AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMERGING MILITARY CAPABILITY

by

Johan Tornqvist, Major, Swedish Air Force

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: WG CDR Stephen H. Cockram

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2001

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Report Type</th>
<th>Dates Covered (from... to)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01APR2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title and Subtitle</th>
<th>Contract Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Union’s Emerging Military Capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Grant Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist, Johan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performed Organization Name(s) and Address(es)</th>
<th>Program Element Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell AFB, AL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performed Organization Report Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution/Availability Statement</th>
<th>Task Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Unit Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Classification</th>
<th>Classification of this page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Abstract</th>
<th>Limitation of Abstract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>UU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis statement and research questions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method for this study</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the study</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From EDC to CFSP</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The early years”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESDP and the development of a military capability</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Malo</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feira</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Petersberg Tasks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem areas</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transatlantic link</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the US</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU-NATO connection</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects On Actual Capabilities</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

Figure 1 The Transatlantic Security Framework .................................................................2
Figure 2 US Force Reduction in Europe............................................................................11
Preface

The European Union’s decision to create a military capability is a significant event in the Union’s common security and foreign policy. For me, as a Swedish officer, it felt natural to do my research on this topic, since it marks the beginning of a new era for the Swedish Armed Forces. As a militarily non-aligned state, Sweden will for the first time, be part of a permanent structure that handles military matters on a daily basis. The EU has chosen a structure that somewhat emulates NATO’s, with a Policy and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. Diplomats and officers in these bodies will be working closely with their NATO counterparts. So, without becoming a member of the Alliance, Sweden has been drawn closer to NATO.

I would like to thank my faculty research adviser, WG CDR Stephen Cockram, for his valuable guidance and support during my research. I would also like to thank the Institute for National Security Studies for funding my research and making my field trips possible. I extend my gratitude to the Swedish mission to the EU for helping me during my visit in Brussels and to Col. David Anhalt, OSD for coordinating my visit in Washington D.C.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their everlasting patience with me during my research.
Abstract

The European Union's decision to create a military capability is a first step towards a common European defense. However, this development is not without problems. The NATO members who are not EU members regard the project with a somewhat skeptical view. They are concerned that an independent force outside NATO’s planning system will deplete the alliance rather than augment it. France is the greatest advocate for the EU’s political independence and Turkey is the most negative NATO member, blocking EU’s proposed mechanism for cooperation between the EU and NATO. The reasons for these two controversial standpoints are to be found in domestic politics rather than foreign affairs in the case of France and in the legitimate security concerns on the Turkish part. There is also the question about the actual capability of the EU force. Several important shortfalls have been identified, requiring US and/or NATO assets to fulfill all of the stated Petersberg tasks. The solution to these problems lies in increased military spending and the enlargement of the EU.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.

—The Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union

Thesis statement and research questions

The creation of a European military capability is a first step towards a common European defense. In part, this is a reaction to the EU inability to employ the military instrument of power. Thus far the EU has relied upon European diplomacy and economic ties that have been supported by a strong US military presence to give credibility to European power and influence, albeit under the auspices of NATO.

First, how will the EU’s emerging military capability affect NATO and the USA? Second, referring to figure 1, how will the three different groups of member states be handled (EU and NATO members, EU members and NATO members)? Third, how will this development affect actual capabilities? Finally, will the EU rely on the US to supply certain capabilities?
Method for this study

This study has developed using the qualitative method. Literature analyses have been made, both on books from the AU library and on documents accessed through the Internet. Most of the relevant documentation is available through the various organization homepages. Interviews have been conducted both in Brussels and in Washington D.C. to get a more in-depth understanding of both the US and EU perspectives.

In my attempt to validate my thesis and answer my research questions I will begin by depicting the background leading up to the EU’s decision to develop the so far untouched military instrument of power. Then I will analyze and discuss the implications of such a
development both intra Europe and towards the transatlantic link. Furthermore, I will address the very tricky question about the effects on actual capabilities and to what extent the EU still will have to rely on certain US capabilities, that the EU lacks today and probably will lack for the foreseeable future. Finally, I will conclude my paper with a summary and a look at future development.

