Preemptive Strike – Security Building

by

COL Robert M. Carpenter
U.S. Army

James Kievit
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
# Preemptive Strike - Security Building

**Title:** Preemptive Strike - Security Building  
**Subtitle:** Unclassified

**Authors:** Carpenter, Robert M.  
**Author:** Author

**Performing Organization:** U.S. Army War College  
**Address:** Carlisle Barracks  
**City:** Carlisle, PA 17013-5050

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT:** APUBLIC RELEASE

**ABSTRACT:** See attached file.

**SUBJECT TERMS:**

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT:** Same as Report

**NUMBER OF PAGES:** 33

**NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON:** Rife, Dave  
**Address:** RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil

**TELEPHONE NUMBER:**  
International Area Code  
Area Code  
Telephone Number  
DSN

---

*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*  
*Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18*
In the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, in a remarkable policy shift for national defense, American national leadership has recognized the need to include some form of nation building as a means for achieving our national objectives vis-à-vis failed nation states. As yet, however, they have not finalized an execution strategy. This paper begins with the argument that the term security building -- defined as a comprehensive and integrated approach using all elements of power to help put a nation state on the road to a secure, stable, sustainable development plan for the future – should be used to describe the U.S. effort, not nation building. It then examines strategic options available to implement this significant policy change in the emerging geo-political environment and makes several recommendations, including that the U.S. Army, specifically the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, should be designated as Executive Agent for DOD for the planning, programming and execution of the policy.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .................................................................................................................................................................iii

**PREEMPTIVE STRIKE – SECURITY BUILDING** ...................................................................................................1

  **POLITICAL CONTEXT** ........................................................................................................................................... 2

  **A NEW DIRECTION - SECURITY BUILDING** .................................................................................................. 3

  **POLICY DEBATE** ............................................................................................................................................... 4

**IMPLEMENTING A SECURITY BUILDING POLICY – PROGRAM OPTIONS** ............... 7

  **COA 1: AMERICAN UNILATERAL EFFORT** ................................................................................................... 7

  **COA 2: MULTI-NATIONAL EFFORT, U.S. SUPPORTED** ........................................................................ 8

  **COA 2A: MULTI-NATIONAL NGO EFFORT, U.S. SUPPORTED** ......................................................... 9

  **COA 3: AMERICAN LED, MULTI-NATIONAL SUPPORTED EFFORT** .................................................. 9

**IMPLEMENTING A SECURITY BUILDING POLICY – UNITY OF COMMAND** ............. 10

**ESSAYONS – (LET US TRY)** .............................................................................................................................. 13

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS** ................................................................................................. 14

**ENDNOTES** .........................................................................................................................................................19

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ...................................................................................................................................................23
PREEMPTIVE STRIKE – SECURITY BUILDING

In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens.

—President Bush Washington, D.C.
(Inter-American Development Bank)
March 14, 2002

In the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, President Bush’s statement potentially portends an even larger and more remarkable shift in the strategy for America’s defense: involvement in nation building. Prior to 9-11, little in the political or national security expert rhetoric claimed strong grass-roots support for American involvement in nation building. The term “nation building” itself is part of the problem. There is no single, agreed on definition. Interestingly, Joint Pub 1-02, U.S. Military Dictionary of Associated Terms, defines only “nation assistance”, not “nation building.” Retired General George Joulwan, former Supreme Commander of NATO, described nation building efforts as “not really nation building but security building.” The term “nation building” has some negative historical connotations and does lead to some confusion. The Center of Strategic and International Studies offers, “post conflict reconstruction … a more accurate representation of the effort: external actors should assist in post-conflict reconstruction, not seek to build the nation or state themselves.” However, the effort is far more than reconstruction. Although how actions are categorized may seem unimportant, it is essential to garnering political and public support. In order to help clarify the debate and for the purpose of this paper, the term security building will be used to describe the U.S. effort, not nation building. Security building is defined as a comprehensive and integrated approach using all elements of power actions to help put a nation state on the road to a secure, stable, sustainable development plan for the future -- not to rebuild an entire nation.

