THE ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PEACEKEEPING VS. HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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**Abstract:**
In this thesis, I examine the role of the National Guard in supporting current National Security and National Military Strategy. I argue that the global security environment has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, making "Homeland Security" a primary mission for the military, specifically the National Guard. Concurrently, the unprecedented number of overseas deployments to perform peacekeeping missions has severely affected the active Army's combat capability. I argue that the US Army has not embraced the requirements for "Homeland Security," focusing instead on maintaining its 10 active division force structure. To meet the needs of National Military Strategy, the active Army has instead relied on the reserve components to perform overseas peacekeeping missions. I argue that the National Guard has also looked to performing these missions as a method of institutional survival. Together, both components have undermined the Constitutional underpinnings of the Reserve Component as a strategic reserve, to be mobilized in cases of "war or national emergency." I argue that making "Homeland Security" a primary federal mission of the National Guard, along with restructuring current combat, combat support, and combat service support ratios will allow the National Guard to support National Military Strategy and "Homeland Security."

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I examine the role of the National Guard in supporting current National Security and National Military Strategy. I argue that the global security environment has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, making “Homeland Security” a primary mission for the military, specifically the National Guard. Concurrently, the unprecedented number of overseas deployments to perform peacekeeping missions has severely affected the active Army’s combat capability. I argue that the US Army has not embraced the requirements for “Homeland Security,” focusing instead on maintaining its 10 active division force structure. To meet the needs of National Military Strategy, the active Army has instead relied on the reserve components to perform overseas peacekeeping missions. I argue that the National Guard has also looked to performing these missions as a method of institutional survival. Together, both components have undermined the Constitutional underpinnings of the Reserve Component as a strategic reserve, to be mobilized in cases of “war or national emergency.” I argue that making “Homeland Security” a primary federal mission of the National Guard, along with restructuring current combat, combat support, and combat service support ratios will allow the National Guard to support National Military Strategy and “Homeland Security.”
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of September 11, the terms “Homeland Defense” and “Homeland Security” have become the watchwords for national security in the 21st Century. The Bush administration’s efforts to create an all-encompassing Department of Homeland Security lend credence to how seriously the government considers the probability and consequences of future attacks on U.S. soil. Not surprisingly, the National Guard has been identified as a key player in consequence management. I argue that three factors contribute to the reliance upon the National Guard in responding to future domestic attacks: The first is location. Due to the National Guard’s distribution of manpower and equipment across 3200 armories in all 54 states and territories, it is uniquely suited to mobilize and respond to future emergencies virtually anywhere in the United States, within hours of an attack. Secondly, the National Guard is not hampered by the federal restrictions of Posse Comitatus. Members of the National Guard can be mobilized immediately by the Governor of each state without restriction, whereas the mobilization of federal military forces requires the approval of the cabinet and President. In addition, the support rendered by active forces must meet strict federal criteria\(^1\) to ensure they are not involved in any type of law enforcement. Although it may seem to be governmental red tape, this restriction upon federal forces employed domestically ensures that our military maintains a credible degree of separation between the military and law enforcement. Together, the chain of approval and Posse Comitatus restrictions add up to serious delays in the capability of federal forces to respond to domestic emergencies, whereas the National Guard can be called out immediately. Last but not least, providing military support to civilian authorities is a unique, “state” mission of the National Guard. Over its 366 year history, the National Guard has excelled in responding to local and regional emergencies. I argue that the relationships it has built with local and federal

agencies, and the experience it has gained performing domestic disaster relief missions make the National Guard perfectly suited to managing the consequences of future terrorist attacks on domestic soil.

However, in spite of these logical arguments for its use, there is considerable resistance to making Homeland Security the primary mission of the National Guard. This resistance comes from both the active military and surprisingly, from within the National Guard leadership itself. I argue that the primary reason behind this resistance is institutional survival. This concept of institutional survival is broken into two related components: first, the appropriation of federal funds; and second, institutional relevance.

Federal funding is the lifeline of the military, and each component jealously guards its share of the annual budget. This funding is dependent upon each component’s perceived importance, or institutional relevance, to the execution of current National Military Strategy. In the current era of draw down and budget cuts, institutional survival is at the forefront of each military component. The active military provides the National Guard with all of its equipment, and finances its training and equipment OPTEMPO. This funding is principally to ensure that the National Guard is capable of performing its constitutional mission: mobilizing and deploying as a strategic reserve in times of “war or national emergency.” Since the active component funds the National Guard, it wants federal funding to directly support this constitutional mandate. I argue that in the Army’s mindset, “Homeland Security” is a secondary, “state” mission of the National Guard. The Army agrees that “Homeland Security” is a core competency of the National Guard, and that the National Guard should be a key player in consequence management. However, the active Army does not want to directly fund preparedness for what it believes is a secondary, “state” mission. The current initiatives to make “Homeland Security” a primary, federal mission for the National Guard also brings up an age-old issue between the National Guard and the Active military: The issue of federal control over the reserve components.

2 OPTEMPO is a military term meaning “Operational Tempo.” OPTEMPO funds pay for equipment use, maintenance, and soldier “man-days.” A “man-day” is the equivalent of placing one soldier on active duty orders for one day. The federal government funds each national guardsman with 15 days of “Annual Training” and 48 days of drill per year, at a minimum.
Since the end of the Cold War, the active military has had to face both cutbacks in size and funding, while at the same time responding to a new National Military Strategy of “forward engagement.” The active military has deployed an unprecedented number of times over the last 11 years to “shape” the global security environment through the performance of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. These deployments for “military operations other than war” have had a documented adverse effect upon the active military’s overall combat readiness. I argue that the active Army cannot continue to support the National Military Strategy of “shaping” the international security environment at the current rate, and maintain its combat capability to “respond” with overwhelming superiority in times of war. Since the end of the Cold War, it has increasingly looked to the National Guard and Reserves to help it perform the “shaping” requirement of National Military Strategy. Since the active military funds the National Guard, I argue that the active component wants these funds to go directly towards the execution of National Military Strategy, not “Homeland Security.”

Meanwhile, the National Guard and Reserves have been on a search for relevance since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The primary reason for their existence (and funding) was to respond to simultaneous large-scale conflicts in Europe and North Korea. With the disappearance of this immediate threat, the relevance of the National Guard and Reserves was called into question. At the same time the active military was searching for help in performing overseas stability and support missions, the National Guard and Reserves were searching for a new mission. Together, they have proposed and executed a solution that seemingly fits the needs of all components: the National Guard and Reserves have mobilized and deployed overseas at an unprecedented level to perform military operations other than war. This mutual performance of missions in support of National Military Strategy has been bolstered recently by federal initiatives to integrate the armed services. In the last decades of the 20th century, the active military embarked upon an aggressive program to integrate its three components (active, reserve,

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3 Known as the “Two Major Theater War” or “Two-MTW” scenario. This scenario has been a primary planning factor for the Army over the last 40 years. The specifics and efficacy of this planning factor will be discussed in detail in chapter III.
and national guard) into one fighting force with common equipment and a common purpose. With the increased funding, more modern equipment, and a blurring of the distinctions between the active military member and his National Guard and Reserve counterpart, there has been an increasing demand upon the reserve components to perform their share of the requirements of National Military Strategy.

However, there are historical distinctions between the three components of the military that were originally designed into the US Constitution by the founding fathers. Distinctions that were not intended to be blurred. By design, each component of the military serves a role in the grand scheme of “checks and balances” that characterize the nature of the US government. In addition, the soldiers themselves are different in one key aspect: active military members are soldiers by profession. The National Guard and Reserves are comprised of “citizen-soldiers,” who are every-day civilians that may be called upon in times of war or national emergency to mobilize, deploy, and fight. These “citizen-soldiers” face unique situations with their employers whenever they are mobilized, and count upon their employers’ support. This support has waned tremendously since the 1991 Gulf War, and the National Guard is witnessing record complaints by employers and soldiers over involuntary deployments overseas for peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions. The major bone of contention is that these overseas stability and support operations, while supporting National Military Strategy, do not support the constitutional requirement for deployment in cases of “war or national emergency.”

In this thesis, I argue that the latest trend of transformation of the military, specifically the United States Army’s integration of the active Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve into one force labeled “The Army,” puts the constitutional framework of the military that the founding fathers intended into jeopardy. I argue that the downsizing of the active Army in the post-Cold War era, coupled with the changes to National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy have forced the active Army to look to the National Guard and Reserves to help fulfill its obligations to “shape” the global security environment. The National Guard and Reserves have also looked to the performance of these overseas deployments in support of National Military Strategy as a
method of institutional survival. With the performance of stability and support operations overseas, the National Guard and Reserves have ensured their relevance in future funding battles.

Meanwhile, the threats to national security have changed tremendously over the same time frame. I argue that the greatest perceived threat to US national security over the next 20 years is from attacks on our population centers, government, and infrastructure on domestic soil. Responding to these types of asymmetric attacks on our homeland forms the basis of the “Homeland Security” mission. I argue that the National Guard is perfectly suited for this role in equipment, training, and manpower, and that “Homeland Security” should be a primary, federally supported mission for the National Guard. In essence, I argue that “Homeland Security,” currently a secondary, “state” mission of the National Guard, should be elevated to a primary, federal mission. “Homeland Security” should complement the existing mission of the National Guard as a “strategic reserve,” not replace it. I contend that assigning “Homeland Security” to the National Guard as a primary mission supports the third leg of National Military Strategy to “Prepare Now” for future conflicts, and reinforces its constitutional role as the primary protector of our homeland.

This thesis will argue that the current path of the Army to blend its three components into a “Total Force,” specifically the requirement of reservists to deploy overseas, is fundamentally changing the checks and balances structure of the military that the framers had originally intended. Deploying the National Guard and Army Reserve overseas to perform the National Military Strategy of “Shaping” the global security environment marks a significant departure from its constitutional role as a strategic reserve. Secondly, I will argue that the requirements of National Military Strategy were fundamentally misinterpreted by the active Army, based upon its fixation on the outdated “two major theater war” scenario, and a desire not to repeat the mistakes of past draw downs. I argue that the actual requirement of National Military Strategy is for the National Guard to return to its roots as the primary agency for responding to domestic threats, and perform “Homeland Security” as a primary, federally funded mission.
In the first chapter, I will review the organization, roles, and missions of the active Army and its reserve components, focusing specifically on the Army National Guard. I will describe the Constitutional and legal underpinnings of the National Guard, focusing primarily on its federal mission of supporting the active Army during wartime, and its equally important, legally unique “state” mission of providing military support to civil authorities. I will also show that “Homeland Security” has always been a primary, constitutional mission for the National Guard. This chapter will detail how history has shaped the relationship between the Army and the Guard, and how it has led to the force structure we know today. By documenting the legal framework, structure, and missions of each component, I hope to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Army, The Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in transforming into a “Total Force.”

In the second chapter, I will describe the major changes to the global security environment over the past decade, and its profound effects on the utilization of the Reserves and National Guard. I will document the change in National Military Strategy from one of deterrence to that of forward engagement. I will show how the resulting twenty-fold increase in deployments required to maintain a global engagement posture has sapped the US Army’s capability to perform what it perceives as its primary mission: responding to two major theater wars. This situation forced the active Army to look to the National Guard and Reserves to help it meet the operational requirements of National Military Strategy.

The third chapter will show how the active Army fundamentally misinterpreted the requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Determined not to repeat the mistakes made during previous draw downs of the 20th century, the Army jealously guarded its ten active component divisions. When the unexpected number of overseas deployments in the “Shaping” strategy began to affect the combat readiness for its “Respond” requirement, it looked to the Reserves and the National Guard to fill the gap. Instead of re-affirming the National Guard’s Constitutional role to protect the population against domestic violence, and strengthening
its capabilities to perform Homeland Security, the Army developed a new role for the Guard that was far from what the framers of the Constitution originally envisioned.

Finally, I will conclude that National Security Strategy did not rate the importance of its three core missions of “Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now,” leaving some ambiguity as to which mission was the most important in preparing the Army for the requirements of the 21st century. I will argue that the September 11, 2002 attacks make it a moot debate. I will recommend a course of action for the Army to return to its historical roots; namely to make Homeland Security a primary federal mission of the National Guard, alongside its Constitutional mission as a “strategic reserve.” This includes resourcing the Guard with the requisite equipment, training, and funds, as well as restructuring the National Guard’s ratio of combat, combat support, and combat service support units to successfully execute both missions. These recommendations will strengthen the constitutional role of the National Guard, and allow the Army to fully execute the requirements of National Military Strategy.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

The scope of this thesis primarily concerns the roles and missions of the Army National Guard in the modern era, and how it will respond to the requirements of the 21st century national security environment. This chapter will review the organization, roles, and missions of the active Army and its reserve components, focusing specifically on the Army National Guard. I will describe the constitutional and legal underpinnings of the National Guard, focusing primarily on its federal mission of supporting the active Army during wartime, and its equally important, legally unique, “state” mission of providing military support to civil authorities. I will also show that “Homeland Security” has always been a primary, constitutional mission for the National Guard. This chapter will detail how history has shaped the relationship between the Army and the National Guard, and how it has led to the force structure we know today.

