USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CIVIL AUGMENTATION OF U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS
AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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As the Army’s leadership constantly looks to establish a higher tooth to tail ratio, combat service support (CSS) units have always been and will continue to be the major bill payer. The impact of sacrificing service support force structure to maintain or increase combat arms end strength is a potential void in the capability to provide uninterrupted CSS to the warfighter. To date, the Army’s bridge to this dilemma is an increased reliance on Department of the Army civilian (DAC) and contractor support to perform necessary logistical functions in support of military operations. As the Army looks to the civilian sector to perform vital military functions, it must carefully monitor the strategic impact this option can have on future operations, particularly in light of a changing warfighting doctrine and the global war on terrorism.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................................III

CIVIL AUGMENTATION OF U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE................................................................................................................................. 2

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ............................................................................................................................... 3

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ............................................................................................................................... 4

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ............................................................................................................................... 5

KOREA AND VIETNAM ....................................................................................................................................... 6

THE GULF WAR, AND PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE-ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS .................................... 6

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ............................................................................................................................ 7

PROTECTING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS ........................................................................................................ 7

JOINT VISION 2020: FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE .................................................................................. 9

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY ........................................................................................................................... 10

THE CIVIL AUGMENTATION BRIDGE; A FORCE MULTIPLIER? .................................................................... 14

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT: A CORE COMPETENCY? ............................................................................. 15

STRATEGIC RISKS .............................................................................................................................................. 17

CONTRACTOR RELIABILITY ............................................................................................................................... 18

CONTRACTOR AND DAC VULNERABILITY TO ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ................................ 19

LEGAL RISKS ....................................................................................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................... 22

ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................................................................ 25
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civilian Contractor Involvement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Combatants vs. Noncombatants</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Our Nation’s cause has always been bigger than our Nation’s defense.”

—George W. Bush

“The symptoms of a potential decline in readiness exist within the United States Army today.” As the Army’s leadership constantly looks to establish a higher tooth to tail ratio, combat service support (CSS) units have always been and will continue to be the major bill payer. The impact of sacrificing service support force structure to maintain or increase combat arms end strength is a potential void in the capability to provide uninterrupted CSS to the warfighter. To date, the Army’s bridge to this dilemma is an increased reliance on Department of the Army civilian (DAC) and contractor support to perform necessary logistical functions in support of military operations. As the Army looks to the civilian sector to perform vital military functions, it must carefully monitor the strategic impact this option can have on future operations, particularly in light of a changing warfighting doctrine and the global war on terrorism.

The purpose of this research paper is to examine past and current concepts of employing DACs and contractors on the battlefield in light of an evolving new Army warfighting doctrine. It will identify the potential benefits and risks the Army realizes by placing a civilian workforce on the future battlefield to provide logistics support. Historically, the Army has always relied on the employment of a civilian workforce to augment CSS soldiers to sustain military operations. “Already the new era is marked by a decrease in conventional warfare with large armies and an increase in conflicts characterized as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).” These developments have fueled a surge of interest in the privatization of conflict. What makes this research strategic is not the fact that contract employees and DACs are employed to support military operations, but the strategic context under which civilians augment the military force. Specifically, much in part due to technological advances, political decisions not to employ reserve forces, dollar savings studies, and a host of other issues, the civilian workforce’s role on the battlefield has become more critical to the success of military operations than ever before in American military history. However, the changing nature of warfare; hence doctrinal changes should cause us to re-look the traditional methods of employing civilian contractors and DACs on the modern battlefield. After providing a historical perspective and the important role of the combatant commander and staff in identifying logistics requirements during deliberate and crisis action planning, this research will address force management concerns regarding the
employment of DAC and contractor employees on the future battlefield, from the initial phases of planning for civilian logistics support, through to deployment into a theater of operations, and ending in post conflict redeployment. Lastly, the author will assess the Army’s strategic planning efforts with regard to the risks assumed when employing civilians on the battlefield. This research paper in no way questions the patriotism and loyalties of DACs and contract employees. Instead, it attempts to address some of the challenges confronted by the Army commander in the wake of a changing warfighting doctrine.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This portion of the research is to provide an historic chronology of the employment of contractors in support of military operations. Much of it is derived from a single source, Dr. Charles R. Shrader’s “Contractors on the Battlefield,” Landpower Essay Series. While its intent is to offer the reader an appreciation for the types of military logistics support provided throughout United States history, it is important to understand the fact that as warfare becomes increasingly mobile as a result of technological improvements in weapon system design, the greater the apparent need for contractors on the battlefield.

From the American Revolutionary War to recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, civilians have performed admirably in answering the call to provide logistics support to American military forces. Where once the Army relied on civilians accompanying the force to provide the basic necessities such as transportation and food stuffs, the civilian contractor’s roles and responsibilities have changed dramatically. “Three factors have contributed to this trend: deep cuts in uniformed personnel, a push to privatize functions that can be done outside the military, and a growing reliance on contractors to maintain increasingly sophisticated weapon systems.” The table below depicts the military to civilian (contract employee) ratio during periods of armed conflict.
<table>
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<th>War Conflict</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<td>1,500(est)</td>
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<td>393,000</td>
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<td>359,000</td>
<td>1:6</td>
</tr>
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**TABLE 1. CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR INVOLVEMENT**

Research conducted on the ratio of civilians to military during the 1991 Persian Gulf War ranges from 1:38 to 1:50. The researcher can only assume that the difference is attributable to the time at which the studies were conducted, how one defined a civilian, or whether or not foreign nationals were included in the analysis. Peter W. Singer of the Brookings Institute has a book due out this spring entitled Corporate Warriors. Based on the rapid expansion of the corporate military, he predicts that there will be a contractor for every ten military service members deployed overseas in the event of a war with Iraq. This equates to several hundred companies supporting the war effort in Iraq with approximately 20,000 contractors.

**THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY**

In all countries engaged in war experience has sooner or later pointed out contracts with private men of substance and talents equal to the understanding as the cheapest, most certain and consequently the best mode of obtaining those articles, which are necessary for subsistence, covering, and moving of an Army.

—Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance

February 1781

In the early years of the Revolutionary War, despite a one hundred-fifty year history of contractors providing supplies and transportation, the government ceased contracting. The decision was based on the contractors excessive profit margin and a suspicion in some circles that private contractors were under Tory influence. Instead, the initial means of sustaining the force was one of “direct purchasing” by Army officers or agents of the government. However, under this system the overall management of providing service support was lacking and the direct purchase system was quickly replaced with a “system of specific supplies,” a state controlled system that proved inflexible to an army on the move. In 1781 the Continental
Congress appointed Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance. He quickly replaced the direct purchase system and system of specific supplies with a system of private contractors. Morris successfully incorporated private competition into the contracting process as a means to drive down costs. Unfortunately, it did not fix the problem as neither side could be convinced of the system's merits. The Army complained of profiteering and poor quality of goods provided while the contractors claimed abuses such as late or insufficient payments. Although there were many problems associated with civilian contractor support, it was by far the most acceptable of the methods. The century ended with “mixed results in terms of performance and adequate support for the troops; lack of experience and expertise on the part of Army officers in dealing with contractors; lack of clarity in communications between the Army and supporting contractors as to requirements, capabilities, and costs; and financial manipulation and desire to increase profits at the expense of the Army on the part of the contractors.”

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Following the War of 1812, not without problems, the Army established the Commissary General of Subsistence in 1820 as the management arm for feeding its soldiers. In addition to the establishment of the Subsistence bureau, the nineteenth century also gave rise to the Army’s Quartermaster, Medical, and Ordnance bureaus. With a certain level of success, they set out to reduce the dependence on civilian contractors, relying more on an organic capability to sustain the force. “Gradually, private contracting was supplanted by the growing system of government arsenals and manufactories and the development for procedures for centralized procurement from the expanding American industrial sector managed by the logistics bureaus of Army headquarters.” In a stationary fortress environment, the system proved most successful. However, logisticians of the time found it very difficult to sustain an army on the move, giving rise once again to a dependence on contractors. As evidenced in 1845 and 1846 when troops were deployed to the War with Mexico, the Army’s procurement system became over-taxed, particularly in the transportation and maintenance fields. This shortcoming led to over 400 contracts being placed for these type services. Many of the same contractor problems encountered in the eighteenth century were repeated. “The hiring of mechanics, teamsters and laborers was expensive, the supply of such workers uncertain, and their retention doubtful. Moreover, contract teamsters proved difficult to control and generally resistant to Army discipline on the march and in camp.”

The next major test bed for the logistical bureaus was the Civil War. Thanks in part to an abundance of unskilled labor in the North, the Army was not compelled to rely on contractors to
the extent initial mobilization plans indicated. Instead, a workforce of freed slaves from the South, coupled with a massive northern civilian mobilization effort, proved to reduce the amount of contracting support believed to have been needed.  

“Despite the scope and scale of Civil War operations, there were essentially no new developments in the use of contractors on the battlefield, and in the postwar period of the Indian wars from 1865 to 1890 the Army continued to find the use of private contractors to provide food, fuel and transport to the frontier posts to be a satisfactory supplement to the Army’s own system of arsenals, clothing factories and storehouses.”

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Now faced with the challenges of sustaining forces deployed overseas, the early twentieth century was a major turning point for the Army logisticians. The Spanish-American war and American interests in the Philippines were events that weighed heavily in the 1912 decision to reorganize service support force structure. The decision was made to consolidate the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay Departments into the Quartermaster Corps, a force of 5,400 men whose primary mission was to support an overseas contingent.  

“Although the creation of the Quartermaster Corps did not eliminate the need for private contractors on the battlefield, it was a move in that direction.” During World War I the vast majority of combat service support was provided by men in uniform. However, such was not the case in World War II. World War II saw the beginning of the use of technical representatives on the battlefield, contractors whose primary purpose was to provide technical assistance for the upkeep of weapon systems. These technical representatives, referred to today as “system contractors,” establish an habitual relationship with the military unit to provide expert advice and assistance on the maintenance of the system being employed. Additionally, the need to build and operate ordnance repair facilities in the Middle East and North Africa was a contractor mission. However, the plan to contract the entire mission was shelved when senior Army leaders questioned the viability of such a decision. Not only were they concerned about duplication of effort, but in the contractor’s supposed expertise in operating repair depots for communications, ordnance, engineer and other equipment as well. “More important than either of these considerations was the fact that there were inherent dangers in assigning to a civilian contractor tasks that were essentially military. The contractor might abandon the work, or the employees could leave when they saw fit. Civilian workers in a combat area might be captured, in which case they did not have the protection of military status, or they might be killed. Furthermore,
the Ordnance Corps argued that the sensitivity of these type operations, and the possibility of them being sabotaged was too vital a function to be left to civilians.20

KOREA AND VIETNAM

Due to a relatively low level of troop mobilization during the Korean conflict, the use of contractors on the Korean peninsula was greater than that of World War II. Japanese and Korean contractors provided the major effort that resulted in a considerable manpower savings for the Army. Estimates reveal that if it was not for the host and third country nationals’ contractor support rendered, “…the Army would have required nearly a quarter of a million more service troops.”21

