Capabilities-based force and Army Force Structure: Can we support the objectives outlined in the QDR?

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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<th>REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</th>
<th>07-04-2003</th>
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<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO)</td>
<td>xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Capabilities-Based Force and Army Force Structure</td>
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<td>Can We Support the Objectives Outlined in the QDR?</td>
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<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Kelliher, Michael P. ; Author</td>
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<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</td>
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<td>Carlisle, PA17013-5050</td>
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<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
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<td>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
<td>Rife, Dave</td>
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18
The Bush administration released its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in September 2001. There were several changes to this version over the previous one. The biggest change was going from a 'threat based' to a 'capabilities based' force. Given today's unstable world situation is the QDR's capabilities-based force, four-objective strategy achievable? In every operation since WWII Army soldiers were required. The Army is capped out at approximately 1.11 Million (480,000 Active; 263,000 Reservists and 367,000 National Guard). It is not clear that the Army will have enough resources to accomplish its QDR objectives. What element of the Army will participate in homeland security? Will we continue to support peace, peacekeeping, humanitarian support with active forces, or turn that role over to the National Guard? Will the National Guard need to play a bigger role in deterring aggression forward, or be totally responsible for small scale contingencies? Will the administration pass additional guidance restating the roles, responsibilities and missions the U.S. will or will not support.
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CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCE AND ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: CAN WE SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN THE QDR?

During the Presidential debates leading to the 2000 Presidential elections, both Presidential candidate George W. Bush and Vice Presidential candidate Dick Cheney promised to end the perceived misuse of American forces by being more selective in committing them.¹ During the mid- to late nineties, U.S. Army forces were committed to all reaches of the globe for deterrence (Multinational Force, Sinai 1996 – 980 soldiers), peacekeeping (Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 – 23,000 soldiers), and humanitarian assistance (Support Hope, Rwanda 1994 – 1,100).² In the United States they were being used to assist in disaster relief and fighting forest fires, among other things.

As the events following 11 September 2001 unfolded, military missions increased again as we began to fight terrorism at home and abroad. As President Bush announced we were at war against terrorism and those who harbor terrorists, we continued to commit military forces to deterrence, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Today, more forces are deployed than ever before from all branches of the Army, Active - approximately 7000 in Afghanistan, 45,000 in South West Asia (SWA); Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserves (USAR) 64,741. A total of over 96,000 soldiers are deployed in SWA or supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Such commitments are bound to grow as tensions increase in SWA and Korea.³

Given these trends the question becomes: does the Army have enough forces, (Active, ARNG and USAR) to accomplish its missions. Or, must the Department of Defense (DOD) re-look its objectives as outlined in the QDR. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has four objectives, deter aggression forward…swiftly defeat aggression…including the possibility of regime change… defend the United States…and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations?⁴ This paper will examine the Army’s current force structure against its strategic requirements and analyze a number of possible alternatives.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE QDR

After his inauguration in Jan 2001, President George W. Bush charged the Department of Defense to “establish a new strategy for America’s security that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise”. The strategy was built around four key goals:
“Assuring: … The Nation will honor its obligations…be a reliable security partner…willingness to use force in its own defense and that of others…promote security cooperation …deter aggression or coercion,

Dissuading: Through its strategy and actions, …influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats…military planning for potential adversaries…well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.

Deterring: A multifaceted approach….wider range of military options to discourage aggression….emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world…modest reinforcement from outside the theater…non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets…active and passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can defeat any adversary.

Decisively defeating: …maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries”.  

The President also determined that the U.S. military needed to transition from a “threat-based” force to a “capabilities-based” force. The previous QDR, (1997), was designed to retaliate against a specific adversary in a specific location. The capabilities-based model is designed around four assumptions: First, we do not know what nation, nations or non-state actors will pose a threat to those vital U.S. interests or to our allies’ and friends’ interests decades from now. Second, the model focuses on how an adversary might fight rather than where he will fight. The third is identifying those capabilities the U.S. military will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric warfare. Finally, it requires the military to focus on emerging opportunities like remote sensing, long-range precision strike and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems.

The QDR and National Security Strategy (NSS) cite the goals of “promoting global security; work to bring the hope of democracy; and build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity”. The NSS is based on an American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and national interests. The overarching strategic intent is not only to make the world safer, but also to make it better. The NSS promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations, and respect for human dignity. The military supports NSS goals in at least four ways: strengthening military alliances to defeat global terrorism (objectives one and two); working with others to defuse regional conflicts (objectives one, two and four); preventing our enemies from threatening us, our allies and friends with weapons of mass destruction (objectives one and two); and transforming America’s national security institutions to meet the
challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century (objective four). The Army’s support of these goals in the near future will affect our force structure, the make-up and use of reserve forces and our ability to respond to small-scale crises. Does the Army, in fact, have the current capability to support QDR and NSS objectives?

