MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY

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**Brazil and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century**

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Brazil and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century

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NO RESTRICTIONS

3. Abstract (maximum 200 words): Having participated in 23 UN operations, Brazil has a great deal of experience in a wide variety of peacekeeping operations. Given the remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations as a consequence of many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established in the current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to maintain the prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts. Moreover, as Brazil claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security Council, it should adopt a foreign policy with a renewed posture that considers the employment of military force with more flexibility, particularly, when there is a consensus of the international community that supports the cause. Furthermore, Brazil’s increased level of participation should not be limited to only peace operations involving Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries. The maintenance of a consistent and distinguished participation will provide the country significant opportunities to improve professional abilities of its military, diplomats and other civilian leaders, project the name of the country internationally and consolidate its national defense strategic objectives. Ultimately, an increased participation will contribute to the achievement of a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council.
DISCLAIMER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Brazil and the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century

Author: LCDR Ludovico Alexandre Cunha Velloso

Thesis: On one hand Brazil has actively participated in various UN Peacekeeping operations since 1956, on the other, the Brazilian Government believes that Peacekeeping operations are only part of a broader context that comprises several peacekeeping and international security aspects. Brazil considers the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council as essential. In this regard the country defends the position that key developing countries, regarded as regional powers, should be granted a permanent seat in the Security Council. During the 1990s, Brazil considered UN peacekeeping operations as a venue to project the name of the country, and to leverage its international support to reach a permanent seat in the Security Council. However its participation did not bring the expected results. Brazil made a consistent, but modest contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. In order to achieve the national objectives defined in its current foreign policy, Brazil should adopt a policy of more active participations in future peace operations.

Discussion: This paper addresses the importance of peacekeeping operations for Brazil. It provides an appreciation of its current Constitution, National Defense Strategy and Foreign Policy, to include its pursuit of a distinguished role in the international community. Subsequently, it examines the Brazilian participation in United Nations (UN) and Organization of American States (OAS) peacekeeping operations from 1956 until present, in order to analyze the Brazilian contribution, and identify the aspects of its foreign and domestic policies that affected the decision to participate. This paper also assesses the country’s ability to keep up to date with the changing nature of peacekeeping operations and improve its participation. Despite Brazil’s large economic potential and regional political importance, its participation in these operations has been modest. Constitutional constraints and a bureaucratic decision-making process continue to limit Brazil’s contribution to peacekeeping operations. Finally, this paper addresses the global importance of peacekeeping operations and discusses the consequences for Brazil’s foreign policy, in order to identify the posture Brazil should adopt, with respect to participating in future peace operations and achieving its national defense objectives.

Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s): Having participated in 23 UN operations, Brazil has a great deal of experience in a wide variety of peacekeeping operations. Given the remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations as a consequence of many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established in the current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to maintain the prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts. Moreover, as Brazil claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security Council, it should adopt a foreign policy with a renewed posture that considers the employment of military force with more flexibility, particularly, when there is a consensus of the international community that supports the cause. Furthermore, Brazil’s increased level of participation should not be limited to only peace operations involving Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries. The maintenance of a consistent and distinguished participation will provide the country significant opportunities to improve professional abilities of its military, diplomats and other civilian leaders, project the name of the country internationally and consolidate its national defense strategic objectives. Ultimately, an increased participation will contribute to the achievement of a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council.
CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES...........................................................................................................................................v

Chapter

1. BRAZIL AND THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.................................................................1
2. UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES...4
3. BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
   AN OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................13
4. WHY PEACEKEEPING REMAINS ESSENTIAL.................................................................47

Bibliography................................................................................................................................................51
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Brazil in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
3. Brazilian Officers in Command Billets of UN Operations
4. Brazilian Officers in Staff Billets in the UN Headquarters and in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
5. Civilian Election Experts who have participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations
CHAPTER 1

BRAZIL AND THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The strengthening of the United Nations can be achieved by a General Assembly more active and better regarded, and by a Security Council more representative, whose composition can not reflect anymore an arrangement set by the winners of a conflict that ended more than fifty years ago.¹

Fernando Henrique Cardoso
President of Brazil

According to the powers that the United Nations Charter gives to the Security Council in regard to international security issues, this institution has authorized the employment of military force in peace operations, which until the late 1980s has performed in few fields, usually overseeing truces and cease-fire agreements.

After the end of the Cold War, these operations grew in quantity and diversified. From this point on, the UN Peace Operations would transcend the classic role of providing an interposition force and would include inspection of military facilities and demobilization of former combatants, disarmament missions, mine clearance tasks, aid to refugees and internal migrants, organization and oversight of national elections and State Administration aid to include law and order enforcement.

Brazil has participated actively in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1956, when the country contributed one Infantry Battalion to the UNEF I, and overall it has participated in twenty-five peace operations. During the 1990s, the country
took part in missions in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Liberia, Uganda, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cyprus, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and East Timor.

Nevertheless, the Brazilian Government believes that Peacekeeping Operations should be considered in a broader context, in which the causes of the necessity of the mission could be addressed. Because of that, it also states that the United Nations will not succeed in dealing with high-cost Peacekeeping operations, if it does not also address the issues that made this kind of operation necessary. The necessity of force employment is not considered as a crucial impeding factor to the Brazilian participation in Peace Operations. As a firm position, the Government states that Brazilian participation will be guided by the missions that can be considered under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in which the parties involved in the conflict consent to the mission, and the principles of impartiality and non-violence are observed.

Brazil defends the principle that the legitimate employment of force is related to the right of self-defense, or in case of humanitarian emergency aid, to forcible entry or the usage of more coercive means.

My intent with this paper is to analyze the Brazilian participation in Peacekeeping Operations in relation to its Foreign Policy and National Defense Strategy, and to develop conclusions on the role that the country could play in future scenarios, and on its potential contribution to the United Nations efforts towards International Security and Peace.

\footnote{Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian President in his speech during the 56\textsuperscript{th} UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.}
My thesis is that Brazil can and should contribute more actively in regard to
United Nations efforts towards International Security without relinquishing the principles
that have been guiding its foreign policy throughout the last 50 years, and assume a more
distinguished participation, particularly in Peacekeeping Operations.

In order to prove my thesis statement, I will begin by providing an overview of
the Brazilian National Defense Strategy and how it is guided by the Constitution and
related to the country’s foreign policy. Afterwards, I will briefly sketch the Brazilian
approach in peacekeeping operations and the relevance of its participation in projecting
the name of the country. Following this, I will address the major deficiencies in the
planning, deployment and employment processes in order to identify potential fields in
which the country can give distinguished contributions to improve the United Nations
peacekeeping operations. Finally, I will address the issue of the Security Council, the
remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations and the consequences for the Brazilian
foreign policy in the 21st century.
CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
AND FOREIGN POLICY

Brazil’s foreign policy has been guided by solid principles throughout the last 50 years. These principles are similar to those included in the United Nations Charter, and are explicitly included in the Article 4 of its current constitution.\(^2\) These principles are:

a. National independence
b. Prevalence of human rights
c. Self-determination of the Peoples
d. Non-intervention
e. Equality among nation-states
f. Peace defense
g. Pacific solution for conflicts
h. Repudiation of terrorism and racism
i. Cooperation among nation-states towards the progress of mankind, and
j. Concession of political asylum.

Despite the fact that this constitution is relatively new, these principles have been setting the patterns for Brazilian participations in United Nations efforts for peace.
Another important aspect is that the linkage between these principles and the content of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, in step with its national objectives, has been the main guide to the decision-making process, particularly which of sending troops to integrate international Peacekeeping forces.