America has long been wary of foreign intervention, dating back to the time of George Washington. The Marshall Plan, after World War II, was the last significant successful effort to implement a security building strategy. In the face of the emerging threat of the Soviet Union, the United States provided significant resources to re-establish European nation states as well as Japan. History has demonstrated this effort to be instrumental to the period of relative peace the world enjoyed at the end of the last century. In the unsettled onset of the War on Terrorism, dramatic changes in the international landscape have forced the second Bush Administration to reevaluate existing policies and search for new strategies. The National leadership has
recognized the need to include security building as a strategy for achieving our national objective vis-à-vis failed nation states but has yet to finalize a policy execution strategy. This paper provides an examination of U.S. national strategy as it relates to security building, assesses the adequacy of the options available to successfully realize this strategy and makes some recommendations for implementation.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

After the fall of the Soviet Union and victory in the Gulf War, America assumed lone super power status and took to the task of assisting with design of a new global order for the post Cold War era. President Clinton claimed America’s right, in principle, to intervene in other nation states if his Administration concluded human rights and social justice were threatened. The U.S. strategy during this period was one of engagement and enlargement. This strategy led to numerous peacekeeping operations for the U.S. military as the Clinton Administration attempted to “shape” the global environment. However, by the end of President Clinton’s first term, failed attempts at “limited nation building” in Somalia led to emphasizing a more isolationist approach and a policy change. As Mark Burgess of the Center for Defense Information writes: “The prospect of another Somalia-type fiasco led to an aversion to nation building, and has been cited by some, such as Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., as a sufficient rationale for America not to get involved in peacekeeping.”

Outlined in Presidential Decision Directives 25 and 56, revised policy ruled out support for extensive security building efforts.

As Robert J. Lieber of the Department of State states, “All this changed in a single day on September 11, 2001. Terrorism was no longer one among a number of assorted dangers to the United States but a fundamental threat to America, its way of life, and its vital interests.” Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff echoed this position at the 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture:

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon did not create the post-post-Cold War world. But they helped end the decade of complacency. They forced Americans to see clearly that foreign policy still matters, and that our oceans and our ICBMs alone do not make us safe. They brought home the stark reality that if we do not engage with the world, the world will engage with us, and in ways we may not like.

These two statements demonstrate that the second Bush Administration understands security of the homeland is America’s primary national interest and the prevention of terrorist acts is directly linked to this interest. Therefore, deciding that the U.S. could not continue to
ignore terrorist groups operating overseas, the Bush Administration has signaled another change in strategy. In the wake of the terror attacks, attention has focused on a number of “failed” nation states involved in armed conflicts and civil wars. Failed nation states -- nation states that are unwilling or incapable of governance -- are a common entity in the world today and continue to pose a threat to America’s national interests by potentially harboring terrorists who promote regional turmoil and are a threat to peace. To prevent terrorists from operating within failed states and projecting their terror America has used, to varying extent, national assistance in the form of grants and loans to foreign governments, but a more extensive effort is required. Since failed states have proven they are incapable of achieving governance by themselves; an approach using all elements of national power is required.

A NEW DIRECTION - SECURITY BUILDING

Currently under the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has a version of “nation building” as one of its core missions. It spends about $7B annually in the pursuit of that mission working with many of the international developmental organizations. Unfortunately, USAID efforts do not represent a comprehensive, integrated effort using all elements of power and therefore cannot meet the definition of security building offered at the beginning of this paper. Security building goes far beyond the aid currently being administered by USAID. Important to note, William Kiehl, a Senior Fellow of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, opines that although USAID has worked extensively with the U.S. military on humanitarian operations (the other principal USAID mission) there is far too little cooperation and coordination between the military and civilian developmental agencies (USAID being the principal one). Change is required if security building is going to be done successfully.

Representative Ike Skelton cites the opportunity cost of inaction, “If we want to decrease the number of contingencies to which the U.S. is asked to send troops, we must aggressively pursue engagement as a means of preventing such conflicts before they happen.” President Bush reiterates this sentiment, “History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.” In his National Security Strategy, President Bush states that America “will provide a 50 per cent increase in core development assistance … every grant must be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth.” These statements represent a significant departure from America’s historical adversity to interventionist policies. Certainly one course of action for
addressing U.S. interests would be security building – let’s examine the arguments for and against it.