**Limitations of the study**

This study deals only with conventional weapons. Weapons of mass destruction and National Missile Defense are not considered. Due to the fact that the new US administration has been in place for such a short time, there is no conclusive material available about changes in policy compared with the previous administration. However, the recent statements by Secretary Powell after meetings with foreign counterparts,\(^1\) leads me to believe that there won’t be any more dramatic changes in policy regarding the US view of the EU’s development of this capability. According to the Pentagon, the statutory limit for the Bush administration to produce a new National Security Strategy is 150 days.\(^2\)

**Notes**

\(^1\) US Department of State, “Press Availability with Her Excellency Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden”, 6 March 2001, www.state.gov/secretary/index
\(^2\) Col. David Anhalt, OSD, Pentagon
Chapter 2

Background

We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.

—The WEU Hague Platform

From EDC to CFSP

“The early years”¹

When the French foreign minister Robert Schuman in 1950, urged by his friend Jean Monnet, presented his plan for European co-operation, he had one overarching idea, namely peace. How could he make France and Germany so interdependent, that these two nations who had fought four wars in less than 150 years, would not go at it again? Timewise, he had been beaten twice as far as collective defense goes. First by the Treaty of Brussels, creating the Western Union in 1948 and second by the Treaty of Washington, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949.

However, Schuman had something else in mind. He looked at the natural resources necessary to manufacture arms and came up with the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC. This community was created in Paris 1951 and came into effect in
1952. The positive effects of this community led to the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community, EEC in 1957

Appendix A contains a more thorough information about the background leading up to the Franco-British summit at St. Malo.

**CESDP and the development of a military capability**

**St. Malo**

The real breakthrough for creating a EU military capability came at a meeting between the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the French President Jaques Chirac in St. Malo, December 1998. They both clearly felt that what had been done so far was not enough, that Europe was not living up to its defense responsibility and potential and that the credibility of CSFP was suffering for it. In a joint declaration they stated that: "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage...

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises... In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO
framework)."² This declaration was to prompt further development at the European Council in Vienna, December 1998.

**Vienna**

At the meeting in Vienna, held just a week after the Franco-British summit, the assembled heads of state agreed that “in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CSFP must be backed by credible operational capabilities.”³ The Council also invited the incoming German Presidency to further explore the issue and discuss it at the next meeting.

**Cologne**

At the European Council in Cologne, June 1999, the German Presidency presented a report, which was endorsed to lay the foundation for further development. The report outlined the basic principles that have subsequently been agreed to. These principles stated the Petersburg tasks should be the focus of the desired future EU military capability in accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union. The incoming Finnish Presidency was invited to develop the concept further and present a progress report at the next meeting.

**Helsinki**

At the next European Council held in Helsinki, December 1999, a progress report was presented by the Finnish Presidency. At this time the Member States set themselves the headline goals of being able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year, forces up to corps level (50-60000 persons). These forces should be able to handle the full spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, be militarily self-sustaining with the
necessary command, control, and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat service, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. The member states were tasked to pledge their contributions at a Capabilities Commitment Conference at the end of 2000.

Furthermore, a politico-military structure was agreed upon creating an interim Political and Security Committee, an interim Military Committee and an interim Military Staff. These bodies were to work in conjunction with their NATO counterparts, developing modalities for the full consultation, co-operation and transparency between the EU and NATO. The incoming Portuguese Presidency was invited to develop proposals for the relationship with non-EU European NATO members and other states interested in contributing to the EU military crisis management.

**Feira**

The Portuguese Presidency responded with a report at the European Council in Feira, June 2000. As requested, the report dealt with the Headline goals and the creation of working groups between the EU and NATO, pending the implementation of a permanent framework. In addition, proposals for the co-operation with non-EU NATO members and candidates for accession to EU were made. These proposals included an invitation to commit additional forces to the future EU military capability and for the contributing states to gain access and take part in the operational planning. However, the EU reserved the right to unilaterally make the political decision whether to deploy forces or not in a crisis action. This standpoint is one of the most controversial against NATO and the US.
The European Council in Nice, December 2000, marked the last chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty. A new treaty was agreed upon by the member states, pending ratification. The new Nice Treaty is driven much more by social, environmental and enlargement issues, than by the CESDP. The already implemented principles from the previous Amsterdam Treaty are still in place. Furthermore, the result of the Capability Commitment Conference was approved. A final proposal concerning the mechanism for cooperation with NATO and other states was adopted.