GUIDANCE OF QDR

The Administration approached the force-planning task aware of the need to provide over time a richer set of military options across the operational spectrum than is currently available and to ensure that forces have the means to adapt in time to surprise. The envisioned force-sizing construct specifically shaped forces to:

- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions.[4]
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts [2] while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of these conflicts— including the possibility of regime change or occupation.[1]
- Defend the United States.[1]
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations (SSC).[11]

Secretary of the Army Thomas A. White recently explained the President’s defense strategy, using the Administration’s new phrase “4-2-1-1”[metric]. Secretary White explained how it calls for forward deterrence in four critical regions—Europe, the Mideast and Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, and the East Asian littorals. Also, our military must have the capability to swiftly defeat the efforts of two adversaries and gain decisive victory, if necessary, in one of those conflicts. Finally, it must defend the United States one. This [metric] system used by the President and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld accounts for three of the four objectives in the QDR. It can however be misleading since there is no mention of the fourth objective, conducting a limited number of SSC operations. The administration has not defined what is meant by a “limited number”. In addition, the majority of SSCs are being performed only by the Army. To paint a clearer picture, the [metric] should reflect 4-2-1-1-4 to capture the objectives of the QDR with the SSCs in Bosnia, Kosovo, Latin America and Africa that we are currently conducting.

On a positive note, this administration’s approach is richer than the last QDR in two areas. First, we will swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts with the option of winning one including a regime change. This guidance is more realistic than previously. It allows us to delay in one theater until we have secured the first, then focus our attention on the second theater. It also does not require us to activate all of the ARNG and USAR units in order to accomplish the
mission. In the previous QDR military forces were expected to participate in two Major Theater Wars (MTW) near simultaneously. This would have required all of the ARNG and USAR forces to be on active duty in order to accomplish the mission. The second, area is Defending the United States. This objective was added after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In this objective the Administration continues to define the roles and missions of the total forces that will participate in this mission. To date, the Department of Homeland Defense (HLD) has stood up and has a plethora of state and federal agencies working for it. Already, HLD has worked two events through the chain of command- Super Bowl XXXVII and the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy. Together the office of HLD and its military affiliate Northern Command (NORTHCOM) continue to work the issues of what the military structure of the organization will look like. What military units will best interface with the local, state and federal agencies assigned to the office of HLD

MILITARY FORCE STRENGTHS

In every conflict in which the United States has participated, the Army has provided the stabilization forces. As America’s largest ground force, the Army is the logical choice to be responsible for this type of mission. However, these missions come with a heavy cost. The total Army has approximately 1.2 Million soldiers: Active – 480,000; ARNG – 350,000; and USAR - 270,000. On any given day, the active force can provide approximately 293,000 soldiers. The remaining 186,500 are running the institution- 111,200; in transit- 63,000; and in Special Operations- 12,500. In some instances the actual available strength is less than 293,000 soldiers, since units pull semi-annual rotations in the Balkans and other locations. From June 2001 through May 2005, active duty units will have deployed more than 5,300 soldiers to Kosovo. In January 2002, approximately 4,000 active duty soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan, leaving approximately 283,700 soldiers available for other deployments.

Mobilizations for ARNG and USAR soldiers continue to increase. There are 64,741 ARNG and USAR soldiers on active duty under the partial mobilization for missions at home and abroad. They protect key installations, provide Chemical and Biological Hazard training, guard airports and borders, and deploy to the Sinai and Afghanistan. The 28th ID Pennsylvania National Guard has deployed 1,500 soldiers to Bosnia. This number will rise when 9,000 Army reservists are called to active duty to help guard 163 Air Force installations. The USAF has requested assistance from the Army in guarding facilities in the U.S. and overseas. An agreement was recently reached between the two services which permit airmen to return to civilian status after having served on active duty for one year.
The other services have also seen their deployments increase over the past few years. The U.S. Air Force has called more than 11,000 airmen from the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and active Air Force to defend our skies since 11 September 2001. Additionally, the USAF has been flying the Northern and Southern No-Fly zones in Iraq since 28 December 1998. The Navy has participated in patrolling the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea since the end of the Persian Gulf War, as well as flying in the No-Fly zones of Iraq.