POLICY DEBATE

President Bush’s security building strategy decision is contentious. Both supporters and detractors present emphatic positions. One supporter is Michele Flournoy, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She cites the advantages of using the “American preeminence in the service of international peace and stability for its emphasis on conflict resolution.”\(^{13}\) She believes no nation can achieve peace better than America. Security building is consistent with American core values and helps to assure allies and friends of American resolve to fulfill its security commitments. In its analysis of security building, The Economist acknowledges, “All the social and economic changes it brings may actually be part of what terrorists were enraged by, so reinforcing it would be more a gesture of defiance than of accommodation.”\(^{14}\) Terrorists have maintained that America is at war with Islam and this strategy will undercut this assertion. Security building efforts will prevent a propaganda coup for the terrorists and are a key to winning the war of ideas. Tangible projects will certainly improve the quality of life of the recipient nations, serve to help legitimize their governments and act as a force multiplier in our efforts to promote American values. Nations that are enjoying positive impacts based on U.S. involvement will want to discourage and arrest those who threaten to obstruct this assistance. Success in stabilization operations and strategic success in the War on Terrorism are closely linked because of their cause-effect relationship. Nations with stable governments are much less likely to become havens for terrorists.\(^{15}\)

Another advantage is that American security building efforts offer the best way to prevent conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In the one-year period since September, America has spent $75 billion in contingency response to the terror attacks, eliminating the budget surplus.\(^{16}\) A security building strategy, proponents argue, will substitute spending money up front to prevent future conflicts thereby saving money in the long-term. Other significant advantages include the positive perception of America that the finished projects will foster along with the further expansion of democracy. Moreover, security building provides trade opportunities for American industry.\(^{17}\) Recipient nations will be more likely to continue the developmental direction started by America and therefore more inclined to purchase American goods and services. Lastly, the program has the secondary advantage of increasing America’s ability to provide support to future force deployments. Dr. Conrad C.
Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute observes that during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; “The United States is creating an infrastructure of new bases and political agreements that will ensure an expanded American presence in Central Asia for many years.” This infrastructure will provide America with basing options outside of the Arab “holy land” and provide flexibility in the event allies like Saudi Arabia choose not to support the War on Terrorism or restrict American operations from their bases.

The strategy of security building also has its detractors. The Economist asserts; “The critics of nation building are right to be leery of it: outsiders take it on at their peril.” Involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign nations is a political minefield and will require a display of significant diplomatic acumen. Critics of security building cite resource constraints, especially cost, and also debate whether mission success is even achievable. Each of these criticisms can be countered after thoughtful analysis.

President Bush himself originally made the resource argument. During the presidential debate in 2000 he stated, “If we don’t stop extending our troops all around the world in nation building missions, then we are going to have a serious problem coming down the road.” This was prior to the attacks on 9-11 and therefore represented the result of a much different cost–benefit analysis. Terrorists had not yet demonstrated their ability to successfully project deadly acts across the ocean. Terrorism’s threat to national security and its infusive nature require direct effort to preempt terrorism at its source.

Writing as a member of the Quadrennial Defense Review Working Group, LTC John Spinelli states that military leadership is concerned about the stress of increased participation and force imbalances caused by peace operations. Implementing a security building strategy could exacerbate the stress on low density/high demand units through increased participation and create force imbalances in the U.S. military. On the other hand, security building offers the opportunity to eliminate havens for terrorists, reducing the need for other types of deployments. This is consistent with the Bush Administration’s aggressive “preemptive” efforts in the War on Terrorism. Better management of the current force structure as well as taking steps to rethink the Active Duty component / National Guard component mix also should mitigate concerns about force structure imbalances.

As for security building being cost prohibitive, the analysis of The Economist sums the counter-argument up best, “Even at $15 billion a year by 2006... is not particularly costly. It amounts to less than 1% of the federal budget. ... The real question is not whether America can afford its global burdens; it is whether it is going to want to afford them.” America currently spends over $6 billion per month in the War on Terrorism with no reduction in sight.
The Department of Defense (DOD) spent over $21 billion on contingency operations in the 1990’s. War has significant negative impact on the national treasury. Security building will also be expensive. For example, the World Bank and CARE estimate that Afghanistan alone requires $10.2 - $30 billion in the next five years in assistance. The International Editor of USA today puts these costs into perspective, “none of the costs will be as great as having to clean up in the aftermath of a nuclear explosion on the American homeland.” Of course America has many significant domestic agenda items that compete for funding. So the Bush Administration may need to find a new position for the budget fulcrum as it seeks to balance the competing priorities of the new world environment. Prudent management and political leadership evoking multinational contributions also can help shoulder the financial burden associated with security building.

