EVALUATING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

RAY P. WOJCIK, MAJ, USA
B.S., Embry Riddle, Daytona Beach FL, 1989
M.S.S.I., Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2002

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Report Type</th>
<th>Dates Covered (from... to)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 Nov 2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title and Subtitle</th>
<th>Contract Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating the European Defense Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)</th>
<th>Performing Organization Report Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Army Command and General Staff College Master of Military Art and Science, General Studies Fort Leavenworth, KS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)</th>
<th>Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution/Availability Statement</th>
<th>Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplementary Notes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Terms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Classification</th>
<th>Classification of this page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Abstract</th>
<th>Limitation of Abstract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>UU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Pages</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Name of Candidate: MAJ Ray P. Wojcik

Thesis Title: Evaluating the European Defense Force

Approved by:

____________________________________, Thesis Committee Chairman
MAJ Andrew S. Harvey, M.S.

____________________________________, Member
LTC Justin L. C. Eldridge, M.S.

____________________________________, Member
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by:

____________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

EVALUATING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE by MAJ Ray P. Wojcik
100 pages.

Following World War II Americans and Europeans have cooperated on varying levels in the area of security. Although NATO became the most important security organization in the region, Europeans pursued other venues as well. By the 1990s, the European Union (EU) emerged as a major economic organization that pursued greater involvement in European security. Thus the EU is developing a force to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW). To accomplish MOOTW the EU defined “Headline Goals” for the European Defense Force (EDF); the force must deploy 60,000 soldiers within sixty days for up to a year.

This thesis provides an overview of European security organizations focusing on the EU’s European Defense Force. Studies of US Army deployments to Haiti and Bosnia are evaluated against US Army doctrine for strategically responsive forces. Similarly a scenario is developed to deploy the EDF to Algeria in order to evaluate the strategic responsiveness of the EDF.

The EU faces great challenges in developing the EDF and is hard pressed to meet their declared deadline of readying this force by 2003. The essential question is to understand similar MOOTW deployments and what capabilities the EU possesses or is developing to meet these requirements.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and expertise provided by my thesis chair MAJ Andrew Harvey. He understands European affairs and this subject matter to a far greater degree than myself and has pointed me in the right direction for research. Dr. Robert Baumann, the thesis committee Ph.D. member, also greatly assisted in this project. Besides his expertise, his articles in *Military Review* on operations in Haiti provided excellent material for this project. The third committee member, LTC Eldridge, aided the project by thoroughly challenging the methodology and enhancing the ultimate narrowing of the projects scope. Finally, Helen Davis in the Command and General Staff College’s Graduate Degree Programs office provided assistance. Her help in fine tuning a million details and formatting challenges freed me up to focus on the thesis.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. EUROPE’S SECURITY INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE EVALUATION CRITERIA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CASE STUDIES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE RESPONSIVENESS: A SCENARIO</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE CONCLUSION: RESPONSIVE?</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Airport of Debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>Airport of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Commission on Security and Cooperation In Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>European Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (formerly, the CSCE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>Port of Debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOS</td>
<td>Zone of Separation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Current Eurocorps Structure</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Eurocorps Unit Locations</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>France: POE to POD</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>France: POE to POD</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>German Rail and Road to POE</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>German POE to POD</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Luxembourg Fort to POE</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Luxembourg POE to POD</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>United Kingdom: Fort to POE</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>United Kingdom: APOE to APOD and POE to POD</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Italy Fort to POE</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Italy APOE to APOD and POE to POD</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Netherlands Fort to POE</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Netherlands POE to POD</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Portugal APOE to APOD</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Greece POE to POD</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Deployment Summary</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TESTING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The Petersberg Declaration is remarkable for the broad scope of military actions it enumerates. They cover everything from the use of combat forces in crisis management to humanitarian operations, with a variety of peacekeeping operations in between. However, thinking about what the WEU <EDF> should be readying itself to do varies considerably from capital to capital.¹

Michael Brenner

The end of the Cold War has brought great changes to the European security arrangement. In this new security environment, organizations involved in European security have been redefining their roles. It is under these circumstances that the European Union (EU) through its newly acquired military arm, the Western European Union (WEU) has affirmed its desire to field a force of 100,000 European military members by 2003. It is called the European Defense Force (EDF) and is expected to rapidly deploy 60,000 soldiers on a contingency operation to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) activities; the mission spectrum ranges from crisis management to humanitarian operations. Once the force is deployed, Europeans envisage a capability to sustain this force for up to a year in duration.

The structure of the proposed organization is limited and planning calls for reliance on some elements (potentially a preponderance) to be drawn from NATO as required by mission. The essential question is to understand how effective the EDF will be in accomplishing its stated objectives to conduct MOOTW activities and therefore, act as the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This thesis utilizes an evaluative case study approach to understand the EDF’s ability to conduct MOOTW operations. The
construct for the methodology is taken from the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 3.0. From this manual the attributes of strategically responsive army forces are used to evaluate the EDF.

There are five crisis resolution institutions in Europe and the former Soviet Union, all of which claim roles and responsibility for management of conflicted problem areas. . . . [T]he challenge for statesmen in Europe and the United States will be the creation of a system of mutually reinforcing institutions in the realm of European security.¹

Overview

European security organizations have evolved since the conclusion of World War II in 1945. As the dust settled after the war and security challenges arose, the Europeans and Americans cooperated variously in a number of political and security arrangements. The most important of these in terms of providing overall security has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); however, other organizations and their development have played key roles and are important in understanding what the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI), the European Defense Policy (EDP), and the European Defense Force (EDF) are based on. The organizations surveyed are the NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE), and the European Community--now European Union (EU). The WEU is discussed in more detail primarily because it is the organization charged with furthering European security concepts including the establishment of the EDF.

Western European Union

Overshadowed during most of its tenure by NATO and lacking any clear mission, the Western European Union (WEU) has been a bit of an enigma. However, it has
resurfaced in importance during the late 1980s and 1990s and, of late, is viewed by
Europeans as the vehicle to foster and promote the European Security Defense Identity.
Ultimately, as the WEU began to regain influence, it gravitated towards the ascendant
EU. In July of 2001 the WEU began a process (expected to conclude by January 2002)
by which the organization subsumes authority under EU jurisdiction. The WEU, which
on paper for almost fifty years was the European military structure of NATO, has today
been absorbed under the Aegis of the European Union and the European Security and
Defense Identity.

From its inception following World War II, the WEU has shared a common
birthright of sorts with NATO and has always been linked to that organization.
Searching for a means to prevent Germany from ever again posing a threat, the French
and British resolved in Dunkirk in 1947 to cooperate economically and on security issues.
The Brussels accord of 1948 which provided the embryonic basis for NATO, hailed the
birth of a European security structure, the WEU.

Article Five of NATO’s treaty is based on words taken from the 1948 WEU
Brussels’s accord. What is poignant about this is that the WEU’s collective defense
article is worded more strongly than the corresponding NATO Article Five. The WEU’s
Article V unequivocally states that other members of the coalition will provide the object
of an attack, “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”² The WEU
never really amounted to a significant security structure, a result due not to a lack of good
intentions, but because NATO became the preeminent means to counter Soviet
machinations on the European continent. “That the WEU was eventually to play a
minimal role in the provision of any of the functions which the treaty envisaged, had
more to do with the existence of other international organizations better equipped to expound and enact them, than it had to do with any particular flaw in the vision of those who drafted the Treaty.\textsuperscript{3}

As the 1940s drew to a close, and the Soviet threat became more defined, the rearmament of Germany became a central issue to both NATO and the emerging WEU. The US in 1950 had called for the armament of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The French, however, were reluctant to support such a rapid change of the state of affairs following closely on the heels of World War II. Having suffered immensely at the hands of the Nazis during the war, their hesitancy was well founded. Thus the French initiated a process to resolve this problem by defining security in a European context. Using the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a model, they hoped to mirror this with a security organization among the same partners.

The idea was called the European Defense Community (EDC) and was championed by the French Prime Minister, Pleven. The plan called for a European Army headed by a European Defense Minister and responsible to a European Parliament. The plan called for cooperation among European partners and relied upon eventual rearmament of the German Army--with more French controls. Unsupported by the British and unpalatable to the French populace the EDC plan was scuttled by the French Parliament.

Still searching for a European means to settle the increasing security challenges on the continent, the signatories of the initial Brussels Treaty of 1948 met in Paris in 1954 to solidify a security plan and what became known as the Paris Agreements, led to the establishment of the WEU by 1955. The plan offered a forum to allow Germany to
be integrated militarily into continental security needs. Ultimately the agreement and establishment of the WEU, allayed French fears of an unchecked rearmament of Germany primarily by guaranteeing British support—the French knew they could not go it alone.

Reacting to the events of 1955, the Soviet Union soon established the Warsaw Pact and clearly defined the Iron Curtain. In Western eyes, it appeared that creation of the WEU and NATO was critically important to preparing for security challenges that the Soviet Union presented in the region. To avoid a wasteful duplication of effort, NATO eventually absorbed the WEU military structure. As NATO became the senior partner to the WEU, the organization eventually became sidelined on the security stage and lost relevance. Its importance in spurring the formation of NATO notwithstanding, the WEU seemed to lose its reason for existence. This situation continued for the next thirty years, and it seemed that the Old Man of Security (albeit by only a few years) in Europe would die an ignominious death.

Just as the WEU seemed to be on the ropes a renewed interest in European input into security matters revived the organization. Perceptions during the 1980s were colored by superpower talks that made some Europeans believe that the US and the USSR were self-absorbed and viewed Europe as nothing more than a potential battlefield. The two key features of the era were US adherence to the necessity of having nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and a US desire to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—potentially arming space vehicles. The Europeans felt they had little input to grand security plans on the continent. Thus they began a process starting in 1984 that reinvigorated the beleaguered WEU.
In Paris in 1984, WEU foreign and defense ministers met and decided to restart the organization. This led to the Rome declaration later in the year that sought to “provide it with the capacity to operate alongside the other organizations involved in the provision of security in Europe.”

By 1987, the WEU produced a Platform on European Security Interests. Most notable was a declaration by the WEU members that: “We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.”

The Europeans were now more serious about European security than ever before. Subsequently the WEU began an expansion program to increase membership. While clearly articulating the organization’s desire to not compete with NATO, the WEU also stated in the Hague declaration, a desire to "strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance." Ultimately, the growing importance of the European Union in the early 1990s led to a concomitant increase in reviving the WEU. By December 1991, the EU declared in Rome that:

Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. . . . The development of a European Security Identity and Defence <ESDI> role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.

Although couched as fully integrated within NATO at the Rome meeting, the WEU acquired a new look of assertiveness following the June 1992 Bonn, Germany
declarations. Here the Petersberg tasks were promulgated and nominal identification of forces articulated.

“…acting under the authority of WEU, WEU forces could be employed for:”
  
  o humanitarian and rescue tasks;
  
  o peacekeeping tasks;
  
  o tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
  
  o including peacemaking.

The planning and execution of these tasks will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies. Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member States, including forces with NATO missions.

The WEU role became more defined. Relegated for forty years to low level political activity, the WEU was now charged to serve as a bridge between NATO and the ascendant EU. Because of the declaration of identifying NATO forces as available to the WEU force structure, friction developed between the United States and ardent ESDI proponents as to the end game of the European security shuffle.

By May of 1994 and following a head nod from NATO the WEU declared that the organization was the military component of the EU, and as such had to pursue integration on several levels among its members. This included making members more interoperable; reducing research and development redundancy in the arms industry; and creating an environment of rational competition in the European defence and defence procurement industries; and consideration of cooperation on arms export controls. Added to this announcement, the WEU reiterated its concept of noncompetition with NATO, but indicated, rather ambiguously, its desire to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic alliance.
In July of 1997, a strengthened WEU collected its members including Atlantic Alliance European members, and associate members (future members) together in Brussels. Though the meeting was entitled “Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance,” not all Alliance partners were present. Notably absent—-the United States. The concept was that the “WEU is thus establishing itself as a genuine framework for dialogue and cooperation among Europeans on wider European security and defence issues.”¹¹ The WEU indicated that mechanisms for NATO consultation both in crises and in defense planning would be developed. Furthering this theme, the organization indicated that operational links would be established that paved a path for NATO assets to be on tap for potential WEU missions. It was at this meeting that the Union posited the complete integration of the WEU and EU.

Today the WEU is in the process of full partnership with the EU. The symbiotic affect of this relationship could not be starker. For years while the WEU languished in ambiguity it sought methods to gain more membership and, thus, credibility. The organization had key partners, but always appeared less credible in consensus building since NATO contained sixteen European members and the WEU only ten (full members). These numbers have changed to nineteen and ten, respectively, with the addition of the Visegrad states to NATO.

