ACTIVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING,
CHANGES TO TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

by

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Given the dynamics of the Army transformation, the time is right to improve upon the existing Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) training support organization and correct deficiencies in the command and control and organizational structure. A streamlined, efficient organization is needed to improve AC/RC integration efforts and maintain quality training assistance for the RC. A single component structure is not the answer. Rather, a further integrated approach is needed to break the barrier created by the perception of AC oversight and place the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) on equal status with the active component and in a position to assume greater responsibility for their own readiness.

The AC/RC training support organization has evolved over the past 15 years. The latest program, Training Support XXI (TS XXI), was implemented in 1999. Both the CONUSAs and the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) control training resources, causing commands subordinate to the CONUSA and USARC to work for two headquarters. Redundancy and lack of unity in command complicate the flow of personnel and money to training support units.

A new structure should provide a single channel for the flow of resources. Additionally, one headquarters needs to command and control the training support assets, regardless of that headquarters’ component.
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ACTIVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING,
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A trained and ready Reserve component force is essential for the execution of the U.S. National Military Strategy. A Total Force, with the right mix of all components, is necessary to bind the nation’s citizenry with the military. Effective training for the reserve component is critical for the successful integration of these forces. The current training organization for the U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve, Training Support XXI (TS XXI), was implemented in 1999. The organization has served the U.S. Army well and provided trained and ready reserve component soldiers for a myriad of roles in support of the nation’s missions. As the active U.S. Army transforms to meet future obligations, the reserve components will also transform. A training organization, ensuring the readiness of the reserve components, must reflect this transformation. Given the dynamics of the U.S. Army transformation, the time is right to improve upon the existing Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) training support organization, correcting deficiencies in the command and control and organizational structure. A streamlined, efficient organization is needed to improve integration and maintain quality training assistance for the reserve component. A single component structure is not the answer nor is the complete exclusion of the active component from training readiness oversight of the reserves. A further integrated approach is needed, dispelling the perception of active component oversight and placing the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) in a position to assume greater responsibility for their readiness.

PURPOSE

This research paper will analyze the current AC/RC training support structure, Training Support XXI, and recommend changes to the organization. A brief chronological review will provide the background and evolution of the organization that exists today. The limited scope of this research does not lend itself to a complete history of AC/RC integration and training support nor is it needed to demonstrate the need for changing the Training Support XXI organization. Following an examination of the chronological evolution of the program, a thorough appraisal of the current organization and structure is provided and its shortcomings addressed. The primary analysis will be of the organization and command and support relationships at the major subordinate command levels, Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA) and U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). Recommended changes for future AC/RC support are provided in a final analysis that corrects deficiencies in the current system.
BACKGROUND

A summary of recent changes in AC/RC programs provides a basis for understanding the current organizational structure and its roles. The programs evolved from pre Desert Storm to today with supporting legislation, regulations, and organizational structures influencing the changes.

ORIGIN OF ACTIVE COMPONENT SUPPORT TO THE RESERVE COMPONENT

Throughout the U.S. Army’s history the active and reserve components have enjoyed and maintained some level of integration. Today’s active component support and integration with the reserve component had its modern beginning in the Affiliation Program that was approved by the Department of the Army in 1973. The program established AC/RC unit relationships with the intent of improving readiness. The program focused on combat arms units initially and added combat support and combat service support units in 1976. The success of the Affiliation Program ultimately led to the integration of reserve units into war plans and requirements. CAPSTONE, initiated in 1979, created command and control relationships between active and reserve component units, established wartime planning responsibilities, and Directed Training Associations (DTA). Active component corps and divisions were responsible for wartime planning and DTA under CAPSTONE.\(^1\) The program assisted reserve component units in training for their wartime mission but the training support alignment did not always follow the wartime chain of command. The potential for conflict of interest existed for the units supported in peacetime by other than their wartime active component affiliate.\(^2\) Reserve units not associated with active component units received training assistance and evaluations from Readiness Groups (RGs), formed to provide regional training support. Readiness Groups provided branch and functional assistance to all other units in their geographic area of responsibility. The RGs were aligned under the CONUSAs. United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) was the higher headquarters for USAR units until the creation of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) in 1990, which added an additional level of command and control. Additionally, each state had Senior Army Advisors to the National Guard (SRAAG) in their State headquarters and there were a number of Full Time Support (FTS) personnel assigned to reserve component units throughout the United States. CAPSTONE continued until Operation DESERT STORM.\(^3\)
POST DESERT STORM SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Three Army National Guard round-out maneuver brigades were mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM. As a result of mobilization difficulties and the training required to get the brigades ready for deployment, a Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) investigation was conducted. The DAIG report recommended making changes to the reserve component training strategy and for increasing the role of the active component in reserve component training.\(^4\) Congress reacted and the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) changed the AC/RC relationship dramatically. Section 414 of the NDAA for FY 92 and 93 (Public Law 102-190) directed the Secretary of the Army to establish a program that mandated the assignment of 2,000 active component soldiers as advisors to assist early deploying Army Reserve units.\(^5\) The resulting program, established by FORSCOM, was called BOLD SHIFT. BOLD SHIFT prioritized the reserve component training requirements and focused the units and trainers on platoon level proficiency for combat units and company level for combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units. The initiative added two organizations to the existing AC/RC support structure. Regional Training Teams (RTT) and Regional Training Detachments (RTD), both subordinate to the CONUSAs, were created to provide direct training and evaluation using lanes training.\(^6\) The lack of clear policy from FORSCOM for detailing the role and responsibility of an RTD created confusion among both the RTDs and the reserve units they assisted. Further problems with BOLD SHIFT and the inability of round-out units to meet training objectives led to a reassessment of the program.\(^7\)