In order to achieve its national objectives, the Brazilian government established in 1996 its current National Defense Policy, which sets the Brazilian National Defense Objectives and the Strategic Orientation to conduct this policy. This Document, the first in Brazilian history, was prepared by a team of diplomats and military officers, and constitutes a presidential directive. The National Defense Objectives are the following:

a. Guarantee sovereignty while preserving the Nation’s territory integrity

b. Guarantee the rule of law and democratic institutions

c. Maintain the Nation’s cohesion and unity

d. Protect individuals, goods and resources that are Brazilian or under Brazilian jurisdiction

e. Achieve and maintain Brazilian interests abroad

f. Give Brazil a significant role in international affairs and a greater role in the international decision-making process, and

g. Contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The strategic orientation of its Defense Policy is centered in an active diplomacy in the pursuit of peace, and its defensive dissuasive strategic posture can be summarized in the followed premises:

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4 Braga, Carlos C. V. Military Integration in The Southern Cone: a Natural Consequence of The MERCOSUR, Command and Staff College. USA, Quantico, VA 2000. p. 22.
- Boundaries and limits lawfully defined and internationally recognized
- Close relation with neighbor states and with the international community based on mutual trust and respect
- Rejection of the war of conquest, and
- Search for a pacific solution of controversies and the use of force only in self-defense.

Despite the fact that previous constitutions have not mentioned its National Objectives and the principles that command its foreign policy, the former participations in United Nation peacekeeping operations indicate that the decision-making process had usually assessed these principles as a general guidance to send troops, particularly that of non-intervention, non-use of the force and impartiality.

On one hand the other important assessment lies in Chapter VI of the United Nations. As a major consideration, Brazil has normally considered the possibility of sending troops overseas in any case in which the parties involved in the conflict consent to the use of international military forces. On the other hand, it is not clearly defined in the text of Chapter VI, as for example in the Articles 33 and 34, that the employment of an international military force could be considered as a legitimate effort to support negotiations and peaceful conflict resolution.

As the Brazilian diplomat Paulo R. C. T. da Fontoura points out, in the practice of the United Nations, the establishment of missions of observation and Peacekeeping operations is not explicitly based on the disposals of its charter. Nevertheless, the members of the United Nations came to a consensus that it would not
be mandatory to search for an arrangement that matches perfectly the content of the charter, if this solution did not contradict any other article of the charter or any related international law or rule. This is called the Implicit Powers Doctrine and was recognized in the decision of the United Nations International Justice Court in 1949 in a case of claim for damage reparation.  

Still today after 51 years, this is a subject that causes countless discussions, and there is no approved definition in the General Assembly of peacekeeping operations. According to Paulo C. T. da Fontoura, that is the reason for not considering peacekeeping operations as one of the options for pacific solutions included in Article 33 of Chapter VI – negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

But these considerations do not impede a country in participating with troops in some United Nations Missions. From this experience, two factors emerge from UNEF I in the Gaza Strip, and from UNAVEM III in Angola (See Figure 1 in Chapter 3). The lessons learned from these experiences seem to be considered as an important guidance for the decisions regarding the employment of Brazilian troops; the former because it was the first and most important Brazilian contribution of troops to the United Nations, and the latter represented the return of a more active participation in the United Nations efforts towards peace after the end of the Cold War.

In both cases, it is important to make a brief appreciation of the non-intervention, impartiality and non-use of force principles. In his report of 9 October 1958 addressed to the General Assembly, Dag Hammarskjöld considered as one of the major

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6 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operaçõe de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 66
lessons learned from the UNEF I that only the expression of contentment of the parties assures the respect of the non-intervention in internal matters of the member-states, considering the content of the Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{8}

In regard to non-intervention, the Suez crisis was an international dispute between Israel and Egypt. This was an inter-state conflict, and both parties agreed that there was a need for the establishment of an international force that would occupy the contested zone and manage the cease-fire agreement, until a pacific solution to the conflict could be reached. That was to be considered the classic role of peacekeeping operations throughout the Cold War period.

After the Cold War, and with an increasing appearance of intra-states conflicts, the Great Powers, particularly the United States, at this point released from the containment strategy that guided its foreign policy during that period, started to influence the United Nations decision-making process. It was especially assertive when democratic principles, such as self-determination, freedom of religion, and humanitarian issues, particularly when genocide issues were at stake. In these cases, the United Nations resolutions were carried out by an ad hoc coalition headed by the United States. These actions were aimed at intervention in internal affairs of the subject countries, and were undertaken under Chapter VII authority.

The explicit use of force outside the self-defense of its military troops is one of the major constraints to Brazilian participation in such ad hoc coalition forces. On the one hand, those resolutions contradict directly the strategic orientation of its National Defense Strategy, the search for a pacific solution to controversies and the use of force only in

\textsuperscript{7} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{8} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 88.
self-defense, and on the other, those resolutions can be considered compatible with the principles of prevalence of human rights and self-determination of the peoples, set in the Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution. The non-use of force, as we can see, has been a key factor in Brazilian decisions regarding contributions with troops in United Nations Peace Operations.

Decisions to intervene in intra-state affairs, with the involvement of non-state actors, contribute significantly to an increased risk of employment of force. Such actors are likely to disobey a United Nations direction or international pressure, and the risk is considered to be higher than that of inter-state conflicts. It is thus important to consider the possibility of transforming a peacekeeping into a peace-enforcement operation during the accomplishment of the mandated mission.  

In that regard, the decision to send troops to Angola during the UNAVEM III, if it did not represent a shift in the Brazilian commitment to the United Nations Peacekeeping operations, it represented an important demonstration of the country’s determination to improve its contribution to the United Nations and remain engaged with the modern trends of international affairs. The increasing occurrence of intra and non-state conflicts characterized by non-observation of human rights constitutes a serious menace to peace.

In this particular case, despite the fact that factions of both UNITA and the FNLA agreed with the intervention of the United Nations, that conflict could be characterized as a dispute between one state actor, the FNLA, and one non-state actor, UNITA, and thus either or both could violate the United Nations mandate. Such a

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9 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 90.
situation could have led to a use of force, or the retirement of the contingent and a consequent review of the mandate or the resolution.

The Brazilian current National Defense Policy and foreign policy, as we can see, is a product of sound international positions adopted by the country since the creation of the United Nations and even before. The other aspect is that its current constitution defines explicitly the principles that guide the foreign policy and the country’s national objectives, which provide legitimacy and transparency to its international affairs. Furthermore, the publication of an unclassified version of its National Defense Strategy, with its clear objectives, augments the confidence that it contributes to international peace and development.

Brazil appreciates and supports the United Nations efforts towards the strengthening of peace. Regionally, in South America, the country has been able to develop solid friendships that are essential factors in the tranquility in the region. MERCOSUR, a regional organization embracing Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries are important organizations that have a major influence in Brazilian foreign policy. In addition Brazil seeks an increased economic, political and military integration of the Latin American countries with a view toward the formation of a Latin America community of nations.

The principles of non-intervention and non-use of force, as analyzed in this chapter, and the Brazilian commitment to international organizations and the culturally fraternal countries of Latin America and the Portuguese speaking nations have played a major role in its decision to participate in the United Nations efforts towards peace. It was
this national policy and philosophy that supported the case for the Brazilian commitment in the East Timor.

