AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO

by

Craig M. Kilhenny

March 2003

Thesis Advisor: Cary Simon
Second Reader: Susan Dooley

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This thesis is a descriptive organizational analysis of MCRDSD. The study describes MCRDSD in terms of its direction, tasks, people, structure, processes, culture, outputs and outcomes using systems analysis and Mintzberg’s configuration theory. Based on document reviews, model comparisons, and semi-structured interviews, e-mail and phone conversations with approximately 30 Depot personnel, MCRDSD fulfills its basic mission but is not aligned for optimum performance. The following conclusions pertain: the current organizational structure of MCRDSD may not be optimized towards overall performance; cognizance over the POI resides at too high a level, is too rigid and implementing change too difficult; and Depot priority of making Marines is too often subordinated to the public relations effort. Recommendations are offered to assist Depot leadership in making systematic change to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the depot. With changes in organizational structure, reprioritization of tasks, and adoption of oversight over the POI, MCRDSD can enhance its command climate, efficiency of the recruit training process, and the quality of basic trained Marine produced.
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO

Craig M. Kilhenny
Major, United States Marine Corps
B. S., St Johns University, 1989

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Author: Craig M. Kilhenny

Approved by: Cary A. Simon
Principle Advisor

Susan Dooley
Associate Advisor

Douglas R. Brook
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
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<tr>
<td>MCRD</td>
<td>Marine Corps Recruit Depot</td>
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<td>MCRDSD</td>
<td>Marine Corps recruit Depot, San Diego</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
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<td>RD</td>
<td>Recruiting District</td>
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<td>RS</td>
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<td>WRR</td>
<td>Western Recruiting Region</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Marine Corps Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Knowledge Skill Ability</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>Instructional Training Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Special Training Company</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Branch medical Clinic</td>
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<td>Branch Dental Clinic</td>
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<td>Basic Marine Platoon</td>
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<td>School of Infantry</td>
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<td>MCT</td>
<td>Marine Combat Training</td>
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</table>
POI  Program of Instruction
CPEN  Camp Pendleton
HQMC  Headquarters Marine Corps
IST  Initial Strength Test
MCMAP  Marine Corps martial Arts Program
COD  Close Order Drill
FFR  Field Firing Range
TECOM  Training & Education Command
BWT  Basic Warrior Training
MRE  Meal-Ready-to-Eat
FMF  Fleet Marine Forces
MOS  Military Occupational Specialty
SOC  Series Officer Course
BRAC  Base Realignment and Closure
MCO  Marine Corps Order
T/O  Table of Organization
MCAGCC  Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
MCAS  Marine Corps Air Station
RAS/PAS  Recruit Accountability System/
        Personnel Accountability System
PRASP  Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program
PFT  Physical Fitness Test
ByDir  By Direction
TIG/TIS  Time in Grade/Time in Service
“THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE DO IN THE MARINE CORPS IS MAKE MARINES.”

General James Jones

32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps
I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego (MCRDSD), one of two Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD), is responsible for training all recruits originating from recruiting stations (RS) west of the Mississippi River. Unlike its sister depot, MCRD Parris Island on the east coast, MCRD, San Diego conducts recruit training at two Marine bases 30 miles apart. The majority of the training is conducted aboard the recruit depot located in the heart of downtown San Diego. However, due to the restrictions placed upon the San Diego depot concerning acreage available for field training and field firing, MCRDSD must temporarily relocate recruit training to Edson Range, MCB Camp Pendleton for four weeks each training cycle. Here the recruits complete critical training requirements to include field training, qualifying with the M-16 A2 service rifle and the final exercise, the Crucible. In addition to the responsibility of training one half of the Corps 38,000 recruits each year, MCRDSD is also responsible for the Western Recruiting Region (WRR) headquartered aboard the Depot.

This study examines recruit training at MCRDSD from an organizational systems perspective\(^1\). A system: is composed of parts; has relations; has a boundary; generates emergent properties; and has a common purpose or outcome\(^2\). Even though MCRDSD may be generating some of the best, basically trained war-fighters in the U.S. arsenal, this study analyzes the extent to which all the critical components of recruit training fit


\(^2\) Prof. Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
together as a system. The purpose is to assist Marine Corps leaders and managers in ways to improve recruit training.

B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis combined literature review, on-site semi-structured interviews, and comparison to accepted theoretical frameworks of organizational performance. A review of relevant literature relating to organizational and systems analysis, systems theory, including Mintzberg’s structural configuration theory was conducted to provide the theoretical foundation for analyzing recruit training. A review of literature, briefs and documents provided by MCRDSD was conducted in order to describe the organizational structure and missions of the depot and subordinate commands prior to an onsite visit and interviews. Additional data were obtained based on an onsite visit to MCRDSD, for observation of daily/routine operations, and 30 semi-structured interviews conducted with depot personnel ranging from the commanding general to drill instructors. Two theoretical models were used to describe and analyze recruit training – systems model and Mintzberg’s configurations model. Both models contain all the important variables for determining the extent to which an organization fits with its external environment and produces desired results.

C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY

This study examines recruit training in terms of how its present organizational environment, structure, processes and culture are aligned with the depot’s primary mission of converting civilians into top-notch, basic trained Marines. This study can be used by Marine Corps leaders, planners, managers, and Drill Instructor’s to modify certain aspects of
recruit training to improve training efficiency and end results. Findings indicate that some components are not in alignment with the depots mission. Recommendations are made to highlight opportunities for increased cooperation and flexibility between recruit trainers and civilian run aspects of recruit training, including restructuring the Recruit Training Regiment, and the creation of a Deputy CG billet to allow the CG to focus on depot priorities.

D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The data used in this thesis was collected through the conduct of only 30 interviews with depot personnel across the spectrum of the command, review of depot literature, command and visitor briefs, and the author’s personal experiences in recruit training. This research has been limited to training operations at MCRD, San Diego only, and does not address or reflect that of MCRD, Parris Island. This was necessary in that MCRD, Parris Island is a centralized recruit training environment and involves significant training and logistical differences and considerations from that of MCRD, San Diego. The analysis is limited to a qualitative study only; no attempt was made to quantify the effect that any areas determined to be not in alignment with the depots primary mission are in terms of time or fiscal resources. The scope of this study is limited to an analysis of those agencies and units directly related to the recruit training mission, and does not take into account other subordinate commands and tenant activities co-located aboard the base.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The primary research question of this thesis contains two basic parts: (1) What are the system components comprising
recruit training at MCRD San Diego (e.g. Environmental context, organizational design structure and processes, and results)? And (2) To what extent do the critical components fit together to produce an optimal system for training basically-trained Marines. Chapter II discusses the systems and Mintzberg’s frameworks. Chapter III provides an overview of the organizational structure of MCRDSD. Chapter IV provides an overview of the recruit training process at MCRDSD. Chapter V analyzes recruit training at San Diego using the theoretical frameworks, and Chapter VI draws conclusions and makes recommendations for improvements.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MODELS

This chapter describes the analytical tools used to conduct the analysis outlined in Chapters V and VI. The first tool is the systems model that looks at an organization from a holistic\(^3\), open system approach. A system is a set of interrelated and interdependent components having a common purpose. The hypothesis is that the extent to which important organizational input, throughput, and results variables fit, or are in congruence, then performance is better. Congruence is defined as “the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of one component are consistent with the needs, demands, goals objectives, and/or structures of another component”\(^4\). The second model used is based on Mintzberg’s theory of configuration, which suggests an organizations structure is based upon the configuration of its core attributes\(^5\).

A. SYSTEMS MODEL

The systems model shown Figure 1 is an adaptation of Prof. Roberts’\(^6\) Organizational Framework design and views an organizational systems framework in terms of its inputs, throughputs and results. Each of these in turn consists of various interrelated attributes (external environment, people, structure, technology, culture, etc.) that interact with each


other whereby a change in one will impact upon the others and vice-versa. The extent of fit, or congruence with the organizations goals is a determining factor in an organizations success. This model will be instrumental in the analysis of MCRD, San Diego. For example, inputs equate primarily to civilian recruits, among other external and internal factors. A throughput would be the recruit training process, outputs are the number of recruits completing training, and outcomes include the knowledge, skills and capabilities, internalized, i.e. basic trained Marines.

1. Inputs

   a. Environment/Context

   According to Nadler and Tushman, inputs consist of those resources or materials that an organization has to work with. These are referred to as the “givens” facing an organization\(^7\). These givens include the environmental factors, resources and history of the organization. The first of three main elements considered as inputs are those that impact the organization that are external to the organization itself. They are most notably the political, economic, social and technological influences that comprise the environment the organization exists within. They combine to create the demands, constraints and opportunities that shape the decisions of the command and to a large degree also determine the resources available to the organization. They range from markets and suppliers to competitors and the economy\(^8\).

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\(^8\)Ibid. p. 95.
Organizational Systems Framework

Source: From Roberts (1998)
Figure 1. Systems Model

Dr. Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1998.
The other two factors to consider when identifying the environmental and contextual factors related to an organization are the Resources and History of that organization. Resources refer to the different assets available to an organization in the form of labor, technology, capital and information. Two concerns regarding the use of these resources is the organizations degree of access to the resources needed and their pliability towards the organizations goals, purpose or mission\textsuperscript{10}. History implies that the way an organization acts, reacts or makes decisions is due in large part to the manner in which they have conducted themselves in the past\textsuperscript{11}. History in large complex machine bureaucracies (military services) is deeply ingrained and often slow to change.

\textbf{b. Key Success Factors}

What does it take for an organization to be successful? This can be dependent upon the organization’s managerial priorities and they can differ between organizations competing within the same industry, existing in similar contexts, and can change from year to year. Though they are commonly similar between organizations competing in similar industries, they in turn can vary significantly between different industries. A key success factor concerning recruit training might be the ability of drill instructors to successfully transform civilians into trained Marines.

\textbf{c. System Direction}

Critical to the success of an organization is the direction, guidance, goals, strategic vision and mission accomplishment identified and obtained by senior leaders. Of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
these, strategy may be the most critical as it defines how the organization is going to compete within its industry, conduct itself within the marketplace, and obtain its quantifiable objectives. System direction also includes any organizational mandates, principles or espoused values administered. System direction includes the method and type of guidance articulated by the leadership.

2. Design Factors

Design factors refer to the throughputs or the transformation process whereby inputs are acted upon to yield desired results. Design factors include structural (decision making) and process variables as well as tasking and technology used to accomplish the work. Again, relative congruence among pairs of design variables impacts performance. For instance, the greater the fit between how decisions are made and the reward process, the greater the likelihood of obtaining the desired results. An example related to recruit training would predict the extent to which recruits are rewarded (or punished) fits desired behavior (decisions), and training is enhanced.

a. Tasks

Tasks are the actual work being done by the organization or the type of work the organization is involved in. Analysis begins with defining the critical tasks and functions that need to be conducted in order for the organization to accomplish its goals. Analysis would include describing the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) necessary to complete the tasks, and the constraints and

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12 Ibid., p. 97.
restraints inherent in the workplace. Notably, the congruence among other components depends in large part on an in-depth understanding of the nature of the tasks to be performed\textsuperscript{14}.

\textbf{b. Technology}

Technology refers to the workflow. How can it be described? Is it linear or are several functions performed simultaneously that contribute to the production of the same product? Technology also includes the key interdependencies among the work groups or activities being performed and the condition of the physical facilities and equipment. It does not account for information systems, often thought to be included in this component.

\textbf{c. Structure}

Structure refers to the basic groupings of activities and people and the relationship between these activities and core tasks, but also includes how decisions are made. For example, are they centralized or decentralized, and are teams used to make decisions? Also considered is how integrating devices are used such as hierarchy, task forces, integrating roles, integrating departments, matrix and network arrangements.

\textbf{d. People}

This factor describes the number, characteristics, motivations, expectations and experiences of the employee workforce. Who are they? What is their demographic make-up? What are their initial KSA’s? This information can assist in understanding the individual and group behavior of the

workforce. New recruits are of course a reflection of Americas changing generations, e.g., Gen-X and millennials.

**e. Process/Subsystems**

This design factor addresses:

1. **Financial Management, Measurement and Controls:** This includes measures of accountability for resources, budgeting and performance appraisal measurements and processes. The idea is to discern if the mechanisms in place are producing or inhibiting the desired patterns of behavior.

2. **Human Resources Management (HRM):** HRM manages personnel polices to ensure it has the right amount of people, with the right skills, in the right jobs, to meet the needs of the organization. Initial analysis focuses on if the right people are being recruited, selected, retained, promoted and terminated. Are the organizations training programs adequate? Lastly, there is a need to focus on the rewards process. Is the organization’s reward system effective in aligning the goals of the employee with the goals of the organization?

3. **Communication Information Planning and Decision Making:** This process deals with how an organization communicates, gathers, processes, distributes and evaluates information. This design factor addresses the organization’s information systems mentioned earlier.

4. **Acquisition and Contracting:** This examines how an organization manages the acquisition and contracting process.