With the reality of a merged EU and WEU, membership in the EU is able to surpass NATO levels. The growing importance of the EU as an economic organization coupled with an emerging military structure may one day challenge the supremacy of NATO in the realm of security matters in Europe. During the early to mid 1990s, interest
in NATO membership by CEE states was strong. The means became the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which gave hope and a methodology for potential Alliance integration. The next logical step for these states is EU entry. The Visegrad states are good examples of this desire. First they gained security-club entry, NATO, now they are focused on economic stability and EU membership. In the case of other CEE states, which are not yet NATO members, EU entry is a stated goal. In the future, these states may view integration with the EU’s security structure as an alternate path for fast tracking into the EU and overcoming difficult economic challenges. Thus the former gravitation towards NATO partnership by these states could decrease as a concomitant desire for further “European” integration increases.

The WEU has emerged as an important European Security structure. It has been given the task to shepherd the concept of ESDI, the European Defense Policy (EDP) and the European Defense Force (EDF). Organizationally it continues to assert its desire to work out the military details as an integrated yet separable part of NATO. With full integration into the EU, the WEU finds its credibility and legitimacy at an all time high. It is challenged in several areas. Most prominent is whether or not the merged EU/WEU structure can build the military force capable of executing the Petersberg tasks. The organization is gaining momentum, but must convince its membership of several necessities in regards to NATO. These include the potential duplication of staffs, schools, forces and equipment in order to accomplish her perceived missions--Petersberg tasks. All this must be done in an era of dwindling defense budgets and stretched European economies and in which NATO has a proven track record of performance.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created after World War II as a military and political alliance of European and North American states. The major emphasis of the Alliance is to provide common security through political, military, economic, scientific, and other fields of cooperation. Of all existing security structures on the European continent, NATO carries the most clout. It is NATO’s effective security policy that helped convince the Soviets and Warsaw Pact of the futility in prolonging the Cold War.

Following the war and a series of regional security crises, Europeans began to search for a means to collaborate on security. In Brussels, in March of 1948, five Western European countries--the United Kingdom Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands--agreed to cooperate on common security needs. This was the birth of what would later be known as the Western European Union (WEU) and planted the seed for an even larger collection of states interested in European-Atlantic security and the creation of NATO.

Eventually negotiations with North American partners and a larger group of European states led to a 1949 accord creating a single North Atlantic Alliance based on common security commitments. The Treaty of Washington was signed in April of 1949 and saw no less than twelve countries, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the UK, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands become part of the treaty organization. By 1999, seven other countries had acceded to the coalition treaty organization including, Greece and Turkey--1952, Federal Republic
of Germany--1955, Spain--1982, and, most recently, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the Alliance in 1999.\textsuperscript{12}

NATO’s European collection of wealthy democratic states combined with her even wealthier Atlantic partner eventually garnering significant military capabilities; these capabilities caused the Soviets to think twice about any serious provocations during the Cold War era. NATO was challenged on several occasions, such as the Berlin Blockade in 1949, Berlin Wall construction in 1959, interventions in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and a near intervention in Poland during 1980 and 1981, the Soviets had to seriously consider potential NATO reactions. In each case Soviet aggression was tempered by NATO’s growing strength and solidarity. Most dramatically, even though the Soviets spent forty-five years preparing for it, they never launched an invasion across Central Europe. Much of this can be credited to the Super-Power balance between the US and the Soviet Union, but in the European theater, NATO stood as the bulwark against Soviet designs.

When in 1989 it became clear that the world order was changing, questions began to emerge about the relevance and future mission of NATO. With a Soviet change of heart and emerging democracies among most of the Central and Eastern European states, NATO’s collective defensive mission did not seem as relevant. It was under these circumstances that a process began in 1990 that led to NATO declaring a New Strategic Concept. Promulgated in Rome in November of 1991, it called for continued reductions in military forces in Europe, increased cooperation with international institutions and former adversaries, and a dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons on battlefield Europe. It maintained the criticality of the mission of collective defense, but provided for a much
broader view on international peacekeeping. This view towards peacekeeping soon manifested itself on an ongoing basis in the Balkans region.

As NATO’s role’s evolved, it considered expansion of its membership. Many fledgling democracies eager for protection from instability in Russia and desiring economic assistance, considered membership in “Club NATO” the premier structure to enhance both. The perception was that with a NATO security blanket, access to markets, foreign investment, and improved economic conditions would follow. This was true of the three Visegrad countries, which entered into the Alliance Treaty in 1999. With enlargement as a stated goal, NATO developed a process that helped prepare countries to enter into the treaty organization.

Tabled by NATO planners early on, this program became known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Operating under NATO auspices through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), it helped prepare militaries for NATO entrance. Because of the democratic nature of the Alliance, the PfP and NATO interaction among these countries helped provide a focus for much of their countrywide democratization efforts. As a result, many countries desiring NATO entrance have made tremendous strides in creating democratic institutions, improving human rights and also in resolving differences among neighboring states.

During NATO’s fifty-year celebration and summit in Washington, DC, in 1999, the organization provided an updated version of its Strategic Concept. In this forum the Alliance agreed that NATO remained the preeminent security provider in the Euro-Atlantic region. Informed by Alliance military operations for the preceding four years in the Balkans, NATO articulated its emerging role in crisis management. Efforts began in
coordinating adaptation of member state’s defense capabilities to meet new security needs. It was also during this summit that NATO, called for an internal organization to deal with WMD destruction.

As NATO reset priorities and gained new membership it had to consider its role among other European security structures. During the January 1994 summit, NATO announced the welcoming of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty creating the EU. Here the discussion of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP--the military portion of which is now known as ESDI) was supported under the rubric of improving the “European Pillar” of the Alliance.

During 1995-1996 NATO created mechanisms for the WEU to gain full access to NATO communications capabilities and formalized agreements on the sharing of classified information. Also in 1996, NATO and the WEU agreed on a methodology to implement the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. The CJTF provided for establishment of small core headquarters within NATO, which could be activated on short notice to react to a crisis situation. In this way in theory, a crisis might be responded to via a WEU-led CJTF. It followed that a WEU led CJTF in coordination with NATO could utilize NATO assets to carry out its tasks. In this way, ESDI and NATO were formally coupled.

As the EU through the WEU asserted itself in the realm of European security, the US hesitated to accept new changes that could lead to a potential reduction of US integration in European affairs. Early on, the US took a hard line approach and supported NATO as the Europe’s only “serious” security mechanism. However, the US did not want to squash European initiative. Moreover, burden sharing of defense efforts had for
years been a topic of heated budget debates in Washington corridors. Reluctant to reduce NATO importance, Washington finally accepted the policy of a separate but inseparable ESDI integrated as the European pillar of the Alliance.

European security initiatives notwithstanding, the diabolical terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 more acutely point to the viability and credibility of NATO as a security structure. Within forty-eight hours of horrific terrorist acts committed on US soil, NATO invoked for the first time Article Five of the treaty’s charter. This article states that an attack on one is considered an attack on all. With this in place, all NATO partners vowed their solidarity with the United States to support its new campaign against terrorism.

Besides its current intertwining with the EU-WEU, NATO consults with the OSCE. In this sense NATO cooperates within the OSCE’s conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. The OSCE, for lack of better terminology, acts like a mini-United Nations among European-Eurasian partners. At the Helsinki Summit in 1992, the UN recognized the OSCE as a “regional arrangement” with a mandate to resolve regional conflicts. This came to the fore when NATO intervened in Bosnia in 1995. It was not clear to NATO leadership whether it would receive a tasking by the OSCE or from the UN. Ultimately, as the OSCE foundered over this question, NATO began to deal directly with the UN and proceeded with execution of operations in Bosnia.

Organization for Security Cooperation Europe

Spurred by a Soviet idea during the 1950s to build an all-European security conference, the Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE) became a reality in the early 1970s. It was a Cold War club of sorts that sought to facilitate a conversation between the antagonists of the era. Mostly held at the political level, the organization
works as a means to encourage human rights and peaceful security cooperation among its members. Currently its fifty-five-member countries make it the largest cooperative security effort among European and former Soviet states. The organization created forums for dialogue on broad ranging issues that helped provide legitimacy to the European revolution of 1989. “It is widely associated with the democratic revolution which came to Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.”

The OSCE has chartered itself to accomplish three broad missions. These are conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict settlement. The organization focuses on the Diplomatic/Information/Military/Economic (DIME) elements of power, but the “D” and “I” more emphatically. The OSCE seeks to bring parties together for consultation before, during and after conflict in order to reduce regional tensions. The OSCE is very active in the Balkans area and has monitored elections and human rights abuses throughout its membership region. Additionally, the organization maintains missions or a presence in some of the Central Asian Republics including a new mission soon to open in Armenia. By its own admission, the OSCE has overlapping responsibilities with existing security organizations. “There exists a multitude of different international organizations operating in similar fields in Europe . . . overlapping jurisdiction and competencies is continuously problematic.”

**European Union**

The European Union is the most important political champion and senior partner involved in formulation of the ESDI. Recently finalizing plans to absorb the WEU, the EU has made its intentions clear that European security requires both military--the WEU--and political--EU--features.
The EU has its origins in the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) initiated by a treaty in Paris in 1951. The idea was to cooperate on steel and coal production among the six founding members: Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Germany, France, and Belgium. Thus began a long process of gradual European integration in the economic sphere. By 1957 two other important organizations were created by treaty. The first was the European Economic Community (EEC) and the second was the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC created a basis for a common market and Euratom allowed collaboration in the nuclear industries. Finally, in 1965 a treaty signed in Brussels brought the community organizations together and the EEC became its formal name.\(^\text{15}\)

During the 1970s and 1980s the organization gained strength with the addition of the UK, Denmark, Republic of Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The EEC sought to promote economic growth and freedom of movement among community members. During the 1990s the EEC became the European Community and later the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty of February 1992 was the watershed event that significantly strengthened and defined the EU. It called for a merging of monetary, citizenship, and security affairs. The monetary policy is already in effect with the new Euro dollar entering circulation in 2002. The most dramatic impact of citizenship policies is the idea of dual-citizenship of Europe and its respective states members. Finally, as already discussed in the WEU section, the EU charged itself, via the WEU, to push forward the concept of ESDI and is active in creating the EDF. The EU has experienced tremendous growth; just one element of this organization, the European Commission, is staffed by no less than 16,000 personnel
The European Union (EU) is a political body organized among fifteen European states. Its major elements are the European Commission, Council of the European Union (commonly called the Council of Ministers), European Parliament, Court of Justice and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).

The European Commission “acts as the heart of Europe.” It is the executive agent within the European Union organizational structure. It comprises twenty representatives drawn from the fifteen member states of the EU. These representatives serving five-year terms, are generally former EU parliament, EU member state parliamentary members or have held high office in their respective country. Two commissioners are designated from each of the “larger” Member States (the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy) and one from each of the “smaller” states (Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden).

The Commission’s main function is to propose legislation for coordination and approval between the European Council and the European Parliament. As a secondary function the European Commission serves as a policing agent for treaties. In this role, the Commission provides oversight ensuring that EU legislation is properly implemented by EU members to create an environment that benefits all members of the EU.

The Council of the European Union is a body organized along functional lines. There are at least twenty-five different meeting groups derived from this construction. Some of the topical areas are Agriculture, Economy and Finance and Foreign Affairs. These councils are represented by EU member state’s ministerial principals for each separate function. For example, a meeting of the foreign affairs council would have
member states’ foreign affairs ministers (or delegates from that office) in attendance. The Council has a president who rotates between member states every six months.

The Council’s main functions are defined in treaty. Under the Treaty on the European Union, the Council is responsible for defining and executing community security policy. Additionally under this treaty, the Council coordinates measures regarding police and judicial actions. Under the treaty for establishing the European Community, the Council has a legislative role. Here the Council, in cooperation with the European Parliament, acts as a partner legislative body. The Council’s efforts include general economic policies, coordinating international agreements and providing, along with the Parliament, budget authority for the EU.18

The European Parliament’s authority and importance have grown gradually over the years. It comprises 626 representatives elected by member states for five-year terms. The numbers of representatives from each country vary based on each country’s population break down. Germany’s contingent of ninety-nine parliamentarians is currently the largest. The parliament is responsible primarily for legislation but also controls the budget and acts as a check on other EU executive bodies.

The Court of Justice comprises fifteen judges and nine advocates general, appointed for six-year terms. It functions as a community law body that can litigate actions among member states, community institutions and by private individuals and companies. It provides a review procedure for some executive and legislative actions. It derives its authority from the treaty and its decisions can have important constitutional and economic consequences on litigating parties. The most important fact about the EU court system is its “supranational” impact. Laws derived in the court are binding on EU
members. This process includes potential sanctions against member countries that do not meet stipulated EU criteria.

The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is a cooperative arrangement with member state’s national banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) located in Luxemburg. The ESCB is primarily interested in maintaining price stability among community members through sponsoring community supported economic policy. Taking effect in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty, laid the foundation for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This one act created an environment whereby all EU members might eventually use the same currency. As of April 2002, all but three EU members are using the ESCB’s common currency system, the Euro.

