THE ROLE OF UNION LOGISTICS IN THE CAROLINA CAMPAIGN OF 1865

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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M.A., Georgia College, Milledgeville, GA, 1996

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ABSTRACT


This thesis investigates the role Union logistics played during the American Civil War and examines the effectiveness of logistics support in Sherman’s Carolina Campaign.

Discussion begins with an overview of Union logistic operations in the war focusing on the logistics functions of supply, transportation, and combat health support. Next it proceeds to examine the role of logistics during the campaign by first discussing the impact logistics operations had on General Sherman’s preparations prior to initiating the campaign. It then further discusses logistics operations carried out during the conduct of the campaign in the Carolinas. Finally, it examines logistics operations in the Carolina Campaign in terms of today’s logistics doctrine.

Logistics played a critical role in the success of the campaign. The logisticians in support of Sherman’s Army overcame difficulties at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide effective support. There were significant problems with the support concept, especially in the areas of casualty evacuation and uniform resupply. This thesis investigates these problems as well as the logistics successes that helped make Sherman’s Carolina Campaign the triumphant it is remembered as.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my friends and colleagues at the US Army Command and General Staff College, I owe a dept of gratitude for your time and patience in helping this project come through. In particular, I wish to thank Dr. Jerry Brown, MAJ Curtis King, and my office mate, MAJ Daniel Jones, for their guidance and assistance.

I also wish to thank LTC (Retired) Dave Chuber and his lovely wife, Rhea, who took time out of their busy schedules to assist me in the working drafts. Finally, to my wife, Traci, and my two children, Wade and Karmen, I cannot express enough my deepest love and thanks. Their patience, support, and help enabled me to complete this project. They endured many hours of “Sherman” and have to come realize in our personal travels in the South that “that man was everywhere.”

Finally, I wish to dedicate this work in honor of all the Civil War logisticians who served during the American Civil War. History often fails to recognize these men who operated in the shadows of their famous commanders. Their commitment to professionalism and dedication to the cause they believed in serves as a model for us all.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march, which for peril, labor, and results will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the high hills and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers were all passed in midwinter with its floods and rains in the face of an accumulating enemy, and, after the battles of Averasborough and Bentonville, we once more came out of the wilderness to meet our friends at Goldsborough.¹

Major General William T. Sherman, *The War of the Rebellion*

Major General William T. Sherman’s Carolina Campaign is one of the most successful military operations in the Civil War by the United States Army. The ability to move a formation of over 60,000 men through the heart of the enemy’s country, against difficult odds of terrain and weather, was nothing short of a logistics triumph. Sherman’s movement through the Carolinas required his army to cross nine major rivers and numerous swollen streams, tributaries, and swamps in the rainiest winter in the Carolinas in decades.² After the war, Sherman wrote, “No one ever has and may not agree with me as to the very importance of the march north from Savannah. The march to the sea seems to have captured everybody, whereas it was child’s play compared with the other.”³ The greatest compliment Sherman’s Army received in regards to his campaign would come from his old antagonist, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston who said, “There had been no such army since the days of Julius Caesar.”⁴

Martin Van Creveld, in *Supplying War*, uses Jomini’s definition of logistics: “The practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.”⁵ In the Carolinas, just as he

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had done in Georgia, Sherman demonstrated the feasibility of conducting operations independent from any established supply base or lines of communications. This thesis will show that although logistically Sherman’s Carolina Campaign was generally successful; however, in Jomini’s definition of “keeping them supplied,” problems existed. Accounts exist in campaign after-action reports and individuals’ journals that show shortfalls existed in logistical support during the campaign.

Officers today will find the study of the logistics operations carried out during Sherman’s campaign in the Carolinas very beneficial. Logistics issues that are relevant to the military commander and logistician in the twenty-first century are many of the same Sherman and his staff encountered during the conduct of the campaign. Significant in the success of the campaign was Sherman’s ability to anticipate future requirements and coordinate the support of strategic transportation assets, such as the navy and railroad in order to sustain his army. During the campaign, Sherman’s forces encountered the full spectrum of operations as defined in present day United States Army doctrine. These operations ranged from high-intensity combat, such as the Battle of Bentonville, to military operations other than war in regards to the handling of thousands of displaced civilians and contraband slaves accompanying the army.

This study will examine the planning and execution of logistics in the sustainment of Sherman’s Carolina Campaign, not just from the tactical level but also from the operational and strategic levels as well. Logistical challenges, such as 20,000 displaced civilians and contraband slaves, presented significant problems to Sherman and his subordinate commanders. These noncombatants only compounded the problem of providing for an army of 60,000 maneuvering through regions of the South in economic
ruin. During the campaign, nongovernmental and private organizations, such as the United States Sanitary Commission and various other soldier aid societies, worked beside the military forces in the field to overcome such hardships. Humanitarian camps, much like those seen today in the world, supported the large numbers of displaced civilians and runaway slaves accompanying Sherman’s army.

The Carolina Campaign took place in the final months of the Civil War when the military situation for the Confederacy was extremely bleak. Recent events for the South were not very encouraging. In Virginia, General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was engaged in a desperate effort to prevent the capture of Richmond and the severing of the vital rail line of communication with North Carolina. Lieutenant General John B. Hood’s Army of Tennessee had met with disaster in Middle Tennessee at Nashville at the hands of the Union Major General George H. Thomas. Lastly, General Sherman had only recently presented President Lincoln the captured city of Savannah as a “Christmas gift.” Although the fall of Savannah was a tremendous blow to Southern morale, Sherman’s drive from Atlanta to the coastal city proved to be even more fatal to the Confederacy’s economic war effort. Sherman’s march had cut straight through the Confederate heartland and disrupted the vital logistics resources that Georgia provided to the Southern cause.

To gain an insight as to why Sherman considered such a risky undertaking as the Carolina Campaign, one must first understand his successful march from Atlanta to Savannah. In Georgia, Sherman established priorities regarding logistics and support assets that remained essentially the same throughout both his Savannah and Carolina Campaigns.
Sherman first conceived of the idea of marching towards Savannah while he was in Atlanta. He thought that the concept of marching into the interior of Georgia “to smash things up” and “to make Georgia howl” was an effective course of action.\(^6\) The idea of disrupting Georgia’s war production seemed very promising. Sherman had no intention of permanently garrisoning Atlanta with troops. Early experiences during the war in both Missouri and Tennessee had shown that an army loses its initiative when tied down defending a city. When General Hood decided to move into Tennessee with his Confederate Army, the door was open for Sherman to move to the coast. On November 2, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant wrote to Sherman, “I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then go on as you propose.”\(^7\)

Sherman immediately answered Grant, assuring his commander that the results of such a move through Georgia would produce results that far outweighed the expense, trouble, and risk. With the approval that he was looking for, Sherman began immediately to set in motion preparations for the upcoming campaign with 10 November set as the target date for placing the army in motion. Much was required, however, to assure his army’s ability to make such movement.

To sustain such a large force in the field, Sherman issued Special Field Order Number 120 that established procedures for how the army would organize and operate to sustain itself logistically while on the march. For the upcoming operation, Sherman divided the army into two wings: the right wing, with Major General Oliver O. Howard commanding, was composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps; and the left wing, with Major General Henry W. Slocum commanding, was composed of the
Fourteenth and Twentieth Army Corps. His cavalry, under the command of Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick, operated almost independently, under the loose guidance of Sherman. At the time of the army’s departure from Atlanta, it numbered around 62,000 men, 14,700 horses, 19,400 mules, and about 2,500 wagons.

Sherman’s planning was very detailed in how transportation would be utilized within the army. He did not permit personal baggage or tentage in the trains in order to eliminate excess weight. To ensure compliance, Sherman issued strict orders that prohibited tents and other excessive camp extras. Each corps wagon train consisted of only those wagons necessary for the transport of ammunition and provisions for the troops and animals. Within the wagon trains of the army, a total of twenty days of supply were available for rations, five days of supply for forage (used as a food source for the animals), and additional ammunition in the amount of 200 rounds per man and artillery piece. The state of preparedness was an army capable of moving light without the burdens of extraneous wagon trains.

Sherman’s action of cutting of his line of communication with Atlanta required him to authorize a system of foraging in order to resupply the provisions necessary for his troops and animals. Foraging is an alternative method to feeding the men and animals of an army as a means of supplementing or in some cases totally replacing an army’s standard supply system. Wherever the army maneuvered, the local population and its resources would be at the mercy of the forager. Depending on the size of the force, foraging could very quickly drain the resources of an area. Because of the effect foraging could have on an area, it was important for the force to be continually moving in order to allow for new resources.
Included in Field Order Number 120, Sherman authorized liberal foraging from the country along the army’s line of march. The order specified that each brigade commander organize a foraging party along the route under the command of a commissioned officer for the purpose of gathering food for the men and forage for the animals. The intent for the foragers was to maintain at least ten days’ supply of provisions for the troops and three days’ of forage. Also in the same field order, the cavalry and artillery units of his command were authorized to appropriate freely from the local populace any horses, mules, and wagons deemed necessary for the sustainment of their organizations. Besides cavalry and artillery units, infantry units received authorization as well for foraging parties to acquire or replace those horses, mules, and wagons required of their operations.\textsuperscript{11}

Sherman, in his memoirs, states that the greatest possible attention had been given to the artillery and the wagon trains. The number of guns in the army were reduced to sixty-five and organized generally into batteries of four guns each versus the army standard of six.\textsuperscript{12} By reducing the number of artillery pieces in the army, Sherman also reduced the amount of supplies required. Fewer pieces meant less ammunition and forage to transport in order to sustain the batteries. Sherman would adopt this reorganization of the artillery as his standard and continue its practice throughout the remaining time of the war.

All total, the army had about 2,500 wagons and 600 ambulances. The wagon trains were organized between the four corps, so that each corps commander was responsible for about 800 wagons. On a typical line of march, an individual corps wagon train would stretch for five or more miles.\textsuperscript{13}
To help understand the amount of reduction in wheeled transportation assets that was executed prior to departing Atlanta, a comparison of Sherman’s Savannah Campaign and Major General William Rosecran’s Chickamauga Campaign of 1863 is necessary. Both generals had roughly 65,000 men to support logistically. Rosecran’s used a total of 4,800 wagons and ambulances to his campaign in comparison to Sherman’s 3,100.¹⁴

Last, to ensure only the fittest of men proceeded on the march, Sherman’s medical officers went to extraordinary efforts to purge the army of any noncombatants or men deemed too weak or sick to make the coast. A thorough screening by the medical officers within the army identified those men unfit for the campaign. Sherman felt that he could ill afford to have sick men occupying space in the army’s ambulances. All that he wanted in the ranks of his army was “able-bodied, as far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and vigorous action.”¹⁵

The army began movement on 15 November with the wings moving on divergent lines, designed to threaten both Macon and Augusta, but ultimately, its objective was Savannah.¹⁶ With Atlanta in flames to the army’s rear, the movement of the two wings began on a front that measured close to sixty miles across.

Sherman’s movement to Savannah impacted the Confederacy both logistically and psychologically. As Sherman’s army maneuvered towards the coast, it systematically ripped up rail lines and destroyed important logistics centers critical to the South’s ability to furnish necessary supplies and equipment to its forces in the field, in particular Lee’s army in Virginia. In addition to the impact on logistics was the effect the march had on the Southern people. It was “total war” in the eyes of General Sherman.
He believed that by attacking the inner soul of the rebellion--its people, it would have far-reaching effects in bringing the war to a close more quickly.

Twenty-four days later, Sherman reached the outskirts of Savannah having covered a distance of more than three hundred miles. With Confederate General William Hardee’s evacuation of the city on 20 December, Sherman’s army was able to occupy and present the city to President Lincoln on Christmas.

As far as Sherman was concerned, he had demonstrated that armies did not have to be tied to supply bases. In all actuality, his movement was nothing more than a shift in bases. As Sherman’s wings marched towards the coast, his army was actually moving in the direction of its new supply base, Savannah. This was significantly different from his previous Atlanta Campaign. During the Atlanta Campaign, Sherman relied upon Chattanooga as a base of resupply. Although Sherman took actions to reduce his army’s logistical requirements, he never severed his link with Chattanooga. Throughout the campaign, he was dependent upon a secure line of communication with Chattanooga and thus committed combat resources in an effort to maintain it. This was not the case in his march through Georgia. Sherman organized and prepared his army so that it required no support from Atlanta. In his memoirs Sherman states, “The railroad and telegraph communications with the rear were broken, and the army stood detached from all friends, dependant on its own resources and supplies.”

