

THE 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE: US RESPONSES
TO A SIMILAR SITUATION

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by

KARL OLSON, FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
A.B., Columbia College of Columbia University, New York, New York, 1982
M.A., Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1992

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Karl Olson

Thesis Title: The 1994 Rwanda Genocide: U.S. Responses to a Similar Situation

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
Bruce W. Menning, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Lieutenant Colonel John P. Anderson, M.I.A.

Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE 1994 RWANDA GENOCIDE: US RESPONSES TO A SIMILAR SITUATION,
by Karl Olson, 74 pages.

This thesis reviews all commentary on the US response (or lack thereof) to the 1994 Rwanda genocide to identify suggested US responses to a similar situation that may occur in the future. Purpose is to develop a course of action for the US response that is feasible, acceptable and suitable. Such a course of action passes fulfills the requirements of Feasibility, Acceptability and Suitability, collectively known as the “FAS Test.”

Commentators reviewed across the political spectrum did provide some specific suggestions, from which the course of action was developed. Overall conclusion is that the most promising policy response that passes the FAS Test is US support to the opponents seeking to overthrow a genocidal regime.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative (formerly African Crisis Response Force)
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CNN	Cable News Network
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
DROC	Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
FAS	Feasible, Acceptable, and Suitable
HRW	Human Rights Watch
MMAS	Master of Military Art and Science
MSF	Medicins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive (Clinton administration citation)
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army (military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front)
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front (rebel organization of Hutus and Tutsis, including many Tutsis whose ancestors fled Rwanda for Uganda in 1959)
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Mission in Rwanda (also known as UNAMIR I to distinguish from the follow-on UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR II)
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On his goodwill visit to Africa in 1998, President Clinton stopped in Rwanda to apologize to the Rwandan people for the lack of an immediate United States (US) response to the events of April through July 1994, which became known as the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Since then, academics and human rights specialists have published extensive historical research on the genocide and the international response, or lack thereof, to these events at the time they occurred. Much of this commentary reinforces Edmund Burke's adage that, "All it takes for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing."

Many have criticized the United Nations (UN) and the US, along with the remainder of the international community, for their focus on applying the legal definition of genocide to the events in Rwanda as they were occurring, which constituted an excuse to do nothing, that is, not to intervene. As the genocide unfolded very quickly, however, other observers and academics have considered whether any specific US or other international action would have made a serious difference in the outcome. Very few have considered whether such proposed third-party actions were realistically possible at the time, or evaluated potential second- or third-order effects of such an outside intervention. At the same time, the second- and third-order effects of outside intervention after the genocide had been completed are clear and have been well documented. However, the question of the proper US and international response to a similar situation in the future remains.

Problem Statement

After the Holocaust, in which the Nazi government of Germany sought to exterminate the Jewish population of Europe, the UN sponsored the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to give meaning to the Holocaust survivors' vow, "Never Again." Yet relative to the size of the country and its population, the 1994 Rwanda genocide constitutes the largest rate of mass murder in human history. For several crucial weeks, the international community remained ignorant of the true nature of the events in Rwanda, until the slaughter had already claimed the lives of the vast majority of its victims. International attention first focused on whether the events in Rwanda fulfilled the legal definition of "genocide." Only after Rwandan exiles invaded and overthrew the genocidal regime did the international community respond with humanitarian relief to those Rwandans, including perpetrators of the genocide, who had fled to neighboring Zaire.

Although a small UN peacekeeping force was in Rwanda at the time, its limited mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter precluded use of military force to protect Rwandan civilians. When the violence first began, Western governments closed their embassies and evacuated foreign nationals from the country. The execution of ten Belgian peacekeepers and Belgium's withdrawal from the peacekeeping force prompted the UN to restrict further the size of the peacekeeping force and to limit its mandate. By the time the international community was fully aware of the situation, the genocide was virtually complete.

In late August 2001, *Time* magazine asked Secretary of State Colin Powell, "If Rwanda were happening tomorrow, what would you do?" Powell responded, "Let's just

say, if there was another situation that approached the Rwandan level, I think in light of what has happened in the past we'd have to take a very, very hard look at doing something. I think it would be very difficult simply to turn away."

Research Question

If a similar situation were to occur in the future, what, exactly, could, would, and should the US do in response? This includes an assessment of proposed US responses according to the criteria of Feasibility ("could"), Acceptability ("would") and Suitability ("should"), collectively known as the "FAS Test," to provide useful specific recommendations to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Historical Background

Rwanda and neighboring Burundi are two countries located in Central Africa between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC, formerly Zaire and the Belgian Congo) on the west, Uganda on the north, and Tanzania on the east. Unlike the vast majority of African states whose colonial-era boundaries were established at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Rwanda and Burundi both represent ancient kingdoms, which controlled territory roughly corresponding to the two countries' current boundaries.

In 1899, both Rwanda and Burundi submitted to a German protectorate without resistance; during World War I Belgium occupied both territories, an arrangement later confirmed by a League of Nations mandate of the territory of Rwanda-Urundi. After World War II, the countries became a UN trust territory. Both received independence from Belgium 1 July 1962.

In Rwanda and Burundi, precolonial indigenous society organized itself under a feudal system, which placed cattle-herding pastoralists, the Tutsi, 14 percent of the

modern-day population, above the agriculturalist Hutu, 85 percent of the modern-day population. However, the Hutu and Tutsi are not tribes per se; rather, the distinction is most closely related to one of caste. The two groups spring from the same ethnic stock, speak the same language, and reside in the same communities in all parts of each country. Some social mobility existed, and mixed Hutu-Tutsi marriages, while not common, did occur and were accepted by the community. Although the colonial Belgians thought that the Tutsi were tall and lean, and the Hutu short and stocky, this is a generalization. In fact, one cannot identify a Hutu or a Tutsi by observation alone. The colonial Belgians recorded Hutu or Tutsi on vital statistics documents as part of a plan to control the indigenous populations of both countries through the Tutsi, whom they set up as overlords of the Hutu, as a local variation on the British practice of “Divide and Rule.”

The colonial Belgians justified the Tutsi domination over the Hutu in part with reference to pseudoscientific theories of racial superiority that were accepted before World War II. In the 1950s, they prepared both countries for eventual independence by encouraging the growth of democratic political institutions. As the colonial era in Rwanda and Burundi drew to a close, tensions between the groups increased. The Hutu demanded majority rule, while the Tutsi feared its consequences.

The history of Burundi since independence has been marked by political instability caused by the inability of the Hutu and Tutsi to cooperate in governing the country. According to the U.S. Department of State background notes on Burundi, “The 1965 assassination of the Hutu prime minister set in motion a series of destabilizing Hutu revolts and subsequent [mostly Tutsi] governmental repression” (2000a, 3). In 1972 and 1988, Hutu revolts resulted in the deaths of large numbers of Burundians (150,000 in

1988) and displaced more Burundians as refugees in neighboring countries. The background notes continue, “Burundi’s first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected in 1993 but was assassinated by factions of the Tutsi-dominated armed forces” in October of that year (2000a, 3). The resulting civil war killed tens of thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands. The security situation continued to deteriorate in late 1993 and early 1994, with the Tutsi-led assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, on 21 October 1993. This was followed by a wave of Hutu-Tutsi violence, which resulted in between 50,000 and 100,000 Hutu and Tutsi deaths and sent almost 400,000 Hutu refugees to Rwanda. The lack of an international response to these events constituted a signal to Hutu extremists in Rwanda that the international community would not intervene in Central Africa. Burundi’s new president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, also a Hutu, supported the long-running peace process hosted by Tanzania in the town of Arusha.

In Rwanda, the experience was different. Before independence, in November 1959, the Hutus, with Belgian military encouragement, overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. This prompted many Tutsi to flee to Uganda among other countries, where they integrated partially into the society including the military, but did not assimilate fully and remained outsiders. In a UN-supervised election, a Hutu-dominated party won and took power at independence. Thus, although the minority Tutsis continued to control the government in Burundi, the majority Hutus controlled the government in Rwanda.

On 1 October 1990, a rebel force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), composed primarily of ethnic Tutsis descended from the 1959 refugees, but including substantial Hutu participation, invaded Rwanda from Uganda, seeking to end the Tutsi diaspora and

the return home of all Rwandans. Tanzania again hosted peace talks at the town of Arusha; these resulted in a cease-fire signed in July 1992 followed by political talks. The Arusha peace process continued into 1993 with the UN Security Council authorization of a UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, in October of that year. The peace process included the stationing of a battalion of RPF soldiers in Kigali, the Rwandan capital.

UNAMIR was established in an atmosphere of skepticism regarding the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. The US was particularly concerned about costs. Furthermore, the UN at the time had a tendency to formulate ambitious plans beyond its capabilities to implement. This had led to criticism of premature UN “nation-building” missions. Many of these problems are well documented in the *Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform*, which made specific recommendations to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.

Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus supported the peace process. The Hutu president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, actively participated. However, Hutu extremists, including some members of the Rwandan government at the time, opposed sharing power with Tutsis. By the end of 1993, extremist Hutu militias, known as Interhamwe (also spelled “Interahamwe”), meaning “those who stand together,” were making plans to solve the Tutsi “problem” once and for all. On 11 January 1994, the UNAMIR commander, Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, informed UN headquarters in New York of an Interhamwe informant’s report of detailed plans for the extermination of the Tutsi in Rwanda. This included killing some Belgian peacekeepers

to force the Belgian government to withdraw them from Rwanda. This warning was not received with the seriousness that, in retrospect, it deserved.

There are several explanations for this phenomenon, which Samantha Power describes in *“A Problem from Hell”*. In any conflict situation, dire intelligence warnings are common; the most extreme may be exaggerated to call attention to themselves. Reports may be intended to influence as well as to inform. The challenge for any analyst or other professional is to sift through a large amount of information that may be incomplete or incorrect to determine the ground truth. Furthermore, UNAMIR was Dallaire’s first experience in Africa; experienced Africa watchers may have thought that Dallaire was more credulous or susceptible to influence from one or both of the parties. The long history of Hutu-Tutsi killing may have allowed readers in New York and elsewhere to discount the gravity of the informant’s report. Finally, as acknowledged by then-US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson, the efforts of UNAMIR and others in the international community to support the implementation of the Arusha peace process may have led those involved to receive information contrary to the established policy only with great skepticism.