Another significant argument of detractors is that pursuit of security building will foster resentment toward the United States for being a hegemon. Gary Dempsey of the CATO institute, for example, believes that security building is a “fool’s errand” that “may drive nations to form alliances and pursue weapons of mass destruction in order to counterbalance Washington’s policy of setting aside state sovereignty to intervene.” Certainly America must be conscious of this perception. It does not want the nations of the world to seek alternative methods to compensate for American super power status. However, a law of physics does not couple security building efforts and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; any linkage can be prevented through skilful diplomacy. Involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign nations is a political challenge, but the Bush and subsequent administrations can overcome this challenge through intensive and skilled diplomatic efforts.

The final major criticism of the policy is that it fundamentally will not work. Peter Boone of the London School of Economics advocates this argument. He concludes, “Aid does not promote economic development for two reasons: Poverty is not caused by capital shortage, and it is not optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.” Ted Gallen Carpenter, the CATO Institute Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy, furthers this position in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, “Aid can inhibit the commitment to reform of even more responsible governments. … By masking the pain of economic failure, outside economic assistance allows recipients to delay politically sensitive reforms, worsening the underlying problem.” This criticism overlooks the main problem of failed nation states, which is not simply the delay of governmental policy reforms but rather the ability to adequately govern at all. Additionally, both gentlemen base their criticism on monetary aid, which is the easiest form of aid to embezzle. Since security building
as defined in this paper is a much more focused kind of aid, it is not as subject to monetary misdirection. Security building is a more direct approach that requires significantly more involvement than financial aid alone. For example, instead of providing just the funding, the U.S. would have direct involvement in the construction of sewer systems and roads, as well as in the training of police and judiciary personnel. Moreover, opponents base their analysis on efforts made during the Cold War when America supported several governments that did not espouse the values of human rights and democracy. The efforts to contain the Soviet Union seemed to require these “less than optimal” arrangements. The Bush Administration no longer has this concern as America has no near-term competitors. In the current global environment, security building assistance potentially provides additional leverage to help alter the governance policies of regimes of failed states that do not espouse our values, furthering our desire to promote democratic values worldwide, without concern for driving them to another superpower.

IMPLEMENTING A SECURITY BUILDING POLICY – PROGRAM OPTIONS

As a member of the United Nation’s Security Council, America is a primary driver of international collective action. Professor Lieber analyzes:

As a result of primacy, as well as the relatively limited capacities of international or regional bodies such as the United Nations and European Union, the United States possessed a unique role in coping with the most urgent international problems, whether in regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing, financial crises, or other kinds of issues.30

Action is America’s most significant demonstration of leadership and acts as a catalyst for international effort. Once President Bush announced America’s commitment to eradicate terror groups with global reach, a worldwide coalition joined the effort. So how involved should America be in security building? Contribution options can be grouped as three courses of action; American unilateral effort, a United Nations (U.N.) / Multi-national led American supported effort and an American led multi-national supported effort. The advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives will highlight a clearly superior choice.

COA 1: AMERICAN UNILATERAL EFFORT

An American unilateral effort has the obvious advantage of providing the most direct display of commitment. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), asserts “The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S.
commitment to allies and friends. The U.S. military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the Nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner.\textsuperscript{41}

A unilateral approach, while certainly assuring allies and friends, will also serve to directly promote American interests and provide the most control for the U.S. government. Efforts towards consensus building and appeasement of coalition nations would be of secondary importance. This strength is also a weakness. World opinion would almost certainly turn against this option. Stephen Walt of the JFK School of Government writes, “Even traditional U.S. allies have been concerned about the concentration of power in U.S. hands and Washington’s penchant for unilateralism.”\textsuperscript{42} The international community could proclaim our action to be interference based on pure self-interest, thereby further eroding American ability to influence the global landscape and jeopardize the support required in the War on Terrorism. However, the most significant disadvantages of this option are the cost and overextension of American resources. The U.S. treasury would be required to fund 100% of the effort, thereby straining an already weakened economy. Additionally, the number of potential failed states and the long duration of the security building process would swiftly exceed capabilities and create or expose vulnerabilities to enemies.

