THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HEADLINE GOAL:
AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

by

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September 2002

Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost
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# Title
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## Abstract
In December 1998, French and British leaders declared that the European Union (EU) must develop the capacity for autonomous military action to respond to international crises. In December 1999, EU leaders meeting in Helsinki established the Headline Goal—defined as the autonomous ability to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for an operation lasting as long as one year to conduct the “Petersberg Tasks” of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. The deadline for the operational capability of the Headline Goal is December 2003. Although in December 2001 the EU declared that it had “some” operational capability, it remains unable to conduct certain Petersberg Tasks, especially “upper” level missions such as peacemaking on the model of NATO’s Kosovo intervention. Despite the current military force structures of EU member states, significant capability shortfalls, and stagnant or declining defense budgets in most EU countries, it appears that the EU will be able to conduct lower-level Petersberg Tasks in permissive environments by December 2003. However, capabilities needed for upper level tasks, such as strategic airlift, will take several years to develop and acquire—far beyond the deadline of December 2003.
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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HEADLINE GOAL: 
AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

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Second Lieutenant, United States Air Force  
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2001

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2002

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ABSTRACT

In December 1998, French and British leaders declared that the European Union (EU) must develop the capacity for autonomous military action to respond to international crises. In December 1999, EU leaders meeting in Helsinki established the Headline Goal—defined as the autonomous ability to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for an operation lasting as long as one year to conduct the “Petersberg Tasks” of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. The deadline for the operational capability of the Headline Goal is December 2003. Although in December 2001 the EU declared that it had “some” operational capability, it remains unable to conduct certain Petersberg Tasks, especially “upper” level missions such as peacemaking on the model of NATO’s Kosovo intervention. Despite the current military force structures of EU member states, significant capability shortfalls, and stagnant or declining defense budgets in most EU countries, it appears that the EU will be able to conduct lower-level Petersberg Tasks in permissive environments by December 2003. However, capabilities needed for upper level tasks, such as strategic airlift, will take several years to develop and acquire—far beyond the deadline of December 2003.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the Franco-British Summit at St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair surprised many observers when they announced that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous military action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”¹ For decades, NATO had been the most significant force in Western European military matters. The Western European Union (WEU), established in 1954 on the basis of the 1948 Brussels Treaty, had chosen to “work in close co-operation” with NATO and to “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”² The European Union had focused primarily on economic affairs, with limited involvement in non-military security matters.

With St. Malo, the governments of the European Union expressed an intention to acquire crisis management means capable of operating on their own without American help or (by some perceptions) American interference. The European Union, while then (and now) primarily concerned with common economic and monetary policies, was charged with the stewardship of this new endeavor. The creation of an EU ability to deploy forces up to a level of 60,000 troops, as outlined in the Helsinki Headline Goal of December 1999, has been described by the EU as the first significant step in pursuing a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

The Headline Goal, the operational manifestation of the ESDP, outlined the requirements for autonomous EU military forces in general terms. The new capabilities, to be composed of sovereign national contributions, would not constitute a standing force or a “Euro-army.” Instead, individual nations would pledge forces to the EU’s force catalogue for possible use in times of need. The term “military force” should therefore


not be construed to mean a “permanent” or “standing” force. This force would be tasked with the “Petersberg” missions of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.”\(^3\) A corps-sized force of up to 60,000 troops is to be deployable in 60 days for operations of at least a year’s duration. Additionally, the EU set the goal of having this force ready for deployment by 2003.\(^4\)

At the 19 November 2001 Capabilities Improvement Conference in Brussels, EU defense ministers met to discuss capability shortfalls that could potentially prevent EU forces from conducting some “Petersberg Task” operations. In view of the dozens of capability shortfalls identified, the defense ministers agreed to implement the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), which is a “bottom-up” approach to evaluate capability shortfalls and begin the process of remedying them.\(^5\) On 15 December 2001, EU leaders meeting at Laeken, Belgium, declared the ESDP “operational,” though not all the forces outlined in the Headline Goal were ready for deployment and significant capability shortfalls still existed.\(^6\) Nonetheless, this “operational” declaration has been one of the most noteworthy ESDP developments since the 1999 Helsinki Summit. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the prospects for fulfillment of the Headline Goal and the significance of its fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) for NATO and the United States.

**A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

With the deadline of December 2003 rapidly approaching, defense establishments on both sides of the Atlantic are pondering some difficult questions raised by the prospect of troops conducting operations in Europe and further afield under the EU flag. NATO and EU member countries are examining the implications of a fully operational and

\(^3\) Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, available online at http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/petersberg92.pdf. This wording was adopted by the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (in force since 1999) and repeated in the Nice Treaty in 2000 (not yet in force, with ratification by all EU states still pending).


deployable EU military capability. Rather than addressing the questions raised by one institution in particular, such as NATO, this thesis examines the Headline Goal force itself, and not the institutions that will be affected by the Headline Goal. The key question examined by this thesis is: will the EU’s proposed Headline Goal military capability prove to be an autonomous, effective, and credible military force? This question can be answered by examining the following closely related questions:

1. What were the decisive factors in the formulation of the Helsinki Headline Goal and what events generated these driving factors?
2. What are the proposed missions and actual operational requirements for the Headline Goal military force?
3. What actions have the EU member states taken to meet these requirements?
4. What is the likelihood that this assembly of national military forces will be capable of successfully conducting “Petersberg Task” operations, and what needs to be done to make it truly autonomous, effective, and credible?

B. SIGNIFICANCE

Ever since St. Malo, the idea of ESDP, including possible EU-led military operations, has been controversial. The concept of an EU military force being assigned missions that NATO as a whole is not willing to undertake has forced many nations to rethink their policies on security and defense. The concept has at times strained trans-Atlantic relations and relations among EU member nations, and in some circles it has also come to represent a challenge to NATO’s role in European security and defense. In the European Union’s struggle to define its military role, the policies of its member nations have been faced with new challenges. This is especially true for the three nations that have been the most actively involved in the process of creating this force, and that have also pledged the most troops to the force catalogue—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). All three countries have played crucial roles in the process of European integration. France and Germany are considered the “engine” of EU integration, especially on the economic and monetary front. The UK, often lukewarm on issues of EU integration, dramatically reversed its policy regarding EU involvement in military security matters by endorsing the agreement at St. Malo. These factors, coupled with the commonly held view that France, Germany, and the UK have also been the strongest military powers in Western Europe, make it clear that ESDP is not without substantial backing by countries that possess both an
ability to deliver the required forces should the EU call upon them, and the experience to use them effectively. The EU could theoretically deliver quite an operational capacity with nations such as these three contributing to the Headline Goal force catalogue. ESDP developments should be given a great deal of attention, because the potential for the EU to play a significant military role in Europe and beyond is evident.

C. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This thesis analyzes only a narrow portion of the literature dedicated to the study of European security and defense matters. Since the Headline Goal was recently established, the relevant documentation is somewhat limited. However, primary sources such as the Chaillot Papers published by the EU’s Institute for Security Studies, official EU documents, and speeches made by the leaders of many EU member countries provide valuable material for analysis. The secondary sources utilized include informational reports and analytical studies.

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines the origins of the European Union’s drive for military autonomy that has manifested itself in ESDP and the Headline Goal. Several steps had to be taken before EU leaders met at Helsinki in December 1999 and endorsed the goal of creating an autonomous military force. The driving factors behind the Headline Goal help to explain why these specific force requirements emerged from the discussions at Helsinki instead of other types of force requirements.

Chapter III examines the operational requirements of the Headline Goal in light of its proposed missions. It also examines the lack of commitment by EU countries to meeting the requirements of providing their armed forces with the troops and equipment that they could need to conduct “Petersberg Task” operations. Since the Headline Goal does not call for a standing army, but rather a catalogue of capabilities that could be temporarily assigned to the EU, any lapses in preparing national forces for military contingencies could directly manifest themselves in any EU force. This chapter looks at both where the shortfalls in preparation exist, and why they exist. Chapter IV deals with the uncertain future that the Headline Goal faces. To deal with the multitude of problems associated with standing up such a force, the EU member countries may need to change their approach to defense matters. This chapter recommends ways to improve
capabilities and examines what else needs to be done to ensure the success of the force. The thesis thereby offers an operational assessment of the EU’s Headline Goal.
II. A DRIVE FOR AUTONOMY: FACTORS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL

A. INTRODUCTION

The idea that there should be military institutions in Europe other than NATO is not a new one. Though it was ultimately defeated on a procedural motion without a debate in the French National Assembly in 1954, the European Defence Community (EDC), a proposed six-nation integrated European army, was the one of the first post-World War II attempts to create a purely European multinational military capability. Since then, numerous other initiatives have taken root, but none has surpassed NATO in terms of importance, nor has any such initiative attempted to do so. The WEU and the Eurocorps are both prime examples of defense initiatives designed to improve European military capabilities, while not attempting to either undermine or weaken the Alliance.

The European Union’s ESDP is not aimed at undermining or weakening the Alliance. The projected Headline Goal force is designed to enable the EU to conduct crisis management interventions and other “Petersberg Tasks” when the Alliance as a whole is not willing to undertake such operations. This is something that no European defense organization has proven capable of doing successfully when the need has arisen, although some ad hoc activities constitute honorable exceptions—for instance, the Italian-led “coalition of the willing” that conducted the “Operation Alba” intervention in Albania in 1997. Thus, the EU is sailing in somewhat uncharted waters as it attempts to fill this role. The motivations behind the Headline Goal and the events which have led to its development not only shed light on this drive for autonomy, but also show why the EU has stepped up to fill such a demanding role.