The issue of what has become known in the State Department as “diplomatic readiness” is relevant at this point. Although with one exception the author has not accessed internal State Department documents in preparing this thesis, the principal diplomatic or political objective of the US Embassy in Kigali at the time would have been supporting the implementation of the Arusha peace process. This support would have included maintaining diplomatic contacts with key participants throughout the political spectrum, and informing Washington of important developments that might

affect the overall plan to implement the Arusha accords. It is nevertheless difficult, due to human nature, to report facts, such as increased Hutu extremist activity, which are contrary to the overall US foreign policy the embassy and the US government are supporting. Furthermore, a recommendation to slow implementation of the policy would also not be well received in Washington. Thus, there is a human tendency not to accept at face value such contrary reports or to allocate fewer resources to reporting them. In fact, the most effective pursuit of overall US interests would indicate the opposite course of action.

The view at the time from Washington, and the United Nations, is also relevant. The Clinton administration faced significant domestic political challenges in 1993 and 1994 with the congress, resulting in the Republican takeover of the legislative branch of the US government in the 1994 elections. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia had begun in December 1992 under the George H. W. Bush administration as a humanitarian mission. It ended in the disastrous October 1993 raid on the headquarters of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. Its memory left both the administration and the congress reluctant to involve US troops in peacekeeping operations absent a compelling US national interest.

The fact that Somalia and Rwanda are both in Africa linked the two countries in the minds of Americans, despite the clear differences between them. The Clinton administration also faced significant congressional opposition to the UN in general, which only increased following the UN withdrawal from Somalia as yet another unsuccessful UN peacekeeping mission. Finally, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were ongoing in 1994; the Clinton administration had to consider whether the congress

would support deployment of US troops to Bosnia in the event of a peace agreement there. As a practical matter, all of these factors limited US interest in events in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, despite statements to the contrary.

As of early April 1994, it was clear on the ground in Rwanda that Hutu extremists were intent on forcing the Arusha peace process off track. The fact that Western diplomats responded to a lack of progress in the Arusha peace process with threats to withdraw the UN peacekeepers actually encouraged Hutu extremists, since the withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers would facilitate their attainment of their objectives. Western governments and the UN were aware that political violence was being contemplated. However, though the signs were there and were discovered after the fact, the international community was not fully cognizant of the extent of planning and coordination for the impending violence. A flurry of diplomatic activity kept the Arusha peace process going, concluding with UN Security Council Resolution 909 of 5 April 1994, which renewed UNAMIR's mandate as a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission (Klinghoffer 1998, 37). Klinghoffer's concluding paragraph sets the stage for the genocide:

As of early April 1994, one-seventh of the population were refugees and there was mounting evidence that extensive ethnic violence was a possibility. The wire was taut, and could snap at any moment. On the other hand, regional mediators at Dar es Salaam seemed to have lessened the tension as [Rwandan President Juvenal] Habyarimana was headed back to Rwanda to implement the Arusha accords. Apparently, there were those in Kigali who wanted to tighten the wire again beyond its point of endurance. (1998, 38)

The Genocide

The triggering event that allowed the Hutu extremists to implement their plans to exterminate the Tutsi occurred on 6 April, 1994, when someone outside Kigali airport

shot two missiles at the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi home from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. It has never been established exactly who fired the shots, nor why. However, Hutu moderates interpreted the event as a signal to the Hutu extremists that the Arusha peace process was at risk.

That night, the Hutu extremists implemented their plans, assisted by hate radio broadcasts that inflamed passions and identified specific Tutsi and Hutu moderates by name, address, and even license plate numbers. The chaos began in Kigali, with Hutu mobs, armed with machetes and more sophisticated weapons, such as guns, focusing on Hutu moderates, such as Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the titular head of government after the death of President Habyarimana. Hutu soldiers then rounded up the ten Belgian peacekeepers, who had been protecting her, killed them and savagely mutilated their bodies. The predictions of Dallaire's Hutu informant began to come true in horrifying detail.

The following summary has been drawn principally from the Samantha Power article that appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* in September 2001, with a focus on key events related to the US government and international response.

As the violence spread throughout Kigali, the immediate Western impression was that the Arusha peace process had broken down and that the civil war had resumed. Thus, Western diplomatic efforts focused on public statements appealing for calm and encouraging the parties to resume their participation in the peace process. At the same time, Western governments evacuated their citizens from Rwanda, assisted by UNAMIR peacekeepers acting under UN instructions. The US stationed 300 Marines in nearby Bujumbura, Burundi, to assist in the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), if

necessary. The Americans departed by road convoys to neighboring countries, while European governments sent aircraft to Kigali. Most evacuations of foreign nationals were completed by 10 April. The US Embassy was closed.

This author believes that the decision to close the US Embassy in Kigali was based on several considerations. In 1979, Islamic militants seized the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran, holding US hostages for 444 days, an event widely believed to have contributed to President Carter's 1980 election loss to Ronald Reagan. Since then, the White House, under both parties, has been very reluctant to risk another hostage situation by keeping a US Embassy open, absent overwhelming policy reasons. For example, the US Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia has functioned continuously during the substantial turmoil in that country since 1990. This is true in part because the US is the de facto former colonial power in Liberia and because the US Embassy is located in a secure compound along the coast and can be evacuated by helicopter or by sea if necessary. Neither situation exists in Rwanda. The US decided to close its embassy and evacuated US citizens 7 April, immediately after the violence broke out. Then-US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson told Samantha Power, "Did we have a moral responsibility to stay there? Would it have made a difference? I don't know, but the killings were taking place in broad daylight while we were there. I didn't feel that we were achieving much" (2001, 93).

The Western evacuation not only deprived Western governments of diplomatic and other sources of information; it also removed the international media presence, including television, which is necessary to inform Western publics of events in the country. Although print media were able to maintain telephone contact with sources in

Kigali, the lack of television coverage, the so-called “Cable News Network (CNN) effect,” ensured that Rwanda would not become a major political issue in the West.

Power reports near unanimity in the US government and media supporting the US decision to evacuate and to decline further involvement in what was believed at the time to have been ethnic violence in renewed fighting in a civil war. Once the NEO was complete, Washington interest in Rwanda waned.

The RPF responded to the outbreak of violence differently, launching on 7 April a renewed invasion from Uganda aimed at overthrowing the Hutu interim government in order to stop the genocide. The soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) were well disciplined and effective. Nevertheless, they required three months to defeat the Hutu regime. The Hutu leaders fled to Goma, in eastern Zaire, followed by an enormous number of Hutu refugees who feared revenge killings. The massive camps, which received international humanitarian assistance, continued to destabilize the region for several years.

Dallaire believes that, if the foreign military personnel in the region for the evacuation had been seconded to UNAMIR upon completion of the NEO, he could have halted the killing. This conclusion is affirmed by the report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. This thesis accepts that conclusion, as the focus here is on US government and other international decisions in response to the genocide.

Belgium responded to the massacre of its peacekeepers by seeking to withdraw all of its personnel from UNAMIR, just as the Hutu extremists had hoped. Belgium sought and received from the US support in the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, though the final UN Security Council decision was a reduction in force.

Power quotes then-US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright as stating that the UN would maintain a small UNAMIR contingent “to show the will of the international community” (2001, 99).

The feeling in Washington at the time, according to Power, was that the overall US commitment to peacekeeping through the UN was substantially at risk after the debacle in Somalia. Thus, avoidance of unsuccessful peacekeeping missions was essential to maintaining US support for UN peacekeeping. Officials in Washington who supported UN peacekeeping were determined to avoid another Somalia-like disaster.

While the genocide continued, midlevel officials in Washington monitored events in Rwanda by telephone and through various other sources of information. The bureaucracy was paralyzed by its inability to formulate a US response that did not involve actual US military intervention. High-level leadership was simply not involved. This left midlevel officials to circulate proposals for specific action, such as jamming the hate radio, for concurrence by the Pentagon, which did not support US military intervention and would not concur absent instructions from high-level leadership, which were not forthcoming. Power quotes Army Lieutenant General Wesley Clark of the Joint Staff as saying, “The Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene. It is up to the civilian [leadership] to tell us they want to do something and we’ll figure out how to do it” (2001, 102). This is precisely what did not happen.

No outside observer immediately labeled the killings in Rwanda as genocide; this would not become apparent for at least one week. Alan J. Kuperman concludes that the genocide became clear to the U.S. Government on or about 20 April, two weeks after it began (2001, 37). Several unproductive weeks were wasted while lawyers in the various

bureaucracies considered whether a threshold definition of “genocide” had been crossed. The reason for this concern was the possibility that officially labeling the killings of Tutsi in Rwanda as “genocide” would obligate the US to act in some way to stop it. Although the rest of the world quickly concluded that the terms of the 1948 genocide convention had been met, the US still resisted. Reproduced here is the 10 June exchange between a State Department spokesperson and a Reuters correspondent:

Reuters: How would you describe the events taking place in Rwanda?

State Department: Based on the evidence we have seen from observations on the ground, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda.

Reuters: What’s the difference between “acts of genocide” and “genocide”?

State Department: Well, I think the – as you know, there’s a legal definition of this Clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which you might apply that label But as to the distinctions between the words, we’re trying to call what we have seen so far as best as we can; and based, again, on the evidence, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred.

Reuters: How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?

State Department: That’s just not a question that I’m in a position to answer. (Power 2001, 96-7)

Later that day, in Istanbul, Turkey, then-US Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally authorized the US government to use the word “genocide” (Power 2001, 97).

Power reports that, despite the intense pressure on the US to acknowledge that genocide had occurred, there was little or no interest in US intervention on the part of US civil society. The human rights NGOs had only a narrow base of public support. “The editorial boards of the major American newspapers discouraged U.S. intervention during the genocide” (Power 2001, 97). This lack of public support allowed the midlevel bureaucracy to plan slowly and cautiously, so that, in the end, events on the ground

overtook their plans. The result was that the genocide did not end until the RPF military victory.

The French sought and received UN Security Council support to create a safe haven in the southwestern part of Rwanda under Operation Turquoise in late June. Meanwhile, the Hutu regime which had conducted the genocide fled across the border to Goma, Zaire, followed by an enormous number, in the hundreds of thousands, of Hutu refugees, who, understandably, feared revenge killings from the Tutsi-led RPA. The international news media were present in Goma; their coverage of the disaster mobilized Western governments, including the US, to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees. This proved that international media attention prompts public support for humanitarian intervention, even in an area of the world of minimal US interest. Though many Hutu refugees in Zaire eventually returned home and were re-integrated into Rwandan society, the existence of a de facto Hutu government-in-exile in the camps destabilized the region for several years.