Summary

Europe possesses a panoply of organizations that overlap and intertwine on very complex and diverse issues. Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of security. NATO, the WEU, OSCE, and EU are involved variously in European security activities, initiatives, and agreements. Understanding the existence of these overlapping organizations and potential friction areas is important in discerning where problem areas may lie regarding new ESDI structures. Specifically, the way ahead for the EDF is colored by these organizations and their relationships. By far the preferred security structure in Europe remains NATO. However, the EU and WEU have made it clear that Europeans intend to further develop ESDI and prepare an EDF that can accomplish the “Petersberg tasks.” The next chapter discusses criteria to evaluate the EDF’s Petersberg Tasks. This helps to build a framework to consider the EDF’s ability to accomplish these
tasks and what force structure might be required to accomplish likely missions of this force.


4The original Brussels Treaty of 1948 specifically contained references connoting, “keep Germany down.” The refined 1954 agreement changed this indicating and interest in “promoting unity and integration in Europe.”

5McLean and Lovie, 27.


There is no consensus over how deeply into the realm of combat and war-fighting Petersberg Tasks will, or should, lead the Europeans.¹

Sir Timothy Garden

Overview

This chapter establishes the criteria by which the EDF is evaluated. US Army doctrine is brought to bear on the EDF to consider its ability to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks and act as the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Part of the challenge in calculating EDF abilities is the lack of clarity in the force’s mission statement; details relating to Petersberg mission subtasks are nonexistent. Broad conclusions can be drawn from the Petersberg Tasks as currently stated, but subordinate tasks need to be assigned in order to further determine EDF requirements.

Evaluation Criteria

This study utilizes the US Army’s “Attributes of Strategically Responsive Army Forces” to gauge EDF capabilities. The US Army Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations, is the US Army’s centerpiece for doctrine on the conduct of Army operations. Finalized and printed in June 2001, this FM is written in light of the US Army’s ongoing efforts in transformation. The US Army transformation process is based on establishing brigades possessing the correct mix of heavy and light forces, which can rapidly deploy worldwide to conduct full spectrum operations. Chapter three of FM 3.0 is entitled “Strategic Responsiveness,” and this is where the attributes utilized as criteria can be found. The
characteristics are useful for this study since the intent of US Army transformation calls for a force that can deploy quickly and complete a wide variety of tasks. The difference in requirements between EDF and US Army “transformed” organizations is in combat operations capabilities. However, this does not detract from the usefulness of employing these “attributes of responsiveness” as a metric to evaluate the EDF.

FM 3.0 states that, “Strategic responsiveness requires Army forces trained, organized, and equipped for global operations, and commanders and units proficient in force projection.” For purposes of this study, the EDF is not evaluated on its ability to project globally, but regionally. It includes potential deployments beyond the expanded European theater to Northern Africa. It excludes deployments to Russia, China, East and Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and North and South America. This does not mean an EDF in the future could not deploy beyond what is expected as “out-of-area” type missions--similar to NATO assertions on this subject. This study remains focused on what the EU or EDF says about its “reach” and to date, near-Europe is all that has been discussed in Brussels.

According to US Army doctrine in FM 3.0 the attributes of strategically responsive forces are: responsive; deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. This study also considers command and control (C2) as part of the evaluation criteria. The importance of using these criteria is that the US Army asserts that these traits determine the programmatic and operational requirements for creating a strategically responsive force. FM 3.0 states that the US Army is redesigning itself around these attributes. By corollary, the EDF is a strategic force designed to support operational requirements for the EU/WEU. Therefore, EDF programmatic and
operational requirements may be illuminated by the same attributes of strategically responsive Army forces documented in US Army doctrine. In evaluating the EDF in this manner, it can be determined whether the force envisaged by the EU is capable of accomplishing the Petersberg Tasks. What follows is a description of the seven attributes of responsive forces. In sections of FM 3.0 where ideas are US Army specific, they are omitted. Additionally, the following definitions are not expanded beyond US Army doctrine (except in the case of Command and Control); however, links are drawn tying in the EDF and its roles as they relate to the attributes of strategic responsiveness.

**Responsive**

In FM 3.0, the Army refers to responsiveness as an “attitude that spans operational planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.” The doctrine describes this attitude as setting the tone for success before the operation commences. It is important for the EDF to deploy quickly. One of the EDF’s headline goals is for the EDF to deploy 60,000 soldiers in 60 days. FM 3.0 argues that responsiveness is more than speed of deployment. The force must be configured and sequenced properly for the mission. The Europeans face the challenge of drawing units from various national forces, and at a higher state of readiness than other national forces. Subsequently, the EDF commander must sequence his force properly into the area of operation in order to provide adequate force protection and complete the mission. The EDF commander must have a wide range of capabilities mixed into his force upon deployment to accomplish Petersberg Tasks. Recent history has taught us that forces involved in military operations other than war (MOOTW) activities must be prepared to rapidly scale up or scale down operations in order to deter or to potentially take decisive action against hostile forces.
As EDF units flow into an Area of Operations (AOR) these contingencies must be carefully balanced.

US forces weld much of their responsiveness capability to forward deployment of units and equipment. There are no plans to forward deploy any EU or EDF assets. Therefore, all necessary resources to conduct the full range of Petersberg Tasks must be considered in detailed planning, preparation and training prior to EDF employment.

A sixty-day requirement to flow the EDF with up to 60,000 soldiers means that EDF commanders will have little or no time to train up for specific tasks; the force must be ready to deploy with little preparation. Thus, EDF commanders must ensure that they are ready to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks prior to notification. The EDF may have a wide range of area of operation (AOR) responsibility within the European arena. This means that EDF commanders need to focus not only on Petersberg Task training, but also on deployment rehearsals. Efficiency in this area requires complex automation that must be linked with the EDF C2 structure and European national forces taking part in EDF operations. Overall, a commander of a “standing” EDF force will likely have to consider mission readiness postures and design supranational, combined/coalition training cycles that support a readiness level that creates a responsive force.

Deployable

Deployability includes more than moving personnel from one location to the next. This means a complete reverse planning process that is tied to established standard operating procedures (SOPs). Considerations of planning need to organize the order of deployment events and specifically, on the particular “force package” based on mission. This is of particular concern for the EDF. The EDF has promulgated its desire to
participate in MOOTW operations; its forces may be drawn from a host of national forces that may also be earmarked for NATO standing missions. Sorting these details out in a deployment plan will be complex. Deployment requires rehearsals and forces allotted to support rehearsals. Tied to the rehearsals the deployment plan must include reconnaissance of deployment facilities and transportation corridors that support them. There is an intelligence preparation aspect to deployability that requires intelligence support throughout the entire deployment process.¹

**Agile**

Agility is a strategic responsiveness attribute and also a tenet of US Army operations. It is key to EDF mission accomplishment. The Petersberg Tasks cover a spectrum of missions from humanitarian to potential peace-enforcement tasks. Experience prior to NATO involvement in Bosnia illuminates how quickly situations can deteriorate for peacekeeping forces, in this case UN peacekeepers. The example of the Dutch UN peacekeepers in Bosnia is instructive; they were essentially taken hostage by Serbian forces.

The EDF should be able to deal with short escalations in hostility. Since EDF operations include a range of missions, transitioning quickly from one task to another is important. It may be that some EDF forces execute humanitarian actions while others are concurrently involved in rescue operations. Overall the projected size of the force is small and may require highly trained soldiers who are capable of operating in varying environments and carrying out a variety of missions.
Versatile

While agility describes the velocity of mission transition, versatility describes the spectrum of operational capability. On the surface, EDF missions look very benign and the casual observer might conclude that required soldier skill levels are not complex. Additionally, it might appear that MOOTW missions are very similar in nature and that similar skills are applied in all MOOTW operations. A closer evaluation reveals a requirement that this force be capable of conducting a myriad of tasks. The Petersberg task of “rescue operations” alone, estimates at a minimum, a limited forced entry capability and a means of rapid extraction. Under humanitarian operations, the force requires a robust Civil Affairs (CA) capability that is often difficult to muster in the much larger and more versatile US Army formations (most US Army units with CA capabilities are in the US reserve force structure).

Lethal

The untrained observer might consider this attribute to be of limited utility for the EDF conducting Petersberg (essentially MOOTW tasks). Scrutinizing requirements for these possible missions reveals that a great degree of lethality is required. The EDF would likely conduct operations following a UN or OSCE mandate. This assumes a “permissive environment” for EDF operations. However, any permissive environment can rapidly turn into a quagmire as US forces learned in Somalia. Even today in Afghanistan as some areas are assuaged, other areas thought to be previously stabilized, may see renewed enemy activity. This means at a minimum, the EDF must provide a means for force protection including the ability to mount a rescue force. This may include a variety of modalities including mobile light forces on standby that could
respond to a deteriorating situation among warring factions and an EDF stabilization force. Other requirements include the ability to withdraw under fire. In this situation, lethal airpower and ground fire support are necessary. Depending on mission area location, this includes naval, air and space support to provide intelligence, early warning and lethal fire capability.

**Survivable**

Survivability leverages technology and methods that provide the greatest force protection for a deployed force. Lethality is directly linked to survivability. A lethal EDF provides the means to thwart enemy intentions before hostile forces gain the initiative. The Petersberg tasks require all the force protection capabilities that any modern deployed force requires. Proper configurations and utilization of engineer, air defense and chemical organizations are necessary for EDF survivability. In the final analysis as described in FM 3.0, the lethality is directly linked to survivability; “In many operations rapid offensive action may provide better force protection than massive defenses around lodgment areas.”

**Sustainable**

FM 3.0 states, “Generating and sustaining combat power is fundamental to strategic responsiveness.” The EU in its headline goals for the EDF has stated that the EDF be capable of deploying 60,000 soldiers within a sixty-day window sustainable for a minimum of twelve months. This is the equivalent of fielding three modern American divisional equivalents and their Joint Force partners for the same period. Even the United States, possessing the most responsive force on the planet, has not assumed an
undertaking on this scale for a twelve-month period since the Vietnam War. This indicates a very large sustainment package required to move with initial EDF units and then continuous inter/intra theater resourcing to maintain this force. EDF missions as described in the Petersberg Tasks are generally non-offensive actions. Therefore, in most scenarios the force is expected to operate in relatively permissive environments. In this context, although the sustainment tasking is an extremely complex undertaking, it will generally not be subjected to enemy interdiction or blockade. Therefore, sustainment challenges that do arise for the EDF will generally be self-inflicted in nature.

**Command and Control**

In its purest definition of “attributes of strategically responsive Army forces,” FM 3.0 does not include Command and Control (C2). The manual does expand upon these attributes further in an area called “Considerations of Strategic Responsivness.” It is in this section that C2 is given primary position as critical to developing such a responsive force.

FM 3.0 assumes away a lot of what US doctrine writers believe is imbued in current American military structures. In particular, it presumes a clear, unified chain of command. This cannot be assumed away for the EDF. This idea alone, presents several challenges as the EDF relates to NATO, the EU and other security apparatuses. The EU has agreed to the US position of building European security forces under the rubric of NATO integration. The Europeans describe this as the EDF holding the position of the “European Pillar” of the Alliance. Some would argue that this means C2 structures of NATO implement and provide C2 for EDF operations. European proponents of the EDF
believe that although NATO C2 systems may be utilized for the EDF, the EDF chain of command--Europeans--must lead and direct the force.

Besides chain of command hurdles there are other C2 areas the EDF needs to emphasize. FM 3.0 calls force projection a “seamless operation.” Thus it is critical that the C2 structure is capable of sequencing joint forces into areas of operation. Unlike the US, the Europeans have some advantage in that their deployment areas of concern are regional and not global. In this sense, it may be easier for EDF commanders to recover from a partially botched deployment or sequencing problem. Yet in an era of shrinking defense budgets and limited movement resources this may not be a luxury that even an EDF commander can afford.

Additionally, EDF commanders must be able to provide the infrastructure that provides a common operational picture (COP) of the battlefield to subordinate commanders. This does not necessarily entail systems that can display hostile forces moving along a line of attack as in the Soviet era. It does mean that C2 systems are in place to command a joint force mission and provide real time intelligence (especially regarding force protection) to subordinate commanders. NATO (primarily the US) is the only force capable currently of providing these C2 capabilities.

Summary

The EDF can be evaluated by utilizing US Army doctrine in Field Manual 3.0, *Operations*. This manual describes “attributes of strategically responsive Army forces.” Although based on evolving requirements for US land forces it is a useful tool to make judgments about proposed EDF missions and required capabilities. It is clear that the Petersberg Tasks are not supported by any standing doctrine. Additionally, there are no
subordinate mission tasks or sub-tasks described by the EU or EDF that refine the
Petersberg Tasks and, therefore, more accurately articulate the European’s intent with
this force. Notwithstanding, the EDF can be evaluated based on definitions of strategic
responsiveness. The next chapter discusses two case studies of US deployments on
MOOTW operations. Then the criteria from chapter 2 are used to analyze these case
studies.