**3. Results**

Results refers to three primary attributes of the systems model: culture, outputs and outcomes. These attributes are resultant of the ongoing transformation of inputs in the
organizations attempt to realize its goals and objectives. They encompass both the intended and unintended consequences of the system as a whole.

**a. Culture**

Culture is defined in many ways. For instance, culture is the “invisible force behind the tangibles and observables in an organization, a social energy that moves the membership into action”\textsuperscript{15}, as a “shared pattern of basic assumptions that a group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems\textsuperscript{16}”. Culture is more simply, “the way we do things around here\textsuperscript{17}.” In the conduct of the analysis it is important to determine the extent to which culture and subcultures impede or facilitate integration of effort within the organization. Culture is an emergent variable important to recruit training. In short, an incoming, diverse mix of civilian cultures has to be molded into the unique, warrior culture of basic trained Marines.

**b. Outputs**

Output is what the organization produces in terms of goods and services and is typically a measure of organizational performance and effectiveness. It is a measure of how well the organization meets its objectives, utilizes its resources and adapts to a changing environment\textsuperscript{18}. In the case of MCRDSD an

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\textsuperscript{16} Bolman, Lee G., Deal, Terrence E., Reframing Organizations, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1997

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Nadler and Tushman, p. 97.
output would be the quantity and quality of the basically trained Marines, including factors such as time to complete training and the number of failures.

\[ \text{c. Outcomes} \]

Outcomes are the implications and consequences of the outputs. Outcomes generate feedback both into an organization's input and direction, and into the external environment, i.e., perceptions of well-trained, basic Marines. This feedback loop allows the organization to change and manipulate its design factors to improve future outputs and outcomes.

B. MINTZBERG’S THEORY

Mintzberg’s theory states that an organization’s success should not rely solely upon one theme for success (such as a particular strategy or product), but more on the interrelationship of its various attributes. Thus, there is not just “one best way”, but there can be many ways for an organization to realize success via the configuration of key attributes\(^{19}\). The interrelationship and size of core attributes can define the configuration of an organization.

\text{Figure 2}\(^{20}\) is a diagram of Mintzberg’s model and an organization's six core attributes as he envisions them. At its base is the operating core consisting of those workers (operators) who perform the rudimentary functions, labor, services and tasks of the organization. At the top of the organizational model lies the strategic apex where the whole system is overseen by senior level management ensuring effectiveness, oversight, and direction over the entire system. As organizations grow, they will require more managers, not just

\(^{19}\) Mintzberg, p.95

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 99.
due to the larger work force within the operating core, but also of other mid-line managers. These managers become the link between the strategic apex and the operating core and are referred to as the middle line. Organizations also require analysts who perform necessary support functions such as the designing, training, planning and controlling the work of others. These analysts make up the technostructure of the organization. On the right of the model, the support staff provides the administrative, legal and other support necessary to allow the organization to accomplish its mission. Lastly is ideology, or culture, which encompasses the entire model. Mintzberg defines ideology as the “traditions and beliefs of an organization that distinguish it from other organizations and infuse a certain life into the skeleton of its structure”.

Mintzberg’s model takes shape with a small strategic apex connected by a flaring middle-line to a large, flat operating core at the base. These three parts of the organization are drawn in one uninterrupted sequence to indicate that they are typically connected through a single chain of formal authority. The technostructure and the support staff are shown off to either side, to indicate that they are separate from this main line of authority, influencing the operating core indirectly. The ideology is shown as a kind of halo that surrounds the entire system.

Mintzberg goes on to define the structure of an organization as ways in which labor is divided into distinct tasks and how coordination among them is achieved. These coordinating measures are considered to be the “glue” that holds

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21 Mintzberg, p.98.
22 Mintzberg, p. 98.
an organization together. Mintzberg outlines six ways in which organizations can coordinate their work.23

1. Mutual adjustment, coordinates via the process of informal communication between operating employees.

2. Direct supervision, whereby one person issues orders or instructions to a group of subordinates whose work interrelates and for which he is responsible.

3. Standardization of work processes, usually coming out of the technostructure, they achieve coordination by standardizing the work processes of those carrying out interrelated tasks.

4. Standardization of outputs, again originating from within the technostructure, these achieve coordination by standardizing the results of outputs such as product or performance specifications.

5. Standardization of skills (and knowledge), coordinates work by the specific training the workers have received such as doctors, engineers or lawyers.

6. Standardization of norms, controls the norms of the workforce so that everyone has the same set of beliefs within the organization.

How these coordinating measures interrelate is a function of the size and industry in which the organization exists. The typical progression of means of coordination begins with the simplest mechanism, mutual adjustment. As organizations become more complex their primary means of coordination will transition to direct supervision and then standardization (of work, outputs, skills and norms).²⁴

Coordination also takes place laterally and vertically. Lateral forms of coordination are typically less formal (meetings, task forces, coordinating roles), more flexible, and more effective than vertical methods.²⁵ Vertical methods of coordination are typical of the hierarchal chain of authority whereby those at the top control the work of their subordinates via rules, policies, and planning and control systems.²⁶ Organizations operating in turbulent and rapidly changing environments require more flexible systems and would emphasize lateral coordination vice organizations existing in more steady and stable environments that rely more on centralized and

²⁴ Ibid.
²⁵ Bolman and Deal, p. 44.
²⁶ Bolamn and Deal, p. 42.
Mintzberg has identified six different types of basic configurations that cover the spectrum of basic organizational structures. The configuration of an organization is dependent upon the context the organization resides in. This context, taking into account external and internal factors, will favor one or more attributes over others, making them dominant. The push or pull effect of these dominating attributes gives an organization its shape, or in this case, its configuration. Table 1 summarizes these configurations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Primary Coordinating Mechanism</th>
<th>Key part of Organization</th>
<th>Type of Decentralization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td>Direct Supervision</td>
<td>Strategic Apex</td>
<td>Vertical &amp; Horizontal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine</td>
<td>Standardization of Work Processes</td>
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<td>Professional</td>
<td>Standardization of Skills</td>
<td>Operating Core</td>
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<td>Diversified</td>
<td>Standardization of Outputs</td>
<td>Middle Line</td>
<td>Limited Vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>Mutual Adjustment</td>
<td>Support Staff</td>
<td>Selected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missionary</td>
<td>Standardization of Norms</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From Mintzberg (1989)\(^{28}\)

\(^{27}\) Bolman and Deal, p. 57.

\(^{28}\) Mintzberg, 1998.
III. OVERVIEW OF MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO

A. BACKGROUND

The overarching purpose of the United States Marine Corps is to make Marines and win our nations battles\textsuperscript{29}. While many thousands of Marines are deployed world wide to ensure the safety and security of our nation and our allies, the process of making Marines is centralized aboard two depots on opposite coasts of the United States. MCRD, Parris Island on the east coast is responsible for training all recruits originating from states east of the Mississippi River and MCRD, San Diego on the west coast is responsible for training all recruits originating from west of the Mississippi River. MCRD, San Diego was originally founded in 1919, through the combined efforts of Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton and Congressman William Kettner, to serve as an expeditionary base for Pendelton’s Fourth Provisional Marine Regiment. In addition to serving as an expeditionary base, the Marine Corps began to train recruits in San Diego in 1923. The primary mission of the depot converted solely to recruit training during WW II where over 200,000 recruits were trained. Today, MCRD, San Diego trains approximately one-half of the Corps 38,000 recruits each year.

Though the two depots share similar missions they differ notably in two significant respects. First, MCRD, Parris Island is a centralized recruit training facility in that it conducts every aspect of recruit training aboard its own depot while MCRD, San Diego is geographically separated. Due to the constraints bought on by its urban location, MCRD, San Diego is restricted as to the type of training conducted. Therefore, in order to complete all phases of recruit training, MCRD, San

\textsuperscript{29} General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, 1996.
Diego must temporarily relocate recruit training for four weeks each training cycle 30 miles north to Edson Range, MCB, Camp Pendleton. Here, all field and weapons training is conducted including Crucible training. Secondly, all female recruits in the Marine Corps are trained aboard MCRD, Parris Island. This is due to the fact that there are not enough females recruited annually to justify the expenditures of training them on both coasts. Beyond these two distinctions, depot structure and operations are quite similar. The material presented in this chapter is drawn heavily from DepO 5450.4L

**B. MISSION**

The Commanding General (CG) of MCRD, San Diego has three overarching responsibilities. The two most notable are: CG of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, entailing oversight of the recruit training process, and the CG Western Recruiting Region, entailing oversight of the recruiting process. Additionally, he is the CG of the base facilities, and unlike other Base CG’s that report to a higher, on-site commander, he reports directly to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in this capacity. The two former responsibilities provide the CG with two complementing mission statements:

Provide reception, processing, and recruit training for male enlistees upon their initial entry into the Marine Corps; provide schools for training officers and enlisted Marines entrusted with the training of recruits; conduct other schools as directed; provide rifle and pistol marksmanship training for Marines stationed in the Southwest and for members of other services, as requested; and conduct training for Marine Reserves, as directed.

As headquarters of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s Western Recruiting Region, exercise operational control of the enlisted recruiting operations in the 8th, 9th, and 12th Marine Corps Districts, through guidance and direction on quality
control matters for all enlisted accessions in accordance with standards established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).30

Since the CG of MCRD, San Diego is responsible of both recruiting and recruit training, he is afforded the unique opportunity to ensure seamless continuity between the quality of individual coming in, and emerging from the transformation process of recruit training in that one process feeds the other.

C. STRUCTURE AND TASKS

MCRD, San Diego is organized into four major command elements, augmented by numerous subordinate commands and tenant activities. The four major command elements are the Recruit Training Regiment (RTR), Headquarters and Service Battalion (H&S Bn), Weapons and Field Training Battalion (WFTBn), and Headquarters, Western Recruiting Region (WRR). Figure 3 is an overview of the organizational structure of MCRD, San Diego listing all supporting activities and tenant commands under the chief of staff. This paper focuses primarily on those elements of depot structure that pertain to the recruit training process.

1. Recruit Training Regiment

RTR is charged with carrying out the primary mission of the depot to make Marines. RTR’s mission statement is to:

Provide reception processing, and recruit training for male enlisted personnel following initial entry into the Marine Corps; conduct training for reserve Marines as directed; exercise military command over Regimental Headquarters and all Marines, Sailors, civilians and Marine recruits assigned to the Recruit Training Regiment.

The intent of the mission is to produce, after twelve weeks, a basically trained United States Marine embodied with

30 MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L
the fighting spirit that has ensured the Corps success since its inception in 1776. RTR consists of four major command elements: (Figure 4) three Recruit Training Battalions (RTBn), 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, and 3\textsuperscript{rd} respectively, and Support Battalion. The Recruit training Battalions are charged with the task of carrying out the specific training requirements as much as in executing the training schedule and transforming the recruits into Marines. And throughout the conduct of such, Support Battalion provides all the support necessary for the RTBn’s to accomplish their mission. These four subordinate commands receive their guidance from the Regimental Headquarters Company staff that double as the liaison between the recruit trainers and further supporting agencies existing at the depot level. The Regimental Headquarters staff consists primarily of the following three

\footnote{MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L}
Figure 4. RTR Organizational structure

Staff sections. The Adjutant/Personnel (S-1) Office is responsible for coordinating with other staff sections and supervising all the Regiment’s general administrative functions

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pertaining to Marines, Sailors and recruits. S-1 also coordinates all collateral duty assignments within the Regiment and conducts the career planning efforts on behalf of the Marines of the Regiment. The Training (S-3) Office is responsible for conduct and supervision of all aspects of operations and training within the Regiment. The S-3 has cognizance over recruit training. The Logistics (S-4) Office is responsible for logistical functions within the Regiment to include oversight of inventories, controls and issues all equipment and supplies. The S-4 also manages the messing, medical, dental, safety and maintenance of all personnel and facilities within the Regiment. The Chaplain provides for the welfare of both the recruits and permanent personnel through the conduct of religious programs, counseling and working to improve morale.

a. **Recruit Training Battalion**

A Recruit Training Battalion’s primary responsibility is the conduct and execution of the 12-week recruit training schedule and ensuring a successful transformation process of a civilian to a Marine. Their organizational structure, as depicted in Figure 5, consists of a headquarters staff and four recruit training companies. The headquarters staff is responsible for all coordination of training, the resolving of any training issues and acting as the liaison to Support Battalion and Regiment as necessary, in order to optimize the drill instructors ability to train recruits and execute the training schedule. This includes the training officer (S-3) responsible for monitoring training and ensuring compliance with the training Standard Operations Procedure (SOP), an Administration Chief (S-1) responsible for all recruit and permanent personnel administrative matters, an (S-4) to
coordinate all logistical matters, and a battalion Chaplain responsible for morale, coordinating all religious functions and the counseling of recruits.

A recruit training company is organized into two series, lead and trail (which is also referred to as “follow”), Figure 5.