Definitions

Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the 1948 genocide convention as:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 1 of the convention obligates the member states to consider genocide a crime under international law, “which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”

The FAS Test represents an assessment, based on judgment, of the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of a particular course of action. Feasibility represents what the US could do in a situation. Acceptability represents what the US would do in that situation. Suitability represents what the US should do to respond successfully to that situation. A proposed course of action must be feasible, acceptable and suitable in responding to the situation in order to merit further consideration. Otherwise, following that course of action may result in strategic failure.

Limitations

Although this study is based on a historical event, its objective is to recommend a course of action to respond to a similar event in the future. Thus, certain unique circumstances, such as the Rwandan seat on the UN Security Council at the time of the genocide, are not considered. Although the approach of the Clinton administration to foreign policy issues, including Rwanda, has been criticized, it is not the intent of this author to focus criticism on the previous administration.

This thesis was researched in the last months of 2001 and written in the first five months of 2002, during Operation Enduring Freedom. Although it takes into account these events, its answer to the research question should be valid for the next several years absent a significant change in US foreign policy objectives.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review began with the commentaries appearing in the international media in 2000 and 2001, which questioned the role of the US and the rest of the international community in the 1994 Rwanda genocide and its response to the events as they occurred. All literature reviewed was available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), on the Internet or was privately purchased for subsequent donation to the CARL. This created a limitation in that the CARL collections of what have become leading opinion journals, such as *The New Yorker* and *The Atlantic Monthly* are not complete for the time in question, nor does the CARL hold the complete series of indices to *The Washington Post*. This did not allow a complete review of all secondary and tertiary references encountered in the literature review. With the exception of works in progress that appeared in the early months of 2002 and follow-up commentary such as letters to the editor, the cut-off date for the review was 31 December 2001.

The Samantha Power article, “Bystanders to Genocide,” which appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* in September 2001, was one of the most prominent articles, in nonscholarly journals, which criticized the US for its actions and inactions in response to the genocide. It appeared to hold the US administration at the time responsible for doing nothing to prevent the genocide, in violation of its commitments under the 1948 genocide convention. The article is quite detailed, with on the record sources and explanations of the rationales for the US response.

Samantha Power subsequently included her research on Rwanda in her book, “*A Problem from Hell, America and the Age of Genocide*,” published early in 2002, which also discussed the US response to genocide in Cambodia and the Balkans. Introductory and concluding chapters including the chapter on Rwanda were reviewed; chapters on other genocides, such as Cambodia and the Balkans, were not.

The indices on Rwanda in the *Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature* from 1994 onward were reviewed and the most promising articles that appeared to offer either opinions or potential solutions or US responses identified for individual review. Basic news stories in weekly newsmagazines were not. Articles in publications available in the CARL were then reviewed individually; those in publications not available in the CARL were not. When warranted, articles that should have been available in the CARL but due to individual circumstances (e.g., an issue of *The New Republic* missing from the bound volume) were obtained by direct contact with the magazine.

Philip Gourevitch, a staff writer at *The New Yorker*, published his research both in the magazine, which was not available in the CARL, and in a book, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*. The book was reviewed in detail.

The NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) published Alison des Forges’ comprehensive research in its report *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, of which the chapters most relevant to this topic were reviewed in detail.

The CARL holds several books on Rwanda; every available book was reviewed for possible relevance. *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, by Gerard Prunier, provides useful historical background on Rwanda and the origins of the Hutu-Tutsi

conflict from precolonial times through German and Belgian administration to independence.

John G. Heidenrich's *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen* goes further than any other source consulted in proposing specific suggestions for preventing and halting genocide, including not only a more robust UN-peacekeeping capability but also various permutations of a standing UN force, an idea initially suggested by US President Ronald Reagan. Heidenrich also considers the application of all instruments of national power, the Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME), to the problem. However, Heidenrich's conclusions include the fact that the 1994 Rwanda genocide happened so quickly that none of the remedies he proposes would have had any noticeable effect.

Alan J. Kuperman considered the principal criticism of the US and other countries after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, namely, that a small force of 5,000 international peacekeepers could have halted the killings. In *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, Kuperman considers the combination of the limited intelligence available to Western policymakers at the beginning of the crisis and the realities of military logistics. He concludes that these factors would have delayed the arrival of additional peacekeepers sufficiently so that they could have saved a maximum of one-quarter of the Rwandan Tutsi killed. In other words, even if the US government had decided to intervene immediately when it became fully aware of the genocidal aspects of the crisis, three-quarters of the Rwandan Tutsi victims would have been killed anyway. Kuperman first published this research in *Foreign Affairs* January-February 2000, with additional

commentary and rebuttal by several writers including Alison des Forges in the two subsequent issues of *Foreign Affairs*.

Arthur Jay Klinghoffer thoroughly analyzed the 1994 Rwanda Genocide in *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda* to determine what lessons may be learned from Rwanda for the future. Klinghoffer compared foreign interventions, or the lack thereof, in Rwanda and Cambodia, among other crises characterized as genocidal. He recognized the complexity of the international legal and diplomatic environment, principally organized between states, and the evolving international doctrine that human rights take precedence over the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Klinghoffer, almost alone, also notes that the only effective method of halting the genocides he researched was outside military intervention.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) appointed an International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It issued its special report in July 2000. Relevant chapters of the report were reviewed in detail.

Linda R. Melvern prepared a full account of the genocide in *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. She documents the unrecognized heroism of the UN peacekeepers and representatives of the International Red Cross and the French NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF--doctors without borders). The former Secretary General of MSF, Alain Destexhe, in *Rwanda and Genocide*, notes critically the role of NGOs in providing humanitarian aid after the genocide, noting that this does not excuse them from responsibility for their failure to act during the genocide.

A simpler work on Rwanda by J. K. Pomeray, under the Major World Nations series, provided an easy introduction to the country. Charles Freeman's *Crisis in Rwanda* is likewise a simple, nonscholarly explanation of the crisis.

The Department of Public Information of the United Nations published, in Volume X of its Blue Books Series, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, with an introduction by the then-Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, including a chronology of events and complete texts of relevant UN documents. The *Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform* was also consulted.

Foreign Affairs published a seminal article by Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," in its July-August 1999 issue. Luttwak advocated that the West, including both governments and NGOs, limit its intervention in third world conflicts until the conflict terminated of its own accord, either with a victor and a vanquished or because both belligerents decided for themselves not to continue the conflict. According to nineteenth century German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, this never occurs at the same time. Luttwak argues that premature external intervention allows the leadership of the belligerents to avoid the difficult political compromises necessary to establishing a lasting peaceful resolution to the conflict. The Western practice of insisting on interim cease-fires allowed the belligerents to recover from the conflict merely to engage again, ultimately leading to far greater sacrifice of life. Once the parties have decided to use military force to achieve their political objectives, Luttwak suggests "letting wars burn" to force the parties themselves to resolve their own problems. Only after they have completed the difficult political groundwork towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict may a lasting and durable peace be implemented.

One monograph of the School of Advanced Military Studies, “Did the United Nations and the United States Ignore the Atrocities/Genocide in Rwanda,” by US Army Major Morris T. Goins, served as useful background on the crisis. Although not directly related to this topic, two CGSC Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses also provided useful ideas. They were, “An Analysis of the Measures of Effectiveness for the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI),” by Lieutenant Commander Andrea Pollard, US Navy, and “Operation Amaryllis: French Evacuation Operation in Rwanda 1994—Lessons Learned for Future German Noncombatant Evacuation Operations?” by Lieutenant Colonel Uwe F. Jansohn of Germany.

The United Kingdom’s Strategic and Combat Studies Institute published an Occasional Paper Number 18, “Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance: Rwanda, April-December 1994” by Richard M. Connaughton, which was also useful in understanding different perspectives on the conflict.

The Carnegie Corporation of New York published *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* by Scott R. Feil, with a foreword by Lieutenant-General Romeo A. Dallaire, in April 1998 as a Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. This reported on a conference including US military officers, which considered General Dallaire’s contention that, with a force of no more than 5,000 international peacekeepers, he could have stopped the genocide as it was beginning merely by a robust show of force by UNAMIR. For purposes of this analysis, the author accepts at face value the contents of this report and its conclusion.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College published *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda* by Steven Metz. This was useful in considering the practical realities of US military intervention in Africa. Also relevant in this respect was the article on Bosnia, “Peace is Hell,” by William Langewiesche, which appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* in October 2001.

The Public Broadcasting System *Frontline* video, “The Triumph of Evil,” dramatically and vividly documents the 1994 Rwanda genocide far more effectively than mere words on a printed page.

HRW produced several reports prior to and during the 1994 Rwanda genocide that the author consulted. In June 1993, HRW published, “Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda,” followed in January 1994 with, “Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War.” HRW issued (May 1994) a contemporaneous report on the genocide, “Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994,” with specific recommendations for the international community, though not directly applicable to the U.S. response to a similar situation in the future. It followed up in April 1995 with “Rwanda: The Crisis Continues” and discussed the refugee crisis the following month in, “Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide.” All of these reports provided useful information.

The CARL contained several useful commentaries directly addressing the issue of exactly how the international community could or should have intervened in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. The codirectors of African Rights, a London-based human rights NGO, Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, published an article, “The Genocide in Rwanda

and the International Response,” in the April 1995 issue of *Current History*. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution published a similar article, “Saving Lives With Force: How to stop genocide,” in *The New Republic* 12 July 1999. One of the few contemporaneous commentaries appeared as an editorial in *The New Republic* 16 May 1994, “Why Not Rwanda?” comparing the Western responses to that crisis to those in Bosnia. Finally, William F. Buckley Jr. in *National Review* responded to President Clinton’s planned apology to Rwanda with “Windy Goodfeel,” dated 10 March published in the issue dated 4 May 1998.

Original source materials consulted included President Clinton’s 25 March 1998 statement in Kigali, Rwanda, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the initial UNAMIR report dated 11 January 1994 warning the UN of the genocidal intentions of the Hutu extremists.

The US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth provided after-action reports on the US Army humanitarian intervention after the genocide in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire. The Center for Army Lessons Learned had no other materials on the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Estilow, US Marine Corps, outlined the FAS Test in Maxwell Paper Number 3 at the Air War College, entitled, “U.S. Military Force and Operations Other Than War: Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure,” published in 1996.

Lieutenant Commander Janet G. Goldstein, US Navy, wrote her MMAS thesis, “Black Market Operations,” in 1998. She reviewed all decisions of military appeals

courts for references to black marketing in order to draw conclusions regarding how black market operations function. Her thesis provided an example of the research method ultimately employed for this thesis.