Much like the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam War involved a tremendous amount of civilian contractor support. At the height of military operations in 1969 there were approximately 52,000 contractor personnel in country. The type of support ranged from major construction equipment, port clearance transportation assets, wholesale fuel facilities, and “tech reps” providing high-tech weapon system support. Despite robust force protection measures for contractor personnel, in 1967 the Nha Ba wholesale fuel terminal operated by the Shell corporation sustained Viet Cong attacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars worth of petroleum product.22 Due to an unprecedented level of dedication and cooperation, private firms were capable of providing services efficiently and cost effectively, yielding substantial savings in both personnel and equipment.23 In 1970, the Joint Logistics Review Board concluded that “U.S. forces committed to conflict have never been better supplied than those in Southeast Asia.”24

THE GULF WAR, AND PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE-ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Despite a relatively brief engagement, estimates of some 5,000 U.S. DACs and 9,200 contractor employees representing over one thousand defense contractors deployed to the Persian Gulf area of operations. The majority of contractor effort was in support of high technology weapon systems, perishable foods, and the provision of fresh water.25 DAC support was primarily located in and around major port facilities and focused on materiel handling operations. In its expanded role to provide peacekeeping/peace-enforcement and humanitarian operations, the U.S. Army continues to rely on contractor employees to provide critical service support in the Balkans and other areas of the world. A November 2002 edition of U.S. News and World Report claims the civilian to military ratio in the Balkans was as low as one to one; up to 20,000 contractors!
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Two-hundred twenty-seven years following the Revolutionary War, due to force structure restrictions, technological advances in weapon system design and capability, politically mandated troop ceilings, a reluctance to call up CSS Reserves, and the number of U.S. military operations being conducted across the globe simultaneously, the expanded employment of civilians on the battlefield to perform Army CSS related functions in the 21st century is risky business, but has never been more warranted. Numerous studies in the form of U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Projects on the employment of contractors and DACs on the battlefield have been conducted under the auspices of decades old doctrine such as the 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, where the Cold War strategy of Active Defense in Central Europe was heralded. In 1982, Field Manual 100-5, Operations was re-written, espousing AirLand Battle, a doctrine that introduces the concept of non-linearity but adheres to the principles of well defined battlefield boundaries. These battlefields of yesterday were the Cold War battlefields, primarily linear and symmetrical. Facing a threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, tomorrow’s battlefield is of a different shape, location and dimension. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, produced in 2001 defines the spectrum of operations as noncontiguous, asymmetric and nonlinear, “where subordinate units receive AOs [Areas of Operations] that do not share boundaries.” “Because the war on terrorism is transnational, battlefields range from the Persian Gulf to the Philippines to Europe and quite possibly to Whiteman Air Force Base and any other place in America.” The gap in previous research that this study intends to fill is in examining 21st century warfighting doctrine and the resulting impact or consequences that can ensue as a result of employing a civilian workforce in potentially hostile combat environments; specifically war.

PROTECTING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Finding the right balance of military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors is subject to continuous evaluation and is the cornerstone of effective Army manpower management. It is readily apparent that we must define our total manpower requirements, to include a flexible workforce mix, in an integrated manner. This strategy will ensure that we can man our combat units at 100%, while transforming our Institutional Army to meet the future National Military Strategy.

—Robert Bartholomew III
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Force Management, Manpower and Resources)
The prevailing theme in today’s The National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Joint Vision (JV) 2020, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security is the protection of United States’ (U.S.) national interests. At the disposal to the nation’s leadership to ensure its interests are protected are the elements of national power; diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. The challenge to the U.S. Armed Forces is correctly interpreting the directives laid out in the NSS and QDR, and converting them into mission statements that can be accomplished with existing force structure. If the strategy cannot be accomplished, then either the strategy must be re-looked or the force structure changed. The assumption is that in each of these directives, the military element of power will be available to the President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to assist in promoting America’s international strategy. Therein lies the root of the challenge; articulating a strategy or strategies that can be executed within the parameters of available resources. The SECDEF’s QDR to the services restates the NSS U.S. interests and objectives, and articulates a strategy for America’s defense. Due to the loss of a Cold War super power, America’s military strategy has transitioned from being threat based to capabilities based; asymmetrical and non-contiguous versus linear and geographically well defined. The national military objectives from the QDR can be summed up in four points. They are:

- Assuring allies and friends of the United States steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
- Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends;
- Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military capability and supporting infrastructure; and
- Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.\(^{30}\)

However comforting the verbs Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat may be, the resources in the existing force structure to make due with these promises are admittedly inadequate. The QDR is quick to point out that while the U.S. military remains the best trained, equipped, and capable force in the world, its readiness is degrading. In addition to an aging fleet of equipment that must be sustained to keep the tip of the spear razor sharp, the SECDEF sights a dramatic reduction in personnel since the end of the Cold War, yet an increase in the number of demands.\(^{31}\) The major challenge alluded to earlier is integrating the strategies laid out by the President’s NSS, the SECDEF’s QDR, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) NMS. Once the strategies are integrated, the task is to formulate a credible joint vision.
that is properly resourced with personnel and equipment, and ensures success on tomorrow’s battlefield.