1 Sir Timothy Garten, “European Defence moves forward slowly” London, UK:
The Source Online Journal, 21 November 2001 [article on-line]; available from

2 Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
June 2001), 3.0.

3 Ibid., 3.6.

4 Ibid., 3.8

5 Ibid., 3.11

6 Ibid., 3.15.

7 Ibid., 3.17.
CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDIES

The need for speed and the size constraints of strategic deployments will also affect the nature of force-projection.¹

Major General Leonard D. Holder

Overview

This chapter looks at US deployment responsiveness. Two case studies are considered. First is the US deployment to the Bosnian AOR in late 1995 early 1996. Here the 1st Armored Division in Germany utilized mainly a ground oriented deployment plan to quickly get forces into Bosnia. The second case is the US deployment to Haiti in the fall of 1994 during Operation Uphold Democracy. In the Haitian case, US forces relied more heavily on air and heliborne capabilities to deploy forces. These cases highlight the positive and negative aspects of US responsiveness in order to build a context for comparison of EDF capabilities in chapter 4. Prior to development and evaluation of the two cases, a brief description of the US strategic mobility structure is included to display its complexity and robustness. The Europeans do not require as large a system to deploy the proposed EDF, but the US system serves as a model of sorts in discussing European deployment requirements.

US Strategic Responsiveness Capabilities

The United States Military possesses significant deployment capabilities that are worth consideration in order to determine a parallel similar for the EDF. This study does not suppose that the EDF build a similar structure in size or diversity, but that the US
design, though complex and expensive, is a successful model. The US bases its deployment system into three major areas: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned stocks. These are the three pillars of strategic mobility. In an October 2001 study entitled, Strategic Responsiveness, the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) describes US mobility assets in detail. Additionally, the DCSOPS has laid out several deployment scenarios to evaluate, qualitatively and quantitatively, the strategic mobility system. This is a US system and the amplification below does not include discussion of pre-positioned stocks because there is no likely parallel in the proposed EDF.

### Air

Airlift is accomplished by both military and commercial aircraft assets. It is currently centered on the C-5 Galaxy, the C-17 Globe Master III, and the slowly retiring C-141 Star Lifters. The civilian counterpart falls under the system, Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF consists of a number of wide-body and narrow-body civilian airline aircraft set aside, based on intensity of requirements, into three stages. In general, military aircraft are used for all categories of personnel and equipment while CRAF platforms focus primarily on lifting personnel and some bulk cargo.

Numerically the fleet expects to maintain 125 C-5s, approximately 120 C-17s, and up to 264 wide- and narrow-body aircraft over the next five to seven years. The DCSOPs study indicates that, while airlift assets are sufficient to support the current national military strategy (NMS), by 2006, a gap in lift capability will exist unless additional C-17s are procured or other means of providing airlift are found. As a context,
the US Army’s future Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) requires a minimum of 233 C-17 sorties to move all personnel and equipment.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{Sea}

While airlift provides immediate and responsive delivery means for US Army forces, the preponderance of Army transportation requirements are fulfilled by the Military Sealift Command and the US Navy. The DCSOPs study indicates that this reality will shift as Army forces “lighten up” moving towards the planned “interim” and then “objective force” structure over the next five to fifteen years. Military Sealift is centered on three major platforms. First, there are eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), with 150,000 square foot capacity and 27 knot speed. Second, there are nineteen large medium-speed roll-on and roll-off (RO/RO) (LMSR) vessels, with 280,000 square foot capacity and 24 knot speed. Finally, there are up to thirty-one commercial RO/ROs available, with a 120,000 square foot storage capacity. As a context, the study states that the future US Army’s IBCT requires 1.5 FSS and .8 LMSR to move approximately 14,400 short tons.\textsuperscript{5}

\textbf{US Deployment--Bosnia--Task Force Eagle}

Task Force Eagle (TFE) was the name assigned to the grouping of almost 20,000 American military members employed in initial entry and follow-on operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina beginning in December of 1995. The almost 20,000 American soldiers added up to a full one-third of the international contingent employed in Bosnia. The deployment is considered by most accounts to be very successful, overcoming
several challenges not the least of which was a major river crossing operation in Hungary.

The missions assigned to NATO--to which Task Force Eagle was the main contributing and enabling element--included several requirements that appear to be Petersberg-like tasks.

1. Ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire
2. Ensure the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and ensure the separation of forces
3. Ensure the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining force
4. Create conditions for the safe, orderly, and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR
5. Maintain control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina

Authority was given to NATO for the military implementation of the Dayton Accords by 15 December 1995 in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 1031. By 31 December, US forces had created the environment for rapid introduction of coalition forces by opening up a major land corridor by bridging the Sava River. Notwithstanding this feat, which was accomplished in less than two weeks, Task Force Eagle faced a rigid time schedule. A significant military presence was required along the Zone of Separation (ZOS) by D+30. Additionally, Task Force Eagle commanders had to deal with preparing their forces for harsh Bosnian winter weather conditions. A Task Force Eagle brigade commander noted, “I had two weeks to do the 30 days of work. . . . I really had to run catch up.”
During the first ninety days of operations, US airlift flew over 3,000 missions, hauled over 15,600 troops and delivered over 30,100 short tons of supplies and equipment. The deployment saw the first major use of American C-17s, which helped alleviate the lifting burden on an aging US Air Force cargo fleet. During the first month of the deployment the C-17 only flew 20 percent of the missions, yet it still managed to deliver more than 50 percent of the cargo.

Task Force Eagle, stands as one of the most powerful formations ever fielded. It was able to establish boundaries and the Zone of Separation among warring factions; it enforced the withdrawal of the combatants and monitored relocation of heavy weapons systems to cantonment areas; it enforced the cease-fire. The Task Force efforts enabled the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to administer democratic elections.  

**Strategic Responsiveness of Task Force Eagle**

**Responsive**

Overall, Task Force Eagle meets the test of Responsive. Time lapse from alert notification to major introduction of forces was sixteen days. Within thirty days the ZOS was established and enforcement commenced. A balance was struck by TFE commanders in flowing the required combat elements mixed with life support capabilities, although some negative aspects of this balancing act impacted efficiency of the deployment. Additionally, key leaders deployed early and had an immediate effect on setting conditions for reception of combat forces. Civil Affairs and PSYOPs teams deployed early too and assisted in allowing for nonhostile operations.
Deployable

Task Force Eagle was an organization centered on a US Army heavy division; Old Ironsides, the First Armored Division (1st AD) was given the task. Built on Cold War organizational charts, the 1st AD was tank heavy and required a significant amount of haul capability. Breaching the Sava River was not only significant for introduction of NATO forces, but it afforded the European based 1st AD, the ability to conduct an overland movement into the theater of operations. This, in itself, saved weeks of ship loading, unloading and set the stage for rapid deployment of the division. The unusual aspect of the operation was the negotiation by EUCOM commanders and Hungarian forces to allow NATO forces to transit a non-NATO former Warsaw Pact country. Hungary, eager for future NATO accession, quickly agreed to this endeavor.

Organization and sequencing the flow of assets into the theater of operations was not without its challenges. Early on, it became evident that the rail deployment plan that launched units from Germany into staging locations in Hungary was inaccurate. The plan assumed twice as much rail capacity as would become available. With the false data, the Task Force could open a ground line of communication (LOC), provide the bridge opening package and begin ZOS enforcement by D+30. Consequently, unintended force tailoring decisions were thrust upon the Task Force. In Hungary for example, a major reduction in life support functions was implemented in order to front-load required bridge crossing equipment. This led to inefficient reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in the initial flow of forces. Additionally, in staging area Harmon in Hungary, it became difficult for units to reestablish integrity before crossing the Sava River.
Another difficulty was encountered when USAREUR began using a non-doctrinal deployment board to monitor progress of deploying units. As force-tailoring decisions were being made, this method of tracking was unable to keep up with the most current information. Essentially the system provided no value added to the deployment of units and in some cases added to the confusion of actual unit locations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned notes that it is critical to utilize automated data systems to track unit deployments of this complexity and size. No coordinated Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) plan was ever designed, thus adding to the overall inefficiency of the movement of forces.

A major mitigating factor for Task Force efficiency was advance entry of key leaders. Prior to the bulk of TF elements crossing the Sava, many TF leaders were already introduced to the area of operations (AOR). Liaison was established with major figures among the warring factions and US leaders conducted some limited reconnaissance. As a result as forces flowed into the AOR, they were moved rapidly into key locations. Informed by these efforts, leaders were able to maximize use of small force packages initially moving across the Sava. Limited patrolling was initiated and a key checkpoint was established on a major portion of the widening LOC.

Additionally, CA and PSYOPs teams deployed early and facilitated these efforts. These teams were able to quickly coordinate for local interpreters and assist in contracting efforts for the TF. The interpreter effort alone, allowed the TF to maintain its momentum as it established itself in the AOR.\textsuperscript{10}
Agile/Versatile

Task Force Eagle was an Armor heavy organization that was able to adapt quickly to the mission in Bosnia. During the deployment phase, the sheer weight of this organization slowed its movement somewhat. A Category-1 bridging operation had to be provided for across the Sava. A more nimble force structure, maybe Marine Corps light-armored vehicle (LAV) based, could have reduced bridging strength requirements and sped up the operation. More of an impact is the movement of heavy tanks along rail and road networks to staging areas in Hungary prior to the Sava crossing. Here flexibility is reduced because of limited LOCs available to move seventy-ton US Army M1A1 Abrams tanks.

Once in the AOR, the Armor heavy organization was versatile. Tanks could be employed in numerous situations as a show of force, checkpoint control, or convoy security. The dramatic sight of such a large combat force has been credited with setting up an immediate stabilizing effect among warring factions. Now the TF could concentrate on low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations (Petersberg-like tasks), but could be ready for heavy-armed combat if necessary.

Organic Army Aviation units and US Air and Naval-Air forces provided an additional means of agility and versatility. They provided rapid mobility, responsiveness and firepower as required. Quick reaction forces were built around the Army aviation unit’s utility helicopters and easily adapted between support and combat mission preparedness. Additionally, aviation assets played a role in reconnaissance missions that helped the TF anticipate future operations, thus adding to the overall agility of the force. Aviation added more versatility by enabling monitoring of factional compliance with UN
mandates. Aviation assets could provide video capability to determine whether or not a particular faction was in fact adhering to requirements.\textsuperscript{11}

**Lethal/Survivable**

Operating with essentially a Cold War legacy force, TF Eagle entered the Bosnian Theater of operations with overwhelming lethality. US forces arrived in Bosnia with a vast array of modern military equipment that made the force very lethal. State-of-the-art armor in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles helped provide this edge. The M1A1 Abrams tank presented overmatch to any similar weapons system on the battlefield. Augmenting US armored brigade task forces were highly mobile attack helicopters (AH64) Apache gunships that added additional punch to any unforeseen escalation.

Survivability was manifested in both physical and preventative ways. First, the heavy nature of the US armored division provided strong physical protection for deploying forces. Second, intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) operations provided overall force protection by defining and anticipating environmental conditions. US forces took advantage of Special Operations intelligence, CA, and PSYOP information and entered the area with a robust counterintelligence capability. US forces deployed with the largest counterintelligence effort since Desert Storm--over 200 civilian and military personnel. The environment was dangerous; although not high-intensity combat, the AOR was saturated with terrorists, criminals, and elements of the warring parties who were difficult to track and identify. The CI effort helped to sort this out and added a great deal to the survivability level of the TF.\textsuperscript{12}
Sustainable

Task Force Eagle was backed up with a robust and complex sustainment plan from theater to tactical. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) deployed elements early on with TFE. Reach-back sustainment to Germany via rail, road and sea were soon developed. Additionally, a direct logistics pipeline was established to New Cumberland Pennsylvania for air-deliverable items. In New Cumberland the consolidation and containerization point (CCP) for the sustainment air-bridge provided packaging of an average of 26 pallets a day. These activities provided the necessary food, clothing, spare parts, medicine and other requirements to support the 1st Armored Division’s deployment and sustainment.\(^{13}\)

US sustainment operations utilized database management to control the flow and to monitor shipments. This methodology allows for detailed information enhancing the deployed unit’s readiness. In the case of the 1st AD, early in Bosnia operations a M1 Abrams was down for a bad fuel pump. “Using advance computer technology . . . transporters in New Cumberland expedite its movement through the pipeline . . . 1st Armored Division Commanders were able to decide how quickly they needed it, and DLA was able to respond to their needs.”\(^{14}\)

Overall, CALL notes that successful split-based operations were vital to sustainment success in Bosnia. The Division Material Management Center (DMMC) was established at Lukovac, it provided for processing and tracking all sustainment requests for TFE. In Germany a rear logistics detachment processed and forwarded requests to ST Louis, Missouri. Then, Germany received updates and would notify TFE of their status.
This allowed for a reduction of the logistical footprint in Bosnia and more freedom of action for TFE.\textsuperscript{15}

Command and Control

The command and control structure for TFE was tied to NATO command and control. TFE was not an independent operation and therefore had to work within the IFOR and NATO C2 framework. “Although the mission could have failed in the early stages due to the lack of a unified political direction by NATO and the weak interaction between the civil and military authorities in Bosnia, the ‘people on the ground’ found ways to make the mission a success.”\textsuperscript{16}

NATO headquarters, AFSOUTH became the operational-level headquarters for the IFOR. AFSOUTH was a Cold War headquarters focused on naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea. Larry Wentz a long time American civilian NATO staffer specializes in C3 and C4I operations. He believes that had TFE and the rest of the multinational forces encountered more combat upon introduction into Bosnia, that AFSOUTH would have been overwhelmed and failed. Essentially, a lack of unified political direction risked the implementation process and TFE operations.