US Army Major Ronald P. Clark proposed new ideas in his MMAS thesis, “The Lack of Ethnic Diversity in the Infantry: Why are there so few Black Infantry Officers in the U.S. Army?” in 2000. The author also reviewed two MMAS theses for format, that of US Army Major Mark Lee Walters (1999), “Fitness Requirements of the 75th Ranger Regiment: Are They Relevant?” and of US Army Major Michael D. Pemrick (1999), “Physical Fitness and the 75th Ranger Regiment: The Components of Physical Fitness and the Ranger Mission.”

Although the literature review did not include all works ever written on the 1994 Rwanda genocide, it is the opinion of this author that it was sufficiently broad to have encompassed a wide variety of opinions and suggestions related to a US course of action in a similar situation in the future.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHOD

This thesis is an exercise in qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis studies a problem by collecting information from several sources, which, by their very nature, do not easily lend themselves to quantitative or empirical sources and methods. The sources include both primary and secondary materials, which constitute the data pertinent to the study. The researcher gathers the materials and analyzes them critically to discover their relevance to the research question, how they relate to the subject, and the meaning of the information obtained. The researcher discerns the nature of the sources and how they relate to the research question.

Qualitative analysis focuses on selection and how to interpret the data that result from the collection and selection activities. Analysis derives from the information in the source materials themselves, the motives inherent in the materials, the relationships of the motives and materials to one another, and the validity of conclusions that can be drawn from the entire collection. After verifying facts and drawing conclusions from the data, the researcher constructs a synthesis based on higher-order conclusions stemming from systematic evaluation of the results in the context of the overall research question.

Although the research question concerns the present time, the question is based upon historical research about a specific event. Historical research itself is a form of qualitative analysis; the methods used in qualitative analysis are similar to those used in historical research. Both types of research normally observe the fundamental tenets of the scientific method. Their common methodological format normally consists of six steps:

1. Identification and Isolation of the Problem. In 1998, then-President William J. Clinton apologized to Rwanda for his failure to “fully appreciate” the events that became the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Since then, the US, along with the international community, has been criticized for its policy choices at that time. This author served in Brazil until 1996 and was similarly unaware of events in Rwanda, with one exception. However, his next assignment, to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department in Washington, D.C., allowed him to visit Rwanda in 1999. The country’s excellent progress in the Humanitarian Demining Program and the legacy of the 1994 genocide prompted further study and consideration of a follow-on assignment in Burundi, which ultimately did not take place.

The publication of Samantha Power’s article in *The Atlantic Monthly* in September 2001 prompted this author to consider whether the criticism of the US was justified, in that very few of the critical commentaries actually proposed any specific US action beyond, “Do Something to Stop the Killing!” This would seem to imply an open-ended US military contingency operation, without a defined end state or US exit strategy. Alan J. Kuperman answered many of this author’s initial questions in his counterfactual historical study, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*. Kuperman considered what would have happened if the US government had decided to intervene immediately upon concluding, privately, that the events in Rwanda constituted genocide. Kuperman analyzed contemporaneous media reports and concluded that the true genocidal nature of the violence was not apparent to Western governments including the US until 21 April 1994--fifteen days after the violence began on 6 April. At this point, the rate of killing had accelerated. Kuperman analyzed the requirements of military logistics and

concluded that U.S. military intervention would have saved only one-quarter or 200,000 of the eventual victims. The 1994 Rwanda genocide has been the subject of numerous studies and reports; at this point, the historical record is now complete.

In late August 2001, *Time* magazine asked Secretary of State Colin Powell what he would do in response to a similar situation today. Powell responded that he would have to take a very, very hard look at doing something and that it would be very difficult simply to turn away. However, the question of an appropriate US response to a similar situation remains.

Although the US military has substantially reduced its personnel and budgetary resources since the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping and contingency operations since then has increased. Limited resources for the State Department have increased demands for peacetime engagement in other countries that currently remain stable, at least as defined by regional standards. The only US government organization with sufficient resources, personnel and capabilities to conduct contingency operations is the Department of Defense. Thus, the US political leadership has turned to the military to implement interim solutions to complex diplomatic problems that defy easy solution.

Since Operation Desert Storm, there has been at least a perception in the US that peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions have substantially increased the number and length of overseas deployments of US military personnel to an unsustainable level. Thus, US political leadership has sought to limit US commitment to such operations by seeking multinational partners, training and equipping regional peacekeeping forces, and engaging with NGOs to share the burdens. Political leadership has had to accept the fact that limited resources do not allow the US government to engage everywhere and that

some crises must be solved by others with greater national interests at stake. Ironically, the Clinton administration approved its policy on reforming multilateral peace operations, known as PDD-25, during the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

At the same time, the US government condemns genocide as violating not only American values, but also as a crime against humanity. For this reason, in 1986 President Reagan successfully encouraged the US Senate to ratify the 1948 genocide convention. This followed the debacle of his 1985 visit to the military cemetery at Bitburg, Germany, at the invitation of then-West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The presence in the cemetery of graves of the Waffen SS implied that a wreath laid there by President Reagan would honor them and the perpetrators of the Nazi genocide of World War II.

What the international condemnation of President Reagan did accomplish, however, was to create substantial domestic political pressure on President Reagan to take any step, however symbolic, against genocide. The US Senate had refused to ratify the treaty for almost forty years. Both conservatives and the American Bar Association opposed the treaty. They were concerned that the treaty could be used against the interests of the US and its citizens for political purposes, based upon contemporary views of US history. Conservatives also argued that a mere treaty would not prevent a Communist nation, such as the Soviet Union, from committing genocide. Once President Reagan strongly endorsed ratification, however, the Senate did act. This singular worthwhile result of Bitburg shows that domestic political pressure, in concert with international public opinion, can encourage the highest levels of the US Government to act despite a longstanding, preexisting belief that no vital US national interests were at

stake. The only element that had changed was the personal political interests of the US president of the time (Power 2002, 163).

US ratification of the genocide convention has deprived those opposed to the US of a convenient rhetorical tool. However, the failure of the US and the international community to act in response to the 1994 Rwanda genocide prompted *Time* magazine, in 2001, to ask Secretary Powell whether the US would respond with indifference to a similar situation. The very fact that Rwanda was the subject of one of only ten questions printed by *Time* indicates greater US public interest in a foreign policy more consistent with American values. Therefore, what is needed is a recommended course of action to include American values in a US policy response to such a situation.

Although this thesis considers only Rwanda, as a historical example, its application and the principles underlying its recommendations are not restricted to Rwanda or to Africa. Besides geography, the key difference in its application to another situation is the level of US, regional, and international interest in the country. For this reason, the discussion and recommendations in this thesis are sufficiently flexible to apply to a wide variety of situations.

2. Development of a Hypothesis. As a US foreign service officer, this author is well aware of numerous situations in which the government, leaders, media, and people of various foreign countries as well as domestic and international NGOs criticize the US government for its actions or inactions on foreign policy issues. While all such criticism is protected as an expression of human rights, that protection does not mean that the criticism is reasonable, justified, appropriate or even relevant to the issue. Implicit in the assumptions underlying some criticism, including historical research on the 1994 Rwanda

genocide, is what this author considers an unrealistic expectation of the obligations, capabilities, and interests of the US government.

In many cases, different commentators representing the same political perspective can simultaneously criticize every possible US response to a foreign policy issue. The opportunity to criticize the US also allows the parties most responsible for resolving the situation to avoid the necessary personal accountability for making and implementing difficult decisions. As a result, resolution of the underlying issue becomes far more difficult and contentious than necessary.

At the same time, one can infer the critics' implicit suggestions for what the US and other parties should have done differently. This author believes that responsible, constructive criticism should include some sort of suggestion of an alternative course of action. Suggestions permit government officials the opportunity to change or modify policies in response to the views of the critics. When this author first discovered this topic in US opinion journals, he did not notice many significant alternative suggestions beyond US military intervention to "do something" to "stop the killing." This conclusion and the *Time* interview with Secretary of State Colin Powell, led to the research question.

3. Collection and Classification of Source Materials. This includes a determination of the facts through the application of various forms of criticism. The author began with the initial articles in such publications as *The Atlantic Monthly* and *The New Yorker* and the well-known books on the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The search expanded to all material on Rwanda in the CARL at the CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, including materials referenced in indices and bibliographies.

The fact that the 1994 Rwanda genocide has been the subject of in-depth historical research meant that the essential facts could be determined by a critical review of the various publications, including responses, such as “Letters to the Editor.” In the four years since then-President Clinton’s visit to Rwanda, these sources have thoroughly documented the facts of the genocide and frequently cross-reference each other. This ensured consistency in interpretation of results.

The rationale governing the selection process was to review all commentaries whatsoever on the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which may include implicit or explicit suggestions for an alternative course of action for the US and the rest of the international community. The only category of potential sources that universally lacked suggestions was specific news articles that reported the facts as they occurred. Publications not in the CARL and not indexed or referenced in the sources reviewed were excluded from consideration. As the specific objective of this exercise was suggestions for an alternative course of action, this author noted all instances in which the commentators made such suggestions. The number of suggestions was small. Suggestions were classified by the actual idea or proposal in the suggestion.

4. Organization of the Facts into Results. The specific objective was to identify specific suggestions for an alternative course of action for the US and the rest of the international community regarding the 1994 Rwanda genocide. This author noticed two characteristics among the suggestions. Commentators with more experience in Africa and those who conducted in-depth research into the genocide were more likely to propose or allude to a suggested course of action that may not be fully consistent with the organization’s core political beliefs, such as opposition to war. On the other hand,

commentators with less experience in Africa were more likely to suggest a more generalized form of US and other international intervention to stop the killing.

5. Formation of Conclusions. The process of forming conclusions was based on a thorough review of all apparent suggestions for alternative courses of action. Those were separated into two groups. The first group represented general suggestions to stop the killing, without indicating that any specific, effective actions to do so would be acceptable. The implied constraints and unwillingness to accept risk made accomplishment of the mission impossible.

The second group included specific suggestions regarding how to stop the killing, which indicated acceptance of risk and of the possibility of imperfect results, including casualties. These suggestions are more useful to a planner because they identify potential courses of action that have at least some potential to be feasible, acceptable and suitable for the US and the international community.

The determination of the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of a course of action is known as the FAS Test. This test represents an application of judgment to determine whether it is realistically possible for the US or the international community to follow a proposed course of action. Simply stated, if a proposal has no chance of passing the FAS Test, then it is not realistic; further consideration is not warranted.