The Army has been committed to the extent that it might not be able to accomplish all its missions without unacceptable risk. In years past it would rely on the National Guard and Reserves for assistance. Today, and most likely in the future, they may not be available since the Army is currently deploying the ARNG and USAR forces as much as it is the active force. It is not clear that the QDR anticipated an increase in the numbers of SSC’s. The QDR and NSS have thus failed to keep pace with the uncertainties of the global security environment. Further, the Administration itself seems reluctant to re-prioritize the nation’s strategic commitments. The Department of Defense must reprioritize the Army’s missions, or increase the overall end-strength of the Army.

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

“Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

The current National Military Strategy (NMS) [still in draft form, but expecting only minor changes if any] has as its unifying themes; Protect the US homeland and interests abroad; Prevent conflict and unwarned attacks, and Prevail against adversaries in a wide range of possible contingencies, today and tomorrow. Fully supporting these objectives is the job of our current military. As usual, the Army’s burden is heavy.

IMPACT OF GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The President has made it clear that the Global War on Terrorism is the number one mission of the U.S. military and government. The Department of Homeland Security was established to ensure this objective is accomplished. While this department is still developing its organizational chart, it is expected to have some element of the Army (Active, ARNG or USAR) working for it. Meanwhile, active duty Army and USAR soldiers continue fighting alongside coalition forces in Afghanistan; and U.S. ARNG and USAR soldiers are mobilized for
a possible war against Iraq. Since 11 September the ARNG and USAR have assisted state, local and federal agencies. Almost 54,000 reservists remain on active duty today, with about 5,000 entering their second year. The war on terrorism has impacted everyone. The U.S. Air Force has come on line recently stating that they can no longer provide security at many of their installations. So the Army was directed to mobilize 9,000 soldiers to provide protection at 163 Air Force bases worldwide. As active units begin deploying for a possible showdown in Iraq, more reservists will be needed to fill new vacancies at Army installations, in addition to assisting the U. S. Air Force and other local, state, and federal agencies.

IRAQ INCREASE OPERATIONS LATERALLY (IRAN / SWA /SEA)

As we fight the global war on terrorism, we must also prepare for war against Iraq for violating the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 and perhaps against North Korea for violating the 1994 Clinton Administration nuclear weapons deal. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld tellingly reiterated recently that we can accomplish our second objective of the QDR, we can swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts, including a possible regime change or occupation.

The threat in Southwest Asia (SWA) primarily consists of approximately 424,000 troops in Iraq’s active Army and approximately 513,000 troops in Iran’s active Army. Like the United States, both countries have reservists of approximately 650,000 in Iraq and 350,000 in Iran. Some might argue that these two countries would never unite. However, should the U.S. attack Iraq for violating UN resolution 1441, there is a possibility that Iraq will try to build a coalition, claiming that the U.S. is trying to become a hegemony in the region. We may see these two forces join together to fight the U.S. with the domination of the region at stake. A more likely scenario is that Iran will let Iraq fight its war with the U.S., anticipating that if Iraq is defeated, then Iran will become the regional hegemony.

North Korea has the world’s third largest army (approximately 1 million active duty soldiers and a reserve force numbering over 6 million). Seventy percent of its active force, including equipment is operating within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) - most of it within hardened underground facilities. The force could quickly launch an attack against the 2d U.S. Infantry Division and South Korea. Further, North Korea continues to be one of the world’s largest producers and distributors of ballistic missiles.
COURSES OF ACTION

Coa1: Maintain the status quo. Continue to commit Army resources [with little or no published guidance on the types of missions they will carry out] in support of our QDR, NSS, and NMS objectives. Accomplish the first objective- deter forward in critical regions- with active duty forces. Execute the second objective- a force identified to defeat aggression swiftly and, if required, ensure a regime change- with the active and ARNG combat forces, ARNG and USAR combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces. Accomplish the third objective- defend the United States- primarily with ARNG and USAR forces at military installations, airports, and selected national events. Re-evaluate the fourth objective, based on revised forecasts for commitments to the global war on terrorism and other missions.

Coa2: Increase the size of the active duty force. This build-up will facilitate meeting the objectives set forth in the QDR, NSS and NMS. The active force will then be sufficient to accomplish Objectives One (Forward Deterrence), especially as we prepare for a possible conflict in Iraq, which may require an occupation force for several years; and Objective Two (Defeat Aggression). The build-up must focus on training and “low density – high demand” forces spread within the active and reserves to deploy with the right mix of critical missions (civil affairs, military police, chemical biological detection etc), specialists that have traditionally served only in the reserves. Objective three (Defend the Homeland) will become primarily an ARNG and USAR mission. Restructuring the forces should facilitate getting the correct MOSs needed for Homeland Defense missions. Objective Four (Conduct SSCs) would remain primarily an active force mission. Even so, DOD and elected officials should carefully consider the number of SSCs we participate in or establish a maximum number of forces we can commit to these missions. Additional forces will allow the Army to stand up new active duty low density - high demand units to augment brigades on SSC deployments with minimal activation of ARNG or USAR units. These added forces will allow each component of the army to train on their primary mission tasks and prepare for overlapping missions as needed. Finally, a smart build-up should substantially reduce in the number of citizen-soldiers called to active duty prematurely.