The ability to accomplish such an undertaking can only occur in the face of an enemy who lacks significant combat power. When Sherman departed Atlanta, he left the only significant threat behind him, Hood’s Army of Tennessee. All that the Confederacy could muster in order to confront Sherman was Lieutenant General William Hardee’s
Corps of about 13,000 men defending the vital blockade port of Savannah and a few thousand of Georgia’s state militia.

Sherman’s success in his march to Savannah influenced his concept of how he expected to conduct his future operations. As Sherman refitted his army in Savannah, he began a dialogue with General Grant as to what should be the next step in how his army can be utilized. He now had in mind another and far more decisive thrust, one that would lead him northward through the Carolinas and a linkup with Grant’s army in Virginia. The feeling from the administration and General Grant was that the most important operation towards closing the rebellion would be the destruction of Lee and his army. Grant’s view was that Sherman’s army would be better utilized if transferred by the navy to the Virginia area of operations to act in concert with the Army of Potomac confronting Lee. In his memoirs, Grant wrote, “I had no idea originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina.”

The season up until January of 1865 had been unseasonably bad and no promise for reprieve. The rain had rendered many roads impassable and could conceivably cause Sherman’s Army much trouble in maneuvering. Besides the weather, Grant believed that the navy could very efficiently move Sherman’s army in a timely manner.

Sherman was disappointed with Grant’s operational plan and asked him to consider the effects of his army on the Confederacy if he was allowed to move his army north through the Carolinas. According to Mark Bradley in his book, Last Stand in the Carolinas, “Sherman realized that by marching his army through the Carolinas he would inevitably cut Lee’s supply lines to the Deep South and induce hundreds--if not thousands--of Lee’s troops from that region to desert.” Sherman’s march through
Georgia had already shown the devastating effect an army could have on an enemy’s transportation and supply networks.

His operations in the Carolinas were to accomplish two key strategic tasks, both of which would have tremendous consequences in regards to General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. First, a march through the Carolinas would completely break the back of the Confederate logistics system and its ability to sustain Lee’s Army in Virginia. Secondly, Sherman’s new concept of “total war” would have an even more devastating psychological effect on the men from the Carolinas serving in the Army of Northern Virginia. Units would dissolve overnight as men deserted in hopes of reaching their families lying in the path of Sherman’s wings.

To accomplish such a mission, he drew upon the success and experience gained during the March to the Sea. He would cut his army’s logistical tail to Savannah in order to allow his forces to sustain itself entirely off the land as it moved. Sherman envisioned a linkup with Union forces somewhere near the key rail junction at Goldsboro, North Carolina. At Goldsboro, Sherman would now be linked to the Union-occupied coast by rail and once again have an established line of communication.

Sherman’s concept of maneuver was one once again based on the theory of deception and movement along multiple routes in order to confuse an adversary as to the ultimate destination of the army. He planned to move initially into South Carolina with one wing feinting towards Augusta, Georgia, and the other feinting in the direction of Charleston, South Carolina. By feinting towards two key southern cities, Sherman would force his opponent General Beauregard to divide his already minimal forces in an effort to protect both. Once within the interior of the state, Sherman intended to turn the columns
towards the capitol, Columbia. Upon departing South Carolina and crossing the line into North Carolina, Sherman’s first objective would be the site of the former federal arsenal, Fayetteville. From there move in the direction of Goldsboro to complete a linkup with Federal forces moving from the coast and ultimately reach Raleigh or Weldon, North Carolina as the final objective of the campaign. From either of these two locations, Sherman would be within a week’s march of uniting with Grant’s forces around the Petersburg trenches.  

General Grant on 27 December, upon reconsidering Sherman’s plan sent the following message to his trusted lieutenant:

Without waiting further directions, then, you may make your preparations to start on your expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now.

Two facts weighed heavy in convincing Grant that Sherman’s concept was the more viable course of action at the time. First, with Thomas’s decisive defeat of Hood at Nashville the Confederate Army of Tennessee no longer wielded the same combat power it once possessed. Second, maritime transportation heavily influenced Grant’s final decision. The time estimated to transfer Sherman’s army from Savannah was unacceptable to Grant due to transportation constraints with ocean going vessels. Sherman was pleased by the good news, and he wrote Grant: “In about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight.” With the go
ahead, Sherman immediately set in motion the preparations necessary for the movement of his army northward.


4“The Surrender of Johnston’s Army and the Closing Scenes of the War in North Carolina,” (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Co., 1888), 256.


10Ibid.

11Sherman, 2:175.

12Ibid., 176.

13Ibid., 176.

14Houston, 236.

15Sherman, 2:171.

16Ibid., 177.

17Ibid., 171.


20 Ibid., 4.

21 Sherman, 2:238.

22 Ibid., 225.
CHAPTER 2

CIVIL WAR LOGISTICS IN THE UNION ARMY

Before a commander can even start thinking of maneuvering or giving battle, of marching this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, en-circling, of annihilating or wearing down, in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has . . . or ought . . . to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those 3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease to be of any use as soldiers; that roads to carry them to the right place at the right time are available, and that movement along these roads will not be impeded by either a shortage or a superabundance of transport.¹

Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War*

United States Army doctrine defines logistics as “the process of planning, executing, and sustaining support for military operations”² It is a process that occurs across the full range of military operations and at all levels of war, strategic, operational, and tactical.³ The Army’s definition of logistics is very much applicable to the support activities conducted during the Civil War. The war presented logisticians difficult challenges ranging across all levels of war from strategic to tactical in regards to supporting the force. During the war, a new era in the industrialization of war fighting occurred which brought about significant developments in the areas of transportation, small arms, and ammunition, each impacting greatly on the conduct of logistics operations. Many of these developments remained the standard in post-Civil War doctrine up to the Spanish American War.

The first level of logistics, strategic, deals with the mobilization, acquisition, requirements determination, force projection, strategic mobility, stockpiling, and concentration of logistics in a theater. In the Civil War, a theater was a certain
geographical region of the United States. Operations conducted west of the Mississippi River were considered part of the Trans-Mississippi Theater of Operations. An example of strategic logistics during the Civil War was the subordinate staff activities of the War Department in regards to supplying the active army as a whole. Additionally, the movement of the entire army command from one theater of operation to another is an example of strategic logistics.

Operational-level logistics encompasses those activities necessary in the sustainment of a force, such as a field army, in a theater as part of a campaign. Operational logistics also includes those activities that bridge support between the strategic and tactical levels of war. The movement of forces within a theater and the buildup of supplies to support upcoming operations are examples of operational logistics.

Tactical logistics supports the commander’s battle and engagements by providing the appropriate support at the right time and place. Logistics activities at this level are those that are commonly performed on the battlefield. Activities, such as recovery of the wounded and ammunition resupply, all have an immediate impact on the situation for the tactical commander.

When war finally came in 1861, the logistics organization of the US Army was woefully deficient in many areas necessary for the sustainment of military operations. The lack of preparedness was not the direct result of neglect on the War Department’s part, but reflected the traditional mood of Congress during times of peace in regards to funding. At the outset, the army consisted of about 16,000 men oriented mostly towards constabulary operations on the expanding frontier. Federal armories existed throughout the United States and were sufficiently stocked with small arms and ammunition in 1861.
However, without a budget allocated to modernizing the weapons, many of the armories had outdated less efficient small arms, such as the smoothbore musket. Because of the Southern locality of many of the Federal arsenals, secession saw many Southern states and local authorities seizing the stocks as an initial supply for outfitting Confederate forces. As the demands of mobilization increased daily, the Army quickly realized a lack of cadre experienced in logistics capable of dealing with the staff requirements. What knowledge any of the staff may have had at all was based on personal experiences from the Mexican War.

To support the tremendous requirements of the expanding Union Army, the War Department established specialized bureaus. Each of these suborganizations of the War Department performed administrative functions in regards to a specific area of support or logistics. Table 1 depicts the various bureaus of the War Department during the Civil War.

Table 1. Subordinate Bureaus of the War Department

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<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Paymaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topographical Engineer</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall responsibility for the procurement and distribution of supplies for the Army fell primarily under the Quartermaster’s Department, the Subsistence Department, the Ordnance Department, and the Medical Department.\(^5\)

The Quartermaster Department was responsible for the procurement of uniforms, shoes, tents, horses, mules, forage, and wagons.\(^6\) As a secondary mission, the Quartermaster Department provided transportation support for the movement of men and materiel. One key subordinate organization of the Quartermaster Department was the Military Railroads Organization. The Union’s ability to harness the capabilities of the nation’s rail network was instrumental in the overall conduct of the war.

The supply of arms and ammunition was the responsibility of the Ordnance Department. The department’s duties included arsenal and armory operations, the storage and furnishing of all ordnance equipment, to include material necessary for the sustainment of horses.\(^7\)

The feeding of troops was the responsibility of the Commissary Department. What began, as a very decentralized operation under the control of individual states, eventually evolved into a system based upon centralized storage and a formalized requisitioning process. The Union commissary structure also expanded itself sufficiently to provide for the feeding of freed slaves whom the military grouped into temporary holding camps, located predominantly along the coastal regions of the southeast.\(^8\)

The last bureau in regards to providing logistics support is the Medical Department. The department’s primary responsibility was the procurement of supplies and equipment necessary to provide combat health support to the army under the guidance and supervision of the Surgeon General.
In addition to the four primary agencies, five other bureaus provided administration concerning other logistics matters but not on such a large scale: The Adjutant General’s Department, the Paymaster Department, and the Judge Advocate General’s Department handled legal matters.

Individual bureaus or departments procured items of their responsibility for the army either from federal arsenals or private industry. In order to reach the soldiers in the field the material flowed from the strategic level to the tactical level through a series of layers of depots. The focus being the establishment of necessary supplies forward into the theater. The base depot was the first level of supply in the network. The distribution of a particular item from its acquisition source to the base depot remained the responsibility of the bureau or department chief. These base depots were located in major cities, like New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Louisville, and New Orleans. During the Carolina Campaign the base depot in New York primarily supported Sherman’s Army. The movement of supplies from the base depots to advanced depots occurred along major transportation routes within the department rear area. From this location the advanced depot used existing rail or water lines of communication to move forward supplies necessary to establish a temporary logistics base of critical supplies. The purpose of the temporary bases was to support the army during campaigns. Supply wagons then moved the supplies from the temporary bases forward to units in the field. The Chickamauga Campaign of 1863 is an excellent example of how material flowed in support of a military operation. To support the operation, the base depot in Louisville sent forward material to the advance depot in
Nashville and in turn to temporary depots in Stevenson and Tracy City along the Tennessee River.\textsuperscript{9}

An understanding of how the Union Army conducted logistics during the war is important in order to establish a foundation for analyzing Sherman’s Carolina Campaign. How these functions were organized and carried out in order to sustain his army is critical in the examination of the campaign. To facilitate this analysis the writer will use terminology from current US Army logistics doctrine as defined in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, \textit{Operations}. FM 3-0 states that combat service support consists of many interrelated functions. These functions include supply, combat health support, transportation, maintenance, human resource support, finance management operations, religious support, field services, explosive ordnance disposal, band support, and legal support. It is critical that the planning, managing, and executing of logistics support involves synchronizing and integrating these functions at all levels of operations.\textsuperscript{10} Because not all these functions existed during the war or were not executed in such detail as to be relevant in this study, the author will incorporate only four of the eleven. The functions of supply, transportation, combat health support, and human resource support are crucial because of the significance of these activities during the Carolina Campaign. A brief summary of these specific functions follows.

The first of these functions is supply. Supply includes those activities involved in the acquisition, management, receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply (except medical) required to sustain the Army forces.\textsuperscript{11} Within the supply function are four critical subfunctions: subsistence (rations for service personnel), forage, ammunition, and general supplies.
Subsistence consisted of various food stocks or rations used in the field feeding of service personnel. The major staple of the Union army ration of food, which was mandated by law, consisted of salt or fresh beef and either flour or bread. The flour and bread portion generally came in the form of crackers, commonly known as “hardtack.”