6. Synthesis and Presentation in an Organized Form. What remains after the analysis above is a list of suggestions, each one of which appears to be at least minimally feasible, acceptable and suitable for the US and the international community in responding to a situation similar to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

The final step is to synthesize these results to provide options for Secretary Powell for a more thorough response to *Time*. The tools used are this author's analysis, his overall experience as a foreign service officer and the habits, methods, and insights garnered from the Command and General Staff Officers Course at the CGSC. The results provide an answer to the research question.

This author acknowledges the guidance of Dr. Bruce W. Menning in developing the research methodology in this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the results of the research method as applied to the materials surveyed in the literature review that suggest how the US could respond to a similar situation in the future. Works consulted for general background are not discussed in this chapter. Application of the method facilitates answering the research question.

In her September 2001 article in *The Atlantic Monthly*, and in her March 2002 book, *“A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of Genocide*, Samantha Power makes several suggestions for a US policy response, which are applicable to a future situation. The first is for the president to have “deployed U.S. troops to Rwanda,” either unilaterally or under UN auspices (Power 2001, 103). HRW reports that President Clinton did make an “unusual direct radio appeal to Rwanda on April 30; it was one minute in length and spoke only in vague terms about the need for Rwandan leaders ‘to recognize their common bonds of humanity’” (1994, 11). However, this direct presidential involvement was not further publicized, for example, outside Rwanda.

Power suggests that a US president exercising strong leadership could have convinced the American public both that US military intervention was justified and that the risk to US troops was “relatively low.” However, Power also acknowledges that even this high level of presidential leadership might not have overcome substantial congressional opposition to sending US troops to Africa.

Power therefore suggests several options short of direct US military intervention. The first is direct diplomatic engagement at a higher level of government than that of deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, the principal US official in direct

contact with the Rwandan government while it was committing the genocide. This option means a conscious use of both the diplomatic and the informational instruments of national power. (One event-specific suggestion of Power is prompt use of the word “genocide” immediately upon concluding that the events in question are indeed genocide.) Such a strategy would include public denunciations of the slaughter by the president and other US officials and diplomatic activity to elicit similar statements from foreign governments and international organizations. (Another event-specific suggestion of Power is expulsion of the genocidal Rwandan regime from its seat on the UN Security Council.) Public diplomacy, including the Voice of America, is most effective at increasing international awareness of US diplomatic positions when the president and the secretary of state personally articulate them.

Power also suggests that the Pentagon could have halted the hate radio broadcasts that are widely believed to have accelerated the genocide, though she acknowledges the claims of Pentagon sources that such an action would have had little effect on the ground. Working-level Pentagon officials observed that, while the broadcasts may have facilitated the genocide, the Hutu extremists were nonetheless motivated to continue the killings even without them (Power 2001, 107).

Even if the US were unwilling to send its own troops to Rwanda, Power suggests that the US could have used its diplomatic leverage to strengthen an existing peacekeeping force (in 1994, UNAMIR). International efforts to strengthen UN peacekeeping, including both the US-backed ACRI and the implementation of reforms advocated by the *Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform*, have changed the overall

context of UN and regional peacekeeping since 1994, thus making the first suggestion somewhat event-specific.

Even if the US were not inclined to send its own troops, Power suggests that the US could have “led the world” by strongly pressuring *other* nations to contribute military personnel to Rwanda, supported by US airlift and logistical support. This is naïve in the extreme. As the current coalition against terrorism shows, other nations measure US commitment to a course of military action by the willingness of US political leaders to take serious domestic political risks, including placing US troops in danger. US diplomatic encouragement or pressure would simply not be considered “strong” without it. Furthermore, such encouragement would have to take into account other US interests at the time.

While some of Power’s suggestions appear viable, they assume that the US would be willing to “lead the world” to respond to an issue about which the American people were simply indifferent. Solutions to this element of the problem do not lie with the US government alone but will be discussed in chapter 5 in the context of formulating an overall course of action in response to such a situation in the future.

Philip Gourevitch, in his book, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*, focuses most attention on an accurate historical record, both of the genocide and the aftermath. As a result, he makes no direct suggestions for a US response to a similar situation in the future. However, some of his observations are relevant. Gourevitch states that dependence on the international community for physical protection means having no defense (1998, 351). Other relevant comments are international community acquiescence in the face of a firm decision by a

national government in the region (1998, 292-3) and the high level of professionalism and discipline of the RPA (1998, 219). These observations may be relevant in formulating a US policy response to a similar situation in the future.

HRW, in its comprehensive history of the Genocide, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, written by Alison des Forges, focuses on creating a complete historical record of events before, during, and after the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Thus, it makes no explicit suggestions applicable to a future situation, except for those that may be inferred from the historical record thus compiled. The report does note that Rwandans were sensitive to international opinion and that strong public statements did hinder the pace of the genocide (HRW 1999, 26-7). HRW also included in the historical record the fact that military action of the RPF did halt the genocide, though with considerable additional consequences (1999, 697). Finally, quoting an anonymous US policymaker, HRW acknowledges policy options for the US after the genocide, when the RPF-led interim government had halted the genocide and expelled its perpetrators to Zaire:

We have three choices. Support the former genocidal government. That is impossible. Support the RPF. That is possible. Support neither. That is unacceptable because it might result in those responsible for the genocide coming back to win. (1999, 731-2)

Thus, HRW is an example of a human rights NGO acknowledging the successful RPA military action that halted the genocide.

Gerard Prunier, a journalist and Africa scholar, wrote *The Rwanda Crisis* as another complete historical record on the events leading up to the genocide, starting with the very beginning of the colonial period at the end of the nineteenth century. Although

he does not explicitly suggest any course of action in a similar future situation, certain of his observations are relevant. Prunier notes RPF opposition to additional peacekeeping troops for UNAMIR I because “they had given the population a false feeling of security” (1995, 276). He also noted that the limited authority of a Chapter VI UN peacekeeping mission did not allow the peacekeepers to protect civilians (1995, 275).

Writing from France, Prunier adds a perspective not found in the other sources consulted: the fact that the French government, at least, could be compelled to act in a genocidal situation without a clear national interest. The 13 June 1994 statement by South African President Nelson Mandela to the OAU in Tunis, Tunisia, represented an Anglophone threat to French interests in a Francophone country, Rwanda (Prunier 1995, 281). In July 1994, rather than cede Rwanda from the Francophone “sphere of influence,” the French decided to launch Operation Turquoise, a peacekeeping mission in the southwestern part of the country. However, most of the killings had already taken place by then. Furthermore, the force was not sufficiently large to protect all threatened civilians in its territory (Heidenrich 2001, 174-5).

John G. Heidenrich presents many specific suggestions in his 2001 book, *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars and the Concerned Citizen*. His suggestions include the four elements of national power (the DIME) based on numerous examples in the last decade and before.

Heidenrich recognizes that an early warning of a potential genocidal situation offers the best hope of dissuading the planners from further consideration of genocide. According to Heidenrich, quiet diplomacy is only effective at a very early stage of the planning process. At that point, the potential perpetrators may possibly be convinced that

the cost, in public legitimacy or whatever other aspect of power seems most significant to them, will far exceed any benefits that may accrue to their movement through genocide. Quiet diplomacy is thus an essential diplomatic activity of states both large and small and a routine activity of a diplomatic mission. When most effective, its success is never noticed. Diplomatic readiness and proper management of intelligence resources should ensure that useful, relevant information is promptly and accurately reported so that diplomatic follow-up is most effective. As many recent crises show, it is also essential that accurate intelligence be believed even if the news itself is unwelcome.

The second stage of diplomatic activity identified by Heidenrich is the verbal maneuver, a more public assurance by a government friendly to the potentially genocidal regime that the latter's survival is not threatened because the friendly government will protect it. Again, the objective here is to convince the potentially genocidal regime that the benefits of maintaining the status quo (by *not* considering genocide) still exceed the costs of the other course of action, genocide, under consideration. A more direct threat is the "friendly" warning (quotation in original), also from a friendly government, that further consideration of genocide must be halted, "or else." As in many other elements of diplomacy, the threat here must be made credible to be effective in convincing the other party to abandon the idea.

The next stage of diplomatic engagement is the unfriendly warning, from any government, which is intended to show the potentially genocidal regime of the genuine seriousness of diplomatic efforts to convince it to cease and desist. Although in most circumstances this communication, like other diplomatic communications, would be kept

confidential, maintaining a record of it ensures that future historians will know that the country issuing the unfriendly warning used all possible means to avert a tragedy.

Additional unfriendly tactics involve the domestic or exiled opposition to the potentially genocidal regime. This can include symbolic support, such as speeches or official statements, to the opposition, or even open material support to them. The possibility of unintended consequences must be considered, however, for support to the opposition may only encourage extremists in the potentially genocidal regime to persist in planning a genocide as the only certain way to respond to perceived threats.

The final diplomatic action, saved for the most extreme circumstances, is breaking diplomatic relations with the potentially genocidal regime. This is a public action with wide-ranging effects on all of a nation's interests in the country concerned. It may only be done once and must have the consent of the other party to be reversed. While it clearly and publicly expresses a nation's abhorrence of the policies of the genocidal regime, it also limits that nation's influence on subsequent events in the country. While the US did close its embassy in Kigali, the Rwandan capital, on 10 April, the closure was for administrative and security reasons only; diplomatic relations remained in place. The US did not break diplomatic relations with the genocidal regime until 15 July, when the RPF was assured of victory (Klinghoffer 1998, 93).

Breaking diplomatic relations means closing embassies in each other's capitals; both countries may consent to allow another country to function as a protecting power and operate the former embassies as an interests section of the embassy of the protecting power. In any event, however, closing an embassy limits assistance to nationals of that country in the other country and deprives the national government of diplomatic and

other sources of information, such as intelligence, on events in that country. Because this may have unintended consequences in the long term, it is very rare.

People of the country whose government is considering genocide may use domestic publicity within their country to encourage their government to change its policies. This is not known to have happened in Rwanda; the only example Heidenrich cites is the Nazi extermination of Germans with disabilities, such as mental retardation. International publicity, however, can be very effective, especially if the target government and its allies are sensitive to international public opinion. International publicity, especially through television, can also motivate Western publics to pressure their own governments to act in some way against the potentially genocidal regime. This has become known as the CNN effect. Unfortunately, this leads to a situation in which a Western government seeks to respond only to the images on television as a domestic political problem and not to the overall international situation that made them newsworthy.

Heidenrich then turns to the economic instrument of national power to describe economic pressure on a potentially genocidal regime. In some cases, such as apartheid South Africa, whose government was elected, albeit exclusively by whites, trade and other sanctions were effective in bringing about nonracial democracy. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, however, are less susceptible to economic pressure, because those who suffer, the common people, have no voice in determining government policy.