In the beginning of this new century with its continuing challenges to the achievement of peace, it is important to identify a proper direction for the pursuit of its National Defense Objectives, particularly, those that maintain peace and international security. To achieve this it is important to evaluate the Brazilian participation and the impact of its contributions in the international community. It is also important to address the priority for commitment in some regional operations, or those in cases of countries with a cultural affinity to Brazil, and the capacity of the country to adapt to the evolution of Peacekeeping operations in terms of military capability, nation-building, intra-state affairs, non-state actors, and civilian affairs, such as, humanitarian aid and elections monitoring.

Brazil regards peacekeeping operations as being of utmost relevance. Internally, its armed forces have been involved in the development and improvement of doctrine. Its regular training exercises include peace operations scenarios, and several efforts to improve the military education and preparedness to this sort of military activity is under way.

With regard to the United Nations, despite the fact that Brazil does not now have a representative in DPKO, it continues to participate in the organizational efforts to improve its rapid response capacity, updating its registers in the database and joining other member states in discussion meetings and conferences, particularly about the UN RAPID DEPLOYABLE HEADQUARTERS.
Brazil considers the Security Council reform a vital point. The government supports the idea that the number and composition of its members must be reviewed in a more comprehensive context to include the role of promoting economic and social development, in relation to human rights and basic liberties. Brazil also stresses that it is relevant to promote a predictable and stable environment for international trade and investment.

The country’s participation in peacekeeping operations has been a result of combined efforts from several agencies of the federal government, of the states, and of the Congress whose role is to approve the assignment of troops and financial resources. Although the majority of the population and government representatives regard peacekeeping operations as of great importance to project the name of the country, it has not achieved a consensus yet. However, there has been a perception that a distinguished contribution to UN peacekeeping would contribute to and influence the process of the country being invited to join the Security Council when it is ultimately expanded.
CHAPTER 3

BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

The Brazilian participation in Peace Keeping Operations started even before the creation of the United Nations. Under the authority of the League of Nations during the interwar period, the government assigned a naval officer to participate in a commission that was to administer the region around Leticia, a city near the boundary of Colombia and Peru on the Amazon River, from June 1933 to May 1934. Simultaneous to the military contribution, which would later be called peacekeeping operations, Brazil contributed actively in overseeing and mediating the peace agreement between Colombia and Peru.

After the Creation of the United Nations, Brazil has participated in Peacekeeping Operations since 1956. The purpose of this Chapter is to make an analysis of these participations in relation to the following aspects:

- The participation in military and civilian missions with mention of its historical antecedents
- The contribution of the inter-ministerial working-group set in May 1993
- The legal and budgetary aspects that affect the assignment of military and civilian personnel to UN operations
- The Brazilian contribution to the improvement of the Fast Reaction Capacity of the UN
- The initiatives to improve the capacity of certain African countries in peacekeeping operations
- The assignment of military personnel to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
- The participation in Command and Staff positions in peacekeeping missions
- The participation in activities related to the process of peace agreement consolidation
- The public affairs issues, and
- The policy adopted by the Brazilian Government in the United Nations and other fora.

THE PARTICIPATION IN MISSIONS

Brazilian participation in the United Nations peace operations can be divided into two periods: the first from 1957 and 1967, when Brazil participated in six UN operations with particular distinction to the UNEF I in Sinai and in the Gaza Strip, and the second during the period from 1989 to the present, in which the country diversified its contributions to perform broader missions requiring a higher command and control, logistic and other specific capabilities, such as disarmament missions and election
supervision. During this period, the participation in the UNAVEM III, in Angola can be highlighted.\(^\text{10}\)

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<td>Military</td>
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\(^{10}\) Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 203.
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<td>Military Observers of the cease-fire agreement from September 1965 until March 1966.</td>
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1995, the end of the
mandate. One
Military Medical
Team with 14
personnel, and in
1992 with 4
election monitors.

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<td>ONUMOZ (Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMUR (Uganda/Ruanda)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia)</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>UNTAC (Cambodia)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>MINUGUA (Guatemala)</td>
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Allowed UN to employ UNAVEM military observers from September to November 1993.

Liaison Officers and policemen as observers from October 1994 until today. To the PKO, 18 military observers, including the Executive Officer to supervise the facilities and the demobilization of the guerrilla from February until May 1997.

12 election monitors in April 1994.

One Infantry Battalion with 800 personnel, one Combat Engineer Company with 200 personnel, Military Medical Units and Military Observers from August 1995 until July 1997.
In both periods, Brazil also participated in peace operations not under the authority of the United Nations. During the first period, it is relevant to mention the Brazilian contribution to the Inter-American Peace Force that was assigned to the Dominican Republic between 1965 and 1966. This deployment was authorized by the Organization of the American States in its resolution of 5th June 1965.

Of the 23,450 personnel involved, most were from the United States; however, 1,450 composed this force from Brazil and 440 from other member states. The OAS established a unified command to coordinate the activities of the various assigned forces. Two Brazilian Army Flag Officers exercised general command: General Hugo Panasco Alvim from the beginning until January 1966, and General Álvaro Alves da Silva from

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11 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 201 to 203.
January 1966 until its dissolution. After having contributed to the reestablishment of democracy through the conduct of national elections on 1 January 1966, the Brazilian contingent was repatriated after the J Balaguer’s occupation of the Presidency in 1 July 1966\textsuperscript{12}.

**BRAZIL IN THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS**

Brazil has not traditionally participated in multinational forces authorized by the United Nations Security Council. According to note 150, included in the Table 6, the Getúlio Vargas government, despite significant international pressures exercised by the United States, declined the formal request of the United Nations Secretary General asking for the assignment of troops to participate in the Korean War. The Brazilian participation was limited to the donation of products up to CR $ 50 million\textsuperscript{13}.

After decades under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, in 1996 Brazil was consulted by the United Nations over the country’s possibility of providing a contingent to the multinational force to Zaire, currently the Republican of Congo, to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally dislocated populace who were trapped in a civil war. Although, the initial response was positive, and indeed the armed

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 204
\textsuperscript{13} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 205
forces and the Brazilian International Relations Ministry had appreciated the engagement options, the force was not mobilized because the situation evolved into a peaceful settlement.

On 6 September 1999, the population of East Timor territory in Indonesia was submitted to a popular referendum which purpose was to define the political future of its people. This referendum intended to define whether East Timor would continue under Indonesian rule or would be independent. The overwhelming majority of 98.5 percent decided in favor of independence. Of this number 78.5 percent favored complete independence, the others being favorable of autonomy.

Right after the announcement of the popular referendum results, the security situation within the territory deteriorated rapidly, turning the population into internal refugees and generating an immediate need for humanitarian aid. The Indonesian militias had launched a series of furious attacks against the East Timor population. While the data on the number of the people killed remains unknown, estimates for the dislocated, who were forced to abandon their homes, were 300,000 persons in a population of 850,000. Facing this situation, the United Nations Security Council, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and with the acquiescence of the Indonesian government, approved the resolution 1264 of 1999 authorizing the member states to compose a multinational force to intervene in East Timor. This resolution allowed the use of necessary means to accomplish the mandate of the mission to restore order and protect the population.\footnote{14}

In the case of a multinational force, it is essential to underline that the participating country must provide all the conditions and resources to sustain their
contingents during the mission. Among the requirements for sustainment are those factors that affect the decision-making process, such as the availability of modern assets for logistics and communication support, the capacity to provide the force proper resources for healthy and transportation, the capability to provide rapidly deployable and properly trained forces and inherent legal issues.

