DISCLAIMER

The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation. Comments or suggestions should be addressed to:

   Director  
   Center for Army Analysis  
   ATTN: CSCA-FS  
   6001 Goethals Road  
   Fort Belvoir, VA  22060-5230
Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army has increasingly become more and more of a CONUS-based force, while overseas commitments to contingencies have increased dramatically. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), War Plans Division, desired to use the Joint Dynamic Commitment 97 Game to draw attention to this change and argue that reduction in forward deployment assets may limit the outside continental United States (OCONUS) commander in chief’s (CINC’s) ability to respond to contingencies if missing force components are unavailable.
ASSESSMENT OF CINC AUTHORIZATIONS TO CINC REQUIREMENTS (ACAR) (FOLLOW-ON)

SUMMARY

THE PROJECT PURPOSE was to determine whether a move to a more continental United States (CONUS)-based Army can impact a commander in chief’s (CINC’s) ability to respond rapidly to contingency operations.

THE PROJECT SPONSOR was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army, War Plans Division (DAMO-SSW).

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVES were to:

(1) Determine whether forward-deployed units were adequate to respond to level contingency operations in Dynamic Commitment 97.

(2) Determine whether forward-deployed personnel were adequate to respond to level contingency operations in Dynamic Commitment 97.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT. The analysis was based on Dynamic Commitment 97 and covered forces committed to two 7-year futures (1997-2003) and 18 smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTION was that CINC authorizations would be relatively constant over time.

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are that forward-deployed forces are critical for the Army to achieve mission force closures in a timely manner. In the future projected by Dynamic commitment 97, forward-deployed forces were not balanced to meet mission projections in the area of contingency operations.

THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS are to:

(1) Match forward-deployed forces to potential overseas missions across the spectrum of missions.

(2) Balance forward-deployed force levels with other means of achieving rapid force employment.
THE PROJECT EFFORT was conducted by Mr. Duane Schilling, Force Strategy Division, (703) 806-5674, DSN 656-5674.

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-FS, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

- Follow-on to ACAR conducted in 97 for SSW. Initial ACAR compared OCONUS CINC Army personnel authorizations to CINC Army requirements by branch for SSCs.

Summary of ACAR 97

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CBT</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>CSS</th>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
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<td>13, 16, 17</td>
<td>13, 16, 17</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>16, 18</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>18, 20</td>
<td>13, 16, 17</td>
<td>13, 16, 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Branch Shortfalls:
- Bold Face - Major Shortfall - Largest Req. > 350 and Largest Req. > 10% of Auth.
- Reg Face - Minor Shortfall - Largest Req. < 350 or Largest Req. < 10% of Auth.

Balance:
- In Balance (No Major Shortfall)
- Out of Balance (1 or more Major Shortfall)

- Final ARB indicated that actual comparison of unit shortages and fills would provide a better answer. Sponsor accepted recommendation for follow-on in Dec 97.

Figure 1. Background

This study was performed at the request of LTC Moores of DAMO-SSW to argue for the retention of key forward-deployed assets.

The sponsor at SSW initially requested a quick nonunit-based look at shortages achieved during Dynamic Commitment. Gross authorizations by branch were compared to gross requirements for Dynamic Commitment vignettes. The result shows summary major shorts, here defined as an imbalance in requirements to authorizations above the company level in gross personnel numbers. DAMO-SSW was made aware of these results. A final Analysis Review Board (ARB) indicated the advisability of obtaining greater resolution in estimate of personnel shortages.
1.2 Sponsor Requirement

Purpose: To help Army make the case that CONUS based forces may create difficulties for OCONUS CINC's in responding to SSCs.

Problem Statement: Determine whether sufficient forces are allocated to the CINCs for application to smaller-scale contingency (SSC) missions. Assess fills and shortages by branch and in total for Army units each of four OCONUS CINCs with respect to QDR SSC requirements.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US Army has increasingly become more and more a CONUS-based force, while overseas commitments to contingencies have increased dramatically. HQDA, DCSOPS, War Plans Division, desired to use the Joint Dynamic Commitment 97 Game to draw attention to this change and to argue that reduction in forward deployment assets may limit the outside continental United States (OCONUS) CINC’s ability to respond to contingencies if missing force components are unavailable.
1.3 Approach

Determine shortages and fills by matching SRC requirements to SRC authorizations.

Forward-deployed units currently deployed to OCONUS CINCs were compared to requirements from Dynamic Commitment 97 vignette requirements. Numbers of unit shortfalls were captured and aggregated by branch. Numbers of units short were multiplied by corresponding authorized personnel quantities and aggregated by branch of the associated unit. Both of these statistics were then aggregated over all branches for each vignette in the data set.
1.4 Scope

(1) SSC missions occur singly.

(2) CINC authorizations remain constant.

(3) Matches without SRC substitution are adequate.

(4) Level of shortage/fill can be expressed by counting personnel strength against branch of associated matched and unmatched SRCs.