Figure 5. RTBN Organizational structure consisting of three to four recruit training platoons as shown in Figure 6. A company also has a small headquarters staff consisting of a Company Executive Officer, a Company First
Sergeant and an Operations Clerk for the purpose of supervising and coordinating all functions of the company, and acting as a liaison to higher and outside agencies on behalf of the recruit training platoons. A typical recruit training platoon consists of three to five Drill Instructors and 50-80 or more recruits. It is here where the recruit will spend 12 weeks aboard the Depot seemingly isolated and concurrently insulated from the everyday activities of the depot.

![Organizational structure diagram]

**Figure 6. RTCO. Organizational structure**

**b. Support Battalion**

The mission of Support Battalion is to provide specialized training to Marine recruits, provide specialized support to the Marines and recruits of the Recruit Training Regiment, and operate the Drill Instructor School. The Commanding Officer of Support Battalion has cognizance over the
Headquarters staff, Receiving Company, Instructional Training Company (ITC), Special Training Company (STC), and the Drill Instructor School. See Figure 7.

The headquarters staff of Support Battalion is not unlike that of a Recruit Training Battalion. The Adjutants office (S-1) coordinates all administrative matters, the Operations Office (S-3) coordinates all planning and training matters, and the Logistics Office (S-4) coordinates all logistical matters in the battalion. Battalion staff also includes a Chaplains office responsible for the spiritual well being of battalion and recruit personnel to include providing for their welfare.

Receiving Company receives and conducts the initial processing of all recruits arriving aboard the Depot. Here they will remain for three to five days to ensure that all the recruits are properly medically and administratively processed prior to beginning training, that all recruits are assigned to their respective training companies, and that the health, comfort, and welfare of recruits awaiting separation is provided for.

Instructional Training Company conducts a vast array of training in support of RTR and the depot. ITC’s primary responsibilities are in the training and evaluation of recruits combat water survival (CWS), close combat instruction (CCI) and academic instruction. ITC is responsible for developing all lesson plans, examination and tests used in the course of the academic portion of the training. ITC also supports training for depot personnel in the areas of CWS and CCI instruction and qualification.

Special Training Company is set up to support recruits who for either physical limitation or medical condition are not capable of continuing in the normal recruit training pipeline.
Consisting of three subordinate platoons, Medical Rehabilitation Platoon (MRP), Physical Conditioning Platoon (PCP), and Basic Marine Platoon (BMP), STC ensure recruits achieve appropriate health and fitness levels prior to returning to either recruit training, separations platoon or rehabilitation prior to rotation to the School of Infantry (SOI)/Marine Combat training (MCT).

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**Figure 7. SPPT. Bn. Organizational structure**  

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The Drill Instructor School is perhaps the most important function of Support Battalion. Both the CG and the RTR CO belief the crux of their success in the recruit transformation process lies in the DI School’s ability to train and prepare the best Drill Instructors possible. In addition to providing 11 intense weeks of instruction to DI’s in the proper technique and practices they will need in order to perform their duties and responsibilities, DI School also trains and educates newly joined company officers on the recruit training process and the environment via the Series Officer Course (SOC).

2. Headquarters and Service Battalion

The mission of Headquarters and Service battalion (H&S BN) is to provide technical direction, staff cognizance, and supervision of Headquarters and Service Battalion functions and provide administrative support for personnel assigned to the Battalion, the Recruiter School, the Marine Corps detachments, and transients within the San Diego area. The Commanding Officer is a General Staff Officer exercising authority over the Battalion Headquarters staff, Headquarters Company, and Service Company (See Figure 8). H&S Battalion Headquarters Staff is similar to that of RTBN and Support Battalion. It possesses administrative, operations, logistics, and chaplain’s offices that support all activities aboard the Depot that do not warrant their own higher headquarters. The Headquarters Company and Service Company together provide personnel support for permanent personnel in the area of administration, training, discipline, morale, welfare, and recreation.
3. Weapons & Field Training Battalion

The mission of Weapons and Field Training Battalion (WFTBN) is to provide instruction to recruits in accordance with the Program of Instruction (POI) for recruit training in rifle marksmanship and combat field training, conduct re-qualification firing for permanent personnel based in the San Diego area, conduct schools to train selected personnel in the methods and procedures of marksmanship instruction, and to provide field medical services for recruits undergoing combat field training. WFTBN is located aboard Camp Pendleton (CPEN) at Edson Range and its organizational structure is depicted in Figure 9. Beyond the similar staff array and functions of fellow subordinate commands, WFTBN has two unique training companies that carry out its primary mission in support of the recruit training process.

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Figure 8. H&S BN Organizational structure

Figure 9. WFTBN Organizational structure
The first is Range Company. Range Company conducts phase I and II entry level marksmanship training for recruits, pre-qualification marksmanship instruction, as well as rifle and pistol sustainment training for permanent personnel of CAMPEN, WFTBN, the Depot, and other San Diego area units. Range Company

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36 Adaptation from MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L
also supervises and manages target manufacturing and supply operations. The Field and Weapons Training Company is the other “long pole in the tent” in support of recruit training. It conducts basic entry-level infantry and field marksmanship (Phase III) for recruits during Field Firing training. This company also provides the primary instructors for the conduct of Basic Warrior Training (BWT). It also is responsible for maintaining supplies and equipment for support training, and provides subject matter expertise for the conduct of the Crucible event to recruit training companies and the DI School. And lastly, the Field & Weapons Training Company provides support to MCRD, San Diego based units conducting Combat Readiness training (CRT) at Edson Range.

D. THE PEOPLE

Having described the structure, mission and tasks of MCRD, Sand Diego, the next section describes the design variable called people. This is important in understanding how MCRDSD accomplishes its primary mission of making Marines. The individual Marines, sailors and civilian employees of MCRD, San Diego comprise a workforce that is as diversified as any organization in the Marine Corps in regards to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), race, ethnicity and socio-economic background. However, what makes this group of individuals unique is the pride they share in ensuring the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego produces the best Marine possible.

MCRD, San Diego currently employs about 768 civilians and 1,725 active duty personnel37. Civilians work in almost every capacity throughout the depot other than the line community directly responsible for the training of recruits. In regards to recruit training, civilians occupy positions in the support

37 Interview with Lt. Col. Henry, G-1, MCRDSD
activities such as clothing issue, chow halls, and barbershops for example. Other than those in direct support of the recruit training mission, civilians occupy a myriad of staff positions from depot headquarters personnel, G-1, Business Improvement Officer, etc., to service oriented positions in the post exchange, commissary and maintenance and facilities.

Active duty personnel include Marine and Navy officer and enlisted personnel. Marine officers, as expected aboard a Marine Corps Recruit Depot, work across the spectrum of jobs necessary in order for the depot to function. Junior officers, 2nd and 1st Lieutenants (0-1 & 0-2 respectively), tend to come to the depot in their second tour in fulfillment of a B-billet requirement. The vast majority of these will serve in billets within RTR at the Assistant Series Commander, Series Commander level and go on to be Recruit Training Company Commanders or hold various staff billets throughout the depot and WFTBN prior to PCS rotation as a Captain (0-3). Majors (0-4) hold various staff billets throughout the depot. Most commonly as Recruit Training Battalion Executive Officers or Regimental and Depot staff. The commander of Drill Instructor School is a Major. Lieutenant Colonels (0-5) serve as the RTBN Commanding Officers. They also serve in key Regimental and Depot staff billets such as RTR Executive Officer and Staff Secretary to the CG. Colonels (0-6) serve as the RTR, Support Battalion and WFTBN CO’s. Colonels also hold key staff billets at the depot level to include the Chief of Staff, G-3, and G-4 for example. The senior Marine officer aboard the depot, the Commanding General of MCRD, San Diego, is a Major General. The vast majority of Navy officer and enlisted personnel aboard the depot are

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38 A B-billet is typically a non-deployable fleet support billet. Examples of such are headquarters tours, Recruiting and Recruit Training billets.
primarily in the medical and dental fields in support of the recruit training mission.

The 1,500 or so Marine enlisted personnel fill billets throughout the depot in every command at every level. Junior enlisted Marines, Privates (E-1), Privates First Class (E-2), Lance Corporals (E-3) and Corporals (E-4) are located in every command in one aspect or another. They are primarily in WFTBN, H & S and Support Battalions in general support of the recruit training mission. Sergeants (E-5) though located throughout the command are commonly in direct support of the recruit training mission either as a primary instructor at WFTBN or as DI within RTR. Staff Sergeants (E-6) and Gunnery Sergeants (E-7), like Sergeants, are commonly in direct support of recruit training as either primary instructors at WFTBN or as more senior DI’s within RTR. Gunnery Sergeants also hold the critical billet of Series Gunnery Sergeant, though this billet can and is sometimes held by a seasoned Staff Sergeant DI. First Sergeants (E-8) are, as the rank would lead you to think, the senior enlisted Marine at the company level, the Company First Sergeant. Sergeant Majors (E-9) are the senior enlisted Marines at every organizational level above and to include battalion. Sergeant Major is the senior enlisted rank.

Drill Instructors bare additional description, as they are the focus of training effort aboard the depot. Everything depot personnel do in one manner or another is designed to support the DI’s ability to train recruits and transform them from a civilian to a Marine. Marines that accept orders to DI School do so knowing they are about to embark upon one of the two most difficult tours available in the Marine Corps. This is truly a special duty that likens itself more to a calling than a job, and thus requires a truly special Marine to be successful.
Marines that successfully complete DI school and are successful DI’s are arguably the most disciplined and dedicated Marines in the Marine Corps. To be a successful DI, you cannot merely show up to work and “punch the clock” as it were, DI’s must submerge themselves in their work in order to imbue those in their charge with the character and traits unique to United States Marines. DI’s are the embodiment of sacrifice where 80-110 hour weeks are the norm, often to the detriment of their personal lives. These hours are often necessary to ensure that best quality product crosses the parade deck on graduation morning. DI’s embody the most professional and rigorous standards of any occupational culture within the Marine Corps. They are truly unique in character and their efforts serve to secure and promote the Marine Corps success for future generations. Marine Corps Drill Instructors are indeed a crucial design variable integral to successful recruit training.
IV. THE RECRUIT TRAINING PROCESS

A. OVERVIEW

Recruit training is one of the two primary missions of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego as set forth in its mission statements. This chapter describes the recruit training process. The structure and processes of recruit training interact in many ways, setting the stage for the heart of this study. The reason for a closer look is that when examining the organizations structure it is reasonable to garner a better understanding of the primary purpose it was designed to serve. The material presented in this chapter is largely drawn from various command briefs gathered as part of my document review.

It is through the recruit training process that civilians are transformed into Marines. This process forges Marines through shared hardship and tough training. This shared, intense experience creates bonds of comradeship and standards of conduct that form the foundation of success for the U.S M.C. Marine recruits are trained physically, mentally, and morally, by repeated concentration of Marine Corps core values of honor, courage and commitment. By incorporating these values into the transformation process, the Marine Corps is attempting to create better Marines and American citizens, who eventually return to society.

Honor
Honor guides Marines to exemplify the ultimate in ethical and moral behavior: to never lie, cheat or steal, to abide by an uncompromising code of integrity, respect human dignity and respect others. The quality of maturity, dedication, trust and dependability commit Marines to act responsibly; to be accountable for their actions; to fulfill their obligations; and to hold others accountable for their actions.
Courage
Courage is the mental, moral and physical strength ingrained in Marines. It carries them through the hardships of combat and helps them overcome fear. It is the inner strength that enables a marine to do what is right, to adhere to a higher standard of personal conduct and to make tough decisions under stress and pressure.

Commitment
Commitment is the spirit of determination and dedication found in Marines. It leads to the highest order of discipline for individuals and units. It is the ingredient that enables 24-hour a day dedication to Corps and country. It inspires the unrelenting determination to achieve a standard of excellence in every endeavor.  

There are seven objectives to the recruit training process that need to be accomplished in the 63 training days over twelve weeks, to yield a basically trained Marine. These seven objectives, tangible and intangible, are accomplished via a litany of academic and field training requirements conducted in accordance with the Program of Instruction (POI). The seven objectives of recruit training are:

1. Discipline
2. Military Bearing
3. Esprit de Corps
4. Individual General Military Subjects
5. Individual Combat Basic Tasks
6. Physical Fitness
7. Character Development

In concert with the objectives to be met are six graduation requirements each recruit must satisfactorily complete to become
a United States Marine. Each of the six graduation requirements listed below are explained in the overview of the recruit training process:

1. Swim Qualification
2. Practical Examination
3. Physical Fitness Test
4. Rifle Qualification
5. Battalion Commanders Inspection
6. The Crucible

B. RECRUIT TRAINING CYCLE

The recruit training cycle consists of the many training events recruits must complete in order to become a United States Marine. The following is a breakdown of those events as they unfold throughout the training cycle. It is important to note that academic training, core values training, close order drill, and physical training occur throughout the training cycle, but are listed up front as the majority of this training takes place during the first 6 weeks. A week-by-week overview of the training schedule and a daily training calendar are provided in Annexes B and C.

The recruit training cycle is often referred to in phases. The first six weeks, conducted aboard MCRDSD, is phase I. The next four weeks, conducted aboard CPEN, is phase II. And lastly the final two weeks of training, conducted back aboard MCRDSD, is phase III.