The Brazilian participation with armed forces was limited to the cession of an Army Military Police Detachment and an Army field grade officer in support of the multinational force and its staff. However, the importance of this decision is that it was the first time that Brazil was integrating with a force authorized but not commanded by United Nations, in the accomplishment of a mandate elaborated under Chapter VII. The acquiescence of Djakarta did give the mission an intervention character by acknowledging that it had lost control of the situation. The Brazilian government decision represented an important advance in the country position towards East Timor independence and the support of the UN peace operations.

Overall Brazil does not have a significant experience in multinational forces mainly because of the effect of financial and legal aspects. Over the last 55 years Brazil has faced the possibility of contributing to a multinational force on three occasions. The first was during the Korean War in 1951. The second was in 1996 during the Congo civil war crisis. The third was in East Timor, when Brazil decided to participate with a small contingent from the Army.

THE PEACE OPERATIONS INTERMINISTERIAL WORKING-GROUP

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14 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 206
There was a lack of an organization to supervise, coordinate and to remain current with the international evolution of peacekeeping operations within the Federal Government until 1992. With an increasing number of Brazilian military personnel participating in these kinds of operations in Angola, Central America and the former Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1992, the Itamaraty thus took the initiative and coordinated the establishment of a working group called *Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial (GTI)* to examine and propose actions to achieve the following objectives:

1. To increase the Brazilian influence in the United Nations departments that deal with Peacekeeping operations by assigning personnel to work in the United Nations Secretariat
2. To improve the coordination between the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Court and the Itamaraty to make the assignment of Military Officers, Police Officers and Electoral Experts more agile and efficient
3. To update the current legislation that regulates the decisions over sending armed military contingents and non-armed military observers overseas
4. To take advantage of any opportunity to establish bilateral cooperation during the implementation process in an effort to achieve enduring peace, and
5. To evaluate the wider aspects that could influence the creation of elite peace operation units in the armed forces, specially trained and equipped to be employed under United Nations request.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 208
As a result of the work of this group, a series of modifications and attempts to increase and improve the Brazilian contributions to the United Nations Peacekeeping efforts were put into practice and will be discussed on the following sections of this chapter.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

The actions proposed by the Inter-ministerial Working Group have led the armed forces to incorporate definitively, as a regular mission, the assignment of military personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations. These personnel may be employed either as observers, or as troops, or as staff officers. The other important policy change is that the UN-related troop assignment was made the responsibility of the joint staff, which replaced the Army ministry, and from that point on it became a joint activity.\(^{16}\)

This institutional change improved the Brazilian contribution of military observers to the UN peacekeeping missions, particularly from 1993. From 1994 Brazil recommenced its UN contribution with troops that reflected an improvement in the preparedness and in the reaction time needed to respond to international situations. This improvement was a clear result of the new military and foreign relation ministries internal decision-making and coordination procedures. The implementation of specific structures within these organizations helped to facilitate the whole process of assignment and preparation of personnel to the missions.\(^{17}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Military Personnel per Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{16}\) In 1993, Brazil did not have an integrated Ministry of Defense, the Defense issues were dealt by four ministries: the ministry of the Army, the ministry of the Navy, the ministry of the Air Force and the ministry of Armed Forces Major Staff, that took care of specific joint issues. Only in 1999 that the Brazilian Government extinguished the four ministries and established an integrated ministry of Defense.

\(^{17}\) Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 210
Figure 2- Military personnel assigned by Brazil to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the period 1989-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR, UNMOP, UNTAES, UNPREDEP</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I, II, III and MONUA</td>
<td>3577</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFCYP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3978</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a consequence of the recommendations of the Inter-ministerial Working Group and from the analysis of DPKO reports, some initiatives to improve training and preparation of personnel and units were put into practice within the Army and the Navy. The Army has implemented a course that consists of a 3-week program for volunteers to work as military observers or as staff officers. These personnel attend classes in computers, English language, UN administrative and operational procedures and special purpose briefings over the situation and characteristics of the nation in which they will perform the mission. This experience has proved of significant value, and the Army has also used computers to implement a non-resident program with a notable success.

In terms of the mobilization and preparation of troop contingents, the Army has made efforts to assign troops from every region of the country in order to spread the doctrine and the lessons from the previous participations. This practice has permitted a simultaneous preparation throughout the Army, increasing the preparedness of its personnel. However, the time to prepare the troops ranges between 60 and 90 days after the congressional approval of the necessary supplementary credits. These credits allow
the assembly of materiel and commencement of the requisite administrative procedures and specific training.

Time of mobilization was improved with the creation of the Rapid Action Battalions as part of the modernization program of the service. Another important aspect of the personnel selection is that no conscript can be assigned to UN missions, only professional soldiers.\textsuperscript{19}

In the Navy, the Força de Fuzileiros da Esquadra (FFE), the Brazilian equivalent to the United States Fleet Marine Force, is responsible for training and equipping troops, staff members and military observers. Despite the fact that these Marines and Sailors are not specifically trained to these sort of operations, the marine units of the FFE have long been conducting training in the specific actions typical to peacekeeping operations, such as, urban and rural patrols and facility security. The Navy also contributes military observers and helps with the transportation of personnel and materiel. Nevertheless, the time of mobilization is the same as that of the Army.

The Air Force contribution in terms of military personnel has been limited to observers and staff officers, although it has also been contributing significantly to the sustainment of the forces in the field, and the transportation of personnel, equipment and supply items.\textsuperscript{20}

Before the need to improve the logistic support and integrate contingents from the two senior services, the Army and the Navy, the former ministry of the Joint Staff determined the establishment of a support unit to each mission involving armed troop

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 210
\item \textsuperscript{19} Rapid Action Battalion. In Portuguese, “Batalhão de Pronto-empręgo”. This Army chose some units throughout the country and established a special program of equipping and training in order to transform these units in rapid deployable battalions to improve time-response and preparedness of the service.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
contingents called *Grupo de Apoio do Estado Maior das Forças Armadas* (GRAPEMFA). Two of these groups were established, one to support the UNAVEM III in Angola and another to support the UNOMOZ in Mozambique. The Ministry of Foreign Relations did not play a formal role in formation of these groups; however, it was invited to participate on an informal basis. This interaction permitted the establishment of adequate coordination between ministries and services, fostering the mutual confidence essential to situations involving the country’s prestige and the risk of human lives.

The cost of sending and maintaining troops for a protracted period is another important issue that deserves to be carefully analyzed. The contingents of UNOMOZ and UNAVEM III accounted for a cost of R$ 236,647,332, or approximately US $100,000,000.00. The personnel expenses accounted for almost 38 percent of the total cost, R$ 102,086,435. Nevertheless, this aspect can be rationalized by the fact that had these troops stayed in the country, they would have consumed almost the same amount in regular training. Furthermore, the expenses in materiel particularly were made to acquire equipment or hire services from national companies. Considering the amount of resources usually allocated to the military budget that in 1998, for example, was US $ 13,8 billion, this cost can be considered affordable.21

It is also important to note that the contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations is mandatory for all the member states according to Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter. In the case of an inadequate contribution, the specified country will have to reimburse other member states. Until 1999, Brazil had been reimbursed in US $

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20 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*, 2000, p. 212
36,000,000, and some other reimbursements are pending because of the delinquency of the UN.

Besides the measures to improve the training and preparation of forces, other important actions were taken in order to defend the Brazilian interests in the context of the missions in which the country was contributing troops, particularly the assignment of personnel to be employed in key functions within the staff in the field and within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).  