The intent of this chapter is to describe the similarities and explain the differences between the three components of the Army, and document their historical roots. This will lead to a better understanding of the arguments proposed in later chapters concerning the increased use of National Guard forces for overseas deployments, and the requirement to re-emphasize homeland security as a primary mission of the National Guard. By documenting the legal framework, structure, and missions of each component, I hope to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard in transforming into a “Total Force” to respond to the threats to national security in the 21st century.

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since its founding, the United States has relied upon a combination of full-time “regulars” and part-time “citizen soldiers” to defend its freedom. The singularly unique structure of an active duty Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard traces its

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4 Each branch of the US military has its “reserve” counterpart. The US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC) have the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves (USNR and USMCR), while the US Army (USA) and the US Air Force (USAF) have their official reserve units (USAR and USAFR) as well as an additional reserve component, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG).
roots to the regular, volunteer, and militia forces that were present during the nation’s struggle for independence. This design was the result of our founding fathers’ purposeful attempts to place a system of checks and balances on the military. They attempted to ensure that any military force would remain under civilian control while simultaneously providing for the common defense.

Today’s active-duty Army traces its roots to the “regular” or standing Army established during the War for Independence, and is comprised of individuals who elect to make a career out of service to the nation. The Army Reserve is descended originally from “volunteer” units that were founded during the colonial era. The “volunteer” units differed from the militia, in that regular units of the Continental Army were created and filled with volunteers. Today’s Army Reserve is comprised of “citizen soldiers” who are civilians except for one weekend a month and two weeks per year. The Army Reserve can be mobilized at the behest of the President in times of war or national emergency, and falls directly under the operational control of the Army.

The National Guard, meanwhile, is the oldest organization of the three, and can trace its roots to the first militia units formed in 1636. These militia units began as collective security organizations designed to provide protection for the colonial settlers. Every able-bodied citizen was expected to serve in the militia for common defense. The militia’s main mission was to defend the population from attack, and respond to emergencies. As the colonies developed, the militia expanded and came under the control of the individual state Governors. This element of state control exists to this day, and is what distinguishes the Army National Guard citizen soldier from his Army Reserve counterpart.

Whereas the Army Reserve has purely a federal mission, and falls under the control of the Army, the National Guard has a unique “dual” mission: It can be activated by the Governor of each state to respond to state emergencies and to provide military support to civil authorities. Usually, “State” Active Duty is performed in support of

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disaster relief operations, such as responding to hurricanes, floods, and fires. The Guard may also be called out to quell local disturbances and keep the peace. This mission is also unique by law. In 1878, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibited the deployment of federal troops against civilians for the purpose of law enforcement. The Act provides that: “…it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States…for the purpose of executing the laws…”

Codified today in 18 United States Code, Section 1385, it applies only to federal forces, to include the National Guard when activated under Title 10. However, Posse Comitatus does not apply to the National Guard when training in Title 32 status, or activated by state Governors for local emergencies. This distinction is key, and limits U.S. military response to domestic emergencies to those units available from the National Guard. To illustrate this point more clearly, the National Guard can be activated immediately by Governors of each state to perform disaster relief missions such as hurricane and flood relief, and to fight forest fires. The Guard performs this disaster relief under Title 32 “state active duty” status, and is paid through state funds. A co-located Army Reserve unit, because it is a federal, Title 10 asset, must go through a long chain of approval to the cabinet and the President before it can be mobilized to respond. In addition, it must meet stringent federal requirements to ensure that is not involved in any type of law enforcement action commensurate with Posse Comitatus guidelines.

The National Guard, like the Army Reserve, also has the primary federal mission of providing combat ready forces to support the active Army, and is considered a “strategic reserve.” The current role for the National Guard in supporting national security is described in Title 32, US Code, Section 102, “General Policy”:

In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard

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and Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States...shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained so long as needed.\textsuperscript{10}

However, the process for mobilizing the National Guard is more complex than mobilizing the active Army, and requires that the President declare a state of “war or national emergency” to mobilize the National Guard for deployment. Even though it is provided with federal equipment and funding for training and OPTEMPO, the National Guard is, by design, still a state force.

B. \textbf{THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM:}

No rational discussion of reserve force utilization can be conducted without a firm grasp of the nature and history of our military forces, and the official guidelines for their employment. In the case of the US Army, this means understanding the key pieces of federal legislation that have established the structure and relationship between the active and reserve components, and the laws concerning mobilization.

The United States Constitution provides the framework and basis for how our military was formed, and how it would be organized and utilized to defend the nation against enemies. In the spring of 1787, during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the framers of the Constitution reached a compromise between the viewpoints of the federalists and anti-federalists in establishing a military organization that “…would protect liberty…without destroying…it in the process.”\textsuperscript{11} The federalists pushed for a strong central government, and wanted a large force of “regulars,” with state militias firmly under the control of the federal government. Mindful of the recent experiences under the British Regular Army during the struggle for independence, the


anti-federalists were fearful of a large standing Army with dubious political ties. The anti-federalists pushed for a small regular force, and a large militia under state control.

In the end, a compromise was struck that remedied what all of the framers considered “…deep, structural flaws in the ability of government under the Articles of Confederation to defend the United States, (chiefly) the inability of the central government to mount and sustain military operations.” The result of this compromise is contained in Article I, Section 8, and Clauses 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of the United States.

These documents define both the structure of our military forces, and the processes by which they are governed and employed. Essentially, the framers established a military organization comprised of a small standing Army under federal control, and a large militia “reserve” that fell under state control during peacetime, and federal control in times of war. This organization is the basic building block for our military.

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution granted Congress the power to “provide for the common defense of the United States…declare war…raise and support Armies…make rules for the government and regulation of land forces… (and) provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia… (and) to call forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union.” This article firmly established civilian control over the military by having Congress determine what the size, force structure, and missions of the different components of the military would be.

Clauses 14, 15 and 16, commonly known as the “Militia Clauses,” established the constitutional grounds for calling up the state militias for federal service. Clause 14 allowed Congress to call up the militia under three contingencies: “to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.” In very specific terms, the militia forces were to be mobilized and put under federal control only in extreme circumstances. Clause 15 further established boundaries between the active Army and

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the militia, giving Congress (and not the Army) the power to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.”\footnote{History of the Army National Guard; Appendix B: Constitutional Charter of the Guard, available online at 
\url{http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/statements/ps/2000/AppendB.htm}, page 1. Accessed 9 June 2000.} This clause also reserved the right of the states to establish a state militia, and put strict limits on federal control over the militia during peacetime.


The importance of the militia in guaranteeing the freedom of the new nation was also stressed in the Second Amendment. The anti-federalists ensured that the federal government could not disarm the militia by stating, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”\footnote{US Constitution, Amendment II. Available online at \url{http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.billofrights.html}. Accessed 14 October 2002.}

The organization of the military into a small standing force and a large militia was unique to our nation, and created some unique problems. The active Army would have to go through Congress and the respective state Governors to mobilize and employ the militia forces in times of war. However, the states were satisfied, because they had a militia that was constitutionally responsible for providing for the common defense, and could be called out by the Governor to respond to state emergencies. This created a control issue over the employment, organization, and readiness of the militias during times of war that the active Army fought hard to change. They wanted a manpower reserve that they could call upon at any time, and wanted strict control over the size, organization, and training of the militia forces. Throughout the last two centuries,
legislation has been enacted at the urging of the active Army that has changed the role and organization of the militia, but never eliminated the fundamental element of state control.

C. OTHER LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE RESERVE COMPONENTS:

In 1792, the Militia Act was passed by Congress, which essentially redefined the relationship of the militia to the federal government. It required every “able-bodied… citizen between 18 and 45” to serve in the militia, and it called for the “organization of the militia into (standardized) divisions, brigades, and regiments, battalions and companies.”\(^\text{18}\) The active Army was finally able to institute some measure of standardization over the various militia organizations in each state. This Militia Act remained on the books for 111 years. The active Army, distrustful of the militia due to its strong state ties, attempted to abolish it in favor of a “national reserve” directly under Army control. Once again, a balance was struck. The Dick Act of 1903 “reaffirmed the (state) militias as the Army’s primary organized reserve,”\(^\text{19}\) but it also increased federal control over each state’s militia forces by subjecting them to regular inspections by the Army, and specifying unit strengths. It provided for federal funds to outfit and equip the militia, and required militiamen to attend 24 drills and 5 days of Annual Training per year. In essence, the Army’s attempt to create a large manpower reserve directly under its control were thwarted once again, and it had to continue to rely upon the state militias for trained manpower in times of war. However, the Dick Act afforded more federal control over how the militias were organized and trained. By utilizing federal funds, the Army could ensure a minimum standard for training and organization of the militia.

In 1914, when World War I erupted in Europe, the preparedness of our armed forces was called into question. The active Army argued before Congress once again to abolish the militia in favor of a “continental army” without state ties, complaining that the individual state militias were impossible to mobilize and control. However, the fear

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\(^\text{19}\)
of a large standing army, and the resistance to funding such a large ground force were strong. The result of this debate was the National Defense Act of 1916. The act “guaranteed the state militias as the Army’s primary reserve force,” and mandated the term “National Guard” be used for all state militia organizations. In a compromise with the active component, more control over this newly coined “National Guard” was given to the Army. First of all, qualifications for National Guard officers, a big bone of contention with the active Army, were passed to the War Department. Secondly, the act called for all units to be federally recognized, and structured according to official Army Tables of Organization and Equipment. Finally, the act gave the President the authority to mobilize the National Guard for the “duration” in cases of war or national emergency.

President Woodrow Wilson exercised this provision almost immediately when he called up the entire National Guard, all 158,000 members, to protect the southern border of the United States from attacks by Pancho Villa. In 1917, the effectiveness of the National Defense Act provisions were put to the test again when the United States declared war on Germany. National Guard divisions were mobilized again for the duration of the conflict, and made up 40 percent of the American Expeditionary Force.

The years between World War I and II saw two more pieces of landmark legislation concerning the National Guard. The National Defense Act of 1920 established that a National Guard officer would be the Chief of the Militia Bureau, and further integrated the components by assigning National Guard officers to the active Army’s General Staff. The Congressional Act of 1933 officially made the National Guard a component of the United States Army. This allowed the President to activate the Guard whenever Congress declared a national emergency, and is significant because it


finally took the state Governors out of the loop in assigning a federal mission to the National Guard.\textsuperscript{23}

The Second World War ushered in a period of profound change for the military, particularly its reliance upon the National Guard as a strategic reserve of manpower. Even though all 18 divisions of the National Guard saw combat in both Pacific and European theatres, it was not enough. President Roosevelt instituted the nation’s first peacetime draft in 1940, which remained in effect until 1973. By providing a constant source of manpower for the military through mandatory conscription, the Army’s reliance on the National Guard as a strategic reserve dwindled. So too did funding for personnel and equipment. Despite mobilizing over 138,000 Guardsmen in 1950 to respond to the Korean War, the Cold War Era saw a decline in both force structure and relevance for the National Guard.

D. THE RISE OF THE ARMY RESERVES:

Following the Korean War, Congress passed the sweeping “Reserve Forces Act” of 1955. This act was significant because it established the Army Reserve as a primary source of manpower for the Army, and increased their share of the defense budget at the expense of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{24} The Army, it seemed, had finally won the battle to establish a reserve force that it had direct control over. The utility of the National Guard as a strategic reserve dwindled even further in the 1960’s when Robert S. McNamara, President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, targeted the National Guard for major cuts in manpower. In an effort to reduce costs and streamline the military, 802 units, including four divisions, were cut from the Army National Guard.\textsuperscript{25} As the sixties progressed, President Johnson made the fateful decision not to mobilize the National Guard to fight the Vietnam War. He opted instead to rely on the existing mandatory conscription laws to fulfill the manpower requirements for combating the North Vietnamese. Because of


the declining relevance of the National Guard in US military strategy, further cuts were inflicted. By 1967, an additional 12 infantry and 3 armored divisions were inactivated.26 The Army National Guard had dwindled down to 8 divisions: 5 Infantry, 1 Mechanized, and 2 Armored. The reliance of the Army on the National Guard for a strategic manpower reserve had been circumvented by mandatory conscription laws and the increased funding and relevance of the Army Reserve. The Army, it seemed, had won the long-standing fight over its control of the strategic reserves.