1. Receiving

Recruits who arrive aboard the depot begin their process of transformation from civilian to Marine as soon as they step off the bus and on to the famous yellow footprints where they are

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MCRDSD Briefing Document
met at once by Drill Instructors from Receiving Company. Depending upon the day of their arrival, they spend three to five days in Receiving before assignment to a training company. While in Receiving Company, recruits must perform several administrative and physical tasks to ensure they are qualified and physically able to begin training.

A recruit’s first night in receiving is a long one with many wearying events taking place. The “20 second” haircut and a urinalysis to test for drug usage are two examples. Recruits also receive their initial issue of uniforms and other essential items. Recruits also undergo medical and dental screening to ensure they are fit to begin training.

The first morning brings the “moment of truth”, an amnesty period allowing Receiving Company personnel a chance to identify any real or potential contract problems that the recruit may have failed to disclose to the recruiter prior to enlisting. Disqualifying events such as prior drug use or criminal convictions are best identified early before the recruit begins training.

The final event the recruits must perform while in Receiving is the Initial Strength Test (IST). The recruit must successfully pass this test in order to be assigned to a recruit training company. To pass, recruits must do two, dead-hang pull-ups, and forty sit-ups in two minutes, and run a mile and a half in 13.5 minutes. Failure to meet any of these minimum requirements will result in the recruit being dropped to Physical Conditioning Platoon (PCP) in lieu of a training platoon till he is physically capable of passing the IST. The test is conducted and monitored by Receiving Company, however, the training company officers and Drill Instructors assist in conducting the test.
2. Forming

Following the IST, recruits will join their training company where they will be introduced to the Drill Instructors responsible for their training and welfare throughout the recruit training cycle. The initial period is referred to as forming. In these three to five days, recruits learn the basics: terminology, how to march and wear their uniform, how to secure their weapon, chow hall procedures, where things are on the Depot and most significantly the Basic Daily Routine, or BDR. The BDR refers to the morning and evening routines in addition to conduct within the squad bay. This period of time allows recruits to adjust to their new environment prior to the first actual training day.

3. Academic Training and Close Order Drill

Throughout the first 35 days of training the recruits attend a series of academic courses, e.g. Marine Corps history, customs and courtesies, military law, rank structure, and basic first aid. Near the end of this period recruits have to pass the first of the graduation requirements, an initial practical examination of the material covered. Those who do not pass undergo an intense remedial program on the material until they have met the minimum score required. It is rare that a recruit is recycled in training due to an academic failure.

In addition to attending classes, recruits spend much of their training time on the parade deck learning close order drill, or COD. COD is the primary tool for DI’s to instruct and instill discipline, esprit de corps and teamwork within their Platoons. The importance of COD cannot be understated in the molding of a Marine. It is very common for increased proficiency in COD to equate to enhanced platoon performance throughout the training cycle.
4. Core values

Core Values training is conducted throughout the training cycle and accounts for 54 hours of instruction time. DI’s, Series Officers and the Battalion Chaplain teach specific core values courses, but the most significant impact of this training occurs between the DI and the recruits either in a one-on-one situation or on a platoon level during recruit counseling or after a training event. For example, a DI might talk to the platoon about integrity, after the drop of a recruit from training for lying, or to a recruit about physical courage after someone fails to accomplish a PT event. Topics covered are not restricted to honor, courage and commitment, but cover a plethora of related, current issues including integrity, discipline, teamwork, duty, drugs and alcohol, suicide prevention, and domestic violence. Core values are integral to teaching the meaning of personal responsibility, respect for human dignity, and the need to remain true to a higher standard of conduct demanded by the Marine Corps.

5. Physical Training

The 77 hours of physical training, or PT, the recruits undergo is a progressive training regimen designed to increase strength, endurance and flexibility. PT is a combination of platoon formation and individual runs beginning with one and a half miles steadily increasing up to three miles, table exercises or calisthenics, and foot marches beginning at three miles and increasing to five and ten miles. Physical training is also used to foster teamwork and esprit within the squads and platoons. Each recruits level of physical fitness is measured by the Physical Fitness test (PFT), whereby recruits perform pull-ups, sit-ups and a three mile run. To pass they must complete three pull-ups, 44 sit-ups in two minutes and finish the run in less than 28 minutes.
In conjunction with PT, recruits also must conduct the obstacle and confidence courses. The obstacle course is a demanding seven-station event, requiring stamina, strength and agility. The stations are run in sequence as fast as the recruit can safely accomplish them, culminating in a rope climb. The confidence course is an 11-station event whose purpose is as it name implies, to build confidence in the recruit’s ability to perform physically demanding tasks. The goal is not to finish in a certain time, but to finish each station and give the recruit a sense of accomplishment.

6. Water Survival Training

In the fifth week of training recruits move to the pool to begin 20 hours of water survival training under the instruction of Support Battalion personnel. Water survival training is intended to increase the recruits confidence and ability to survive in the water. Here, the recruits master techniques to maneuver in the water and have the skill to survive extended periods of time in the water. Training at the lower levels (e.g. CWS-IV) only requires the recruit to be in uniform. Training at higher levels of difficulty (CWS-I or II) requires additional gear to include the M-16, flak jacket, pack and helmet. The level of proficiency a recruit must acquire is dependent upon their assigned Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). However, all recruits must complete CWS-IV at a minimum.

7. Team Week

After five weeks of training, the recruits enter what is referred to as “team week“, the final week of phase I. During this period, recruits traditionally work in the mess halls and with base maintenance personnel aboard the depot and at Weapons

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42 CWS stands for Combat Water Survival. There are four progressive levels of proficiency assigned to recruits. CWS-1 the highest and CWS-4 the lowest.
and Field Training Battalion (WFTBN). This is the first time recruits are out from under the direct supervision of their DI’s and are expected to conduct themselves accordingly, while accomplishing the menial tasks assigned them. However, due to the recent civilian contracting of the mess hall personnel, recruits are no longer required to fill these and other tasks. This has opened up a week of training hours now available to recruit training personnel. The latest recruit training schedule modification\textsuperscript{43} indicates the inclusion of instruction in small unit leadership, driver improvement and interior guard.

8. Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

The latest innovation to the recruit training process is the implementation of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)\textsuperscript{44} in October of 2000. MCMAP replaces the Linear Integrated Neuro-overide Engagement (L.I.N.E.) training. It instructs recruits and Marines in a more logical, easier to learn method of offensive and defensive close combat skills. MCMAP is combined with pugil-stick training that focuses on bayonet fighting and provides the recruits an opportunity to practice the techniques they have learned.

9. Marksmanship Training

At the end of the sixth week, recruit training moves north to WFTBN at Edson Range, Camp Pendleton for Phase I and II marksmanship training. This encompasses 126 hours of instruction over the course of weeks seven through nine. The first week, Phase-I, Preparatory Marksmanship Training, is more commonly referred to as “grass week” or “snap-in week”. This first week covers 50 hours of marksmanship instruction, by Range Company personnel, including firing techniques and fundamentals,

\textsuperscript{43} MCRDSD Training modification 35-03
\textsuperscript{44} ALMAR 042/01
sight adjustments, weather considerations, and the four different firing positions: standing, kneeling, sitting and prone. At the conclusion of “grass week”, recruits’ have their first live-fire event, a grouping exercise, conducted in order to zero their weapon for the following weeks qualification firing. The second week, Phase-II, Known Distance Firing, is live-fire whereby the recruits fire variations of the Known Distance (KD) course for the first three days, shooting the actual KD qualification course of fire on the fourth day. The fifth day is the actual day of qualification firing for recruits, firing 50 rounds from distances of 200, 300 and 500 yards using only iron sights.

10. Field Firing Range (FFR)
Once recruits have successfully qualified with the M-16A2 service rifle they progress to phase-III of the marksmanship program conducted over the course of week 9, the third week at Edson Range. During FFR they will receive 40 hours of field firing instruction on how to fire their weapons in varying combat conditions. Recruits conduct live-fire exercises in gas masks, full combat equipment and engage multiple and moving targets at unknown distances in low light/night conditions.

11. Basic Warrior Training (BWT)
BWT is a three-day field training package, with over 20 hours of instruction, focusing on teaching recruits to operate in a field environment using their combat issue. Instruction covers the set-up of shelter-halves, subsisting on Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MRE’s), learning to operate within a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environment to include going through the gas chamber, and other necessary field skills such as field sanitation and camouflage. The skills they learn here will be
instrumental in the conduct of the Crucible and follow-on training at either SOI or MCT.

12. The Crucible

The final evolution at Edson Range is the conduct of the Crucible, referred to as the “defining moment”. The Crucible is the recruits’ greatest challenge in recruit training. The 54-hour evolution includes 50 plus miles of foot marches, 32 events and stations to include; day and night combat assault courses, problem-solving stations and team-building events. Recruits also are subjected to sleep and food deprivation, receiving only four-hours of sleep a night and two and a-half MRE’s to last them over the course of the Crucible. The purpose of the sleep and meal deprivation is to simulate the stress inherent to combat conditions. It is important to note that throughout the conduct of the Crucible, the focus is on Core Values and teamwork.

13. Transition Phase

Upon completion of training at WFTBN, the recruits return to MCRDSD to complete the final two weeks of training, Phase III. These two weeks are referred to as the transition phase, whereby recruits make the final “transition” from recruit to Marine. These weeks can be very hectic as there is much that needs to get done. The first week encompasses several graduation requirements such as the final academic examination, the PFT, and the Battalion Commanders Inspection. Company Final Drill and the Motivational Run, both of which are non-graduation requirements, are also conducted during this phase. The transition phase ends with the Eagle, Globe and Anchor ceremony whereby the Drill Instructors present their recruits with Marine Corps insignia signifying their new status of Marine.
14. Family Day and Graduation

The final two days of recruit training are family day and graduation. The day prior to graduation, recruits get an afternoon of on-base liberty to spend with family and friends whom they haven’t seen since arriving aboard the depot. Lastly, the final event in the recruit training process is the graduation parade denoting their successful transition from civilian to Marine.

Upon graduation the new Marines will readily depart the depot on 10 days of leave enroute to either the School of Infantry (SOI) or Marine Combat Training (MCT). Both of these training commands are located aboard CAMPEN. Which school a Marine attends will be based on their MOS designator assigned to them in the latter days of recruit training, if it had not already been assigned initially through the enlistment contracting process. Infantry Marines will attend SOI and all non-infantry Marines attend MCT. A few of the graduates will have the opportunity to go back to their home towns and participate in the Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program (PRASP), for up to 30 days prior to reporting to SOI or MCT to assist in the Marine Corps recruiting efforts. Upon completion of SOI or MCT, the new Marine then attends their MOS school, where they will the learn skill they are expected to perform in the Operating Forces.
V. ANALYSIS OF MCRD, SAN DIEGO

A. DATA REVIEW

Data used in this analysis are derived primarily from 30 semi-structured interviews conducted with depot personnel ranging from the Commanding General to Drill Instructors. Though a specific interview protocol was used, interviews were flexible, and participants were encouraged to expand upon their answers and provide additional insights if desired. Telephone communications, emails, and three years of personal experience in recruit training were also sources of contributing data.

B. MCRDSD SYSTEMS MODEL

Systems theory provided the theoretical foundation for this study. The systems model was selected as a tool having diagnostic and predictive capabilities useful for analyzing the relatively complex process of converting civilians into basic trained Marines. The model also facilitates drawing conclusions and making recommendations for improvements. Figure 10 is the “generic” systems model discussed in Chapter II and Figure 11 is an adaptation of the model in terms of an MCRDSD overlay.

1. Environment/Context

There are several factors to consider when describing the environment or context of MCRDSD. As discussed earlier in chapter 2, they are the external environment, resources and history of the organization. The external environment can best be described in terms of political, social, economic and technological arenas that influence the daily decisions and operations of the depot.
Politically, MCRDSD exists in a military friendly local and regional environment, as there is a strong military presence throughout much of southern California. The Marine Corps

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Figure 11. MCRD Systems Overlay

has bases in close proximity with Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton 30 miles to the north and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat

Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Miramar to the west. Together, the city of San Diego and the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, are the recipients of this historically positive relationship. The city, the seventh largest in the U. S., provides the depot with a significant and convenient transportation hub through which nearly a hundred thousand visitors to the depot pass each year, and which the Marine Corps in turn can use to satisfy its logistical and transportation requirements.