Title XI of the NDAA for FY 93 (Public Law 102-484) subsequently prescribed initiatives to improve the readiness of the Army National Guard. Section 1132 required the Department of the Army to assign an additional 3,000 active component advisors beginning in 1995. The revised organization, built upon the existing BOLD SHIFT organization, was called Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE). The new training structure created Regional Training Brigades (RTB) under the CONUSA and Divisions (Exercise) (DIV EX) under the USARC. Field Exercise Brigades (FEB), subordinate to the Divisions (Exercise) provided training support for CS and CSS units while the RTBs continued to provide support to combat arms units. Advisor teams, called Field Training Groups (FTG), were created and aligned with each of the eight ARNG divisions. Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement expanded the CONUSAs ability to provide direct training in addition to the advisory assistance provided by the RGs. The addition of the DIV (Ex) improved the support for CS/CSS units. The structure further reduced the requirements placed on active component corps and divisions and added to the CONUSA’s role.
of training reserve component units. Figure 1 shows the training organization as it had evolved from before Operation DESERT STORM until 1997.

FIGURE 1. AC/RC STRUCTURE PRIOR TO 1997

The organization, while a vast improvement over previous designs, provided a reserve component commander with a challenge when requesting training support. A typical unit had to coordinate with up to four different and distinct organizations to plan training and could not rely on having the same units provide support from one training year to the next. The CONUSA was tasked with the responsibility to coordinate and deconflict training assistance requests, but it was a difficult process.³

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVE COMPONENT SUPPORT

By 1996, legislative action and language defining active component support to the reserve component was simplified. The minimum number of active component soldiers assigned to reserve support was 5,000 with no specific number dedicated to a component. Prior to 1996, the total number was expressed as 2000 for the USAR and 3000 for the ARNG. The law, as expressed in the National Defense Authorization Act, provided the clear intent of the AC/RC support program:

- Improve the readiness of reserve component units
• Increase the number of active component personnel directly advising reserve component unit personnel.
• Provide a basis to determine the most effective mix of reserve component and active component personnel in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training reserve component units.
• Prescribe a training strategy that mandates crew qualification and platoon maneuver proficiency. Increase the role of the active component division commander in planning, conducting and evaluating overall readiness to include training of round out units.
• Institute changes to staff and leader training.  

IMPLEMENTATION OF TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

Headquarters, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to conduct a Support to Organizational Training, Functional Area Assessment (SOT, FAA) in 1996. The goal was to assess the current AC/RC training support organization and determine the optimum structure to train reserve component units. Specifically, FORSCOM’s guidance was to eliminate redundancies in the system and improve the unity of command for the training support units. The SOT, FAA sought to build on the experiences and successes of BOLD SHIFT and GFRE. Strengths of the existing system retained in the new organization included the emphasis on platoon level proficiency, use of lanes training, and the role of the RTBs.

The assessment identified the importance of a pre and post mobilization training relationship. The study recommended designing the new training support structure as a tri-component organization to further the “One Army” concept. A single chain of command was identified as essential for unity of command and effort and to provide a single point of contact for reserve component commanders to coordinate training. The idea of providing a Combat Training Center like experience at platoon level for reserve component units was a training objective sought by FORSCOM. The CONUSA’s role was expanded to provide not only pre-mobilization but also post mobilization training support and mobilization assistance. An underlying goal of the SOT, FAA was to find efficiencies that would reduce the demand on active component corps and divisions. The new structure developed and approved by FORSCOM and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army was called Training Support XXI.