Heidenrich summarizes the challenges of trade sanctions in the following paragraph:

Too often trade sanctions masquerade as a policy where there is no policy, because there is no strategy. They can make a genocide less convenient to continue, but they cannot stop it. Are trade sanctions, therefore, the wrong

approach? More than three decades of U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba did not topple its regime. Two decades of Western trade with post-Maoist China helped to transform its regime from one utterly totalitarian to one, arguably, only authoritarian. Moreover, as a response to genocide, are trade sanctions morally enough? The principles of free trade are no excuse for moral indifference, but to expect that trade sanctions alone, implemented as one's only tangible response, can somehow stop a genocide and thereby satisfy one's moral responsibilities accordingly may well be a mere delusion. (2001, 103)

Furthermore, while trade sanctions, such as an arms embargo, may have some use to support the diplomatic and informational instruments of national power, as a practical matter, administration and enforcement are complicated matters; if the sanctions themselves are intended to influence change, those matters must be considered.

Nonviolent resistance is attractive to pacifists who believe that nonviolence is the only ethical response to violence, including genocide. However, Heidenrich quotes Mohandas Gandhi of India as considering that a war against Nazi Germany, which was persecuting German Jews in a manner not seen before in history, as "completely justified" (2001, 105). However, even Heidenrich saw no nonviolent solution in Rwanda (2001, 109-10)

Heidenrich devotes an entire chapter to the theme of covert action against genocide. He presents many ideas, some of which may have unintended consequences. They include secretly arming the imperiled, as was proposed for the Bosnian Muslims, physical sabotage of the instruments of genocide, and assassination of the leaders of the genocidal regime. Secret nonlethal material support provided during the Second World War included forged documents and small items that were scarce and, therefore, could be used as bribes. Psychological operations are intended to counter the propaganda of the genocidal regime. In Rwanda, hate radio inflamed popular passions against the Tutsi and

even coordinated the killings. However, Heidenrich notes that the other idea, rescue of the persecuted, is extremely difficult to encourage by psychological operations alone (2001, 121). Nevertheless, in Rwanda, Heidenrich reports many individual Hutus did act to save their Tutsi neighbors (2001, 118). All of these covert actions against genocide require individual dedication and material support.

Heidenrich introduces ethical principles of humanitarian intervention to discuss the unprecedented 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign against Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic to halt “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo Province, Operation Allied Force, without a mandate from the UN. He quotes UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his address to the UN General Assembly a few months later:

To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask, not in the context of Kosovo, but in the context of Rwanda: *If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?* (2001, 132)

Although the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states has been a central element of international relations for centuries, Heidenrich notes that the international community now authorizes humanitarian intervention as an exception, in order to protect people from gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. The principle is best described by U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a prominent critic of the UN, who addressed the UN Security Council in January 2000:

The sovereignty of nations must be respected, but nations derive their sovereignty--their legitimacy--from the consent of the governed. Thus it follows that nations lose their legitimacy when they rule without the consent of the

governed. They deservedly discard their sovereignty by brutally oppressing their people. . . . And when the oppressed peoples of the world cry out for help, the free peoples of the world have a fundamental right to respond.

And it's a fanciful notion that free peoples need to seek approval of an international body, some of whose members are totalitarian dictatorships, to lend support to nations struggling to break the chains of tyranny and claim their inalienable God-given rights. The United Nations, my friends, has no power to grant or decline legitimacy to such actions. They are inherently legitimate. (2001, 138)

Some commentators in Heidenrich's *How to Prevent Genocide* specifically mentioned the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Heidenrich quotes Ernest Lefever, a neoconservative writer on ethics and world politics, who suggested an intervention in Rwanda in general terms:

This holocaust should have been stopped by any agency that had the capacity to – always preferably in cooperation with an agency representing the actual or potential victims. Where was the UN Security Council, the USA, Belgium, or the International Red Cross? In any event, Washington could have provided logistical and humanitarian assistance before matters got wholly out of hand. (2001, 140)

Heidenrich quotes other conservatives, such as Joshua Muravchik, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, expressed support of intervention in Rwanda. “In specific, we ought to have intervened in Rwanda--a case of indisputable genocide--because the humanitarian issues were so unusually grievous” (Heidenrich 2001, 141). Heidenrich also quotes similar support from former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

At least in Bosnia we did something--maybe too late--but in Rwanda hundreds of thousands were killed. [Rwanda] is not a country of strategic importance for the United States; you cannot define a national interest that would take us there. And yet, there, I tend to think I personally would have supported an intervention.

It would have been a violation of what ordinarily is my principle. Ordinarily I feel you should not risk American lives for objectives where you cannot explain to the mothers [of U.S. military personnel killed during the operation] why you did it. . . . [Yet] my instinct tells me we should have done it in Rwanda.

But then there are lots of killings--we cannot intervene against every unjust killing somewhere in the world. We cannot right every injustice in the

world. But we should have a sense when something gets beyond a certain point that we ought to do something. (2001, 142)

While the conservative commentators Heidenrich quotes do support, after the fact, humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, they do not provide specific suggestions beyond what has already been quoted above.

Heidenrich next considers peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions as tools to help prevent genocide. The difference between peacekeeping, a UN Chapter VI mission, and peace enforcement, a UN Chapter VII mission, is that peacekeeping requires the consent of all parties; peace enforcement does not. UNAMIR was a peacekeeping mission, with rules of engagement requiring neutrality between all parties. This was one factor that limited UNAMIR's response when the genocide began.

Heidenrich discusses two tools available to peacekeepers: safe havens and psychological operations. The rump UNAMIR force successfully established safe havens at various large facilities in the city of Kigali, which protected large numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu throughout the genocide. The safe havens would not withstand an attack by the Hutu extremists; their protection came from the Hutu extremists' unwillingness to engage UN peacekeepers in combat. As stated earlier, psychological operations could have countered the messages of hate radio, which goaded the Hutu populace into supporting the genocide. In any event, both tools would be utilized only after a decision has been made to intervene.

How to Prevent Genocide continues with a discussion of the limits of multinational forces. These include UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and multinational alliances and coalitions. The issues of command and control as well as

interoperability present challenges that should not exist in a single-nation force. At minimum, multinational forces require additional time to organize and deploy; political guidance for military operations may be unclear. That said, it is prudent to assume that the US prefers the international legitimacy that flows from multinational participation.

Heidenrich concludes *How to Prevent Genocide* with the idea of a standing UN force, which could intervene quickly in a crisis situation. Unlike ad hoc multinational forces, this standing UN force would train together and have common equipment and supplies, supported by an extensive logistics system also under UN control. This would allow the UN to avoid the disadvantages it has experienced with multinational forces.

Former US President Ronald Reagan endorsed this idea in one of his last public speeches, at Oxford University in 1992:

It is not only the Balkans that can be saved from perpetual conflict; so can other regions torn by ethnic or political violence. An African recipient of the Nobel Prize has asked: *Why does the world ignore ethnic cleansing in Africa?* And he is right--African genocide is no less a crime against humanity than mass murder in the heart of Europe.

.....
That is only the beginning of what must be done. We must work toward a standing UN force--an army of conscience--that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force if necessary. (Heidenrich 2001, 214)

Although it is commonly assumed that conservatives do not support the UN, Heidenrich has shown that both liberals and conservatives do support the concept of humanitarian intervention. While many of these ideas are useful subjects of discussion for the international community in the longer term, they do not provide an immediate answer to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

In researching *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, Alan J. Kuperman began with the premise that only a lack of political will prevented the West from intervening

militarily to stop the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Because Western governments closed their embassies and evacuated their nationals from Rwanda shortly after the genocide began, diplomatic and other sources of information on conditions in the country were shut off at a time when policymakers most needed them. The international media also fled Rwanda, leaving the Rwandan Tutsi to their fate. These facts delayed the reporting of the extent of the genocide to the West, which, according to Kuperman, could not have realized that the violence constituted genocide until 21 April, 1994, fifteen days after the killings began on 6 April.

Kuperman presents a detailed analysis of the airlift requirements, based on several actual US military deployments. He concludes that, even if then-President Clinton had issued an order for an immediate military intervention on 21 April, 1994, US troops would not have been able to begin stopping the genocide until 11 May (2001, 67).

Kuperman acknowledges the claims of what he terms “optimists,” such as HRW, that the genocidal regime would have halted the killing upon announcement of the US mission, or arrival of the first US troops. However, he notes that the Hutu extremists were already guilty of genocide; without an amnesty, they had no incentive to stop.

Kuperman does not agree with the claim of UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire that, with 5,000 troops, he could have prevented the genocide. Kuperman has four objections to this view. First, the actual time required to deploy the 5,000-man international force would have taken longer (Kuperman 2001, 84). Second, the launch date of 10 April 1994 was not realistic given the lack of Western acceptance that a genocide was in progress at that time. Third, Kuperman disagrees with Dallaire that the genocide was confined to Kigali for the first two weeks (2001, 85). Fourth, Kuperman

considers that 5,000 troops would have been insufficient to stop the genocide, but “would have offered only a hope rather than any strong assurance of success” (2001, 87). This author acknowledges the results of Kuperman’s research. However, for purposes of answering Secretary Powell’s question and assuming the minimum force required, this thesis also accepts the conclusions of Dallaire and the panel of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict that Dallaire could have stopped the genocide with 5,000 troops, as claimed. It is this author’s view that this assumption does not adversely affect the validity of the conclusions, because the answer to the research question is not directly tied to the force level on the ground.

Kuperman concludes with lessons learned from his research, which he applies to a potential future situation. First, Kuperman endorses wise diplomacy that prevents genocide from happening in the first place. This includes supporting realistic peace agreements which both parties can and will implement, rather than merely pressuring them to sign a flawed agreement imposed from the outside. Second, once a peace agreement has been signed, the international community must deploy a robust peace enforcement mission preventively. Third, responsible diplomats must maintain open minds regarding the future actions of the parties.

Kuperman continues with a fourth principle, that, “if the West is unwilling to deploy robust forces preventively, it must temper its use of coercive diplomacy against ethnically stratified states intended to compel rulers to surrender power overnight, so as not to inadvertently trigger massive violence” (2001, 111). He cites numerous examples of unrealistic diplomatic solutions to conflict, including Kosovo and East Timor, which actually provoked violence. Kuperman also notes the reluctance of human rights groups

to endorse the idea of offering incentives to such rulers to give up power, such as “‘golden parachutes’--monetary rewards, asylum, and immunity from subsequent prosecution--to entrenched authorities who consent to leave power peacefully” (2001, 111). This author attributes this reluctance to an extreme ideal of political correctness and the desire of human rights NGOs to maintain their ideological purity against criticism from similar organizations. One example of this trend is the criticism of the Lome Accord of July 1999, which sought to end the conflict in Sierra Leone by offering the rebels positions in the government, including the powerful post of minister of mines. While maintaining this purity by criticizing an imperfect agreement may comfort NGOs, this attitude does not help to resolve the situation on the ground.