B. FRANCE—CHAMPION OF EU AUTONOMY

Whenever people discuss improved EU military capabilities, including an EU ability to operate without US support, a discussion about France will inevitably arise. France has had a colorful military history in the decades since the end of the Second World War. At first, the French were adamant in seeking a firm US commitment to European defense and a continued US military presence. The French wanted the United States to ensure that, if a third world war broke

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out, it would be fought entirely east of the Rhine and that American forces and military supplies
would be available from the very start to defend French territory.8

NATO was of course the institution that solidified that commitment, but US support was
not as comprehensive as the French had anticipated. The French felt betrayed by a lack of US
support at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and felt further betrayed by America’s harsh condemnation of
the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of the Suez in 1956.9 Charles de Gaulle (President of France,
1958-1969) felt that the French voice in NATO was becoming ever more overpowered by that of
the United States. When French doubts about the US commitment to Europe arose, tensions
within the Alliance grew. In spite of efforts by the United States to ease French concerns within
the planning structures of NATO, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military
structure in 1966.10

While the French remained in NATO’s political structure, cohesion among the rest of the
allies may have been actually enhanced as the remaining allies were able to proceed with military
decisions that had previously been delayed by France.11 The events leading up to this withdrawal
had planted a seed of distrust for America among some of the French, particularly certain
Gaulists. France’s efforts to create an EU military capacity for autonomous action, with little or
no dependence on NATO or the United States, may be partly attributed to these events, among
many other factors.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the following dissolution
of the Warsaw Pact, the traditional thinking regarding Europe’s defense needed to be
reexamined.12 On 9 April 1990, President George Bush and President François
Mitterrand met in Key Largo, Florida, to bilaterally discuss the future of the Atlantic
Alliance.13 From the US perspective, the primary strategic objective was to find a new
role for NATO which would involve structured dialogue with the former adversaries to

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10 Kay, 43.
11 Ibid.
the East and also a definition of collective security tasks for the European theater.\textsuperscript{14} France’s view was that NATO should remain the institution responsible for Article 5 collective defense tasks, but that the European Community (EC) should lead in the stabilization of Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, the French advocated the creation of what would come to be called a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) for the assumption of collective security and crisis management tasks, which were to be “essentially European responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{15}

Though Mitterrand went away from the meeting with the impression that President Bush had agreed to consider this division of responsibilities, it soon became clear that the United States was in fact committed to revitalizing NATO for the collective security role in Europe.\textsuperscript{16} “The United States wanted to transform NATO from a military to a much more political alliance, embracing collective security tasks and immediately restructuring NATO’s military forces to reflect that new reality.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, where the French saw a greater security role for the EU (then the EC), the Americans saw the same role for NATO. These differing ideas at Key Largo about the new responsibilities for the two institutions would set the tone for the security debate that would develop in post-Cold War Europe. The United States saw NATO as an institution that could play several new security roles, whereas France thought NATO should concentrate on its Article 5 mission while the EU would assume the new security functions.

\section*{C. Maastricht and Beyond – the Emergence of the EU}

In December 1991, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed after weeks of meetings and intergovernmental negotiations. The TEU marked the birth of the European Union and its three-pillar structure. The three pillars are the European Community (EC) for economic and social affairs, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for security and foreign policy issues, and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar for legal issues.\textsuperscript{18} The Maastricht Treaty was clearly not the first significant step taken towards European integration in the twentieth century. In fact, efforts at

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., emphasis in the original.
\item\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 17.
\item\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{18} George and Bache, 124.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
integration began in 1951 when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established. However, Maastricht made possible a level of integration that had not been seen previously in the decades following World War II.

Of particular interest in defense circles was the CFSP and the idea of a common defense policy among the EU members. Maastricht did not set specific criteria or requirements for an EU military capability. According to Article 14,

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.19

In other words, the Maastricht TEU gave the WEU the responsibility for EU military matters, and this contributed to a revitalization of the older and infrequently called upon organization. At this time (and in fact to this day) the WEU and the EU were separate institutions, but agreement between them was facilitated by the fact that all WEU members are members of the EU. Article 17 of the amended TEU further clarifies that agreement.

It [the WEU] supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.20

Although such a dramatic step was not actually approved by the member governments, this proposal showed the willingness of the EU leaders to take over many of the roles filled by the WEU. Rather than rely upon an outside organization whenever security concerns arose, the EU was hoping to acquire this capability within its own organizational structures. Just as in the WEU, however, had the EU absorbed the WEU structures, member nations would still have been the ultimate decision makers concerning the contribution of forces to any military operation.


20 Ibid., 38-39, emphasis added.
On 2 October 1997, the members of the EU signed the Treaty of Amsterdam. This treaty included many additions and amendments to the earlier Maastricht TEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam was significant, among other reasons, because it incorporated the “Petersberg Tasks” from the earlier WEU Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992. As noted in Chapter I, these tasks consist of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.” With this change to the original TEU in place, the likelihood that the EU would develop a capability to perform these tasks further increased. French motivations alone, however, could not make the pursuit of an ESDP a reality. The true key to the process would be the United Kingdom. If the UK got behind the idea of building an ESDP with an EU military capability, the initiative would have a much better chance of coming to fruition. However, until late 1998 British policy regarding European defense and security arrangements differed from that of the French.

D. THE UNITED KINGDOM—KEY TO THE PROCESS

Whereas France has consistently played the role of protagonist regarding ESDP and an autonomous EU military capability, until 1998 the United Kingdom opposed endowing the EU with military security functions. After World War II, the UK enjoyed a renewed and intensified positive relationship with the United States on many fronts. This “special relationship,” as it was soon to be called, has helped to keep the trans-Atlantic bond strong between the United States and the rest of Europe. The 1956 Suez Crisis did not scar relations between the UK and the United States to the same degree as it did relations between Washington and Paris. In the end, President Eisenhower referred to the crisis as a “family spat,” indicating the rapid improvement in relations between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.21

Throughout the Cold War, the British never wavered in their commitment to NATO. When proposals for an autonomous EU military capability first arose, the British were quick to reaffirm their commitment to a “NATO first” policy. From 1990 to 1998 the efforts to create a stronger European pillar within NATO led primarily to institutional adjustments. When the focus of many Europeans shifted to the ESDP in light of the new British policy in 1998, the British were quick to reassure the Americans that an EU capacity for autonomous action would be pursued not to compete with NATO, but rather

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21 Ibid., 98.
to supplement and strengthen the trans-Atlantic partnership. Phrases such as “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” dominated British government literature on the subject.

Though the UK chose not to adopt the euro, unprecedented military cooperation within the EU was not out of the question. Blair’s turnaround came about from briefings he received in the spring of 1998 that showed how dependent Europe would be on US military support in the event of a crisis in Kosovo. As the threat of war loomed in Kosovo, doubts were raised about the US commitment to the region. Only a few months before Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, Tony Blair did an about face with respect to ESDP. The resulting declaration at St. Malo in December 1998 brought together French and now British aspirations for an autonomous EU military capability.

### E. FROM ST. MALO TO THE HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL

On 3-4 December 1998, French President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at a regular bilateral summit in St. Malo to discuss the future of European defense and security arrangements. The resulting Joint Declaration was a landmark document that represented a fundamental change in the UK’s stance toward an autonomous EU military capability. The document states that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous military action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” Before the EU could capitalize on the efforts of France and the UK, Operation Allied Force soon began in Kosovo and NATO aircraft took to the skies for 78 days of bombing. Tony Blair’s worst fears were realized with Milošević’s actions to kill and expel the Kosovar Albanians, and the resulting NATO operation confirmed the European dependence on US military capabilities. So dependent on the United States were the European NATO allies that Tony Blair described the European reaction to the crisis in Kosovo as being one of “weakness and confusion.”

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22 Gunning, 6.
23 Ibid.
25 St. Malo Joint Declaration, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 47, 8.
The glaringly obvious and growing gap between European and US military capabilities was visible for the entire world to see, and Tony Blair was not pleased. Blair was also upset with the reluctance and hesitancy the United States had shown in getting involved again in the former Yugoslavia. As Jolyon Howorth, a British scholar in international security studies, has written,

The divergent interpretations of that crisis, and particularly of the ways to deal with it, which marked the responses of, on the one hand, the United States, and, on the other hand, the principal countries of the European Union, led political leaders in Europe to look afresh at the entire structure of EU-US relations. Nowhere was this process more far-reaching than in London, where Tony Blair, anxious to carve out some European role for the United Kingdom, looked on with growing frustration as his friend Bill Clinton, guided and advised by Richard Holbrooke, stumbled from one unsatisfactory approach to Belgrade to another, while Europe attempted vainly to rattle sabres that hardly existed. The Atlantic Alliance, it was concluded in London, was in serious trouble.27

The US hesitations before Allied Force and the comparative weakness of the Europeans during the operation made the pursuit of an ESDP seem imperative yet difficult to achieve. ESDP would be crucial should the United States choose not to take action in future military contingencies in Europe, but Allied Force had shown that the European Union would be unable to conduct similar operations on its own. The EU accordingly decided to continue its efforts to develop the ESDP. The EU was quick to build upon the foundation recently laid by the Franco-British Summit at St. Malo in December 1998. At the Cologne meeting of the European Council on 3-4 June 1999 (days before the conclusion of Allied Force on 10 June) a Declaration was issued that made the development of an EU military capability almost inevitable:

We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.28

With this statement, the groundwork for the eventual European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was laid, and the Headline Goal would soon follow. The next step was to articulate the need for operational capability with greater specificity.

27 Howorth, 25.

The European Council’s Helsinki meeting of 10-11 December 1999 laid out the criteria for the Headline Goal. The final report listed the following criteria for the operational arm of the ESDP:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;

- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;

- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.29

With this document, the operational arm of the ESDP was for the first time given specific criteria and guidelines. It is in Annex I to Annex IV of the document that the term “headline goal” is actually used.30 (Nowhere in the document is the term “rapid reaction force” used, although this expression is employed by journalists to refer to the Headline Goal force.) The EU outlined in the Headline Goal the capabilities it deemed necessary to conduct the Petersberg Tasks. Now it was up to the EU member states to


30 Annex I to Annex IV also includes the following statement on military capabilities for the fulfillment of the Petersberg Tasks: “These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces,” in ibid., 85.
agree upon who was going to supply this force and what exactly was going to be supplied.

F. COMMITTING THE CAPABILITIES

To determine how the Headline Goal would be supplied, the EU held a Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) in Brussels on 20 November 2000, almost a year after the Headline Goal had been announced. At a preparatory meeting before the CCC, it was agreed that the requirements for the Headline Goal as determined in Helsinki implied the following military capabilities:

- “more than 500 kinds of land-, air- and naval units,” as well as “key or strategic capacities” in seven areas: “C3I, ISTAR, Deployability and Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, Sustainability and Logistics, and General Support”;
- an 80,000 man strong land force (to enable a force of 60,000 to operate);
- an air element of “between 300 and 350 fighter planes”;
- a naval element of “80 ships.”

