PROSPECTS OF SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

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# Prospects of Sino-Russian Relations

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**Abstract**

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Russia and China have been regarded as significant nations of influence. Today one of those nations is in decline, drowning in a sphere of social conflict and criminal corruption while the other is rising. Historically, both play important roles in the international arena. International common events and resolution of international issues has and will continue to depend on both. Thus we need to study the relationships of both nations and offer perspectives on their future development.
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The Sino-Russian relationship has steadily improved since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Along the border once marked by military tension, China and its neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union now foster increased trade and political cooperation. In 1989, the secretary general of the Communist party of the former Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok [on the promise of removal of Chinese] claimed three obstacles to better relations: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, cessation of Soviet Union military action in Afghanistan and Ending support Vietnamese operating in Kampuchea¹. The relationship between China and Soviet Union is marked by several significant agreements between them. Among such important agreements is the agreement on friendship and good neighborhood signed in Moscow 2001. Today while none can predict future development of Sino-Russian relationship, many claim that this “strategic partnership” will continue if only to stand against United States global hegemony.

Presumably, from the political perspective, the core of the Sino-Russian relations is to preserve global or at least regional influence. Recent developments in the international political situation over Iraqi once again proves that these two countries will not always support or agree with US global political efforts. Iraq has potential to change relations between major powers due to disagreement on how to execute the United Nations’ Security Council resolution calling for Iraqi disarmament. From the military and economic point of view, the main link between China and Russia is trade of military equipment and energy.

In 1993, Asian Survey argued that the post–Cold War Sino-Russian relationship represented nothing but a “modern, Eastern version of Rapallo”—the treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany in the 1920s that “symbolized a pact between two continental powers united by their real or imagined objections against the West.” Despite a united appearance there remains however, historically unresolved tension stemming from Russia’s concern that China is expanding its influence such that it could become a regional, and then a global hegemony.
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PROSPECTS AND TENSIONS IN SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Debates going on among politicians endeavor to predict how long the partnership would last, however the critical question is not about duration, rather it is about the character or nature of the relationship. To present a more detailed understanding on the level of Sino-Russian relations one must assess past challenges between the two nations that will influence the future approach of both in regional and international issues.

In 1993 Asian Survey argued that the post–Cold War Sino-Russian relationship represented nothing but a "modern, Eastern version of Rapallo"—the treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany in the 1920s that "symbolized a pact between two continental powers united by their real or imagined objections against the West." In the broader understanding this partnership between China and Russia aimed against any US attempt of global hegemony would probably go counter to national interests, and hinder influence both regionally and world wide.

Beijing’s strategic priorities are based on the three main directions:

1. Regime security. This includes protecting Chinese Communist Party from popular overthrow and internal division, and from foreign and domestic infiltration.
2. Preserving territorial integrity. This includes preventing the breakup of a large, ethnically diverse nation, especially the prevention of Taiwan’s permanent separation from the mainland, preventing Tibetan independence, and quelling Muslim uprisings in Xinjiang.
3. Gaining international prestige, power, and respect: increasing China’s “comprehensive national power,” which involves not only military but also economic and political power. This includes acquisition of high-profile weapon systems, space programs and other technology initiatives, and the hosting of international events such as the Olympic Games.

To reach the above objectives China needs a reliable environment, especially in security matters and needs support by major powers such as Russia. Actually, China should not ignore or abandon Russia, in terms of political and security arrangements otherwise Russia could lean to Western influence, particularly to the US which could result in Russian recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation, a major blow to China’s strategic objectives.

From the Russia’s perspective the core of Russian’s relationship with China is major arms sales and extensive military co-production arrangements. Russia’s interest in these exports is not driven by the need to counterbalance US power. Rather they are desperately needed to slow the inexorable decline of Russia’s military industry.
Two U.S. actions, in particular, would push China toward greater strategic cooperation with Russia: the imposition of restrictions on Chinese access to the American technology, capital, and export markets it needs to continue its economic modernization, and the effective recognition and defense of Taiwanese independence. The United States and China normalized relations in the 1970s on the understanding that the United States would not promote or support Taiwanese independence or stand in the way of a peaceful unification of Taiwan with the Mainland. Taking actions that Beijing believes contradicts this understanding on Taiwan or denying China access to the above-mentioned economic resources would effectively eliminate the foundation of China’s current policy toward the United States. At the very least, Chinese leaders could conclude that there is no longer a compelling reason to maintain constructive relations.

Recent developments in the international political situation over Iraqi could change major powers relations due to disagreement in the execution of the United Nations’ Security Council resolution over Iraqi disarmament. The United States position may push China or Russia to an anti American coalition together with European nations such as Germany and France. Presumably, it was Iraq’s early intention to create an international political environment suitable for its own national security by using major powers standing in the UN Security Council excluding the United States and United Kingdom. Neglecting the UN economic sanctions declared in early 90s, France and Russia have established economic ties with Iraq, directly related to the disposition of Iraqi oil, putting themselves in a difficult position.