The most notable failure in command and control was the civilian support structure. In this case a separate structure was organized to coordinate civilian reconstruction and support activities parallel to military stability efforts. The command and control of this structure led to confusion and in some cases competition among military and civilian actors on the around. The inertia fostered by this strange relationship between civilian authorities, tied in some way to the UN and military commanders working for NATO, did not facilitate rapid reconstruction of Bosnian civil
A similar conflict developed along a parallel track with the International Police Task Force (IPTF).

The IPTF was authorized 1,721 monitors. It had low-recruiting standards. These were the ability to drive, English fluency and eight years of police experience in the police recruits home country. In practice these standards were overlooked as long as the applicant could speak English. The legitimacy of the IPTF was in question because of the officers’ overall lack of police experience. Since the police force was not integrated into the military command structure its success in rebuilding Bosnian police forces is dubious at best. Wentz comments, “In performing its monitoring function, the IPTF suffered from and enforcement gap that plagued the entire peace operation.” Ultimately TFE Civil Affairs police specialists proved invaluable in bridging the gap between lackluster IPTF forces and the international contingent.

US Deployment--Haiti--Uphold Democracy

Strategic maneuver was, in itself, the essence of the deployment phase and was conducted like clockwork by both sea and air.18

John T. Fishel

Operation Uphold Democracy, although an international operation, boiled down to a US mission to restore stability and an exiled democratically elected government to Haiti. In 1991 a military junta had displaced Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was widely viewed by the international community as the freely elected leader of Haiti. By 31 July 1994, the UN had adopted UNSCR 940 “authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency.”
Planning focused on two options, a forced entry and a permissive landing operation. As execution of the plan drew close, the reigning military junta was still in place and US planners focused on the forced entry scenario. US Atlantic Command was the lead agency for planning and tasked the 10th Mountain Division to work the permissive plan and the XVIII Airborne Corps to take the lead on the forced entry option.

The XVIII Airborne Corps operated as a Joint Task Force and planned to seize key nodes in Port-au-Prince, deny their use by the ruling junta and cause the rapid demise of the regime. The 10th Mountain’s plan envisaged capitulation of the Cedras-led junta or a hand-over of control after execution of XVIII Airborne’s Corps forced entry option. The actual sequence of events caught all planners by surprise and forced a significant change to overall execution of the plans.¹⁹

Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton believed that the junta would likely back down at the last moment to avoid a conflagration with US forces--he did not imagine an 11th hour negotiation with junta strongman, Cedras. Former President Jimmy Carter stirred the pot by conducting last minute talks with the Cedras regime. These discussions carried through all the way to the commencement of military operations. As a result, the Cedras regime remained in place, at least temporarily. Meanwhile, US forces launched, by air and sea, intent on the forced-entry option, which envisaged regime expulsion. The 18th Airborne Corp’s 82nd airborne division had to be recalled mid-flight and the 10th Mountain Division mustered to the front of the formation to commence operations. This in itself was not difficult since the 10th Mountain Division was ready for entry following the airborne option. The challenge became logistics.²⁰
In preparing for the forced-entry option, the sustainment package was geared for combat operations, not Stability and Support and Sustainment Operations (MOOTW)—Petersberg-like tasks. The support and logistics resources could not be instantly diverted to 10th Mountain Division control. As a result, “port and airfield organization, not to mention establishing living areas for US Soldiers, suffered severe dislocation.” Ultimately, under these new conditions, operations commenced and the military aspects of Uphold Democracy were fulfilled.

Strategic Responsiveness--Uphold Democracy

Responsive

Overall, US deployment and operations in Haiti meet the definition, “Responsive.” Planners had considered two major deployment scenarios. As events unfolded, the most likely option was quickly modified to react to a changing environment on the ground. One of the major defining elements of “Responsive” is that the unit is configured and properly sequenced for the operation. In the planning and conduct of Uphold Democracy, the US had the luxury of standing up two major planning headquarters in order enhance responsiveness. Ultimately, units were resequenced in order to put the right mix of forces on the ground under new conditions. Even though major logistics dissonance resulted from this resequencing, the mission was still successful in fulfilling the UN mandate with minimal loss of life.

Deployable

US operations in Haiti meet the strategically responsive force definition of deployable. The planning for Uphold Democracy was detailed and considered operations
necessary to defeat enemy forces. Centers of Gravity (COGs) were defined that drove the planning process. These were seizure of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian. Following these actions would be operations in the hinterlands by US SOF teams to control the countryside. Plans called for combined seizure of objectives by air and sea-based forces in a rapidly executed “mass-effects” operation. Following operations led by airborne forces at Port-au Prince and Marine forces at Cap Haitian, the 10th Mountain Division-10th MD(L) would move in from the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower by rotary wing insertion. A side effect of the mission change presented SOF entry forces with a temporary loss of insertion platforms.\textsuperscript{22} As it happened, the 10th MD(L) was inserted earlier than anticipated, with generally good results. However, there were problems regarding the Rules-of-Engagement (ROE). The fact that existing Haitian security organs remained in place created unintended perceptions by the Haitian populace. This led to ambiguous ROE interpretation and tactical difficulties conducting MOOTW--Petersberg type operations.\textsuperscript{23}

**Agile/Versatile**

Forces introduced into Haiti were generally light infantry, marine or airborne infantry. Additionally, SOF forces were employed during this operation. A major feature of all these forces is their agility. Coupled with rotary wing assets, the forces could rapidly move to new areas on the island nation as necessary to support or reinforce other forces in need. Unlike operations in Bosnia, the nature of the threat in Haiti was from lightly armed forces. More significant for the operations was the role ground forces found themselves in of working with Haitian security organs that were expected to be illegitimate and no longer in power. In effect, US forces were in the awkward position of
lending credibility back to these forces because of the last minute negotiation pulled off by Jimmy Carter.

Positive versatility examples in Haiti are found during operations in Haiti as well as poor examples. US forces pulled off a myriad of tasks that contributed to overall stability in Haiti. This prepared the way for a “safe and secure” environment to reintroduce Aristide to power. Ground forces secured airfields and ports; conducted seizure operations to clean out known Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) hideouts; SOF forces established political liaison in the hinterlands and began to systematically gain popular support for the US cause; and led by PSYOPS efforts, MPs and infantrymen were able to gather up the majority of FRAPH weapons with very little confrontation with FRAPH elements.

Dr. Robert F. Baumann is a renowned military historian assigned to the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He notes some major versatility and agility issues that confronted deployed forces in Haiti. The major problems revolved around the 10th MD(L) and their ability to transition in and out of certain aspects of the MOOTW spectrum. As stated earlier, the last minute agreement to retain (at least temporarily) the existing government, led to confusion among US ground force elements interacting with these erstwhile enemy forces. After initial objective operations, some observers felt that the 10 MD(L) had resorted to an unusually cautious force protection posture and was giving an air of irrelevancy to the US mission.24

Another unusual aspect of the mission was that some 10th MD(L) and Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) had initiated joint patrolling operations. This caused no small amount of angst among a populace who expected removal of existing military and police

48
structures that had committed untoward aggression against the Haitian people. This was in part a result of the ambiguous nature of the relationship of US forces to existing government forces. After the first month of operations many of these problems faded and with some prodding, 10th MD(L) forces began to take on a more active role in operating among the populace thus helping to alleviate growing tensions between Haitians and the US contingent.25

Lethal/Survivable

The US forces brought the proper mix of lethality and survivability to Uphold Democracy. Lethality was readily apparent with the lead-in plan to seize multiple objectives, simultaneously with overwhelming force. The operation envisaged required fire support from air, ground and sea-based assets in order to shape the area for follow-on peacemaking operations. The initial plan included redundant assets with the 10th MD(L) sequenced behind the major combat forces. The speed of the initial plan lent force protection to the entry elements and thus survivability.

Additionally, survivability was enhanced by PSYOPS, SOF and counterintelligence efforts. The initial ROE was unclear during the beginning of the operation. Questions about how to handle existing Haitian authority structures decreased survivability and could have led to a major confrontation. The employment of PSYOPS and SOF operators who understood the nature of how to win popular support greatly enhanced force protection for the entire US and international contingent. SOF operations in the hinterlands helped convince Haitians of the sincerity of US intentions and contributed to demobilizing the FRAPH elements. In one instance a firefight broke out among Marine forces and FADH elements that helped convince the local populace and
later, the rest of the country, that it was not in the US plan to retain and bolster FADH forces.\textsuperscript{26}

**Sustainable**

Sustainment operations were greatly strained by the initial shuffling of entry forces placing elements at some risk until these problems were sorted out. US forces were able to quickly overcome these difficulties while achieving mission objectives.

The landing craft utility (LCU) played an important sustainment role for Army forces in Haiti. Two companies of LCUs were deployed to Haiti in support of Uphold Democracy. The LCU is a 786-ton landing craft that can carry up to 350 tons. In practice, the LCU can carry up to five M1 Abrams tanks, eight M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, or twenty-eight 20-foot ammunition containers. The LCUs were critical in opening up Port-au-Prince by bringing in offloading equipment to offload RO-RO cargo vessels deployed by Military Sealift Command.\textsuperscript{27} One of the major LCU logistics successes that fostered stability was Operation Light Switch. When US forces entered Haiti on 19 September 1994, many towns had been without electrical power for over three years. In a unique operation, Army LCUs were sent to the theater laden with heavy expanded mobility trucks and fuel tankers. Once on the ground these vehicles were utilized to distribute vast quantities of fuel and spare parts that facilitated the regeneration of fourteen different power stations, positively impacting on thousands of Haitians.\textsuperscript{28}

Air assets were used for reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions, fire support and were ready to drop 3,900 paratroopers on D-Day, 19 September 1994. Tankers supported the effort by flying over 297 sorties among KC-135 and KC-10 tankers. Strategic airlift utilized staging bases in Dover, Delaware; Griffiss, New York;
and Mcquire, New Jersey and transported personnel and materiel from the continental United States to the Caribbean basin. Port-au-Prince was the primary destination of the strategic lift aircraft. At another major destination in theater, Cap Haitian, C-5s and C-141s were unable to land, but C-130s filled this gap. Personnel and equipment were sent to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and were transloaded to C-130s for movement to Cap Haitian and other Haitian locations.²⁹

**Command and Control**

John T. Fishel is a professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. He notes in an article in the *Military Review*, some problems with command and control, and specifically the planning process. “There were numerous problems in joint planning, especially in the integration of OPLAN 2380 with 2370.”³⁰ These plans were the two versions, forced entry and permissive entry that the 18th Airborne Corps and 10th MD(L) worked on concurrently. Fishel says that the 10th MD(L) staff was not robust enough to carry out the detailed planning required of a complex OPLAN like Uphold Democracy. Additionally, many of the resource organizations earmarked for the mission were located at Fort Bragg. This proximity allowed the 18th Airborne Corps to conduct close coordination with these supporting units on the Corp’s forced entry option. The 10th MD(L) planners had to shuttle often between Fort Bragg and Fort Drum, New York, which led to some degradation in the planning phase. Finally, interagency considerations were afterthoughts and not fully vetted in the planning process.³¹

---

¹Strategic Responsiveness, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), 12 October 2001, 1.
2Ibid., 1-6.

3Ibid., 7.

4Ibid., 8-9.

5Ibid., 11.


10Ibid., 135-137.

11Ibid., 135-137.


14Ibid., 24-27.


17Ibid., 152.


20 Ibid., 4, 15.

21 Ibid., 14-15.

22 Ibid., 4, 18.


24 Baumann, 4, 16-17.


26 Fishel, 4, 24-28.


30 Fishel, 4, 23.

31 Ibid.
CHAPTER 4

EDF RESPONIVENESS: A SCENARIO

Overview

The EDF, as defined by the EU and in the Petersberg tasks, must be capable of deploying 60,000 soldiers on a contingency operation in sixty days or less and for up to one year in length. The case studies reviewed in chapter 3 surveyed US deployments of divisional size elements and supporting Corps support forces (approximately 20,000 personnel). The EU has stated that the EDF must be capable of conducting responsive deployment and operations on a magnitude three times greater than the US examples. This chapter focuses on an Algerian crisis scenario in order to understand the movement requirements of such a large deployment. The scenario projects the proposed EDF into a European-Mediterranean AOR in order to conduct a UN-mandated, Petersberg-Task type operation. This scenario is selected based on a EU discussion of likely missions for the EDF; one of the arguments held by the EU for the creation of the EDF is that the US (vis-à-vis NATO) may not be interested or willing to participate in certain “European only interest” operations—Algeria.