**The Petersberg Tasks**

Originally agreed upon by the WEU member states in 1992 at a meeting in Bonn, Germany, these tasks includes the full range of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Tied in to the EU headline goals, these are the tasks that the committed forces are supposed to be able to handle by 2003.

**Problem areas**

When the otherwise cautious and rather slow moving leaders of the EU put the CEFSP and the development of a military capability in high gear, things started to move too quickly. Almost like a snowballing effect the creation of the political and military staff functions materialized. Left behind was the serious look at the reasons for why the national European forces are in the state that there in. Instead of addressing policy issues first and creating a suitable force later, things progressed at an unprecedented pace in EU history. This has left several important but unsolved questions, which should have been
dealt with, instead of the artificially created hurry that the EU leaders now find themselves in.

Notes

1 “The History of the European Union”, www.eu.int/abc/history/index
3 Vienna European Council: Presidency Conclusions
4 Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration
Chapter 3

Issues analysis and discussion

The United States will not depend on individuals in key positions to ensure that ESDP does not split the Alliance. It will want to establish institutions and processes that will lock the European effort into a transatlantic framework.

—Stanley R. Sloan

The Transatlantic link

Implications for the US

For the United States this development is like a two edged sword. While the US has demanded that the European members of NATO take more responsibility for its own continent, they risk loosing influence if this is achieved through the EU rather than through NATO. The US was instrumental in launching the project that would strengthen the European pillar of NATO, namely ESDI. High goals have been set for the European member states to ultimately pick up the slack that originated in the American reduction of forces in Europe after Cold War had ended. Figure 2 illustrates US personnel reduction in Europe since 1990. From that point of view, the US should be happy about the firm commitment that the EU has made to create a military capability, with clear goals both in quantity and in functions. However, a valid question is what the net effect of this new
capability will be? As pointed out by Secretary Cohen, there won’t be one bag of money for the EU forces and another bag for NATO forces.¹


Figure 2 US Force Reduction in Europe

The problem lies more in the fact that the EU has chosen not to use the existing NATO structure, but rather created its own similar structure exclusive for its member states. This means that the US doesn’t have as much influence in the decision making process as it is used to have in NATO. While the US clearly has pointed out its continued interest in European security and defense issues, this has been looked upon with skeptical eyes by certain European NATO members. A common observation has been “first you tell us to take more responsibility for our own continent, but when we tell you how we intend to do it (i.e. through the EU) you tell us that’s not the way we think you should do it.

Another source of dispute is the treatment of the other NATO members who are not members of the EU. The Clinton administration proposed a common forum for all 23
states (NATO and EU) to ensure transparency and participation for all. While the EU did not formally reject this proposal, the union preferred to submit its own proposed mechanism for cooperation with NATO. Unfortunately, this proposition was not accepted at the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Brussels, December 2000.

According to several interviews with senior political and military leaders in both Washington D.C. and Brussels, the Turks were under considerable pressure from the US. Despite that President Clinton both wrote and later talked to his Turkish counterpart on the telephone, the Turkish government elected to block the proposal. The primary reasons for the Turkish standpoint are discussed later in this chapter. While this is viewed by the EU as a temporary setback it does point at some of the problems associated with this new role for the EU.

**Implications for Europe**

For the European states, this is a very complex development. It entails an area that for long has been considered out of bounds. Despite the recurring attempts to incorporate a military dimension, the EU has functioned as a solely civilian organization since 1957. All the previous attempts to put some muscle behind the EU’s word in world politics have failed for various reasons. Not until the Berlin Wall came tumbling down was it realistic to gather enough support for this new chapter in European history.