“The prescribed march ration included 1 pound of hardtack, ¾ pound of salt pork or ¼ pound of fresh meat, coffee, sugar, and salt.” The Civil War saw for the first time commercially produced canned items as a means of preserving perishable food. Items, such as condensed milk, peaches, and oysters, were purchased by the Subsistence Department and placed in the Army supply system. Another method to preserving food was called “desiccation,” or dehydration in the modern definition. Potatoes or vegetables in this form were designed as a substitute to the normally prescribed fresh potatoes or beans. Sherman’s reference to the items as “desecrated vegetables” and “consecrated milk” is a testament to the feeling the men in the army had towards such preserved items.

In order to relieve the unnecessary burden on the transportation system, the procurement of various subsistence items was decentralized down to depot officer level. Depot officers contracted for food items from the local open market in nearby urban or agricultural producing areas. Contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder for such items as flour, sugar, salt, bread, and rice. For the most part, depot officers attempted to procure flour and other commodities closer to the units in the field in order to alleviate problems of food spoilage. A separate system was used to deliver meat food products to units in the field. Along with contracting cattle for beef, both armies maintained major beef depots. Major Union beef depots existed in Washington, DC; Alexandria, Virginia;
and Louisville, Kentucky. The Commissary Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to Army rear areas in the field. Brigade butchers then slaughtered the cattle the day before issuing the meat to troops in the field for consumption. Although the beef would be a nice alternative to the daily routine of salt pork, many times the animals were ill fed and marched long distances in order to reach the army resulting in tough meat for consumption.

A characteristic of the Carolina Campaign was the system of foraging, whereby the army acquires necessary supplies from local resources. Foraging allowed an army to operate independent of any established line of communication in regards to resupply of rations or forage for the soldiers and animals. An example of successful foraging occurred during the Savannah Campaign, where Sherman’s foragers procured an estimated 5,000 head of cattle along the line of march.\textsuperscript{15} Forage is also defined as the items necessary for the feeding of animals in the army, such as hay and oats. When it is defined as such, it becomes a subcategory of supply, which is discussed later in the chapter.

Foraging was not always a valid alternative to an established logistics distribution system for two reasons. First, the availability of forage depended on the length of time since the last harvest. In the Carolinas, late fall to early winter allowed for successful foraging. Secondly, the availability of food in a given area was proportional to the density of population.\textsuperscript{16} Sherman’s foragers discovered the vast pine forests of the interior regions of North Carolina yielded little in the way of subsistence.

The next key subordinate function of supply is ammunition. It is arguably one of the areas of supply that saw the greatest change occur during the course of the Civil War.
With the rapid expansion of the Army came a significant growth in America’s industrial base, specifically in the area of weapons technology and ammunition. As rifled muzzleloaders and breechloaders replaced the old smoothbore musket, problems arose in regards to meeting the ammunition requirements.

The major issue in regards to ammunition resupply was not quantity but a lack of standardization. At one time, the Army had no less than a dozen various types of rifles in use by troops in the field. Throughout the war, new patents of weapons and ammunition created additional burdens on the supply systems. Because of a lack of standardization in the types of small arms, problems eventually arose in regards to the repair of the weapons, spare parts availability, and supply of ammunition. All this was exasperated by the fact many regiments purchased their own weapons in lieu of state or federal issue firearms. The types of weapons used by units in the field varied from the traditional .58-caliber rifled musket to the Henry .44-caliber, repeating rifle. It is quite easy to see the difficulties for division ordnance officers in determining the requirements for assigned units. Table 2 depicts a breakdown of the various types and calibers of ammunition transported during the campaign in the ordnance trains.

During the Carolina Campaign the standard basic load of an infantryman was sixty rounds. Forty rounds was carried in the individual’s cartridge box and the remaining twenty rounds in the haversack or coat pocket. The division ordnance trains transported additional ammunition for resupply. Ammunition carried in the wagons was packed in wooden boxes containing 1,000 rounds each.
Table 2. Ammunition Calibers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Type</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifled Musket Elongated Ball</td>
<td>.5774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer Rifle &amp; Carbine Cartridges</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Rifle Cartridges</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith Carbine Cartridges</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharps Carbine Cartridges</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnside Carbine Cartridges</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colt Army Pistol</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colt Navy Pistol</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second major area of ammunition supply was in regards to field artillery. By the end of 1864, the unofficial standard in the Union Army was the three-inch rifle and twelve-pound smoothbore (4.62 inch) for field artillery use. As table 3 depicts, Sherman’s artillery composition was consistent with the practices of the period.

Table 3. Types of Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Piece</th>
<th>Number of Tubes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-Pound Napoleon (Smoothbore)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Inch Ordnance Rifle (Rifled)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Inch Rodman (Rifled)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Pound Parrott (Rifled)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The smoothbore cannon fired a spherical projectile commonly referred to as a “cannon ball.” During the campaign the only smoothbore artillery used was the twelve-pound Napoleon. Rifled cannon were designed with spherical grooves that allowed the firing of an elongated projectile. A rifled artillery piece had much greater range and
accuracy because the sabot attached to the projectile conformed to these grooves resulting in a spinning action. Within Sherman’s artillery the three-inch ordnance was the standard rifled piece except for one battery of three-inch Rodmans. One battery in the Fifteenth Army Corps fielded the larger caliber rifled twenty-pound Parrott. The various types of rifled artillery used in Sherman’s Army required unique ammunition that was not compatible with other artillery pieces. For example, Parrot ammunition could not be fired from a three-inch ordnance piece. The makeup of Sherman’s artillery presented some challenges in regards to size and compatibility, but overall the trains carried enough ammunition to sustain two major battles. Including the reserve ammunition, the basic load per artillery piece consisted of 350 rounds of ammunition.  

The last subfunction of supply is forage. An army conducting sustained operations from the field requires a large number of draft animals for its wagons and its mounted forces. Critical to the sustainment of these animals is forage. During the war the consumption factor for each horse was a requirement of fourteen pounds of hay and twelve pounds of grain per day, while mules required the same amount of hay per day and nine pounds of grain per day. Because these two items were extremely bulky and difficult to transport, planning for the resupply of forage presented unique challenges and was an important aspect of any campaign plan.

The logistics function of transportation is defined as the movement and transfer of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the concept of operations. During the war, the staff responsibility for ensuring transportation requirements fell under the Quartermaster Department. Transportation operations during the war covered three
separate modes: rail, water, and ground transportation. The later being the standard horse-drawn wagon.

During the Civil War, dramatic changes in transportation were a key dimension in shaping the war’s character. Transportation operations conducted by either rail or sea influenced the commander’s plan especially at the operational and strategic levels. The biggest change occurred with the use of the railroad. To ensure an efficient rail system, the War Department adopted civilian rail management as a means of coordinating integrated plans.

At the beginning of the war, coordination between the War Department and the civilian rail industry was anything but efficient. The movement requirements of the army were in direct competition with those requirements of the public. Early in 1862, because of this uncoordinated effort, the US Congress passed two major pieces of legislation that would impact greatly the rail operations during the remainder of the war. First it established the United States Military Rail Roads (USMRR). The War Department created the USMRR as a separate agency with the primary mission of overseeing all railroad operations in support of the army.

In addition to the creation of the USMRR, Congress authorized President Lincoln the ability to seize control over any or all of the railroad lines in the United States. As President Lincoln later formally spelled out in May of the same year, “The main substance of the order lay in its injunction to railroad companies to hold themselves ready to transport troops and ammunition, to the exclusion of all other business.” Because the military lacked the expertise to handle railroad management and operations, the individual companies would still oversee actual rail operations because “the true experts
in railroad generalship at the strategic level were the civilian executives who managed railroads as a profession.\textsuperscript{24}

A key subordinate element under the USMRR was the Construction Corps with the responsibility of ensuring rail line maintenance and the capability of supporting the military’s use. The corps itself consisted of professional civil engineers, skilled workmen, and manual laborers who were organized to respond to crisis and ensure the rapid repair of the rail line.\textsuperscript{25} The Construction Corps played a vital role in the support of Sherman during the Carolina Campaign. The repair, upgrade, and maintenance of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad proved vital in the success of the later stages of the campaign.

The use of the railroad by the army allowed for a more timely transfer of men and materiel and dramatically changed the course of how campaigns were waged. The availability existed now to move large quantities of supplies and men in a relatively short amount of time from one region in the country to another. During the campaign, Schofield’s initial vessels arrived in North Carolina without wagon transport for his men and material. The ability of Schofield to disembark his corps on the coast and rapidly concentrate his units in the interior of the state is because of the railroad. Trains of that time period traveled at a rate five times faster than the standard mule-drawn wagons.\textsuperscript{26} A fifteen-car train, on average, traveled at a speed of about fifteen miles per hour compared to the army six-mule wagon, which traveled at a rate of only three miles per hour. The ability to move faster allowed for a quicker turnaround time of the transportation assets, thus enabling the logisticians to transports larger quantities of men and materiel. The
major benefit of moving personnel by rail versus traveling by foot decreased fatigue and straggling.\textsuperscript{27}

Rail lines of communications presented additional security challenges for the military commander in regards to maintaining an operational line. The responsibility increased proportionally with the length of rail line used. Remote areas of track or key bridge sites along the line were vulnerable to enemy cavalry raids operating within the Army’s rear area. The viable response a commander could make was to assign valuable combat forces with the responsibility of ensuring the rail remained unimpeded by enemy activity. Previous campaigns, especially those in the Western theater of operation had shown the vulnerability of rail lines to Confederate Cavalry. Because Sherman depended upon foraging as the means of resupply, there was no rail line of communication back to Savannah.

In addition to the increased use of the railroad, water transportation grew to play a significant role in support of the army. As the war progressed, the US Navy experienced growth not only in its combat capability, but also in the capability to support logistically combined operations with the Army. The navy’s increase in support capabilities gave the army logisticians the means to move men and material along the coastal regions of the United States as well as inland along the nation’s major rivers. During the war, the Navy routinely transferred forces by water from one region of the country to another. In addition to the assets belonging to the navy, the Quartermaster Department routinely contracted out commercial vessels for support of military operations. The movement of Major General John M. Schofield’s Twenty-third Army Corps from the Western Theater to Virginia and subsequently to North Carolina in order to support General Sherman’s
Carolina Campaign is an example of the strategic capabilities of both rail and sea transportation incorporated by the Union Army during the war.

The military’s use of the water transportation along the coast and of the nation’s inland rivers proved very successful throughout the war. The ability of a maritime vessel to move large tonnages of supply is demonstrated by the efficient use of steamboats along the inland rivers. In actuality, water transportation proved to be at time much more efficient and cost effective than rail. An example of this is the amount of ordnance, subsistence, quartermaster, and medical stores moved by water verses rail in the western region of the US during 1863. Chief Quartermaster of Western River Transportation Colonel Parsons reported railroads transported roughly 76,000 tons, while riverboats moved more than twice that amount, 169,000 tons.²⁸

The use of water as a means of transportation proved to be a more viable option in regards to security along the line of communication. Water allowed for the escort by gunboats as a means of providing security in support of the transport vessels. As the war progressed water transportation hindered enemy disruption more so than rail.

Additionally the use of water transportation proved useful to the railroad because they complemented one another. The fact that the military was able to move such large numbers of men and materiel by water freed the railroad from this tremendous burden. According to James A. Houston, in his book Sinews of War, “Indeed water transportation was such an important factor in the war that it could be said that the railroads remained complementary to the older form of transportation.”²⁹ This is true during the Carolina Campaign in both the preparatory phase in Savannah as well as the later stages in North
Carolina. Both modes of transportation complemented each other and allowed the movement of large numbers of men and material.

As the war progressed, the Army came to depend on water as the primary means of evacuating casualties to northern hospitals. The US Sanitary Commission assisted in the design of hospital vessels specifically for the evacuation but also with the means to provide en-route treatment to large numbers of casualties. One such vessel J. K. Barnes, operated by the Medical Department in support of Sherman’s Carolina Campaign, is shown in figure 1.