JOINT VISION 2020: FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

When diplomacy fails and military force becomes the only option, in what scenarios can America expect to see her sons and daughters deployed? To answer this question, we look to the aforementioned publications and extract the following missions. The U.S. Armed Forces are tasked to “maintain the capability to swiftly defeat the efforts of adversaries in two overlapping combat operations.” In addition to possessing this capability, there are many other missions that could easily fall into the hands of the United States military, all of which have and will continue to involve the deployment of U.S. Army forces. The other type operations referred to as smaller scale contingencies include, but are not limited to, support operations to combat the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, humanitarian relief in the U.S. in areas hit by a major disaster, humanitarian relief outside the United States, multinational peacekeeping/peace-enforcement efforts across the globe, combating terrorism as a threat to United States citizens, and maintaining a presence in overseas areas of vital national interest in order to stem potential problems. In other words, it appears the U.S. military must be capable of responding to any contingency, or in the words of JV 2020, “Full Spectrum Dominance.” But is this feasible? With more missions than ever before, is it realistic to assume there exists the logistics capability to meet the demands of Full Spectrum Dominance? The intent of this research paper is not to suggest that our armed forces must be capable of responding to each of the aforementioned contingencies simultaneously. Surely, in a resource constrained environment the U.S. can ill-afford to maintain a military of such magnitude to address such an occurrence. From a CSS perspective, in the wake of a downsizing Army, the response in many cases has been to look to the civilian sector or corporate world to fill the void. To add to the previously mentioned missions, considering September 11, 2001, to what degree will homeland security requirements affect the Army, potentially stretching logistics resources beyond their current capability? Lieutenant Colonel Antulio Echevarria, Director of Strategic Research at the Strategic Studies Institute at Carlisle Barracks, questions the ability of the U.S. Army to perform homeland security missions in addition to the myriad of other responsibilities outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to assume an acceptable level of risk, where and when prudent. “Achieving full spectrum dominance means the joint force will fulfill its primary purpose - victory in war, as well as achieving success across the full range of operations, but it does not mean we will win without cost or difficulty.”

9
Two of the four operational concepts of Full Spectrum Dominance, Focused Logistics and Dominant Maneuver, have a direct relationship to combat service support functions. “Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations.”

“Dominant Maneuver is the ability to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks.”

Future engagements discussed in Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, particularly stability and support operations, are often described as asymmetrical, noncontiguous, and nonlinear. Under these conditions, the battlefield of the last half century is susceptible to losing its traditional characteristics of having a secure rear area, with a forward edge of the battle area, and right, left, and rear boundaries. Sustaining the force on the future multi-dimensional future battlefield will not only require a concept of focused logistics and dominant maneuver that can keep pace with the operational tempo but it will also depend on a logistics force structure capable of operating between engagement areas, across extended and vulnerable lines of communication.

These operational concepts will be made possible through a real time, web-based information system providing accurate, actionable visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistian across joint forces, services, and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to systems, processes and organizations, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.

Best summarized by Eugene Smith in his Winter 2002-2003 Parameters article entitled “The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Conflicts and Its Implications,” “No one has yet outlined how the U.S. military will match means with potentially endless objectives that can be associated with full spectrum dominance.” Perhaps the answer from the executive branch is that much of the means will be accomplished by civilians on the battlefield. Why not?

This is certainly a convenient method to avoid congressional oversight?

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

In the nine line portion of the QDR that addresses sustainment, the SECDEF articulates a need to accelerate logistics enterprise integration. Logistics enterprise integration is an extension of the term supply chain management. Best defined as the requirement to integrate all the supporting players, civilian and military, in the management of logistical support flowing into and out of a theater of operations, the objective is to ensure the flow of materiel through the logistics pipeline is visible, accurate and timely throughout the journey to the consumer. In the
wake of a post Cold War downsizing military, CSS force structure is arguably inadequate to meet the demands of fighting the nation’s wars and MOOTW; namely humanitarian assistance, support to domestic authorities, and peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. One manner by which the Army chooses to accelerate logistics enterprise integration is through an increased reliance on DAC and contractor support to perform necessary logistical functions in support of military operations. Once again the intent is to allocate as much of the Army’s authorized end strength to the combat force.

History has proven that much coordination is involved in the planning, contracting for, and integrating of DAC and contractor employees to ensure success on the battlefield. As the service component typically assigned theater level logistics responsibilities, the Army has a major role to play in implementing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a document that based on potential missions apportions forces to a combatant commander. The Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) is the senior Army representative in the theater of operations who typically is assigned executive agent responsibility to provide common user logistics support to other services, and potentially to other allies. He must review the forces and resources apportioned to the combatant commander, and advise the joint staff of service support voids that exist in the deliberate or contingency planning process. In the event of a void in uniformed service support capability, the strategic and very critical element at this stage of the planning process is for that of the combatant commander to perform a risk assessment associated with employing civil augmentation. The paradox is that the combatant commander has the arduous task of planning for any number of contingencies in his AOR but is limited in resources to prosecute the missions assigned by the very same politicians who determine military end strength.

Based on CSS forces apportioned for a given contingency, it is critical that the ASCC determine how he will support the war effort by identifying what additional support elements in the form of DACs and contractors are required to prosecute the service support piece of the military campaign. Said another way….

War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

—Clausewitz
With the decision to employ contractors on the battlefield comes a significant operational command responsibility that includes but is not limited to support, real estate management, and security. From training, deployment, sustainment, force protection, command and control, to redeployment, it is a contracting officer’s responsibility to address each of these areas in detail in the contract. The commander is responsible to coordinate the efforts of the military organization and those of the civilian employees to successfully perform the assigned mission(s), ensuring the orders to the contractor are within the terms of the contract. When dealing with contract employees, the commander, with the assistance of the contracting officer, must be intimately familiar with the verbiage of the contract, such that he fully understands the limitations of the support the contractor can provide. Any deviation from the existing contract can result in contract nullification or unforecasted expenses to the Department of Defense.