Table 1 compares the two courses of actions (COA) used in this paper.
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<td>Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts with decisive victory in one and possible regime change or occupation</td>
<td>Active force, ARNG and USAR combat service and combat service support forces</td>
<td>Active and ARNG combat forces; Active, ARNG and USAR combat service and combat service support forces</td>
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<td>SWA: 5 AC Divisions [6 ARNG Divisions (5/1)]</td>
<td>Korea: 4 AC Divisions (2/2) [4 ARNG Divisions (1.5 M/2.5 LT)]</td>
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<td>Korea: 4 AC Divisions (2/2) [6 ARNG Divisions (6/0)]</td>
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<td>Defend the United States</td>
<td>Active, ARNG and USAR forces 0 AC / ARNG identified</td>
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<td>Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations</td>
<td>Active, ARNG and USAR forces 2 AC Divisions (1 ARNG Division)</td>
<td>Active force 4 AC Divisions</td>
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**TABLE 1. COA COMPARISON**

**COA 1 Advantages:**

The structure and composition of our ARNG and USAR forces, support the third objective to defend the United States with minimal changes.

**Disadvantages:**

The Army will struggle to accomplish Objective One as it carries out transformation and continues to carry out increasing increase SSCs missions.
Objective Two requires the entire Army force, supplemented by the ARNG combat forces [ARNG maneuver brigades / divisions have not been activated for combat since WWII] in fighting two overlapping conflicts, especially as we continue to transform the Army.

Risk to Objective Four is high, especially without definitive policy on the number of SSC or a maximum force size. More ARNG / USAR units will be called upon to carry out these missions.

Overall risk in this COA is high, for three primary reasons: First, we may have insufficient active forces due to transformation and over-tasking our low density – high demand MOS. Only a limited number of training days are allocated for ARNG units that need to prepare to fight a second conflict. We may have insufficient critical units and trained specialists to defend the homeland because of SSC and deterrence missions.

**COA 2 Advantages:**

Objective One will be executed by the active duty force.

Increasing the Army’s end strength and restructuring all three branches of the Army will facilitate meeting Objective Two and will reduce the number of ARNG and USAR units called to active duty.

The increase and restructuring of forces would facilitate ARNG / USAR units to focus on Objective Three.

Risk associated with this COA is low. Units can focus on fewer missions. Specific ARNG and USAR units are structured for homeland defense. Some MOS changes will facilitate active force deployment. ARNG brigades and divisions are aligned with combatant commands (homeland defense or war fighting).

**Disadvantages:**

An increase in force size could result in more deployments to support Objectives One and Four. Additionally, the restructuring of ARNG / USAR units could create MOS shortages in these units and a fear that governors do not control all their forces, especially to support Objective Three.

**COA 1**

**Analysis**

The decision to rely on COA 1 rest on three dubious assumptions. The Army will be able to transform as scheduled with little to no distraction; it will not be committed to any other deterrence missions. The Army will be able to restructure the active, ARNG and USAR forces to meet new challenges. SSCs will be limited in number or size of force committed.
To continue its transformation program, the Army must commit approximately one-third to one-quarter of the force to testing, fielding, and training. These units will be unavailable for deployment except under worse case scenarios. The Army has a history of dragging its feet when it comes to transformation. History has proven that it requires a lot more than just soldiers fielding new equipment, as General Edward “Shy” Myers, Chief of Staff of the Army tried in 1980 with the fielding of the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD) in the 9th Infantry Division.\textsuperscript{31} As today’s Army begins its transformation into the Interim and Objective Force, transforming units may be temporarily unprepared for conflicts in deterrence, fighting two overlapping conflicts and SSCs.

Additionally, the Army will not be committed to any other forward deterrence missions. Currently approximately 102,000 Army soldiers are permanently deployed forward (62,000 in Europe and 26,782 in Korea deterring aggression\textsuperscript{32}) with an additional 3,000 supporting U.S. Army Southern Command.\textsuperscript{33} An adjustment to the actual locations of units assigned to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), would trigger second and third order effects on the active component. First, with two divisions and an airborne brigade located within USEUCOMs Area of Responsibility (AOR), the divisions in Germany and airborne brigade in Italy, and with a cap placed on the number of DOD personnel authorized with in United States Army Europe (USAEUR), there is little chance that additional state-side units will be assigned to this theater. If the decision is made to move one of those units (division or brigade) to SWA in order to have a full time presence in the region the most likely location would be Turkey which would keep all the forces assigned to USAEUR and USEUCOM since both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are in the CENTCOM AOR. If this move takes place, the Army would need to determine what size force gets assigned and for how long. Possibly, a brigade would be assigned, and the tour would become an unaccompanied tour since it would take years to find or establish adequate housing, schooling and associated amenities that go along with caring for the force and families. This brigade should be tailored with combat, CS and CSS units as the Berlin brigade was.