The results of this policy were to have drastic impacts on the popularity of the Army and the government during the Vietnam War. By eliminating the National Guard in its strategic planning, the Army ignored one crucial aspect of the military that the founding fathers understood: the National Guard’s key role as an indicator of national will. Realizing the importance of the National Guard as an indicator of public support, the military announced a major shift in policy after Vietnam.

E. TOTAL FORCE POLICY:

Due largely to the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict and the public outcry against mandatory conscription, the military abolished the draft in 1973 and created an “all-volunteer” force. It seemed that military planners finally understood the link between the National Guard and grass roots public support. The ‘Total Force’ policy of 1973 was designed to gain popular support for military operations from the American public by mobilizing the National Guard from its thousands of locations across the United States when needed.27 Military planners finally realized that the National Guard was truly a “community” force, and a reflector of national will. The same holds true today. In 1998, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre made the following remarks:

…The Army needs the Guard because the Army doesn’t touch America, the Guard touches America…When the Army was sent off the 7th of August [1991] to Desert Storm, the Army went to war, but America

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didn’t. America went to war when all those moms and dads were on the courthouse lawn, saying goodbye to their Guardsmen…²⁸

Today, the National Guard is spread across 3200 Army National Guard Facilities and 88 Air National Guard Bases in 2700 communities across all 54 states and territories.

Figure 1: The National Guard.²⁹

The “Total Force” policy re-emphasized the importance of the National Guard as a strategic reserve. It mandated that all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single, integrated force. By the mid-1970’s, the “Total Force” policy resulted in more Army National Guard missions, equipment, and training opportunities than ever before. The Army Reserve and the National Guard were being integrated into planning and training at an unprecedented level. When President Reagan was elected in 1980, he boosted the funding levels of our military tremendously. By 1983, military expenditures


²⁹ MSPowerpoint Slide Provided by MG Raymond F. Rees, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, during a briefing to the Naval Postgraduate School, 26 March 2000. Slide 16.
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product reached an all time high of 6.7%\textsuperscript{30}. The National Guard and Reserves shared in this defense build-up, and began to see changes in the way they were utilized. Today, the National guard still receives over 9.7% of the Army’s total budget for training and OPTEMPO.\textsuperscript{31} National Guard units were given specific “war traces,” and were organized as “Round Out” units attached directly to active duty divisions. This established formal relationships between National Guard units and their active component counterparts. During their two-week annual training rotations, National Guard and reserve units began to participate in major active duty training exercises such as “REFORGER” with their round-out units.

Even though the National Guard and Reserves experienced a boost in funding and relevance during the Cold War, it is important to realize that the fundamental nature of the National Guard and Reserves did not change. They were still considered a “strategic reserve” of manpower to be called upon only during times of war or national emergency. Secondly, the nature of reservists as “citizen-soldiers” differed from that of the active military soldier. Reservists are by nature ordinary civilians who volunteer to be part-time soldiers. As such, they face different challenges than their active component counterparts. They undergo the same basic training as the active army (nine weeks), followed by advanced training anywhere from five to 22 weeks, and become qualified in a military occupational specialty. Reserve and Guard officers graduate from the college-level Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and attend a nine to 12 week Officer Basic Course (OBC). Reservists then serve one weekend per month in a drill status, and perform two weeks of active duty “Annual Training” per year. For most citizen soldiers, this was “a commitment that was almost unnoticed by employers and only a slight inconvenience to civilian businesses.”\textsuperscript{32} Recognizing these unique contributions of Reservists and Guardsmen, legislation was enacted in 1973 along with the “Total Force” policy that protected the reservists’ civilian jobs while they were performing military


\textsuperscript{31} Refer to Appendix A, Figure 6.

duty. A national committee was established to provide support to civilian employers and reservists, and help mediate disputes. This committee is known familiarly among reservists as ESGR, or Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves.

F. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have discussed the constitutional basis for the Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, and described the historical context in which each component was forged. The main point of this chapter, in the context of determining the roles and missions of the National Guard in the 21st Century, is that the National Guard is, by law, a strategic reserve of trained military manpower to be called upon in times of war or national emergency. The National Guard is a unique institution in that it is a military force with two specific missions: First, to provide trained combat units to defend the country in times of war; Secondly, it is a military organization that provides for the common defense of its respective state, and has the primary domestic mission of homeland security. Above all, the National Guard is an organization comprised of “citizen soldiers.” These soldiers are civilians who have volunteered for military duty as a second career, and have unique requirements. The last two centuries have witnessed many changes in the utilization and relevance of the National Guard, but its fundamental nature has remained unchanged.
This chapter will describe the major changes to the global security environment over the past decade, and its profound effects on the utilization of the Reserves and National Guard. Basically, I will document the change in National Military Strategy from one of “deterrence” to that of “forward engagement.” I will show how the resulting twenty-fold increase in deployments required to maintain a global engagement posture has sapped the US military’s capability to perform what it perceives as its primary mission: responding to two major theater wars. The detrimental effect of performing repeated stability and support operations overseas has blunted the combat effectiveness of the Army’s 10 active component divisions. Their readiness for combat has suffered to such a degree that its overall readiness to respond to a two major theater war scenario was called into question. This forced the active Army to look to the National Guard and Reserves to help it meet operational requirements. The global situation essentially forced military planners to re-assess the utilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve.

In order to understand the fundamental changes to the employment of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve over the last decade, we must study the changes to the United States’ National Security and National Military Strategies brought on by the fall of the Soviet Union. I will illustrate the realities of the 21st century security environment, and show the increasing demands of the “shape, respond, and prepare now” doctrine on the military, and contrast it with the capabilities of the existing force structure. With the Army Reserve and Army National Guard now making up over 54 percent of the current Army force structure33, it is clear why the active Army came to the conclusion that it must utilize the reserves: it could not ensure both “global engagement” and combat readiness by itself. For completely different reasons, The National Guard leadership came to the same conclusion. With the decline of the Soviet Union, the relevance of the National Guard and Reserves in supporting National Military Strategy was called into

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question. The National Guard and Reserve leadership sought additional missions to ensure its future institutional survival. Seeing the dilemma of the active component in performing the “shaping” strategy, the National Guard and Reserves latched onto these overseas stability and support missions as its guarantor of future relevance and funding. I will show how the active Army, out of necessity, and the National Guard, out of survival, then sought to fundamentally change the constitutional underpinnings of National Guard utilization.

A. THE COLD WAR PARADIGM

During the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserves were considered nothing more than a “strategic reserve” of trained manpower. Their primary role was to mobilize and deploy overseas to support the active component, in case of war in Europe or North Korea. Even with the increased funding of the Reagan era, this remained the National Guard and Reserves’ primary mission. In terms of the National Military Strategy of the Cold War era, the National Guard and Reserves were considered as conventional supplement to the active Army, to be utilized in a two major theater war scenario. Between 1950 and 1989, our Army consisted of 28 divisions: 18 were Active Army, and 10 were in the National Guard. During this same time frame, our military was mobilized only ten times, and called on to deploy overseas only seven. These deployments filled the full spectrum of military conflict, from the National Guard deploying to quell riots in Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago in the 1960’s to major theater wars in Korea and Vietnam. During the 1980’s, the era of the largest peacetime defense budgets in US history, our reserve forces numbered over 1 million personnel. However, these reserve forces supported the active component at a rate of fewer than one million man-days per year, the equivalent of only 2,750 personnel on active duty at any given time.34

According to Charles Cragin, the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,

To serve in (the reserves) during that period meant finding oneself suspended in the frozen logic of the Cold War. Such logic held that reserve forces were precisely that – they were kept ready in reserve, waiting for the advent of World War III and the cataclysmic contingency that would call them on the front lines in the fight against communism in Europe or Asia.\(^{35}\)

The constitutional role of the reserves to mobilize and deploy for its wartime mission had essentially remained unchanged from 1950 through 1989. However, the geostrategic environment would change rapidly with the end of the Cold War.

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**Figure 2. “The Geostrategic Environment, 1950-1989.”**\(^ {36}\)

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B. THE POST-COLD WAR PARADIGM

Due to the profound changes in the international security environment with the fall of the Soviet Union, coupled with the impacts of the “revolution in military affairs,” the period between 1989 and the present day has witnessed a fundamental change to the utilization of our National Guard and Reserve forces. The following excerpt from a New York Times article highlights the growing trend of all branches of the military to deploy Reserve and National Guard soldiers overseas to perform small-scale contingency operations in support of National Military and National Security Strategy:

The Army, like the other armed services, is increasingly relying on the National Guard to supplement active-duty soldiers in military operations…and announced today (4 December 2000) that it would effectively turn over its mission in Bosnia to part-time National Guard soldiers…By late 2002, the peacekeeping mission is to be commanded exclusively in six-month rotations by troops from the eight National Guard divisions.37

The primary reason for the increased employment of reserve soldiers and units for operations overseas is to “mitigate the effects of high operational tempo and better sustain the Army’s overall level of readiness…”38 In simple terms, without deploying Army Reserve and National Guard forces overseas to perform peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and other stability and support operations, the active-duty Army can not maintain the readiness to fulfill its primary combat mission: Respond with overwhelming superiority to two “nearly simultaneous” major theater wars.

Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinsecki, upon taking office in 1999, aggressively reinforced the Department of Defense’s “Total Force” policy. In integrating the National Guard and Reserves into the Army’s strategy of global engagement, he stated: “Today, I declare that we are ‘THE Army,’ totally integrated with a unity of


purpose – No longer the ‘Total Army’, no longer “One Army.’ We are ‘THE Army,’ and we will march into the 21st century as ‘THE Army.’” 39

While this integration has made landmark strides in eliminating intra-service competition for relevance and funding, and reduced the operational tempo of the active force, it marked a drastic shift in the constitutional underpinnings of the nation’s reserve forces. On any given day since this policy went into effect, the United States has had over 35,000 reserve and National Guard soldiers deployed overseas in direct support of overseas missions, the manpower equivalent of adding two Army divisions to our active duty end-strength.40 It is important to note that these deployed reservists are performing peacekeeping and stability / support missions as part of the National Military Strategy of “shaping” the global security environment. These reservists have been involuntarily mobilized for a purpose not expressly covered by the Constitution. In short, these forces have been deployed without the declaration of war or national emergency.

Today’s military has been shaped by two powerful influences: The first influence was domestic pressure for force reduction due to the end of the Cold War. The 6.7 percent of gross domestic product expended on defense during the Reagan era could not be maintained. President Reagan successfully bankrupted the “evil empire” by forcing them to into an arms race they could not sustain. However, continued spending at that rate would also threaten the United States’ own stability. During the 1990’s, the US embarked on a large-scale draw down of the military in an attempt to realize the “peace dividend” provided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Spending decreased dramatically. In fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense budget was in real terms nearly 37 below its peak level in 1985. In 2000, defense expenditure was only 2.9 percent of gross domestic product.41 Total US military force structure decreased by


about one-third. While that may not seem drastic, especially in relation to the “century of peace” prophesied by some, it is important to realize that the demographics of the force changed significantly. The National Guard retained its 8 divisions, while the active Army reduced in size from 18 divisions to 10. Today, over fifty-four percent of all Army combat forces are in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. That means the majority of our available military manpower is in the form of citizen-soldiers. The graph below depicts the current Army demographics by percentages of the total force.

Concurrent with these reductions in force, a second major influence increased the rate of employment of US armed forces: the changing international security environment. In the era of globalization, the US would play a primary role in maintaining the world’s political and economic stability. The scope of our national security interests changed, and with it, the nature of our doctrine. In 1996 and 1997, new National Security and

![America's Total Army](image)

Figure 3. America’s Total Army. 43

42 Charles L. Cragin, Page 1.

43 Slide part of the “National Guard” briefing presented to the Naval Postgraduate School by Major General Raymond F. Rees, Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 9 March 2000.
Military Strategies were published, calling on the US military to “Shape” the international security environment, “Respond” to crises, and “Prepare Now” for any contingency.\(^\text{44}\) The US Army’s version of this doctrine, known as “The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation,” calls on our ground forces to be “Persuasive in Peace,” and “Invincible in War.”\(^\text{45}\) “Persuasive in Peace” specifies that the Army will be relied upon to resolve the ever-increasing number of inter-state and intra-state conflicts around the globe. By performing disaster relief, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and humanitarian intervention missions, to name just a few, the US hopes to shape the international environment by promoting peace and ensuring the stability of free-market economies. Should these efforts fail, the US military is expected to protect national security interests by maintaining the capability to be “Invincible in War.”

Specifically, this part of our strategy requires the US Army to maintain the combat capability to respond with overwhelming force to conflicts in two separate areas of the world (known familiarly as the two major theater war scenario). It was expected that the proposed active-duty force levels for the post-Cold War era would be more than adequate to support our doctrine of global engagement.