Though the EU has not published the specific contributions to the force catalogue, Table 1 is a list of estimated contributions. Since the CCC, the numbers have fluctuated. However, the total number of forces pledged has remained somewhat constant. See Appendix III for a more detailed estimation of contributions to the force catalogue.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member</th>
<th>Initial Contribution to Force Catalogue</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>20,000 troops, 72 combat aircraft, 18 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12,000 troops, 70 combat aircraft, 2 AWACS, 30 UAV’s, warships (to include 1 carrier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13,500 – 18,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,000 troop mechanized brigade, 1 F-16 squadron, unspecified number of naval vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5,000 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>500 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,000 troops</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,000 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Unspecified number of troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>No contribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T1: Initial Contributions to the Force Catalogue

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At the CCC, Denmark abstained from contributing forces to the Force Catalogue, referencing Protocol 5 to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam—that is, the “Protocol on the position of Denmark.”

Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area. Therefore Denmark shall not participate in their adoption. Denmark shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing of operational expenditure arising from such measures.\(^33\)

Therefore, it was clear well before the CCC that Denmark would not contribute forces to the ESDP. Copenhagen believes that the EU should leave defense concerns to NATO, and instead concentrate on civil approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Polls in Denmark show a populace opposed (as high as 66 percent in some surveys) to the European Union “creating its own armed force.”\(^34\)

When these figures are added up (even without Denmark), the result is a land force of more than 100,000 troops, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels, which (by numbers alone) actually exceeds the requirements called for in the Headline Goal. The EU subsequently issued a Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration stating these figures and announcing that they made “it possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the headline goal.”\(^35\)

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III. PROPOSED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

According to Annex II to the Presidency Conclusions of the 2001 Laeken European Council:

Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop. Decisions to make use of this ability will be taken in light of the circumstances of each particular situation, a determining factor being the assets and capabilities available.  

This statement was widely interpreted by journalists as a declaration of “operational” capability for the ESDP. However, it is clear that the conclusions from Laeken refer only to an ability to “conduct some crisis-management operations.” What exactly does it mean to be able to conduct “some” operations? What could these operations entail, and which of the Petersberg Tasks do they include? The EU member countries have pledged the troops necessary to meet the force requirements of the Headline Goal, but what will these troops and assets really be capable of doing?

In spite of this noteworthy organizational development, the European Allies—of which eleven are members of the European Union—still remain heavily dependent on NATO and the United States in particular for their defense needs. Aside from France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and a few other exceptions, European Union members and NATO European countries are not increasing their defense budgets. Nor are most of the EU nations procuring the necessary equipment and demonstrating a determination to sustain the Headline Goal forces without dedicated NATO support.

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36 Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper No. 51, 120, emphasis added.

37 The NATO European Allies in the EU are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The non-NATO members of the EU are: Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden.
In addition to various shortfalls in capability, the number of forces called for in the Headline Goal is probably too small to accomplish at least some of the middle to upper level Petersberg tasks, which are themselves ill-defined and open to interpretation by EU members. Recent military operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrate that the EU would be ill-equipped to deal with the most demanding modern military contingencies. Although the EU is considering using some of the forces pledged to the Headline Goal in the near future, considerable obstacles lie in the way of assembling an EU force for major operations. The EU countries are simply not spending enough on their military forces and not procuring the assets necessary to support anything but the smaller Petersberg tasks. What the EU professes to want to do and what it will actually be able to do may therefore differ.

B. THE HEADLINE GOAL—IS IT ENOUGH?

The numbers outlined in December 1999 at Helsinki were easily met by the contributions pledged in the subsequent Force Catalogue, which totaled over 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships. However, the first real obstacle to the European Union achieving a truly operational force lies in the “rule of 3’s.” The rule of 3’s concerns the lifecycle of any combat force, the three phases of: preparing and training for deployment, conducting the deployment, and recovery after deployment. Given this time-tested rule of force planning, the actual force required would be much greater than 60,000 troops and the associated assets. The Headline Goal actually states that the force “will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.”

Although the drafters of the Headline Goal are hinting here at the rule of 3’s, they do not go so far as to specify just how many troops in addition to the 60,000 would have to be earmarked for the force. Estimates taking this reality into consideration generate much more daunting numbers. The Army forces would require 200,000 to 230,000

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39 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals (London: Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, 2001), 9.

troops, broken into thirds for combat, combat support, and logistics. One corps (15 brigades) would be engaged in the operation, one corps in training, and one corps in recovery. The Air Force would require 300 to 350 combat aircraft comprising 8 or 9 wings, plus 180 or so support aircraft to include air-to-air refuelers, long-range cargo, reconnaissance, etc. Adequate naval forces require three to four task groups of around 20 frigates each, or 1 aircraft carrier plus about 15 frigates if a nation has a carrier available. Given these numbers, it does not seem impossible for the fourteen participating EU nations to gather the necessary men and materiel for the Headline Goal force. After all, in February 1996 President Chirac of France said that similar numbers would be the targets for a purely French deployable and sustainable force. However, when the actual professional and deployable forces are added up, a force of 180,000 troops constitutes 21% out of an available pool of 830,000. Earmarking over one-fifth the available EU member troops for the Headline Goal is not impossible, but is certainly a commitment that could prove quite daunting if national assets are already committed elsewhere.

C. **THE VAGUENESS OF THE “PETERSBERG TASKS”**

The deployment of the Headline Goal force would not be as difficult if smaller groups were deployed in lieu of the whole force of 60,000 troops. After all, are not some of the Petersberg Tasks peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks, search and rescue, and crisis management missions? The “peacemaking” aspect of the Petersberg Tasks could involve separating warring parties and disarming belligerent units, and missions of this type could well require most if not all the forces pledged to the force catalogue. Nonetheless, why would lower level Petersberg Tasks (with less likelihood of armed engagements) require a whole corps sized force? The problem is that “Petersberg Task” operations of the same category might require significantly different force levels.

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41 Howorth, 39-40.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 *Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals*, 9.
This is where another difficulty with the Headline Goal emerges—definitional ambiguities in the Petersberg tasks. The Petersberg tasks were defined only in terms of function, meaning tasks to be performed and jobs to be done.\textsuperscript{46} Because they were not distinguished by the different levels of military force required to complete the mission, a great deal of confusion has arisen over what constitutes a “lower,” “middle,” and “upper” level Petersberg task.\textsuperscript{47} Whereas a state with considerable military capability like France may well view an operation as demanding as Desert Storm as an acceptable upper-level Petersberg task, states such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, while all possessing sophisticated military forces, reportedly deem the NATO operations in the Kosovo conflict as about as upper-level as they would envisage.\textsuperscript{48}

This creates a problematic situation. The EU is not in charge of planning for its members’ military forces and what types of contingencies they train and equip for. The 14 EU nations participating in the ESDP may therefore have different ideas on what the Petersberg tasks could really entail.\textsuperscript{49} The relationship between the Headline Goal and the Petersberg tasks is therefore best conceived as being circular: the force levels planned are derived from a sense of the Petersberg tasks, and the tasks the EU is prepared to undertake will be limited to those that can be achieved with the force capabilities in existence.\textsuperscript{50} In essence, they plan for what they envision reacting to, but can only react to that for which they have planned.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{50} Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, 12.
The whole debate about defining the upper limits of the Petersberg tasks may be pointless if the EU is unable to generate the necessary forces to engage in these tasks. The European Union currently lacks the strategic airlift to carry out some of the lower level Petersberg tasks (e.g., large-scale disaster relief in Africa, or peacekeeping in Southeast Asia). In subsequent deliberations, the participating EU nations broke the December 1999 Headline Goal into 144 specific requirements, with US assistance still needed to meet 55 of them by late 2001.51

At the 19 November 2001 Capabilities Improvement Conference (CIC) in Brussels, a new plan to address these shortfalls was adopted. Called the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), this plan outlined 40 specific shortfalls and asked member states to develop their own plans to address them. ECAP was able to formally secure the commitment of EU members to either take the lead in addressing certain capabilities, or to be an observer to the process. Appendix I lists all 40 capabilities in which the EU is deficient and the states that have signed up to address them. Nonetheless, at the December 2001 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, EU experts estimated that assistance from the United States would still be needed to fill about 50 requirements, which could cost up to £8.5 billion to acquire.52 Many of the capabilities, such as strategic airlift, sealift, aerial refueling, satellite communications, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), encompassed by ECAP will take years to develop.53 In some cases, these capabilities will not be in hand until 2008 or later.

Given the current rate of progress, the EU may be unable to engage in more than the lower-end Petersberg Tasks without the US support that some EU members were hoping to avoid relying on with this autonomous force. The most significant shortfalls have also been the most obvious—long-range air and sealift, force protection, precision munitions, standoff weaponry, logistics, etc. The inability of some NATO European military establishments to significantly contribute to the NATO air operations in the

51 Smith, 16.
52 Ibid.
former Yugoslavia highlighted some of these shortfalls, but few have been substantially resolved.

The participating EU members had also hoped to announce at the Laeken Summit that they had reached an agreement with NATO on the sharing of NATO assets. Since 11 of NATO’s members are also members of the EU, an EU-NATO asset-sharing arrangement would be advantageous. However, continuing Turkish-Greek differences have prevented approval of such an arrangement.\textsuperscript{54} Even if this agreement had been reached, however, some of the capabilities that the European Union is seeking are not NATO assets, but sovereign US military assets. The only option left for the European Union countries concerned is actually to procure this equipment. The current political climate in Europe has, however, reflected an unwillingness to do so.

\textbf{D. A LACK OF FUNDING}

Shrinking defense budgets have been the hallmark of European militaries in the last decade. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has concluded that European defense spending has fallen in real terms by 5\% per year, with R&D spending falling by 2\% per year, and procurement spending dropping by 6.9\% since 1996.\textsuperscript{55} In dollar terms, defense spending in the three largest economies in the EU (France, Germany, and the UK) fell by an average of 14.7\% between 1998 and 2000.\textsuperscript{56} In order to procure the equipment that is vital to equip any EU force, this dismal budgetary performance simply cannot continue. To what extent do the Europeans really need to spend more? They already spend almost 60\% of what the United States spends on defense, and they only seek to play a regional role, whereas the United States plays a global one.\textsuperscript{57}

Evidence suggests that the Europeans need to spend \textit{more wisely} in addition to simply \textit{more} on defense. A RAND study concluded that funds could be freed up in a “reallocation of existing military spending and military investments from their somewhat ‘backward-looking’ focus—for example, on heavy tanks, artillery, surface ships, etc., all relating to World War II imagery—to a more forward-looking, high-technology, C\textsuperscript{4}I, air-mobile, and deployable set of

\textsuperscript{54} Nicholas Fiorenza, “Capabilities Summit: NATO Plans to Exit the Prague Summit Not Only Bigger but Better,” \textit{Armed Forces Journal International}, August 2002, 38.