U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND REGULATIONS

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command published the Training Support XXI Implementation Plan in 1998. It provided the concept for establishing and integrating the
training support organization and systems. The plan defined a mission and vision for the Training Support XXI structure. The mission statement addressed the shortcomings of the GFRE organization and mission and it emphasized integration and synchronized support.

**Mission:** FORSCOM implements the Training Support XXI Structure (Integrated Alternative) on or about 1 October 1999, to provide synchronized, integrated, and effective training support to priority and other reserve component units at reserve component unit locations and other designated training locations to achieve pre-mobilization training goals, readiness levels, and reduce the time required for post mobilization training prior to operational deployment.

The vision provided the training priority and the long-term end state. The end state was significant in that it defined what the training structure must ultimately become in order to accomplish its mission. It also identified needed changes to the existing organization.

**Vision:** Training Support XXI is a fully functional, multi-component structure with streamlined command and control. Its primary mission is the training support, assistance, and evaluation required for reserve component units during pre and post mobilization.

a. Priority reserve component units receive the preponderance of training support. Other reserve component units receive training support within capability.

b. Priority units are: divisional round out (RO) units, Force Support Package (FSP) 1 and 2 units, units with latest arrival dates of less than or equal to 30 days (LAD≤30), designated attack helicopter (AH-64) units, and the enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs).

c. This orients the Training Support XXI effort on our purpose for existence as a military, the defense of the Republic. It will focus on the essential training required by the forces that will be deployed to accomplish the assigned mission. In the long term, with legislative changes, this structure must evolve to a truly integrated organization that will operate and function under a single, focused command and control system.¹¹

Additional guidance and focus for reserve component support is found in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training. Its purpose is to prescribe FORSCOM guidance for pre-mobilization training to the ARNG and USAR. The regulation also:

...provides commanders premobilization training requirements, prescribes training proficiency levels they are expected to achieve, and prioritizes required training support. The premobilization training requirements listed in this regulation will be executed within available resources.
The responsibilities and missions, for both the active component and reserve component commanders of Training Support XXI units, are also described in FORSCOM Reg. 350-2. A detailed description of Training Support XXI follows.

TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

Training Support XXI further streamlined the training support by putting the training mission under one headquarters, the CONUSA. The goal of the organization was to enable reserve units to establish habitual relationships with the training support unit in their region and through “one stop shopping” request and schedule training and training support.

In October 1997, a new interim training structure was accepted and implemented as an initial step to reaching the approved Training Support XXI structure. Referred to as the Hybrid Alternative (figure 2), it began the integration of all training support under one headquarters. The hybrid organization placed combat arms training support under the CONUSAs. The reorganization eliminated Readiness Groups and Regional Training Brigades and replaced them with a new organization called a Training Support Brigade (TSB). One additional TSB was placed under the command and control of U.S. Army Pacific to provide support to reserve units in the Pacific Command area of responsibility.

![Hybrid Alternative Diagram]

FIGURE 2. HYBRID ALTERNATIVE
Combat support and service support training organizations, the DIV (EX) and FEB, were still organized under the USARC. The two organizations, TSB and FEB, coordinated training on a regional basis. The combat support and combat service support training battalions moved to the TSB as the FEBs inactivated.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

U.S. Army Forces Command fully implemented Training Support XXI on 1 October 1999. The last of the Field Exercise Brigades, subordinate to the DIV (EX) in the USARC, were inactivated and their subordinate battalions reorganized under the TSBs. The TSB is the key organization in the Training Support XXI structure. It supports the combat arms as well as combat support and service support units; responsibilities formerly divided between the CONUSA and the USARC.

The two CONUSA’s, First Army and Fifth Army, now have responsibility for all the training support for reserve component units in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Under their operational control (OPCON) are the Training Support Divisions (TSD). The TSDs were formed from the former DIV (EX).

![TS XXI Organization Diagram]
The USARC retains command and control of the TSDs but they receive missions and taskings from the CONUSA.

There are five TSDs, three in First Army and two in Fifth Army. Each TSD has a specific area of responsibility in which to coordinate, synchronize, and supervise training support. They also support requirements in other regions within their capability. The TSDs are comprised of a number of TSBs as determined by the training requirements in their areas of responsibility. The TSBs have direct support relationships with the reserve component units in their area of responsibility. The brigades provide not only training support but also assist reserve component units with training management functions and help reserve component commanders determine training requirements. Each TSB, in turn, has Training Support Battalions (TSBn) that are organized to support units with lanes training, evaluations, and observer controller trainers (OC/T). (Figure 4) The combat arms TSBns are comprised of active component personnel whereas the CS/CSS TSBns are integrated units and have both active and reserve component soldiers assigned. Each TSB also has a logistics battalion organized with all reserve component personnel. The logistics battalions maintain the TSB’s equipment and vehicles. Additionally, the TSDs are organized with one simulation brigade, integrated with both active and reserve component soldiers, to conduct training for staffs.