For the EU to suddenly have a High Representative for its Foreign and Security Policy (Dr. Solana who used to be the NATO Secretary General), a Political and Security Council, a Military Committee and a Military Staff, whose officers even wear uniforms, is not a trivial occurrence by any means. For the European NATO members this is
nothing new but for the traditionally neutral or non-aligned states, this is a big change, having great impact on domestic issues as well.

For the states outside the Union, whether being candidates for accession or not, this development puts even further distance between the different states in Europe. Hereby creating an even bigger feeling of alienation among the states that aren’t members of either the EU or NATO. This development goes quite contrary to what the EU want for Europe as a whole. This is one reason why the EU has invited third party countries to participate in EU led operations, augmenting the forces committed by the member states.

Arguably, this will be one of the most difficult tasks the Union has undertaken. European governments briefly considered but then rejected so-called “convergence criteria” in defense spending and common priorities similar to what was used during the formation of the Euro. Instead, individual governments at various conferences are to pledge resources, guided loosely by a sense of peer review and common commitment.⁴

The decision to embark on such a journey is dictated more by real politics than by the most wanted solution. Since the four neutral or militarily non-aligned member states can veto any development that would be to hard for the domestic voters to accept, the chosen path is the one of least resistance. Politics are known to be the art of what’s possible, but perhaps not always the most desirable. Without any firm economic constraints, like a minimum funding for the development of a trustworthy military IOP, the EU run the risk of creating yet another paper tiger that look good but who’s teeth consist of partially outdated non-expeditionary Cold War Assets.
The EU-NATO connection

WEU

The decision at Nice to incorporate the WEU into EU's military structure marks the biggest change in transatlantic and European defense policy in fifty years. By retaining the WEU as a “sleeping” organization dealing only with the member’s article V commitment, the EU was skillfully able to gain the WEUs knowledge and experience, without having to address the tough issue of collective defense with the states who are EU but not WEU members. This way several members of the WEU military staff will move over to the EU military staff, bringing with them valuable experience from WEU led operations during the 1990s. Furthermore, the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the WEU Satellite Center in Torrejon, Spain will be transferred to the EU.

However, while collective defense against a perceived threat from the Soviet Union was the main reason for the Brussels Treaty, it remains to be seen how strong the commitments to non-Article V operations really are. Certainly, the WEU has carried out some successful operations during the 90’s. In those cases, the member states came together on a case by case basis and accepted to provide forces for these low threat missions. In future EU-led operations it might be easier to support the mission politically but harder to justify sending the nation’s sons and daughters in harms way, achieving objectives that are admirable but not enough domestically rooted.

EU

In one hand, by adopting most of the WEU functions, structure and personnel, the EU has been drawn closer to NATO. On the other hand, by creating a separate and somewhat different structure, the EU has purposely distanced itself from NATO. This is
the work of the French government. For the EU to fully embrace NATO’s defense planning and execution system is not acceptable to the French. They insist that the EU maintain its political autonomy and right to self-determination, regardless of NATO influences. According to several interviews with members of the interim EU military committee, and the interim EU military staff, the French attitude during their recent presidency was marked by a rather rigid approach instead of the much-needed open mindset.6

This attitude is the result of French Gaullism. Ever since France left the permanent military structures of NATO in peacetime, their struggle for independence has lingered on. With the new EU military structure, France sees a chance of dominating more than it ever have in NATO. By taking the lead together with Germany and supported by Britain, France will try to ensure a permanent leading role in the EU as opposed to a supporting one in NATO under US leadership. However, what France risk to do is in a way similar to the US. By exercising it’s power it alienates weaker members, forcing them to refuse actions they may have taken under a different leadership.