\textsuperscript{57} Howorth, 41.
capabilities.” In essence, spending existing funds more wisely requires their dedication to capabilities more relevant to the fulfillment of the Headline Goal, not Cold War defense postures. The study, however, recognized an unwillingness to reallocate funds. Such sentiment was typified by a French Army colonel who said, “About the reallocation, I don’t see what can be done to allow [for a] shift of money of this magnitude. The European armies are very rigid organizations.”

Spending more wisely also requires, in addition to overcoming institutional rigidity, new methods of EU member military procurement. Support for independent national defense industries, especially in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, has resulted in duplication of costly research and development (R&D) programs, relatively short production runs, and small national orders. Even though the UK introduced the “smart procurement” process in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the program has apparently yet to produce any gains in efficiency. The UK’s National Audit Office reported that the UK’s 25 major defence projects were running $2.7 billion over budget and roughly four years late. Professor Keith Hartley of the University of York has estimated that if procurement were on a competitive and supranational basis, with open, liberalized, and competitive bidding, the resulting annual savings in defense procurement would range from 10 percent to 17 percent, or from $10 billion to $15 billion annually. Such a move, though difficult and politically charged (especially when political constituencies who earn their living in the defense sector feel their jobs are being threatened by competition from other EU member nations), would free up existing funds and thereby substitute for an actual increase in defense spending.

Even if the EU does reverse the trend in defense spending, though, how much can its member states expect to pay for the Headline Goal force? Estimating the costs of the force is a difficult task because the participating states of the European Union have never had to pay for a force with this makeup and with this mission before. Scholars at King’s College of London estimate that $42 billion will have to be spent on the necessary capabilities for the Headline cost.

59 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
60 Ibid., 34.
Goal over a 10 to 15 year period, which amounts to a collective 10% increase in EU investment in new military equipment. The RAND research group produced four estimates, of which one was a “bottom-up” approach estimating a cost of $37-47 billion, a “top-down” approach of $23.5-31.4 billion, one based on the costs of a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade of $52.4 billion, and finally one based on the costs of a Mobile Advanced US Army Division of $35-56 billion. It should be noted, however, that these estimates by RAND are only for the procurement of the necessary equipment, and neglect the additional cost of operations and maintenance costs, which increase the figures by an additional 30 to 50%.

Aside from treaty-writing and institutional innovations, few aspects of developing an operational ESDP are going to be economically easy for the Europeans. The consequences of not spending the money to develop the necessary capabilities could be detrimental to trans-Atlantic cooperation and European security. In a January 2002 speech, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson concluded that the long-term effects of diminishing capabilities could be severe.

For all the political energy expended in NATO to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative, and in the EU to push ahead with the complementary Headline Goal process, the truth is that mighty Europe remains a military pygmy. Orders of battle and headquarters wiring diagrams read impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tanks and aircraft give a similar impression of military power. But the reality is that we are hard pressed to maintain about 50,000 European troops in the Balkans. A new operation would oblige most non-US NATO countries to slash their contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM to produce usable forces in any numbers.

Whether the participating EU nations choose to address this problem will determine whether they will be able to actually conduct the types of operations that they propose, or whether they will remain the “military pygmy” depicted by the Secretary General.

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63 Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals, 24.


65 Ibid., 26.

E. SO WHAT CAN THEY DO?

Given that 2003 is not far off, what will the EU countries participating in the ESDP be able to do in the near future with operational forces? Already throughout Europe, many EU members are engaged in Petersberg type missions under different auspices and agencies. Whether they are with NATO, the OSCE, or one of the various multilateral and bilateral agreements between European countries, European forces are not unfamiliar with Petersberg type tasks. It is the coming together under the command of the EU that would be foreign to these militaries. Local search and rescue, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and other traditionally lower-level missions are within the conceivable spectrum of operations. However, given that many countries are already engaged through different institutions, contributing to the EU as well could prove to be too demanding, as indicated by Lord Robertson. Some of the smaller countries, including the four which are either neutral or non-aligned, can supply high quality and highly trained specialists for such contingencies. The problem is that if an EU member can only contribute a limited number of troops to the force catalogue (as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal have, with 1,000 or fewer troops pledged to the catalogue) one operation may be about all that it could sustain. The EU could therefore face considerable difficulty in getting countries other than the major contributors, such as France, Germany, and the UK, to contribute forces for a lower-level Petersberg task.

Additionally, unlike purely national forces, multinational land forces are by their nature less efficient and effective due to problems with language, different weapons systems, organization, logistics, and standard operating procedures. The assembled EU troops could have a combined effect less than might be achieved by nationally homogenous forces of the same size. Although the political incentives to take action jointly could well outweigh these operational concerns, one has to consider these problems of interoperability when assessing the effectiveness of the forces that could be placed in combat.

Also, should the EU be able to assemble enough national contributions for a crisis management mission, the concept of transfer of command from sovereign nations to a supranational authority has always been an emotionally and legally heated issue. Often, national governments have imposed considerable restrictions on such moves, and there is no doubt that

68 Ibid.
the use of sovereign forces to pursue missions deemed necessary by the European Union would create intense scrutiny, if not outright hostility, for the EU by some constituencies (even though arrangements are being made at an inter-governmental level). One of the reasons why the Irish people rejected the Nice Treaty in a national referendum was concern about Irish forces operating under an EU flag. Command and control concerns have not significantly hindered NATO’s operations; but NATO has also had over 50 years to work out the details of such moves and to a great degree national forces remain under sovereign national control in the NATO system.

Further adding to the problem of assembling forces under the EU is the limited availability of combat services support formations. While 14 EU member nations are willing to contribute to the Headline Goal force catalogue, combat services support troops are often considered rare national treasures to be deployed only when absolutely required. Since many nations are already engaged abroad, they may be unwilling to commit combat services support assets to EU operations when they could be needed in some other operation. This could create a problem for the EU in some circumstances in that the contributions the EU receives from its member nations might not be the full complement of troops necessary for a certain mission. Given all these problems, the EU may in some circumstances face considerable difficulty in assembling a force for even lower level Petersberg tasks. While the armed forces of EU member states are fully trained to participate in such tasks, national priorities could limit what EU nations choose to contribute to specific EU operations. Since even lower level tasks could present problems for the EU, recent military operations demonstrating the need for capabilities associated with middle and upper level Petersberg tasks serve to further highlight how difficult crisis management operations may be for the EU, at least under certain conditions.

F. RECENT CONTINGENCIES—BENCHMARKS FOR PLANNING

The recent examples of military action that influenced the EU members in defining the Headline Goal were the operations under NATO command in the former Yugoslavia. The operations of the future may not be conducted like the wars of the last decade. However, the Manning levels and capabilities of the forces involved in these operations show what could be required of the EU in the future, especially considering that the following missions are the types of tasks that many EU nations want the Headline Goal forces to perform. The first example is

69 Ibid, 10.
the Implementation Force (IFOR) that was placed in Bosnia in December 1995. Following the Dayton Peace Accords, IFOR had a one-year mandate to “oversee implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement—bringing about and maintaining an end to hostilities; separating the armed forces of Bosnia’s two newly created entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; transferring territory between the two entities according to the peace agreement; and moving the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved storage sites.” IFOR’s mandate certainly included many aspects of peace enforcement. At the start of the IFOR operation, there were 60,000 troops in Bosnia, and (as noted earlier) their mandate lasted one year. This force size and duration are notably similar to the Headline Goal requirements.

On 20 December 1996, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. SFOR, operating in a more permissive environment, was charged with preserving the secure environment (that is, peacekeeping) and has even been able to assist in civil administration and military reform. Between December 1996 and November 1999, about 32,000 troops were deployed in SFOR. That level is currently around 20,000. How does this example relate to the Headline Goal? Simply stated, planning for operations of only one year in duration is rather optimistic, especially for peacekeeping operations. In March 1999 when Operation Allied Force began, over three years after IFOR began operations, there were still 30,000 troops on the ground in Bosnia under General Montgomery Meigs’ command. As noted earlier, SFOR is still in Bosnia, with a strength of 20,000 troops. The fact that the NATO-led force for Bosnia was initially the same size as that required by the Headline Goal but has been deployed for over six years (although at decreased force levels) does not bode well for the Headline Goal and its one year timeframe. It would be unrealistic for EU members to anticipate their participation in only one of the Petersberg Tasks at a time and to assume that such participation would be of

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71 Ibid.
72 NATO Handbook, 479.
74 Ibid.
finite and predictable duration. If EU members contribute to a higher level Petersberg Task (such as peacemaking), they should realize that middle and lower level Petersberg Tasks may follow.

The next major operation was Allied Force, NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict. Allied Force does not demonstrate the need for troops as much as it does for well-equipped air forces, sustainability, and modern technology. 78 days after the bombing began on 24 March 1999, over 900 aircraft had been involved in the operation, of which over two-thirds were American. By the end of the operation, over 38,000 sorties had been flown, and half of those sorties were flown by US Air Force F-16’s and F-117’s. Precision guided munitions, an area in which most European Allies were poorly equipped to contribute, comprised 34% of the 23,000 weapons delivered. The United States contributed 98% of the aerial refueling capability and airlifted over 78,000 tons of supplies and 42,380 people. While the European Allies contributed many fighter and attack aircraft, they failed to provide any suitable long-range cargo aircraft, a capability that would be needed for many Petersberg Tasks. By the end of the operation, the cost was estimated at over $5.5 billion for the US taxpayers—an amount that suggests how much more the EU would have to pay to mount such an operation on an autonomous basis.