Assigning a division would necessitate major adjustments within the Army personnel management cycle. For example, in assigning personnel to Korea, Army personnel command (PERSCOM), assignment officers normally identify four soldiers for every one position required. Personnel issues, health, or deployability status of individual soldiers not yet identified at PERSCOM require such measures. This process of filling two overseas unaccompanied tours would also require additional changes within the personnel assignment process; it would also shorten tours at CONUS installations. To limit the new forward deployed force to a brigade size
would be easier on the personal assignment side; it would not have as large of an impact on the current length of CONUS tours.

The second assumption is that DOD will be allowed to make the necessary adjustments to the force structure of the active, ARNG and USAR forces to meet the current and projected future needs of the Army. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas H. Hall are working to determine what the right mix is. This problem has existed since Vietnam, when President Johnson and Nixon declined to call up the reserves for service. As the new All Volunteer Army was built, Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton W. Abrams was charged with shaping the force to ensure that when America went to war again, it would call on hometown America’s support.  

Today the active Army cannot deploy from home station without calling to active duty USAR units. Since Vietnam, 54 percent of the total Army strength (55 % combat arms, 86% combat support and 72% combat service support) is found in the ARNG and USAR. Today between eighty and one-hundred percent of key CSS units (railway, transportation, chemical, water supply and terminal units) are located in the USAR. If we limit the number of ARNG and USAR units called to active duty we must consider bringing some key reserve units back to the active force. The restructuring of maneuver battalions in the late 1990’s reduced the number of maneuver companies to three per battalion. So it makes sense to consider restructuring our Area Support Groups (ASGs) and Corps Support Groups (CSG) and designating some elements as new active CSS elements. Selected reserve units should be redesignated as active duty to enable the active force to deploy itself, and, if needed, call for additional reserve forces.

The eight ARNG divisions and fifteen enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) are primarily combat arms forces. None of the eight ARNG divisions or fifteen eSB’s have deployed to combat since before Vietnam, and only a few select brigades from the eight divisions have deployed in support of peace keeping duties (49th division TX and 29th division PA - Bosnia). However, many of the USAR units have deployed in support of SSCs and deterrence missions. The heavy CSS structure of the USAR and the need for their critical low-density high demand MOS’s have identified them for call-up. Elements of the ARNG and USAR need to be restructured to fill short MOS’s that do not require extensive specialized schooling such as military police, transportation, communication, and civil affairs - to mention just a few specialties. Over the long haul, it would be wise to select some ARNG units to get schooling in specialized areas. Army education programs could prepare them.

This dual restructuring will enhance defense of our homeland, President Bush’s highest priority and the third objective of the QDR. Too many of our USAR low density high-demand
MOS’s are the same people that local, state and federal agencies are depending on to be the first responders should another terrorist attack hit our homeland. Some laws excuse these citizen soldiers from serving should their units be activated. DOD must therefore ensure that we have the right numbers and MOS’s in all components of our armed forces to prevent any potential shortages.

Will the administration or DOD clearly define and place a limit on the number of SSCs or establish a maximum force size capacity? Today there are more than 13,000 soldiers deployed under the category SSC in locations like the Balkans, Sinai, Africa, Philippines, and South America, to name a few. Since 1989 the Army’s end strength has been cut by more than 34% and civilian strength cut by 42%, while the mission rate has increased by 300%. Lack of guidance on SSCs has resulted in Army units being stationed in Bosnia for seven years and Kosovo four years with no apparent end in sight. Additionally, Army forces have been deployed to Africa, South America and South East Asia in the past ten years. The Administration or DOD must clearly define our roles in SSCs and limit the number of forces participating in them. Many soldiers used in SSC missions come from USAR units requiring CSS MOS’.

Risk

In this COA the risk is high. The first risk jeopardizes Objective One. We may not have adequate forces available to deter in more than one forward location? The second risk jeopardizes Objective Two and our force structure to fight in overlapping conflicts. The Secretary of Defense may not be able to restructure all components of the Army to meet future needs? The third risk jeopardizes Objective Four. With the current mandated end strength and no clear definition of “limited”, can the Army continue to participate in every global SSC.