Scenario EDF Deployment to Algeria

Background

By 2004 terrorist activity among antigovernment forces in Algeria has grown significantly until these elements have coalesced and now comprise a major insurgency that has besieged the country with civil war. UN declarations and initiatives have thus far failed to stem the tide of unrest and antigovernment forces control almost one-third of the
country (primarily rural areas). The insurgency has been supplied relatively modern former-Soviet weaponry and training by Libya and Iran for almost three years. The Islamic Liberation Front (ILF), as they are known, can now field up to brigade-sized infantry and mechanized infantry (including tanks) formations. Additionally, the ILF maintains significant capability in waging unconventional guerrilla warfare.

By January 2005, the most significant power broker among the antigovernment forces decided to come to the peace table and has asked for UN intervention. The beleaguered Algerian polity has agreed to this proposal. Thus, the UN notified a strengthened OSCE to carve out a resolution on the matter. Finally, an OSCE mandate supported by the UN called for a large peacekeeping mission to Algeria. Eager to build credibility as a military organization and legitimacy for straining military budgets, the EU seized the initiative, leaving NATO out of the decision process; the organization volunteered all 60,000 of the earmarked EDF soldiers for the mission. US planners in NATO were not surprised by this development, understanding the EU’s (especially the French) interest in delivering on stated headline goals for the EU and the EDF.

The peacekeeping mission deployment plan hinges on rapid response. The key antigovernment figure has cobbled together a consensus among loosely organized regionally factionalized militias in order to entice UN intervention. This in practice means the EU must be able to introduce a division-plus size element into theater by D+14, a second division by D+30 and close with all remaining forces by D+60.

The OSCE mandate states that the government of Algeria (GOA) forces and antigovernment forces:

1. Are separated by establishing and monitoring a ZOS
2. Create an environment for peaceful elections and a transition of power to a coalition government of both GOA and ILF partners

3. Provide humanitarian relief to over 600,000 refugees plagued by a drought complicated by the civil war

4. Assist in providing critical infrastructure repair and nation-building activities to facilitate the transition of power

Assumptions

1. Countries involved in this operation are currently the “full” members of the WEU.

2. Entry into Algeria by military forces is considered “permissive.” US national and NATO-earmarked lift assets and air support are unavailable.

3. Deployment is mixed with air and seaborne assets.

4. Each EU-WEU nation is responsible for self-deployment.

5. Merchant fleet sealift capability only supports 25 percent of each nation’s movement capability. This study does not evaluate each nation’s merchant fleet in detail; therefore, this planning factor, although generous for some countries, considers some amount of merchant fleet capability in all EDF countries.

6. The EU has built the EDF around the Eurocorps and employs it in this scenario. European roll-on and roll-off (RO-RO) and other landing craft average speed is thirty kilometers (based on US RO-RO at 17 knots)

7. Each nation’s movement capability is based on current data form Periscope

Online.
8. Any sealift movements over 3,000 kilometers require one or more in-transit refueling, adding twelve hours to transit time.

Data Utilized

1. As much as possible, the data utilized regarding ports, airports, shipping capabilities, and force structure are actual “real-world” information. *Lloyds Ports of the World 2000* and the *Periscope Online database* provide port data and nations’ shipping capabilities; Dorling Kindersley’s *Concise Atlas of the World* provides mileage data; Air mobility Command’s online database *Global Decisions for Global Engagement* provides worldwide airport data; and the *Eurocorps homepage* provides information on the Eurocorps structure.

2. Algiers is the principal port of Algeria, located on the northern coast of Africa between Morocco and Tunisia. The port has forty-nine general cargo berths and bulk berths, three RO-RO berths, and two tanker berths. Algeria has two other lesser port facilities; one of these is able to support one RO-RO type sealift platform.

Composition of Forces

**Eurocorps** (see figures 1 and 2)

**France**

- One brigade armor (Nantez, France)
- One brigade mechanized infantry (Nantez, France)

**Germany**

- One brigade armor (Sigmaringen, Germany)
- One brigade mechanized infantry (Sigmaringen, Germany)
- Combined Brigade (German/French):
  - One brigade, infantry (Mullheim, Germany)
Belgium

One brigade, mechanized infantry (Leopoldsburg, Belgium)
One brigade, mechanized infantry (March-en-Fammene, Belgium)
One brigade, mechanized infantry (Spich, Germany)

Spain

One brigade, mechanized infantry (Cordoba, Spain)
One brigade, mechanized infantry (Badajoz, Spain)
One brigade, mechanized infantry (Madrid, Spain)

Luxembourg

Recon company (Diekirch, Luxembourg)¹

United Kingdom (UK)

One airborne (“superbrigade”). The airborne brigade is known as the “superbrigade.” In 1999 the UK in light of their Strategic Defence Review, combined the 16th Air Assault Brigade and 12th Mechanized Brigade to form Britain's rapid reaction forces. The brigade is 10,000-strong and has two parachute regiments, attack helicopters and mobile air artillery.²

Italy

One Brigade of mountain troops (Alpini). The Italian Army Website has them identified as “the Taurinense Brigade in Turin . . . earmarked to be the Italian land component of the NATO Allied Mobile Force (Land), the Julia Brigade.”³

Netherlands

One battalion light infantry (from ARRC commitment)⁴

Portugal

One mechanized battalion

Greece

One mechanized brigade from “B” Group. This is the newly formed Corps that the Greeks have earmarked for rapid reaction missions.⁵
Figure 1. Current Eurocorps Structure (Eurocorps Homepage)

Figure 2. Eurocorps Unit Locations (Eurocorps Homepage)
Deployment Capabilities

**Sealift**

UK: Navy, 1 RO-RO (18 tanks and 20 other vehicles); Merchant Fleet 18 RO-RO

France: Navy, 2 dock landing ships (468 pax, 20 tanks); Merchant fleet 4 RO-RO

Germany: Navy, 4 Small LCUs (5 tanks); Merchant fleet 13 RO-RO

Spain: Navy, 2 Amphib transports (each carries 14 smaller landing craft); Merchant fleet 36 RO-RO.

Italy: Navy, 1 dock landing ship, several small/medium mostly old US landing craft; Merchant fleet 64 RO-RO.

Netherlands: Navy, 1 x medium LC (5 tanks + 40 other vehicles); Merchant fleet 18 RO-RO

Belgium: Negligible

Greece: Navy, small amphibs; Merchant fleet 19 RO-RO

Portugal: Navy, 12 small various landing craft; merchant fleet 6 RO-RO

Luxembourg: Navy, negligible; Merchant fleet 7 RO-RO

**Airlift**

UK: 2 x Airbus 310, 76 x C 130 (variants)

France: 2 x Airbus 310, 3 x DC8, 14 x C130, 20 x C160

Germany: 3 x Airbus 310, 84 x C160

Spain: 51 x Aviocar C212A-1, 7 x C130

Italy: 20 x C130, 38 x G222

Netherlands: N/A

Belgium: 2 x 727, 11 x C130

Greece: 18 x C130
Portugal:  24x Aviocar C212A-1, 12 x C130

Luxembourg:  N/A

Flow of Forces

In order to adhere to the time line, the EU must introduce a credible force (division) within fourteen days. Based on national assets available and mix of forces required, the following is a list of primary movement means for the preponderance of each contributing nation’s forces:

- UK: airlift
- France: sealift
- Germany: sealift
- Spain: sealift
- Italy: sealift
- Netherlands: sealift
- Belgium: sealift
- Greece: sealift
- Portugal: sealift

Luxembourg: sealift (although this is a light infantry company, it is vehicular mounted, Luxembourg possesses no airlift assets to move this company).

Deployment of the EDF

In a movement study completed in 1997, the US Military Traffic Management Command Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMCEA) established a movement planning guide to assist deployment planners in preparing for contingency operations. This document provides a useful baseline to determine rates of movement from EDF
units’ home station to port of embarkation (POE) and from the POE to the port of
debarkation (POD). Finally, the study considers movement from the POD to units’
tactical assembly areas (TAA). The data and tables in this study are the primary source
for calculating the EDF deployment rates into the Algerian AOR. For simplification in
correlating the data, a one-for-one exchange of a US brigade is substituted for a similar
organization in the EU force.

France

The French contingent deploys from locations vicinity Nantez and Bordeaux
France (see figure 3). These formations consist of a mechanized brigade and armor
brigade and must be moved by sealift. France has available two dock-landing ships
(DLSs) and four merchant fleet RO-RO ships. There are three phases to this movement:
(1) from home station to POE, (2) from POE to POD, and (3) from POD to TAA.

Figure 3. France: Fort to POE
From home station to POD, the French use a combination of rail and road network to arrive at the nearest supported port facility. The distance from Nantez military garrison to port is less than fifty kilometers. Deployment preparation and movement to the Port at Nantez takes three days. Uploading each brigade takes three days. The port at Bordeaux is 300 kilometers from Nantez. Preparations and rail and road movement take four days. Additionally, with RO-RO capability at Bordeaux, loading takes one day. Utilizing merchant fleet RO-RO and naval DLS means that the DLSs require two complete circuits to move the armor brigade. The mechanized brigade can be moved split between one RO-RO circuit and a third dock landing ship circuit.

The distance from Nantez to Algeria is 2,100 kilometers (figure 4). At an average speed of thirty per hour, one-way travel to Algeria takes four days. Two days to offload means that the French can have a battalion plus of armor on the ground in Algeria at D + 10. These DLSs make two more circuits bringing in the second armor battalion by D + 18. During a third circuit the DLS can move a battalion minus of the mechanized infantry brigade by D+26.

Meanwhile, two battalions of mechanized infantry conduct rail and road movement from Nantez to Bordeaux. Including preparation, this takes four days. These forces are uploaded on merchant fleet RO-RO platforms in two days. Distance from Bordeaux to Algeria is 1,800 kilometers. RO-RO speed of thirty kilometers allows these elements to move to Algeria in three days. They close on a RO-RO facility by D+7.

Debarkation, convoy preparation, and distance to TAAs add an additional four to five days for all contributing forces. Thus the French can field entry forces by D+12 and close with rear elements of their two brigades by D+31.
Germany

The German contingent deploys from locations vicinity Sigmaringen Germany (see figure 5). These formations consist of a mechanized brigade and armor brigade and must move by sealift. Germany has available four small LCUs that support five tanks each. Additionally, the Germany merchant fleet has thirty-six various RO-RO-capable ships. There are three phases to this movement: (1) from home station to POE, (2) from POE to POD, and (3) from POD to TAA.
From home-station to POE, the Germans use primarily rail to arrive at two POEs. The two ports selected have the largest out-load capability, they are Bremerhaven and Wilhelmshaven, both with RO-RO capability. Distance from home station to the port areas is 760 kilometers. Preparation for and movement to port via rail and road including rail upload and download for both brigades to the port areas is seven days. Two battalions of armor move by RO-RO. Distance to Algiers from the port areas using English Channel route is 3,225 kilometers (figure 6). RO-RO upload is two days and transit time to Algiers is six days. Thus, by D+15 two battalions moved by RO-RO can be in PODs in Algeria. Germans do not have the option to move naval platforms (LCUs) across these distances; thus, they must turn around the RO-ROs (based on the 25 percent availability in assumptions) and move the complement of their forces in this manner.
Figure 6. German POE to POD

Conducting two more circuits with RO-RO platforms deposits the bulk of their contingent in Algeria. This takes until D+29 for the second wave and until D+43 for the
final wave. Debarkation, convoy preparation, and distance to TAAs add an additional four to five days for all contributing forces. Thus the Germans can field entry forces by D+20, two more battalions by D+34 and close with rear elements of their two brigades by D+48.

Combined Brigade (German/French)

The Combined Brigade is a mix of mechanized infantry and infantry. It requires sealift to self-deploy. Since Germany has more sealift assets, this brigade deploys from vicinity Mullheim Germany by rail to the POE at Bremerhaven. Sealift assets available are German. There are three phases to this movement: (1) from home station to POE, (2) from POE to POD, and (3) from POD to TAA.

From home-station to POD the brigade utilizes rail to arrive at Bremerhaven. Distance from Mullheim to port is 810 kilometers. Including preparation for rail and movement to the port this takes seven days. The brigade embarks on RO-RO ships (two days) following movement of German national forces (two brigades). This movement commences on D+51. Transit time is similar to movement of the German national contingent and follows the same route. Based on this movement, the combined brigade arrives at the vicinity of Algeria at D+57. With five days of RSOI and movement to TAAs, the combined brigade is ready to conduct operations at D+62 days.