Unfortunately, the capability of our military perform these types of missions was fundamentally misunderstood, and the requirements for global involvement grossly underestimated. This miscalculation, coupled with the current demographics of the armed forces, has led to the current deployment of 35,000 reservists overseas in 77 countries throughout the world.\(^\text{46}\) In short, the decreasing active component force structure and increasing global requirements have forced military planners to call upon the National Guard and Reserves to ensure global stability.


C. THE INCREASING REQUIREMENT FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

There are three primary reasons for the increased use of the National Guard and Reserves to help “The Army” execute the requirements of National Military Strategy: First, there is a growing divergence between military capabilities and the operational requirements to execute National Military Strategy; Second, the impacts of performing stability and support operations on combat readiness were grossly misjudged; Last but not least, the increasing the use of reservists became a means of institutional survival for the National Guard and Reserve components.

First, there is a mismatch between the requirements of the Post-Cold War security environment and the capabilities of the active-duty military force designed to execute them. In particular, deploying overseas on an ever-increasing number of small scale contingency operations has had an adverse impact on the active-duty military’s ability to fight large scale wars. Instead of the expected era of peace, the post-Cold War years have been marked by an unprecedented number of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Richard N. Haass concludes,

On balance, the post-Cold War world promises to be a messy one where violence is common, where conflicts within and between nation-states abound, and where the question of U.S. military intervention becomes more rather than less commonplace, and more rather than less complicated.47

As a result, our military deployments overseas have increased dramatically. The Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves organization (ESGR) notes that the “…operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Army is now 20 times higher than during the Cold War.”48 The simple fact is that the ability of the US military to “Shape” the global environment through stability and support operations has been so successful over the past


decade that the demand for this service has exploded. The US Army, former Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer remarked, “…has become the 911 force for the global village.”

The sheer level of military involvement in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions has far surpassed anything force planners ever intended. The force structure levels agreed upon by military and civilian experts after the end of the Cold War was sufficiently large to ensure the successful resolution of two major regional conflicts. However, this force structure was not adequate to perform that mission and deploy on countless numbers of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions.

The slide below demonstrates the remarkable number of deployments the military has performed overseas over the last decade.

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The ever-increasing number of deployments depicted above leads directly to the second point: The side effects of performing peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions were largely misunderstood when the post-Cold War force structure was designed. These “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW), are costly, often long (or unending) in duration, and generate an enormous drain on manpower and readiness. Combined, these factors have a documented adverse impact on the fighting capability of the forces deployed. “Experience (has) revealed…that relief and peacekeeping operations were …money-losers and that they blunted and exhausted combat units.”\(^5^1\)

In today’s highly specialized and sophisticated military machine, this equates to a loss of combat capability. On 26 October 1999, two of the US Army’s active duty units, the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division and the 1\(^{st}\) Infantry Division, both reported lower than normal combat readiness ratings.\(^5^2\) This was a direct result of their recent deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo. It took these divisions almost 120 days to retrain and report normal readiness levels.\(^5^3\)

Recent experience has proven that stability and support operations require the commitment of at least three units to keep one unit deployed.\(^5^4\) Much like the Navy mantra of “It takes three carriers to keep one on station,” military operations other than war usually require that one unit be in training, one unit be on station, and one unit be retraining for its wartime mission.

This increased operational tempo, and its resulting effects on combat readiness were fundamentally misunderstood by governmental decision makers during the draw

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\(^5^0\) Slide part of the “Aviation Force Structure into the 21\(^{st}\) Century” briefing provided by CPT Jeff Janey, US Army Aviation Warfighting Center, 24 August 2000, slide 6.


down. The active military force structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union was adequate to respond to two overlapping major theater wars; not two major conflicts and an untold number of contingency operations.

Another unexpected impact of performing stability and support operations has been the negative effects on unit esprit de corps. Individuals who make a career of the military possess a certain warrior ethos, and this spirit suffers when personnel are forced to perform peacekeeping duties. To put it plainly, “…warrior and constabulary ethics (victory versus peacekeeping) don’t mix…”55 Active Army units with repeated deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai have reported large losses in retention rates, especially of its younger soldiers. These soldiers, in their exit questionnaires, point directly to the increased burden of deploying overseas for “non-standard” missions as the primary reason for leaving56.

As the number of deployments overseas increases, the only answer, it seems, is to look to our reserve forces to fill the gap. “Future rotations of US peacekeeping forces… will require Army Guard and Reserve forces (to deploy) in large numbers for periods up to 179 days. The regular Army today just does not have the personnel to complete these… small-scale contingency missions… while maintaining a readiness for large-scale warfare at the same time.”57

However, the increased use of reservists for overseas stability and support operations was not solely implemented at the behest of the active Army. The third reason for the increased deployment of National Guard and Reserve Personnel overseas was institutional survival. As the Soviet Union passed away as the United States’ primary antagonist in world affairs, so too did the Army’s requirement for maintaining a large strategic reserve of manpower and equipment. The fact is, the Army Reserve and National Guard leadership sought out these missions to prove their utility as a “relevant”


57 Groves, John R., Jr., Adjutant General, Kentucky Army National Guard, “New Challenges Ahead For Kentucky’s Citizen Soldier’s and Airmen,” The Louisville Courier-Journal, 15 September 2000, Page 9A.
component of the Army. As the active-duty military began reporting recruiting, retention, and readiness issues with repeated deployments to places like Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai Peninsula, “…the reserve leadership embraced these overseas deployments as its raison d’être.” This was a bureaucratic survival technique employed to protect the National Guard and Reserve’s manpower, equipment, and operating budgets.

It seemed that the active Army’s dilemma was over: it could pass small-scale contingency missions to National Guard and Reserve units, allowing it to concentrate on maintaining combat readiness for the two-major theater war scenario. At the same time, the National Guard and Reserves were able to secure funding, and gain a sense of purpose as an integral member of the Army team. General Shinsecki’s “THE Army” directive began to ring true: National Guardsmen and Reservists were deployed overseas alongside their active component counterparts, executing the National Military Strategy of “shaping” the global security environment. However, this increase in the utilization of the Army’s strategic reserves to perform military operations other than war marked a profound change to the constitutional charter for the National Guard and Reserves.

D. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have shown how the changes in the global security landscape brought about by the end of the Cold War caused fundamental changes to the US National Security and National Military Strategies. With the loss of a major peer competitor, the strategy changed from one of deterrence to one requiring global engagement.

US forces would be expected to deploy overseas to prevent the escalation of minor conflicts into threats to our national security interests. This equated to far more overseas deployments in the ten short years after the fall of the Berlin Wall than during the 40 years prior. This increased requirement to mobilize and deploy overseas came at the same time the American population was demanding a peace dividend from the end of

the Cold War. The military was forced to downsize and reduce its force size by over one third. The double blow of reduced force structure and increased deployments had a detrimental effect upon the active Army’s combat readiness to perform its primary mission of responding to two major theater wars. The impact of performing stability and support operations also had unexpected effects on readiness. The costs, both in monetary and readiness terms, was grossly underestimated by military planners.

Meanwhile, Army Reserve and National Guard planners were searching for relevance in the post-Cold War era. With budget pressures forcing reductions in the size of the military, the strategic reserves were the first on the chopping block. To ensure their continued existence and importance to the National Military Strategy, the National Guard and Reserves actively sought out new missions to ensure their institutional survival.

The combination of these forces resulted in profound changes to the constitutional roles and missions of the strategic reserves. Without deploying Army Reserve and National Guard forces overseas to perform peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and other stability and support operations, the active-duty Army could not maintain the readiness to fulfill its primary combat mission: Respond with overwhelming superiority to two “nearly simultaneous” major theater wars.
IV. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS A PRIMARY MISSION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD

In this chapter, I will show how the active Army fundamentally misinterpreted the requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy during the post-Cold War era. I will show that this misinterpretation was not malicious, but motivated by the desire to perform what it determined to be its core mission: fight and win two major theater wars. The Army jealously guarded its combat capability of ten active component divisions, and was determined not to repeat the mistakes made during previous draw-downs of the 20th century. However, the changes to the international security environment posed a greater threat to domestic national security than a major theater war: The threat of attack on US population, infrastructure, and government on domestic soil through terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite National Military Strategy requirements for Homeland Security59, the Army did not specifically incorporate it into its strategic planning for the future. Instead of actively preparing for the force structure, modernization, and equipment requirements needed to execute the “Homeland Security” strategy, the Army doggedly stuck to the two-Major Theater War scenario to justify keeping what it already had. It deemed that “Homeland Security” was a secondary, “State” mission of the National Guard, and that the mission could be executed with available resources. The ten active component division force structure required to respond to two nearly simultaneous major theater wars was deemed the most important factor in Army future planning.

I will begin by detailing the re-emergence of Homeland Security as a major planning requirement for the different services for the next century. I will then document, through external reviews of Army planning and strategy for the next century (the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews), how the Army misinterpreted the requirements for Homeland Security, instead favoring a retention of the archaic two major theater war scenario. Finally, I will show that the Army needs to fundamentally

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59 The Army’s Strategic Vision specifically addresses the requirement to “Support Homeland Defense.” Refer to Appendix A, Figure 7 for a graphic representation of how “Homeland Security” was a core mission of the Army.
transform and fund the National Guard for the Homeland Security mission. Paramount in the Army’s plans for transformation must be the roles, structures, equipment and priority of the National Guard to adequately perform Homeland Security. In essence, the National Guard’s role in providing for national security must change back to what the original founders had in mind: it must defend the homeland against domestic threats.

A. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The fall of the Soviet Union led to profound changes for the US military; some, like the draw down required to realize a “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War, were expected. Other changes, such as the realities of the post-Cold War security environment, were harder to anticipate. Congress, in order to make informed decisions on future warfighting strategies and their respective budget requirements, directed the intelligence experts to evaluate the threats to US national security over the next twenty years. The resulting evaluation of the global security landscape for the 21st century led to profound reformulations of our National Security Strategy. Instead of the “deterrence” strategy maintained during the Cold War, the loss of the Warsaw Pact as a major peer competitor forced the United States into adopting a forward-deployed, “prevention” strategy: If the US could intervene overseas in small disputes early enough, major conflicts threatening national security interests could be avoided. This led to the adoption of a new, “forward engagement” National Military Strategy in 1997. This strategy revolves around three core elements: First, “Shaping the International Environment,” which mandates that US forces prevent conflicts through “peacetime engagement activities;”60 Second, “Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises,”61 which translates into the rapid deployment of overwhelming conventional combat power when conflicts erupt; and Last, “Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future.”62

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61 Ibid., page 1.

62 Ibid., Page 1.
“vision statements” for how they expected to transform their force structure, size, and missions to execute the new strategy.63

The Army actively engaged in the first two requirements of the National Military Strategy; it deployed overseas, at an alarming rate, to “Shape” the global environment. To “Respond” to crises, the Army actively fought to maintain its force structure and readiness. However, the Army did not correctly analyze the “Prepare Now” portion of the strategy. Instead of organizing for future asymmetric threats, the Army focused on the transformation and modernization of existing forces to maintain conventional military superiority.

One of the major findings of the intelligence analysis of the 21st century was that the US would be subject to asymmetric threats to our national security.64 Due to the overwhelming superiority of our political, economic, and military assets, the enemies of the United States would understand that conventional attacks would be futile, and would resort to other means to attack our national security interests. The intelligence summary concluded that terrorist attacks, especially those using weapons of mass destruction, were not only likely, but inevitable. These attacks would concentrated on the perceived “soft underbelly” of the United States; namely, our civilian population. The analysts concluded that that the best way to counter these threats would be to enhance the existing capabilities of our military to perform the mission of “Homeland Security.” This mission was seen as perfectly suited for the National Guard, as it had traditionally performed the role of Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and disaster relief since its inception. Secondly, the “Posse Comitatus” limitations on using active component forces in law enforcement and domestic disputes made the National Guard a key player in the new mission of “Homeland Security.”65

63 Refer to Appendix A, Figure 7 for a graphic representation of how the US Army developed its current vision statement: “The Army Vision; Soldiers on Point for the Nation.”


B. THE REBIRTH OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS A PRIMARY MISSION

Over the last decade, “Homeland Security” has re-emerged as a primary mission for our military, due to the increasing threats of terrorism, cyber warfare, and the possible use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against our population, government, and economic infrastructure. The threats to US national security in the 21st century would no longer be from the conventional military force of a peer competitor, at least for the next twenty years; future threats to national security would be asymmetric in nature. “Homeland Security” is the strategic plan of the government to prepare for and respond to such asymmetric threats. Because the response to domestic attacks involves many different branches of the government, to include the Departments of Defense, Transportation, and local and regional disaster management agencies, Homeland Security has had different meanings for different organizations.