Kuperman continues by suggesting that the Pentagon develop flexible contingency plans for lighter intervention options in known trouble spots and that the processes of sharing intelligence information within the US government be improved. He also notes the failure of the international news media to report the genocide on a timely and accurate basis and the subsequent tendency of the media to exaggerate such reports in later crisis situations, leading policymakers to question their accuracy (2001, 112). For this reason, it is essential that the US government ensure that its own intelligence and other information are both timely and more accurate than the media. This is difficult in practice, however, as policymakers frequently set their own agendas based upon what the media are reporting.

Kuperman also anticipates the effect of US Army transformation, which includes a more rapidly deployable, lighter force, and suggests forward deployment of US troops at bases in Africa (2001, 114). He notes US support of ACRI, but also describes several

shortcomings. These include the exclusion of lethal-force training, a focus on training smaller units, and the lack of heavy equipment pre-positioned in Africa. Thus, ACRI is still a work in progress. Kuperman draws the same conclusion from the *Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform*. It is a step in the right direction, but is still subject to limitations on its effectiveness.

Kuperman identifies the inherent contradiction in US foreign policy, which also affect the foreign policies of many other members of the international community. This includes the desire not to ignore a genocide, that is, by “doing something,” coupled with the reluctance to commit ground forces, that is, “not to do anything.” Samantha Power herself cites the tension from these two mutually contradictory political ideals as resulting in “agony as our specialty” (2002, 385). In the final analysis, this becomes an issue of political leadership: that the US must take care to limit expectations of what it can accomplish to what it is actually willing to accomplish.

Kuperman concludes with a discussion of the “moral hazard” of ill-considered peacekeeping interventions: that the willingness of the international community to intervene to prevent bloodshed merely emboldens other parties in other countries to initiate military operations prematurely, in hopes that the international community will also intervene with humanitarian assistance, at least, thus allowing them to prolong the conflict. This issue is also considered by Edward Luttwak in, “Give War a Chance,” discussed below.

Arthur Jay Klinghoffer provides a useful historical analysis of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide in his book, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. The specific suggestion he offers for a similar situation in the future is “humanitarian realism,” an

idealism that takes into account the interests of states. Klinghoffer's principal concern is the establishment of a theoretical basis for "humanitarian realism," rather than specific, practical suggestions for a US response to a future situation.

The July 2000 report from the OAU, *International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP) to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events: Special Report*, provides an African perspective on the regional and international response to the genocide. The report notes that the Hutu-Tutsi tensions increased with the 1990 RPF invasion and that flaws in the 1993 Arusha accord set the stage for the genocide.

The OAU report notes the effectiveness of public and international condemnation prior to the genocide in discouraging human rights violations. "On the few occasions when the world did protest against the human rights violations being perpetrated, the abuses largely halted, if temporarily" (2000, sec. 10.2). The converse was also perceived by the Hutu extremists, accurately, as true: if the world ignored the atrocities, then they could continue to violate human rights with impunity. The relative silence of the world as the genocide began encouraged its acceleration.

The OAU report also praises the RPF for its military victory which halted the genocide, noting approvingly that, "a military truce—the single consistent initiative pursued by the international community—was never reached" (2000, 10.6). The report endorses the Dallaire proposal of a "serious international military force to deter the killers" (OAU 2000, 10.7) and observes that the international community could—and did—act quickly in the NEO when its own nationals were threatened. The OAU report

concludes that it was a failure of will on the part of the UN and the international community that abandoned the Rwandan Tutsi to their fate (2000, 10.16).

Linda R. Melvern provides a useful historical analysis, focused on the UN, in her book, *A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*. However, this book also lacks specific suggestions for a US response to a similar situation in the future.

The next author, Alain Destexhe, in *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*, also presents a historical analysis, but includes a few specific suggestions. These include his observation that increased international access to Rwanda after the genocide, when the RPF had taken power, resulted in complaints by international human rights NGOs of individual situations as violations of human rights. This contrasted markedly by their relative silence during the genocide itself and reduced the NGOs' credibility with the RPF as a result. Destexhe suggests that, "a discerning commentator would not confuse a systematic policy with an isolated event" (1995, 69).

Destexhe also considers the public response to a genocide, suggesting a "new militancy" on the part of human rights organizations. He thus proposes an idea to recognize the fact that NGOs have become part of the international governmental system:

Rather than calling on the UN to deploy human rights observers in Rwanda or in other countries, why do human rights organizations not do the job themselves? Rather than wait for some hypothetical international justice to arrive, why do they not carry out "trial by media" of these war criminals? (1995, 73)

Because many if not most NGOs have private sources of funding, they have more freedom to act in many situations. By asking the NGOs to participate actively in the solution to a crisis, Destexhe is offering them the opportunity to enhance their own credibility as legitimate, serious organizations.

J. K. Pomeray, in *Rwanda*, part of the Major World Nations series, and Charles Freeman, in *Crisis in Rwanda*, describe the origins and events of the crisis in simple, nonscholarly terms. Neither makes any specific suggestions as to a course of action for the international community in a similar situation in the future.

The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996 provides a historical record but lacks specific suggestions for a U.S. response to a similar situation in the future. The *Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform* provides recommendations to improve UN peacekeeping. While its acceptance by the UN is assumed in this analysis, because it focuses on the UN, its recommendations are not directly applicable to the US and its own response to a future situation.

In “Give War a Chance,” published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1999, Edward Luttwak argues that the US, the UN and other members of the international community should not intervene in “small wars,” because external intervention inevitably prolongs the conflict, increasing the total amount of human suffering. According to Luttwak, “The defining characteristic of these [international] entities is that they insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat” (1999, 38). He therefore suggests that effective intervention either helps the winner to achieve decisive victory or convinces the loser to sue for peace. As long as the objective of external intervention is to prevent war rather than to facilitate a lasting political settlement of the conflict, intervention merely shields the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make peace. Luttwak specifically cites the internationally supported refugee camps near Goma, Zaire, as destabilizing the region rather than contributing to a lasting peace.

Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, by Scott R. Feil, a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, validates Canadian Lieutenant-General Romeo A. Dallaire's hypothesis that, with 5,000 troops, he could have halted the genocide soon after it began. Although this thesis accepts that conclusion, its focus is not on the level of military operations, but at the strategic and national level where the US response to a similar situation in the future would be decided.

Steven Metz, in *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda*, published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, makes several suggestions for future US Army humanitarian operations in Africa. According to Metz, in humanitarian operations, the US military should support another organization that takes the lead, focusing on combat support and combat service support functions in which the US military has useful capabilities. Mission creep must be avoided in favor of a clear exit strategy so that the US military may continue to fulfill its other worldwide commitments. Metz also notes that an international intervention or cease-fire halting the 1994 Rwanda genocide before the RPF victory would have left "a [festering] stockpile of hate . . . only to explode again in the near future" (1994, 11).

Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, codirectors of African Rights, a London-based human rights NGO, published an article, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," in the April 1995 issue of *Current History*. They cite several opportunities missed by the international community in responding to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

First, de Waal and Omaar describe the exercise of moral leadership. This includes, "public condemnation of those responsible for the genocide, by name;

expulsion of Rwandese [*sic*] ambassadors (above all from the UN, where Rwanda's ambassador continued to sit on the Security Council throughout the crisis), and the threat of indictment for crimes against humanity" (1995, 158). De Waal and Omaar disagree with one NGO staff member whom they quote as saying, "there is no point in expressing moral outrage without being able to take practical action" (1995, 158). They take the position that moral condemnation is the first and most important step in responding to such an outrage:

This point of view [of the NGO staff member] is contrary to the basic principle of human rights work, namely that condemning violations is imperative, irrespective of whether concrete action can be taken. Moral outrage is expressed partly to express solidarity with those who are suffering abuses, and to ostracize those who are committing them. Moral condemnation is a practical action that can have practical effects.

The most important international action to stem the bloodshed in Rwanda and give courage to those resisting the killing was repeated public expressions of solidarity and moral outrage. This would have helped isolate and discourage the killers, and encourage those opposed to them. Ordinary Rwandese [*sic*] are more bitter about the lack of this outrage than any other of the many failings of the international community. (1995, 158)

De Waal and Omaar also criticize the international community for not announcing economic sanctions. They acknowledge that they would have taken too long to have any effect in the short term, but argue that they at least should have been raised (1995, 158).

The authors are among the few who note that the RPF was actively engaged in stopping the genocide from the moment it started:

The preoccupation with an international response to the genocide in Rwanda also overlooked one fact: a Rwandese [*sic*] solution to the disaster was at hand, in the form of the military victory of the Rwandese [*sic*] Patriotic Front. (1995, 158)

De Waal and Omaar continue by criticizing the response of the West to the RPF offensive, the only concrete action taken by anyone, other than UNAMIR, to stop the genocide:

Western governments and NGOs did not support the RPF advance. In fact, they repeatedly called on the RPF to observe a cease-fire, without securing any guarantees from the government [of Rwanda] to halt the genocide. Part of the reason for this [cease-fire] was so that UN troops could be dispatched to protect civilians. (1995, 159)

The authors' criticism continues by noting that the operational neutrality of the international human rights community triumphed over their human rights objectivity (in this case, to stop the genocide):

The RPF, however, was actively engaged in rescuing people at risk of massacre and committed to following this rescue through to the end, while the record of UN peacekeepers in carrying out their mandate is increasingly seen as poor. Knowing that the UN had no proven capacity to stop the genocide, for the West and the NGOs to advocate UN intervention was an abdication of responsibility. (1995, 159)

De Waal and Omaar conclude by hypothesizing the results had the UN intervened successfully as intended:

Consider the most likely scenario if there had actually been an internationally supervised cease-fire and the dispatch of 5,000 UN troops to Rwanda at the end of April. The battle lines would have been frozen, with the RPF in control of less than half the country, and the government and Interahamwe controlling the remainder. It is probable that killing, albeit on a reduced scale, would have remained endemic. (1995, 159)

Although approaching the 1994 Rwanda genocide from a perspective opposite that of Edward Luttwak, de Waal and Omaar conclude by advocating a similar solution: that the international community should not intervene if the parties themselves are approaching a just and lasting solution to the conflict, namely, military defeat of the genocidal regime.