**Figure 4. TSB Organizational Model**

INCLUDES BRANCH/FUNCTIONAL ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY FORMERLY PROVIDED BY READINESS GROUPS.

AC / RC - Commanders

NOTE: MANAGES CS/CSS EQUIP AND AUGMENTS CA BN RQMTS IF DIRECTED.
The Training Support XXI organization is a significant improvement over past training organizations. The training mission flows through a single chain of command. The TSB mission chain of command is clearly through the TSD to the CONUSA. The TSDs, however, are still presented with a dual chain of command that can create difficulty when establishing priorities and when working resource issues.

Under GFRE, the CONUSAs had clear command and control of the RGs and RTBs. The CONUSA coordinated training missions for the DIV (EX) but did not have direct control. The relationship continued under the Hybrid Alternative for CS/CSS training requirements. Training Support XXI places the TSD (formerly DIV (EX)) with its Simulation Brigade in a direct OPCON relationship with the CONUSA. The rating chain of the TSD commanders further supports the OPCON relationship by having the CONUSA commander senior rate the division commanders. The command relationships and issues regarding responsibilities with respect to resources are further clarified in a later section.\(^\text{15}\)

MISSIONS

The Training Support XXI Implementation Plan identifies the responsibilities of the organizations involved in training support. The CONUSA mission is to “execute command and OPCON responsibilities for Training Support XXI organizations in their areas of responsibility, discharge Title XI responsibilities, perform Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) functions, mobilization, compliance, and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).”\(^\text{16}\) The plan establishes and explains the command relationship between the CONUSA, the TSD, and the TSB. Additional key responsibilities of the CONUSA, outlined in the Implementation Plan, include: synchronize reserve component collective training, coordinate reserve component annual training (AT), train and certify OC/Ts, assist reserve component leader training, and serve as higher headquarters for ARNGs during BCTP exercises.\(^\text{17}\) FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 addresses additional requirements to coordinate Yearly Training Briefs (YTB), Overseas Deployment Training (ODT), and validate mobilized separate brigades, ARNG divisions, and general officer commands for deployment.\(^\text{18}\)

The mission of the TSD is to synchronize, coordinate, and supervise training support provided by the TSBs and the command and staff training conducted by the simulation brigade. The TSDs enforce FORSCOM and CONUSA training priorities and policy, coordinate intelligence training requirements with the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers, and coordinate new equipment training. They also provide mobilization assistance and support to reserve component units as required.\(^\text{19}\)
In addition to supporting the missions of the TSD, the TSBs are expected to synchronize the training support requirements of reserve component units in their area of responsibility and coordinate Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) during federal disaster response operations. The brigades establish and conduct training for their OC/Ts, assist reserve component commanders in the development of their Mission Essential Task List (METL), conduct and report training assessments, approve training plans; review readiness reports; assess manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements; and validate the compatibility of reserve component units with active component forces. An example of a TSB mission statement from First U.S. Army follows:

Brigade (TS) provides training assistance and support to priority Reserve Component units and all other units within capabilities, and synchronizes training support within area of responsibility in order to enhance individual and unit readiness to meet directed pre and post mobilization and/or wartime requirements. On order, deploys a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and/or a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) to coordinate Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) during Federal disaster response operations.

RESOURCE CONTROL

Personnel and budget control responsibilities are divided among the organizations with Training Support XXI requirements. The USARC is responsible for providing the resources necessary to accomplish the Training Support XXI mission requirements. The CONUSA is the synchronizer of the resources. The integration of the three components; Active, Army Reserve, and National Guard, along with civilians, Military Technicians, and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) make for complicated resource control. FORSCOM provides the overall guidance for program and budget responsibility for the Training Support XXI Programs.

There are three primary “pots” of money that finance Training Support XXI: Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) funds, Operation and Maintenance Army Reserve (OMAR), and Reserve Pay and Allowance (RPA). The CONUSA provides required input for the budget process and serves as the allowance holder and establishes funds control for all OMA funds that support the Training Support XXI mission. Civilians on the CONUSA Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) are paid with OMA funds. Operation and Maintenance Army funds also pay for the CONUSA’s travel, transportation, contracts, supplies, and equipment. The CONUSA monitors budget execution and provides funding targets to subordinate units. The CONUSAs also provide funding for OPFOR support from the ARNG.