One detractor from the seemingly politically friendly environment is the ongoing political debate over the expansion of the city’s airport, Lindberg Field. Currently, San Diego’s airport is unable to meet the needs of the populous nor the demand for air travel to its city in that it has only one runway capable of serving large commercial aircraft. Further, the airport’s current location is geographically restrictive and does not allow for expansion in any direction other than towards the Depot. The Depot's proximity to the airport leaves many questioning if the Marine Corps property could be put to better use, i.e., consolidation of recruit training aboard Camp Pendleton and expansion of Lindberg Field with MCRD land is an example of changing the land usage. The leadership of the Depot has responded diligently to work with the city in resolving this issue. Over the years, the Marine Corps has signed over substantial acreage to the city for the purpose of expanding the airport and currently has several airport guidance and navigational systems located on and throughout its property. Additionally, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of

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47 Downloaded from http://www.infoplease.com/cgi-bin/id/A0108476.html.
48 MCRDSB Briefing Document.
49 MCRDSB Briefing Document.
1990, is a considerable political issue across all of the services, most notably since the next round of base closures is due in 2005. Though MCRDSD does not consider itself a candidate for this round of base closures, Depot leadership remains proactive in espousing the historical significance, validity and legitimacy of the Depot. Despite being located in an urban environment not conducive to its mission, forcing the geographic separation in its training schedule, MCRDSD leaders state that the depot remains “a premier installation in the Marine Corps” and is a “jewel in the Marine Corps crown”. To this end, the Depot includes within its boundaries a 110-acre historical district and 25 buildings that were nominated to the National Register of Historic Places in 1991. Its place in history has become cemented in the San Diego community and in turn the city has become part and parcel to the history and traditions of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot.

Beyond the political relationship and geographical proximity to each other, the Depot has quite a significant economic impact upon the city and its local areas. It is estimated that the Depot contributes over $190 million dollars to the local economy via tourism, and operating and payroll costs of the Depot itself. A substantial portion of this amount, estimated at 20 million dollars, is considered “recession proof dollars”. The generally accepted belief is that regardless of the health of the economy, families will still travel to and visit the Depot to attend the graduation of
their loved one. Per one senior Marine leader, “Money talks – and that’s where we talk the loudest – financially”.

The regional and national health of the economy impacts the depot in turn. Historically, the health of the domestic economy, as measured by the unemployment rate, is inversely related to the number of active-duty enlistment contracts attained. Theoretically, the current economic downturn positively impacts the Depots external environment in regard to recruiting efforts and success, i.e., the Depots ability to provide for the key input, recruits, to the recruit training process. This notion as put forth by a military-economic study by Asch & Warner (1995), is the healthier the economy or lower the unemployment rate, the more challenging it is to recruit and enlist qualified individuals. And as is currently the situation, the higher the unemployment rate, the less challenging it is to recruit qualified individuals.56

Recruiting and recruit training commands are unlike most other commands in the Marine Corps in that they are well resourced in both personnel and money. The Marine Corps has long recognized the criticality of successful recruiting and recruit training efforts and how this translates to sustained combat readiness. Thus, they place a high priority on both missions as evidenced by Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5320.12D57. This calls for the Depot to be staffed at 95 percent of the chargeable T/O (Table of Organization)58, or a manning level of 100 percent. As per the Commanding General of MCRD, San Diego, “I have never been to a command such as this one. In past

57 MCO 5320.12D.
58 The Table of Organization (T/O) for a command is a list, by grade and MOS, of the manpower required to complete that units mission.
commands, I have always had to fight or ask for more money to accomplish my mission. But, here they have given me all the money and people I need to get the mission done. It’s unlike any other command I have ever worked in before.”

There are social environmental factors that shape the external environment of MCRDSD. In a post 9/11-environment, the war on terrorism has reawakened a call from legislatures for national service in one form or another ranging from mandatory civil service to active duty military, i.e., a draft. While interest in the military, or some other form of national service has doubled since 9/11, this has not translated into any marked increase in enlistments. Though policy makers at the Pentagon refute the necessity of a draft, the impacts of such legislation if it were to be implemented upon recruit training, length of service contracts, benefits, etc., would be significant. Other social environmental factors impact MCRDSD. An increased propensity or aspirations of the nations youth to attend college coupled with the decreased desire to serve the country make the recruiting effort even more challenging.

MCRDSD pursues an aggressive community outreach program with Marines participating in various local volunteer and mentor programs, color guards, and community events. The Depot also chose to support the Suzuki Rock n’ Roll marathon, one of the nations largest marathons, by allowing the race to finish on the Depot parade deck, when cost concerns threatened the survivability of the race. The Depot strives to be as integral a part of the community that it can, knowing the benefit this

59 CG Interview


61 Ibid.

62 MCRDSD Briefing Document.
brings to both the Marine Corps and the people of San Diego. Per the current chief of staff, Mr. Meyers, “We feel that it is essential that we are an active member in the community. That we are a partner with them and we will do everything in our power consistent with our mission accomplishment to try and help the community in every way we can.”

2. Key Success Factors

The key success factors for MCRDSD identified through interviews with MCRDSD leadership are its people, training, and basic Marine Corps leadership. These three components combine in every aspect of depot functions to facilitate mission success. They were uniformly the responses given during the interview portion of the data collection process.

The quality of people of MCRD, San Diego is an important key success factor as described during the interview process. General Huly states, “Key is the selection and training of those who make the process work. It starts with who we select and train as our recruiters and Recruiting Station (RS) commanding officers. Because you’re not going to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. It’s also who we select to be the Drill Instructors, Series Commanders, Company Commanders, Rifle range Coaches, Commanding Officers in this process to sustain that process. That’s what makes a good product. That’s the key.”

These quality Marines, more specifically the Drill Instructors, are sought from the operating forces and elsewhere. Their commands are required to complete a command screening checklist that in essence says, this Marine is personally and professionally qualified for a tour on the drill field.

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63 Interview with Mr. Myers, G-1, MCRDSD, November 2002.
64 Interview with Major General Huly, Commanding General, MCRDSD, November, 2002.
Additionally, it is helpful that Marine Corps commands, for the most part, are sensitive to the recruit training mission and the quality of individual it takes to be an effective Drill Instructor. This subjective assessment assists in further screening of potential DI candidates and maintains the current quality spread. Though, in the mind of one senior enlisted personnel, outside commands could afford to be more discerning. He believes the attrition at DI school to be too high, graduating on average “50 out of every 70 or so”. He says, “There are too many failing out that shouldn’t have been here to start with.”

In concert with people is trust. Trust between the DI’s and the battalion and RTR officers and senior enlisted is paramount to mission success. It creates an environment of mutual respect and admiration that facilitates the DI’s ability to be successful in their task. As one senior enlisted put it, “We have to trust our DI’s and the DI’s have to trust their chain of command. If they do make a mistake, they need to know and understand that – trust us to make the right decision.”

The training at MCRDSD is the second key success factor for the Depot. This training applies to that which the permanent personnel must undergo in order to take part in the recruit training process. For enlisted recruit trainers, that training is Drill Instructor school. The school is seen as the “crux of success” and the “quality control device” by the regimental commander. He further says, “if I can get good people out of my DI school, I’ll get good recruits out of my regiment and everyone will be better off in the fleet.” This is echoed in

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65 Anonymous interview
66 Anonymous interview
67 Interview with Colonel Thaler, Commanding Officer, RTR, November, 2002.
the schools motto of “The future of the Marine Corps begins here.” Drill Instructor school is first and foremost a leadership school focusing on developing the leadership abilities and potential of future DI’s. It is 11 intense weeks of training to prepare the Marine for what will most certainly be his or her most difficult tour. This level of intensity is necessary and required in order to adequately prepare these future DI’s for what lies ahead. Officers that are assigned to RTR, or will otherwise take part in the recruit training process, attend the Series Officer Course (SOC). SOC, also conducted at the DI school under the tutelage of the assistant director of DI school, a post company command captain, is a 10 day orientation package designed to familiarize the new series officer with his new environment and responsibilities. The course covers basic drill, physical fitness, General Military Subjects and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) evaluations along with panel discussions with personnel throughout the depot who contribute to the recruit training process either directly or indirectly. This course also provides the DI school staff an opportunity to evaluate the incoming officers and if need be, forward a recommendation to RTR that a particular individual need not be assigned to a recruit training company for cause, i.e. lack of maturity, professionalism, physical fitness, appearance, etc. The bulk of the training a new series officer will receive is done on the job while “shadowing” a current series commander. Here, a certain level of knowledge and proficiency must be demonstrated to the company commander and company staff before being qualified to assume the billet of a recruit training series commander. Whether officer or enlisted,

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68 Shadowing is when a new officer, not yet qualified to oversee recruit training on his own, observes training with a current recruit training officer till he is qualified.
the quality of instruction they receive at DI school is instrumental not only to their success, but to that of the Marine Corps as a whole. Both the Commanding General and the RTR Commander recognize the importance of DI school to their mission and have resourced the school in personnel and resources accordingly.

The third key success factor identified was leadership. The ability to “arouse or inspire men to rise to great achievements by perceiving their capacities and motivations, articulating the goals to be achieved, and inspiring the efforts and sacrifices needed to achieve them. In this sense, leadership seems somehow mystical – and unattainable for the ordinary person.”69 This in essence captures the role of the DI in the recruit training process, the ability to make the recruits believe in themselves and instill in them a degree of confidence, arrogance and aggressiveness. This is inculcation, or indoctrination of the Marine Corps culture is something that is not replicated in any of the other services. It is truly a unique style of leadership, almost “mystical”, that is imparted upon the recruits by the DI. As the RTR CO says, “the beauty of this place is just basic Marine Corps leadership. MOS regardless.”70 More specifically, it’s “leadership from the front.” All Marines, enlisted and officer alike, understand the degree of selflessness and sacrifice that is incumbent upon them as leaders. And perhaps more than most other commands, in times of peace, is this more evident or held to a higher standard than on a Marine Corps recruit training depot.

70 Interview with Colonel Thaler, Commanding Officer, RTR.
55 Anonymous Interview
3. System Direction

Marines aboard the Depot often receive their formal guidance from their leaders face-to-face, whether it is on a one to one basis, or en masse via a unit commander speaking with the personnel of his unit in a classroom or auditorium on a periodic basis. The idea is that the leaders understand that those subordinate to them must hear their guidance from them personally in order for their message to have meaning and purpose. It also lends itself towards establishing credibility as a leader. Depot leaders formal guidance is further published in letter format, referred to as Commanders Guidance, and disseminated to the lowest common denominator where it is displayed in common areas, series offices and company offices, battalion offices, etc., to serve as a reminder of the commanders intent. This guidance is seen as critical. As one senior enlisted personnel puts it, “the guidance we get from the commander is critical. I don’t think we could do our job effectively without understanding and knowing his guidance. It really starts from there.”

The mission, or goal of the Depot is well defined, clear and concise. And that is to make basically trained Marines. Nothing more. Nothing less. Everyone aboard the Depot recognizes this as it was unanimously relayed through the data collection process. As one enlisted Marine said, “We’re here to make a basically trained Marine, not to our standard, but to the Marine Corps standard. We’re not looking for super squad members. We’re not looking for Marines who could attack a hill tomorrow. Just a basic trained Marine.”

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72 Anonymous Interview.
The direction or guidance espoused by the Commanding General is described as an “operational mindset”\textsuperscript{73}. He espouses that it is important for everyone at every level, regardless of their relationship to the recruit training mission to be proactive and ask questions, “What are we doing that we could be doing better? What are we doing that we shouldn’t be doing? What are we not doing that we should be doing?” As one key staff officer says, “The fact that we can question what we are doing is beautiful.”\textsuperscript{74} He has begun a planning culture within Depot staff offices. Such thinking in the has led to past innovations in recruit training like the Crucible and instilling Core Values training into the curriculum. An example of the direction, values or guidance espoused by the Commanding General in concert with an “operational mindset” is the understanding that the end state to mission accomplishment is increased combat readiness in the operation forces. This is best exemplified by the following quote, “I want a hard hitting physical outfit – I’m not training the Viennese Boy’s Choir here.”\textsuperscript{75} While he provides for the welfare of recruits, a priority above all else, he further shows understanding for the arduous and tenuous environment within which the DI’s work, via slight informal SOP changes. “I don’t want my DI’s walking around on pins and needles....they’re human!”\textsuperscript{76}

In contrast to the obvious physical purpose of the Depot itself, the guidance passed down and the espoused values of its leadership, it was evident in the interview process that some officer and enlisted personnel feel that recruit training is not

\textsuperscript{73}Anonymous Interview.
\textsuperscript{74}Anonymous Interview
\textsuperscript{75}Interview with Major General Huly, Commanding General, MCRDSD, November, 2002.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid
the priority of the Depot. The following was recorded. “I don’t get the feeling there is a set of priorities on the Depot that says this is the most important thing we do”, says one senior Marine. Another senior Marine felt that “we need to refocus the depot back on recruit training as opposed to community relations, PAO,…..” Or as another senior enlisted Marine said when commenting on coordination between units and commands, “with supporting within RTR, adequate. Outside RTR – let’s just say our priorities are not necessarily their priorities.” And “We revolve around them instead of them revolving around us”. In addition, there was ample concern for the level of attention paid to the successful conduct of, and the prevalence of civilian tours, educator tours and media interference aboard the depot and the adverse impact these evolutions in turn had on recruit trainers and recruit training. It was expressed that these evolutions, though conceded to be important, leave the recruit trainers to believe their work in fact is not the priority.

4. Design Factors
   a. Technology and Tasks

What is the nature of the work aboard MCRD, San Diego? What specification is required? Per this study, the following four processes are considered basic technologies critical to the MCRDSD organization.