Operation Allied Force was won through a superior American military contribution that compensated for the European allies’ inability to provide the requisite military might and technological prowess. Had the EU nations wished to conduct an operation such as Allied Force on their own, there is little evidence that the approximately 400 aircraft pledged to the force catalogue would have been able to sustain such an operation. In fact, a French source has estimated that had Allied Force been conducted without an American contribution, the Europeans would have lost 20 to 30 aircraft during the hostilities. Whether the European national constituencies would have accepted such losses or whether, at the sight of dozens of aircrews taken prisoner (and no doubt exploited by Milošević’s propaganda apparatus), they would have called upon their governments to cease military action is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that (except for France) the European nations contributing to Allied Force

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76 U.S. Congress, 391. The following Operation Allied Force numbers come from this document.
77 Ibid., 259.
lacked the combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets necessary to deal with downed aircraft, and were consequently dependent on the United States to provide such a capability.  

The capabilities that the European Allies did bring to the table were often below US standards. European aircraft could make significant contributions in some circumstances, unless they were unable to fly in unfavorable weather, or drop ordinance precisely enough to adhere to requirements on avoiding collateral damage.

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops were introduced in June 1999 soon after the cessation of hostilities by Milošević’s army. It was originally envisioned that 28,000 troops would be required to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities. By July 1999, these 28,000 troops had increased to a force of 33,000. In the following months the number grew to a corps sized formation of 55,000 troops. These numbers show that planners cannot call for a certain number of troops and expect requirements not to change. In this case, if the EU members had been asked to provide all the troops for KFOR, the EU planners would have originally called for almost half of the number specified in the Headline Goal, but would have called only months later for almost the entire Headline Goal force instead. Given the problems associated with assembling forces, it cannot be assumed that asking for a doubling of contributions would have been well received by the EU members. Although EU members contributed more ground troops to KFOR than did the United States (the United States initially contributed only 15% of the troops), NATO still relied upon the contributions of 19 Partnership for Peace (PfP) members and other nations to supply part of the 55,000. As of May 2000, EU member contributions to KFOR made up 63% of the total force. So, while EU member nations note that non-US forces make up a larger percentage of KFOR, many of these troops are also from non-EU members. It should also be noted that it took five months to deploy some 40,000 European troops to support KFOR—a statistic that does not bode

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79 Ibid.
80 U.S. Congress, 68.
81 Ibid., 245.
82 Ibid., 225.
83 Ibid., 245.
well for the 60-day requirement for the Headline Goal force set forth in Helsinki in 1999.\textsuperscript{85} NATO planners envisage reducing KFOR to 29,000 troops in June 2003, four years after the mission began.\textsuperscript{86}

It is even more disconcerting for the Headline Goal, however, to consider the plan for the use of ground troops before the aerial bombing campaign was decided upon. The North Atlantic Council was unable to achieve consensus on the plan, but the NATO military authorities had devised a “forced entry” option calling for a force of 200,000 troops to be put on the ground in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{87} By all estimates, there is no way that the EU could have provided that number of troops for an operation that some EU members do not even consider to be the highest level of Petersberg Task.\textsuperscript{88}

Most recently, the world has been witness to the war against terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom. By 11 September 2001, the European allies had still not taken many of the necessary steps to improve their capabilities (ECAP was implemented two months later). Consequently, for most of the offensive aerial operations beginning in early October 2001 in Operation Enduring Freedom, EU members contributing to the war in Afghanistan were providing primarily supporting aerial assets. Of the EU members, France and the UK have provided the most substantial combat assets. France provided its only carrier battle group to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea, and had flown 2,000 hours in support of Enduring Freedom as of June 2002.\textsuperscript{89} France did contribute six Mirage fighter-bombers to the campaign on 27 February 2002, which took part in bombing raids during Operation Anaconda; but the French were unable to supply a full squadron.\textsuperscript{90} The United Kingdom, in addition to contributing to the opening Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against terrorist training camps, provided air refueling

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{85} The Military Balance 2001-2002, 286-287.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the Military Committee, quoted in U.S. Congress., 481.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals (London: Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, 2001), 13. According to this King’s College study, France and Italy consider an operation of the magnitude of Desert Storm to be the upper-most Petersberg Task.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} “The French Have Landed,” Air Force Magazine, April 2002, 14.
\end{itemize}
assets, airborne early warning (AEW), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. These assets, however, were relatively limited in comparison with those furnished by the United States. Although these supporting elements and limited combat assets definitely helped to enhance the combat capability of the coalition, the majority of the actual combat sorties was once again flown by the United States.

Through February 2002, over 6,500 strike sorties had been flown by the United States out of a total of 21,500 American sorties. Compared to Operation Allied Force, fewer sorties were flown from October 2001 to February 2002 than during the 78 days of Allied Force. However, in 6,500 US combat sorties over Afghanistan, 17,400 munitions were expended, compared with 23,000 munitions in 10,000 US sorties in the Kosovo conflict (the resulting ratios are 2.7 bombs per sortie in Afghanistan and 2.3 bombs per sortie in the Kosovo conflict). However, while 34% of the 23,000 weapons used in Allied Force were precision guided, over 69% of the 17,400 dropped during Enduring Freedom (by late February 2002) have been precision guided. Because the proportion of precision munitions used has more than doubled and will no doubt increase, the European Union members are facing an ever-widening gap between American capabilities and their own. Additionally, while some EU countries have placed limited numbers of forces on the ground in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), their lack of combat capabilities kept them far removed from the actual fighting being conducted by the American and Northern Alliance forces earlier in the war (British special forces being a notable exception).

Of the 5,000 troops serving under the ISAF mandate, between 90 and 95% are from EU member countries. The ISAF mandate, which does not extend beyond the city of Kabul, was set to expire in May 2002, and in spite of desperate pleas from the EU envoy to extend the mandate and increase the force to 10,000, European countries were unwilling to commit more troops, especially the Germans and the British, who said that

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93 Ibid.
they were overstretched. Only at the last minute were the Europeans able to contribute more troops to ISAF, keeping the force at 4,650. The UN Security Council voted to extend ISAF’s mandate for six months starting 20 June 2002, but it also rejected a request from interim president Hamid Karzai to deploy ISAF to other regions where the Afghan government faces threats from rival warlords. Thus, ISAF, which includes 1,387 British and 1,056 German troops, was forced by the UN Security Council to remain in Kabul. If European governments are unwilling to increase support for this force, whose mission is of great importance to international security (and highly visible around the world), what does this say about the European willingness to accept significant security responsibilities?

G. PROPOSED MISSIONS—TOO MUCH TOO FAST?

In spite of the EU’s probable inability to carry out middle to upper level Petersberg tasks without substantial American support, the EU is nevertheless looking at deploying forces under EU command in the near future. The EU is looking at taking over the international policing of Bosnia and Herzegovina by supplying 500 officers to replace the 2,000 officers of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) whose mandate expires at the end of 2002. While not traditional military troops, providing these police officers, also envisioned under the ESDP, will be a significant operational test of the EU’s new institutional mechanisms and will also reveal whether there is a commitment among the EU members for such operations.

However, the more significant push within the EU, especially by High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana, is for the EU to take over the 1,000 soldier-strong NATO mission Amber Fox in Macedonia. Amber Fox, whose mandate was set to expire on 26 June 2002, has already been led by a German officer and includes French,

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95 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, and Polish troops.\textsuperscript{102} To turn Amber Fox into an EU-led operation would not be very difficult, given the size and current make-up of the force, but it would still serve an important purpose in ensuring that further fighting does not break out in Macedonia.

Even assuming responsibility for this small operation is meeting significant resistance among Europeans. Some NATO European diplomats have reportedly voiced reservations about the changeover given the volatility of the situation. Finland, Germany, Portugal, and the UK are reportedly also hesitant about the EU taking over the mission, with considerable political infighting occurring in Britain over the issue.\textsuperscript{103} This is especially alarming considering Britain’s earlier decision at St. Malo to reverse its previously unenthusiastic position toward giving military security functions to the EU. This lack of consensus does not bode well for the EU’s military aspirations given that it concerns the deployment of a force numbering around 1,000 troops. NATO was prepared to turn over the operation to the EU on 26 June 2002, but has instead left it under a Dutch NATO officer.\textsuperscript{104} However, disagreements among EU members and a lack of consensus have pushed the date for a possible changeover to 26 October 2002.\textsuperscript{105} Whether the changeover will actually occur is an issue of great speculation and skepticism. According to at least one report, the United States, eager to find a success story in the Balkans and to bring missions there to a close, may push for the mandate not to be extended.\textsuperscript{106} Whether that would imply turning the mission over to the EU or ending it completely is unknown.

Alarmingly, the support that has made ESDP different from previous initiatives in post-World War II multinational European military security cooperation may be in danger of crumbling away in the UK. The British government has been supportive of the ESDP, and has increased the UK contribution to the force catalogue with four C-17

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Judy Dempsey, “EU and NATO at Loggerheads Over Macedonian Operations: Solana is Pushing for European Military Role as Soon as Possible,” \textit{Financial Times} (London), 6 March 2002, 8.
\end{flushright}
heavy-lift aircraft and 100 armored vehicles. However, Conservative Party opposition to the ESDP led by Iain Duncan Smith has emerged in the last few months, owing to fears that ESDP could jeopardize the trans-Atlantic relationship. Shadow Defence Secretary and Member of Parliament Bernard Jenkin, taking the same viewpoint as Smith, is worried about “what it [ESDP] will take away” from European defense. Jenkin notes that the structures of the ESDP “deliberately exclude the US.”

That such views exist is not surprising. What is surprising is the growing resistance to the ESDP in the UK, especially when the current EU drive to take over NATO’s operation Amber Fox in Macedonia is mentioned. Two documents recently leaked from the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) cast doubt on the EU’s ability to conduct even a small operation like Amber Fox and raise questions about British support for the ESDP. “There would be a real risk that the EU’s first mission would end in failure or rescue by a re-engaged NATO, which would be disastrous in presentational terms,” the documents say. The documents continue, “An EU-led operation in Macedonia would not be ‘premature’ but simply wrong…we should not risk stability in the Balkans by opting for an EU-led operation.” These documents cast doubt on the British commitment to the ESDP (although the opposition to an EU takeover of Amber Fox could also be interpreted as a fear that any early failure of the ESDP could jeopardize its long-term prospects) and give more ammunition to the Tories who claim that the Headline Goal force is “a paper army desperately trying to find a mission to prove itself.”