China and Russia need not form an actual alliance for their relationship to cause problems for the United States in a number of international settings. The two countries could complicate U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf by increasing the quantity or quality of weapons sales to countries like Iran, or even Iraq. Of course, this can be done without any overt cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

China and Russia might find common cause in opposing U.S. influence in the Korean Peninsula. This would require closer diplomatic and strategic cooperation, but not necessarily an alliance in the formal political and military sense. Presumably, both China and Russia do not want the two Koreas reunited in a manner of western democracy. In terms of its location and relative military power, North Korea serves as a key buffer zone of separation for China and Russia from US military power in the North East Asia.

The two countries can also share intelligence and early warning systems. Access to Russian intelligence resources could be very useful to Beijing during a crisis centered on Taiwan to follow the U.S. defense posture in the region before and during the crisis. China and Russia can
also work to generally undermine U.S. established international norms by opposing American initiatives in the United Nations, or developing economic relationships that bypass or ignore the World Trade Organization and other international economic influences. They can also provide weapons and financial assistance to countries that are the object of punitive U.S. sanctions, like North Korea, Iraq, or Cuba. The threat this kind of behavior poses to U.S. interests should not be overstated. What Russia and China can do to undermine U.S. global power is limited by their own political and economic shortcomings. Nonetheless, over time China and Russia could emerge as the foundation of a broad coalition of states that believe they will benefit by the diminution of U.S. power and influence.7

**Challenges and obstacles in Sino-Russian relations**

There are significant obstacles to close Sino-Russian strategic cooperation over the long term. There is widespread dissatisfaction in the Russian Far East (RFE) with the 1991 border arrangement.6 The head of the Russian demarcation group for the eastern section of the border resigned in 1996, arguing that ceding territory to China was counter to Russia’s national interests.9

The RFE is the only region where the two countries have a common border with the disagreement on islands of the Amur and Usuri rivers, which could cause conflict in the long term. In 1969 a border clash took place between China and Russia which resulted in the stationing of military forces on both sides for the foreseeable future. In fact both sides could not reach consensus in the 1997 border demarcation agreement.

Two factions surfaced among the Russian politicians in terms of China in the RFE: one favors the Chinese claiming that China is feeding and clothing the RFE while easing the economic burden of the Russian government, while another faction claimed China is seeking to occupy the RFE and that they are controlling the RFE economy. Two characteristic figures on the either side of the argument are Alexander Lebed former secretary of National Security Council of Russian Federation and Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the “unsinkable” governor of the RFE district.

Alexander Lebed, a figure of national prominence, echoed this theme at a press conference in 1997.10 Russian officials in the RFE also warn that the new border demarcation will allow China to construct a major new port facility on the Tumen River that will undermine the economic viability of the Russian ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka.11 These security and economic criticisms derive added emotional weight from claims that the border agreement
requires Russia to transfer land that holds the remains of “tens of thousands” of Russian soldiers who died “defending the motherland” in border clashes with Japanese forces in 1938.

Local leaders in the RFE have been quick to exploit these issues to bolster opposition to the border agreement, and in turn strengthen their own political positions. Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the “unsinkable” governor of the Maritime Territory, is the clearest example of this practice. Nazdratenko won seventy percent of the vote in a December 1995 election by playing on local fears of China and disgust with officials in Moscow. He focused in particular on local Russians’ fears of illegal Chinese immigration and the adverse impact the 1991 border agreement will have on the Maritime Territory’s economic prospects. Nazdratenko swore that he would not allow the border agreement to be implemented as long as he is governor. To be sure, Nazdratenko’s rhetoric is largely populist bluster that, as yet, has only marginally affected Russia’s official relationship with China.\(^{12}\)