Furthermore, the position taken by the Turkish government is troublesome. Turkey is one of the candidate states to membership of the EU, but they are not likely to make the “short list” of states that will be admitted in the next round of enlargement. There are two main reasons for this. One being the fact that Turkey does not respect the Declaration of Human Rights in the way the EU would like it to. This is most visible in the way Turkey treats its Kurdish population. The other reason being that Greece can veto Turkish membership. Turkey is of course fully aware of these facts and will eventually use them in the negotiations with NATO and EU.
Compared with several other candidate states, Turkey knows that it has something that the EU wants. Militarily, Turkey is a great power in Europe and one of the few who’s increasing it’s military spending. Apart from the ability to commit forces, Turkey also has the aptitude to do so. Perhaps less casualty adverse than its fellow NATO-countries, Turkish participation in EU-led operations would be preferable. This capability, coupled with the deciding vote on whether to let the EU in to the NATO planning system, will make it almost impossible for the EU leaders to ignore Turkey and force them to take a hard look at the Turkish membership application.

Turkey is also possibly the only NATO member that sees an imminent threat to its own territory. With Eastern Europe being relatively stable, the Asiatic part of Turkey is the most unstable region that borders a NATO member. Therefore, Turkey stands to lose the most, should forces otherwise available to NATO, be tied up in an EU operation up to a 4000 km radius of Brussels. Should these forces be needed to honor an Article V commitment in NATO’s southern flank, this will naturally take precedence over a EU peacekeeping mission. Needless to say, it takes some time to redeploy forces that need to be shifted from one theatre to another. Turkey will most likely need some sort of assurance that this isn’t going to happen. Furthermore, since Turkey has pledged considerable forces to the EU force, they will need to be let in at the decision table and not be shut out.

What concessions can the EU give Turkey apart from a full membership? Since the EU in this respect is parliamentary democracy, it will be hard to set a side the human rights issue. The European parliament as well as several national assemblies is not likely to endorse a Turkish membership in the near future. The EU will more likely have to
work with other instruments. Free trade is one example and facilitating movement of people and capital is another. If the whole union can’t come together, then bilateral agreements adding up to the same thing is one way of appeasing Turkey, thus making them loosen up their deadlocked position.\(^7\)

### NATO

For NATO, the development of a separable but not separate EU military capability, is somewhat problematic. The latest NATO project, Defense Capabilities Initiative, agreed upon at the summit in Washington 1999, calls for NATO’s own strengthening of its military capacity, both from the Atlantic and European members of the alliance. If the European members decide to spend its scarce resources on CESDP rather than on DCI, NATO sees the risk of becoming obsolete.

Again, the French position constitutes a problem. Giving voice to its ever-present transatlantic skepticism, France risks doing permanent damage to NATO. While both the German Chancellor and the British Prime Minister time and again ensures the importance of NATO\(^8\), the French political leaders have a different agenda. If this sort of rhetoric is necessary for domestic reasons, France must privately convince their transatlantic partners that this is the case. Otherwise both the US and Canada will be reluctant to endorse the EU development any further, as they both see the risk of weakening NATO.\(^9\)

### Enlargement

At present, the EU has 13 candidate states seeking accession into the Union. The timetable calls for the first new members to be accepted in 2002. The implementation of CESDP complicates the negotiations, since there is now yet another major policy area where the EU and the candidates must agree. Regardless, it’s vital that the current EU
members agree on policy. Otherwise we may end up accepting new members, while the
total is still debating. Such a development would seriously damage the credibility of
the CESDP. The future enlargement of NATO and the already complex picture of
different European states with various memberships can become even more complicated
unless the enlargement of the two organizations harmonizes with each other.

Effects On Actual Capabilities

General

Regardless of the number of forces committed by the member states at the
council, hidden behind the numbers are mainly Cold War type forces, which deploy
by rail or road, in lieu of organic or augmented strategic lift capabilities. Apart from the
previously committed multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), of which all
have not been committed to the EU, the national European forces are largely designed for
homeland defense or action in central Europe along the old NATO/WP confrontation
line. This explains why the forces were thought to have enough mobility without
European strategic lift capabilities in place.