Additionally, in what might be a noteworthy blow to any autonomous EU military capability, the MoD documents continue, “We [in the British MoD] would reject any attempt to go for an EU-led operation in circumstances where the US did want to take part.” In effect, this would mean that NATO would take priority over working via the

110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
EU.\textsuperscript{113} If the United States wanted to get involved, according to these MoD documents, NATO would have precedence. How France and the rest of the EU members participating in the ESDP will respond to this development is yet to be seen, but this wavering support in the UK could prove to be a blow to the ESDP.

In spite of the aspirations for ESDP operations in the near future, the EU needs to approach proposed missions with a sense of caution. Those who fear the early deployment of Headline Goal forces are concerned not only about the immediate effects of a mission gone awry, but also about the long-lasting negative impact such a failed mission could have on any future development of the ESDP and the armed forces of the contributing nations. According to Eckhard Lübkemeier of the German Foreign Ministry,

> Following the adoption of the Declaration on the Operational Capability [at Laeken in December 2001], the existence of such a [political] will may now be put to the test. The Union needs to tread a careful path: on the one hand, providing conditions are right, it should make use of its existing yet still incomplete capabilities, while on the other, particularly when assuming such tasks for the first time, it should avoid overestimating its ability, for that might lead to operational failures that could set back the whole ESDP project.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

IV. AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HEADLINE GOAL

A. INTRODUCTION

The 14 EU members participating in the ESDP agree that they need to improve their military capabilities and make them more effective. The recent setbacks in meeting the Headline Goal have only served to increase the skepticism in some quarters about the EU’s military efforts. Charles Heyman, editor of Jane’s World Armies, said that he was “astounded” at the EU’s December 2001 claim of some “operational” capability. “No matter what the EU claims,” said Heyman, “it is quite obvious that a proper EU capability to mount a serious operation does not exist.”

Given, however, that the Headline Goal deadline of December 2003 is drawing ever closer, what are the prospects for improving capabilities? What can the EU members do to remedy the shortcomings they have identified in their armed forces? This chapter examines three problem areas and offers suggestions on how to address them. How the EU members deal with shortfalls in defense spending, opportunities to consolidate assets, and measures to narrow the widening trans-Atlantic capabilities gap, will determine the extent to which the EU will be a significant military player on the world stage. It is difficult to reach precise judgments, given the vagueness with which the Petersberg tasks have been articulated; but it is possible that the EU will not be able to conduct more than “lower end” Petersberg Task operations by December 2003. Moreover, if current tendencies are not reversed, it is unclear whether the EU’s military options will be enlarged in the foreseeable future.

B. FIND THE WILL TO SPEND, OR SPEND MORE WISELY?

As has been previously mentioned, virtually all European defense budgets have shrunk since the mid-1980’s. In the period from 1985 to 2000, European defense budgets have fallen, as a percentage of GDP, to the following levels: Germany, 3.2% to 1.6%; France, 4.0% to 2.6%; Italy, 2.3% to 1.9%; Belgium, 3.0% to 1.4%; Spain, 2.4% to 1.3%;

115 Smith, 16.
UK, 5.2% to 2.4%. In this post-September 11th era, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to drastically increase defense spending in support of the war against terrorism. On 1 August 2002, the US Senate passed a $355.4 billion defense appropriations bill for 2003, adding $34.4 billion to the Pentagon’s budget, which is the largest increase in two decades. In the Senate version, funding for procurement, research, personnel and operations, and maintenance programs all grow by at least 9%. Funds are being appropriated for critical assets needed for the war on terror such as 15 new C-17 airlifters, 4 KC-130J aerial refueling aircraft, and new Navy ships.

The same cannot be said of Europe. With personnel costs rising at approximately 5% per year, and with equipment costs rising at more than 5% above inflation, current defense budgets will only be able to sustain “substantially smaller forces” in Europe. Additionally, given the environmental disaster caused by the flooding in Europe during August 2002, some European governments may not even be able to maintain defense budgets at present levels. While Germany intends to deal with the damage caused by the floods by postponing a promised tax cut, Austria and the Czech Republic have chosen to cancel or reduce prior orders for jet fighter aircraft. With some estimates of European-wide damage of 15 to 20 billion euros, these current reductions in defense spending will most certainly be followed by others of a potentially far greater nature as the cost of the damage rises.

Europe also faces a potential reduction in defense spending because of its demographics. The Economist reports that by 2040 America will likely surpass Europe in terms of population, and by 2050 America will have a population of 550 million people.

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117 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Frans Osinga, “European Defence, Does Anyone Really Care?,” 29.
123 Ibid.
and rising, while Europe will have a population of 360 million and falling.\textsuperscript{124} The American populace is projected to be twice as big as it is now (thus constituting twice as large an economic market, dwarfing the EU), and significantly younger than that of Europe. In Europe, the number of people over 65 will be equivalent to 60\% of the working-age population, compared with only 40\% in America.\textsuperscript{125} Consequently, as the demographics gradually shift over the coming years, Europe will be faced with ever-increasing pension and health-care costs for the elderly. The Economist concludes:

If Europeans are unwilling to spend what is needed to be full military partners of America now, when 65-year-olds amount to 30\% of the working-age population, they will be even less likely to do more in 2050, when the proportion of old people will have doubled. In short, the long-term logic of demography seems likely to entrench America’s power and to widen existing transatlantic rifts.\textsuperscript{126}

Given these trends, it becomes less and less likely that European governments will choose to spend more on military forces. The few EU governments that have expressed an intention to spend more may have difficulty in sustaining such decisions. The political and demographic realities of Europe (which call for an emphasis on greater social programs at the expense of defense spending) make the drive for an ever-increasing “peace dividend” an almost unstoppable trend, even in post-September 11\textsuperscript{th} conditions.

If the EU could create a mechanism for EU oversight and review of the defense portion of national budgets, maybe the current trend of shrinking defense budgets could be halted. Even before the Helsinki meeting in December 1999, suggestions were made at the Cologne Summit of June 1999 that EU members use the UK’s then-current defense spending as a percentage of GDP (2.5\%) or simply a level of spending 2\% of GDP on defense as a benchmark.\textsuperscript{127} However, such suggestions were not well received. The idea that the EU could have quasi-control over the size of defense budgets was repugnant, and therefore an opportunity to directly address the problem of falling defense spending was dismissed by the EU members. In spite of such resistance, some experts continue to

\begin{itemize}
  \item 124 “Demography and the West: Half a Billion Americans?,” The Economist, 22 August 2002.
  \item 125 Ibid.
  \item 126 Ibid.
  \item 127 Frans Osinga, “European Defence, Does Anyone Really Care?,” 12.
\end{itemize}
argue that EU members should spend a larger percentage of GDP on defense. However, it would be imprudent to expect Europeans to spend significantly more than they do at present. In these circumstances, the focus should be on encouraging the Europeans to spend their resources in a more sensible manner.

For all the criticism that the US military receives for investing in force structures and weapon systems that are supposedly based upon a “Cold War mentality,” most of the European armed forces have persisted with “Cold War” thinking and force structures to an even greater degree. As a result, for the most part, Europe’s current force structures appear ill-suited to carrying out Petersberg crisis management tasks. First, out of 1.7 million Europeans in the military, almost 1.15 million serve in army units.128 This figure is twice as large as the number that serve in European Union navies and air forces combined (260,000 and 360,000 respectively).129 This focus on land forces is not reflected in the makeup of the US armed forces. The US military (including the reserves) is not only smaller, but far better balanced, with 470,700 people in the Army, 576,730 in the Navy and Marines, and 494,460 in the Air Force.130 Not surprisingly, most European governments spend around 50% of their defense budgets on personnel costs, and some even approach 70 to 80% of the defense budget.131 Many EU members also have large numbers of conscripts to train and equip (these are not included in the 1.7 million total, however). See Appendix 2 for a military profile of EU members, to include conscripts.

Even more puzzling is why the Europeans have retained over 50 army divisions which have no capability to be projected abroad.132 These divisions were organized to resist a Warsaw Pact invasion, but that risk disappeared forever in 1989-1991. Although armor might be a significant factor in dealing with some of the most demanding Petersberg Tasks, there is no geostrategic reason why the Europeans should be supporting a force of over 18,000 medium and heavy tanks, which is three times as many as are owned by the US Army.133

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128 Ibid., 28.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
With such a focus on land forces, it is no wonder that certain capabilities, especially airborne capabilities, have been neglected in favor of large national armies and their corresponding personnel costs. This focus is even reflected in the Headline Goal, in which air and naval assets, proven to be vital in recent military contingencies, are addressed almost as an afterthought. The EU members lack sealift even more than airlift. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, almost 95% of the equipment deployed by the US-led coalition reached the region by sea. In comparison, the United States has fifty large ships dedicated to sealift, while the EU members own a total of two smaller ships designed for the same mission. Though such armor-heavy force structures would have been vitally important for defending against a Soviet attack on Europe, they are far less relevant now, and probably of little value in helping the European Union to develop cost-efficient forces capable of conducting EU-led crisis management operations. The military options of the EU members clearly would be enhanced if they chose to strike a better balance between land, naval, and air assets. Moving away from force structures that reflect the requirements of an earlier era would be a massive yet vital change.

C. WORKING TOGETHER

Another vital change that is necessary to make an operational ESDP a reality is to re-examine the process of working together on common defense initiatives. Some weapons systems and other major pieces of equipment are simply becoming too costly for every country to own, let alone develop. Instead of individual countries working on their own to develop their national capabilities, more attention should be given to the sharing of assets and/or national specialization in the particular capabilities that are the most demanding to develop and operate.

One example of such an initiative is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands and Germany on the use of German Luftwaffe transport aircraft. Rather than spend a great deal of money on new transport aircraft, the armed forces of the Netherlands now rely upon the Luftwaffe for airlift capability. In return for 45.378 million euros, the German government has promised that it “will provide strategic and tactical air transport services and medical air evacuation services to the Netherlands

\footnote{Ibid., 6.}

\footnote{The Military Balance 2001-2002, 286.}
Armed Forces” in that amount. However, this agreement is not merely designed to pay for services rendered. The framers of this initiative realized that this represented a chance for Germany to improve its airlift capabilities as well. The Memorandum also states that the Dutch payment of 45.378 million euros will allow Germany to “reallocate the respective part of the foreseen budget in order to reinforce European capabilities in other areas in which shortfalls have been identified in the framework of the [NATO] Defence Capabilities Initiative and the European [Union] Headline Goal.”