The third and final mode of transportation is ground. The principal method of ground transportation during the war was the horse-drawn or mule-drawn wagon. The wagon was responsible for transporting supplies for an army while on the march. The
The standard army wagon was ten feet long, forty-three inches wide, and twenty-two inches deep pulled by a team of either six horses or mules. Historically, the operating payload of an individual wagon averaged around 2,500 pounds. Designed to sustain a maximum capacity of up to 4,000, the army’s supply wagon rarely met this capability because of conditions beyond the control of the teamster, such as weather or road conditions. In his memoirs, Sherman described the typical movement rate for the trains as fifteen miles per day.  

The wagons of an army typically moved together in “trains.” It was standard procedure for the wagons of each logistics function to move together. For example, the wagons tasked to transport resupply ammunition moved as the ordnance train. The same would apply for wagons transporting wounded soldiers, forage, and subsistence for the troops. On good roads, these trains could stretch out to a distance of twenty-five miles, as was the case during the Carolina Campaign. To eliminate congestion and allow for rapid movement, it was necessary for each corps to move upon separate routes as much as possible. To shorten each corps’ column, roads were reserved exclusively for wheels, while the troops marched alongside the roads.  

The third logistics function is Combat Health Support (CHS). Field Manual (FM) 3-0 defines Combat Health Support as those efforts to maintain the force by preventing disease non-battle injury (DNBI) casualties; clearing the battlefield of casualties; providing forward medical treatment; providing enroute care during medical evacuation; and ensuring adequate Class VIII supplies. Today’s definition of CHS is exactly the same support activities performed by Sherman’s medical staffs. For example, the
Carolina Campaign demonstrated the use of all three modes of transportation in the evacuation of wounded.

When war came in 1861 CHS was primitive by today’s standards. A Union soldier could expect no better care than soldiers who fought in the American Revolution received. The surgeon general and his medical directors had served many years in the prewar Medical Department, but were hindered by an initial lack of administrative experience in handling large numbers of casualties, and by the state of medical science in the mid-nineteenth century. Administrative procedures improved with experience, but throughout the war, the simple lack of knowledge about the true causes of disease and infection led to many more deaths than direct battlefield actions.³³

Several doctrinal changes evolved during the course of the war that corrected many of the earlier shortfalls. The first involved the consolidation of all regimental hospitals at division level. Along with the consolidation was the establishment of the division surgeon position with the administrative authority to operate the hospital. The army continued to operate general and base hospitals capable of providing more definitive health care to the wounded. The general hospital served as an operational-level asset within the theater of operation. During the campaign, the Medical Department either had in operation or established general hospitals at various sea ports along the Carolina coast. Base hospitals located throughout the US provided long-term definitive care to the more seriously wounded. Base hospitals located in the Northeast supported operations during the campaign.

The ambulance served as the principal means of evacuating wounded at the tactical level. The Civil War was the first conflict in which armies of the United States
used specially designed ambulance wagons for the evacuation of the wounded. Ambulances of the period were either of two- or four-wheel design with spring cushions to provide a more stable and comfortable transport for the wounded.

“The greatest weakness in the evacuation chain at first was in the removal of casualties from regimental first aid stations or collecting points to hospital facilities in the rear.” Based on this experience, one of the most significant changes to occur during the war was in regards to ambulance operations. Complications arose when surgeons depended upon the Quartermaster Department for evacuation assets and upon details from the ranks. This system became terribly broken during the worst time as units were decisively engaged.

In March of 1864, a bill approved by both legislative houses and signed by the president incorporated what was known as the Letterman system. Letterman, the medical director for the Army of the Potomac, saw the need for an ambulance service totally independent from the quartermaster control. The Letterman system called for the appointment of certain officers who would have direct control of the ambulances, the horses, and all equipment necessary to function properly. This officer would act upon the orders of the medical officers as necessary.

Additionally, the Letterman system called for the ambulances while in camp to park together as brigades. By the time of the Sherman’s Campaign in the Carolinas this was modified to the standard of grouping ambulances by divisions. On the march the ambulance train of each division moved ahead of the normal supply wagons in the corps.

The system of evacuating wounded from the field hospitals to more permanent bases or general hospitals was principally dependant upon either rail or water
transportation. The use of the railroad as a means of casualty evacuation began at the very earliest stages of the war. In today’s terms it could be defined as “backhaul.” As empty supply trains returned from the front, wounded men were placed in empty freight cars. The backhaul of Sherman’s wounded occurred in the later stages of the campaign upon his army making contact with the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad originating from the coast.

As the war progressed, the need for centralized command and control became increasingly obvious in regards to water transportation, specifically in regards to the vessels being utilized for the movement of wounded soldiers. During the Carolina Campaign the competition over vessels between the medical and quartermaster officers became quite an occurrence. Vessels assigned to the duty of patient evacuation were commandeered by the quartermaster officers for use elsewhere. In response the War Department issued a general order in February of 1865 that gave the Medical Department exclusive control over all vessels used as hospital transports and could not be used by local or departmental commanders for other missions.³⁷

Throughout the course of the war various private and government relief agencies worked to insure better health conditions for service members. These agencies grew out of a genuine concern of private citizens to make up for shortfalls the government had in regards to providing proper health care to wounded soldiers. The US Sanitary Commission is the most significant one to provide support functions during the Carolina Campaign. The commission served in all theaters of operations providing help in patient care, evacuation, and field sanitation. These private agencies served with Sherman as his army through the Carolinas and supported the general hospitals established along the
coast of North Carolina in support of the Union forces in the state. Sherman’s Medical Director Surgeon John Moore complemented the efforts of such organizations when he wrote: “The Sanitary Commission was prompt in furnishing luxuries to the hospitals, which they had no other means of obtaining.”

In addition to the specific individual functions mentioned above, the category of general engineering and contract support has a significant part in enabling logistic functions to perform properly. General engineering involves constructing, repairing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure and the facilities to enhance the provision of sustainment and services. Contracting support obtains and provides supplies, services, construction labor, and materiel as a responsive option or enhancement to support the force. Contracting labor and services during the campaign assisted Schofield in the establishment of a logistics infrastructure capable of supporting a force of over 90,000 men.

Logisticians today have the primary mission of providing Combat Service Support (CSS) at the right time, place, and quantity on the battlefield to sustain units in the process of conducting combat operations. Critical functions, such as supply, transportation, medical support, and contract logistics, were vital to sustaining the soldier in the Civil War as they are now. The Carolina Campaign provides an excellent example of how these critical logistics functions enabled Sherman to conduct the campaign. These same activities or functions conducted by Sherman’s logisticians are much the same as those carried out in today’s army.

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1Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, 1.

3 Ibid..


8 Hattaway and Jones, 141.

9 Robertson et al., 35.


11 U.S. Army, FM 3-0, 12-3.

12 Trey G. Burrows, “The Logistics of Mobilizing and Supplying the Union Army During the Initial Stages of the American Civil War” (Thesis, Air University, 1997), 43.

13 Houston, *The Sinews of War*, 218.

14 Ibid., 217.

15 Sherman, 2:208.


17 Burrows, 58.


21 Robertson et al., 34.

22 US Army, FM 3-0, 12-3.


25 Ibid., 18-19.

26 Ibid., 3.

27 Ibid., 2-3.

28 Houston, *The Sinews of War*, 211.

29 Ibid., 213.

30 Sherman, 2:184.


32 US Army, FM 3-0, 12-3.


34 Ibid., 243.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 245.

CHAPTER 3

PRECAMPaign LOGiSTiCS OPERATIONS

The weather has been villainous, and all the country is under water, and retards me such. It may be some days yet before I can cast off, as the roads are under water, and my men are not yet exactly amphibious yet, nor the mules either.¹

General William T. Sherman

Sherman completed his march from Atlanta to the Atlantic Coast in mid-December 1864. From the coast of Georgia, Sherman opened communications with the US Navy and began the necessary preparations to put his army in motion. Unfortunately for Sherman, logistics and weather caused considerable problems as to when his army could depart Savannah. These two factors combined to disrupt his departure a full month and one-half. This chapter addresses these factors in order to better understand the events leading up to the campaign and the effects they had on Sherman’s support concept for operating in the Carolinas.

The capture of Fort McAllister on 14 December 1864 allowed Sherman to open a secure line of communication to the sea through the use of the Ogeechee River and its outlet to the ocean, Ossabaw Sound.² Over the next several weeks both of these watercourses proved to be excellent transportation routes for the movement of supplies inland. The channel depths allowed the navy to navigate seagoing vessels as far up the Ogeechee River as Kings Bridge, which was located fifteen miles west of Savannah. Kings Bridge became a distribution node for the transfer of supplies from the navy’s vessels to the army’s wagon trains. Initial supplies for the army were readily available when Sherman reached the coast because of pre-positioning several ships loaded with

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stores at Tybee Roads (vicinity Fort Pulaski) and Port Royal Sound. However, rough sea conditions brought on by bad weather hampered the download of these supplies at times. In addition to the arrival of supplies, the immediate evacuation of close to 200 wounded men by water to the military hospitals located on Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, was made possible through the use of hospital ships (see figure 2).

In some cases, the supply requirements of Sherman’s Army exceeded the capability of the pre-positioned ships, and when this occurred, additional logistics resupply came from the Department of the South, headquartered just north of Savannah at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. Brigadier General J. G. Foster, who commanded the department, had supply depots along the coast of South Carolina at Hilton Head Island and Port Royal.

In the event Sherman’s supply requirements exceeded the capability of Foster’s department, assistance from Quartermaster General of the Army Major General Meigs was required. General Meigs primarily called upon the depot in New York to support Sherman logistically during the Carolina Campaign.

For over a week, the army occupied positions outside Savannah in the face of Hardee’s Confederate defenders. However, an assault was to prove unnecessary with the pre-Christmas withdrawal of Hardee’s forces from Savannah. Fortunately for Sherman’s men, they marched into the city with hardly a shot fired in anger. The occupation of Savannah allowed for additional access to the sea through the use of the Savannah River. Until its capture, the port of Savannah had remained one of the few blockade-runner destinations left open on the East Coast. Unfortunately for Sherman’s logisticians, they discovered that before the Confederate forces withdrew from the city, they had blocked
the channel in an effort to impede its future use by the Federals.\(^4\) Navy and civilian contractors immediately began an effort to clear the channels for use by maritime traffic.

Figure 2. Initial Resupply Locations Along the Georgia Coast.
With Savannah in Sherman’s possession, he issued Special Field Order Number 139 that outlined his general concept for preparing the army for what lay ahead. Included in the order were specific tasks for his logisticians that focused their efforts on the establishment of a grand depot in Savannah. Sherman directed both Brigadier General Langdon C. Easton, his Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief of Commissary Subsistence, to coordinate their staff efforts in order to secure the necessary transports for transferring supplies from Kings Bridge to the newly established grand depot in Savannah. To support the building of a grand depot, Easton acquired all the public buildings and warehouses deemed necessary to support the needs of the army. In addition to establishing the depot, Sherman’s Chief of Ordnance, Captain Baylor, was tasked with the responsibility of securing all captured Confederate ordnance and ensuring its transfer to secure points. The heavy ordnance guns from the local forts required transferring to Fort Pulaski. Although not written in the order, the movement of such heavy material required the support of the quartermaster chief to acquire the necessary transportation assets and work details.

Sherman’s decision to publish Special Field Order Number 139 was based on written guidance from Grant that the army was to be transferred north up the coast to Virginia to disembark at a point inland along the James River. The cavalry, artillery, and a small contingent of infantry were to remain in Savannah, while the bulk of the army was to cooperate with Grant’s upcoming spring campaign against Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. The immediate task at hand was the concentration of enough vessels to facilitate a move of such proportion. The ocean-going transportation assets available to the War Department were stretched thin by December of 1864. The shortfall in the
number of available vessels helped convince Grant that Sherman’s suggestion of a move north through the Carolinas was a more viable option.  

Sherman had no intention of remaining idle for long. He immediately put in motion the actions required for his army’s departure. On 30 December Sherman’s Chief Quartermaster General Easton sent the Quartermaster General an initial logistics estimate outlining the necessary requirements for refitting the army in preparation for movement. In addition to the estimate, he provided the Quartermaster General a situational update in regards to the logistics posture of the army and issues in regards to facilitating a logistic buildup in the Savannah area. General Easton noted supply issues in the area of soldiers’ uniforms and food for the animals. In describing the situation concerning the animals, Easton wrote, “We have but one day’s grain on hand and none in the sound or river.”  