With the current limits on the size of the Army and the current world threats, the Army is becoming hard-pressed to deter aggression forward with a force much larger than a brigade. Should the need arise to send a division forward to deter aggression in SWA, the Army will need to weigh the cost of this against its benefits. One of the costs might be a second one-year, unaccompanied tour, like the current Korean tour is. This may impact on retention in the active, ARNG and USAR units. The Secretary of Defense has stated that we have the force structure to defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts (objective two), but no one seems to consider the effect on the force of a hardship tour to Turkey or some other SWA country.

The second risk may be reduced by creative restructuring of the force. The Secretary of Defense may not be able to restructure the active ARNG and USAR as he sees fit. Congress and state governors will also influence the outcome. As the Secretary of Defense has
frequently noted, several critical CSS capabilities found only in the USAR need to be moved back to the active force. Following the Vietnam War, CSA Creighton Abrams restructured the Army to ensure that Americans knew when we were going to war simply by seeing there nearby reserve units activated. Will current elected officials continue to tolerate such disruption of reservists’ lives and communities? Will governors continue to tolerate the loss of their called-up Guard Units? To reduce this risk, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is going to need the support of almost every elected official in Washington D.C.. Failure to restructure the Army will lead to disaster in the near future as our deployments continue to increase and we overcommit our low density-high demand soldiers, or as they get exemptions from serving due to their first response status within their states. Will we be capable of deploying the necessary forces to fight overlapping conflicts knowing that we do not have some critical CSS assets?

The third risk comes from over committing to SSCs. The U.S. Army remains everywhere it has fought: In Europe since WWII ended in 1945; in Korea since 1953 and counting. Army soldiers have been in the Balkans for almost eight years and do not appear to be leaving any time soon. The Army has forces deployed in over 120 locations worldwide, maintaining a military presence in many locations year round.\(^{38}\) As these SSCs increase, as they are likely to do in the emerging strategic environment, so do the stabilization forces. In the past, this mission was primarily an active force mission. Today however, theis demand has increased so much that the citizen soldiers of the ARNG and USAR are now pulling these missions.\(^{39}\)

COA2

Analysis

Recent world events (Iraq violating U.N. Resolution 1441, North Korea developing nuclear weapons, and the threat of terrorism world wide) have led to much debate among top military and elected officials. The General Accounting Office has assessed the need to increase the Army’s end strength in order to accomplish DOD objectives. An increase of somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 is supported not only by CSA Eric Shinseki and endorsed by Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) and Congressman Ike Skelton (D MO).\(^{40}\) If the active force of 480,000 is increased by 40,000, the new total of 512,000 would enable the active force to deter forward better as well as relieve the ARNG from participating in SSCs, for which they are called to active duty for approximately eight months, six of which they are deployed.

The Association of the United States Army’s (AUSA) Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) has conducted a study showing how SSC impact the force. They have determined that Army end strength is low and additional forces are needed. The AUSA is certainly pro-military so we
would be surprised if they did not want more soldiers in the Army. Even so, their study is relevant, and it depicts an accurate estimate of daily available forces. The study reveals a ratio of three or four soldiers impacted for every one deployed. This takes into consideration the reduction in combat readiness of the deploying unit, units used to conduct the deploying unit’s training, additional units from within a division or Corps who provide the key low-density MOS’ to fill critical gaps, and finally, the unit that is currently deployed. Current legislation limits Army end-strengths to approximately 480,000 soldiers on active duty. AUSA estimates, however, that only approximately 293,000 are available on any given day for deployment.

Table Two shows the current approximate ‘available daily strength’, using AUSA methodology:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Approx. #</th>
<th>4:1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army end strength</td>
<td>480,000</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>- 12,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transit soldiers</td>
<td>- 63,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>- 111,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total #1</td>
<td>293,300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Approx. #</th>
<th>4:1</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>5,300</td>
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<td>15,900</td>
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<td>Bosnia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total #2</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>61,200</td>
<td>45,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total #1 | 293,300 | 293,300 | 293,300 |
| Total #2 | 15,300  | 61,200  | 45,900  |
| Available strength | 278,000 | 232,100 | 247,400 |

**TABLE 2. AVAILABLE STRENGTHS**

To meet current Army needs, it has become necessary to activate approximately 64,700 reservist soldiers. This number changes weekly as more troops are called up or returned to after a year of active duty. Many of these reservists are filling low-density or low-density high-demand MOS’s that are found only in the reserves. The decision to move the majority of our CSS assets to the reserves has been in effect since the end of the Vietnam War, when a conscious decision was made to ensure elected officials did not commit our forces to war without active public involvement. It is now time to abandon this rationale and get critical CSS units back on active duty.