If similar arrangements could be worked out for other capabilities that are sorely lacking, yet very expensive to improve or acquire, the EU members could make great strides toward at least beginning the process of improving their armed forces. Similar agreements on unmanned aerial vehicles, satellite access, combat search and rescue, and several other capabilities could in principle be developed, although the continuing lack of interoperability between national forces would have to be overcome. Interoperability shortcomings may constitute another major obstacle to working together effectively in permissive non-combat environments, to say nothing of actual war zones.

Joint development projects, despite their somewhat checkered and complex history in European defense establishments (e.g., the Panavia Tornado fighter-bomber), also make the process of developing a new weapon system more accessible to smaller nations with less money to devote to research and development. Some European nations propose to solve the problem of long-range air transport by pledging together to buy the Airbus A400M military transport, which still has not left the drawing board. Eight European countries have pledged to buy 196 Airbus A400M four-engine transports in an effort to diminish their long-standing reliance on the US Air Force to do the heavy lifting.

The fragility of such multi-national endeavors was demonstrated, however, when Germany declared in late January 2002 that it could not devote enough money from its national budget to pay for its share of the project. The entire project, already burdened by delays and setbacks, nearly collapsed. In March 2002 Germany was able to commit

137 Ibid., Section 1.
to a portion of its original order (40 instead of 73 aircraft), but the entire project is continuing under the assumption that Germany will find the funds promised to buy its remaining share (33) of the aircraft. Should the economic situation in Germany take a drastic turn for the worse, as it potentially could after the devastating August 2002 flooding, the project could again be in jeopardy. With a delivery date estimated to be 2010 or beyond, such setbacks make the strategic airlift gap even more worrisome. In spite of the difficulties being experienced with projects like the A400M, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has declared that integration is more important than ever.

Increased solidarity and a stronger sense of common interests among member states reduce the scope for purely national military intervention and push towards more integration between their armed forces. Therefore it should not be hard to move more decisively towards greater task sharing among our military [forces], development of multinational capabilities, pooling of resources or assets, joint operation and maintenance. Areas such as strategic mobility or communication and information systems (CIS) are prime candidates for progress in that approach.139

D. NARROWING THE EU-US R&D INVESTMENT GAP

The efforts of EU members in pursuit of an autonomous military capability have been commendable, but to achieve their goals they will need to do more to narrow the trans-Atlantic R&D investment gap. Spending more on R&D would not necessarily require an overall increase in European defense spending, although that would be desirable. Streamlining their armed forces and concentrating on the operational requirements at hand (instead of those of the Cold War) could free up money to be re-allocated to R&D. A common European complaint about R&D is that the United States is not willing to share its technology with its partners across the Atlantic, but at the same time Europeans have called attention to their own civilian technological advances. As Professor Keith O’Nions, chief scientific advisor to the British Ministry of Defence, has said, “gaps in basic science and technology are small: often non-existent through globalization.”140 His point is that emerging civil technologies, including Information Technology, biochemistry, and nanotechnology, developed with no military applications in mind, are readily available in the

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139 Summary of the interventions by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), at the informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Zaragoza, 22-23 March 2002.

140 Rosemary Righter, “The Insanity of Europe’s Farewell to Arms,” The Times (London), 21 February 2002, Lexis-Nexis online.
The United States does not have a monopoly on these markets or technologies. Additionally, many of the improvements necessary to fight alongside the US armed forces in major operations, or apart from the US armed forces in EU-led crisis management operations, are not hindered by cost, but rather by political will. General Joseph Ralston, SACEUR, has stated that, “If you can afford a $25-million aircraft, don’t you think you could put a $5,000 radio in it?” If the Europeans do not have the political will to make inexpensive investments to improve their ability to contribute interoperable military capabilities to NATO operations, what evidence is there that they will enhance their capabilities for EU operations?

An analysis of ECAP (see Appendix I) shows that several EU countries have not demonstrated the political will even to participate in capability improvement projects, let alone lead them. France, Spain, and the UK have each volunteered to lead four projects, while Italy and the Netherlands have each volunteered to lead three projects. Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden have each signed up to lead one or two of the forty capability improvement efforts in ECAP. In terms of leaders, only seven of the fourteen EU participants in ESDP have volunteered, and over a dozen projects lack any leader. As Frans Osinga states, ECAP “may easily be another chapter in Europe’s checkerboard of defence cooperation methods, which thus far has still not resulted in substantially altering the way Europe procures defence equipment, nor the territorial defence posture. On the other hand, this plan could, in bringing defence planners in frequent contact, create enough groundswell and act as a catalyst towards more ambitious plans.” If NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative is any indicator, however, the latter development is doubtful. Javier Solana stated that

We must also make sure that the ECAP ultimately delivers real capabilities. Regular reporting and review have to be put in place, in order to measure progress made and give added impetus in the areas where it is insufficient or absent. Ministers of Defence have a central role to play in that respect, in framing common goals and ensuring their implementation by their respective national governments.

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141 O’Nions quoted in ibid.
142 Ralston quoted in Morrocco, 137.
143 Frans Osinga, “European Defence, Does Anyone Really Care?,” 18-19.
144 Summary of the interventions by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), at the informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Zaragoza, 22-23 March 2002.
Whether ECAP can live up to Javier Solana’s expectations is yet to be seen, but little comfort can be drawn from the fact that twenty of the forty projects remain leaderless, and six of those have no participants at all.

While some Europeans have complained about US unilateralism or “hyperpower,” the fundamental obstacles to greater EU influence in international security affairs reside in the EU’s military shortcomings and political divisions. European interoperability shortcomings are representative of both problems. As Lisa Bronson, the US Department of Defense’s Director of Technology Security and Counter-Proliferation, recently said, “None of us gets out of bed saying ‘what can we do alone?’ But if you can’t talk together you can’t fight together…A lot of good friends wanted to participate [in operations in Afghanistan]. We had to tell them that you don’t have the interoperability—and we weren’t talking state of the art.” Additional factors may have been involved, however.

Some European observers have identified yet another factor [for the lack of larger European contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom]. In their view, even when European allies offered militarily relevant capabilities in support of the campaign against the Taliban government and the Al Qa’ida terrorists in Afghanistan, the United States was cautious and selective in accepting their assistance because of political and strategic incentives to achieve positive results promptly, without the complications of coordinating unneeded contributions from allies and other countries. In other words, it seems to some European experts that, if the United States could effectively conduct combat operations without allied assistance, the Americans responsible for these operations preferred this course of action, despite its implications for transatlantic relations.

This American approach to operations in Afghanistan was likely influenced by the US experience during Operation Allied Force in 1999. A common American complaint concerned the problem of coordinating actions with many allies that often had different views on how to use the Alliance’s airpower. However, the American experience in the Kosovo conflict supports Bronson’s observation. During Allied Force, every European offensive mission required three

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145 Hubert Védrine, then French Foreign Minister, referred to the United States as a “hyperpower that dominates in every field.” Quoted in “The Mixed Feelings of Europeans,” The Economist, 17 April 1999, Lexis-Nexis online.

146 Bronson quoted in Righter.

US supporting aircraft. If European allies acquire greater capabilities, they are likely to have more political influence and more significant operational roles.

E. FINAL THOUGHTS

The ESDP and the Headline Goal have not yet been as successful as the participating EU governments intended them to be. EU leaders declared ESDP capabilities “operational” to take part in “some” crisis management missions in December 2001, but there is little chance that the full complement of combat forces and associated capabilities envisaged in the Headline Goal will be ready for deployment by the scheduled deadline of December 2003, although accepting responsibility for the Amber Fox operation in Macedonia is a possibility. Moreover, search and rescue and humanitarian missions in permissive environments are feasible with the forces currently pledged to the EU.149

An EU force incapable of performing all the Petersberg Tasks would be regarded as a failure for the EU. If this result is to be avoided, France, Germany, and the UK will need to set an example for the rest of the EU to follow. These three countries could change the dangerous trend of declining European military capability, narrow the widening gap between NATO European and US military capabilities, and convince their fellow EU members that capable militaries are a vital necessity to lessen dependence upon the United States for military support.

There is evidence that France, Germany, and the UK are taking (or may soon take) some preliminary steps to reverse current trends. In the British Ministry of Defence’s “New Chapter” for its Strategic Defence Review released in July 2002, Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon outlined plans to increase defense spending by £3.5 billion over the next three years.150 Discussing the need for “network-centric capability” bringing together sensors and strike assets, the document states that, “The outcome of Spending Review 2002, with the biggest sustained real increase in Defence spending plans for 20 years, will enable us to make the investment necessary to acquire these sorts of capabilities.”151

149 Smith, 16.
151 Ibid., 5.
France has also made preliminary plans to increase defense spending. Sensing a widening gap between British and French defense spending and military capabilities, and perhaps concerned by an apparent American focus on British contributions to the war in Afghanistan, French President Jacques Chirac announced in July 2002 that he intends to increase funding for the French armed forces. The budget increase will be submitted for a parliamentary vote “before the end of the year” and could possibly infuse 1.1 billion additional euros a year into the French defense budget.152

German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has made statements indicating that, should he and his coalition win the election on 22 September 2002, defense spending increases will be possible. The Social Democrats proposed in their budget for 2003, released in June 2002, that defense spending would be increased by 767 million euros (for a 24.4 billion euro defense budget). Though a modest increase such as this could be helpful, certain areas are actually losing money, such as R&D and aeronautical equipment procurement.153 This budget’s adoption depends on whether Schröder can retain his coalition’s place in power. The CDU/CSU parties are also vying for control of the Bundestag. Headed by Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber, the opposition parties pledge to raise funding for the German armed forces, but do not give an exact amount. Wolfgang Schaubale, advisor to Mr. Stoiber, declined to disclose firm spending targets, but said, “We won’t solve the problems of underfinancing of the armed forces in 2003, but we’ll make a start…It will be a step-by-step process.”154 Provided such statements are more than campaign rhetoric, the German armed forces could see larger budgets regardless of who wins the election. It seems that the three leading members of the EU in defense spending are taking the right course by increasing their efforts, thereby leading the EU in the right direction.