An initial estimate of sixty days of supply was required for the 35,000 animals belonging to the army. In addition to the problem with the animals, transportation issues occupied a good deal of Easton’s time as he struggled with the procurement of shallow draft vessels capable of navigating safely in the shallow waters in and around Savannah. In some local waters around Savannah the shallow depths restricted vessels’ drafts to as low as four feet. This negatively impacted the amount of materiel that could be allowed transport.  

To ensure the readiness of the army for immediate departure, Sherman’s staff focused its efforts on accomplishing the key tasks that were specified in Field Order 139. First, the leadership in Washington identified the port city of Savannah as of strategic importance and required a garrison force to maintain a Union presence upon Sherman’s departure. In addition, the dismantling and transfer of Confederate heavy ordnance from
the nearby forts, such as Fort McAllister, was necessary. An estimated 150 guns with ammunition were located throughout the city’s extensive defensive network. The elimination of these guns minimized any future threat against the saltwater channels that linked Savannah to the Atlantic Ocean.\textsuperscript{11}

It is important to understand that the task of preparing for departure from Savannah committed logistical assets that detracted from the army’s preparation for movement. Sherman, his staff, and subordinate commands expended a large amount of energy and resources in accomplishing these missions.

General Hardee’s withdrawal from Savannah left a network of abandoned defensive works. To save time and reduce engineering efforts, the Federals proceeded to modify the existing Confederate works in order to establish a defensive perimeter suitable for an occupying force. The amount of effort in manpower to complete this task was expressed by Major General John A. Logan, Commander of the Fifteenth Army Corps: “besides the whole strength of my pioneer force I had 3,000 men at work on the fortifications, besides 1,000 men on duty with the chief quartermaster of the military division.”\textsuperscript{12}

Savannah remained under the control of the Left Wing until 18 January and the arrival of General Grover’s Division of the Nineteenth Army Corps from Baltimore, Maryland. Grover’s transfer to Foster’s Department of the South was executed in order to bolster his forces upon Sherman’s departure.\textsuperscript{13}

Simultaneous with the tasks required to secure Savannah existed the more pressing task of refitting the army with new uniforms, equipment, and supplies. The movement from Atlanta to Savannah had left many of the men without proper shoes and
uniforms. The sense of urgency was felt in an order issued by Major General Alpheus S. Williams, Commander of Twentieth Army Corps, as he stressed the need for immediate attention in regards to the issue of clothing and equipment for the troops. In his order he wrote: “The men must be thoroughly clothed and equipped. Requisitions must be at once made on the quartermaster and ordnance departments to put the command in condition for active service. This must be attended to immediately, as our stay here will probably be short, and when the time arrives the command will move, whether in readiness or not.”

Along with the uniform and equipment issues, subordinate commanders began to echo the same concern for the animals as Quartermaster Chief Easton had done. The situation had reached emergency levels in regards to forage for animals in the Right Wing. Howard advised Sherman in a message, “The animals in this army are actually suffering for want of forage.” This was brought on by the concentration of a large body of animals in an area not suitable for such numbers. Unlike the diverse agricultural regions of Georgia, which the army had just passed through, the low-country counties of the state and those of coastal South Carolina were not conducive to the growing of hay. This resulted in difficulty in procuring local forage for the animals. Units attempted to improvise without much success by using rice straw, which was abundant because of the army’s proximity to the many coastal rice plantations. In fact, the situation was no better off in the United States Army as a whole. In a correspondence dated 18 December 1864, Halleck wrote to Sherman advising him of the situation in regards to obtaining hay. He wrote: “The haycrop is short this year, and the Quartermaster’s Department has great
difficulty in procuring a supply for our animals.”\textsuperscript{16} The situation improved over time, but not enough to provide the required quantities.

The only noted success in obtaining forage early in the occupation was by the army’s cavalry. Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry was successful in acquiring forage for the command’s animals, but not without work. He wrote Sherman, “My people are getting plenty of forage . . . but are fighting for it.”\textsuperscript{17}

On 2 January Sherman received the authorization from Grant to proceed with the proposed Carolina Campaign. Key to the success of the campaign was the timing of Sherman’s arrival in North Carolina. It was Sherman’s intent to be in position with his army to cooperate with Grant in the spring. Grant had approved Sherman’s plan for striking through the Carolinas, aiming at Columbia, the capitol of South Carolina, crossing the border into North Carolina in the direction of Fayetteville, and ultimately completing the campaign in the vicinity of Goldsborough or the capitol, Raleigh.\textsuperscript{18}

Sherman immediately placed the army’s wings and cavalry in motion. The initiating movement was a combination of both land and sea operations designed to concentrate both wings at various locations on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River. Sherman saw this positioning of forces as a necessary precursor to the beginning of the campaign. Figure 3 shows the composition of Sherman’s command as of 2 January 1865.
The plan called for the Right Wing to embark vessels at Fort Thunderbolt and move by water to the Beaufort, South Carolina. General Easton selected Fort Thunderbolt, which was located just south of Savannah along the banks of the Wilmington River, because of the ongoing work to clear the obstacles and obstructions in the Savannah River. Order of movement within the Right Wing was Blair’s Seventeenth Army Corps followed by Logan’s Fifteenth Army Corps. As the two corps arrived in South Carolina, they were to move overland to areas in the vicinity of Pocataligo, South Carolina. Pocataligo was important because it was located adjacent to the Savannah and Charleston Railroad and was within fifty miles of Charleston. The Right Wing’s movement in this direction would assist in the overall deception plan of confusing Hardee as to Sherman’s destination and keeping the Confederates off balance. In addition to supporting the deception, Sherman placed great importance in Pocataligo as reflected in these words written to Howard: “I will not move from Pocataligo till we get a good supply in our wagons, as that is the great point.”\(^{19}\)
The Left Wing along with Kilpatrick’s Cavalry was ordered to cross the Savannah River, along the Union Causeway, and move northwest toward Hardeeville ultimately proceeding overland to vicinity of Robertsville, South Carolina. Order of movement being the Twentieth Army Corps followed by the Fourteenth Army Corps. At Robertsville, the Left Wing would concentrate and await further orders from Sherman.

Now that the wing commanders had movement orders, General Easton went to work ensuring he met the intent of his commander. With the reality of an arduous campaign in the immediate future, Easton set forth to “thoroughly refit the men, the animals, and the wagons, and to accumulate enough to load the trains with the more essential articles necessary to the long march into North Carolina.” He submitted a follow-up logistics estimate to Meigs on 30 December, modifying his initial requirements by requesting the following:

I am now instructed by General Sherman to say that he contemplates a very important move, and desires the sixty days’ grain and subsistence for 70,000 men for sixty days sent forward as rapidly as possible. . . . Time is a very important consideration. . . . Hurry forward all clothing and other stores I have asked for as soon as possible. . . . The animals of this army are in great jeopardy at present for the want of grain, as but little has as yet arrived, and the animals have been without for several days. Drafts of vessels were an issue for unloading key supplies. Based on his request, the issue of forage still remained a supply priority for the army.

Grant echoed the importance of Sherman’s requests in a dispatch sent to Halleck in Washington on 5 January. Grant told the general to “have everything called by Sherman forwarded without delay” stressing the fact that his army “cannot move until the forage and subsistence called for is received.”

Throughout the month of January, Sherman carried on a dialogue with Grant and other senior Army generals and the naval commander supporting his upcoming
campaign, Rear Admiral David D. Porter. To ensure unity of command, Sherman was given the responsibility of both the Department of the South and the District of North Carolina. Grant, demonstrating his grasp of command, had incorporated both Palmer’s and Foster’s commands under the authority of Sherman. This ensured the focus of all efforts towards the accomplishment of Sherman’s Campaign.23

As Sherman continued to work through the difficulties in order to get his army moving, Grant ordered two separate actions with the intent of supporting his trusted lieutenant’s move north into the Carolinas. First, he ordered a second expedition against the Confederate bastion at Fort Fisher. Located at the mouth of the Cape Fear River, Fort Fisher ensured the safety and security of blockade runners attempting to penetrate the naval blockade and gain access to the port city of Wilmington, North Carolina. The capture of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington provided Sherman a safe haven halfway between Petersburg and Savannah in the unfortunate event he required an immediate move to the coast.24 More importantly, the port and its adjacent location to the Cape Fear River allowed a means for the transport of reinforcements and supplies inland from the coast. The suitability of Fayetteville as Sherman’s first destination in North Carolina was made more practical by the city’s location on the Cape Fear River. Federal forces provided a source of emergency resupply via the river if Sherman required such support.

Major General Alfred H. Terry, commander of the Fourteenth Army Corps, was assigned to lead this mission against the Wilmington area. Supporting the army was Admiral D. D. Porter’s North Atlantic Squadron, which was on station outside Wilmington along the coast. Terry’s force actually was comprised of elements from
several army corps to include units of his own Twenty-fourth Army Corps. Terry’s Provisional Corps, as it was to be known, was made up of roughly 9,600 men.

Because of the delay Sherman encountered in Savannah, Terry captured Fort Fisher prior to the commander’s departure. Sherman expressed with great pleasure to Grant the news of Terry’s success at Fort Fisher. The fort’s capture had a significant effect on the plan in regards to supporting the campaign logistically. Sherman wrote: “The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on my campaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point of security on the seaboard.”

His security was the ability to resupply his army, if necessary, whether from the coast or inland along the Cape Fear River.

Grant’s second major supporting effort was the transfer of Major General John M. Schofield’s Twenty-third Army Corps from Tennessee to the coast of North Carolina. Schofield’s movement from Tennessee and ultimately to North Carolina can be considered one of the Civil War’s greatest logistics triumphs. To accomplish, the move required the movement of men and material by two separate modes of transportation, rail and water, all in a time frame of less than two weeks. The intent behind Schofield’s move was to place a considerable combat force on the coast of North Carolina with the idea of moving inland and forming a juncture with Sherman as he moved north into the state. The combination of Terry’s and Schofield’s commands represented a massive element of maneuver and would complicate any move considered by the Confederate forces in North Carolina. Upon his arrival, Schofield assumed command of all forces present in North Carolina and those enroute.
As Sherman’s staff continued their logistic work in Savannah, the commander turned his focus towards anticipating the support of his army 450 miles to the north. Sherman envisioned arriving somewhere in Eastern North Carolina, by early March. The objective he chose for planning purposes was Goldsborough, North Carolina. From Goldsboro, Sherman expected to refit and resupply his army before beginning its probable movement north into Virginia. However, to accomplish this task meant the establishment of a logistics infrastructure in Eastern North Carolina capable of supporting the flow and buildup of material to Goldsboro. In early January the limited infrastructure at the coastal towns of New Bern and Morehead City hindered any logistical buildup. Eastern North Carolina was about to go from an occupying force of less than 10,000 to a combined strength of well over 90,000 with the planned linkup of Sherman and Schofield’s Armies. Sherman placed a high priority on the staff planning and execution for this crucial logistic operation. He deemed this so critical to the success of his operation that he chose to not bring Generals Easton and Beckwith, his Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissary, along on the campaign north. Sherman ordered the two men to move up the coast and provide the necessary staff coordination required to orchestrate such a large logistics buildup in North Carolina (see figure 4).

Sherman wrote to Foster, “I attach great importance to the point at New Berne, and think you had better send to that point an inspector-general.” Additionally, Sherman was concerned as to the security of the New Berne and the possible threat from Bragg’s retreating forces traveling north out of Wilmington. He stressed this very point to the admiral when he wrote: “Notify the commanding officer of the importance of the position, and if need be re-enforce him.”
The commander of the District of North Carolina was Brigadier General Innis N. Palmer, whose headquarters was located in New Berne. In a reply to Sherman’s request for information, Palmer informed the commander of the status of his forces and of the condition specifically regarding the operational state of the railroad. Palmer confirmed
the needs of Sherman’s army in an effort to anticipate these requirements, but also
provided a situational update to the capabilities and shortfalls that existed in supporting
the planned logistics buildup.