Despite a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) which found contract support to be a potentially effective means of providing combat service support, the report questioned the Army’s ability to properly account for and report costs. In other words, despite the GAO’s opinion that contract support had dollar savings potential, the Army’s method of reporting and accounting for costs during OJE was very much in question. This lack of confidence in Army contracting capabilities is significant, particularly when United States Army Europe’s (USAREUR) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) costs for the first year of OJE were in excess of $459 million.

LOGCAP, described in greater detail later in the text is the Department of the Army’s premiere logistics contract with commercial companies, designed to privatize logistics support in an effort to save money and improve efficiencies.

Although a high percentage of today’s defense contractors have prior military experience, the commander must not assume the contractor is adequately trained to operate in austere environments, which include nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) situations. The Virginia-based Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) defense contractor currently has approximately 90 employees in Kuwait, the majority of whom are retired military personnel. In past conflicts, by Army regulation, DAC and contract support was limited to rear echelon areas, not forward of the brigade support area. Army regulations will almost certainly require change. The new warfighting doctrine of quick and decisive, highly mobile operations in an asymmetrical and noncontiguous environment suggests that contractors will be required well forward, “effectively ending the concept of a safe division rear.” The enemy will almost assuredly continue to conduct strikes against targets to disrupt the flow of essential supplies to forward based units. Such was the case during the Persian Gulf War when an Iraqi Scud Missile fired into the enemy rear echelon, killing 28 U.S. Army reservists, 13 of whom were supporting a
water purification mission. Currently, water purification missions are being performed by Brown and Root Services Corporation in Bosnia and by DynCorp in Rwanda. Granted, these missions are not being conducted under combat conditions, but certainly under conditions where hostilities can erupt overnight. The point is that an increased dependence on civilians to provide logistic support has grave risks, particularly as the Army transitions to a new warfighting doctrine. In a memorandum issued on June 11, 2002, in addressing the issue of requiring contractor support on the battlefield for so many weapon systems, the Army’s Assistant Secretary of Logistics, Mr. Claude Bolton stated “we must change our planning direction with regard to supporting our battlefield systems.”

As doctrine dictates, it is imperative the commander make every opportunity to exercise the contractor’s ability to deploy and perform his duties during peacetime deployments. Here, the commander can assess the contractor’s functional capabilities and make judgments on his physical and mental condition. Furthermore, training scenarios provide the commander with an important responsibility, to integrate the contractor into the strategic, operational, and tactical scheme, prior to the employment of civilians into a potentially hostile environment. It is vital that the contractor, inasmuch as possible, be given every opportunity to function as a member of the military team. In addition to providing basic force protection for the contractor and DACs, the commander may have to provide additional levels of protection, such as NBC protective garments in the event of a possible attack. Depending on the urgency of need, the commander may decide to include elements of the contractor capability in the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) planning process. Strategically, the United States Army has put itself in a position of no longer being self-sufficient in performing its CSS mission. Instead, the Army has chosen to accept a certain level of risk by potentially putting civilians in harms way. What if the contractor or DAC, for fear of injury or loss of life, chooses not to provide the support necessary to ensure mission accomplishment? To cover this occurrence, shouldn’t the Army have some redundancy built in its force structure to fill this void? If so, what is it and where is the expertise if we have removed it from the Army’s force structure? Do we put the mission on hold and wait for the contractor to fly in another specialist from continental U.S.? “Nobody has their arms around those issues,” according to Neil Curtin, the General Accounting Office’s director of defense capabilities and management. Some of the many risks associated with these responsibilities are addressed in a follow-on portion of the text.
THE CIVIL AUGMENTATION BRIDGE; A FORCE MULTIPLIER?

In an effort to augment CSS force structure, the Army currently employs three major categories of contractor support. The vast majority of contractors are employed in logistics, research and development, and base operations roles.\(^5\) The use of Contractors and DACs must be considered during both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. It is important to note that by Army regulation, the civilian contract employees are considered force multipliers not designed to replace force structure, but to augment or offset existing military unit/personnel shortfalls.\(^5\) In other words, CSS positions declared inherently governmental may not be replaced with contractor employees referred to as Component (COMPO) 9 forces (Contingency Contracting). Vacancies that exist in the force structure are identified as COMPO 4 forces (Unmanned and Unequipped Unit Requirements).\(^5\) Despite laws and regulations that mandate contractors as augmentees versus replacements, these COMPO 9 forces are arguably replacing many COMPO 4 equipment and personnel requirements. Whether or not COMPO 9 forces are replacing COMPO 4 forces or merely augmenting the existing force is concerning. The answer not only lays in the interpretation of what is and what is not considered inherently governmental, but who is doing the interpreting. The next portion of this research, which discusses logistics as a core competency, surfaces the hypocrisy of this entire issue.

In addition to the DACs who deploy to perform a number of essential service support functions, there are three categories of civilian contractor support determined to be critical in sustaining a military operation. They are: theater support contractors, external support contractors, and system contractors.\(^5\) Although each category can accompany the force, each has its specific mission and rules under which it may be used to augment the military force. The DAC is a Federal civil service employee, subject to a military chain of command when deployed in support of military operations, whereas the other three are not, except during a declared war.\(^5\) Theater support contractors are those civilians who are generally from the local vendor base under the direct authority of the Army theater Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), providing minor construction, basic goods and services. External support contractors are managed differently than theater support contractors. External support contracts are normally pre-arranged, not under control of the theater PARC, but uniquely managed by military organizations such as Army Materiel Command (AMC) through the Defense Contract Management Agency, as well as U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). For example, AMC is the executive agent for the Army’s umbrella contract for LOGCAP and USTRANSCOM administers the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program as
well as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). These contractors deploy to the area of operations as part of the military force to augment the organic service support capabilities, providing logistics support such as maintenance, supply, general labor, transportation, and other field services. Lastly, the system contractor supports sophisticated weapon systems from factory to foxhole. “Patriot Missile Defense, M1A1 tanks, Hunter unmanned aerial vehicles, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) targeting system, and Spitfire radios are also heavily contractor dependent.” The system contractor forms an habitual relationship with a military organization, providing high-tech systems support throughout the life cycle of a piece of equipment, during peacetime and contingency operations, and during transition to war.

