the GNA, Joint Vision 2010 and 2020, etc. is to affect a fundamental change to service centric cultures just enough to give “jointness” a chance. As stated by Harry D. Train, II, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, we are trying to reach a point where “jointness is a state of mind.”

Given the preponderance of public
support from leadership of each of the services and unified commands, that point will one day be reached.
### Officer Military Education Framework (Figure 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Cadet/Midshipman</th>
<th>0-1/0-2/0-3</th>
<th>0-3/0-4</th>
<th>0-5/0-6</th>
<th>0-7/0-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level</strong></td>
<td>Precommissioning</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>General/Flag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Educational Institutions and Courses** | Service Academies
| ROTC | OCS/OTS | Branch Warfare, Staff Specialty Schools
| Primary Level PME Courses | Air Command & Staff College
| Army Command & General Staff College | College of Naval Command & Staff
| Marine Corps Command & Staff College | Joint Forces Staff College
| Joint & Combined Staff Officer School | - Air War College
| - Army War College | - College of Naval Warfare
| - Marine Corps War College | - Industrial College of the Armed Forces
| - National War College | - Joint Forces Staff College
| - Joint & Combined Warfighting School | - CAPSTONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Levels of War Emphasized</strong></th>
<th>Conceptual Awareness of All Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Focus of Military Education** | Introduction to Services
| Military Missions | Assigned Branch Warfare, Staff Specialty |
| Warfighting within the Context of Operational Art | Service Schools: National Military Strategy
| - Joint Matters and National Security | - Interagency Processes
| - Multinational Operations | - Joint Operations |

| **Joint Emphasis** | Joint Introduction
| National Military Capabilities and Organization | Joint Awareness
| Foundation of Joint Warfare | JPME Phase I
| National Military Capabilities and Command Structure | National Security Strategy
| Joint Doctrine | National Planning Systems and Processes |
| Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War | National Military Strategy and Organization |
| Joint Planning and Execution Processes | Theater Strategy and Campaigning |
| Information Operations | - The Role of Technology in 21st Century Warfare |
| JPME Phase II | Joint CAPSTONE |
| - National Security and Military Strategy in Development of Theater Strategies | - National Security Strategy |
| - Theater Engagement and Campaign Planning with Joint, Multinational and Interagency Organizations | - Joint Operational Art |
| - JSPS, JOPES and Operational-Level Battlespace Systems Integration through Deliberate and Crisis Planning |

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1Refer to Appendix B to Enclosure A for a comprehensive description of PME
2ICAF and NWC offer full JPME (Phase I & II not applicable)
3Only JFSC is authorized to offer JPME Phase II

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**APPENDIX**
NOTES

3 McElroy, 5.
7 McElroy, 8.
8 Naylor, 10.
12 McElroy, pg. 6.
17 Ibid., GL-5.
18 Ibid.
30 Naylor, 10.


Information obtained per a recent electronic poll sent throughout the services to gather data and opinions regarding JOM and JPME. This particular study was awarded to Booz Allen Hamilton of McLean, VA and the final report is due to DOD and Congress by March 2003.


Abahazy, Daniel F., USIFCOM JWFC Interoperability Training. <abahazy@jwfc.jfcom.mil> “GO Joint Training.” [Email to author <brunsa@nwc.navy.mil>] 17 January 2003.

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