Another great concern is the limited interoperability between the different national
forces. Weapon systems and munitions may play a smaller role in solving Petersberg
tasks, but communications play a vital part of all operations. The lack of common secure
communications capabilities hampered NATO during operation ALLIED FORCE in
1999. On several occasions the ATO were said to have been compromised, giving the
Serbs prior notice of targets, making it possible for them to hide equipment and
personnel.
Land Forces

The land forces pledged by the member states at the Capabilities Commitment Conference amounted to more than 100,000 people. This should not be seen as a willingness to commit more than what was agreed on, but rather a surplus needed to meet the goal of one year’s sustainability, since a lot of the forces would only do 6-month rotations. The forces consist of a wide variety of forces, everything from armor to signals and are deemed enough to meet the requirements for all of the Petersberg tasks. The weakness of the committed land forces are not to be found in the composition, but in the above mentioned lack of mobility and interoperability.

Naval Forces

A similar variety applies to the committed naval elements. About 100 ships were contributed in all fashions, from destroyers to submarines. Again, this is more than required, but probably needed for the sustainability of a longer operation like a blockade or a mine clearing operation. The reason for this limitation lies in the fact that the European navies are largely brown water navies with limited endurance and supplies. The smallest number of assets was pledged in the field of amphibious forces. Many states simply have very few or no amphibious forces to commit.

Air Force

Regarding air assets, approximately 400 combat aircraft were committed. Among these forces, there was less variety. The European Air Forces consist mainly of tactical fighters, which leads to a shortage of strategic air assets such as large transport aircraft, tankers and airborne radar. Another limited asset is tactical reconnaissance aircraft. Many states have cut their resources in this field to a minimum or nothing at all. This
fact also proved to be a limiting factor during operation ALLIED FORCE. Furthermore, the European stockpiles of weapons are much smaller than the US one’s. Of the all the munitions used in Kosovo, the Europeans contributed with only a fraction compared to the US. Such a shortage of weapons could prove to be a limiting factor in a tough peacemaking operation.

**US/NATO assets**

The shortfalls that was identified and where US and/or NATO assets would be needed lies in the following sectors: Command and Control for air and naval forces, Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and, Strategic Air and Sealift and Logistics. The Collective Capability Goals-process, to correct these shortfalls, has started and it has the highest priority during the incumbent Swedish Presidency. The results and the way ahead will be discussed again at the European Council in Gothenburg, June 2001.

However, for these issues to be addressed correctly, a more firm structure than the existing ad-hoc working groups between the EU and NATO would be beneficial. The proposed permanent co-operation structure would help to solve some of the problems associated with this process. With the implementation of a permanent structure, a joint EU-NATO review with full transparency and participation of all member states would be possible. Both organizations would benefit from such a review, making it possible to address common shortfalls in a more rational and economic way.

**Required restructuring**

As the Cold War ended, the European states have been reluctant to restructure their forces. There are still several states that retain their old conscription systems geared toward homeland defenses rather than expeditionary operations. This slowness in change
costs a lot of money. Money that could be better spent on procurement of weapon systems with precision capabilities and strategic lift capabilities in form of large transport aircraft and fast cargo ships. Since there is no foreseeable invasion threat to western Europe, the European states should leave their old, Cold War style, mass armies, in favor of lighter and deployable forces more suitable for the Petersberg tasks that lies ahead in the near future.

Notes

2 Ibid
3 Interview in Washington D.C.
4 “NATO and ESDP: The need for a political agreement”, www.journal.ca/voll/no4_e/nato_e/nato3_e
5 “Implementation of the common European security and defense policy”, www.weu.int/eng/chronology2000
6 Several interviews in Brussels
7 Several interviews in Brussels and in Washington D.C.
8 “Germany urges caution on missile shield”, www.cnn.com
9 “Eggleton warns EU to consult Canada on military plans”, www.globeandmail.com
10 “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration”, ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/ccc
11 “European Security Review”, www.fhit.org/isis
12 “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration”, ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/ccc
13 Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council, 2000
14 “Strengthening European security and defense capabilities”, www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi
Chapter 4

Conclusion and summary

*The Union cannot see its status reduced to that of NATO subcontractor any more than the Alliance can be treated as a secondary organization in matters of European security.*

—Nicole Gnesotto

Summary of findings

The two key actors in the development of an EU military capability are France and Turkey. If the French keep up with their attempts to distance the EU capabilities too much from NATO, the alliance isn’t going to lend its much needed hand in planning and augmenting the EU capabilities. As long as the Turks continue to block the proposed cooperation-mechanism between NATO and the EU, every attempt to conduct independent EU operations are likely to fail.