An emerging EU military capability could be significant for the United States and the world. As the US armed forces increasingly engage in operations further afield, the United States will need capable European allies, and will continue to encourage them to


take the necessary steps to develop their capabilities. As US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told troops at the NATO airbase in Geilenkirchen, Germany:

The risks that face the world because of weapons of mass destruction and their availability to terrorists and terrorist networks through terrorist states is a significant risk. It is a risk of a different order than we have experienced previously with conventional weapons, and it seems to me that that reality is something that will suggest to the populations of our respective countries that spending 2 ½ or 3 percent of our Gross National Product before the fact – to be able to deter and defend and prevent those kinds of attacks – is not much when one thinks about it. And allowing those kinds of attacks to take place – where, rather than 3,000 people being killed as was the case in New York and Washington, you’re talking with a weapon of mass destruction of tens of thousands or potentially hundreds of thousands of people, 2 ½ or 3 percent of a Gross National Product doesn’t sound like very much.155

The benefits of more capable EU forces currently exceed the risks involved with their development. In fact, the ESDP has the potential to improve what have recently been characterized as strained trans-Atlantic relations. As Eckhard Lübkemeier of the German Foreign Ministry has written,

Without the ESDP, however, the potential for friction [between the European Union and the United States] would presumably be greater still, since now [that] the Cold War is over the United States expects the Europeans to shoulder a greater share of our common responsibility for security. Moreover, North America and Europe continue to be each other’s principal partners on the international political scene, and a stronger Europe is thus just as much in the Americans’ interest as a strong America.156

Even though the EU may prefer to emphasize its achievements, an operational Headline Goal force capable of conducting the full range of Petersberg Tasks will not be ready by 2003. A more realistic goal would be 2010-2012. Approaching full operational capability in an incremental fashion could prove to be a more reasonable course of action. Instead of using December 2003 as a firm deadline, the EU might find advantages in setting less ambitious goals. For example, by December 2003 the EU could feasibly declare an ability to deploy two to three brigade-level formations in support of

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humanitarian and rescue tasks, and limited peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{157} This move, while not meeting the goals set forth in Helsinki, would make it clear to other nations and to other security institutions such as NATO what missions the EU contributors to the force catalogue would be willing and able to undertake. Although it would only be a partially complete Headline Goal force, such a success story could promote a reduction in the rate of decline of post-Cold War European defense spending, and possibly even encourage EU members to spend more and to improve their military capabilities.\textsuperscript{158} That would change perceptions of the Headline Goal. It would then be seen not as a military project bordering on failure, but as a military project with a capacity for growth and future success.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 289.
## APPENDIX I—European Capabilities Action Plan (20 June 2002)*

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<td>Recovery/Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>UAV / STA Units</td>
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<td>BE GR IR IT</td>
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<td>Language Code</td>
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<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
<td>GE IT</td>
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<td>BE GR SP</td>
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<td>Cruise Missiles &amp; Precision Guided Munitions</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>FI GE IT NL</td>
<td>SP UK</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Air Defense</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>GE GR NL SP</td>
<td>BE FI UK</td>
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<td>Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>FR GE GR IT SP</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Deployable Communications Modules</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>FR GE</td>
<td>AU SW</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, CCHQ) &amp; Augmentees</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>FI FR GE IT NL SP</td>
<td>GR IR</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Logistic Centre &amp; Augmentees</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>AU</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>BDA (Operational Level)</td>
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<td>GE SP SW</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Strategic ISR IMNT Collection</td>
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<td>BE GE SP UK</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Strategic ISR SIGINT Collection</td>
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<td>Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Ground Picture</td>
<td></td>
<td>GE IT SP SW UK</td>
<td>IR</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture</td>
<td>SW UK</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>UAV (HALE-MALE)</td>
<td>FR NL</td>
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<td>AU BE</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Out Sized Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BE GE IT</td>
<td>FR SP</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>General Cargo Aircraft</td>
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<td>BE FR GE IT NL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 &amp; 40</td>
<td>RO-RO &amp; General Cargo Shipping</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>BE GE IT NL UK</td>
<td>FR SP</td>
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</table>

*Shaded rows indicate ACTIVE programs

Source: This document was furnished courtesy of the British Ministry of Defence
APPENDIX II—A Military Profile of EU Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Member</th>
<th>Defense Expenditure as % GDP (2000)</th>
<th>Armed Forces Active</th>
<th>Deployed (Dec '00)</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
<th>Are Conscripts Deployed?</th>
<th>Initial Troop Contribution to Force Catalogue</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>17,500</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>35,391</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>7,693</td>
<td>128,400</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>1,447</td>
<td>5,860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>52,700</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>32,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>212,450</td>
<td>36,459</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,693,609</td>
<td>109,898</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>74,950</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Patrick Keatinge and Ben Tonra, The European Rapid Reaction Force (Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, 2002), 27. Note: Due to the lack of a published force catalogue, the figures in the “Initial Troop Contribution to Force Catalogue” column vary somewhat with Table 1 on page 16. They are merely estimates.
APPENDIX III: Detailed Estimations of Contributions to the Force Catalogue

**Austria:** one mechanized infantry battalion, one light infantry battalion, 1 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense unit, one “humanitarian civilian assistance package,” one Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) element, one helicopter transport squadron, one transport company, 100 observers/experts.

**Belgium:** Land: one mechanized brigade, plus smaller units as part of humanitarian operation for up to six months. Air: 24 F-16 fighters, eight C-130 and two Airbus transports. Navy: two frigates, mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels.

**Denmark:** No contribution; opted out of ESDP at Maastricht in 1992.

**Finland:** Land: one mechanized infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, one transport company, one CIMIC company. Navy: one MCM command and support ship. Joint: 15-30 experts/observers.

**France:** Land: 12,000 troops from a 20,000 pool; Mechanised, light, airborne (for a year), and amphibious brigades headquarters. Air: Combined Air Operations Center, 75 combat aircraft, eight air-refueling aircraft, three long-range and 24 medium-range transports, two Airborne Warning & Control System aircraft, combat search & rescue (CSAR) helicopters. Navy: Two battle groups, each with one nuclear attack submarine (SSN), four frigates, three support ships, and maritime patrol aircraft. One would include the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with 22 aircraft aboard. Mine countermeasures vessels. Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Creil if required, others at operational and tactical levels, satellite communications, reconnaissance satellites and aircraft.

The Eurocorps headquarters has also been offered for the force.

**Germany:** Land: Nucleus land component headquarters, up to 18,000 troops from a pool of 32,000 at division and brigade level, including armored, air assault, and light infantry brigade headquarters and seven combat battalions. Air: Nucleus air component headquarters, six combat squadrons with 93 aircraft, eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons, air transport, other support elements. Navy: Maritime headquarters, 13 combat ships, support. Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Potsdam if required, nucleus operational headquarters.

**Greece:** Land: one operational headquarters, one mechanized or other brigade, one light infantry battalion, one attack and one transport helicopter company. Air: 42 fighter aircraft, four transport aircraft, one Patriot SAM battalion, one short-range air defense (SHORAD) squadron. Navy: Escorts, one submarine.

**Ireland:** one light infantry battalion, 40-strong Army Ranger Wing Special Forces unit, headquarters, observer, and support elements. 850 total.
Italy: Land: one corps-level headquarters for six months, one division headquarters for a year, 12,500 troops from a 20,000 pool (including an airmobile brigade for up to six months and three other brigades), one railway-engineering battalion, special forces, one CIMIC group, one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense company. Air: a Combined Air Operations Center (air component headquarters), 26 Tornado and AMX combat aircraft, six CSAR helicopters, four C-130J transport aircraft (from 2003), nine tactical transport aircraft, two air refueling aircraft, three maritime patrol aircraft, two SHORAD units. Navy: A sea or shore-based maritime component headquarters; one task group with one aircraft carrier (Giuseppe Garibaldi), one destroyer, three frigates, four patrol ships, one submarine, four MCM ships, two amphibious ships, one oceanographic vessel, eight helicopters.

Luxembourg: one reconnaissance company, one A400M transport aircraft. 100 total.

Netherlands: Land: with Germany, Headquarters I German-Netherlands Corps, one mechanized Brigade, 11th Airmobile Brigade, one amphibious battalion. Air: one to two F-16 fighter squadrons; transport aircraft, SAM squadrons. Navy: Air defense and command frigates, multipurpose frigates, landing platform dock Rotterdam.

Portugal: Land: one infantry brigade, including reconnaissance, armored, artillery, engineer, signals, logistics, military police, and CIMIC elements; two teams of military observers. Total 4000. Air: squadron with 12 F-16, four C-130 transports, 12 C212 tactical transports, three maritime patrol aircraft, four tactical air control parties, four medium transport helicopters. Navy: one frigate, one submarine, one survey ship, one support ship.

Spain: Land: division headquarters to coordinate humanitarian operations and a brigade HQ for other operations, one brigade, mountain unit, one light infantry battalion at high readiness available as an immediate reaction force. Air: one Mirage F-1 squadron, one F/A-18 squadron each of 12 aircraft, six transport aircraft, two each surveillance, electronic warfare, and strategic transport aircraft (A400M). Navy: one carrier group including carrier Príncipe de Asturias, two frigates and support ships, one submarine, one MCM ship, Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).

Sweden: One mechanized infantry battalion including intelligence, electronic warfare/signals, reconnaissance, engineer, and explosive ordinance disposal units. Air: tactical reconnaissance element of four AJS 37 Viggen to be replaced in 2004 by four JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters, one airbase unit (225 personnel), four C-130 transport aircraft. Navy: two corvettes, one support ship.

United Kingdom: Joint: Permanent Joint HQ (Northwood) if required, at least one mobile joint headquarters, including a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Land: either an armored or a mechanized brigade, each of which could be sustained for at least a year, or 16th Air Assault Brigade, which could be deployed for up to six months. Combat support forces such as artillery, air defense, and attack helicopters could also be deployed, supported by logistics forces. Total 12,500. Navy: one aircraft carrier, two
SSNs, up to four destroyers or frigates, and support vessels. An amphibious task group including one helicopter carrier and 3rd Commando Brigade could also be made available. The aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, and submarines could not necessarily be sustained continuously for a whole year. Air: up to 72 combat aircraft, including naval fighters, with 58 associated support aircraft including 15 tankers, strategic transport aircraft, and Chinook and Merlin transport helicopters. This total would be available for an initial six months to cover initial theatre entry; for a longer term commitment the number would reduce.

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