An additional 40,000 soldiers would allow the active army (currently incapable of deploying itself) the ability to self-deploy by filling critical low-density MOS’ and providing
sustainment MOS’ like military police, water supply, transportation and chemical-biological units. To deploy quickly, the Army needs these assets in the active force. Further, in the event the U.S. invades Iraq and removes Saddam Hussein from power, a stabilization force will be needed to assist a new government in getting established. This mission will require a significant force structure that most likely would remain in the region for a considerable period. Some defense analysts have suggested an occupation force of a division (approximately 16,000 soldiers), staying as long as five years. Others, such as Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) stated that it might take 75,000 soldiers for a period of one and one-half years up to five years. Still others believe our forces should remain permanently forward-deployed in SWA in order to deter aggression and fight the war on terrorism. The bottom line is yet another force will be deployed forward in support of deterrence.

The need for additional forces are further supported by the fact the Army will undergo transformation in the upcoming years. While the Army does not know exactly how large the transformed units will be, we do know that the force will be lighter in weight and transportable by air. Additionally, we expect that during transformation approximately one-third to one-quarter of the force will be non-deployable except in a worse-case scenario. As specified in the QDR our military forces must be prepared to deter forward and conduct limited SSCs. But we do not know how many missions will be assigned. With increased terrorism and threats to U.S. allies, the U.S. is expected to lead the way. This requires soldiers on the ground in many MOS’. The need for additional active duty CSS assets will increases with every new mission the Army undertakes. We can no longer count on our reserve forces to handle this mission alone. They are already stressed by on-going missions.

To support Objective Three, the ARNG and USAR are probably best suited for this task. As the Department of Homeland Security (HLS) and NORTHCOM continue to grow in size and take on more missions, their interactions with local state and federal agencies will continue to improve. As we witnessed with the tragic loss of the space shuttle Columbia, a quick decision was made by Secretary Ridge to have the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency for the disaster. States were quick to respond with over 200 ARNG soldiers from Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma to safeguard debris areas, test debris for contamination, and provide air reconnaissance for police, the Governor and FEMA officials as directed. The Texas 6th Civil Support Team provided the first responders (six soldiers) who were on site within six hours. Twenty-one soldiers and seven vehicles were then on site within 12 hours of the crash.42
Select ARNG and USAR units should also be restructured like the active forces. Further, shortages in critical full-time active guard and reserve (AGR) positions should be filled. And while some critical CSS assets are moved to the active force, these assets cannot just disappear from the reserves. The preponderance of CSS assets must remain in the USAR. The primary mission of the ARNG should remain to augment the active force with combat and combat support forces. The ARNG divisions should remain aligned with active divisions and corps as outlined by the CJCS, (JSCP change 1 alignment approved in 2001). Assigning the ARNG and USAR the HLS mission will reduce the number of deployments being conducted by the reserve forces. It will also allow the reserve forces to focus their limited training days (on average an ARNG battalion gets 32 training days per year) on missions associated with homeland defense.

To support Objective four, an increase in the size of the force is needed in order for the active army to conduct SSCs. Currently the Army provides the largest DOD commitment to SSCs. Most Americans are aware of only four Army-supported SSCs- in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Sinai- if they are even aware of these. However, this past fiscal year (FY 02), the Army had over 180,000 soldiers forward deployed: 102,000 are permanently stationed in Europe, Korea and South America; the remaining 78,000 soldiers are conducting SSCs in over 120 countries. Many of these 78,000 soldiers are ARNG or USAR soldiers filling critical low-density, active duty MOS’s. Many of them were mobilized because the active force could not fill the mission due to other obligations. More than 32,000 ARNG and USAR soldiers were mobilized in 2002 for federal service at home and abroad. So almost two divisions of soldiers were called to active duty, and an additional 11,000 soldiers deployed in support of state-controlled missions. The active force does not have the required personnel to conduct all the SSCs that our elected officials have committed us to. An increase in the overall Army end-strength would enable the active force to accomplish most of these missions, while requiring fewer deployments for our citizen soldiers. On average, it takes our reserve forces three to four weeks to be ready to deploy. We are asking in most cases that our reserve forces prepare with little special preparation to conduct difficult unfamiliar missions when we commit them to many of these SSC missions.

Risk

In this COA the risk is low. With the restructuring of the Army, there exists the chance that Objective One and Objective Four could increase in numbers. Should the U.S. invade Iraq, there is a good chance we will have soldiers there for an undetermined number of years. As
stated earlier, the number of SSCs has increased 300% over the past ten years and indications show that rate may increase with the current world environment; (war on terrorism, violation of U.N. resolution 1441, North Korea’s nuclear production threats, and the increase fighting between Israel and Palestine). With a restructuring of the Army, more CSS units to active duty, the active force would not have a problem accomplishing these increased missions.