Under the external support contract that will typically deploy as part of the force, as is the case with the AMC managed LOGCAP umbrella contract, the contractor is normally responsible for training the team, deploying to the area of operations, sustaining the team, and redeploying following conflict resolution. This is primarily due to the potential size of a LOGCAP contingent and the requirement for the contractor to be capable of receiving the military force at a rate of 1,500 per day, within fifteen days after notice to proceed. The LOGCAP contractor must be capable of supporting up to 25,000 personnel for up to 180 days, with an option to increase the size of the force to be supported to 50,000 personnel for up to 360 days. Furthermore, the LOGCAP contractor is responsible for arranging all contractual agreements with the host nation. If the contractor is responsible for deploying himself, this allows the commander during deliberate planning the opportunity to focus on the employment of combat forces to the AO during the TPFDD process. That said, care must be taken to ensure the contractor isn’t competing with the military for the same potentially scarce resources such as aircraft, airfields, and a host of other logistical requirements.

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT: A CORE COMPETENCY?**

Forget logistics and you lose.

—General Frederick Franks, Jr.

Determining whether or not a function was considered core or not was once a fairly simple decision. The rule of thumb was that if the task to be performed was combatant in nature, involved the possibility of putting one’s life in danger as a result of armed conflict, or required a surge capability in the event of a national crisis, then the task was determined necessarily organic to the military; hence, a core capability. Title 10 of the United States Code, Section
2464 states that the Department of Defense must maintain a core logistics capability that is Government-owned and Government-operated in order to provide for the national defense. The issue is to then define those CSS capabilities that should be determined core. To assist in the process, Section 2464 of Title 10 elaborates on the issue by providing the following guidance. Core logistics capabilities are those functions determined “necessary to maintain and repair the weapon systems and other military equipment.” Based on this definition, the obvious assumption must be that maintenance functions are considered inherently governmental and must therefore remain the responsibility of a DoD employee. However, due to the complexity of many military systems, coupled with the time it took to instruct both military and DAC technicians to learn how to repair the system(s), DoD Directive 1130.2 Management and Control of Engineering and Technical Services established the provision allowing a contractor to perform maintenance on a piece of equipment for up to 12 months following the fielding of the system. It was understood that during this 12 month period, not only would the contractor be responsible for sustaining the system, but this period would also serve as a train-up period for the soldier and/or DAC to become proficient in performing the maintenance. Technological advances in weapon system design caught up with this directive very quickly and proved it to be short-sighted.

Despite the directive’s well-intended primary purpose to minimize military dependence on contractor provided maintenance support, thus supporting the core competency issue, the directive was rescinded, becoming outdated almost overnight, giving way to a completely different Congressional philosophy. New and current law passed by Congress states the maintenance and repair of critical weapon systems may be under contract jurisdiction for a minimum of four years and for the entire life cycle of non-critical systems. To further complicate matters, in a 1996 speech by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, to the Atlanta XXII Conference stated DoD will not consider outsourcing activities that constitute our core capabilities. This entire issue of logistics as a core competency requires re-examination. Simply put, policy and law require clarification.

Some might argue that the tail is wagging the dog on the core competency issue. Considering the information provided in the previous paragraph, one might surmise that the Congress and DoD are not coordinating their efforts very well. In accordance with Joint Pub 4-0, “The relative combat power that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations.” Clearly, force projection, the ability to project and sustain the force is one of the military’s principle centers of
However, due to force structure decisions imposed by the nation’s leadership, to maintain its combat strength, the Army has divested itself of the responsibility to provide certain types of support such as the deployment of certain CSS assets to the theater of operations, possibly before the arrival of troops if the contractor has the reception, staging, onward movement and integration mission, as well as repairing and sustaining major weapon systems located virtually anywhere on a non-contiguous battlefield. As spelled out in Field Manual 3-93 (100-7), The Army in Theater Operations, “Successful rear area security operations are critical since the joint rear area contains the lines of communication, establishments for supply and evacuation, and agencies required for immediate support and maintenance of field forces.” These security operations in logistical areas no longer confined to the rear area have the potential of becoming even more critical in future operations involving hostilities where boundaries and flanks are blurred by the nature of future warfare.

**STRATEGIC RISKS**

On January 21, 2003, two American civilian contractors providing logistical software support to US military forces stationed at Camp Doha, Kuwait were ambushed while traveling in a sport utility vehicle, without security. The assailant, a self-proclaimed follower of Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist group Al Qaeda, killed one of the contractors and wounded the other. The strategic risks and implications of employing a civilian workforce to augment combat service support capabilities on the battlefield are considerable. Several weeks later on 27 February, 2003, the Associated Press reported the capture of three American contractors working for U.S. Southern Command in Bogota, Columbia. The captors, Columbian rebels, have agreed to release their hostages on the condition the Columbian government releases dozens of jailed rebels. A tremendous risk assumed by the combatant commander is when out of necessity, he is put in the awkward position of having to trust and rely on an asset he must go to war with, but over whom he has no command authority. Some of the greater challenges can include civilian/contract team training, deployment, sustainment, force protection, command and control, and redeployment. This portion of the research is devoted to identifying some of the larger concerns or risks, and implications of the strategic decision to employ civilians on the battlefield, in potentially hostile operations.