Sherman recognized the strategic importance of New Bern as a rail link to
Goldsboro. The Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad, which the Federal’s controlled
since Burnside’s Expedition in 1862, required significant repair to move such large
quantities of men and material in support of Sherman. At the start of the Carolina
Campaign it ran from the seaport at Morehead City to just beyond the city of New Bern
(see figure 5). At that point, it became questionable as to its status of serviceability
because of its close proximity to Confederate forces. Sherman attached so much
importance to the condition of the rail that he sent Colonel W. W. Wright, Chief Engineer
of Military Railroads, to the coast of North Carolina to assess the situation. Colonel
Wright was expected to ensure repairs were initiated in a timely manner that allowed for
an extended rail line beyond New Bern to Goldsboro. To support Schofield and
Sherman’s arrival, Palmer’s rail assets on-hand were four engines, ten boxcars, and
twenty flat cars in various states of serviceability. His water fleet consisted of only eight
steamers capable of conducting operations only on the coastal sounds and rivers.

In conjunction with the Army’s preparatory movement of the campaign,
Sherman’s Chief Surgeon, Brigadier General Moore organized medical support in
accordance with his commander’s guidance to ensure the health of the men prior to
movement. The army’s corps hospitals were established “for the reception of such sick
or disabled men as were then in the army as well as for receiving all such cases as would
be unable to undergo the hardships of a severe campaign when the time came for taking
Figure 5. Coastal Railroads in North Carolina. Source: Harpers Illustrated Weekly, 14 February 1863, 102.

The field. To provide health care to the men identified as unfit for field duty, a limited number of medical officers and enlisted personnel from the two wings were detached and assigned duty in the temporary hospitals established in the Savannah area. As a precursor to initiating the campaign, it was necessary to ensure only the strongest and healthiest
men were allowed to march forward into the Carolinas. Just as in Atlanta prior to the
Savannah Campaign, the army would disencumber the commands of men incapable of
efield duty, thus increasing the combat readiness of the army.

In addition to the screening efforts carried out by the medical personnel, the army
began to experience an increase in the loss of personnel due to disease. The increase
occurred while the army remained camped around the coastal low country. The
unusually wet weather had made many campsites ill suited for the camping of large
numbers of personnel. Chief Medical Director, Fourteenth Army Corps, Surgeon Waldo
C. Daniels in his postcampaign report explains the reasoning behind the increased disease
rate as follows:

This unusually large number was easily to be accounted for by the fact that the
command for the month previous were unavoidably camped on low swampy
ground northwest from the city, and which, for a large portion of the time, was
literally submerged by water.\[34\]

Moore went on to further describe in detail the effects on the army a breakout of
variola or what is commonly referred to today as “smallpox.” The “command was
delayed in crossing the Savannah River eight days, during which time variola broke out
among the troops, twenty-five cases occurring within three days.” Ninety-five soldiers
were evacuated to the hospitals in Savannah, and over one hundred incapacitated men
required transport up the coast to Wilmington, North Carolina.\[35\]

By 17 January Sherman’s initial plan of positioning his wings on the South
Carolina side of the Savannah River had met with great difficulties. The winter rains in
January had flooded most of the low-country regions. The severe weather brought a rise
in the water levels of the rivers and local tributaries creating natural obstacles that stopped transportation operations or made them very slow and time consuming.

A combination of bad weather and shortfalls in logistic support, specifically transportation, caused Sherman to issue a change to his original movement order. Problems arose in transportation not because of a lack of availability, but because problems such as vessel draft and suitability for handling cargo. Logan, in his postcampaign report, described the difficulty his corps had while trying to embark and reposition itself to South Carolina. In his campaign report, Logan wrote: “The character of the vessels used for transporting the troops and trains of the corps greatly impeded the movement.”

His issue with the vessels was not that they could not facilitate the transport of his men, but the loading and unloading of the animals and equipment consumed the greatest amount of time and energy. To facilitate the process each individual animal was required to be hoisted on and off by a sling and the wagons disassembled into subcomponents for ease of lifting operations. Table 4 depicts the vessels used in moving portions of Howard’s Right Wing. To facilitate movement certain vessels were used strictly for the animals and equipment in an effort to not delay the loading and transport of personnel.

Now his focus was to concentrate as rapidly as possible the bulk of his forces into South Carolina. His general plan was to “get all my army in hand on a line from Sister’s Ferry to Pocataligo.” In addition to reworking the movement flow, Sherman gave specific instructions for logistical support to occur while the army concentrated in South Carolina. Special Field Order Number 19, published on January 19, established the commander’s requirements for basic loads in regards to supplies and locations for the
construction of temporary depots. These temporary depots were to support the continuing buildup of supplies and sustainment for the army. From these depots the army drew the necessary items to sustain its stay in the Savannah area and load the wagon trains with its basic loads. In addition to the supplying the army, the order addressed the establishment of hospitals prior to the army departing.

Table 4. Movement of the Right Wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Vessel (All Steamers)</th>
<th>Cargo Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Sherman</strong></td>
<td>500 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Louisburg</strong></td>
<td>1,000 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fannie</strong></td>
<td>500 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crescent</strong></td>
<td>1,200 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spaulding</strong></td>
<td>1,000 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mary A. Boardman</strong></td>
<td>500 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canonicus</strong></td>
<td>600 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delaware</strong></td>
<td>800 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Golden Gate</strong></td>
<td>Teams / Wagons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>George Leary</strong></td>
<td>Teams / Wagons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wyoming</strong></td>
<td>Teams / Wagons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sylph</strong></td>
<td>Teams / Wagons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cosmopolitan</strong></td>
<td>Teams / Wagons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Right Wing concentrated both corps in the vicinity of Pocotaligo with orders from Howard to have on hand in the wagon trains five days of forage and provisions and as much ammunition as the wagons could support. Howard established forward depots under the direction of his Chief Quartermaster Brigadier General Easton and Chief of Commissary Subsistence Lieutenant-Colonel Remick at the several locations along the Broad River. These positions provided logistic support for the wing up until movement. The Seventeenth Army Corps established depots at Mackay’s Point and Tullifinny, and
the Fifteenth Army Corps established depots at Beaufort and General Hatch’s wharf. Beaufort served as the primary depot for all supplies and remained operational until the wing departed. Howard gave additional guidance to his commissary chief to have thirty days’ rations and hard bread on hand to support the wing (see figure 6).  

Figure 6. Precampaign Logistics Sites on Georgia and South Carolina Coast
Slocum’s Left Wing concentrated its corps in the vicinity of Roberstsville, having in its wagons the same loads as the Right Wing. Slocum directed his quartermaster and commissary chiefs to leave a competent officer capable of forwarding supplies by the Savannah River to specified points of concentration. Supplies sent up river were off-loaded at Purysburg or Sister’s Ferry along the Savannah River and from there forwarded to the specified points of concentration. The forwarding of sufficient quantities allowed the Left Wing to meet the requirements of the command while awaiting orders at Robertsville, as well as meet the campaign requirements for transport in the trains. Included in the Left Wing move was Kilpatrick’s Cavalry who was to move with the Left Wing and subsequently position itself as pickets along the routes in front of the wing. The depot at Sister’s Ferry supplied the cavalry up until initiation of movement.40

Up until this date, the only combat force to be entirely concentrated across the river was Blair’s Seventeenth Army Corps. Only a portion of the Fifteenth Army Corps had embarked on vessels for transfer over to Beaufort, South Carolina, before loading was ceased. In addition to the problems affecting the Right Wing, Slocum’s Left Wing was positioned none the better. Only one division of the Twentieth Army Corps had made it across, and the remaining two divisions along with the entire Fourteenth Army Corps were still on the Georgia side of the river. Logan’s Fifteenth Army Corps was ordered to cease embarkation of the remaining elements of his corps and proceed overland along the Union Causeway, crossing the Savannah at New River Bridge. Howard’s instructions to his subordinate were to “move the balance of your command by slow and easy marches to Pocataligo.”41
Because of the conditions of the roads Howard additionally issued specific guidance as to the movement of Logan’s wagon trains. In regards to his wagons, Howard wrote, “cause all the wagons of your command to be lightly loaded with rations and forage, not more than 1,000 in each wagon.” The wing commander’s intent was for Logan to resupply his corps upon his arrival at Pocataligo.

Sherman’s change to the initial movement order called for Slocum’s Left Wing along with Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division to move north along the Georgia side of the Savannah River and to cross about forty miles north of Savannah at a location on the river called Smith’s Ferry. Progress was made until Mother Nature again released her energies to thwart Sherman’s timeline. All of Williams Twentieth Army Corps was across minus one division. On the twenty-first Sherman informed Grant of the situation and how the tremendous rainfall resulted in his movement north being delayed. He wrote, “The Union Causeway, on which Slocum had put ten days hard work, . . . the hard rains had raised the Savannah River so that the whole country was under water, and the corduroy road on the Union Causeway was carried away.” The result was one division of the Twentieth Army Corps was left on the west side of the river along with the elements of the Fourteenth Army Corps.

Luck ran out once again for Logan’s Fifteenth Army Corps when the swelling waters caused a halt in the attempted move across the river towards Pocataligo. Logan describes the situation to Howard when he writes: “The dikes along the Union Causeway turnpike have been broken during the late storm, and the road is several feet under water and totally impassable for wagons or troops.” One of Logan’s subordinates divisions,
Brevet Major General J. E. Smith’s along with the corps trains almost drowned when the pontoon bridge gave way to the rising water.\(^{46}\)

In his memoirs Sherman described the terrible extent of the flooding, he wrote: “The river had swelled to a distance of three miles across in some areas.”\(^{47}\) The result of such bad weather had caused a delay in Sherman’s departure of about two weeks. As frustrating as the situation must have been for a man of Sherman’s nature, he actually found humor in it when writing Admiral Porter. Sherman wrote:

> The weather has been villainous, and all the country is under water, and retards me such. It may be some days yet before I can cast off, as the roads are under water, and my men are not yet exactly amphibious yet, nor the mules either.\(^{48}\)

As the commanders wrestled with the challenges of refitting their men and moving their units, issues arose that would require substantial energy not only from Sherman but the logisticians of his personal staff as well. With the occupation of Savannah came issues in regards to captured commerce and the disposition of freed slaves. Each one of these issues presented unique challenges and unfortunately at times competed with the commanders for already limited logistics support. An example of how resources vital to the logistics support of Sherman’s Army was used in secondary roles was the transfer of civilians and their personnel property from Savannah to Charleston with maritime transportation assets. By the first of February, Charleston was still in the hands of Confederate forces.

The issue of trade and commerce required Sherman to assign his Chief Quartermaster General Easton the responsibility of dealing with captured stores of cotton and other economic goods. The United States Treasury Department under current
operating procedures of the time was responsible for the handling of such nonmilitary issue. Sherman, however, felt the Treasury agents were ill suited to carry out the necessary functions because of their former mischievous actions. Treasury agents received pay based on the revenues gained from the sell of captured goods. Because of this perception, he felt the Quartermaster Department was better suited to fulfill the duties in accordance with the laws of the United States. This resulted in one more action being required by a staff officer who already was trying to prepare an army for what was predicted to be a very difficult campaign to support logistically.

On 1 February with two divisions of the Twentieth Army Corps and Kilpatrick’s cavalry across the Savannah River Sherman believed the conditions were set to initiate the campaign. The order was issued to begin movement on 2 February.

Sherman’s time in Savannah presented the commander and his personal staff some very difficult logistics challenges. Many of these same challenges, such as refugees and transportation shortfalls, are characteristic of present day operations faced by the United States Army. Transportation continues to be an issue that all modern logisticians struggle to manage with great care. Support for displaced civilians and civil government are common occurrences in many of the troubled spots of the world. The amount of energy expended by Sherman and his staff on nontraditional wartime missions is quite comparable to what a commander and his logistic staff will face in the twenty-first century. To the layman, issues, such as supporting displaced civilians or restoring civil authority, appear to have no relevance in regards to military strategy. This is about as far from the truth today as it was for Sherman in his short while in Savannah.
General Sherman sums up his feelings on his time in Savannah when he writes in his memoirs “I was quite impatient to get off myself, for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxious to get into the pine-woods again.”

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1 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 2, 104.
2 OR, ser. 1, vol. 44, pt. 1, 726.
3 Sherman, Memoirs, 2, 200.
4 OR, vol. 53, Supplement, 45.
5 OR, ser. 1, vol. 44, pt. 1, 793.
7 Grant, Memoirs, 529-530.