Although the majority of the measures implemented somehow helped to improve the country contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts, it is relevant to address the issue of mobilization, particularly the congressional approval of credits. While the assignment of military observers is absorbed by the regular budget of the armed forces, the deployment and employment of troops need congressional approval for extra credits, a process that normally requires ninety days. Considering that the time for preparation of the force accounts for additional 60 to 90 days the overall time to have the contingent operating in the field can reach up to 180 days.

**BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN COMMAND BILLETS IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

The inter-ministerial working-group stressed the need for Brazil to have officers assigned to command billets in the UN peacekeeping operations as an effective way to safeguard the troops assigned to those missions, as well as a means to provide the assigned officers with a broader professional experience and motivate the officers dealing

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22 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU, 2000., p. 215
23 Ibid., p. 213
with these challenges. However, the Brazilian experience, throughout its more than 50 years duration, reveals that the selection process to key billets is a cloudy mixture of political criteria, of the size of the troop contributions, of the mood of the Secretariat, of particular aspects of the conflict, and of the sensitivities of the neighboring countries and of the country invited to cede the flag officer.\textsuperscript{24}

Moreover, as a usual procedure, the DPKO tries to assign the billets in proportion to the quantity of troops and personnel assigned by the contributing countries. On one hand, in Angola, Brazil offered 43 officers to compose the staff and work in the regional commands. However, only a small part of them occupied key billets, despite the fact that Brazil and India were the two greatest contributors of troops. On the other, in Guatemala, in Mozambique, and in the former Yugoslavia, where in each case the contributions of the participating countries were far less expressive, the Army supplied one field grade officer to be the executive officer of the MINUGUA and two flag officers to command the military observers in UNOMOZ and in UNPROFOR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>NAME AND RANK</th>
<th>BILLET</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>General-de-Divisão Carlos Paiva Chaves (Flag Officer O-8)</td>
<td>Commandant of the UN Force</td>
<td>JAN/AGO 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>General-de-Divisão Syseno Sarmento (Flag Officer O-8)</td>
<td>Commandant of the UN Force</td>
<td>JAN1965/ JAN1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>General-de-Brigada Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Flag Officer O-7)</td>
<td>Commandant of the UN Force</td>
<td>JAN1989/ MAY1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>General-de-Brigada Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Flag Officer O-7)</td>
<td>Commandant of the Military Observers</td>
<td>MAY1991/ SEP1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>General-de-Divisão Lélio Gomcvalves Rodrigues da Silva (Flag Officer O-8)</td>
<td>Commandant of the Military Component</td>
<td>FEB1993/ FEB1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>General-de-Brigada Newton Bonuma (Flag Officer O-7)</td>
<td>Commandant of the Military Observers</td>
<td>NOV1994/ NOV1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Carlos Eduardo Brandão (Field Grade Officer O-6)</td>
<td>Commandant of the Military Observers</td>
<td>JUL1996/ JUL 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Carlos Ribeiro</td>
<td>Commandant of the</td>
<td>AGO1997/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 216
Although the Brazilian capacity to influence the selection process is limited, it is relevant that the country makes a continuing effort with the Secretary General to have its officers assigned to the staffs and assigned to the higher billets of the regional commands in each mission that employs Brazilian personnel. According to the former ministries of the Joint Staff (EMFA) and of the Army, this was one of the most significant lessons learned from the Brazilian participations in Mozambique and in Angola. 26

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)

As a result of a long effort and the successful contribution of troops to the UNOMOZ and UNAVEM III, Brazil was formally invited to join the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1994. The participation of Brazilian in the DPKO was of great importance to the country, as it had worked hard to be accepted. It also opened Brazilian access to key information regarding the organization of the missions of observation and peacekeeping operations and the bureaucratic procedures of reimbursement and indemnities. On June 1998, Brazil became the 5th largest contributor with 7 officers joining the DPKO, only surpassed by 4 countries, the United States with 11, France with 10, Italy with 9, and United Kingdom with 8. Figure 4 shows these assignments through February 1999.

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25 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 215
26 Ibid., p. 217
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>BILLET AND SECTION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Robert R. Baptista</strong></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Logistic Officer of the Operational Logist Section in the Field Administration and</td>
<td>JUN/1994 to JUN/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logistic Division (FALD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major João A. A. da Costa</strong></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Engineering Officer of the Engineering Section in the FALD</td>
<td>MAY/1995 to APR/1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Marcelo E. C. Rodrigues</strong></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Engineering Officer of the Engineering Section in the FALD</td>
<td>APR/1997 to FEB/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitão-de-Fragata (O-5) Paulo C. D. Teixeira</strong></td>
<td>Navy (Marine Corps)</td>
<td>Logistic Officer of the Operational Logist Section in the FALD</td>
<td>MAY/1996 to FEB/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Gregório Feldman</strong></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Medical Support Officer of the Medical Support Unity in the Planning Division</td>
<td>MAY/1997 to Feb 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenente-Coronel (O-5) José da F. M. Leal</strong></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Claims Officer of the Administration Unit in the FALD</td>
<td>MAY/1996 to DEC/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suboficial (E-7)</strong></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Assistant Claims Officer of the Administration Unit in the FALD</td>
<td>MAY/1996 to DEC/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitão-de-Fragata (O-5) Afrânio de P. M. Júnior</strong></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Military Personnel Policy Officer of the Under Secretary-General Personnel Administration Office</td>
<td>NOV/1996 to NOV/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitão-de-Corveta (O-4) Maria de A. Oliveira</strong></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Information Systems Officer of the Policy and Analysis Unit in the Under Secretary-General Office</td>
<td>NOV/1996 to NOV/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capitão-de-Corveta (O-4) Tomás de A. T. Botelho</strong></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Logistic Officer of the Operational Logist Section in the FALD</td>
<td>JUN/1998 to FEB/1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4- Brazilian Officers in Staff Billets in the UN Headquarters and in the DPKO

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27 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 218
The UN suspended this free assignment of officers to work in the DPKO in February 1999, because their tours were limited to 2 years. After that short period, the expertise was lost. Considering the high level of specialty required to fill the billets in the DPKO, the UN decided to hire retired officers or officers that had left active duty to gain a more permanent reservoir of skill. In 1998, Brazil submitted candidates selected from within the armed services; however, with this new policy no one is being considered.

Even though candidates are being rejected at the moment, Brazil considers their assignment to DPKO vital. Even the alternative of assigning retired officers or officers who are not on active duty is considered essential, as it is important to occupy these billets, as such assignments are key in having access to privileged information regarding the mobilization of forces and organization of UN missions. This last point is important in that a Brazilian representative can participate more actively in discussions and the conceptual development of force employment to the benefit of his country.28

PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

The Inter-ministerial Working Group verified that Brazil was able to participate in Elections Monitoring Operations in every type of electoral operation performed by the United Nations. Until the year of 2000, the country had contributed to 5 peacekeeping operations and only one civil mission that included election monitoring. This one mission has been Brazil’s most important civilian contribution. Figure 5 details this activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNAVEM II</th>
<th>UNTAC</th>
<th>UNOSAL</th>
<th>UNOMSA</th>
<th>UNOMOZ</th>
<th>UNAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 219
In 1993, as recommended by the Inter-ministerial Working Group, the Superior Electoral Court selected 69 voluntary experts from the states and from the Federal District, and their names were included in the data-base of the Elections Assistance Division of the United Nations. Besides the civilians from the Ministry of Justice, diplomats from the Itamaraty also worked in support of these activities as government observers.