Despite uniformed personnel cuts of 38% since 1989 and a 44% cut in DoD civilians, since the end of the Cold War the U.S. Army alone has deployed troops 36 times, compared
with just 10 such operations during the entire Cold War. Post Cold War downsizing limits the Army’s active duty current end strength authorizations at 480,000. Despite recent reserve force activations for the global war on terrorism and the escalating possibility of a war with Iraq, the U.S. government’s historical reluctance to call up CSS reserve forces are two-fold. First, there is a significant fear not to alarm public opinion. Secondly, troop ceiling mandates often do not allow for an excessive show of military force. Since troop caps do not apply to civilians, contractors are a convenient answer to filling the existing CSS shortfall. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, technological advances in weapon system design have surpassed the intent of basic Army maintenance technician training, and has contributed to a greater dependence on full time contracting. On the other hand, one might argue that hiring civilian contractors to perform Army CSS missions is done not only in an attempt to minimize the perception of a larger military presence, but for political expediency. Volumes of GAO studies have been conducted to determine real cost savings incurred when using contractors in lieu of soldiers to perform vital CSS functions. These studies oriented on cost reduction must be careful not to confuse antiquated warfighting doctrine with future warfighting doctrine and the impact it will have on the ability to sustain the force. As stated in Field Manual 3-0, “CSS forces may not be contiguous with those of their supported forces. Commanders may separate CSS forces from the CSS base, thus extending their lines of communication. The presence of noncombatants in the AO further complicates operations.” These non-combatants may include the same DACs and contractors employed to support combat operations.

CONTRACTOR RELIABILITY

Following the January 21, 2003 ambush in Kuwait of two American contractors from Tapestry Solutions, a San Diego based computer software company, Chairman and Chief Executive of CACI International Inc., J.P. London, whose company has a sizeable computer-network DoD contract in Bahrain and two or three other countries was asked to comment about his employees heading into Iraq if warfare breaks out. His response was “I’m not prepared to address that. There are no commitments right now. We’ll have to assess that.” What if the contractor is unable to meet the terms of the contract? Specifically, let there be no doubt that the principle reason for a contractor to enter into an agreement with the U.S. Army to provide sustainment functions is first and foremost profit driven. In a Washington Post article written about Peter Singer’s book Corporate Warriors due out this spring, Springer is quoted as saying “They may be patriotic former military men and have security clearances, but they answer to their employers not the armed forces. And the workers who get 20 to 30% danger pay bonuses
from their employers, may not properly calculate the risk to themselves until they come under fire. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some contractors fled their duty station at a Saudi Air Base in fear of the use of chemical weapons. As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is no intent on the part of the author to question the loyalties and integrity of a contractor, but businesses are motivated primarily by their ability to make money for their stock holders. Surely the matter of a professional force with an ethos that is built on being willing to sacrifice one's life for the defense of its nation falling prey to an enterprise motivated by profits is a strategic issue that must be addressed. The bottom line in today's capitalistic society is the earnings statement and profit margin. In our global economy where fierce competition for resources exists everyday, U.S. companies, big companies once considered impregnable, are falling prey to Chapter 11 and accusations of fraudulent business practices. As late as January 2, 2003, Boeing Satellite Systems and Hughes Electronic Corporation were accused by the State Department of illegally selling China satellite and rocket technology that could be used for intercontinental missiles. Furthermore, as a result of September 11, 2001, the nation's airlines are downsizing dramatically. The potential impact this can have on their ability to meet the obligations of CRAF contracts is considerable. Can the American public afford tolerating putting the United States Army, our nation's largest land component, without which we are unable to occupy and defend, into situations of not being prepared to defend the nation's vital national interests on account of fraudulent business practices, integrity violations, personnel strikes, to name but a few? In countries where there exists a legitimate government, the country determines who is allowed entry, often for a pre-determined amount of time, and the amount of outside support that may be brought into country. The contractor accompanying the force is responsible to lay the legal and contractual ground work with the host country, not the U.S. Army. How tenuous might this agreement be, and who is to say that the support personnel contracted for in country will align themselves with the allied force when the time comes to conduct military operations?

CONTRACTOR AND DAC VULNERABILITY TO ENEMY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are numerous components to force protection. From an operational standpoint, employing civilians on the battlefield only adds significant challenges for the ground commander. The CSS enlisted soldier, like all soldiers, is multifunctional. Specifically, he is trained to perform his logistical responsibilities. Yet unlike the civilian contractor, he receives extensive training and is required to be proficient in other critical areas such as operations security (OPSEC), physical security, NBC defense, anti-terrorism, missile and air threats, law
enforcement, and defensive information operations. All of these areas represent real concerns to logistics operations. Contractors and DACs may receive basic training in the dawning and wearing of NBC protection suits, but can we expect them to be capable of operating for extended periods of time in this environment? Terrorist attacks on unarmed civilians accompanying the force represent easy targets, as indicated in recent news articles. “Security for rear areas in nonlinear operations with noncontiguous unit areas will be especially challenging and require centralized planning for local security.”

As discussed in a follow-on portion of the text, the legal status of DACs and civilian contractors in rear areas requires a tremendous amount of coordination by the commander and staff. Their protection is obviously vital to the success of the mission, yet their ability to perform other than their logistical role is left in doubt or many times not required by contract. By substituting an unarmed contractor for an armed CSS soldier, the commander faces the potential of having to allocate a greater portion of his combat strength, the fighting force, for the purpose of providing round-the-clock security to noncombatants. “Forces conducting nonlinear operations require robust communications and sustainment capabilities. Commanders may dedicate forces for LOC security beyond that provided by available military police.”