For the military in general, and the Army specifically, “Homeland Security” is defined as: “… all military activities aimed at preparing for, protecting against, or managing the consequences of attacks on American soil, including the continental US and US territories and possessions. It includes all actions to safeguard the populace and its property, critical infrastructure, the government and the military, its installations, and deploying forces.”

There are three key military tasks involved with Homeland Security:

1. Deterring and defending against foreign and domestic threats.
2. Supporting Civil Authorities in crisis and consequence management.
3. Ensuring the availability, integrity, and survivability of critical national assets.

With this operational definition of Homeland Security in mind, we need to examine how it re-emerged as a priority in preserving our national security.

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With the demise of the Soviet Union as a major antagonist in world affairs, the United States was thrust into a position of being the pre-eminent military and economic power on the globe. Enemies of the United States, be they religious, economic, or ideologic in nature, would have to resort to attacking at our only perceived weak point: our homeland. The fall of the Soviet Union brought about a unique threat: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons from the Soviet Armies were increasingly available to well-funded terrorist organizations. Secondly, the global reach of the internet also made the technology to produce such weapons readily available. Certain events over the last 10 years have lent credence to this increasing threat:

- The Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect in 1995, in which Sarin Nerve Gas was employed.
- The Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta during the 1996 Olympics.
- The bombing of the Al Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996.
- The attacks on embassies of the United States in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam by Osama bin Laden in 1998.  
- The attack on the USS Cole in 2000.

In January 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen made this remark concerning future threats:

> I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology...and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat any of us will face in the coming years.

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69 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, as quoted in the “Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction”, prepared by the DoD
Congress, to better understand the changing nature of threat to our national security, commissioned many investigations into the risk and consequences for such attacks on US soil, and the level of preparedness of our military to prevent, respond, and manage the consequences from such attacks. The assessments of these reports were quite enlightening for military planners. First of all, the requirement for Homeland Security was deemed a critical mission for the Army in general, and the Army National Guard specifically. The National Defense Panel, which convened in 1997, made the following recommendations concerning the preparation for Homeland Security in its report “Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020”:

- Develop integrated active and passive defense measures against the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
- Incorporate all levels of government into managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction attack.
- Prepare the Reserve Components to support consequence management.
- Equip, organize, and train the National Guard to provide general-purpose forces for Military Support to Civil Authorities.

These recommendations were echoed in the January 31st, 2001 “Report of the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century.” Also known as the Hart / Rudman commission, it recommended making Homeland Security a primary federal mission of the National Guard, and that the Guard “should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.”

In the Army’s defense, the “Prepare Now” element of the 1997 National Military Strategy is somewhat vague. Since it was published prior to the 1998 version of National Military

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Security Strategy, “...this may account for its relative inattention to the issue of homeland security.”

However, even though the 1997 National Military Strategy does not mention “Homeland Security” per se, it describes threats such as “asymmetric warfare against the United States, (where)...some state or non-state actors may resort to asymmetric means to counter the US military...Of special concern are terrorism, the use or threatened use of (weapons of mass destruction), and information warfare.”

Clearly, the intent of National Military Strategy to make homeland security a primary mission of the military was evident. The 1998 issue of National Security Strategy, titled “A National Security Strategy For a New Century,” clearly delineates the requirement for Homeland Security: “Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security...the solution is...a broad, national effort that relies on interagency efforts at the federal level and a program that knits these federal capabilities together with local and state capabilities.”

Despite the mandate to plan and prepare for the future mission of Homeland Security, the Army has overlooked these requirements to transform its force structure, size, and missions (especially those of the reserve component) to the realities of the post-Cold War era. The active Army concluded that “Homeland Security” was a secondary, “state” mission of the National Guard that could be accomplished with existing assets. It misinterpreted the “Prepare Now” element of National Military Strategy and focused on modernizing and transforming its current forces to defeat a conventional peer in the next century.

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C. "NO MORE KOREAS"

General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army in the early 1990’s, preached a mantra of “no more Koreas,” and vowed to keep the United States Army ready for any contingency. His reference to the Korean War was right on the mark. Historically, the United States Army had gone through a cycle of build-ups and mobilizations, followed by massive, ill-planned, and ill-executed draw downs.

These cycles had a detrimental effect on the Army’s preparedness for combat, as demonstrated during the Korean War. Within a short five years after celebrating “V-E” and “V-J” days, the United States Army had demobilized to such an extent that it was completely unprepared to fight a conventional war. The level of training, discipline, and morale of US forces on the North Korean border were so poor in 1950 that the American Army was very nearly routed. Once again, the nation had to resort to a general mobilization to draft, train, and deploy an army to stop the North Korean advance. This was a great source of embarrassment for an Army that had just been victorious in the Second World War. General Sullivan and the senior Army leadership vowed that the US Army would never again suffer such casualties from being unprepared, and that any future draw-downs would be intensively managed to maintain readiness. This mantra has stuck in the minds of Army planners to this day, and is the primary reason the Army fundamentally misinterpreted the requirements of National Military Strategy to “Prepare Now” for future operations.

During the initial draw-down in 1990 and 1991, the Army went from 18 active component, and 10 National Guard Divisions down to 10 active component and 8 National Guard divisions. However, after the initial rounds of Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC), the Army leadership continued to internally evaluate its size, force structure, and strategy in preparation for future debates. In 1991, the “Base Force” commission was conducted, as well as the Commission On Roles and Missions (CORM). In 1993, an internal Army Bottom Up Review (BUR) was also conducted. All three of these *internal* commissions concluded that 8 active component Army divisions were
sufficient to meet a two-MTW threat. However, these reviews did not take into account the increasing number of deployments Army was making to shape the international environment, and their effect on the combat capability of the existing units. The bottom line is that the active Army, because of its 20th century draw-down history, was determined to learn from the mistakes it made after WWII. It was committed as an organization to maintain, at all costs, its combat capability to wage two major theater wars. In specific terms, this meant that the Army was committed to maintaining its 10 active component divisions at all costs, despite the requirements of National Security and National Military Strategy.

D. THE 1997 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The results of the externally mandated 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the following RAND Arroyo Strategic Development Center Study, clearly document that the Army doggedly maintained its focus on the two major theater war planning scenario instead of aggressively embracing “Homeland Security.”

In 1997, the Department of Defense completed its first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This was an externally mandated bottom-up review of all services and military departments. The QDR essentially reviewed how each service was planning, organizing, and preparing for future missions, and gave congressional visibility to the mindset of each service as it prepared for the future.

There were three major reasons why Congress requested the QDR: First and foremost was the change in the national security landscape. With the fall of the Soviet Union, there was no longer a peer competitor that could match the economic and conventional military capabilities of the US. The overwhelming victory of our conventional forces over Iraq during the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm conflict also put into question the planned modernization requirements of each respective service. Secondly, the increasing number of engagements in “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), such as the deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and Somalia

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75 Dr Leslie Lewis, “Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review” page 44.
put into question the way our forces were being utilized, and the effect on the military’s capability to respond to the two major theater war scenario. Lastly, the projected funding requirements to purchase new weapon systems for the different services were far greater than available or projected funds.

For the review, Congress legislated that the QDR specifically address the following issues:

- US defense strategy and the force structure required to implement it.
- The nature of threats to US national security.
- All assumptions used during the review.
- The effect of planning for, training, and conducting peace operations and military operations other than war on force structure requirements.
- The effects of technology on force structure requirements.
- The manpower levels and force structure levels required to sustain conflicts longer than 120 days.
- The roles and missions of the reserve components.
- The “tooth to tail” ratio of combat and support forces.76
- Airlift and sealift requirements to support the defense strategy.
- The “forward presence,” and pre-positioning of assets needed for deterrence and response to expected conflicts.77
- The amount of resources that would need to be shifted between theaters of operation in the event of conflict.
- Any suggested revisions to the Unified Command Plan.78

From the above tasks, The QDR would evaluate the strategy of the Army in terms of its size, force structure, equipment, and active / reserve force mix to deal with the myriad of threats within its traditional sphere of operations. From the Army perspective, the QDR would analyze its ability to:

- Deter and defeat attacks on the US.
- Deter and defeat aggression against allies.

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76 “Tooth to Tail” ratio refers to the ratio of required combat support and combat service support forces to field a specified amount of combat forces.

77 This refers to the amount of military weapons and assets located in cache sites overseas that forces in the US could draw and use in the event of conflict. It basically refers to the size of forces that would be required in Europe and Korea based on the Cold War paradigm.

• Protect the lives of US citizens abroad.
• Support regional stability.
• Counter threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
• Deter and counter terrorism.
• Conduct disaster relief and humanitarian operations.
• Counter the production and import of illegal drugs.79

The QDR was an exhaustive inventory of every area of Army planning, and would put existing programs and force structure justifications under the microscope. Not surprisingly, the Army viewed the QDR as an “exercise with little hope for gain and a high risk for loss.”80 Going into the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army was fully expecting to lose two active component divisions, based on its previous internal reviews. The Army senior leadership, in preparation for the QDR, searched for any and all possible ways to justify its 10 active component division force structure, regardless of the QDR’s emphasis on transforming the force for the requirements of the 21st century.

E. QDR RESULTS FOR THE ARMY

The results of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review were quite enlightening for Army leadership. First of all, the QDR revealed that the Army’s methodology for force structure requirements81 was outdated and flawed. The two major theater war planning scenario the Army used to justify its force structure was viewed as a vestige of the Cold War. However, the QDR also documented that Army forces were far more heavily engaged than during the Cold War in overseas stability and support operations, in support of the National Military Strategy element of “Shaping” the international security

79 Ibid., page viii.


81 Namely, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which used the two-MTW scenario as its primary justification. This TAA process was used in all of the aforementioned internal reviews (1991 “Base Force,” 1991 Commission On Roles and Means [CORM], 1993 Bottoms-Up Review [BUR], etc.)
environment. The end result was that the QDR rated the Army’s active duty force structure of 10 divisions “about right” for current requirements.\textsuperscript{82} Surprisingly, the force structure and missioning of the Army’s reserve forces was not evaluated, due primarily to their “secondary” role in the two major theater war scenario. Secondly, the QDR criticized the Army’s efforts to “Prepare Now” for future requirements, labeled “Force XXI.”\textsuperscript{83} The modernization of the Army’s existing heavy divisions with technological advances such as digitization was viewed with skepticism. There was no detail on the how much more effective the new forces would be, or what they would look like. Secondly, there was no concrete information on how much the transformation would cost.

Basically, the Army was committed to its heavy division force structure as its “vision” for the future, despite the growing realization that the existing heavy divisions were enormously cumbersome, and the “tooth to tail” ratio made rapid deployments of such forces extremely difficult, if not impossible. Lastly, expensive future weapon systems such as the Comanche Helicopter and the Crusader self-propelled Howitzer were called into question, especially since the funding for these new weapons was currently unavailable and unlikely to be procured.

The QDR basically revealed that the Army was on the wrong path for the requirements of the next century, and urged that it prepare more realistically for future missions. As demonstrated by the fact that the reserve component was not even addressed in the Army’s future planning, there was no specific planning evident for “Homeland Security,” or any restructuring or modernization of the Reserves and National Guard. The Army viewed “Homeland Security” as a core competency of the National Guard, something it could accomplish with existing assets in a “state” role. It clearly interpreted the requirement to “Prepare Now” as a method to modernize for the next conventional peer, instead of focusing on “Homeland Security.”


\textsuperscript{83} Force XXI refers to the next stage of the Army’s progression on its way to the Army After Next (AAN).
The Army, regardless of the criticisms for retaining a “Cold War” posture and organization, was extremely pleased with the outcome of the 1997 QDR. The primary goal was achieved, in that the Army was able to retain its 10 active component divisions. The expected reductions in end strength were much smaller than anticipated, and could be accomplished by spreading them across the “less relevant” National Guard, Reserves, and civilian work forces. However, this approach met with considerable resistance, and highlighted an additional finding of the QDR.

F. THE FALLOUT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

The 1997 QDR aggravated a sore point for the Army leadership; namely the roles, missions, and relevance of the Reserve Component. Surprisingly, the specific utilization, integration, and modernization of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard were not addressed in the 1997 QDR. This was due primarily to the active component view of National Guard combat units as a “strategic reserve.” In other words, the two major theater war scenario involved only the active component divisions. National Guard combat units would only be called upon in such a scenario if the conflict was not resolved within a specified time frame, or active forces were required to redeploy to another conflict. Based on existing deployment practices, National Guard combat units would deploy to theater 45 to 60 days after mobilization, and would be committed only when the situation was under control. Basically, the National Guard was viewed as less “relevant” to future warfighting requirements.