Belgium

Belgium has committed three mechanized brigades to the Eurocorps. These units deploy from three locations in Belgium. All three must be moved by sealift means. Belgium has no sealift available and is unable to support this deployment.
Spain brings three mechanized brigades to the EDF. They are located in Cordoba, Badajoz, and Madrid, Spain (figure 7). They require sealift in order to move to the AOR in Algeria. Spain has available two amphibious transport ships and thirty-six RO-RO vessels. Spain has the luxury of being one of the closest nations geographically to the AOR. There are three phases to this movement: (1) from home station to PO, (2) from POE to POD, (3) from POD to TAA.

Ground movement takes each brigade to three separate port facilities for embarkation. The brigade in Cordoba embarks at Malaga; the brigade in Badajoz utilizes Huelva; and the brigade in Madrid departs from Cartagena. Distances from home station to POE for each brigade are 190 kilometers to Malaga, 250 kilometers to Heulva, and 490 kilometers to Cartagena, respectively. Units deploy by mixture of rail and road to POEs.
Allowing for two days preparations and deployment these brigades can arrive at their
POEs by D+5 for the brigades at Cordoba and Badajoz and D+6 for Madrid.

Port-to-port distances from the three Spanish ports are 625 kilometers from
Huelva, 425 kilometers from Malaga, and 300 kilometers from Cartagena. Based on
these distances and loading, transit time takes 2 days from Huelva, 1.5 days from Malaga,
and 1 day from Cartagena. Cumulative figures see the Spanish forces arriving at PODs at
D+8, D+8.5 and D+ 9, respectively. Following RSOI, movement to TAA has the
Spanish contingent ready for operation at D+13, D+13.5 and D+14, respectively.

Luxembourg

The Luxembourg contingent is the last of the Eurocorps elements. Although this
unit is a “light” company, it requires sealift to move all their supporting vehicles. It is a
reconnaissance company. The unit is located in Diekirch, Luxembourg (figure 8).
Luxembourg has no naval movement capability, but RO-RO support can be found in its
merchant marine fleet. There are three phases to this movement: (1) from home station to
POE, (2) from POE to POD, and (3) from POD to TAA.

Movement from Diekirch to the Belgian port of Amsterdam (Luxembourg has no
port facility of this capacity) including convoy and preparation—no rail—takes six days.
Uploading equipment at the POE and transit of 3,050 kilometers to Algeria takes seven
days (figure 9). Downloading equipment and movement through RSOI to their TAA, a
lead platoon of the Luxembourg reconnaissance company is operable at D+14. Follow-
on elements (based on sealift circuits) arrives at TAAs by D+23 and D+32.
Figure 8. Luxembourg Fort to POE

Figure 9. Luxembourg POE to POD
UK

The UK contributes a recently formed “superbrigade.” Light forces associated with this unit move by aircraft (two battalions). The heavy forces, including attack helicopters, are transported by sealift. The UK has available: 2 x Airbus 310, 76 x C 130, (variants) and 1 naval RO-RO (18 tanks and 20 other vehicles) and merchant assets with 18 RO-RO. The unit is located in three areas vicinity Colchester in Essex, Wattisham in Suffolk, and Dover in Kent (figure 10). This contingent stages from two port facilities and one airfield.

![Figure 10. United Kingdom: Fort to POE](image)

Units at Colchester conduct sealift movements at POE, Dover. Ground movement from Colchester to Dover is 140 kilometers. Units at this location take until D+5 to depart on naval RO-RO from Dover. Units in the vicinity of Dover are less than fifty kilometers from the POE; they take until D+4 to begin transit to Algeria via merchant RO-RO. It takes two transits with merchant RO-RO to complete this movement. Distance from Dover to POD in Algeria is 2,625 kilometers (see figure 11).
Lead elements out of Dover arrive at D+8 and D+9. Including download and RSOI movement, these initial units are prepared in TAAs by D+15 and D+16. By D+33, trail elements from Dover have completed movement and are linked up with their parent units.

Meanwhile units in the vicinity of Wattisam prepare for airlift movement and sealift movement. These forces utilize the port facility in Liverpool and available airfields. Movement, marshalling, and launching of two parachute battalions is executed in three days. The most direct route of flight is 2,100 kilometers, and these two battalions can be on the ground in Algeria (assuming two separate lifts based on MOG) at D+4 and D+6. The balance of equipment and vehicles depart from Liverpool, which is eighty kilometers from home station at Colchester. Distance by sea route to Algeria from Liverpool is 2,175 kilometers. Thus, sealift is virtually the same as movement from Dover. Including download, linkup with forces and RSOI procedures, elements departing from Dover are operational by D+15.

Figure 11. United Kingdom: APOE to APOD and POE to POD
Italy

The Italian contribution deploys from locations vicinity Turin, Italy. This organization is a light infantry mountain troop brigade assigned normally as part of NATO’s Allied Mobile Land Force (Land) contingent. The unit is light and the personnel with minimum equipment can be airlifted. The complement of supporting elements and vehicles for this brigade must be sealifted to the POD. Troops fly from a C-5 capable field at Turin. The Italian airlift capability is twenty C-130 and thirty-eight G222s (an Aerospatiale transport similar to the US Lockheed C130s in capability)--these are medium-lift aircraft. Based on MTMC data, the Alpini brigade requires forty-five sorties of a mixture of C130 and G222 transport planes to move the brigade. The international airport in Algiers supports C-130 aircraft and based on a maximum on the ground (MOG) capability of eight C130s per day, the unit can complete its movement in eight days. This includes marshalling to the airfield, loading equipment and flight time to Algiers of ten hours.

The brigade’s bulk equipment is outloaded from unit locations in Turin, Italy to the POE at Genoa, Italy (figure 12). Distance from Turin to Genoa is 150 kilometers. Distance to Algiers from Genoa is 900 kilometers. Italians have three DLSs, which are capable in one lift, of moving all bulk brigade equipment. Movement to POE and preparation of equipment is four days. Transit to Algeria is two days plus two additional days for downloading (figure 13). Thus, the airlanding Italian brigade can linkup with their equipment concurrent to arrival in the AOR. The Italian brigade is prepared for operations by D+13.
Figure 12. Italy Fort to POE

Figure 13. Italy APOE to APOD and POE to POD
The Netherlands contributes one light infantry battalion from their one brigade commitment to NATO’s AARC. This element could deploy by air but has no lift capability. Therefore this force moves by RO-RO platform and including movement from home station to POE to POD can arrive in Algeria at D+12 and move through RSOI and into TAA by D+17 (figures 14 and 15).

Figure 14. Netherlands POE to POD
Portugal deploys one light infantry battalion to Algeria. Portugal has enough airlift capability (24x Aviocar C212s and 12x C130s) to move in one lift. The number of sorties for one battalion is fifteen. From fort to airfield including load-out preparation is three days. Flight distance to Algeria is 1,000 kilometers or four hours flight time (figure 16). Bulk equipment moves from home station to POE and then, POE to POD. The distance from POE at Lisbon to POD in Algeria 935 kilometers (figure 16). Moving the bulk equipment to the POE and transit to the POD takes seven days. Including RSOI into the AOR, the Portuguese battalion is ready for operations by D+14.
Greece

The Greeks contribute a mechanized brigade from their newly fielded “B” Corps, which is a newly designed corps intent on rapid-reaction capabilities. This unit must be moved by sealift. This unit is garrisoned in Athens and deploys from the port in this city, Piraeus. Greece has small amphibious craft and nineteen RO-RO platforms in the merchant fleet available.

Movement in the vicinity of Athens to POE is less than fifty kilometers (figure 17). Including preparations, movement to port, and loading, the brigade can begin its first transit of a battalion-minus to Algeria by D+4. The distance to Algeria by fastest sea route is 1,800 kilometers. This transit takes three days. Unloading and RSOI preparation have the leading Greek battalion-minus prepared by D+12. Follow-on sealift circuits continue to bring Greek brigade elements to this stage by D+22, D+32, and D+42. The Greek brigade is in their TAA as a complete element by D+42.
Figure 17. Greece POE to POD

Table 1 is a compilation of the EDF deployment data for movement to Algeria. The results show that it is possible for the EU to move a significantly sized force within their stated “60-day “ requirement. The Table does not indicate however, whether the EDF is able to accomplish the full spectrum of Petersberg Tasks.
Table 1. Deployment Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Earliest arrival D+</th>
<th>Final closure D+</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurocorps Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2 Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2 Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1 Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3 Bdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1 Coy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other EU nations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1 Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1 Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1 Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1 Bde</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “D-Day” represents the day the EU assumes the mission to Algeria.

**This deployment equals an approximate 13 brigade or 4-division equivalent. Including supporting troops, this approximates 60,000 personnel.

Summary

This scenario surveys a potential EDF deployment to Algeria to conduct Petersberg-task operations. Although it appears that the EDF is able to project sizeable forces into this AOR in less than sixty days, the deployment seems awkward at best. EDF units are deployed in an ad hoc manner by whatever means their parent country possesses. Of more concern is the requirement to sustain these forces for up to one year in the AOR. Based on the deployment alone, it is obvious that most EU countries possess limited lift capability either by sea or air. This limitation impacts each nation’s ability to sustain its forces for any length of time. Additionally, this deployment assumes liberal availability of military and civilian lift assets. The next chapter concludes the study by
summarizing aspects of the EDF deployment in this scenario utilizing FM 3.0’s strategic responsiveness construct and drawing some comparisons to US deployments in chapter 3.


2 BBC News Website, Army Launches Superbrigade, 3 September 1999; available from http://news.bc.co.uk/hi/English/uk/newsid 437000/437218.stm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.


CHAPTER 5

THE EDF CONCLUSION: RESPONSIVE?

Overview

It is clear the Europeans have decided to create a “European only” military mechanism. Their desire is to create some sort of military structure that can respond to lower-end conflict issues in Europe or in out of area locations—potentially North Africa. Broadly, the EDF mission statement has been articulated in EU declarations known as the Petersberg-Tasks. Collectively, the Europeans have a long way to go in creating a force that can accomplish these tasks.

This study discussed European security structures and a methodology to evaluate the EDF. As a context, similar Petersberg-like deployments of U.S. forces to Bosnia and Haiti were examined. Similarly, a scenario was developed in chapter 4 to highlight deployment challenges for an ascendant EDF. This final chapter once again lays out the criteria from chapter 2 against analysis from the rest of this project. Here the EDF is judged on its ability to deploy and support Petersberg-like missions.

Responsive

In the Algerian crisis scenario it appears that the EDF meets the test of responsive—mostly based on deployment timeline. Yet many underlying issues (besides timing) impact responsiveness. The EDF units flowed into the North African AOR were moved at best possible speed based on national movement capabilities. The scenario did not consider many potential delays in each nation’s deployment plan. There are three
important areas to consider. These are political considerations, training and equipment readiness, and finally composition of forces.

In the political arena, the EU, like other security institutions, is a consensus-based organization. In order to make a decision on a deployment, national parliaments among EU nations consider and debate the necessity of such a mission. These discussions could add considerable time to a deployment schedule--potentially many weeks. Once national debates are settled and EU consensus is built, the reality of the agreement is that some EU nations may “opt out” of the deployment for lack of interest. Rhetorically, the EU would like to believe that security interests in a particular region impact all members of the Union equally; this therefore, helps to create more consensus. In practice, it is obvious that threats to Italy from North Africa are different than those to the Netherlands. It follows that if the mission is not interesting to several parties, then there could be gaping holes in the deployment of EDF forces because of a lack of commitment. This could be mitigated by a more robust political and military structure among EU members. In March of 2002, the EU began a constitutional convention that could institutionalize response activities in a more aggressive manner.

The second responsive area to consider is training and equipment readiness. It is assumed that the EU members intend to earmark their crisis-responder military organizations and train them for these contingencies. As already discussed in chapter 4, this “earmarking” could be based on previous attempts by Europeans to integrate/modify existing reaction forces--the Eurocorps is an example. In practice this involves an upgrade in many capability areas. Bosnian deployments and coalition operations during Desert Storm displayed numerous deficiencies in European military interoperability. In
fact, the French case was so glaring that they have focused efforts since 1991 to improve on these hard-learned lessons. France has one of the larger defense budgets in Europe and is able to make some limited modernization. However, many other EU countries do not have the capital and in some cases the political backing to increase defense expenditures. This means efforts in modernization and interoperability for Europeans at large, is dubious at best. Among NATO members, there is an ongoing effort under agreements regarding the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). This is a NATO effort to focus Europeans on defense deficiencies (especially interoperability) that may dovetail into providing better compatibility among EDF forces.