Nonetheless, in 1996 Nazdratenko was enough of a concern to Moscow that Yeltsin’s government attempted (and failed) to have him removed from office.\(^ {13}\) In that same year, then-Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov described the border agreement as “vital” to Russia’s relationship with China and warned, rather vaguely, that “if localities do not give up their interests, the fate of the Russian-Chinese border agreement . . . will become a problem.”\(^ {14}\) Again, local resentment toward the Chinese has yet to have a significant impact on the overall Sino-Russian relationship. However, over the longer term it could limit or at least complicate official relations between Beijing and Moscow. Nazdratenko’s exploitation of local Russian fears of illegal Chinese immigration is the product, to some degree, of real demographic pressures on Sino-Russian relations. Eight million Russians living in the RFE face roughly 100 million Chinese in the PRC’s neighboring regions to the south.\(^ {15}\) In Russia’s Maritime Territory these pressures are even more acute, with the 2.3 million Russian residents confronting more than 70 million Chinese in neighboring Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces. The net migration of almost 500,000 Russian citizens from the RFE since 1991 has only heightened Russian concerns over the demographic imbalance. The two countries tightened their visa regime in 1993 to reverse the growth of the Chinese population in the region, estimated to range anywhere from 200,000 to over two million in 1992. Even so there are many “China Towns” getting rice in the RFE. These migrants basically occupied Soviet military garrisons and facilities abandoned during, the downsizing of the Russian Armed Forces. The new visa arrangements did reduce the number of Chinese illegally living in the Russian Far East, but at the expense of dramatically reduced border trade with China.\(^ {16}\) However, the new visa regime could not calculate other directions of Chinese flow to Russia, such as transit through Kazakhstan, Mongolia and other countries. Even
with the new visa regime, Russian anxiety and suspicion stemming from demographic pressures will play a complicating role in Sino-Russian relations for years to come.\(^{17}\)

Central Asia is a potential object of contention between China and Russia. Whether Russia takes measures to counter China’s growing influence in Central Asia has been described by some analysts as “one of the great uncertainties of the region.”\(^{18}\) Assumptions made by some observers indicate that Central Asia’s natural resources and important geographical position will “unavoidably cause it to become contested territory” between China and Russia.\(^{19}\)

In fact both countries policies rest on the Central Asian rich natural resources particularly the Caspian sea oil fields which has potential oil reserves of 70 to 200 billion barrels (reserves of 100 billion barrels would allow for production levels roughly equivalent to that in the North Sea).\(^{20}\) In this context as a second largest oil customer Beijing already managed to negotiate with the Kazakhstan government on the building of a $9.6 billion pipeline from Caspian Sea oil field to Eastern China which could garner the economic interests of North East Asian powers such as Korea and Japan.

China’s official policy toward the region appears to be conservative - to promote regional stability and expand economic ties. In a speech to the Russian Duma in 1997, Jiang Zemin declared that China and Russia will work to uphold the other’s “national dignity” and safeguard their “respective due status and legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.”\(^{21}\) Such rhetoric implies that Beijing is not seeking to displace Russian influence in Central Asia. This probably reflects actual Chinese sentiment on the issue. As long as Russia is a force for stability and works against the growth of radical Islamic or Pan-Turkic elements in the region, there is little reason for China to oppose its continuing influence there. Beijing understood that Central Asian Republics need not only need Russia for their territorial stability and to get rid of Islamic fundamentalists but also they need China for their national security and economic development. In other words, Russia will help to maintain favorable economic security environment for Central Asian Republics along with China. In terms of Chinese security perspective, Russian presence in Central Asian states or at least influence also significantly helps to restrain possible Islamic fundamentalists support to Islamic movement in Xinjiang Uigur Autonomic Region (XUAR).

This approach toward Russia’s presence in Central Asia will change if instability emerges in the region that is beyond the ability of Russia or the Central Asian states to control and has an adverse impact on Xinjiang’s stability. This would create a much greater encouragement for Beijing to support particular governments in the region with arms or financial
assistance. It would also prompt a greater Chinese military presence on the Sino-Central Asian border as Beijing attempts to control the flow of destabilizing elements into the XUAR.  

Regardless of Chinese declarations of concern for Russia’s “national dignity” and perhaps genuine satisfaction with the status quo regarding Russia's influence in Central Asia, China’s policy of expanding economic links with the countries of the region is effectively undermining Moscow's influence there. The reality of the Chinese economic boom and the Russian economic bust is causing a shift in the economic orientation of sections of the Central Asian region from the north to the east. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this process is that it is occurring independent of intentions or desires in Beijing or Moscow. As long as China maintains its open economic policies toward Central Asia and its economy continues to grow, it will inevitably become more important to many areas of Central Asia than is Russia.

Russian leaders are not likely to quietly watch as China gradually but inexorably displaces the influence their country developed in Central Asia over the last 150 years. Russian suspicions of China’s expanding presence in Central Asia are already evident. A nationalist Russian paper warned that Li Peng’s 1994 tour of Central Asia represented nothing less than “pre-battle reconnaissance” of a region China covets as part of its own traditional sphere of influence. For the foreseeable future, China will develop significant economic and political influence only in those areas of Central Asia that lie along or near its western border. However, even this marks the most dramatic change in the region’s strategic and economic alignment since the Russian conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries.

China is not the sole outside variable in the Central Asian equation. Other countries, such as Turkey and Iran, are economically and politically active in the region. However, because of its dramatic economic growth, China’s role in undermining Russia’s dominant position will be the most noticeable at the earliest date. This probably will not lead to military conflict, but it will increase friction in the overall Sino-Russian relationship.