This view was to some extent a product of necessity. The Army has by far the largest reserve components of any of the armed services. The sheer size of the National Guard and Army Reserve, (over 550,000 soldiers) coupled with their secondary role as

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a “strategic reserve” have put them at the bottom of the list for fielding modernized equipment. Due to budget constraints in the era of draw down, the Army has practiced the modernization strategy of “cascading.” Equipment from first-to-fight units in the Army has been “cascaded” down to the Army Reserve and then the National Guard as new technology and weapons enter the force. During the Cold War, this was not a serious problem, as most of the equipment was interoperable, and tactics remained relatively uniform across the different components. However, over the last decade, weapons technology and tactics have advanced at exponential rates, creating a unique problem for the Army. The end result is that the National Guard is often equipped with military hardware and tactics that are not compatible with the first-to-fight units.87 Despite these difficulties, the Army has never seriously considered modernizing the entire National Guard and Reserves, as the cost would far exceed the available budget. Since the reserves have never been incorporated into the two major theater war scenario per se, and their “cascaded” equipment is often incompatible with that of the active component, the National Guard contribution to the two major theater war strategy was deemed minimal.

Based on the recommendations of the QDR, viewed then as binding, the Army was supposed to lose 45,000 personnel in effective end strength. The Army leadership, without consulting the National Guard or the Army Reserve, decided that the reserve components should bear the brunt of these force cuts, based upon its relevance (or lack thereof) to the two major theater war scenario. This resulted in a major conflict between the Army and its National Guard counterpart. The acrimony between the two components reached such ferocity that the Secretary of Defense was forced to direct an off-site conference to resolve the issue. On one hand, the Army was attempting to

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87 The Army’s situation with regard to interoperability is unique among the services. The Air Force and Marines, although considerably smaller, have embarked on an aggressive policy of ensuring that equipment given to the reserves is on a par with its active component counterpart. The USAF has embarked upon the Aerospace Expeditionary Force, where all of its wings are multi-component, with crews and aircraft interchangeable between the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. Another example is the commonality of aircraft between the United States Marines and the Marine Corps Reserves. Both operate the same model of AH-1W attack helicopter and UH-1N utility helicopter, and modernization efforts cover all aircraft in the inventory. Source: Eric Bleakney, “The 2000 Army Aviation Modernization Plan effect on Active Component Army and Army National Guard Interoperability and Integration,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 2000, Page 86.
comply with the provisions of the 1997 QDR and execute the manpower reductions in what it thought was the most prudent way; namely, reducing the size of its strategic reserve. On the other hand, the National Guard argued that its contributions to National Security and National Military Strategy through “Homeland Security” were ignored.

Not surprisingly, the agreement reached at the off-site conference did not suit any of the parties. The active component Army agreed to lose 15,000 personnel, and the Army Reserve and National Guard were directed to give up 45,000 personnel. The off-site conference led to a fierce debate between the active component Army and the National Guard over the future roles and missions of each component, and fostered bad blood between the two components. However, it also raised the visibility of the National Guard’s importance in performing “Homeland Security.” Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, in an address to the Adjutant General’s Association of the United States on February 3rd, 1998, stated:

…You know, the truth is that last year [1997] was a bad year. It was a bad year for the Guard. It was a bad year for the Army. And frankly, it was a bad year for America… it’s not good to have that kind of a fight in the family…I honestly believe that the Army and the Guard cannot live without each other…

He continued by pointing out that the National Guard and the Army are “equals in defending America,” and that the defense mission of the next century was Homeland Security, stating that “…Homeland Security…could not be more important for the National Guard to embrace as a mission.” The National Defense Panel, in its evaluation of future threats facing the United States, criticized the Army and the Army National Guard heavily for their “destructive disunity.” The National Defense Panel recommended that the National Guard play a larger role in Homeland Security by

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88 The reserves would have to give up personnel on a three to one ratio, based on cost estimates. Dr Leslie Lewis, “Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review”, page 45.


“…responding to domestic emergencies, terrorist attacks, and attacks using weapons of mass destruction.”  

Sadly, the results of the 1997 QDR were never fully implemented. The fundamental changes to the Department of Defense specified in the legislation were never realized, partly due to the inflexibility of large institutional bureaucracies. Another blow to the implementation of the 1997 QDR came in the form of the Congressional Balanced Budget amendment of 1997. Originally, the 45,000 man reduction in end strength was originally a partial measure to fund the Army’s transformation for the next century, the majority of which would be funded, or so it was hoped, with future appropriations. With the Balanced Budget Amendment, the possibility of future appropriations for modernization vanished, so there was no incentive to follow through on the force reductions. In addition, the increased OPTEMPO caused by deployments to Kosovo, Bosnia, and Southwest Asia caused all of the services by 1999 to request increases to their force structures and budgets.

Despite these setbacks, the Army began to see that the Quadrennial Defense Review could be used to its advantage. It was an unbiased, external assessment of each branch’s ability to perform its mission as defined by National Military Strategy, and carried more weight in requesting budget resources than any internal assessment. After all, the QDR recognized the increasing requirement of the Army to deploy overseas to execute National Military Strategy, and allowed it to keep its 10 active division force structure.

Due to the overall effectiveness of the 1997 QDR in examining the individual service branches’ methodology in preparing for future operations, Congress passed the “National Defense Authorization Act” for Fiscal Year 2000, requiring that a formal QDR be conducted every four years. Based on lessons learned and shortcomings from first Quadrennial Defense Review, the scope and language of the assessment was rewritten to

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93 Dr Leslie Lewis, “Preparing for the Next Externally Mandated Review”, page 43.
focus on specific areas. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review would be composed of three primary tasks:

1. Outline the national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy.
2. Define the force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget plans required for each service to execute the full range of operational missions defined in the national defense strategy.
3. Determine a budget plan that would provide sufficient resources to “execute successfully” the full range of missions delineated in the defense strategy at a low to moderate risk.\textsuperscript{95}

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 also specified the following reports be included in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 (QDR 01):\textsuperscript{96}

* The full gamut of threats to defined US national security interests and the methodology used to examine those threats.
* Assumptions relating to levels of engagement in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Small-Scale Contingency operations (SSC), particularly exit strategies and withdrawal plans.
* Effect of preparation for and participation in MOOTW and SSC operations on readiness for high-intensity combat missions.
* The status of readiness for existing forces within each branch.
* The roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy, and the readiness of the reserve component to perform those directed missions.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, page 2. “Low to Moderate” risk is defined by the Secretary of Defense in concert with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and concerns the political, strategic, and military risks involved in executing the missions delineated in the national defense strategy.

\textsuperscript{96} There were fourteen separate reports required in the QDR 01, which I have limited to five in the scope of this thesis.
In preparation for the QDR 01, The Army hired the Rand Arroyo Center in the fall of 1998 to assess the United States Army’s strategic planning. The primary purpose of the research was to identify critical Army issues that would surface during 2001 QDR, and explore the relationships of Army issues with those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and Congress. Most of the issues selected for analysis by the Rand Corporation were developed from the issues raised in the 1997 QDR, and included concerns raised in Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), National Security Strategy, and National Military Strategy. The Rand Corporation basically evaluated the thought process of Army leaders in preparing for operations in the next century, and was hired to point out shortcomings in their planning process, so that the Army could prepare for QDR 01.

The first task was to evaluate all of the issues that confronted the Army that would surface in the QDR 01. Included in the evaluation was the requirement from the 1998 National Defense Panel (NDP) to focus on the issue of transformation, specifically the changes in doctrine, force structure and equipment required to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In plain terms, this was the requirement for the Army to clarify its responsibilities and requirements for “Homeland Security.” Of the original 58 issues confronting the Army, The Rand Corporation evaluation produced three major ‘issue sets’ that “were critical to both quelling external criticisms of the Army and telling the Army story.” These major issue sets were:

1) What strategic demands will be placed on the Army?
2) How will the future Army operate?
3) What is the required force size and content (Active and Reserve Component)?
The first issue set (What strategic demands will be placed on the Army?) requires that the Army correctly understand the post-Cold War strategic environment, and the complexity of world affairs in which it will operate. This includes the emergence of a conventional military peer in the near future and the assessment of asymmetric threats, such as terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. The Rand analysis concluded that although the Army did understand the strategic environment and its complex demands, “…the Army is (still) focusing …on the conventional response to two near-simultaneous major theater wars rather than on asymmetric threats.”

The Rand corporation concluded that the Army focused mainly on the traditional two major theater war scenario based on its institutional comfort with the Cold War strategic paradigm. Rand suggested to the Army leadership that it focus its analysis on other strategic threats besides the emergence of a peer competitor, such as threats to the communications infrastructure, denial of access of Army forces in regional conflicts, and the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially on ports of debarkation where mobilizing Army forces assemble to deploy overseas.

Basically, the Army was still focusing on the archaic two major theater war planning scenario to maintain the status quo in its present force structure and funding levels. Any serious evaluation of “asymmetric” threats would endanger the current Army force structure of 10 combat divisions. However, Rand concluded that the Army must evaluate these strategic threats to better plan and prepare for future operations. This issue set forms the basis for all military planning; other issues such as size, force structure, equipment, and budgeting all revolve around the strategic demands. President Bush, in an address February 13, 2001 to assembled sailors and NATO ambassadors in Norfolk, Virginia, stated “Our defense vision will drive our defense budget, not the other way around.”

This fact clearly demonstrates why the Army has steadfastly stuck to the

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two major theater war planning scenario. The Army was going to protect its combat readiness at all costs.

The second issue set (How will the future Army operate?) requires that the Army leadership develop a “vision” that would be responsive to the full gamut of strategic demands placed upon it. Primarily, this issue set deals with force modernization, integration, and transformation plans. The Rand Corporation, interestingly, found the same shortcomings in Army planning during its evaluation that were identified in the 1997 QDR and the National Defense Panel. All three pushed for the Army to accelerate its move to a lighter, more mobile force. The Army, Rand concluded, was basically still entrenched in the Cold War “conventional peer” mindset, and was spending an inordinate amount of time on creating a “digitized” division (“Force XXI”). This division is organized with the same type of equipment as the Army currently has, except the “tooth to tail” ratio is even larger than current units. In other words, the Army was still stuck in the Cold War mindset of modernizing its heavy divisions with new equipment and technical wizardry, instead of planning for light and medium force deployments. Rand correctly assessed that “new concepts [such as General Shinsecki’s “medium force” of Brigade Combat Teams] are often easy to conceive; the difficult part is their refinement, development, funding and implementation.”

The third issue set, (What is the required force size and content?), requires the Army determine the right force size and mix to meet mid-term and long-term strategic demands. Basically, it revolves around the Army’s utilization of its reserve component, primarily the National Guard. The Rand Corporation found that this issue is one that “continues to be a major internal issue for the Army.” Perhaps the most damning statement from the evaluation is that the “re-emphasis on the Homeland [Security]
Mission…requires some rethinking of the [Army’s current force] structure justified on a 2-Major Theater War strategy.”

The bottom line is that the Army mindset had not changed dramatically between the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997 and the Rand assessment in 2000. The active Army had basically ignored the requirements of the National Security and National Defense Strategy to contend with asymmetric threats and actively pursue “Homeland Security.” Instead of embracing the “Homeland Security” mission, the Army leadership was still focused on the requirement to respond to two major theater wars. The only area that saw a dramatic change between the 1997 QDR and the 2000 Rand study in terms of reserve component utilization was the increased reliance on the National Guard to perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions as part of the National Military Strategy of “shaping” the global security environment.

However, by ignoring the strategic implications of Homeland Security, the Army actually put its combat capability at risk. One of the threat scenarios deemed most likely to occur was that enemies of the United States would actually target our mobilization stations or nearby civilian communities for a terrorist attack using biological or chemical weapons, seriously disrupting the capability of our responses to respond to a major theater war. Such an attack would be coordinated with an attack on national security interests overseas, with the intention of delaying or preventing our forces from deploying.

H. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the Army has misinterpreted the requirements of National Military Strategy to support “Homeland Security.” It has steadfastly focused on its “core competency” of fighting and winning a conventional war, and protected its 10 active component division force structure at all costs. When the Army developed its vision of being “persuasive in peace” and “invincible in war,” it was

103 Ibid, page xiii.
actively supporting what it thought were the requirements of National Military Strategy. It began to deploy overseas to “Shape” the international security environment; it maintained its heavy division force structure at all costs to “Respond” to crises; and it focused its modernization and digitization initiatives on the existing heavy division force structure to “Prepare Now” for future operations. When the number of overseas deployments in the “Shaping” strategy began to affect the combat readiness for its “Respond” requirement, it looked to the Reserves and the National Guard to fill the gap. This fundamental change to the utilization of the reserves marked a large departure from what the framers of the Constitution envisioned for the role of the National Guard and Reserve.