- MCRDSD is responsible for all recruiting efforts, programs and enlisted accessions within the Western Recruiting Region in accordance with the Commandant’s guidance, and in accordance with the needs of the Operating Forces.
- MCRDSD is responsible for the receiving, processing and training of all recruits into
basically trained Marines in accordance with the Commandants guidance, and in accordance with the needs of the Operating Forces.

- MCRDSD is responsible for the development and conduct of training those Marines assigned to and responsible for the accomplishment of both the recruiting and recruit training efforts.

- MCRDSD pursues an aggressive, community outreach program to maintain a positive community presence and relationship with the greater San Diego area.

The scope of this research, however, is limited only to that organizational structure which pertains to the recruit training process. And in as much, the tasks related to making Marines for the most part are very routine, purposefully standardized, formalized and highly structured. The tasks are built around the execution of the POI in accordance with the SOP. The Program of Instruction, the 12-week training regimen described in an earlier chapter, is a cyclic and repetitive process. It can further be described as predictable and somewhat automated. The process follows a progressive, building block approach in as much as it resembles an assembly line, mass production effort towards making basic trained Marines.

The execution of tasks in support of the recruit training process is in turn similar, i.e. standardized. However, the tasks vary dependent upon billet and responsibilities. The primary trainer in the recruit training process is obviously the DI. Though his tasks will vary from training day to training day, his responsibilities on any given training day are the same for that particular training day for any future training cycle. The POI is a rigid, and often
inflexible, training regimen, and recruit training calendars are often set as far as a year in advance. Thus, recruit trainers can accurately predict where they will be and what training they will be conducting on any given training day months in advance. This is similarly true for commanders and staff above the company level, the only difference being the scope with which they observe, supervise and support the recruit training process, i.e., company, battalion, regiment, etc. A recruit training battalion has oversight of four recruit training companies, RTR has oversight of three battalions, or up to twelve companies. However, above the battalion level, tasks and responsibilities can become blurred. While all subordinate recruit training units are on the same training schedule, no two units are on the same training day. The execution of the POI rotates among the lettered company’s in alphabetical order.

There exists at the core of recruit training efforts, most especially at the enlisted instructor level, a degree of specification and differentiation, or a variance in tasks and units assigned to conduct them. DI’s are the primary instructors of recruits and conduct the vast majority of the training in addition to mentorship, guidance and leadership. However, there are supporting instructors that conduct specialized, specific training critical to the making of a Marine. A prime example of this is the Marines of Instructional Training Company, Support Battalion, who provide academic instruction, swim instruction and qualification, and close combat instruction to recruits. Additionally, the Marines of Range Company and Field Company, WFTBN, who conduct formalized marksmanship training, expert field training and supervise the conduct of the Crucible. In each case, there is specialized training conducted by specific personnel from an outside
supporting agency that the recruit training companies are dependent upon.

Supporting agencies, such as Support Battalion and WFTBN provide key interdependencies to recruit training battalions in support of the recruit training mission. Per the POI and the established organizational structure, there is a sequential interdependence amongst all units involved in the recruit training process as training platoons, series and company’s rotate to and from training conducted by these critical supporting units.

b. Structure

MCRDSD is structured as a traditional, military, top-down hierarchy. Branches are grouped by tasks with various supporting and tenant commands falling under the Chief of Staff. The organizational structure is similar to what you might find in any command throughout the Marine Corps. There is the Depot headquarters atop the organization, and from there in descending order, are the RTR, RTBNs, RTCos, lead and follow (trace) series, and recruit training platoons. The overall structure of the Depot is in line with its mission of making Marines with one possible exception, WFTBN. The only noticeable differentiation from a traditional command slate is WFTBN is on par with RTR organizationally and is commanded by a Colonel (0-6), as is the RTR. The reason this is noteworthy is the mission of WFTBN, critical as it is, is subordinate to, and in support of RTR’s overarching mission to make basic trained Marines. Placing this important command apart and on par with RTR may be cause for concern. This has not gone unnoticed by the Depot leadership and they recognize the structural overlap. The justification for the WFTBN being commanded by an 0-6 (vice an 0-5), is it’s location aboard CPEN, 30 miles to the north at Edson Range. The
WFTBN commander is assigned the collateral duty assignment of an Area Commander of Camp Pendleton\textsuperscript{77}. Since all area commanders aboard CPEN are Colonels (0-6), were the CO of WFTBN a Lieutenant Colonel (0-5), it is argued that he and his command would be at a distinct disadvantage in the ongoing scramble for scarce resources from the Base CG, CPEN. This reasoning will be discussed further in the following chapter.

Lateral and vertical coordination between units is conducted both formally and informally. However, due to the nature of recruit training and the intended inflexibility of the POI, coordination is most normally done through formal channels. This is critical in ensuring compliance with the POI and SOP, which in turn acts as a safeguard on behalf of the recruits, and recruit trainers’ personal and professional welfare. The formal coordination between appropriate and authorized personnel aboard MCRDSD also allows for accountability among the coordinating units and facilitates the flow of communication between the commanders and staff who are directly accountable for their units actions. Lateral and vertical informal coordination also occurs quite frequently and is often instrumental in the execution of the recruit training day. Informal coordination, vastly lateral in nature, is most commonly exercised by battalion level SNCOs with peers in adjacent, subordinate, higher and supporting units. Often referred to as “gunny grease”, this type of coordination, when successful, allows smaller units to be flexible, when practical, even if it accounts for a deviation from the POI. However, the inflexibility and rigidity of the organization can and often does frustrate these efforts.

\textsuperscript{77} MCB, Camp Pendleton is zoned into several “areas”, each with a designated commander responsible for the maintenance of that training area.
The physical layout of the Depot is not optimized towards mission accomplishment. In addition to the geographic separation from WFTBN as discussed earlier, the grounds of the Depot are restrictive and allow for rudimentary training outside of C.O.D. and classroom instruction only. However, the buildings housing the various commands and schoolhouses are centralized, encircling a massive parade deck in the middle of the Depot. The various commands occupy building space in a logical, orderly manner that facilitates communication between the commands and the conduct of training.

All the commands aboard the depot are interdependent upon one another in order to accomplish the recruit training mission. This interdependency is resultant of the supported-supporting unit relationship commonly found in military organizations. Aboard the depot, RTBNs are the supported unit, and commands such as SPPTBN, WFTBN, H&SBN, etc. are the supporting units. There are no autonomous commands associated with the recruit training process.

Liaison personnel are used throughout the command to facilitate coordination among units. These personnel, commonly DI’s from RTR, are placed in key areas such as Dental and Receiving to assist in the accountability of recruits and ensure training and logistical concerns are handled expeditiously and at the lowest level. Currently there is no liaison on staff at WFTBN.

Recruit training is a 24-hour a day, seven day a week responsibility. Training is conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily Monday through Friday and from 0800 to 1300 on Saturdays. Sundays are reserved for religious services and a few short hours of free time to prepare for the upcoming week’s training. Recruits are required to be supervised at all times. This
requires DI’s and Company officers to be in the company of the recruits for long hours, with DIIs consistently working in the 80-100 hour a week range.

c. People

MCRDSD appears to have the right mix of people for the work required. This organization is a veritable “melting pot” as it brings together a wide variety of individuals from throughout the Marine Corps with various ranks, skills, backgrounds and experiences. And due to the preliminary screening process for DI duty, the command screening checklist, those selected for this arduous duty arrive with the character, discipline and motivations necessary to be successful recruit trainers, MOS regardless.

Enlisted recruit trainers come from a wide variety of backgrounds and having varying degrees of years in service and experience on the drill field. MCRDSD achieves a proper mix of the youth and energy of first time DIIs with senior enlisted personnel, almost all of whom are on the second or third tour in recruit training. This allows for a proper balance between the aggressiveness of the junior DIIs and the maturity and experience of the senior DIIs and staff. Furthermore, first time DIIs, commonly sergeants between 5-8 years of service, are beginning to see the Marine Corps as a career. This “careerist”78 outlook lends itself towards the professionalism and maturity required to have a successful tour and as such will be viewed on par with recruiters in regards to promotability later on in the Marines career.

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78 Careerists are defined as Marines beyond 8 years of active-duty status. This is a noteworthy milestone in that the vast majority of enlisted that remain in service beyond this point go to the twenty-year mark.
Officers are given orders to the Depot based upon availability, career track and eligibility for career level schools, regardless of MOS. They range in rank from 2nd Lieutenant to Major General. The majority of officers are of the rank of Major and below and hold various staff positions throughout the command, with exceptions for company commands and the Director, DI School.

Commanding Officers, RTBN CO’s, RTR, H&SBN, WFTBN, CG. MCRDSD, are selected and slated via a highly competitive command screening process held annually at HQMC. Only a select few at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above are screened for command and subsequently slated for a command billet. This is testament to the quality of commanding officer within the ranks of MCRDSD.

The enlisted men, women, and officers of MCRDSD are the right people for the tasks and missions for which they are assigned. They arrive in possession of the raw skills and capabilities (KSAs) required in order for the depot to be successful in the transformation of recruits into Marines. Their varied background, MOSs, ethnicity, rank, etc. add to their value as instructors, supervisors and staff in the recruit training process. The system, though sensitive to political pressures, demanding and rigid, is simple and rudimentary in nature. Other than the specifics related to the POI, SOP, and DI school for prospective DIs, no new real skills are required to be learned in order to be successful. As stated earlier by the RTR Commander, “The beauty of this place is it’s basic Marine Corps leadership”. And there in lies the lasting value to having conducted a tour aboard MCRDSD. The leadership skills honed here are in turn, rotated back to the Operating Forces in
terms of more capable and professional officer and enlisted Marines.

d. **Processes and Subsystems**

1. **Human Resources Management.** MCRDSD does not have a formal human resources function by title or office, but the inherent processes of selection, training and rewards are formalized and imbedded in existing structure. The selection process, as discussed earlier is executed externally between the Marine and his or her MOS monitor. It is up to this system to ensure the depot receives the right people, at the right time, with the right skills. Distribution and accountability of officer and enlisted personnel once aboard the depot occurs within the G-1 offices located in Depot Headquarters.

The training system aboard the depot is seen as one of the core competencies of MCRDSD and accordingly is a top priority. There are three training pipelines conducted aboard the Depot. The primary training process is in accordance with its mission of making basic trained Marines. The recruit training process is a highly scrutinized, rigid, and detailed training regimen that produces arguably the best war fighters in this nation. The current POI is highly evolved and more than adequate. Arguably, due to timeline restrictions regarding submission of swim qualification codes, priority of PRASP\(^79\), logistical constraints regarding WFTBN, etc., the POI could be altered for the better. How so remains a matter of opinion and ample fodder for discussion.

Currently, the training phases are broken down, by week: Phase I, 6 weeks, Phase II, 4 weeks, and Phase III, 2

\(^{79}\) PRASP, Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program, whereby, new Marines are temporarily assigned to a Recruiting Station near their home of record to assist in the recruiting effort for a period of up to 30 days.
weeks. This places a constraint on recruit trainers to accomplish ample required training prior to graduation; the final PFT, final uniform fittings, the Battalion Commanders Inspection, and the final practical examination, most notably. Of these, the most significantly impacted is the final PFT. Recruits often return from CPEN injured and not capable of conducting physical fitness training over the last 2 weeks. This results in often as many as 100 recruits receiving waivers and not having to run the final PFT. Adjustments to the current training schedule, i.e. the POI, need to be considered to allow recruit trainers maximize their efforts and the quality of their product, vice the current “mad-dash” to graduation.

The other two training pipelines aboard the depot, the DI course and SOC, are conducted at the DI School and instructed by DI School officers and staff. These were discussed at length earlier in Key Success factors (see Key Success factors, B-2). Both the DI course and SOC are seen as the crux of success in support of the Depot’s primary mission of making Marines. And as such, the command pays strict attention to the resourcing and POIs of these two programs. The training is adequate in both instances and contributes directly and significantly to the quality of the product that crosses the parade deck each graduation morning.

Follow-on training is conducted. Upon completion of the DI course or SOC, the Marine will report his unit for assignment to a platoon or series. The quality of the supervision, instruction and introduction into his new environment he receives will be instrumental in his success as a recruit trainer. This initial period is referred to as OJT, or on the job training. New DIs and series officers must

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80Anonymous Interview
demonstrate a basic knowledge of, and proficiency in, recruit training prior to being signed off by either their Senior DI or Company Commander as being fully qualified to train and supervise recruits. This initial time is important in providing for the welfare, integrity and maintenance of the high standards associated with Marine Corps recruit training.