Mongolia is a potential source of tension between Beijing and Moscow. Mongolia shares complicated histories with both Russia and China. It was a satellite of the Soviet Union for the better part of this century. During the Cold War Mongolia was a real military danger for China, due to the Soviet Union stationing 50,000 troops in close proximity to Beijing. Mongolia is endeavoring to develop in the way of democracy yet its fate will always depend on its two giant neighbors. For both countries Mongolia offers a buffer zone. Moreover, as long as China runs policy aimed to gain economic power Mongolia’s small population and harsh weather condition does not satisfy Chinese market economy. China is home to almost five million ethnic Mongols
(roughly twice the population of Mongolia itself) and harbors some concern that these citizens will assist the fledgling independence movement in its Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.\(^{24}\)

As in Central Asia, the issue here is how Russia will react to the expansion of Chinese influence into an area that, until recently, was within Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence. The most fundamental challenge to China’s relationship with Russia over the long term is the growing difference in the two countries’ relative national power. During the 1990s, China’s economy grew rapidly whereas Russia’s contracted. This trend underlies the enormous reversal in balance of power that is taking place in Northeast and Central Asia. Provided China sustains its strong rate of economic growth, Russia will be hard-pressed to maintain anything more than junior-partner status in any kind of close Sino-Russian relationship. “Strategic partnership” notwithstanding, Moscow has to deal with Beijing on a wide range of issues, some potentially contentious, that invariably arise between two countries who share a long border. As Sherman Garnett explains, in ten years’ time “Russia is likely to discover that it can no longer manage an equal partnership with China.” While avoiding conflict will remain in both sides’ interests, “Russia will likely face a choice between the increasingly close embrace of a more dynamic China and attempting to find regional and global partners to help balance Chinese influence.”\(^{25}\)

Prospects for an enduring Sino-Russian strategic relationship aimed against U.S. influence and power are also weakened by the fact that most issues of concern to Moscow and Beijing regarding U.S. power do not directly involve the other country as a third party with a common position. Russia is unhappy with the expansion of NATO and the growing role of the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia. China is displeased with U.S. actions regarding Taiwan’s political status and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese security agreement. Each country lends rhetorical support to the other’s case against the United States. However, neither country is willing or able to offer substantive assistance that might help the other. Furthermore, even if China could have an impact on the expansion of NATO, it does not have a sufficient interest in the issue to risk open conflict with the United States. The same could be said of Russia’s interest in the Taiwan issue. It is worth pointing out that the most immediate common concern in Moscow and Beijing—preventing the rise of radical Islamic forces in Central Asia—is also one of the primary U.S. policy goals for the region. Like a formal Sino-Russian alliance, a stark Sino-Russian conflict in the near future is possible, but not terribly likely. Even if China’s relations with the United States and the other countries to the east and southeast improve dramatically over the next ten to fifteen years, China will continue to have compelling reasons for maintaining stable relations with Russia and the countries of Central Asia. As noted earlier, Russia has the potential to become an important source of energy resources for China.
generally, China will continue to have a strong interest in maintaining a stable region in order to focus on economic development. In short the prospect for favorable Sino-Russian relations remains strong, but not for reasons of US opposition, but rather mutual economic, influential, and stabilization benefits.

Figure 1. Sino – Russian pipeline project
Figure 2. China's top ten trade partners

Figure 3. Sino-Russian trade development

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ENDNOTES


4 Baabar, Batbayar, “North East Asia” Columns of Baabar, downloaded from Baabar’s official web page


6 Mark Burles, Chapter Three: Prospects for and tension between China and Russia, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics, 1999 RAND, p.41

7 Mark Burles, Chapter Three: Prospects for and tension between China and Russia, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics, 1999 RAND, p.43

8 The Russian Far East consists of the Primorski (Maritime) and Khabarovsk regions, the Sakha-Yakutia Autonomous Republic, and the Amur, Magadan, and Sakhalin provinces. It extends geographically from Russia’s Pacific coast to roughly the Lake Baikal region.


10 Mark Burles, Chapter Three: Prospects for and tension between China and Russia, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics, 1999 RAND, p.45.


12 Mark Burles, Chapter Three: Prospects for and tension between China and Russia, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics, 1999 RAND, p.44


15 This figure represents the combined population of China’s Northeastern Provinces: Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. Although the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region borders Russia, the bulk of its population lies much further to the southwest, along the Sino-Mongolian border.
16. Baabar, Batbayar, “North East Asia” *Columns of Baabar*, downloaded from Baabar’s official web page


20. Mark Burles, Chapter Three: Prospects for and tension between China and Russia, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, 1999 RAND, p.23


21. Baabar, Batbayar, “North East Asia” *Columns of Baabar*, downloaded from Baabar’s official web page

22,23 and 24. *Ibid*
Replies to the American TV correspondent MIKE WALLACE


Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics*, 1999 RAND

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