COA 2: MULTI-NATIONAL EFFORT, U.S. SUPPORTED

The option to use the U.N. or a multinational coalition led by a foreign nation has many strengths. International burden-sharing would produce immediate cost savings to the U.S. treasury. Foreign involvement will also reduce the prospect of overextension of American forces. As a disadvantage, this option reduces American control and in some cases, may require suppression of our national interests in order to maintain the coalition. After a study of worldwide efforts in security building, Washington Post writer Sebastian Mallaby postulates:

The best the world has now is what might be called the East Timor model, under which a competent army (in that case, Australia’s) leads a coalition of the willing, sanctioned by a U.N. Security Council resolution. This model has been copied in Afghanistan (where the non-U.N. peacekeeping force has been led by Britain and then Turkey) and in Kosovo and Bosnia (patrolled by NATO).\textsuperscript{33}

Unfortunately, however, the limited scope of the East Timor effort makes it a poor choice for basing the world-wide, strategic direction for security building. Australia most certainly will not volunteer to be the lead in all security building efforts. Finding a competent nation state interested in providing the necessary leadership will be difficult. As for Afghanistan, the effort has barely begun and can hardly be considered a success. While actions in Bosnia and Kosovo
have demonstrated some success and hold potential for future success, it is much too early to claim victory. Moreover, there are some systemic problems with the “East Timor model”. While the United Nations has recently adopted some modest reform of its peacekeeping offices, it is not capable of directing the extensive security building efforts required. The organization of the U.N. does not provide the command and control structure to complete large, near simultaneous security building efforts. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs determined, “support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Furthermore, the U.N.’s command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement.”

Mr. Mallaby’s research uncovered further systemic problems:

There are two problems with the East Timor model. It involves passing the hat each time there is a crisis, so that it’s never certain how many troops can be assembled, or for how long. And it involves cobbled together multinational forces whose constituent parts have no experience of working together, unless international legitimacy is compromised by limiting participation to members of NATO.

A security building mission requires experienced, professional leadership to have any real chance for success. It is in America’s national interest to use a multinational-led option in all cases where it determines voluntary leadership contributions will be adequate. However, ad hoc organizational leadership will not achieve consecutive successes. East Timor is a rare case.

COA 2A: MULTI-NATIONAL NGO EFFORT, U.S. SUPPORTED

Another variation of this option would be to allow non-governmental organizations (NGO's) to direct the effort. However, the required capability is not resident in any NGO forcing significant expenditures and time to obtain the capability. This option also interjects NGO interests and priorities into an already complex operation. Additionally, NGO's would command less interest and support from the international community than the U.N. led effort and as such would exacerbate its shortcomings.

COA 3: AMERICAN LED, MULTI-NATIONAL SUPPORTED EFFORT

American leadership of a multi-national supported effort is another option. This alternative would allow the U.S. to direct the effort with international assistance and serve to defuse the international communities concern for our proclivity for unilateralism. Our actions would most likely to be viewed as legitimate by the international community. Additionally, the financial burden would be shared, an important consideration especially given domestic economic
challenges. The ability to reach more failed states would be increased using a larger pool of international capabilities. However, contributors would certainly want their national interests addressed and diplomatic efforts would be a major challenge making a complex situation even more difficult.

**IMPLEMENTING A SECURITY BUILDING POLICY -- UNITY OF COMMAND**

Unity of command is essential in complex operations. Security building requires a synchronized campaign of numerous governmental agencies including the military, nongovernmental and international organizations as well as foreign governments, all under a unified command structure. This synchronization is further complicated by the wide variety of tasks required. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated this interconnection: “All these tasks – humanitarian, military, political, social and economic- are closely interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together. We can not expect lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy.”

Success therefore depends on successful integration. The dilemma – how can this integration be done most effectively? As stated earlier, USAID is the nominal Executive Agent for “nation building.” However, the Bush Administration’s desire to expand security building efforts exceeds the current capability of USAID. A bipartisan Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction classifies the challenge this way:

In 1994, USAID established an Office of Transition Initiatives to provide immediate programming in the area of political development in countries emerging from conflict. That experiment has now grown to a larger, more established effort to address the reemergence of violence as well as post-conflict reconstruction efforts, but funding and staffing to date remain inadequate. This small-scale response to an ever-growing need to provide immediate, on-the-ground programs in war-torn societies is limited by resources, staff, and capacity to address the myriad of situations that currently affect our national interest.