The USARC develops annual budget requirements to support USAR soldiers in Training Support XXI units for military pay, special training, military occupational specialty qualification
MOSQ), Professional Development, and Annual Training. USARC monitors the budget execution of OMAR and RPA. Regional Support Commands (RSC) provide RPA targets to the TSDs and serve as allowance holders and establish funds control for all RPA funds that support Training Support XXI. Reserve Pay and Allowance (RPA) funds mandays and travel for USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers. The RSCs execute and provide fund control for all RPA funds. Figure 5 depicts the funding flow for Training Support XXI OMA and RPA.

![TS XXI FUNDING](image)

**FIGURE 5. TS XXI FUNDING FLOW**

Civilians on the USARC TDA in the TSDs and all Military Technicians are paid with OMAR. National Guard Personnel Army (NGPA) funds mandays and travel for National Guard Mobilization day (M-day) soldiers. Training Support Divisions provide funding targets to the TSBs, as directed by the CONUSA, for all funds. They provide funding targets to monitor execution and provide execution data to the CONUSA. Training Support Brigades provide budget support to all subordinate TSBns, the lowest level of budget execution in the structure. The TSBns provide budget execution data to the TSB for input to the CONUSA through the TSD.

Control of personnel authorizations in the organizations is also divided between the CONUSA and USARC. The CONUSA maintains and manages the TDAs for all active component soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), and ARNG AGR and M-day
soldiers assigned. The USARC, through the RSCs, maintains the TDAs for USAR drilling reservists, DACs, USAR AGR, and Military Technicians. The CONUSA is responsible for task organizing the units, TSD and below, as required to accomplish the reserve component training support mission. Reorganization changes that affect the personnel on the USARC TDA must be coordinated through the USARC, who has final authority to implement the changes. These changes must be made within the approved core structure of the TSDs that is specified in the Implementation Plan. Changes to active component personnel and others authorized on the CONUSA controlled TDA is accomplished through a different approval process at FORSCOM. The management of those personnel authorized under Title XI must be carefully monitored to ensure the intent of the legislation is met. The Implementation Plan tasks the CONUSA to maintain a Multi-Component document for all positions in each organization subordinate to the CONUSA. This has not been possible given the different TDAs.\(^{23}\) Compliance to maintain more than an unofficial consolidated working database would require designating the CONUSA and its subordinate units as multi-component.

**EXTERNAL INFLUENCES**

The Training Support XXI organization does not operate without external influences affecting its training support mission. Other organizational requirements, new priorities, and fiscal constraints all affect the system. The activation of the Integrated Divisions, increased emphasis on Homeland Security, mobilizations, Army Transformation, and budget and personnel cuts have all had an impact on Training Support XXI’s success.

The two Integrated Divisions were activated in October 1999. Each is an active duty headquarters with three ARNG enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) over which they have training readiness oversight (TRO). The six eSBs receive training support through Training Support XXI and have direct support TSBns. The brigade’s training is conducted in accordance with FORSCOM Reg 350-2. The manpower to staff the integrated division headquarters comes from the garrison staffs at their installations and from manpower cut from the Training Support XXI structure. In total, approximately 160 authorizations were provided, 80 from each CONUSA, to staff the integrated divisions. The authorizations count against the total Title XI authorizations dedicated to reserve component training. The reduction in the number of trainers from the Training Support XXI force structure did not reduce the requirement to support the integrated division’s eSBs. The manpower, provided to staff the Integrated Divisions, does not support training requirements. The TSBs continue to support the eSBs with a reduced number of trainers.
Since September 11, 2001, Homeland Security requirements have impacted the ability of the Training Support XXI organizations to provide training support. Several missions demanded the CONUSAs, TSDs and TSBs redirect their focus. The CONUSA headquarters and the TSBs have the additional requirement of establishing command posts to coordinate military support for consequence management operations. In addition to the staff requirements, the increase in mobilizations and training of required reserve component assets has drained resources and money originally projected for routine training support. Training Support Brigade commanders have had the added requirement to command and control mobilized, federal forces deployed within the United States. These missions are beyond the scope of the Training Support XXI organizational structure and increase the requirements on the small TSB staffs.24

As the Army transforms so will the reserve components. The training support units are organized and manned to support priority reserve component units as established in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4. As reserve component units transform, their training requirements must change and their habitual training support units must transform in order to continue to provide support. As an example, one brigade of the 28th Division, Pennsylvania National Guard is scheduled to transform to a Stryker Brigade as part of the Interim Force. Previously a non-priority unit, this brigade will now receive priority training. The Training Support XXI organizations must reorganize and transform prior to the brigade in order to provide training support during and after their transformation.25 Unless resources and manpower are increased in the TSD and TSB responsible, a realignment of resources will mean other units may not receive the same level of support as they have in the past. This is but one example. Any change in reserve component unit priority, their mission, or in some cases their organizational structure must be preceded by a change in the Training Support XXI force structure. The training units must change to meet new requirements.