9 The requirement for one day of supply of forage is determined by using a planning factor of 26lbs/animal multiplied by 35,000 animals. Total for one day of supply equals 910,000 lbs. The wagon requirements for moving one day of supply is determined by dividing 910,000 pounds of forage by the planning factor of 2,500lbs/wagon. Total wagon requirement for one day of supply is 364 wagons.

18 Sherman, Memoirs, 2, 277.
36 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 220.
40 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 2, 94.
43 *OR*, ser 1, vol. 47, pt. 2, 102-104.


CHAPTER 4
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS DURING THE CAMPAIGN

My chief difficulty will be to supply my army, but on this point I must risk a good deal, based upon the idea that where other people live we can, even if they have to starve or move away.¹

Major General William T. Sherman

Through all the difficulties of the past forty-five days, the army was once again on the move. As he had done during the Savannah Campaign, Sherman launched Slocum’s and Howard’s Wings in a simultaneous movement that deceived the Confederate opponents as to his real intention. By design, the movement of the wings gave the impression of threatening Augusta, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina. Neither was of interest to Sherman. The capital of South Carolina, Columbia, was his objective for this phase of the campaign.

The logistic status of the army during the first week of February was at levels deemed acceptable enough to Sherman in order to initiate the campaign. By this time all the army’s trains were loaded with sufficient levels of supplies to sustain the command for over a week to thirty days depending on the individual supply item. Each division of the army averaged between three to four days’ of supply per man in regards to individual rations, which were carried in the soldier’s haversack. These same rations averaged between ten and twelve days of supply on hand in the wagon trains of the divisions. Considering all the difficulties the army had just went through in Savannah in regards to forage for the animals, the divisions averaged seven days of supply on hand in the wagons. Table 5 shows the on-hand supply level of Major General Geary’s 2nd Division, XXth Corps, upon initiation of the campaign. The numbers in regards to days of supply
are typical of the amount of government supplies transported by the divisions at the start of the campaign.

Table 5. Government Supplies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ration Type</th>
<th>Days of Supply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt Meat</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Bread</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As table 5 illustrates, without a logistics base to draw from, the government-issued supplies could not sustain the army throughout the campaign. Once the army departed the coast of South Carolina, the overall campaign support concept called for no possible resupply until the linkup with the coast via the railroad was complete at Goldsborough. Contingency planning called for possible resupply at Fayetteville and worst case any point along the coast of the Carolinas if need be. To Sherman the issue of cutting his logistics line of communication at Savannah was a concern, but “reasoned that we might safely rely on the country for a considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, if the worst came to worst, we could live several months on the mules and horses of our trains.”\(^2\) To Grant he wrote, “I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied as before, depending on the country for all food.”\(^3\) The plan called
for government-issued supplies to be used only in the case of incidents when authorized foraging fell short.

Initially, Sherman hoped to organize foragers for each brigade, but it soon proved unsatisfactory, since too many division commanders sent out only fifty men per brigade, not enough to provide for all the troops. As the brigade organization began to break down, many commanders decentralized the system even more and had each regimental commander assign foraging details to one or two companies. The forage they gathered no longer went to the brigade commissary; it went directly to the men in each regiment. Foraging proved very successful as the army moved into the interior of the state (figure 7). The movement of the army in South Carolina left a fifty-mile-wide area so bare of edibles that a Rebel prisoner claimed “a crow could not fly across it without carrying a haversack.”

The practice of foraging for the army was not without dangers and hazards for the detailed men. Around ever bend in the road existed the possibility of a patrol of Confederate cavalry on the lookout for Sherman’s foragers. Throughout the course of the campaign “a minimum of one hundred and nine were either hanged, shot in head from very close range, or killed with their throats slit, and in a few cases someone had actually been butchered.” The common practice for the Confederates was to leave the bodies of the men alongside the road for Sherman’s men to see. Because of the consequences if they were captured, foragers fought with a ferocity that prevented many of them from meeting the fates of their comrades.

On 2 February the enemy disputed Howard’s crossing of the Salkehatchie River at River’s Bridge. A sharp skirmish with elements of the Seventeenth Army Corps occurred with a loss of sixteen killed and eighty-five wounded. The deceased and wounded from this affair were evacuated back to the hospitals located at Beaufort, South Carolina. From this point on, all men who became ill or were wounded in hostile actions were required to be transported in army wagons until evacuation could take place.

After the fight at River’s Bridge the most serious obstacle encountered during the first ten days was not the enemy but the bad condition of the roads. The army moved through a region of the state that was intersected with innumerable streams and intervening marshes requiring corduroyed roads and bridging to make the roads serviceable. Sherman’s Chief Medical Director Surgeon John Moore contributed to the primary cause of the difficulties to several days of heavy rain, which “so swelled the streams as to cover the whole face of the country with water, so that the marching
columns were almost constantly in water, often knee deep.” Throughout the campaign it was common for individual regiments to be detailed with the task of escort duty for the division trains. The terrible conditions brought on by the weather resulted in the wagons and artillery becoming mired and a great number of men spent the entire day and many times into the night wading through water and mud to move the trains along.

Between the skirmish at River’s Bridge and the Right Wing’s arrival at Congaree Creek, south of Columbia, no other considerable action occurred which constituted anything more than a delaying action on the part of Confederate cavalry. As the Right Wing neared Columbia, Confederate cavalry under the command of Lieutenant General Wade Hampton opposed the arrival and attempted crossing of Howard’s command at Congaree Creek, near Columbia. The crossing was successful but accomplished at a loss of five killed and fourteen wounded. Two days later, on 17 February, Sherman’s army occupied the capital of South Carolina. During Sherman’s occupation of Columbia, events transpired that left the city in total devastation and ruin. Continuing his policy of destroying anything of value to the Confederate war effort, Sherman’s men razed the arsenal and many of the government warehouses that contained military supplies. The Federal’s did not destroy all the supplies but used some items to replenish the supply wagons of the army. For example, the Charleston Depot in Columbia contained many bags of cornmeal that was immediately procured by the commissary chiefs.  

Columbia’s fate as the capitol of South Carolina was to be much worse than any other city occupied by Sherman’s men throughout the campaign. Somehow a fire started that spread throughout the city destroying both public and private properties. The fire’s total destruction had an immediate effect on Sherman’s continuance of the campaign.
The burning of Columbia left many homeless, hungry, and without work because of the city’s conditions.

Sherman ordered several actions that were designed to relieve the suffering. First, to aid in the feeding of the population, he instructed his quartermaster to turnover to the mayor 500 head of cattle. Second, as a means of restoring civil authority to the mayor of Columbia, Sherman authorized the release of over 100 military rifles with ammunition to be used in maintaining order and guarding of what food stocks survived the fire. With his work done in Columbia, Sherman headed for the North Carolina border in the direction of his next objective, Fayetteville, North Carolina.

After the departure of Columbia, the army’s appearance began to take on a new look. Within the march columns, groups of refugees joined the formations along the march. The numbers continued to grow with each passing day as noncombatants sought security and support from the Federals. Sherman had dealt with the issue of contraband slaves joining his ranks during the march from Atlanta, but now the refugee train took a diverse look with no indifference to race or place in society. Eventually corps and division commanders organized separate refugee trains as subordinate elements. To provide command and control for the refugee train, escaped Union prisoners of war who had joined the ranks of the army upon the occupation of Columbia were tasked with the responsibility of accompanying the columns.

Once again the combination of bad weather and difficult terrain presented the army with many challenges. Slocum’s Left Wing’s crossing of the Catawba River was made difficult by torrential rain, which swelled the river’s banks. Slocum had successfully crossed the Twentieth Army Corps by 22 February when swift currents
caused by the sudden downpour swept 600 feet of pontoon bridge away leaving Brevet
Major General Jefferson C. Davis’s Fourteenth Army Corps stranded on the south bank
of the river. Over the next several days, the 58th Indiana Regiment (Pontooniers)
struggled to overcome the forces of nature without much success. As the 58th attempted
to reconstruct the bridge, the Fourteenth Army Corps, now idle in camp began to
consume supplies on hand from the corps trains. An army that depends on foraging to
sustain it cannot remain idle in one location for very long. “The Federals could not
afford to remain in this sparsely settled region for more than a few days, because they had
already exhausted the few provisions the foragers had managed to gather.”

The desperation of the situation is apparent in Sherman’s order to Davis to reduce his trains
by destroying the wagons not needed but giving priority to “salt, sugar, coffee, and
bread.”

Luck played out for the Fourteenth Army Corps as the 58th managed to
complete the task, and Davis was able to move his entire corps across without the need to
lighten his load.

On 3 March the army arrived at Cheraw, South Carolina. Sherman learned in
Cheraw that his old nemesis General Joe Johnston had been reinstated as the commander
of Confederate forces in North Carolina. Johnston’s task consisted of uniting the
fragmented parts of several former Confederate commands with the hope of providing
some measure of significant resistance to Sherman. Sherman described the news of
Johnston’s return in his memoirs with respect to the Confederate commander. He wrote:
“I then knew that my special antagonist General Joseph Johnston, was back, with part of
his old army; that he would not be misled by feints and false reports, and somehow
compel me to exercise more caution than I had hitherto done.”
Sherman’s men located in the town of Cheraw “an immense amount of stores” sent there from Charleston as a means of safeguarding the property from possible Federal seizure. The army’s quartermasters confiscated those stores deemed necessary for sustainment and destroyed the remaining items. Interestingly, the men of the Seventeenth Army Corps found a large wine storage of excellent quality. Slocum remembers the event as the most fortunate event for the whole army and thanks to the commander of the Seventeenth Army Corps, Blair, to whom “distributed it with the spirit of liberality and fairness.”

Sherman remained in the vicinity of Cheraw until 6 March allowing the army to complete the crossing of the Pee Dee River before resuming the march towards Fayetteville. Once across the river, the foragers in Sherman’s army began to report poor results in their daily missions. One such soldier described this region of South Carolina as the “poorest country I have seen yet.” The success of foraging became sporadic day to day and remained a problem until the army arrived at Fayetteville.

An increase in logistic activity occurred along the North Carolina coast simultaneously with Sherman’s movement into central South Carolina. By mid-February the tempo of support operations had increased significantly (see figure 8). Schofield from his headquarters in New Berne worked to integrate the arrival of his Twenty-third Army Corps from Tennessee and to ensure the buildup of logistics necessary to meet Sherman’s intent of refitting his army. The three seaports at Wilmington, Morehead City, and New Bern saw the arrival of men and material almost daily. All this activity began to put a strain on the already limited transportation network in Eastern North Carolina. Key to supporting the operation logistically was the throughput of supplies from the coast to a
point in the vicinity of Goldsboro prior to Sherman’s arrival. The task proved difficult as Confederate forces under the direction of General Braxton Bragg, who had recently evacuated from the town of Wilmington and moved north up along the Wilmington and
Weldon Railroad line to Kinston. Kinston lays directly in the path of the rail moving from New Bern in the direction of Goldsboro.

Besides preparing for future combat with Bragg, issues in regards to logistics began to test Schofield and his staff. First and foremost were the repair of the railroad west towards Goldsboro and the buildup of supplies to refit Sherman’s army. Assisting Schofield was Sherman’s Chief Quartermaster Easton and Colonel Wright from the Railroad Department. Based on a visit between Grant and Schofield earlier in the month, the seaport at Morehead City was chosen as the site for the grand depot. Morehead City proved critical in the overall logistical support concept because the coastal town provided a quick an easy access for ocean going transports and a railroad that linked the coast to the interior of the state (figure 9).

Figure 9. The Port at Morehead City. Source: Departure of the Great Southern Expedition from Beauford, North Carolina (Photograph), Harpers Illustrated Weekly, 21 February 1863, 117.

Because of Morehead City’s importance logistically, General Easton established his headquarters’ location there and oversaw the construction of the grand supply depot. By this phase of the campaign, transportation requirements began to overwhelm not only
the capability of Easton’s assets but those at the strategic levels as well. First, Easton could not push daily the necessary amounts of supplies from Morehead City and beyond due to the limited rail assets. To alleviate the pressure from the railroad, Schofield issued guidance to Easton on 10 March to cease all movement of men and material not necessary for the support of operations at Goldsboro.

However, issues regarding transportation went beyond those under Easton’s control. In a letter to General Gilmore at Hilton Head, Major General Meigs, Quartermaster General of the Army, wrote that the “demands upon the ocean transports of the country are now enormous” and further specified that the “Southern ports have been nearly bare of vessels suited to our uses.”