This capability–mission mismatch cannot be fixed overnight and probably best is accommodated by a change in Executive Agent. USAID would remain the Executive Agent for exclusively humanitarian aid cases determined likely not to involve U.S. military units. In failed states, DOD is the best choice for the Executive Agent. DOD’s military capabilities make it the logical choice because they:

- are uniquely trained and equipped for hazardous duties.
are able to bring with them a complex web of capabilities and organizational structures that can be put into place in areas where the ordinary civil institutions may not be functioning. Military forces are highly adaptable and possess the structure and expertise required to produce a comprehensive plan. The Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction determines, “Civilians in both the diplomatic and development communities are not accustomed to planning for international contingencies and often lack experience working with military counterparts.” DOD has the ability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize the other agencies’ support across the full spectrum of operations. Moreover, DOD has the experience in planning and executing complex operations within foreign countries. America must capitalize on these strengths. USAID would still be a major participant in security building, but in a supporting role. Part of each security building plan would ensure eventual seamless transition to a civilian-agency-dominated program and reduction of military combat force involvement.

In effect, security building is “preemptive deterrence” using all the elements of national power. The interagency process is critical to success. Prior to the initiation of assistance, a coordinated plan must be established and the previously mentioned “security building fundamentals” must be completed. Recent U.S. efforts have failed, largely in part due to the failure to adequately plan for a coordinated, comprehensive effort grounded in the fundamentals.

The existing Bush Administration National Security Council (NSC) System is well suited to provide the necessary strategic guidance to the security building effort. The NSC Principals Committee is the senior interagency forum and will function as a “board of directors.” They will approve the strategic vision; determine the global strategy and issue planning guidance. The next level down, the NSC Deputies Committee, would take the Principals’ guidance and provide oversight to and direction for the only new committee structure required, a NSC Policy Coordination Committee for Security Building Operations (NSC/ PCC / SBO). The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, with Presidential and NSC approval is authorized to establish new PCCs. Policy Coordination Committees are chartered by the President to perform: “Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government …They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.” The NSC/PCC/SBO would be an executive interagency committee chaired by the DEPSECDEF responsible for the operational planning, interagency coordination, and allocation
of resources and funding, as well as overall implementation of the program. Some key elements of the security building strategic plan should be:

- Unless otherwise directed, the State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional humanitarian aid operations that do not involve U.S. military units.
- Department of Defense (DOD) will retain management and funding of all other operations involved with security building.
- Each agency would be responsible for coordination its area of expertise. For example the Secretary of the Treasury would be responsible for establishing funding mechanisms for the strategy.
- “the sequence designed must choose areas in which success can be demonstrated early, momentum can be built and sustained, and seeds for success can be sown early in critical areas that may take more time to demonstrate progress.”

American determination of which states receive aid must be based on an analysis of national security interests. The Honorable John Hamre emphasizes the importance of national interest, “Not all failed states are created equal. Not all will be equally important to the United States and the international community.” Security building operations are unsustainable if not aligned with national self-interest. As evidenced in Somalia in 1993, public and congressional support evaporated when American security building efforts produced casualties. Somalia’s linkage to our national security was not made clear to the public. American national leadership must carefully choose its engagements, proactively pursue a public relations campaign to garner and maintain public support and unambiguously state the linkage to national security. If the linkage cannot be made the task should not be undertaken. Gary Dempsey of the CATO Institute researched security building and argues limits on its application.

America cannot make the world over in its own idealized image of the good society when: (1) the peoples in other countries have no desire to stop the warfare and bloodshed that divides them; (2) the history, traditions, and cultures of the country offer no local soil for the fostering of constitutional order bolstered by individual freedom, property rights, and the market economy; and (3) the groups within a country or region lack the willingness or tolerance to live and interact peacefully within the same political regime, especially when the government is viewed by each of the groups as a vehicle for power and privilege at the expense of the others.
The CATO studies highlight that the divisions and attitudes of the local populace as well as their commitment are essential parts of the prospect for security building success and must be carefully considered before American support is offered.

**ESSAYONS – (LET US TRY)**

Once assigned the mission, a question remains – how can DOD effectively and efficiently implement the security building strategy and accomplish the function of Executive Agent? The magnitude of the challenge requires DOD to be wary of an overly ambitious plan of operation that exceeds its force capabilities. The first action for the SECDEF should be to identify and designate a lead. Dr. Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute analyzes the security building task and argues that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) might be the best candidate: “This task, especially in such precarious security environment, is perfectly suited to the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its engineers…only the Army - not the Air Force, Navy, or Marines - can really do it in an environment of questionable security.”