As far as actual military forces go, a long overdue transformation from stationary homeland defense to deployable and versatile units are much needed. Such a transformation needs funding and the political will for these remains to be seen. Another open question is how the new Bush administration will treat this new addition to the transatlantic security framework. As previously alluded to, this will have to wait a few more months until the new NSS is published.
Principal conclusions restated

This development is the first step towards a common European defense. To think that neighboring countries, who share a common foreign and security policy and that exercise and conduct Peace Support Operations together, wouldn’t stand by each other in times of a defensive war against an intruder, is not feasible. Another important insight is that the EU has realized that it was in fact partially “toothless”. The union lacked the military instrument of power. While the EU has been exercising the other instruments of power, diplomacy and economics, for quite some time it finally became clear that a CFSP without the military might to back it up wasn’t credible.

However, the European approach of developing military capability before policy is fundamentally flawed and will result in a lack of credibility, as Cold War forces are restructured within the EU to address internal power struggles amongst Europe's elite. The politicians have hidden behind the American military umbrella for too long and appear unable to direct a coherent policy review process.

The politicians have effectively turned the problem over to the military, but civilian control of the military will ensure that funding is not forthcoming to address their legitimate concerns, particularly regarding capability shortfalls such as rapid sealift assets, tanker support and a truly integrated C4I infrastructure.

For the EU it is absolutely necessary to reach an agreement with Turkey. The solution to this issue must come from within the EU. The EU cannot look to the US to “deliver” Turkey. How big of concessions that’s needed remains to be seen, but anything short of the craved full membership will need some serious efforts on a bilateral level to appease the Turks. With the right attitude towards Turkey, this may not be such a big
problem after all. Accepting Turkey’s legitimate security concerns with their Asian neighbors and treating them like the equal NATO member that they are will probably help solving this problem. However, if any of the EU members chose to veto all Turkish involvement for domestic reasons, the EU will have to find a new approach towards NATO.

Equally important for the EU is to curb the French ambitions to become the most valuable player of the union, possibly using such a status in an attempt to embark the EU on a secessionist path towards the US. Luckily, such a development would never be accepted by the British and probably not by the Germans either.¹ The other members of the EU must let France understand that they will give the French some latitude, but also clearly state where the non-negotiable boundaries are. These borders include, but are not limited to, the redeployment of all US troops in Europe, the total revisal of NATO chain of command and ultimately breaking the transatlantic link. Nobody, not even France has anything to gain from a development that weakens or destroys NATO.

**Future development**

The three biggest challenges ahead are the solutions of the identified shortfalls in capability, the relationship with NATO and the enlargement process. Much work is needed in these areas, but if these three issues can be resolved to the satisfaction of all states concerned, then the development of an EU military capability will succeed. If not, it is doomed to fail.

**Notes**

¹ “Statement to the House by the Secretary of State on European defense cooperation”, www.mod.uk/index.php3
Appendix A

Background Information

However, in the realm of defense, things did not progress as smoothly. After the creation of NATO, the next question was how to bring Germany into the emerging security structures? France proposed the creation of a European Army, built on the principle of integration. This proposal led to the signature, in May 1952, of the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed among the Six countries - Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, while the United Kingdom abstained. However, in August 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. The failure of the EDC meant that an alternative way had to be found to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western security system.

At a special Conference convened in London in September 1954 and attended by the Brussels Treaty powers, the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, it was decided to invite the latter two countries to join the Brussels Treaty. The conclusions of the conference were formalized by the Paris Agreements, signed in October 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, created the Western European Union (WEU) as a new international organization and provided for the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to join.
In 1970, in Luxembourg, the Six countries adopted the "Davignon" Report, which marked the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC). That cooperation related exclusively to foreign policy and its purpose was to ensure mutual understanding and to strengthen Member States' solidarity on major international policy problems. EPC could not be extended beyond the economic aspects of security issues.  