As is the case with many units in the Army, Training Support XXI units were forced to cut authorizations in order to support Transformation initiatives. The two CONUSAs lost approximately 200 authorizations in Fiscal Year 02. The reductions were implemented with the intent of minimizing the impact on OC/Ts. The headquarters staffs at all levels of the Training Support XXI structure experienced cuts in personnel. An additional initiative, with the intent of returning captains to Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and to active component divisions, substituted captains in Training Support XXI with master sergeants. While not a loss in end strength, this substitution place a burden on the units affected by removing peer trainers from reserve component company level support units.
SUCCESSES

Army Reserve and National Guard units are receiving better training support from active component units than ever before. Training Support XXI established habitual training relationships that benefit the reserve component units as well as their trainers. The integrated nature of the organizations brings an understanding and appreciation for reserve component issues that were never realized in earlier programs. The mobilization mission provides active component units to assist and train reserve component deploying units as they transition from pre to post mobilization training. The recent success of reserve component units employed in the Balkans is a testimony to the support provided.

Active component soldiers not only train reserve component units but also learn from the reserve units they work with. Establishing such relationships and links between soldiers from the active component and reserve component helps reinforce the One Army concept. This unanticipated benefit of Training Support XXI can only improve the integration of all components over time and help build a truly seamless force as the Army transforms.

Training Support XXI has proven to be a great improvement over previous training initiatives. The success achieved by mobilized reserve component units is a demonstration of the improved effectiveness of the training relationships. There are still efficiencies to be gained in the system and further improvements as the training support organizations prepare to support reserve component units into the 21st century and Army Transformation. An analysis of the current organization of the units and of the support systems will highlight the needed changes.

ANALYSIS OF TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

The previous section highlighted important aspects of Training Support XXI. An analysis of the organization structure, command and control relationships, resources systems, and unit missions will identify areas and systems which, if modified, could further improve the training provided to reserve components.

The Training Support XXI force structure was designed to provide support to priority reserve component units as defined in the Training Support XXI Implementation Plan. Priority units are division round out units, Force Support Package (FSP) 1 and 2 units, latest arrival date of less than or equal to 30 days units (LAD ≤ 30), designated AH64 units, and enhanced Separate Brigades. Since 1999, the number of priority units has increased by over 50%. During the same time period, the authorized personnel in the support units has decreased due to personnel reductions. Non-priority reserve units receive training as resources permit or as their operational requirements demand. The increased OPTEMPO required of the support
units, smaller than originally designed, severely limits the amount of training available to these traditional reserve component units. Complicating this issue, recent mobilizations have primarily been of these non-priority units. These units, without regular training support, require longer post-mobilization training time to meet validation requirements, which, in turn, requires additional Training Support XXI resources.

In addition to the increased requirement to train priority units, requirements resulting from homeland security missions and other programs, have been added to the CONUSA’s and subordinate unit’s mission load. Preparation and execution of crisis response and consequence management requirements have become important missions for the CONUSAs. Homeland security has always been a mission of the CONUSAs but when Training Support XXI was added no additional resources were provided to support the homeland security role. A training mission to prepare and evaluate Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD/CST) increased the burden on the headquarters and TSBs. The CONUSAs also have the requirement to deploy a Response Task Forces or Joint Task Force to the vicinity of incidents to provide support to other federal agencies. The task forces number in size from 25-100 people and require the total involvement of the headquarters to accomplish. Requirements placed on the TSBs demand the commander and staff function as a defense coordinating officer and staff at crisis sites. The training and resources necessary to accomplish these missions, and the time involved, draw from the CONUSA’s traditional training support role.

The CONUSAs also perform functions and programs on behalf of FORSCOM and Department of the Army. Each Army headquarters is designated the action agent for managing the Secretary of the Army’s Civilian Aide program. They are funded to accomplish the mission, but manpower and time are absorbed by the organization. The same is true for the support required to conduct the National Boy Scout Jamboree and the Military to Military programs with Mexico.