Several things specifically recommend the USACE. The USACE does not require massive transformation (although it could require an increase in size) in order to do it. The Corps’ strategic vision could easily incorporate global responsibility. The Corps’ vision currently states, “the world's premier public engineering organization responding to our nation’s needs in peace and war … a full spectrum Engineer Force of high quality, dedicated soldiers and civilians.” Not only could the security building mission comfortably fit within the vision for the Corps, historically the Corps has provided this same type of service: “The military has played a major role in the emergence of new nations that transcends combat missions … Greek and Roman soldiers had built roads, colonial armies had established public works, and in the United States, the Army Corps of Engineers helped to settle the frontier.”

More recently, USACE has demonstrated the capability to accomplish extensive security building type efforts in numerous natural disaster relief operations. USACE is a major Army command consisting of about 34,000 people that has the international experience, contracting savvy and military expertise to handle the mission. Currently configured with two branches, one branch with tactical units and the other branch composed of military led, civilian staffed, civil works districts, the Corps is well structured for security building. The Corps’ military elements possess the ability to deploy world-wide and perform construction operations in a non-secure environment. Its civil works operations include international construction contracting, public works, and environmental mitigation. Moreover, the Corps has a robust headquarters structure and already has rapid response systems in place due to its involvement with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency for disaster relief operations. Together these USACE capabilities closely match the full spectrum requirement associated with security building, and will produce continuous momentum for a comprehensive program when leveraged with other federal agency capabilities.

Dr. Robert Orr, former National Security Council Director, offers the title “Director of Reconstruction” to the security building leader and provided the following as a job description: “Responsible for implementing large, multidisciplinary U.S. government programs … with significant operational experience.” The job description is not broad enough, and the title is only marginally acceptable. This Director must oversee the entire multinational effort, not just U.S. programs. Moreover, the intention is to build anew what may never have been, going well beyond “reconstruction”, producing an effective sovereign, preferably democratic, capitalistic government. In addition to his normal military staff, the Director should be supported by an interagency working group, which would include representation from all the major agencies and NGOs involved as well as foreign liaison officers. The Chief of Engineers, a three-star general who functions as a principal Department of the Army staff officer, would appoint Directors for specific operations from a range of options. Depending on the size of the mission, active duty Brigade Commanders, District Commanders or USACE Division Commanders make logical choices as Directors. For larger efforts an ENCOM commander, a reserve component two-star general officer, could be given the mission and provide significant staff functionally to the effort. USACE has the expertise to lead this mission.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Stabilization operations and strategic success in the War on Terrorism are linked. Former DEPSECEDEF Hamre notes, “The United States cannot wait for the next crisis to try and build its post conflict capabilities.” Work must be done at both the strategic and operational levels to develop economically stable states capable of governing and providing for their people. Donald H. Rumsfeld, in the forward to 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stated: “A multifaceted approach to deterrence is needed. Such an approach requires forces and capabilities that provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion. In particular, it places emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world.”

Security building will provide an opportunity for forward deterrence and, by reducing the terrorists’ ability to operate unhindered by interference from an effective sovereign government with popular support, will serve to diminish terrorism. Again, the purpose is not to rebuild an
entire country but to secure a stable, sustainable development plan for a nation state that respects the rule of law and provides for its people. Rather than using security building against terrorism directly, we use it indirectly, creating an environment within which terrorists cannot operate effectively because the population/society will not aid or conceal them, but rather will turn them in at best or at least shun them as undesirable, and the local governments’ security forces possess both legitimate sovereignty and effective capability to act against terrorist cells. In some situations, aid in the form monetary assistance offers a reasonable hope of promoting stability. However, in other settings, monetary aid alone will not suffice. Security building is a possible, albeit a difficult, task. Just because the task is difficult does not mean it should not be undertaken. Nor should one assume that security building is the answer for every failed state. However, security building can jump-start economic recovery providing failed states with an opportunity to break the cycle of poverty by providing initial, required infrastructure and stability. Stable governments and economic markets are the objective. The potential dividends of winning the War on Terrorism, preventing future conflicts, and global stabilization are worth the risk.