The changes brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union were far-ranging. The major threat to US national security in the next century would not be from a major peer competitor; rather it would take the form of asymmetrical threats against our population centers, institutions, and infrastructure on domestic soil. Numerous studies during the post-Cold War era documented the emerging threat of terrorism, electronic warfare, and the employment of weapons of mass destruction targeted against our civilians. This caused governmental planners to focus on “Homeland Security” as the primary mission for the next century. The National Guard’s core competency of Military Support to Civil Authorities, and the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act on the employment of federal forces in domestic operations made the Guard perfectly suited for the mission. However, the Army was too focused on “No More Koreas,” and preventing the mistakes of previous planners in the post-Cold War era of draw downs and budget cuts. Since budgeting is inextricably linked to the defense strategy, the retention of combat forces to fight two major theater wars was deemed non-negotiable. This one-track mindset caused the Army planners to neglect the contributions of the National Guard to the National Military Strategy.

Instead of re-affirming the National Guard’s constitutional role to protect the population against domestic violence, and strengthening its capabilities to perform Homeland Security, the Army developed a new role for the Guard that was far from what the framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned. To protect the active Army’s ability to
fight a conventional war, it called upon the Reserve and National Guard to “Shape” the international security environment by performing stability and support operations overseas.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787, one of the most profound challenges it had to face was how to defend the new nation. The framers had to balance the need for defense with the risks and costs of maintaining a large standing force of “regular” soldiers. The compromise they reached established a singularly unique defense organization: a “militia” nation. The defense of the nation would be founded on an organization comprised of a small standing Army under federal control, and a militia “reserve” that fell under state control during peacetime, and federal control in times of war or national emergency. In doing so, the framers created a system of “checks and balances” on the power of the military. Being a community-based organization, the militia was given the Constitutional mandate to defend the homeland against domestic threats. This mission of “Homeland Security,” coupled with the federal mission to mobilize as a wartime strategic reserve, were deemed by the framers of the Constitution to be the primary role for the state militia.

Much like the Constitution over the last two centuries, the structure of the US military has changed with the times, but held true to its nature. The system of checks and balances the framers built into the organization of the military, created, by design, a friction between the regulars and the militia. The issue of federal control over the structure, training, and mobilization of the militia reserve was bitterly fought by the active military and the state militias in Congress. The next two centuries witnessed a series of changes to the size and strategic importance of the reserve component as threats to our national security changed; however, the fundamental nature of the militia as a state organization, and its role as a strategic reserve remained intact. This constitutional paradigm remained in effect until the end of the Cold War.

The abrupt end of the Cold War in 1991 led to profound changes in the global security environment, and translated into fundamental redefinitions of our National Security and National Military Strategies. With the loss of the Soviet Union as a major peer competitor, the military, as it had in the past, was expected to downsize accordingly in the post-Cold War era. This meant huge reductions in the force structure, size, and
budgets of the military, especially the United States Army. However, stung by the disastrous effects of an ill-planned and ill-executed demobilization after World War II, the Army vowed that it would never again lose its combat readiness. It viewed its ability to fight and win two major theater wars as non-negotiable, and equated this requirement to maintaining a force structure of 10 active Army divisions. This guiding principle, born of the Cold War era, would remain firmly entrenched in the Army mindset, despite the realities of the post-Cold War geostrategic environment.

In determining a National Military Strategy for the next era, military planners had to first evaluate all existing and potential threats to our national security. The technological revolution that led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a major peer competitor also led to a transformation in the nature and gravity of threats on the global horizon. The technology to build chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons became readily available. With the collapse of the Soviet economy, the ingredients to build weapons of mass destruction also became more accessible to potential adversaries. With our demonstrated superiority in military, political, and economic capabilities, enemies would have to resort to attacking the US by “asymmetric” means. The only area that military planners deemed vulnerable to such attacks was our homeland; namely, our civilian population, critical infrastructure, and economy.

On the conventional front, no major global peer competitor was expected to emerge until at least 2015, even though there were hostile regional powers such as China, North Korea, and Iraq. Intelligence analysts also concluded that there would be numerous small scale conflicts developing in the absence of the stability generated during the bipolar world. These disputes on the lower end of the Spectrum of Military Conflict, if allowed to escalate, could pose a threat to our national security interests overseas, or those of our allies. These three threats (small scale conflicts, conventional peer competitor, and weapons of mass destruction106), and the government’s plans to

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105 See Figure 5, Appendix A, for a pictorial representation of the Spectrum of Military Conflict.
106 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) refer to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons aimed at non-military targets, i.e. civilian populations.
prevent, mitigate, and respond to them became the core elements of the US National Security Strategy.

To execute this security strategy, military planners had to develop a new and profoundly different National Military Strategy. The military strategy during the Cold War was one of “deterrence.” Commonly known as “Mutually Assured Destruction,” or “MAD,” the main tenet of deterrence was that regardless of who struck first, the survivor would maintain enough nuclear capability to ensure the mutual destruction of the attacker. This philosophy lent a certain degree of stability to the global geostrategic environment during the Cold War. However, with the disappearance of a major competitor, the military strategy for the 21st century would require “forward engagement” to ensure global stability. The new strategy called upon the respective branches of the military to “Shape” the international security environment, “Respond” to crises, and “Prepare Now” for fighting the threats of the future. The “Shape” element required deploying overseas for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and stability/support operations. This would mitigate the security threat from small-scale conflicts. The “Respond” component, meanwhile, was one military planners were more familiar with; namely, fighting and winning major conflicts. This would alleviate the security risk from a regional power or emerging peer competitor. The “Prepare Now” requirement, however, would prove much more difficult for military planners to articulate. It would require the military to transform its structure, roles, and equipment to deal with asymmetric future threats. This part of the strategy was intended to mitigate the threats of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction on our homeland.

The Army, in translating the National Military Strategy into a vision statement for the future, was fundamentally blinded by its mindset of maintaining the conventional combat capability to respond to two major theater wars. “The Army Vision…Soldiers On Point For the Nation” described the requirements of the active Army to support National Military Strategy. The Army understood the “Shape” requirement, and professed that it would be “Persuasive in Peace”. It wholeheartedly embraced the

107 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.
mission of deploying overseas to extinguish small-scale conflicts before they became a major threat to US interests. The “Respond” element, however, only served to reinforce the Army’s determination to maintain its 10 active component divisions, and re-validated its Cold War “two-major theater war” planning scenario. One of the major arguments of this thesis is that the last requirement to “Prepare Now” was fundamentally misinterpreted by the Army leadership.

Instead of restructuring, reorganizing, and remissioning the Army, in particular the Army National Guard for the asymmetric threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our civilian population, the Army embarked on a strategy called “Force XXI”. This was the Army’s modernization imperative to strengthen the combat firepower of its heavy divisions to fight the next peer competitor or hostile regional power. Aside from funding the development of some regional Civil Support Teams, it considered that WMD consequence management could be handled by the Army National Guard in its secondary, “state” role. It did not actively incorporate the requirements of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to make “Homeland Security” a priority federal mission for the National Guard.

As the Army began to execute the requirements of National Military Strategy, it ran into an interesting, and escalating, dilemma that was not anticipated: It could not continue to support the “Shape” strategy without jeopardizing its ability to “Respond”. In other words, it could not continue to deploy overseas for peacekeeping and stability / support operations at the rate it was being asked to, without seriously impacting its capability to fight a war. Even though the Army was successful in maintaining its ten active division force structure in the post-Cold War era, it was not enough. Military planners anticipated neither the frequency of deployments nor the impact that such missions would have on the ability of its forces to wage war. This situation, coupled with the ever-prevalent mindset of maintaining a two-major theater war capability, forced the Army to look to its strategic reserve for help.

Meanwhile, the opportunities of the post-Cold War environment looked bleak for the Army Reserve and National Guard, especially after the boon to force structure and
funding enjoyed during the Reagan years. The same Revolution in Military Affairs\textsuperscript{108} that helped win the Cold War also seriously threatened the relevance of the National Guard and Reserve in future strategic planning. The ever-accelerating rate of technological advancement prevented the equipment and tactics of the Army’s “first to fight” units from cascading down to the reserve component. The Army Reserve and National Guard found itself with legacy equipment that was not interoperable with the Active Army. This situation sent the leadership of the reserve components on a “search for relevance.” It was not long before they ran into the active Army leadership, which was searching for help in executing the National Military Strategy of “Shaping” the international security environment.

Together, the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve leadership embarked on a path that would fundamentally change the constitutional underpinnings of the reserve components’ role as a “strategic reserve.” Now they would stand side by side with the active Army in executing the National Military Strategy, performing missions together across the broad spectrum of military conflict. Not coincidentally, this was precisely what the Department of Defense called for in it’s “Total Force” policy, which Army Chief of Staff General Shinsecki translated into “THE Army” policy. This policy was intended to blur the traditional lines between the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. However, this was a distinction not intended to be blurred by the framers of the Constitution.

This radical transformation of the reserves’ Constitutional role was carried out based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the requirements of National Military Strategy. The “Prepare Now” strategy was a mandate for the Army to respond to the growing asymmetrical threats against our homeland. This meant preventing and countering the threats of terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction against our civilian population, infrastructure, and government. This mission was, in fact, a core competency of the National Guard in its state mission of “Military Support to Civil Authorities” (MSCA). A re-interpretation of National Military Strategy actually

\textsuperscript{108} The technological revolution of the military. It refers to the incredible increase in weapons technology and the resulting changes in tactics from stand-off weapons, precision guided munitions, and digitization of the battlefield.
stresses the increased utilization and federal funding of the National Guard for the “Prepare Now” element, not the “Shape” component. In other words, the National Military Strategy actually calls for strengthening the constitutional role of the National Guard to perform its mission of “Homeland Security,” not the radical departure from the Constitution sought by the Army (and ironically, its National Guard counterpart) to perform overseas stability and support missions. National Security and National Military Strategy actually dictate the National Guard “…fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of homeland security.”109 In fact, the National Guard vision for the next century states, “Homeland Security is a logical extension of the Federal and State missions we already perform, and (are) consistent with our Constitutional foundation and militia heritage.”110

A. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RESERVE FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

Instead of embarking on this path, however, the National Guard and Reserves are being activated at an unprecedented rate to perform the “shaping” portion of National Military Strategy. However, this increased use of National Guard and Reserve personnel in peacekeeping missions overseas, albeit pragmatic and cost-effective, has its own peculiar set of drawbacks. One side effect of using reserve personnel for overseas contingency operations is that they blunt the reserve’s combat readiness even more so than the active component. The detrimental effect of training for peacekeeping duty, deploying, and re-training is magnified due to the limited amount of time reserve personnel can devote to relearning their wartime skills. The primary result is that reserve forces are taking much longer to recover from these types of deployments.

In another parallel with the active components, recruiting and retention problems have also cropped up in the National Guard and Reserves. Once again, these side effects have been exacerbated by the nature of the citizen-soldier: Personnel are not re-enlisting


and are resigning their commissions due to the strain of conflict with civilian employers over repeated deployments. During Desert Shield / Desert Storm, the large majority of reservists and employers enthusiastically supported deployment. Now, however, with routine deployments scheduled to support a growing number of dubious “national emergencies,” we have witnessed a greater number of complaints from both reservists and their employers. Mobilizing and deploying reserve units, in many cases involuntarily111, places a great strain upon the citizen soldier, his employer, and his family. The Constitutional contract with reserve personnel specifies that they would be mobilized and deployed only “…in times of war or national emergency.” As the definition of “national emergency” has conveniently widened in our doctrine of global engagement to include the protection of vital national security interests overseas, “…our (reserve personnel) and our companies are caught in the middle.”112 An Army National Guard Major recently stated, “I have been working every weekend and most evenings for the past few months preparing a rifle company to deploy to Kuwait…on top of working 50 hours a week at a civilian job. The Patriot missile sites this unit will be providing security for have been in country for 10 years. Where is the national emergency?”113

In addition to the strain on the reservist, employers, especially small business owners, are feeling the crunch. Under the revised “Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),” issued in 1994, employers must reinstate reservists upon completion of their tour of duty (anywhere from 180-270 days) with seniority, status, and rate of pay. They also must not discriminate or punish employees based on their military commitments.114 As the number of reservists deployed overseas increases, so do the number of documented reservist-employer conflicts. Within a week of Texas’ 49th Armored Division notification that that it was headed for Bosnia, the

111 Under mobilization guidelines, reservists must deploy once activated.

112 Herschiel Sims, President of Acordia Employers Service, as quoted in Judy Keen’s “Part-Timers Promised Fewer Deployments, President Tells Guard and Reserves,” USA Today, FEB 15, 2001, Page 6A.