The Brazilian participation in these activities has been diversified, and the country has accumulated significant experience with its system of mobilization of electoral experts not only to UN missions, but also missions carried out by the OAS and other multilateral and regional organizations.

With regard to foreign policy, participation of diplomats working together with military and electoral experts has contributed to a better domestic visibility of the overseas activities, especially because of the assignment of representatives from all the states. Overall and as a consequence of good results achieved internationally and domestically, it is of great importance that the country pursues a foreign policy towards a permanent commitment in order to contribute even more effectively to UN efforts in the electoral field and to continue to update the data-base of the Elections Assistance Division of the United Nations.

THE ISSUES OF THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION

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29 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 225
Efforts of the Executive to influence the congress over the necessity to update and modernize the legislation that regulates the employment of troops overseas in peacetime has produced little. The current federal law 2,953 dates from 17 November 1956 and is in need of revision. Moreover, there is still no legislation to regulate the employment of military observers.

The law project that resulted from the recommendations of the Inter-ministerial Working Group tried to update the current legislation in 1993. The Government sent to congress draft legislation on December 27; nevertheless, the experience accumulated in Angola and Mozambique revealed that it was inadequate and the project was withdrawn from the congress.

In 1999, constitutional amendment number 23 dated September 9 created the Ministry of Defense and extinguished the former three services ministries and the joint staff ministry. It addressed expressly the role of the Defense regarding peacekeeping operations. It should be responsible for preparing, mobilizing and providing forces to UN peacekeeping operations, while the ministry of foreign relations would provide an interface with the UN and would advise the President with regard to choosing the best scenarios in which the country could participate. These roles were perfectly in accordance with the National Defense Policy, established by the President in 1996. However, the congress considers that this document does not address fundamental issues. Among other issues, there are procedures needed to hire companies to provide services or materiel and equipment and to allocate resources in the Defense budget to meet the needs of this type of operations.

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30 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 225
Moreover, within the Executive branch there is no consensus over the inclusion of a rubric in the Military budget to attend the specific expenses in UN peacekeeping operations. The economic advisors within the Executive consider a formal appreciation by the Congress as essential to alter the composition of the Budget, which move would meet one suggestion made by Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace to shift the responsibility from the Foreign Relations Ministries to the Defense Ministries. According to him, this would presumably highlight international peacekeeping as a central security mission in the post-Cold War period and could provide much larger resources than typically exist in the Foreign Relation Ministries. In the specific case of Brazil, it would also contribute to better meeting the roles set in the National Defense Policy.

Every time that the country has had the opportunity to contribute with troops in United Nations peacekeeping operations, the issue has had to pass two times in the congress. First, the Executive has needed to obtain the acquiescence to send a contingent overseas and second, to approve additional credits to meet the financial needs of the mission. As a result, the overall delay in this process could reach up to 180 days.

It is highly recommended that the Executive and the Legislative establish a co-responsibility system, because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the matter and the need to respond with supplementary budget credits, both of which could improve the country’s response to the UN requests. This system would also allow a more effective channel of information between the branches, improving the transparency of the decisions, an aspect.

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highly valorized by the Congress, particularly with regard to press coverage of the events in the field\textsuperscript{32}.

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE UN EFFORTS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY

A most important aspect of the Brazilian government effort at responding to UN needs is that of its opposition to the establishment of a permanent or even semi-permanent force under the operational control of the United Nations, particularly in the way it was proposed in the Peace Agenda elaborated by the former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The major concerns of the country in this regard are threefold. The first is budgetary implications. The second is the issue of command and command relationships, and the third is the existence of a potential risk of manipulation by the great powers, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council\textsuperscript{33}. Despite these challenges to Brazilian sovereignty, the government intends to support the UN efforts to reduce the time between the issue of the Security Resolution setting the mission and the deployment of the forces.

This paper now addresses other suggestions to improve the United Nations response. It is important to assess the Brazilian participation in the Stand-by Arrangements System and in the informal group of the Friends of the Rapid Deployment Mission. Finally, it is vital to analyze the Brazilian contribution to the establishment of a United Nations Rapid Deployable Brigade.

\textsuperscript{32} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 239 and 240.
\textsuperscript{33} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 240.
THE PARTICIPATION IN THE STAND-BY-ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM

Despite former invitations in 1991, Brazilian participation in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System was regarded more seriously only after the establishment of the Inter-ministerial Working Group in 1993. As a consequence of this change in posture, the Army and the Navy had to identify the forces that would be available for these operations. However, the need of Congressional approval both for deployment and financial resources were incompatible with the mobilization time proposed by the DPKO, which was up to 7 days, up to 14 days and up to 30 days, depending on the size of the force and scenario. This incompatibility had left the initial efforts inconclusive. In 1994, the government put the project on hold pending reconciliation between congressional approval times and UN notice.

It was not until 1997, when the DPKO reviewed the mobilization time requirements – up to 30 days, from 30 to 60 days, up to 90 days and more than 90 days – that the matter gained a renewed life. These times could be considered feasible and compatible with Brazilian government requirements, since they would now allow the time usually needed by the Congress to approve and make available the proper resources. At the same time the Army was implementing its Rapid Action Battalion, a force that would soon qualify to be introduced into the data-base of the DPKO.

On July, 1998, the armed services committed to the Itamaraty the forces available to support the UN Stand-by Arrangements System. Mainly, these forces were comprised of one Marine Corps Infantry Battalion, one Army Infantry Battalion, a Combat Engineer Company, a medical detachment, and 27 officers from the Navy,
Marine Corps and the Army to support the Rapid Deployable Mission Headquarters and the Staff of the Mission Command.

Despite the relaxation in the mobilization times, there were lingering concerns about the legislative and the budgetary issues. However, these obstacles did not impede the country to making progress and overcoming issues, such as, information unavailability, readiness, logistics and training improvements within the armed forces. In the budgetary field, the government needs to study the possibility of establishing cotangential credits in the budget, and in the legal field the Congress and the Executive should contemplate signing a Memorandum on an Ad Referendum basis. This memorandum would give the Executive prior authorization to commit forces as proposed in 1998. Occasional adjustments could be further carried out by the Congress as a result of negotiations with the UN. Moreover, this would allow the reliable insertion of Brazilian forces in the DPKO data-base.  

PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE UN

Different methods have been developed to improve the Rapid Deployable System by various countries, mainly European and North-American States, with lesser or greater degrees of success. Among those, the Rapid Deployable Brigade (SHIRBRIG), the Iberia-American Peace Force and the “Força Lusófona de Paz” are of special interest for the Brazilian Government because of the priorities in its foreign policy of strengthening its ties with other Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries.

34 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 244.
With regard to the SHIRBRIG, the main constraints to the Brazilian integration are the legal and the budgetary issues already discussed. These impose a considerable delay in the mobilization and preparation of forces. Considering the fact that until now the country has not found a way to overcome these constraints, the government has never shown any real intention in joining this force. The other two initiatives, restricted to a smaller group of countries, were likewise not advanced.

During the II Defense Ministers Assembly of the Portuguese Official Language African Countries in May 1999, Brazil and Portugal agreed to submit to the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community a proposal for the creation of an Interstate Defense Commission. Given the Government’s experience and those of the European countries and of the United States in Africa, the true underlying intent of the proposed military cooperation was aimed at preparing troops to integrate into UN peacekeeping forces rather than to establish any long-term commitment to a multi-national force.

Furthermore, no African country has shown any real the intent to participate in the Stand-by Arrangements System. In Latin-America, only four other countries agreed to participate in this arrangement: Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala and Uruguay.