The **rewards** process, or what is recognized for success at MCRDSD, presents an interesting perspective on the recruit training environment. Formally, rewards are given in the form of Navy Achievement or Navy Commendation medals to individuals who complete a successful tour. And due to the stress, rigors, and sensitivity inherent to the recruit training environment, this generally refers to any individual who succeeds by not failing. An example, regardless of the performance of a particular platoon, series or company in any particular event or throughout the training cycle as a whole, is whether or not that unit was the subject of any administrative action that resulted in an investigation or the relief of a DI. To a fault, those at the lowest level of recruit training defined success as finishing a cycle with those you started with. In addition, they felt that “staying off the skyline” or having no allegations was typical of a rewarding cycle or tour. This presents an interesting paradox. Those responsible for executing the recruit training process, where the environment is the most tenuous, and of whom the most is asked, are not rewarded based upon the quality of the product they put across the parade deck from cycle to cycle, but in turn are punished for any misgivings or mistakes they make in the process. It’s an environment where “one ah’ sh**” can wipe away all your “atta’ boys” in a heartbeat. It should be noted that the command has issued guidance that honest mistakes, understandably, will occur, and may even be forgiven, but cannot
be repeated. Also, as one senior enlisted wisely warned, “be
careful what you call an honest mistake”81.

2. Measurement and Controls. The bottom line to
the organizational performance of MCRDSD is measured by whether
or not they meet the needs of the Operating Forces in accordance
with the Commandant’s guidance. Personal performance is
measured primarily by fitness reports that are not necessarily
an accurate measure of productivity. Other means of
measurement evolve around recruit training statistics measured
in percentages. Both RTR and Depot track several statistics
that indicate key trends in recruit training analysis. Important among them is the percent of originals graduated82 and
percent injuries by body part and training event83. Tracking
and analysis of these figures allows policy makers to adjust the
recruit training program accordingly.

MCRDSD personnel have many controls imposed upon
them by higher, primarily, the POI, which is authored at TECOM
on the east coast. This, as previously mentioned, must be
strictly adhered to and any deviations from which are not looked
upon favorably. In addition, they must work within existing
guidelines, policies, rules and regulations that act as system
constraints. Most notably is the SOP. The SOP, referred to as
the “bible” of recruit training strictly prescribes the conduct
of all personnel involved in the recruit training process,
whether directly or indirectly.

81 Anonymous Interview
82 Percent of originals graduated is the number of recruits graduated that
were original platoon members. This number discounts any new recruits
adjoined from other units or picked up from PCP, MRP, etc.
83 By tracking injuries per extremity and event, training could be
adjusted to alleviate the frequency of injuries to recruits
3. Planning, Communication, and Information Management. Long-range planning for the most part is limited to monitoring, forecasting, and making any necessary adjustments to the long-range recruiting and recruit training plans disseminated by MCRC and TECOM. These plans generally consist of forecasted enlisted contracts, tentative ship dates from MEPS to MCRDSD, assignment to recruit training company’s for pick-up and subsequent training. Planning also accounts for follow-on training dates at MCT and SOI. Forecasting has been historically fairly accurate, and when, as is often necessary, is capable of flexibility in response to changes in the recruiting environment and retention.

The majority of short-term planning done on the Depot revolves around tweaking the training schedule to allow for civilian tours, media tours, conduct of burials, and conditions brought on by foul weather. The former are often causes of “leap-ex’s”84 at the battalion and company levels, as it is often their personnel, DIs primarily, that are called upon to lead the tour at the expense of recruit training. Beyond these considerations, planning is minimal and doesn’t much extend beyond final coordination measures by the training unit.

Communication at all levels of command aboard the depot is vital to the success of the recruit training mission. MCRDSD relies on a variety of communication mediums for planning and coordination. E-mail, the internet, Depot intra-net, multiple phone lines, and fax capabilities facilitate the Depot mission at all levels. Like other commands, the internet and e-mail have become pervasive, however, the primary means of communication, and the most preferred, remains face-to face,

84 “Leap-ex” is the term given to a task received at the last moment that causes the personnel, planning and training resources of the assigned unit to become momentarily strained in order to accomplish the assigned task.
followed by phone conversations and then e-mail. The only exception to this rule is communication to WFTBN, separated by more than 30 miles, where coordination can be difficult, and primary means remain the phone line and e-mail. Periodic meetings are also held to facilitate communication between commands. An example would be a weekly battalion commanders and staff meeting.

There were no acknowledged problems, or short-comings, in the Depot's current information management system. The most recent improvement in information management aboard the Depot is the advent of RAS/PAS. RAS/PAS is a multi-function, personnel accountability system and database. It improves the generating and sharing of information Depot wide. Currently, computer desktops are located in DI huts at the platoon level. RAS/PAS facilitates the ease of maintaining accurate recruit record books by platoon, series and company staff, by automating the recruit-entry system. Whereas in the recent past DIs had to hand-write all entries into the recruit record books, they and company staff can now cut and paste off a menu of options, edit past entries, and ensure consistency and accuracy amongst the DI team in future entries. RAS/PAS also allows for the submission of morning reports and the transfer of recruit information from one unit to another electronically, vice having to hand carry a book or books. RAS/PAS also facilitates the commands ability to manage the training curriculum, and maintain a shared, statistical database, which allows the commands to generate long-term trend statistics, such as event scores and averages, graduation percentages and recruit drops. RAS/PAS is also interfaced with other data bases, most notably MCTFS, the Marine Corps Total Force Structure personnel data base.
5. Culture

The culture aboard MCRDSD can best be described by dividing it into three sub-cultures: the personal and professional conduct of Depot personnel; the overall culture of recruit training; and Drill Instructors. The Marine Corps’ overarching culture of pride sums up the professional conduct and appearance of all Depot personnel, active duty military and otherwise. MCRDs are traditionally the epitome of professionalism in the services and MCRDSD is no exception. MCRDSD personnel understand they are part of a showcase and that they are on exhibit to the public at all times. It is this mentality that reinforces the highest professional standards of any base in the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps recruit training culture, i.e., “We don’t promise you a rose garden”, is the toughest entry-level training of all the services and its preservation is critical to the future of the Corps. When other services got easier, the Marine Corps got tougher. They incorporated combat hitting skills, then Line Integrated Neuro-override Engagement (L. I. N. E.), and now Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (M. C. M. A. P.). They added an extra week of training to already the longest recruit training in the services and implemented the Crucible, a grueling 54-hour “gut-check”. When other services decided to go co-educational and combine males and females into one training pipeline, the Marine Corps retained and defended its policy of progressive integration of females into a historical and predominantly male fighting force. The logic is based on the premise that young people, male and female, perform better when they learn first how to be Marines, then gradually learn how to work well with other gender Marines. Recruits arrive aboard MCRDSD understanding they are about to begin the toughest
recruit training in the services. When you ask them “why the Marines?” They respond, “because they’re the toughest, sir.”

The culture of the DIs is a source of pride in the conduct of their duties. To begin, there is no billet in the services, which by mere presence alone exudes nearly the level of pride than does that of a Marine Corps Drill Instructor. By donning the “smokey”, the revered cover of the DI, a Marine becomes part and parcel to a very special part of Marine Corps history. They adopt a legacy of the very highest standards of conduct and assume the awesome responsibility of creating Marines out of civilians and teamwork out of individuals. Marine Corps DIs are readily recognized as the best recruit trainers of all the services. This legacy of pride, honor and personal dignity are visible cultural norms, and are the driving forces behind the results they consistently achieve.

6. Outputs and Outcomes

MCRDSD has one customer specific output regarding recruit training. For the Operating Forces, that output is producing approximately 20 thousand basic trained Marines annually. While providing Marines to the fleet is a concrete, measurable output, there are other less tangible, more difficult to measure outputs, which result from the recruit training process. For example, the conversion of individual strangers into cohesive units, drastic improvements in physical fitness, neatness, organization skills, and marksmanship are examples of typical outputs. Consequences of these outputs includes a new-found professionalism and personal confidence, job satisfaction, and increased retention and reenlistment rates.

Serving the Operating Forces results in the following outcomes: increased fleet and combat readiness of the operating forces positively impacts national security and accomplishment
of America’s objectives worldwide. Providing the operational forces with basic trained Marines is critical in order for these units to maintain required manning levels to meet mission requirements. As mentioned earlier, a transformed individual with the physical and mental confidence to succeed is a positive contribution to society. It is not a stretch to say that recruit training provides thousands of young people with the basic knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to succeed throughout their entire lives.

C. MINTZBERG MODEL

When defining the interrelationships and core attributes of MCRDSD, its configuration, as defined by Mintzberg, is that of the machine organization. It is an organization where the basic structure has highly specialized, routine operating tasks; very formalized communication throughout the organization; large-size

![MCRDSD Mintzberg Model](http://example.com/mintzberg_diagram.png)

Figure 12. MCRDSD Mintzberg Model

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operating units; reliance on the functional basis for grouping tasks; relatively centralized power for decision making; and an administrative structure with a distinction between line and staff.86

An analysis of the MCRDSD organization via the Mintzberg model yields the following (see figure 12). The operating core and techno-structure are adequate in size and operating capacity. The supporting functions are not in alignment, or in congruence with the middle line. They are too influential in purpose and task and overlap the mission and responsibilities of the middle line and operating core. These supporting commands provide critical instruction and support to the mission of making Marines, but overarching cognizance over these functions resides outside the middle line. This causes an overlap in the configuration between the supporting functions and line commands. This is cause for concern as it can lead to ambiguity in direction and guidance for those in the operating core who must discern who’s “turf” they are on today. Further, this disconnect can give rise to friction in the assignment or allocation of resources. The strategic apex may be strained due to multiple responsibilities of Commanding General.

Both the systems model and the configuration model are effective tools for analyzing MCRDSD in that each looks at the organization as a whole, including external factors that may impact the system internally. These models applied to MCRDSD show an organization that appears extremely efficient in the production of Marines. There are indications that are explained in the next chapter that the organizational structure, primary training pipeline, and DI subculture may not be optimized. Coupled with increasing and changing demands from the external

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environment and geographic constraints, MCRDSD, indeed all defense organizations, must continually assess their actions in terms of producing desired results. The question is always, in what ways can the recruit training process be improved.

The models provide a useful framework in which to view the system and its components in relation to one another in terms of congruence or fit, i.e., to what extent is MCRDSD as a whole tending towards equilibrium, i.e., are the parts more compatible than not? The next chapter draws conclusions around this hypothesis and offers recommendations for improving recruit training.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Systems analysis and Mintzberg’s configuration theory were used in this thesis to describe and analyze the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego organization. Results of the analysis in the previous chapter indicate that although MCRDSD accomplishes its basic mission, key variables are incongruent. When important aspects of any organization are out of alignment, optimum performance is not occurring. Describing Key factors and how they interrelate is an important first step for leaders and policy makers. The purpose of this comparison to theoretical models is to identify where to intervene in the recruit depot to improve overall results.

Though MCRDSD is successful in terms of mission accomplishment and goal attainment, every organization must continually examine itself and seek change where it is needed. For MCRDSD, changes to the current organizational structure, culture, direction and recruit training process offer the opportunity for improvement. The conclusions and recommendations offered here are not meant to be conclusive, but to begin dialogue among Marine Corps leadership and policy makers towards implementing change and improving MCRDSD performance.

A. CONCLUSIONS

It is important to mention the limitations of this study prior to discussing any conclusions in order that they are understood in their proper context. Conducting an in-depth organizational analysis of MCRDSD requires expertise, a knowledge base, experience level and time that exceed the scope of this thesis. One week aboard MCRDSD learning about the organization, conducting 30 interviews, and limited archival information does not constitute a thorough organizational
assessment. This thesis is a preliminary assessment of MCRDSD to provide Depot leadership a rudimentary understanding of areas within the organization that may benefit from change.

The following conclusions are offered:

- **Key external and internal organizational variables are incongruent, i.e., not aligned for optimal performance.** Structurally, the Commanding general appears to be spread too thin and over tasked making it difficult for adequate attention to be paid to competing and emergent priorities. An additional structural and decision-making finding is that the Recruit Training Regiment has overall responsibility for the transformation of civilians to Marines per their mission statement, but it does not have cognizance of one-third of the recruit training process, nor of outside agencies integral to mission accomplishment. This command structure creates an unnecessary duality within the organization, consequently ending to potential and actual friction, and turf issues. Subordinate commanders must often answer to two different commands which may detract from clear lines of command and control. Further, argument for a command, whose mission is subordinate to RTRs, to remain on par with RTR, is equal to subordinating the overall mission as a matter of convenience for the supporting command.

- **Origination and cognizance over the Program of Instruction (POI) is held at too high a level and is too rigid, leading towards increased cycle time in implementing change.** The Depot’s limited authority over the POI and its lack of flexibility in implementing change were clearly indicated. Requests for changes to the POI require a long turn-around time and are subject to the authority of staff planners located in Quantico, VA, on the opposite coast from the executing command. This unwieldy separation of planners from executors is clearly
documented in the research literature as the “fallacy of detachment.”\(^87\) Results include an unnecessary consumption of time and effort on behalf of the recruit trainers and command staff to the point where several had words to the effect: “it’s not a battle worth fighting.”\(^88\)

- **Systems analysis indicates that the recruit training schedule, or Program of Instruction (POI), is currently not optimized towards producing the highest quality basic trained Marine.** The current training schedule is weighted too heavily in the last two weeks of training, i.e., battalion commanders inspection, final uniform fittings, final physical fitness test, final drill competition, final academics testing and preparation for graduation. This places unnecessary time constraints on recruit trainers and supporting agencies in the accomplishment of multiple graduation requirements. Further, it does not give ample opportunity for recruits to physically recover from the conduct of the Crucible prior to the final PFT, perhaps compromising the quality of the final product.