Department of Labor investigated over 28 complaints against employers. In a *New York Times* Page 1 article titled “Duty Calls the Guard, But Some Bosses Resist,” Steven Lee Myers reports, “For the Pentagon, these conflicts are more than just a legal headache. More than a third of enlisted reservists and 45 percent of officers say that their military service – even short of a long deployment like Texas’ 49th Armored Division’s (to Bosnia) – has created problems with their civilian bosses. According to the Pentagon, a third of people who resign their commissions or choose not to re-enlist do so because of conflicts with employers.”

The utilization of the National Guard and Reserve to perform stability and support operations does offer significant benefits, however. In addition to the relief of operational tempo on active component forces, reserve units have provided an unexpected benefit to our National Security Strategy: They have made tremendous impacts in promoting democracy and stabilizing the areas they have been deployed to. This is due in large part to two factors: First, in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, our citizen soldiers provide less of an ostensible “threat” to those nations in which we intervene. Secondly, our reservists bring an unprecedented amount of civilian expertise to bear, in addition to their military specialties. Reservists have fostered nation-building programs and have established civilian-civilian contacts that have endured far longer than their deployments. “In Bosnia,” noted the Commanding General of Peacekeeping Operations during the rotation of Texas’ 49th Armored Division, “…we saw for the first time local military forces and local communities working together to help build the infrastructure. They’ve rebuilt three bridges and completed one road project. That wasn’t the case when we got here. We’ve pushed the peace process forward.”

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Herein lies the dilemma: As our National Security and National Military Strategies increasingly rely on Reserve and National Guard personnel to help shape the international security environment, it has both positive and negative impacts. The active component is able to maintain combat readiness for large scale war, and our global engagement strategy is benefiting from the civilian expertise of our citizen soldiers. In addition, the institutional survival of the Guard and Reserves is being further cemented with each deployment. However, the burden for this increase in reserve utility has fallen squarely on the shoulders of our citizen soldiers, and they are the ones paying the price: Increased employer conflicts, deployment fatigue, decreased readiness, and declining recruiting and retention rates are but some of the indications.

B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER BRANCHES

The future is not entirely bleak, however. There have been a number of proposals to modify the way the Army is structured, as well as successes encountered by other branches in the way they utilize their reserve forces. These proposals can have a tremendous impact on the Army’s ability to sustain its global engagement strategy, maintain combat readiness, and reduce the number of reserve activations. It will also significantly reduce the number of employer complaints.

The first proposal focuses primarily on creating a separate type of Army contingent dubbed a “Peace Force.” This unit would be comprised of soldiers with common military occupational specialties, such as Infantry, Military Police, Engineers, Aviation, and other combat support and combat service support specialties. A Regimental sized unit could be established, with equal sized active Army, Reserve, and National Guard contingents. This “Peace Force” could be located across a few centralized training bases, and be specially trained and equipped to perform Humanitarian Relief and Peacekeeping missions. This would preclude active Army combat units from suffering readiness problems associated with deployments overseas for contingency missions. Philip Gold, a Senior Fellow and Director of Defense and Aerospace Studies at Seattle’s “Discovery Institute,” suggests that such forces would be
“better equipped and quicker to respond”\textsuperscript{118} to such missions as Bosnia and Kosovo. He continued by saying that the United States needs “…forces suited (primarily) to keeping the peace.”\textsuperscript{119} Such a force would solve numerous problems. It would eliminate the need to retrain and equip combat units for the peacekeeping mission, and would reduce the requirement for National Guard and Reserve deployments by rotating the mission among the three components. As the soldiers for these units would be drawn from volunteers, it would eliminate the warrior vs. constabulary ethos dilemma, thus improving unit morale. However, as these forces would come out of the existing hide of current units, it would meet with considerable resistance from the active Army, unless funded separately.

Another proposal, both more palatable and feasible to accomplish, is to change the deployment practices currently used by the Army to those used by the Air Force. Under the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), Army reservists are typically called up for a period of 180 to 270 days. As the length of US presence in one area continues, deployment lengths typically increase to the 270 day limit. To reduce the number of employer conflicts with such deployments, General Shinsecki, the Army Chief of Staff, made an announcement on 6 March 2000 limiting National Guard and Reserve deployments in Bosnia to 6 months. While this is a step in the right direction, “…it didn’t go far enough,” said Major General E. Gordon Stump, the President of the National Guard Association of the United States.\textsuperscript{120} He recommends that the Army go to a system like the Air Force’s Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF).

As part of the armed forces’ “Total Force” policy, the Air Force has made the largest steps in unifying its three components. The EAF is comprised of active Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units. They train together and deploy together as one package. Typically, these forces are notified at least two years in advance of a deployment (the Army routinely notifies soldiers and units less than 180


\textsuperscript{119} Deborah Martinez, page B1.

days from deployment), and the EAF deploys for a period of only 90 days. If the mission requires a longer on-station time, another EAF is rotated in. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex), who led a congressional delegation to Bosnia, stated, “It would be my hope that that if we are going to use (Army) Guard units in peacekeeping operations, that we would have much shorter mission times.” The Air Force EAF model has benefits for all the armed services. By limiting deployments to 90 days and increasing notification times, it serves the needs of the Army overseas as well as “better serving the needs of their most valuable resources, their soldiers and families…the Army could select units, develop rotations, and satisfy unique requirements while minimizing the stress on people and units.” It would greatly reduce the impact of a reservist’s deployment on his civilian employer by reducing the length of his deployment, and increasing the time available to find a temporary replacement. According to General Stump, “The Air Force is experiencing ‘real success’ with its 90-day, Expeditionary Aerospace Force program. The Army would be wise to follow suit.” Both of these options offer real solutions to the Army’s problems, and if implemented, could pave the way for more integration of the National Guard and Army Reserves into General Shinsecki’s vision of “The Army.”

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although General Shinsecki’s “The Army” initiative is making tremendous strides in blurring the distinctions between active duty and reserve soldiers, there are differences that should not, and cannot be ignored. The reservist, by nature, is a “citizen soldier;” a civilian who serves the military part-time. As we increase the number of involuntary deployments of our reservists overseas, we run the danger of doing

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permanent harm to the capability of our reserve forces. Charles L. Cragin assessed the situation correctly:

The bottom line is that we cannot overuse our reservists without seeing a corresponding increase in attrition and a decline in readiness. In the end, we must strike a balance, so that we create a Total Force that is appropriately sized for missions and staffed with people who want to serve but who do not find the burdens of that service so onerous they leave.124

The National Guard and Reserves are filled with volunteers, who for the most part join to perform what they believe is their patriotic duty. These men and women are employed full time in the civilian workforce, and train typically one weekend per month and two weeks per year in their military occupational specialties. The increased expectation of the part-time “citizen-soldier” to perform overseas stability and support operations, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, means that these reservists will be deployed anywhere from six to nine months. This creates numerous challenges for both reservists and their civilian employers. The increased burden on the “citizen soldier” to support national military strategy begs the question, “What is the price of patriotism?” In other words, what should the role and expectations of the National Guard and Reserves be in the 21st century security environment?

This question has recently been complicated by the events surrounding September 11th, and the ensuing war on terrorism. “Homeland Security” has become a major focus of the US government in general, and the US military specifically. The roles and missions of the National Guard have come under the spotlight, especially their capability to respond to and manage the consequences of domestic attacks. The simple fact is that the National Guard now has two missions that are in direct competition. Army and National Guard leaders are being asked to weigh the contribution of the National Guard to support overseas peacekeeping missions with their capability to perform homeland security, with the realization that they cannot do both.

I believe that “Homeland Security” should be made a primary federal mission for the National Guard. Even though regarded as a core competency, it still considered a

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secondary, “state” mission by the active Army, and National Guard readiness to perform “Homeland Security” is not directly funded. Both the active Army and National Guard leadership, in my opinion, fear that “Homeland Security” will become the primary mission for the National Guard, and have vocally resisted any such initiatives. The active Army needs the National Guard to perform overseas stability and support missions, and the National Guard fears a tremendous loss of funding and relevance if relegated to performing only domestic support operations. In my opinion, the threat to national security by weapons of mass destruction used against our population, infrastructure, and economy far outweigh the threat of a major theater war, both in probability and consequence. The National Guard, as the primary responder, needs to be provided with the requisite equipment, training, and OPTEMPO funding to successfully perform consequence management operations. However, even though homeland security should be a federally funded mission, I do not believe it should come at the expense of our traditional wartime mission to mobilize and support the active component in times of war or national emergency. If homeland security is elevated to a primary federal mission for the National Guard, it will have the funding and capability to perform both missions, provided the Army and National Guard restructure their forces.

To achieve this capability, I believe that the current demographics of the Army National Guard in relation to the overall percentages of combat, combat support, and combat service support assets needs to be altered dramatically to support homeland security initiatives. Homeland security missions require a preponderance of combat support and combat service support units to successfully mitigate the consequences of a domestic attack. Although the National Guard must retain some combat units to augment the Active Army in a two theater war scenario, the current ratio of 54% combat forces in the National Guard is far too high. The majority of combat units should be in the Active Army, where they can perform overseas stability and support missions, and retain the capability to respond to a two major theater war scenario. The percentage of combat forces, in my opinion, should be increased to 65% in the active Army, and reduced to

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125 See graphical distribution of US Army components and percentages, page 45.
35% in the National Guard. The National Guard needs to be redesigned and reformed with one basic premise in mind: every unit in the National Guard needs to be able to support homeland security in some capacity. If it does not, then it needs to be moved to the active Army or Army Reserve.

For example, major combat multiplier units, such as army aviation attack helicopter units, should be assigned entirely to the active component. There is simply no homeland security mission that attack helicopters can perform, and they require inordinate amounts of funding to maintain minimum combat readiness levels. Compounding the problem is the fact that National Guard units are outfitted with older equipment that is not compatible or “interoperable” with that of the active Army.126 The existing attack helicopters and mission should be given to the regular Army, and replaced with utility or medium-lift helicopter units. The active Army could more easily fund the modernization of the attack helicopters, and the utility or medium-lift helicopters given to the National Guard could perform both a wartime and a homeland security mission. On the other hand, standard infantry units in the National Guard could be largely retained, as the troops could perform a myriad of homeland security support missions in addition to the primary mission of augmenting the active Army in times of war or national emergency.

The National Guard, in the form of the militia, has been around for 366 years. The organization predates the founding of our nation. This institution has adapted numerous times over the last two centuries, and I believe it is capable of conforming to the realities of the 21st century security landscape. I believe that our citizen soldiers have a lot to offer in the way of nation-building and promoting peace, and those strengths need to be capitalized upon. However, I also believe that the current problems facing the National Guard and Reserves, primarily the conflict with civilian employers, needs to be seriously addressed. If the Army adopts a policy similar to the Air Force’s Expeditionary

126 The National Guard is equipped with AH-64A Apache helicopters, whereas the active Army has AH-64D “Longbow” helicopters. These two aircraft, although sharing the same airframe, are not compatible on the modern battlefield. For an in-depth examination of this problem, refer to MAJ Eric Bleakney’s Naval Postgraduate thesis titled “The 2000 Army Aviation Modernization Plan effect on Active Component Army and Army National Guard Interoperability and Integration,” December 2000.
Aerospace Force, whereby deployments are shortened and formal notice of deployments are lengthened, we can virtually eliminate the greatest threat to the future employment of the reserves: conflicts with civilian employers.

I believe that the current initiatives for “Total Force” integration are necessary, and in the Army’s case, will do much to reduce the intra-service rivalry that has marked the Army and the National Guard’s history over the last 220 years. I believe that our citizen soldiers should serve a greater purpose than being merely a strategic manpower reserve. As our National Security and National Military Strategies change with the realities of the 21st century security environment, so must the Cold War approach to the utilization of our reserve forces. Reservists are now, and need to be more than just “weekend warriors.” If the constitutional premise for the mobilizing the Army Reserves and National Guard “during war or national emergency” needs to be amended to allow them to promote peace overseas, then so be it. At the same time, the structure of the National Guard needs to be altered to better perform homeland security. If initiatives such as those outlined above are instituted, the three components that that comprise the Army of today; the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, will truly become the integrated force envisioned by General Shinsecki as “The Army.”
Appendix A, Figure 5. (Figures 1-4 in main body text) “Spectrum of Military Operations”. Source: MS PowerPoint presentation by LTG Kevin P. Byrnes, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, in a presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School, 5 June 2000. Slide 3.
Appendix A, Figure 6. “Army Fiscal year 2001 Budget”. MS Powerpoint slide provided by MG Raymond J. Rees, Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau, in a presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School titled “The National Guard,” 26 March 2000. Slide 18.
Appendix A, Figure 7. “Army Strategic Vision Development.” MS Powerpoint slide provided by LTG Kevin Byrnes, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, in a presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School titled “The Army Transformation Overview,” 5 June 2000. Slide 6.
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