Argentina, a strategic partner in the MERCOSUR, joined the SHIRBRIG, which clouds the situation with respect to Brazil and raise further issues to consider with regard to economic and military integration in the Southern cone and in Latin-America.

As a result, the only initiative that has gained maturity, particularly after 1994, is the SHIRBRIG. The others are considered to be more a way to strengthen bilateral military relations than an effective way to improve the rapid response capability for United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Regarding these aspects and the legal and
budgetary constraints, any significant improvement in a short term is not considered feasible.\footnote{Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 247.}

THE PARTICIPATION IN THE FRIENDS OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT GROUP AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAPID DEPLOYABLE MISSION HEADQUARTERS

Brazil has participated in the informal group of Friends of Rapid Deployment, and believes that the position of the group should be disseminated better, and that all members contribute with equal weight. This position is adopted so that a small number of states, particularly the NATO members, do not dominate the recommended proposals and the courses of action. Brazil recognizes the utility of this group; however, it considers that the appropriate forum for this matter is the UN Peacekeeping Operations Special Committee.

The proposal most favored by Brazil and discussed in this forum is the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ). After the creation of the RDMHQ Unit in the DPKO in July 1996, the Secretariat consulted the member states over the assignment of personnel to fill its billets. Today, the nucleus of the Headquarters has been established; however, the DPKO intended to create an intermediate support unit with up to 29 personnel in the DPKO and another 24 personnel on stand-by in their home countries.

As opposed to the Stand-by Arrangements, the military personnel assigned to the RDMHQ can be employed without further notice to their home country. This idea does not contravene the Brazilian National Policy of impartiality and non-use of force.
This arrangement is reinforced by Brazilian participation in of the group of Rapid Deployment Friends, which fosters discussion over vital matters, such as transportation of troops and other logistics requirements.\textsuperscript{36}

**IMPROVING THE AFRICAN CAPACITY IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

The former advisor of the Secretary-General, General Franklin Van Kappen, suggested that Brazil should extend its participation in Africa to non-Portuguese speaking countries. According to him, this could be an appropriate response to critiques from a number of countries regarding Brazilian participation in lusophone UN peacekeeping operations. The inference here is that Brazil is “the new Portugal”, an epithet with adverse colonial connotations. Such a modification in policy tends also to prevent adverse comparisons to other South-American countries, such as, Argentina and Uruguay.

Besides the moral pressure, this proposal seems to have a clear intent of forcing Brazil to augment its contribution with additional troops. Brazil’s principal commitment is to the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community and Latin-America. Nevertheless, it has authorized the United Nations to transfer military observers from the UNAVEM II in Angola to the UNOMIL in Libya, has sent electoral experts to the UNOMSA in South-Africa, and furnished military observers and a medical detachment to augment the UNOMUR.\textsuperscript{37}

In terms of bilateral cooperation, Brazil has made contacts with the American African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and the French *Renforcement des Capacités*

\textsuperscript{36} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*, 2000, p. 249
\textsuperscript{37} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*, 2000, p. 250
Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) initiatives. The first result of these contacts was the participation in two assemblies of the African Peacekeeping Support Group (APSG) in New York. These meetings envisaged the conduct of infantry training. The Brazilian Army was consulted and agreed to examine the possibilities for cooperation in light of its financial constraints and the kind of training required. In regard to the latter, the French government invited Brazil to participate in two exercises. The first occurred in 1998 in Senegal, and the other in 2000, in Gabon. In both exercises the country participated only with observers. Although these invitations were important from the stand-point of bilateral relationships and military interchange, they did not contribute significantly to improve the Brazilian capability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Despite the increasing need for emergency humanitarian assistance during the recent conflicts on the African continent, the Brazilian government is currently incapable of providing a significant contribution in this area, again because of operational and budgetary constraints. Nevertheless, a plausible course of action could be the establishment of agreements with selected countries on information sharing, engineering missions, military personnel education, and on-job training. This political gesture would highlight Brazilian commitment without a long-term or expensive commitment. However, over time it could be positively interpreted and might prove to be an effective commitment towards the improvement of the African countries in conducting peacekeeping operations.  

THE REPERCUSSION IN THE PRESS

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38 Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 252
As the commitment of the Brazilian troops grew during the early 1990s, there was an increasing need to give more transparency to the government decisions affecting troops employed in Mozambique and Angola. Overall the media coverage focused on the contribution of Brazilian troops to the happy notion of peace and international security. The press did, however, address the complaints of low salaries by military personnel, and the augmented pay of UN missions acting as a primary factor in attracting volunteers.

The Joint Staff Ministry (EMFA) was anxious to have the media visit military facilities overseas and arranged a daily program in the Radiobrás, the official Brazilian government radio station, to report on Brazilian troops in Angola and Mozambique.

In the majority of cases the response was very positive; however, in some episodes, such as, the fatal wounding of a marine corporal who was killed in an ambush, media coverage was sensational and gave a distorted and disproportional view of the situation. As the media is a significant instrument in forming and manipulating opinion, it must feel that immediate and precise information is being provided, particularly over any adverse development.

The decision to contribute with troops is certainly a political one, and it is taken with the inherent risks of participation in operations such as peacekeeping. However, government decisions cannot be dictated by a possible negative public reaction at the news of accidents or fatalities. The government needs to be pro-active and provide substantial and timely information to the general public. Part of this anticipation should be a policy of cooperation with all forms of media in influencing public opinion. The publication of articles in specialized magazines is one way that could contribute effectively to the government efforts.
PARTICIPATION IN NATION REBUILDING OPERATIONS

Actions that are aimed at keeping peace need to be followed by or implemented simultaneously with measures to consolidate peace. These measures seek to prevent the reopening of hostilities, to aid in economic recovery, and to encourage a democratic government.

The economic, political and social recovery can be achieved through a reintegration of a population into sound business, government and social pursuits. To achieve these purposes, there will be a considerable need for the generation of new jobs, investments to rebuild the physical infrastructure, and the establishment of the rule of law. It is also essential to reestablish means for the population to feed itself and make a living free of NGOs and other sources of support. Brazil has given aid both by bilateral and multilateral agreements to host nations. Among the contributions, the ministries of foreign relations and the armed forces have provided support for the organization of police forces, and mine removal activities.

Recently, the Army and the Marine Corps have been participating in a mission conducted by the OAS to remove mines in Central America, the MARMINCA. This mission is part of the Mine-clearing Assistance Program in Central America (PADCA), created in 1991 upon a request of countries within that region. The Inter-American Defense Joint-Staff (JID) coordinates the operational activities of the international military teams that in June 1999 were composed of 28 personnel from Brazil, 4 from Argentina, 5 from Colombia, 3 from El Salvador and 4 from Venezuela. Traditionally the largest contingent to augment the MARMINCA is Brazilian and without onus to the
organization or the host nation. The Brazilian Officers have performed tasks of mine clearing in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Another important contribution is to the improvement of police services. Policemen from Brazil have contributed to the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP), in which Brazilian policemen performed as instructors and advisors and also contributed to the Central-American Police Superior Studies Institutes, both located in El Salvador.

In Angola the Army has sent one doctor to teach in the Mine Counter-action Technical School of Angola, and to contribute to the National Development Program of a Mine-clearing Capacity, sponsored by the United Nations Office Project Services (UNOPS).