The failure of the Genscher-Colombo initiative in November 1981, whose aim was to extend the EPC's sphere of competence to security and defense questions, prompted the countries in favor to look for another framework of consultation. The WEU was the obvious choice. France supported by Belgium proposed to reactivate the WEU, which was done at an extraordinary meeting in Rome, October 1984. Work on the definition of a European Security Identity and the gradual harmonization of its members' defense policies were among the stated objectives. The Council's work was to be consolidated. It would now meet twice a year at ministerial level with the participation of Defense as well as Foreign Ministers, and start to consider its role in crises beyond Europe.

After Gorbachev came to power in 1985, new possibilities arose for nuclear and conventional disarmament between the two blocs, which will transform the basis of European Defense and Security. The negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces highlighted the need for even closer European consultation on defense. Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister of France, suggested that WEU should define a common position on security matters to guide its policy in the rapidly changing international scene. The result was the Hague Platform of
1987. The obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty were reaffirmed and renewed pledges of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance were made.

**Maastricht**

In the early 90s, the Western institutions that had been shaped by the Cold War faced the challenge of adapting to a totally new environment. A new security architecture capable of embracing the whole continent and based on transparency and cooperation had to be devised. France and Germany advocated deepening European integration and developing a common foreign and security policy in the European Communities (EC). The 1990 London NATO Summit welcomed these developments and supported the enhanced role of Europeans within the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout 1991, officials prepared the adaptation of the EC, NATO and WEU to the new strategic environment. In November 1991, the NATO Summit in Rome reaffirmed the Alliance's role in the new Europe. In December 1991, the Treaty on European Union and the parallel WEU Maastricht Declaration established the basis for EU-WEU relations in the period 1991-1997. The Treaty established a common foreign and security policy, which was to "include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense". Article J.4.2 provided for the EU to be able to request WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications". In its Maastricht Declaration, WEU stated its readiness to respond to such requests.

Meeting in June 1992 at Petersberg near Bonn to consider the implementation of the Maastricht Declaration, the WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers took a major step forward in defining WEU's operational role. They defined the "Petersberg tasks"
(humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) and agreed to designate forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

The next major step came at the Atlantic Alliance Summit of January 1994. The NATO countries' Heads of State and Government gave their full support for the development of the European Security and Defense Identity. NATO expressed its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for WEU operations. In June 1996, the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Berlin then the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels made important advances in the process of NATO adaptation and WEU-NATO relations. Ministers approve in particular the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the elaboration of multinational European command arrangements for WEU-led operations and the conduct of military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.

Amsterdam

In 1997, with the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty revising the Treaty on the European Union, WEU was drawn closer to the EU. WEU's role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability was confirmed, the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the EU Treaty and the possibility of the integration of WEU into the EU, should the European council so decide was mentioned.

Notes

1 "The History of the European Union", www.eu.int/abc/history/index
2 Regelsberger, Elfriede. Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSFP</td>
<td>Common Security and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capability Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>European Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>European Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOP</td>
<td>Instrument of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

Treaty of the European Union, Maastricht, 1991
Treaty of the European Union, Amsterdam, 1997
Presidency Conclusions, Vienna European Council, 1998
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 1999
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 1999
Presidency Conclusions, Feira European Council, 2000
Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council, 2000
Sperling, James, ed. Two tiers or two speeds? The European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. St. Martin’s Press, New York 1999.
“The History of the European Union”, www.eu.int/abc/history/index
“NATO and ESDP: The need for a political agreement”, www.journal.ca/voll/no4_e/nato_e/nato3_e
“Implementation of the common European security and defense policy”, www.weu.int/eng/chronology2000
“Eggleton warns EU to consult Canada on military plans”, www.globeandmail.com
“Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration”, ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/ccc
“European Security Review”, www.fhit.org/isis
“Strengthening European security and defense capabilities”, www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi
“Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration”,
www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg

“Germany urges caution on missile shield”,
www.cnn.com/2001/world/europe/germany/02/03/us.defense.02/index