Training readiness is a difficult calculation. EDF contributors certainly have had some opportunity to gain low-end spectrum experience in the Bosnian AOR. Lessons learned from these operations have impacted the thinking of military staffs in Europe. Still there is the question of funding realistic training venues to increase combined training experiences and challenges for EDF forces. The United States boasts three major training centers that focus on full spectrum conflict scenarios. The Europeans have some training centers at the national level, but no single country can provide a training center to exercise multinational brigades and divisions. In practice this means that EDF forces deployed in the North African scenario bring with them a mixed bag of experiences. In some cases, units may have very little experience in peace-making operations that could jeopardize forces in the AOR. This could lead to a rescue mission having to be mounted in order to resolve a deteriorating situation. Rescue missions are at the higher-end of the Petersberg requirements and are complex tasks. It follows that if national forces are
deficient at peacemaking tasks, they are likely found wanting in rescue mission type operations.

Finally, a third area of concern regarding responsiveness has to do with force composition. The North African scenario deploys forces from the Eurocorps and assumes the composition of force deployments from other WEU members. The Eurocorps is generally a “heavy” organization with multiple mechanized or armored brigades assigned to it. A mix of forces is required in Algeria. The government of Algeria’s military structure is conventionally based. The antigovernment forces in Algeria are both conventional and unconventional. In order to enforce a ZOS among these factions, the EDF must possess capabilities to thwart aggression on both sides. In practice, this means the EDF must bring some heavy forces and some lighter “counterinsurgency” capable forces.

The EDF deployment brings a mix of units (mostly heavy) to the Algerian AOR. These forces may pose a credible threat to conventional forces on both sides. However, the light forces associated with the EDF deployment may not be able to manage the unconventional aspects of the threat. Additionally, a major lesson discussed in chapter 3 is the U.S. capability to conduct robust civil affairs and psychological operations. These operations are regarded as decisive for the success of these U.S. contingency operations. Thus, a dearth of capabilities regarding CA/PSYOPs and special operations could place the Europeans in unenviable situations during a contingency operation. This means Europeans are going to have to dedicate a significant amount of thought and resourcing into raising and committing special operations and counterinsurgency capable units to the EDF.
Deployable

Many of the aspects of EDF deployability are covered in chapter 4. The EDF as it stands today is woefully lacking in strategic deployment capabilities. In most cases, European forces must rely on sealift platform capability. The Algerian scenario required credible force by D+14 (a division). It appears the EU among its contributors is able to accomplish this task, however, there are other areas of deployability concern to examine. These are sequencing of forces and platform capabilities.

For the EDF to be able to accomplish their mission, they must have a logical flow of command and control (C2), combat, and sustainment forces moving into an AOR. Chapter 4 focused on getting combat forces into theater rapidly. The lack of large sealift and airlift capability means that risk is taken in some area based on sequencing. As was seen in Bosnia, rail shortages had a similar impact on U.S. forces deploying to Bosnia. The Bosnian deployment was mainly a ground movement conducted on a contiguous landmass. In this situation as reality met the plan, U.S. forces sacrificed some initial life support and sustainment capabilities in order to introduce combat forces rapidly into the AOR. Europeans have similar difficulties multiplied geometrically by attempting a complex deployment with limited lift potential on noncontiguous terrain. The Algerian deployment presented in chapter 4 is bare bones and concentrates on combat forces.

Another significant benefit learned by U.S. commanders deploying to Bosnia is getting leaders on the ground early. This led to “smart” positioning of forces as they were introduced and contributed to an ability to quickly define and enforce the ZOS. The EDF can benefit from this model if they sequence C2 properly among their limited movement assets. Moving C2 in this manner does not necessarily mean a leader or two
on an airplane. As an example on another contingency operation, in sending U.S. leaders to Rwanda in 1994, a battalion minus of infantry was sent to provide security for this reconnaissance effort.

Lift platforms, their organization, and their availability directly contribute to EDF deployability. The North African scenario allowed for a 25 percent planning factor of each nation’s merchant fleet to support movement. Even with this liberal factor in many cases it took multiple lifts to move each nation’s forces to the AOR.

The data compiled in chapter 4 highlight the fact that there is no coherent lift organization or effort among the Europeans. As in the Belgian case, they are left at home station for lack of lift capability to move their Eurocorps assets to the AOR. Some EU members have agreed to an organized effort to improve airlift capability. Europeans have pinned their hopes on the procurement of Airbus 400M (A400M) heavy transports (about twice as much lift potential as U.S. C-130J variants). Additionally, some of the EU states have begun to collaborate on a supranational military airlift command. These efforts could dramatically change the deployability responsiveness potential of the EDF.¹

Unfortunately of late, many of the would-be purchasers have significantly reduced their initial A400 projections. The major issue is the high-cost of each airframe. Current expectations for A400 production targets 2006 as the initial start date for the first EDF A400 delivery.² The EDF is supposed to stand up in 2003; if it takes three additional years to begin heavy transport procurement, this leaves EDF responsiveness in doubt for some period of time.
The nature of the low-intensity spectrum of operations is that these operations insinuate potential overlap with high-intensity operations. Even without this “spillover” effect, the Petersberg tasks as articulated clearly point to high-end spectrum combat capabilities. Two examples of these types of missions include Petersberg requirements for “Peacemaking” and for conducting “Rescue Operations.” Either one of these missions includes the potential for serious combat operations. Historical examples in Bosnia of peacemaking include NATO air interdiction during the campaign. Additionally, rescue combat operations were mounted to extricate UN peacekeepers and downed pilots.

In order to participate in such operations, the EDF requires unique agility and versatility. First the EDF must be able to transition from some sort of SASO humanitarian effort quickly to thwart efforts by a potential actor to break a cease-fire, disregard a ZOS, or commit genocide as Serbian leader Milosevic did in the Balkans. The forces employed in the North African scenario in chapter 4 provide some modicum of capability to react in a conventional manner against conventional forces committing potential illegal actions.

Notwithstanding these abilities, the EDF does not appear versatile and agile enough to mount a complex rescue mission. These activities require significant intelligence and precision-guided weapons capabilities, which are currently not in strength among EU nations.

At the lower end of the spectrum, the EU has stated that numbering among a targeted deployment of 60,000 are 5,000 police forces. Based on lessons in Bosnia, these
forces are likely prepared to conduct local law enforcement and as the mission progresses, provide training to host-nation authorities. In Bosnia, a major failure of the civilian authority effort was command and control of the international police forces. This created a situation of animosity between civilian and military authorities. An EDF deployment could overcome this problem by connecting the C2 of the police forces to the military structure.

**Lethal/Survivable**

The EDF brings to North Africa a significant amount of land combat power. Some of this equipment is older and not as up to date as its U.S. counterpart, but the EDF could hold its own against a conventional threat in Algeria. The introduction of forces focused on combat capability first, which enhanced survivability. This is based on the maxim that survivability is tied directly to lethality. The challenge is in the unconventional arena.

As stated before, U.S. Special Operations support in Bosnia and more recently in Afghanistan highlight the danger of unconventional threats. A robust intelligence support structure and PSYOPs campaign are critical to “Shaping” the environment. The EDF does not want to find itself in a Somalia-like situation. In Somalia, a SASO operation grew into a series of raids in order to enhance the success of the SASO effort. Even with robust intelligence architecture, U.S. forces suffered unwarranted casualties because they misread enemy capabilities and were unprepared to mount a complex rescue operation. Survivability was reduced significantly because of these failures. EDF leaders must plan for “contingencies” within their contingency operation. As currently organized, the EDF
Sustainable

“Sustainable for twelve months,” is the EDF or EU’s headline goal to mount a SASO operation. Recent experience in the last decade shows no historical example where a SASO mission was completed and successful after only twelve months. Europeans are slowly coming around to this reality and the NATO International Secretariat states that Europeans are considering that in order to have 60,000 soldiers ready to go, another 40,000 to 120,000 may collectively need to be in a pool ready to replace the initial 60,000. The Secretariat mentions another issue is that each nation has different unit rotation requirements. As an example, the French like to deploy units for 120 days or less. The UK prefers 180 days. Ultimately, 60,000 in North Africa on initial entry does not equal staying power for multiple rotations and years.³

Shortages of strategic movement assets not only impact deployment, but also have a dramatic impact on force sustainment. As was shown in chapter 4, the EDF must make hard choices in deployment sequencing. This may include sustainment risks to the force. Besides sustaining the force, lack of significant lift assets can strain the operational environment in other ways. On a humanitarian operation, airlift capability of relief material to remote areas can be linked directly to survivability and legitimacy of the operation. If EDF forces arrive to stabilize and provide relief to Algerian refugees, yet are unable to generate the airlift to accomplish this, then the mission is in jeopardy. This threatens the legitimacy of the operation in the minds of Algerian and also on the home front in European capitals. Additionally, other neighboring onlookers understand the
nature of a European failure and thus, interest in future EDF intervention in a crisis is significantly reduced. Finally, on many relief operations, food becomes a weapon (Sudan, Somalia are two examples). Thus, if relief is not provided throughout the AOR, competing factions can intervene and reduce EDF control and legitimacy.

Command and Control

The EDF as an idea belongs to the WEU. The WEU recently was absorbed as the military structure of the EU. Thus, the political chain of command for the EDF belongs to a diverse consensus based organization, the European Union. The military structure of the EDF command and control is still under debate. Some argue for autonomy from the NATO chain of command (mostly French), others argue for use of NATO C2 assets and coupling EDF C2 under the new NATO concept of the Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF is an idea promulgated to prepare NATO to conduct non-Article 5 tasks (Petersberg-like SASO operations) in light of NATO’s perceived mission expansion away from purely collective defense. The methodology allows NATO to design ad-hoc response forces to accomplish SASO type missions. How the Europeans sort this out remains to be seen. There is an obvious conflict among NATO members (especially non-EU-NATO members like the U.S., Canada and Turkey) if the Europeans design a force and then use NATO assets minus NATO C2 to accomplish a contingency mission.

Besides NATO conflict, the EU needs to come to grips as discussed above with the C2 architecture that promotes nation building and provides survivability to EDF forces. The example of the mismanagement of civilian structures--the international police effort--in Bosnia is the example of poor C2. The EDF has decided wisely to incorporate a policing organization coupled to the reaction force. Thus the question
remains, which organizational body is to command and control the EDF policing organization?

Closing

The Europeans are moving ahead with some difficulty to create a European Defense Force. This thesis illuminates some of the challenges facing the Europeans in developing this force under the rubric of creating a “strategically responsive force.” One of the major discussions among Europeans is whether or not they are capable of meeting their stated Headline Goal of deploying this force within a sixty-day time frame. It shows by utilizing current rail, road, and lift infrastructure (primarily sealift) that the Europeans could move a significant force (their Headline Goal) into a near-Europe AOR in under a sixty-day time period. This does not mean that the Europeans have achieved mission success on a Petersberg-type (MOOTW) mission by merely executing movement on a stated timeline. As indicated, it takes the right sequencing and mix of forces to accomplish complex tasks included in any MOOTW mission profile. Thus in the final analysis, although the EDF may be able to manage a sixty-day deployment timeline, its ability to conduct successful MOOTW operations is not assured.

Besides near-Europe missions, it is not clear whether or not Europeans intend to make the EDF ready to deploy beyond Europe. Afghanistan is an example of a distant theater that several EU countries have sent forces to support an U.S. led “coalition of the willing.” The German deployment to this AOR is illustrative of European deployment challenges. In order to move their forces they have paid the Russian military numerous millions of dollars to provide lift aircraft for transport of German forces.
This project utilized criteria from FM 3.0 and focused mostly on the deployment of the EDF. Future research on this topic must critique other areas in this study not considered as in depth as deployment. Some of the most important issues are C2 and versatility of the force. Specifically, a determination of how much of the EDF C2 should be coupled with NATO C2 structures must be considered. Regarding versatility, a review of European commitments in the area of civil affairs, police and special operations to the EDF is required. On a broader scope research is necessary in the area of supporting European naval and air forces to the EDF. More research is required in the area of “lift.” Specifically, a detailed capability study of European merchant sea vessels and the future of the A400 acquisition program requires evaluation to determine strategic lift potential for the EDF.

Finally, as an alternative option to establishing an EDF altogether, research into improved NATO capabilities should be accomplished. Specifically, the NATO promulgated Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) provides a venue for Europeans to improve military capabilities in concert with the current NATO structure. The Europeans have spent a lot of political capital on the EDF and while the idea of an “improved NATO” option may prove fiscally responsible, it might be politically unpalatable; nevertheless it warrants consideration.

---


2Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Article


Books


**Government Documents**


Internet


Theses and Research Papers


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   US Army Command and General Staff College
   250 Gibbon Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

2. Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
   825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
   Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

3. MAJ Andrew S. Harvey
   DJMO
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

4. LTC Justin L. C. Eldridge
   DJMO
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

5. Dr. Robert F. Baumann
   CSI
   USACGSC
   1 Reynolds Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 31 May 2002
2. Thesis Author: MAJ Ray P. Wojcik
3. Thesis Title: Evaluating the European Defense Force
4. Thesis Committee Members

Signatures: __________________________

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

A   B   C   D   E   F   X   SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)

Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12
Critical Technology (3) / Section 4 / 31
Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)

/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: __________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:


2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the US Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.


6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a US military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and US DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).