RECOMMENDATION:

The administration should adopt COA 2 and increase the Army’s end strength by 40,000. It should also re-look the QDR, NMS and NSS and compare the explicit and implied missions against the Army’s available force structure. At a minimum, the Army needs approximately 40,000 additional soldiers to fill critical low-density MOS's within all three components. The three components must be restructured to get the correct mix of low-density MOS’s on active duty, as well as in the reserves. ARNG and USAR forces are best suited for the Homeland Defense missions. Their interface with local, state and federal agencies gives them an added advantage. Further, the nation’s strategic reserve (active duty light force) could as determined by the President.

As a war with Iraq approaches and tensions increase in North Korea we must determine whether we have the necessary force structure to support the four QDR objectives. The Bush Administration’s QDR assumes we have the available forces to deter aggression forward; to defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts with a decisive victory in one and a possible regime change or occupation; to defend the United States; and to conduct a limited number of SSCs. Are these valid assumptions?

Since the QDR was released in October 2001, the Administration has indicated repeatedly that DOD has the necessary forces to accomplish the largest of the objectives, defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts. A year ago, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that we did not have the necessary forces or aircraft to defeat two regional foes simultaneously. Then, in December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that the military has the power to take on two opponents simultaneously. As we approach a show down in Iraq, USA Today announced on 4 February 2003 that senior defense officials are skeptical that we can defeat two such adversaries with the current force structure citing shortages of aircraft, ships and soldiers. Retired officers and military strategists feel the shortages are contributing to the President’s relatively mild response to the North Korean nuclear threats. Do we have the necessary force structure to accomplish the objectives of the QDR?
The Army has deployed the 3rd Infantry, 4th Infantry and 101st AASLT divisions to SWA already. Analysts expect the 1st CAV, parts of the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry divisions [currently one of the two forward-deployed brigades of the 1st Infantry division is deployed to Kosovo conducting SSC mission] to be deployed soon. Of the six heavy divisions in the active force five are focused on SWA, while the 2nd Infantry division remains poised along the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) in Korea. Elements of the 82d Airborne division are in Afghanistan participating in another SSC, the hunt for Al Quada and Osma bin Laden. This leaves the 10th Mountain and 25th Infantry divisions available for Korea should Kim Jong Il decide to attack.

The NMS cites the need for strategic reserve, but the only force available would be the 3rd ACR-a very powerful force with M1 Abrams tanks, M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles, AH-64 apache helicopters, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters and Paladin howitzers. But this force is not mobile enough to respond immediately, like our airborne forces can. Currently, no ARNG divisions or eSBs have been alerted for duty in either SWA or Korea. According to the JSCP, (change 1, approved in 2001), ARNG divisions and eSBs were aligned with the active force Corps and Divisions. The ARNG makes up approximately 55% of the combat arms, and 86% of the combat support forces. It takes approximately three weeks for ARNG units to form and begin processing, then they conduct 14 days of unit training at a mobilization site. With an attack on Iraq on the very near horizon, it seems we should have mobilized ARNG divisions to our dirt Combat Training Centers to better prepare these citizen soldiers for potential combat. Are we hesitating because we know they are not trained to the level required? We can only conclude that we do not have the necessary force structure to support the 2001 QDR objectives.

WORD COUNT=7,419
ENDNOTES


6 ibid.

7 ibid, pp.13-14


9 ibid, p1

10 Rumsfeld, p.17

11 Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of the United Sates of America (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Pre-Decisional Draft 19 September 2002), 17. It is believed this Pre-Decisional Draft will have minor changes if any.


23. Bush, p.1

24. Myers, p.iii

25. Rumsfeld, p.17


2000 Report to Congress Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, 12 September 2000 available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html; Internet; accessed 2 January 2003. North Korea has successfully tested a 2000 Km and continue working on a 5000Km missile that could end up in the hands of any nation or rouge state with hard currency makes them a threat that must be considered especially with the recent events on the peninsula, in both the North and South.


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28th Infantry “Keystone” Division (Mechanized); available from Http://sites.state.pa.us/PA_Exec?Military_Affairs/28idm.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2002.

The U.S. Army: Too Small for the Tasks at Hand, 1 and Lewis ‘Peacekeeping’ Saps Military pp.2-3.


2000 Report to Congress Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, 12 September 2000 available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html; Internet; accessed 2 January 2003. (North Korea has successfully tested a 2000 Km and continue working on a 5000Km missile that could end up in the hands of any nation or rouge state with hard currency makes them a threat that must be considered especially with the recent events on the peninsula, in both the North and South).


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