From the liberal perspective of the Brookings Institution, Michael O’Hanlon makes a similar suggestion in, “How to stop genocide: Saving Lives with Force,” published in *The New Republic*:

Almost any intervention would have been better than standing aside. The international community should have quickly sent at least 10,000 forces to defeat the genocidal Hutu militias that targeted Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Whether those forces then stayed on for years to help the country rebuild . . . would in this urgent case have been a secondary concern. (1999, 23)

Although O’Hanlon also suggested partitioning Rwanda, he failed to note that in Rwanda, unlike Bosnia, the two communities were divided by caste, not ethnicity, and thus lived together all over the country, making partition impossible.

An editorial in *The New Republic*, “Why Not Rwanda?” appeared during the genocide in the issue dated 16 May 1994. It compares the consequences of failing to intervene in Bosnia--rewarding cross-border aggression and destabilizing the international system--to that in Rwanda, where the longer-term effects, known at the time, were restricted to Rwanda itself. In *National Review*, William F. Buckley, Jr., responded to then-President Clinton’s 1998 apology with “Windy Goodfeel,” by acknowledging the practical limitations on any intervention to stop a genocide, starting with the Holocaust:

There is of course always the problem of what to do. You are the plenipotentiary at the Oval Office. You bring in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

“Are you aware of what is going on in Rwanda?”

“Yes, Mr. President”

“Well, do something about it.”

“Yes, sir. What?”

In an ideal world the answer would be: “*You tell me* what. You’re a military technician, I’m not.” To which the forlorn answer by the military technician would be, “Nothing can be done about it.”

By nothing, of course, one means, nothing that would be politically tolerable.

.....
Somehow it is hard to fault Mr. Clinton for making the right humanitarian sounds, when visiting Rwanda. What hurts is the manifest incapacity, in a world of sovereign states and limited resources, actually to reach in and do something about it, having renounced colonialism. . . . In the best of all possible worlds we would have been there 24 hours after the first thousand (hundred thousand) Tutsi were dead. But this isn't the best of all possible worlds, and presidential rhetoric can't make it so. (Buckley 1998, 63)

This concludes analysis of the literature for practical suggestions about a US response to a similar situation in the future.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

If a situation similar to the 1994 Rwanda genocide were to occur in the future, it would be in the US interest first to use existing diplomatic and other means to identify and confirm it. The next step would be to apply preventive diplomacy and the other diplomatic means described by Heidenrich to convince the parties not to consider genocide or other violence. If necessary, a pause in the peace process may allow the parties to increase public support for the process within their own communities. Assuming that diplomatic deterrence has failed, however, the course of action begins at a point similar to 6 April 1994 in Rwanda.

The first step would be to identify and report on the motives behind the violence, to determine if this indeed constitutes genocide. The first priority of a US embassy would be evacuation of US citizens, family members and non-emergency personnel to the US. Once that has been accomplished, it may be appropriate either to retain a small political reporting staff in the embassy during the crisis or to evacuate them to a nearby country to facilitate effective monitoring and political reporting on the crisis. Assuming that the violence is confirmed, through a reasonable application of the genocide convention, to be genocide, then the US and the international community have an obligation to prevent it.

The operative term in Article 1 of the convention is “undertake to prevent” genocide, and to punish it if it has occurred. This does not necessarily require that the US send its own combat troops to the country. Rather, the convention represents a political commitment by the U.S. and other countries to prevent genocide, according to their best

efforts, and to punish it after the fact. Exactly how the parties to the convention are to “undertake to prevent” genocide is not further defined. Punishment of genocide, on the other hand, is defined in detail.

Although independent media are not under the direct control of the US government, it must be recognized that the media are intimately involved in informing the public about events abroad, and in setting the US political agenda. The media have a responsibility to the public to report significant events, even in potentially dangerous situations. The public, including private parties such as human rights NGOs, should remind the media of this and encourage them to report what is happening in the country concerned.

Once the US government has concluded that genocide is, in fact, occurring, the highest levels of the US government should publicly denounce it, repeatedly, and encourage other countries to do the same. Countries with historical experience of genocide, actual or claimed, should also be encouraged to do the same. These include Armenia, Germany, Israel and Turkey. NGOs and other private parties may choose to take action in this regard as well.

The US government should immediately announce an arms embargo on the country concerned. Even though the practical effects might be minimal, a public announcement of an arms embargo sends a strong message to the international community that the situation in the country concerned is serious and worthy of their attention. Failure to announce an arms embargo sends the opposite message. The president has the authority under the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, Chapter 39 of the US Code) to place an arms embargo on any country.

Other types of economic sanctions may be appropriate, but would require Congressional and, therefore, public support. Other countries would have to make their own decisions on economic sanctions.

As was done during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, human rights NGOs should be reminded that the US will not intervene militarily without strong public support. If NGOs cannot convince the American people that preventing genocide is worth risking American lives, then they will have to accept that direct US military intervention will not be possible.

Although it would not be appropriate for US government officials, especially in the executive branch, to suggest how NGOs should communicate with the American people, the NGOs, like all Americans, have First Amendment rights to demonstrate. Many commentators have juxtaposed public statements and events at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., with the facts on the ground in Rwanda at the same time. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) video, *Frontline: The Triumph of Evil*, even features the Holocaust Museum prominently.

The Holocaust Museum keeps alive the memory of the World War II genocide as a crime against humanity. Its symbolism may be useful to private citizens in explaining to the media, and the American people, the relevance of current events, in a little-known, faraway country, to overall US foreign policy interests and longstanding American values. That decision is theirs to make; private citizens and NGOs should not be discouraged from exercising their constitutional rights in this respect. What is clear is that strong public support for deliberate action to prevent genocide provides US officials with additional flexibility.

If all of the above responses fail to dissuade the regime in question from committing genocide, then this author concludes that that regime must be overthrown. The 1948 genocide convention represents a political and legal commitment to prevent and, if necessary, to punish genocide. Accordingly, a regime that has actually committed genocide forfeits its legitimacy. In diplomacy, this is the “Point of No Return” or the “Crossing of the Rubicon.” There can be no further negotiations because the continued existence of the genocidal regime jeopardizes the future stability of the country and the region. In addition, the commitments of the convention limit available diplomatic options, making success in further negotiations extremely unlikely.

At this point, the US should publicly announce its support for the opponents of the genocidal regime. In Rwanda, this was the RPF. Although few active military organizations have a perfect human rights record, the greater good of humanity must recognize that the overthrow of a genocidal regime is necessary. Thus, it would not be in the best interests of the international human rights movement for NGOs and other parties to denounce relatively minor human rights violations by the opposition while the opposition is seeking to overthrow the genocidal regime. (The historical record can be completed at a later point in time.)

This is a mission that the president can give to the Pentagon. As the US assisted the Northern Alliance and others to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, so the US can assist the opponents of the genocidal regime in seeking its overthrow. With “mission-type orders,” it is not necessary for the President to specify further details beyond constraints of political acceptability.

William F. Buckley’s oval office conversation might go like this:

President: Are you aware that the Rwandan Government is committing genocide even as we speak?

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Yes, Mr. President.

President: Well, that regime must be overthrown.

Chairman: Yes, Mr. President.

President: Let's help their opponents to overthrow them to stop the genocide, stop the killing. Can you do that?

Chairman: Yes, Mr. President. Do you have any further guidance?

President: Yes. Let's keep the opponents in the lead; it's their country, not ours. They should do the fighting themselves. We want to help them win because it's the right thing to do, while minimizing our own casualties, if any. We should encourage them to respect human rights. We should cooperate with other countries that share our values and want to help. If necessary, we can provide emergency humanitarian assistance afterwards, then bring our servicemembers home. Do you see any problem with this?

Chairman: No, Mr. President.

President: Then let's do it. I will work with the Congress and the public to ensure that the American people are behind you. And I'll work with the Secretary of State to round up international support. It's the right thing to do.

Chairman: Thank you, Mr. President.

Having made its own decision to seek the overthrow of the genocidal regime, the US may also seek UN Security Council authorization. However, if the US does not believe that the UN Security Council will authorize this action, it should not seek the authorization.

Other countries may respond to the US announcements by offering their own assistance to the opposition. Those countries that recognize the new International Criminal Court may ask it to prosecute those responsible for the genocide. It is not necessary for the US to take the lead in all areas. Rather, it is sufficient for the US to announce what actions it will take, allowing other countries to make their own decisions. Direct US involvement should be limited to US actions and unique US capabilities.

Edward Luttwak would approve of such an intervention because its objective is to bring about peace by assisting the opponents in decisively defeating the genocidal

regime. Other commentators across the political spectrum should also support this plan as a practical way to stop the killing.

This course of action, if successful, will require advance planning for post-conflict assistance. The US has unique airlift capabilities that can be utilized, as they were in Rwanda and neighboring Zaire after the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Such an operation may involve significant airlift and other logistical capabilities. However, the logistical impact of post-conflict humanitarian assistance is a second-order effect of the initial decision to prevent genocide by supporting the opposition.

This author accepts the conclusion of the report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict that 5,000 would have been sufficient for the UNAMIR Commander, Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, to halt the killings. However, once the genocide has begun and has been confirmed to be genocide, the best course of action is to seek the overthrow of the genocidal regime. The principal reason for this position is that it is unlikely that the US would send such a relatively small number of troops to begin a peace enforcement mission, as this would involve assumption of an unacceptable amount of risk. Once the US president and the secretary of defense have made the decision to intervene, it is US doctrine that sufficient resources to ensure success be utilized.

The final step is to apply to FAS Test. This course of action is feasible because it is based on US diplomatic readiness and on existing US military capabilities which have been demonstrated most recently in Afghanistan.

Although supporting an imperfect opposition to a genocidal regime might give Americans pause, in the opinion of this author, the organizations supporting US action

against the genocidal regime are the same organizations in the best position to criticize the opposition to that regime. This author believes that most responsible NGOs would recognize the greater good being achieved by overthrow of the genocidal regime. Thus, this course of action is acceptable.

This course of action is suitable if it, in fact, results in the overthrow of the genocidal regime. That would depend on the motivation and capabilities of the opposition and is thus based on the specific situation.

In 1994, if the US had supported the RPF upon concluding that the interim Hutu government of Rwanda was engaged in genocide, the RPF might have achieved victory earlier than it did. This would have prevented at least some of the tragic loss of life. Should such a situation occur in the future, the US should consider this course of action against genocide in favor of the greater good.

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