One might make the analogy that it is similar to ensuring an infant child is always in the company of an adult or baby sitter. If left unattended, the situation could prove disastrous. The commander is ultimately put in a situation whereby he potentially could have to hold more of his combat force in reserve for the purpose of providing non-combatant security. The situation would be much more manageable and less risky if the commander had a full complement of well-trained combat service support soldiers capable of defending themselves against a Level 1 threat. According to Field Manual 3-0, Operations, “As the Army transitions to a replace forward, fix rear, maintenance system, contracted support in forward areas during offensive and defensive operations is less viable than in stability operations or support operations.”

Based on the changing nature of warfare and how the Army plans to conduct future operations, employing and replacing systems operated by contractors in forward areas poses a significant security challenge.

LEGAL RISKS

What is the legal status of a DAC/contractor when deployed to an area of operations where hostilities are ongoing or imminent? Although the type support rendered may be very similar to that which a military member or unit might provide, their legal status is indeed fundamentally different. In the case of a contractor, he is only liable to work under the specifics of the contract. By the Geneva and Hague Conventions, a DAC, if wearing a uniform, can be
considered a combatant by the enemy, is a legal target, and is eligible to prisoner of war status if captured. “The line between combatants and non-combatants is blurry, and it becomes virtually meaningless in MOOTW”. Of course, the rules aren’t necessarily applicable when combating a nation or group(s) which is a not signatory to these conventions. When using contractors and DACs, the general policy is that civilian augmentation forces will typically be employed in echelons above division areas, and lower when determined absolutely necessary but not forward of the brigade support area. Commanders are responsible and accountable to ensure they avoid putting the contractor in a position that jeopardizes his status as a non-combatant. However, if the contractor gives the appearance to the enemy that they are providing support to the military force, particularly support that could be construed as offensive support, their status as a non-combatant is arguably in jeopardy. If the terms of the contract allow the contractor, the non-combatant, to arm himself for the purpose of self-defense and he then chooses to use his weapon in other than a self-defense mode, his status as a non-combatant changes is subject to being changed to one of an illegal combatant. By the recognized laws of land warfare, he is in this case no longer afforded Prisoner of War status, becomes a valid military target, and is potentially subject to be tried for war crimes. A noncombatant's status would have to change to illegal combatant to commit a war crime. This very strategic issue is subject to close scrutiny and interpretation. It is certainly a gray area, yet a constraint the commander must understand and exercise with extreme caution. The chart below addresses the status of civilians accompanying the force and the rights afforded to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Military Target</th>
<th>POW Status</th>
<th>War Criminal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatants</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Combatants</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2. COMBATANTS VS. NONCOMBATANTS**

Combatant commanders may find it necessary to use contractors over military personnel in circumstances dictated by troop ceilings, type mission, and limited numbers of uniformed service support personnel or units apportioned to cover all the missions in the AO. For example, a combatant commander might choose to use contractors to provide service support
for a MOOTW such as a peacekeeping or humanitarian operation while keeping certain elements of his military CSS capability in reserve, in the event of a potentially hostile mission on the horizon. However, despite their record of being able to provide outstanding support to the warfighter, the Army’s regulation governing LOGCAP espouses that “their [contractors’] performance cannot be accurately predicted”\textsuperscript{80}. As the nature of warfare changes, so too must doctrine governing the employment of the civilians on the battlefield. As military systems become more technical and require contractors further forward on the battlefield either to replace or operate the equipment, the individual’s safety and status as a noncombatant is arguably jeopardized more than ever before. The support provided by the contractor accompanying the force is through a voluntary contractual agreement. Since the contractor is bound by contract and not by oath, he cannot be compelled to remain on the battlefield. The notion of having the contractor sign a pledge to do so would not hold up in court as it would constitute involuntary servitude.\textsuperscript{81} Therefore, it is vital that the contractor’s performance be exercised in peacetime to ensure he can meet the terms of the contract when called upon to deploy in support of a military operation.

CONCLUSION

The employment of DACs and contractors on the battlefield is a strategic decision. Based on the Army’s decision to sacrifice the CSS tail for more tooth is the fact it has put itself in a position whereby it must now contract for a CSS capability it no longer has the internal ability to perform, but which is considered vital to mission success. In both stability and support operations, the use of contractors to provide combat service support may be more appropriate than deploying CSS soldiers. Constrained by troop caps so as not to give the appearance of an overwhelming show of military force, coupled with the desire to retain as much of the military CSS for potentially hostile contingencies on the horizon, civilians may be the combatant commander’s preferred option for select service support missions performed in secure areas of the AO. The greater concern however, is not MOOTW type operations.

During armed conflict the entire issue of civilians on the battlefield takes on a new meaning. The manner by which the Army plans to prosecute future wars based on evolving doctrine that capitalizes on speed, surprise, lethality, technology, and information, be it in the Middle East or North East Asia, is changing. Once defined by boundaries, future conflicts are being characterized as nonlinear, asymmetrical and noncontiguous. This research has attempted to show that as a result of the changing nature of warfare, the Army must re-address its concept of employing contractors and DACs on future battlefields. The issue is not the
provisioning of technologies from the contractor, but the dependence on the contractor to sustain and operate these critical systems in forward areas on the battlefield. The risk is not only to the civilian but to the combat forces who count on the proper support in the right place, in the correct quantity, and at the right time. “The issue of “Contractors on the Battlefield” is clearly bigger than any functional area, bigger than any Service, and perhaps bigger than DoD itself.”

WORD COUNT = 9,374
ENDNOTES


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33