Figure 4. Scope

The analysis was conducted at a fairly high level of resolution. The conditions listed above were applied to the analysis performed. Examining the impact of SSC missions over time would have yielded a different answer than examining each mission independently, but the basic question was to focus on the CINC’s potential ability to respond to each mission. Current CINC deployments and personnel authorizations were used as the standard against which mission requirements were measured. No substitutions were applied at this level of analysis. Any personnel associated with a unit were counted against the branch of that unit.
1.5 Data Set

Dynamic Commitment:

- J-8 controlled game
- All four services played in both futures

ACAR follow-on focused on 18 SSC missions from DC 4. For missions with multiple phases each phase was treated separately:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>1 NEO, 3 Humanitarian Asst., 2 Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>1 NEO, 3 Humanitarian Asst., 2 Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>3 Humanitarian Asst., 1 Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>1 Humanitarian Asst., 1 Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Data Set

The data set for measuring SSC requirements came from the Dynamic Commitment gaming process held in early 1997 in support of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The boxes in Figure 5 above show the types of missions considered for each region.
1.6 Vignette Analysis - eup09c

Figure 6 above is an example of the analysis performed for each vignette played in Dynamic Commitment 97. It represents the CINC’s ability to respond to an SSC mission, independent of other commitments, using current forces and associated authorized personnel.
1.7 EUCOM Overview

![EUCOM Unit Summary and EUCOM - PAX Summary graphs]

**Figure 7. EUCOM Overview**

The European Command (EUCOM) is relatively capable of meeting potential contingencies within the area of responsibility (AOR).
As a whole, the Pacific Command (PACOM) has organic forces, but significant shortfalls do exist.
1.9 SOUTHCOM Overview

The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) does not have significant organic force levels, since it is relatively close to CONUS.
1.10 CENTCOM Overview

The Central Command (CENTCOM) has little in the way of uncommitted forward-deployed forces available for contingency operations. Most of its rapid deployment capability is represented in terms of prepositioned (PREPO) units.
### 1.11 Summary

**Balance:**

- **In Balance** (No Major Shortfalls)
- **Out of Balance** (1 or more Major Shortfalls)

**Branch Shortfalls:**

Major Shortfall - largest Req. > 350 \( \text{and} \) largest short > 10 % of Req.

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<tbody>
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<td><strong>EUCOM</strong></td>
<td>IN, FA</td>
<td>CM, EN, MP, MI, AV, AD</td>
<td>QM, CS-42, CS-43, TC, OD, AR-87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACOM</strong></td>
<td>IN, FA, AR</td>
<td>SC, EN, MP, MI, AV, AD</td>
<td>QM, CS-42, CS-43, TC MD, CS-63, HQ-52, OD, AG, FI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHCOM</strong></td>
<td>IN, FA, AR</td>
<td>CM, SC, EN, MP, MI, AV, AD</td>
<td>CA, CS-42, CS-43 CS-63, TC, AG, AR-87, LT-77, HQ-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTCOM</strong></td>
<td>FA, IN, AR</td>
<td>CM, SC, EN, MP, MI, AV, AD</td>
<td>MD, OD, AG, CS-42, CS-43, CS-63, TC, CA, HQ-52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 11. Summary**

Applying the criteria above, all CINCs have major shortfalls in organic Army combat, combat support, and combat service support forces to respond to contingency operations.
1.12 Observations

- All OCONUS CINCs significantly short in most CBT and CS branches for SSC missions.
- All OCONUS CINCS significantly short in TC, CS-42 and CS-43 branches for CSS.
- OCONUS CINCs would require significant external support for most SSCs.

Figure 12. Observations
1.13 Conclusion

Actual SRC level comparison provided a better assessment of CINC readiness to respond to SSCs within AOR with authorized forces than previous method using personnel counts.

ACAR 97:

ACAR (Follow-On):

Figure 13. Conclusion

The follow-on technique provided a better description of CINC ability to respond to contingencies than the rough order of magnitude applied previously.
APPENDIX A. PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

1. PROJECT TEAM

   Project Director

   Mr. Duane Schilling, Force Strategy Division

   Team Member

   Mr. Barry Groves

2. PRODUCT REVIEW

   Dr. Ralph Johnson, TQM Specialist
APPENDIX B. REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

P Performing Division: FS
A Tasking: Verbal
R Acronym: ACAR

T

Title: Authorization of CINC Assets to Requirements

Start Date: 14-Feb-97
Estimated Completion Date: 31-Oct-97

Requestor/Sponsor (i.e., DCSOPS): DCSOPS
Sponsor Division: SSW

Resource Estimates:
  a. Estimated PSM: 1
  b. Estimated Funds:
  c. Models to be Used:

Description/Abstract:
This is a follow-on to the Cluster Analysis in Support of QDR (Dynamic Commitment). Assess how well forces are allocated to OCONUS CINCs in terms of possible smaller scale contingency missions (SSCs).

Study Director/POC Signature: Original Signed
Study Director/POC: Mr. Duane Schilling
Phone#: 703-806-5674

If this Request is for an External Project expected to consume 6 PSM or more Part 2 Information is Not Required. See TAB C of the Project Directors’ Guide for preparation of a Formal Project Directive.

Background:

Scope:

Issues:

Milestones:

Signatures  Division Chief Signature: Original Signed and Dated  Date:
Division Chief Concurrence:
Sponsor Signature: Original Signed and Dated  Date:
Sponsor Concurrence (COL/DA Div Chief/GO/SES):