Support within the government for the conduct of security building operations is gaining. As the Boston Globe reports,

The September 11 attacks fundamentally changed the Bush Administration’s view of the world by sharpening its foreign policy focus and heightening awareness that defending the United States was its top priority. In that light, helping rebuild states so that terror organizations cannot operate is far more attractive. But retaining the term “nation building” and its historical baggage will hinder U.S. efforts in this campaign. The Bush Administration definitely should pursue the use of the term “security building” as a more appropriate title for the effort.

The Bush Administration’s adoption of a security building policy would add a mission to the national security agenda. There are three fundamental requirements before embarking on any particular security building effort. First and foremost, the executive and legislative branches must present the case to the American public in order to obtain their support through a comprehensive, broad-based information campaign. The main theme of this campaign must be that security building is a “preemptive strike” against terrorism and provide a linkage to national security. Without public backing, any security building effort is doomed from the start. Additionally, it is important to recognize that the broad based information campaign can not just
focus on getting support to begin. America must commit for the long haul, as a shortsighted focus will almost certainly produce long-term failure. Long-term commitments are especially difficult in a democracy, but not impossible. World War II is a positive example of democracies committed for the long haul. Secondly, the State Department must aggressively seek regional allies and partners to join the coalition in support. American commitment should make this effort significantly easier but nonetheless important. Finally, the President must determine the scope of the involvement and obtain long-term funding support from Congress.

A U.S. led, multi-national supported effort is the best choice for America. First, it offers an unambiguous display of commitment yet provides for multi-national commitment furthering the legitimacy of the effort. American leadership can foster international support and provide significantly more resources than any U.S. unilateral option. It does require diplomatic effort to consider the national interests of the coalition members. However, this is a small price to pay for the international legitimacy such actions would foster. In the current political landscape international consultation is a virtual requirement for legitimate involvement in the affairs of another sovereign nation. Nonetheless it is a strategic imperative for America to lead. Former Deputy Security of Defense (DEPSECDEF) John Hamre asserts, "U.S. leadership can be a critical determinant of an operation’s success or failure, given both the unique standing of the United States in the world and the comparatively vast military, political, and economic resources Washington can bring to bear." The War on Terrorism confirms this assertion. America must pursue the option to lead a multi-national security building coalition.

Philanthropic by nature, the American people will support security building when presented with the facts. This support can be gained initially if the President himself personally states a convincing case as part of an overall public relations campaign. Long-term public support, however, requires demonstrated effectiveness, the likelihood of which will be significantly improved by the designation of a superior executive agent leading highly capable forces. The U.S. Army, specifically the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers should be delegated as Executive Agent for DOD for the planning, programming and execution. To ensure unity of effort with the interagency contributions required, the Chief of Engineers should appoint a “Director of Development” for each nation state effort and resource this leader with the funding and staff required.

If all this is done, we may be able to achieve Senator Joseph R. Biden’s vision concerning the future of post 11 September America: “Folks, in a twist of fate, we may be able to turn recent calamity into good luck. History may have given us the best chance we’ve had since the end of World War II to build a new framework for international affairs.”
A unique opportunity to further the prospect of hope and provide a long lasting framework for peace currently exists – America must prudently provide the leadership. Pursuit of a strategy that involves security building is mankind’s best hope; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the best tool to use to achieve that hope; Essayons!

Word Count: 6801
ENDNOTES


11 Bush, 1.

12 Ibid., 19.


15 Conrad C. Crane, Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing A global War Against Terrorism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 6.


17 Emmott, 5.

18 Conrad C. Crane, Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing A global War Against Terrorism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 6.

19 Emmott, 17.


21 Flournoy, 263.

22 Emmott, 26.

23 Flournoy, 277.


26 Flourney, 156.


28 Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Testimony of Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute and Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow Cato Institute, 13 March 1997.

29 Ibid.

30 Lieber.


35 Mallaby, 25.

36 Hamre, 92.


39 Mendelson-Forman.


41 Ibid, 215.

42 Hamre, 93.

43 Ibid, 86.

44 Dempsey, 168.


46 Crane, 8.


48 George A. Luz and John W. DePauw, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), 1.


51 Hamre, 95.

52 Rumsfeld, 12.
52 Mallaby.


55 Hamre, 93-94.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Crane, Conrad C. Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing A global War Against Terrorism. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.