The command and control relationship between the TSB, TSD, CONUSA, USARC and the RSCs is complicated and burdens the subordinate units. The combination of command and control, operational control (OPCON), and administrative control (ADCON) relationships among the units degrades unity of command. The TSDs are OPCON to the CONUSA, the only headquarters that can assign missions or tasks and set priorities for the execution of mission funds. The USARC, however, retains command and control less OPCON. Stated another way, the USARC provides administrative control, the manning and money. Any commander knows the headquarters that controls the money and people controls the unit, yet not so in this case. To further complicate the system, the USARC exercises command and control through their
RSCs. The RSCs prioritize resources for not only the TSDs but also for other USAR units in their region. The TSDs compete for resources through a headquarters that has little if any control over them. The TSDs have ADCON of their TSBs. The TSBs are commanded by the CONUSA. The Training Support XXI organization has a single chain of responsibility with regard to training. No clear chain of command exists and conflicts of interest are common budget execution, force structure changes, and personnel policies. The current command relationships are cumbersome, untimely, and impractical.

The resource authorities and mission responsibilities are not aligned. Figure 5 showed the complicated budget system in place. In addition to the complicated flow and multiple sources of money, the commanders in the TSBs plan and schedule reserve unit training without knowledge of their annual budget. Most critical to the TSBs is the RPA, which determines the number of days their reserve component OC/Ts have available in a given year. Limitations in RPA funds can dramatically reduce the number of reserve units that the TSBs can support. The priorities set by the CONUSA and TSD may not be achievable if the USARC and RSCs do not adequately resource them.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO TRAINING SUPPORT XXI

The current organization possesses the flexibility to adjust to changes in requirements by reorganizing the brigade and below units. The TSDs are adequately staffed and organized to accomplish the functions they were designed to do albeit, their small number of full time personnel sometimes struggle to keep up with the full time headquarters they report to. Organizational change offers no real improvement or solution to the difficulties experienced by the different headquarters. Rather, it is the systems that support Training Support XXI that require some modification and improvement.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Clearly, the chain of command is a critical shortcoming in the current organization. The command relationship, from major subordinate command to battalion, should be command and control to improve unity of command.

The only clear command relationship is the one between the TSBs and the TSBns. The relationships above TSB level create confusion and misunderstanding for everyone involved. The TSBs should be under the command and control of the TSDs. The relationship that exists between the brigades and divisions, in accordance with the Training Support XXI Implementation Plan, is ADCON. However, the divisions pass all missions to the brigades, with
the exception of military assistance to civil authority missions that come direct from the
CONUSA. The division commander rates the brigade commander and resources flow through
the divisions to the brigades. The TSDs command and control the TSBs in every way but
name.

The TSDs are under the command and control of the USARC, but OPCON to the
CONUSAs. As previously explained, this relationship violates a unity of command for the TSDs.
They clearly work for two bosses. One sets priorities and assigns missions and the other
controls their resources: budget and personnel. The TSDs should belong to a single command.
The USARC could assume responsibility for both the USAR and the ARNG training, but not the
functions that must be performed by an active component commander. An active component
commander or unit must validate reserve component units for deployment and complete certain
Title 10 inspection requirements. The CONUSAs perform all the functions required and
provide a link to the active Army. The recommended chain of command should be the
CONUSAs in command and control of the TSDs. The USARC and ARNG commanders remain
supported commanders, but with no influence in the chain of command of the training support
units.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Personnel assigned to Training Support XXI units are authorized on one of three TDAs,
depending on their component. United States Army Reserve drilling reserves are on a TDA
executed by the USARC. The USAR AGRs, DACs, and military technicians are on a RSC TDA.
Active component, ARNG AGRs, and DACs are on the CONUSA’s TDA. From division level
down, the commands must synchronize and coordinate the three documents.

The recommended alternative is to designate the CONUSA and its Training Support XXI
organization, as a multi-component unit. This designation would require all components be
managed on a single authorization document. This recommendation would require the
modification of current policy to permit designating a TDA organization as a multi-component
unit. Currently, Headquarters, Department of the Army is only considering MTOE units as multi-
component units.

BUDGET CONTROL

Control of the funds that support the training support units has the greatest effect on the
efficiency of the organization. The mission funding flow is different for each budget category:
RPA, OMA, and OMAR. As with the chain of command and authorization document, there needs to be a single flow.

The distribution and accounting fund flow should be the same as the chain of command. Headquarters, Department of the Army should distribute all funds, whether it is OMA, OMAR, or RPA through FORSCOM to the CONUSAs. This recommendation gives the CONUSA control over the RPA money that determines the number of days drilling reservists are available for work. This further streamlines the system and provides the fund control to the command that establishes priorities.