- **The Depot priority of making Marines as espoused by Depot leadership, is at times not in concert with, and in conflict with perceived and actual priorities.** The emphasis on public relations and its related taskings upon Recruit Training Battalions diverts valuable recruit training personnel from their mission and often places undue hardship on strained resources at the battalion level, e.g. tours. Many recruit trainers indicated that this factor subordinates the training mission to public relations, thereby adversely impacting desired results.

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\(^87\) Mintzberg, 1989

\(^88\) Anonymous Interview
An aspect of culture among recruit trainers is incongruent with the desired culture of making high-quality, basic trained Marines. Culture in systems analysis is an emergent variable, i.e., actual behaviors, norms, and language resulting form the (mis)fit of key input and throughput variables. An emerging culture can be subtle and can become deeply ingrained and difficult to change. Data were fairly convincing. The notion is as long as recruits cross the parade deck and no recruit training violations have occurred, than a successful training cycle has been completed. There is insufficient attention paid to the quality of training completed, and focused attention paid to keeping production on-track. Training to the lowest standard can become a defacto standard in a production-line mentality. This is a slippery slope fraught with controversy and varying interpretations. The notion that the Depot is more of a pump than a filter was echoed by experienced recruit trainers. Too much emphasis is placed on the word “basic” in producing the basic trained Marine. The intent is to stimulate further analysis of this difficult concept and to ensure that appropriate interventions occur to produce consistent results over time.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations address the fore-mentioned conclusions.

- Assign a Deputy Commanding General billet to the Depot staff. The current depot-level command structure of MCRDSD, though congruent, is not optimized towards mission accomplishment. Currently, the Commanding General of MCRDSD presides over major and multiple responsibilities that fragments his ability to focus on recruiting. Quite simply, he is over-tasked. The creation and manning of a Deputy Commanding General
billet would alleviate a centralized command decision-making process and increase efficiency aboard the Depot. The relative scope, breadth of responsibility, and specific tasks of this billet would be assigned by the CG of MCRDSD as deemed necessary. Oversight of the POI at the Depot is an example of a specific tasking.

**Restructure Recruit Training Regiment to include Weapons and Field Training Battalion and Clothing Detachment.** The current organizational structure of subordinate units is not in alignment with assigned tasks and mission accomplishment. Re-designating WFTBN for command by a Lieutenant Colonel (0-5) and placing it within RTR would provide continuity of command throughout the recruit training process and “continuity equates to credibility”\textsuperscript{89}. This would facilitate communication, information flow, implementation of policy, logistics, save money, etc., which all contribute to enhanced proficiency and efficiency. Assign the RTR Commander the collateral duty of Area-31 Commander with the WFTBN Commander possessing ByDir\textsuperscript{90} authority. Further, it would be worth studying the feasibility of placing the Clothing Issue Detachment within the RTR S-4. This would provide RTR Commander and his staff with oversight of the uniform issue, and increase flexibility, responsiveness and command influence over this important supporting function.

**Restructure accountability and responsibility of the Program of Instruction to the Depot level.** Cognizance over the Program of Instruction (POI) should reside with the command that presides over its execution, should the command be capable. MCRDSD possesses the senior command, expertise, experience base

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\textsuperscript{89} Anonymous Interview

\textsuperscript{90} ByDir stands for By Direction. This is a degree of authority to allow a subordinate commander to act in place of his immediate superior.
and professional competence to oversee, author and implement its own POI in accordance with TECOM’s guidance. This would provide the depot the capability to be responsive to innovative training ideas and special circumstances unique to MCRDSD, i.e., geographic separation of WFTBN from the Depot.

- **Reorganize the current recruit training schedule to three phases, four-weeks each phase.** By allowing for four weeks of training following the Crucible, recruits would have the opportunity to realize their maximum potential and complete training physically qualified to progress to School of Infantry or Marine Combat Training. And, recruit trainers would have the time and opportunity to ensure recruits graduated fully qualified. This would have no impact upon training conducted at WFTBN as their four weeks of instruction would remain intact. There would need to be a shift of instruction between the first and last four weeks of instruction dealing with academics and physical conditioning. Swim week would be conducted week four so as not to interrupt the requirement of assigning codes for Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program.

- **Shift responsibility for the conduct of all non-training related taskers to the Depot.** Place primary responsibility for the conduct and manning of depot tours and other public relations taskers with Depot staff and personnel, i.e., exclude RTR from having to provide manpower for the conduct of these tours. Recruit training is the priority activity aboard the Depot and the execution of these tours, though important, negatively impacts directly at the recruit training level.

- **Revamp/enhance the reward/recognition system for Drill Instructor performance.** Institute an informal Depot and RTR level award for the recognition of enlisted recruit trainers.
for individual, platoon, and series performance. Informal rewards in the form of the “Big Dawg” award, i.e., Lt. General Klimp\textsuperscript{91}, are unique and demonstrate command interest, recognition and appreciation for enlisted recruit trainers special efforts. Enlisted recruit trainers are any enlisted Marine or Navy personnel involved in the recruit training process to include AIs, Range Coaches, and Corpsmen. Informal recognition such as this is invaluable in increasing individual and unit morale and in improving upon the senior officer to junior enlisted command relationship.

C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study looked at MCRDSD in its current context without exploring alternatives to its current physical disposition. The following area is proposed for further research.

- **Conduct an Activity Cost Based analysis of the consolidation of recruit training aboard Camp Pendleton.** MCRDSD is not quite the ideal location nor does it provide all the requisite structure and facilities for a consolidated recruit training effort. However, Camp Pendleton to the north does. There is little question of the benefits that consolidated recruit training would bring, saved resources, simplified logistics, proximity to SOI and MCT, and I MEF. However, the initial cost in doing so would be significant.

The Marine Corps would benefit from a study that would quantify the cost of consolidation of recruit training aboard Camp Pendleton to the Marine Corps, the economic impact upon the two communities, the impact upon the quality of life of DIs, and

\textsuperscript{91} Lt. Gen. Klimp’s Big-Dawg Award. Lt. General Klimp, CG, MCRDPI, '93-'96, would personally appear in the conduct of training events to present to an individual recognized by his chain of command as having gone above and beyond, a large plaque with a pen and ink drawing of the Marine Corps mascot, a bulldog along with a personal inscription denoting the Marines performance. These awards were highly regarded and proudly displayed.
the environmental impact upon Camp Pendleton. This would constitute a significant investment and require perhaps multiple efforts, but could yield benefits in terms of cost savings and increased combat readiness.

D. A FINAL WORD

This study provides Depot leadership with recommendations for change within their organization, including an objective perspective of the DIs view of the world. These recommendations are not made lightly, and the steps necessary for their implementation and possible ramifications were considered. Some of the recommendations would obviously require a significant effort to implement and approval would be dependent upon higher authority within and external to the Marine Corps. However, other recommendations are well within the authority of Depot leadership to enact and their impact would be easily discernable as advantageous to the functioning of the Depot. Lastly, recommendations regarding the re-structuring of RTR would require the bolstering of the RTR S-3 and S-4 shops with additional staff personnel.

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego is an outstanding organization whose contributions to the Marine Corps and the country cannot be overstated. It is this along with my three years of recruit training experience that provided the inspiration to analyze an aspect of recruit training. It is my hope that the work done here will contribute to the ongoing effort of improving upon this important process.
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

This interview is being conducted as part of the research for my master’s thesis. I am conducting an organizational analysis of MCRD, San Diego using the systems model. The primary purpose on my research is to analyze the structure, processes, information systems, and both internal and external relationships of MCRD, San Diego.

The results of this interview will be used in explaining how this organization works and if it is organizationally optimized towards its goals. Anything said in this interview will be kept confidential. I will need to record this interview for accuracy sake.

Background
1. Briefly, what is your background?
2. How long have you been in this position?

Inputs
3. What would you say is the overall purpose of MCRDSD?
4. Can you describe for me your units external environment (Political, Economic, social and Technological)?
5. What would say are the inputs to MCRDSD (unit specific) in terms of information and resources?
6. What do you believe to be the key success factors for your unit (efficient, effective, collaborative)?
7. Briefly describe your goals for your unit (vision, values, mission)?
8. What is your strategy/approach in attaining your goals?

Design Factors
9. What are your primary responsibilities? Which are the most important ones? Which do you spend the most time on?
10. How do you spend the majority of your time in a typical day?
11. How long do you estimate does it take to become effective at this job?
12. What would you change about your job as it currently stands?
13. Is the current organizational structure consistent with mission accomplishment?
14. What individuals or organizations have an impact on you getting your job done?
15. What types of constraints/restraints do you face in the conduct of your job?
16. How would you describe your work environment?
17. Do peer or subordinate agencies/units work together in a manner consistent with the depots mission and goals?
18. How do you communicate with your superiors, peers and subordinates? Which is the most effective? Which is the most efficient?
19. What are the information systems used by this organization? Are you able to get the information you need in a timely manner to make decisions? What information would you like to have you currently aren’t getting?
20. Is the current communication technology/infrastructure adequate in order to do your job? Please describe any shortfalls.
21. Briefly describe the people who work for you? Can you describe their knowledge, skills, and abilities?
22. Are the right type of people be recruited and selected? How do you train and develop those who work here?
23. Are the current training methods used in preparing those who work here adequate?
24. What specific training have you received for this job? Do you feel that training was adequate?
25. How is success measured here (unit/individual)? Is it a desired pattern of behavior that’s rewarded?
26. How are people held accountable? Do the current methods of accountability produce the desired patterns of behavior?

**Culture**
27. Can you define the culture of your organization? Is it consistent with the mission precedence? Does it instigate or mitigate conflict between peer/subordinate units?
28. How is conflict managed?

**Outputs**
29. What would say are the outputs of MCRDSD?
30. Who or what organizations depend upon these outputs?
31. How are the outputs measured?
32. What are the indicators of performance?

**Outcomes**
33. What are the reasons for the commands successes/ failures?

**Miscellaneous**
34. If you were CG for a day and could change three things in this organization, what would they be?
35. Is there anything you can think of that I should be asking in order for me to better understand this organization?
36. Do you have anything else you’d like to add?

Thank you very much for your cooperation.
# APPENDIX B. RECRUIT TRAINING MATRIX

## Recruit Training Matrix

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**NOTE:**
- **SWIM WEEK**: Weeks 5 and 6
- **TEAM WEEK**: Weeks 6 and 7
- **FIELD WEEK**: Weeks 9 and 10
- **CRUCIBLE**: Week 10

*21 MAR 01 CVK*
Week 1
Introduction to Physical Training
Introduction to Core Values
Intro to the M-16A2 Service Rifle
Circuit Course
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program

Week 2
Strength & Endurance Course
Obstacle Course
Bayonet Training
First Aid classes
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
Core Values classes
Academic classes
Physical Training

Week 3
Log Drills
Core Values classes
First Aid classes
Senior Drill Instructor Inspection Confidence Course
Academic classes
Physical Training
Initial Drill Evaluation

Week 4
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program
Pugil Sticks
Log Drills
Museum Tour
Academic classes
Series Officer Inspection

Week 5
Swim Week
Core Values classes
Circuit Course
Obstacle Course
Physical Training
Start of Team Week
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program Test
Week 6
Team Week
Move to WFTBN

Week 7
Marksmanship Training
5 Mile Hike
Core Values
Physical Training

Week 8
Marksmanship Qualification
8-Mile Hike
Physical Training

Week 9
Field Training
Confidence (Gas) Chamber
Field Firing
Beach Run

Week 10
Company Commander's Inspection
The Crucible
Tan Belt Presentation
Warrior's Breakfast
Family of the Corps Presentation
Equipment Inspection
Movement back to MCRD

Week 11
Final Uniform Fit
Practical Examination
Physical Fitness Test
Rappelling

Week 12
Battalion Commander’s Inspection
Final Drill Evaluation
Motivation Run
Emblem Ceremony
Family Day and Recruit Liberty
Graduation
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General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, 1996


Recruit training modification 35-03, RTR, MCRDSD.


USMC Core Values, http://www.mcrdsd.usmc.mil/RTR%202/ValuesA.htm

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   (Attn: Operations Officer)
   Camp Pendleton, California

7. Professor Cary Simon
   Code SM/Sn
   Department of Systems Management
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA

8. Lt. Col. Susan Dooley, USMC
   Defense Resources Management Institute
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA

9. Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot/ WRR
   Suite 240
   San Diego, CA
   Attn: G-3

10. Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Regiment
    Marine Corps Recruit Depot
    San Diego, CA
    Attn: S-3
11. Commanding Officer, Weapons & Field Training Bn
Edson Range
Camp Pendleton, CA
Attn: S-3

12. Major Craig M. Kilhenny
Stafford, VA