Again in Angola the government attempted to establish a bilateral cooperation with the proposed foundation of a Mission of Military Cooperation. This military mission would comprise military personnel and material mobilized primarily from the Army. It would consist of a liaison office, one combat engineering company, and one medical team. The Itamaraty defined the purpose of the mission, and the financial resources necessary to support the mission would be approximately 17 million dollars. The ratification of this mission is still dependent on the signing of the agreement between Brazil and Angola and a subsequent congressional approval.

In Angola, the military participation in peace consolidation initiatives helps to project a positive image of Brazil both in international circles and in Angola. While this country is located in a region that receives a high priority in Brazilian foreign policy, its outlook remains dim under the current government, despite the fact that it holds great
potential with its vast natural resources. Taking advantage of its industrial, services and technological capabilities, other potential fields of bilateral cooperation can be explored, such as structuring of the education system and construction, particularly housing and roads.\textsuperscript{40}

In other words, in light of Brazilian foreign policy, it is essential to sustain a presence in order to demonstrate good faith toward the potential bilateral relationship. Indeed, it is important to note that countries simply contributing with donations of equipment and financial resources garner less appreciation and acknowledgment than those contributing troops and personnel in the field. Brazilian experience indicates that a people-to-people aspect of any program is important in making it understood and appreciated by all concerned. A remaining question is raised as to what extent the Itamaraty would be interested in focusing its bilateral relations on the military and police field in the face of decreasing budgetary resources and increasing technical capabilities requirements.\textsuperscript{41}

**LESSONS FROM THE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Brazil has kept an independent and consistent position without succumbing to the oscillations in the postures of some western countries that until 1993 had considered peacekeeping operations as a panacea for every conflict. After 1994, those countries adopted an unwavering position regarding the creation of new missions and have preferred to support the authorization of Chapter VII mandates for multinational forces,

\textsuperscript{39} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C.  *T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 258

\textsuperscript{40} Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C.  *T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU*. 2000, p. 259
or depending on the case, for regional or sub-regional organisms, considered more “efficient” by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{42}

On one hand Brazil does not support the policy adopted by some non-aligned countries that are adamantly against new concepts and proposals to adjust or change the methods employed. On the other, it does not concur with the developed countries that seek to implement their interventionist policies.\textsuperscript{43}

It is clear to say that Brazil has a large and widely varied experience in peacekeeping operations. However, there are still some fields in which the country needs to improve effective practical measures in order to support its foreign policy and the achievement of its strategic goals. There is little question about the know-how acquired in participating in a broad and wide context in the last forty-five years, from military observation and demilitarized zone patrolling to electoral monitoring. Nevertheless, some essential capacities can be improved in order to contribute more effectively to the role of the country in the future.

These opportunities for improvement include logistic capabilities to support missions at long distances, command and control, inter-agency and joint planning and conduct of operations, revised legislation, presence in the host nation after the end of the mandate, enhanced peace consolidation process, and a review of its foreign policy to consider the possibility of integrating ad hoc coalitions of multinational forces authorized by the United Nations and the expansion of the priorities of commitment from being mainly restricted to the Portuguese speaking countries and Latin America to other regions of the planet.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 259  
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 264
CHAPTER 4

WHY PEACEKEEPING REMAINS ESSENTIAL

As the character of threats has changed, many conflicts may seem remote to those not immediately in the line of fire. Nevertheless, recent history has shown how quickly civil wars between parties can destabilize neighboring countries and spread throughout entire

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Da Fontoura, Paulo R. C. T. O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU. 2000, p. 264
regions. These conflicts often generate a series of other threats to international security, such as illegal arms traffic, terrorism, drug traffic, refugee flows and damage to the environment, whose repercussions can be felt far way from the initial conflict zone.

International cooperation is essential to deal with these global problems. UN peacekeeping operations, with more than half a century of experience, are a feasible and reliable tool. Its legitimacy and universality, although sometimes contested, can barely be achieved by other arrangements. An organization with 189 member states is unique. It provides peacekeeping forces with special credentials and a moral strength that no other organization in the world can give. Today there are 15 UN peacekeeping missions spread through 4 continents, employing 47,095 persons among civilians, police, and military personnel from 87 countries. The projected cost of the current peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 ranges from 2.7 to 3 billions of US dollars. This considerable sum underlines the relevance of peacekeeping operations today.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Brazilian enhanced participation during the 1990s did not provide the expected returns. Despite the fact it helped to project the name of country, it did not gather international recognition or support for the Brazilian claims over a Security Council reform and a possible permanent seat. Nevertheless, the Inter-ministerial working-group conclusions about the importance of United Nations peacekeeping operations were correct, since the improved participation of the country in the mid 1990s
contributed to various invitations to participate in other ongoing operations, as it consolidated its prestige as a competent peacekeeper.

Given the remaining relevance of peacekeeping operations as a consequence of many latent conflicts spread throughout the globe, Brazil’s enhanced participation in UN operations, if it does not contribute directly to gaining the objectives established in the current National Defense Policy, at a minimum will help to keep the prestige of the country as a distinguished contributor to UN peace efforts. Moreover, as the country claims to be prepared to assume the inherent responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security Council, its current participations can be considered far too modest when compared to the financial burden imposed on this select group alongside the economic potential of the country that could reach up to US $ 80 million. Nowadays, Brazil is contributing military and civilian personnel in only 3 UN peacekeeping operations, totaling 80 persons.  

Participation in Peacekeeping operations provides relevant experiences and is a valuable way to improve the professional abilities of any military force. The co-habitation of forces of various countries in a common purpose provides a unique environment that helps to improve the readiness and capabilities of an armed force to integrate with multinational forces. It helps the development of doctrine and the acquisition of important professional experience. It is also vital to mention that broader, more active participation not restricted to peacekeeping operations can contribute

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significantly to project the name of the country internationally and help consolidate its defense strategic goals.

Regarding military force employment principles, the country has shown significant evolution in the recent years. Understanding that adamant restraints with respect to peace-enforcing will contribute neither to the accomplishment of its national objectives nor to the improvement of international peace and security. During its last participation in the Security Council, the country joined a multinational coalition headed by Australia carrying out a UN mission for the first time in history and gave support to the NATO bombardments in Kosovo. These decisions revealed that Brazil intends to keep up to date with the international trends.

Brazil to date has had a consistent but modest commitment to peacekeeping operations, particularly in light of its national wealth. It had initially seen such operations as an avenue to a seat on the UN Security Council; however, as this route seems less and less certain, Brazil has been reluctant to commit further resources, particularly in peace-enforcement missions.

A renewed posture is vital particularly when there is a legitimate need of humanitarian aid. In such a case failing to respond rapidly and adequately can seriously compromise the international prestige of the country. In order to achieve improvement, it is also essential that internally Brazil pursue an enhanced integration in the executive and between the executive and the legislative, in order to provide the country with a response capacity compatible with its economic potential.

When the mission includes the need for a restoration of a nation self-governing ability, the capacity to contribute to rebuilding a nation’s infra-structure, and to conduct
democratic elections are key to participate more actively in current UN operations. There seems to be an endless demand for these activities. Regardless of the mandate scope, it is also of fundamental importance that Brazil pursues an enhanced post-mission relationship with the host country to strengthen friendship ties and also to take advantage of potential bilateral and multi-lateral political, military, trade and business opportunities.

Although Brazil maintains a foreign policy that gives priorities to Latin-American and Portuguese speaking countries, it intends, nevertheless, to maintain adequate peacekeeping participation in order to remain current in its capabilities. Brazil continues to hope that the political landscape will change and permit it to reap the rewards of increased exposure with a more prominent stature internationally and particularly with a permanent seat on a revised UN Security Council.

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