MISSION CREEP

The organizations designed to train and mobilize reserve component units and improve their readiness are doing too much. Forces Command, as the higher headquarters of the CONUSAs, should divest the CONUSAs of all responsibilities and missions that do not relate to training support or mobilization.

The recommendation is to pass all missions and functions that pertain to Homeland Security to U.S. Northern Command, it’s subordinate organizations, and service component commands. The CONUSAs role has been to provide Military Support to Civil Authorities. These MSCA responsibilities include providing Defense Coordinating Officers and elements, Response and Joint Task Force headquarters, the validation of WMD/CST units, and command and control of CONUS security missions. All are missions resourced “out of hide”. By eliminating these requirements, the CONUSAs and subordinate commands could focus solely on the training and readiness of their reserve component customer units.

CONCLUSION

The recommendations provided must be considered collectively. The common threads running throughout the suggested changes are unity of command and effort. Lack of unity of command and effort are the primary, if not sole, deficiency in the organization as it was designed in 1997. To piecemeal the recommendations would defeat the overarching need to create a truly multi-component unit focused on reserve component readiness.

The U.S. Army has fewer soldiers now than at any time since before World War II. Missions and challenges have steadily increased since the end of the Cold War. The active component cannot fulfill its requirements without tremendous support from the reserve components. The experience of Training Support XXI has greatly improved the linkage between the components and instilled a confidence in each other that in some cases never
existed or had eroded over the last several decades. Over 4000 active component soldiers are involved first hand with the training and readiness of Reserve and Guard units. Routine training support relationships and one-stop shopping for support, under one active component chain of command, has greatly benefited the reserve commanders. Training Support XXI is building a partnership for the future. It is growing an echelon of active component leaders who know the reserve component. The quality OC/Ts, focused on training, make available more lanes training for reserve component units and provide them a Combat Training Center like experience at the platoon and company level. These benefits and more are possible with Training Support XXI. The recommended improvements to the existing organization can only enhance the opportunities for improved readiness in both the reserve component and in the active component.
ENDNOTES


2 Jerry C. Smithers, Reserve Component Training Under CAPSTONE, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1989), 44.

3 Hummel.


6 Hummel.

7 Keith Vore, The Training Relationship Between the Army National Guard Brigades and Their Active Army Resident Training Detachments: Is This an Effective Relationship?, School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 27 May 1999), 22-28.

8 Hummel.

9 Minor.

10 Ibid.


13 Hummel.


15 FORSCOM, TS-XXI-IP, 5.

16 Ibid., 7.

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19 FORSCOM, TS-XXI-IP, 10.

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22 Ibid., Annex H.

23 FORSCOM, TS-XXI-IP, 8.


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29 FORSCOM, TS-XXI-IP, 7-11.

30 Minor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<td>ADCON</td>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
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<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
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<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>Annual Training</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Combat Support</td>
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<td>Department of the Army Inspector General</td>
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<td>DCE</td>
<td>Defense Coordinating Element</td>
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<td>Defense Coordinating Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIV (EX)</td>
<td>Division (Exercise)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>Directed Training Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>eSB</td>
<td>enhanced Separate Brigade</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Functional Area Assessment</td>
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<td>Field Exercise Brigade</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>Force Support Package</td>
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<td>FTG</td>
<td>Field Training Group</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Full Time Support</td>
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<td>GFRE</td>
<td>Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>Military Assistance to Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MOSQ</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>National Guard Pay and Allowance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC/T</td>
<td>Observer Controller/ Trainer</td>
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ODT  Overseas Deployment Training
OMA  Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMAR  Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve
OPCON  Operational Control
RC  Reserve Component
RG  Readiness Group
RO  Round out
RPA  Reserve Pay and Allowance
RSC  Regional Support Command
RTB  Regional Training Brigade
RTF  Response Task Force
RTD  Regional Training Detachment
RTT  Regional Training Team
SOT  Support to Organizational Training
SRAAG  Senior Advisor to the Army National Guard
TDA  Table of Distribution and Allowances
TPU  Troop Program Unit
TRADOC  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRO  Training Readiness Oversight
TSB  Training Support Brigade
TSBn  Training Support Battalion
TSD  Training Support Division
TS XXI  Training Support XXI
USAR  U.S. Army Reserve
USARC  U.S. Army Reserve Command
WMD/CST  Weapons of Mass Destruction/ Civil Support Team
YTB  Yearly Training Brief
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