Table 6 illustrates the number of vessels belonging to General Meigs in support of Sherman’s Carolina Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>Number of Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steamers</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooners</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Gilmore’s issue surfaced as he tried to procure transportation for the movement from the Savannah of close to 5,000 men area who belonged to Sherman’s army and who
were either to return to duty (recently released from the local hospitals) or actual replacements sent to Sherman’s army from the north.

When Sherman’s command was expanded to include the Department of the South and District of North Carolina, he also gained responsibility for the control of all vessels operating under contract for the War Department in the littoral regions of the departments. Responsibility for managing these transportation assets was delegated to Sherman’s Quartermaster Chief General Easton.

In addition to pre-positioning logistics stocks and material for railroad repair, the medical staff of Schofield’s command began preparations to receive Sherman’s personnel upon the linkup in Goldsboro. To meet the anticipated increase in medical requirements, the plan developed called for the establishment of temporary hospitals in the vicinity of Goldsboro to provide health care to those men not requiring evacuation. The soldiers with more serious illnesses or wounds would be transported to the Foster General Hospital in New Bern. The Foster General Hospital was increased to 1,500 and later further modified to handle up to 3,000 beds. This expansion was done taking into consideration the hospital’s close proximity to the rail line that ran west from the city in the direction of Kinston and Goldsboro.  

Along with the Foster Hospital in New Bern, the additional hospital the Mansfield was established in Beaufort, North Carolina, to facilitate patient overflow and patient evacuation from the seaport. The new Mansfield Hospital had a capacity of 600 beds. Ironically, Sherman’s Chief Quartermaster General Easton earlier in March had discontinued the old Mansfield Hospital in Morehead to use the buildings for storage of supplies being off-loaded at the port city.
On 8 March Sherman reached the community of Laurel Hill, North Carolina, roughly forty miles from his intended destination of Fayetteville. From here he attempted to open communications with the commanding officer in Wilmington by dispatching two separate couriers with the following message:

We are marching on Fayetteville; will be there Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, and then will march of Goldsborough. If possible send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyed to General Schofield that I expect to meet him bout Goldsborough. We are all well and have done finely. The rain makes our roads difficult, and may delay me abut Fayetteville, in which case I would like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee. We have an abundance of all else. I expect to reach Goldsborough by the 20th instant.  

The couriers reached Wilmington safely and the Union forces there immediately initiated efforts to open communications via the Cape Fear River towards Fayetteville. The next several days proved difficult for both wings in regards to mobility and foraging. The rain turned most roads into a quagmire requiring enormous labor efforts from the men detailed to escort the trains and the pioneer troops who preceded them. In addition to the problems with the wagon’s mobility, foraging in this part of the state proved difficult again for the army. The tall North Carolina pine trees that escorted Sherman’s men towards Fayetteville produced turpentine as a cash product for the region.

As Sherman approached the outskirts of Fayetteville his forces began to encounter an increase in Confederate resistance. Confederate Lieutenant General Wade Hampton caught Sherman’s cavalry chief Kilpatrick in a dawn attack just west of Fayetteville at Monroe’s Crossroads. The affair ended in a draw with both sides claiming a victory. Although Kilpatrick managed to escape with his command still intact, losses in regards to wounded, killed, and missing were significant enough to prevent his division from executing anything major beyond minor reconnaissance or foraging actions. While in
Fayetteville, Kilpatrick used the majority of his time while in Fayetteville refitting his command for future operations.

Hampton’s delay of the Federal cavalry provided enough time for Hardee’s main body of infantry and artillery to move through Fayetteville and cross the Cape Fear River ahead of Sherman’s forces. Knowing his army needed supplies, Sherman decided to remain in Fayetteville several days to accomplish this task. In order to set the conditions for his movement from Fayetteville, Sherman first positioned his entire army across the Cape Fear River where the men awaited the arrival of supplies from Wilmington. Secondly, he left one division, Baird’s of the Fourteenth Army Corps as a temporary occupying force in Fayetteville, with the responsibility of destroying the former Federal Arsenal and any other property deemed valuable in sustaining the Confederate war effort.

On 12 March as the army paused in Fayetteville, the arrival of the tug *Davidson* from Wilmington opened Sherman’s communication with the forces in Wilmington and the outside world for the first time since beginning the campaign (figure 10).

![Figure 10. The Army Tug Davidson](image)

The Davidson’s arrival in Fayetteville was the result of the couriers dispatched from Laurel Hill making it through the Confederate lines to Wilmington.

Sherman immediately provided situational updates to Grant and Halleck that described the condition of the army and his intentions for subsequent movements. In addition to the messages he sent to his superiors, he forwarded instructions to Schofield and his Quartermaster Chief Easton.

On 12 March Sherman wrote Schofield outlining his intentions for carrying out the remainder of the campaign. While in Fayetteville Sherman intended to refit the army as much as possible, to reinitiate movement no later than the fifteenth, and to anticipate the two meeting in about ten days. Sherman expected to form a junction with Schofield at Goldsboro, vicinity of the railroad bridge over the Neuse River. Sherman addressed matters related to transportation priorities, specifically rail and wagons were Sherman’s priorities. He desired repairs continue on the railroads linking the coast to Goldsboro from New Bern and Wilmington. So far throughout the campaign, Sherman’s army had collected enough wagons and mules to support an army of 100,000, and he relieved Schofield of the burdensome task of procuring and organizing this mode of transportation. Sherman still envisioned New Bern as the grand depot and requested the pre-positioning of forage, clothing, and provisions be stocked there. He conveyed confidence in victory to his subordinate when he wrote: “With my present force, and with yours and Terry’s added we can go wherever we can live.” Sherman continued by saying, “We can live where the people do, and if anybody has to suffer let them suffer let them suffer.”

21
The same day he wrote Schofield, Sherman sent a separate message to Wilmington addressed to either Generals Easton or Beckwith. Sherman was unsure as to the exact location of his quartermaster chief. As he had done in Schofield’s message, he reiterated the logistic status of his army but in more detail as to what specifically was needed and how he envisioned the conduct of future logistics operations. Sherman’s immediate priority for resupply was for shoes, socks, draws, and trousers. Sherman expected his men to receive an “entire equipment of clothing” upon the army’s arrival at Goldsboro.\textsuperscript{22} The march so far through the Carolinas required the men to operate an excessive amount of time wading in water in the execution of their duties. Such activity quickly wore out uniform items and footwear in large numbers.

Sherman implies to the two logisticians that he envisioned Goldsboro as an area for refitting the army. He wrote, “The moment you hear I am approaching Goldsborough forward to me clothing and bread, sugar and coffee and empty wagons will meet them.”\textsuperscript{23} As he had done with Schofield, Sherman relieved the two men of any responsibility for ensuring availability of wagon transportation.

On 14 March the steamer \textit{Howard} arrived from Wilmington with supplies. Quartermaster Dodge accompanied the vessel carrying sugar, coffee, and corn up the Cape Fear River. Unfortunately, the two items most needed were uniforms and footwear. The corn actually became a joke amongst the men in the army because they had collected so much along route from Savannah they had plenty they could sell to the Quartermaster in Wilmington. As Sherman halted briefly in Fayetteville, additional vessels laden with supplies navigated up the river to Fayetteville from the coast. Eventually shoes arrived
but not in the quantities deemed necessary by the commanders. All total, Terry in Wilmington sent to Fayetteville 3,800 pairs of shoes and 2,400 pairs of pants.²⁴

Prior to the vessels returning back down the river to Wilmington, patients requiring evacuation were embarked at Fayetteville. According to Sherman’s Chief Surgeon John Moore, “about three hundred sick and a few wounded were sent on the river transports to Wilmington.”²⁵

To continue the deception of his intended final destination, Sherman asked Captain Young of the navy in Wilmington to continue traffic along the Cape Fear River as to convey the intention of establishing a permanent logistics base at Fayetteville. To the commander of the gunboat fleet in Wilmington he wrote, “I would like to produce the effect of a design to establish a base, which, of course I do not propose to do.”²⁶ Sherman’ distrust of journalists caused the need for such a deception. In corresponding with Terry at Wilmington he wrote, “Our foolish Northern journalists have published the fact that I am aiming for New Berne, a fact that I had concealed from everybody not necessarily I my confidence.”²⁷ By observing the vessel traffic transporting logistics supplies between Port Royal, South Carolina, and New Berne the plan was compromised by the papers.

Additionally, as a precursor to the army’s movement was the passing off of many thousands of refugees and contraband slaves. The numbers had grown significantly since his departure from Columbia and had become a drain on his limited logistic resources. In describing the situation to Grant, Sherman wrote, “I could leave here tomorrow, but want to clear my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber me.”²⁸
Sherman estimated the number of refugees in his formation to be between twenty and thirty thousand “useless mouths.” His plan for dealing with the refugees was to move the entire amount to Wilmington, and from there, proper care was to be administered upon waiting disposition. As many as possible were to be backhauled on the vessels shuttling back and forth between Fayetteville and Wilmington. The remaining would travel over land in vehicles or on captured horses via the town of Clinton and arrive eventually in Wilmington. Responsibility for escorting the group overland was Major John A. Winson, from the 116th Illinois Infantry along with about 200 men from the army whose enlistments had expired. In addition, Sherman ordered each wing and the cavalry to “turn over to him [Winson] all such refugees, with such wagons, horses, and mules, . . . to facilitate the journey, with a small supply of flour, bacon, and beef-cattle.”

On the morning of 15 March Sherman once again put his army in motion. In the lead was the Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division, which preceded Slocum’s Left Wing along the Fayetteville and Raleigh Plank road. Slocum’s Left Wing moved in a northerly direction in an effort to feint towards Raleigh, but would turn northeast upon reaching the town of Averasboro, twenty miles to the north. Howard’s Right Wing moved in a more northeasterly direction towards Goldsboro. For the first time in the campaign, the army traveled much closer to enable them be more responsive in the event one or other needed assistance. In addition, the trains of the Left Wing intentionally traveled parallel with the maneuver division in an effort to place combat power between the Confederates and the logistics assets. Slocum assigned General Geary, Commander of the Second Division, Twentieth Army Corps, the responsibility of guarding the wagons of the Left Wing.
Geary describes the organization of his trains as being comprised of the following: “First, Second, and Third Divisions, Twentieth Corps trains, corps supply, and artillery ammunition trains, Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division train, Michigan Engineers, train, pontoon train, in all nearly 1,100 vehicles.”

Sherman modified from his former march design because of the presence of Johnston’s Confederate forces. Sherman wrote of his old adversary, “We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro.” The Union commander was confident of victory but fearful of what Johnston may attempt. He wrote, “I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro in compact form.”

Late during the evening of 15 March Sherman received news from Terry that forces under Schofield’s command had defeated Bragg’s Confederate forces at Kinston and had occupied the town. In addition to the victory at Kinston, Terry informed Sherman that he was moving his forces north along the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad and should form a juncture with Schofield in several days. The capture of Kinston eliminated any doubt in Sherman’s mind as to the feasibility of Goldsboro as his juncture point with the Union forces coming from the coast. In thanking Terry for the good news, he described Kinston, as, “of great importance, for thence to Goldsborough there are no bridges.”

As Sherman’s army moved in the direction of Goldsboro, a significant change occurred in the operational environment of the campaign. Up until now the most significant enemy activity occurred shortly before the occupation of Fayetteville at Monroe’s Crossroads.
The first major combat action was to occur against Hardee’s command, who upon their evacuation of Fayetteville had moved north along the Fayetteville and Raleigh Plank Road to the vicinity of Smithville, about five miles south of Averasboro. The area was named after the prominent Smith family who owned major residences, most notably three homes that were used by both the Union and Confederates as temporary hospitals and headquarters. Here Hardee decided to contest the movement north of Kilpatrick’s Cavalry and Slocum’s Left Wing.

The Battle of Averasboro began on the afternoon of 15 March when Kilpatrick’s lead brigade encountered Hardee’s first line of works constructed to block any movement further north along the plank road towards Raleigh. Utilizing a defense in depth, Hardee employed his two divisions between a series of three constructed lines of works. By the evening hours of 15 March Hardee had successfully blocked the movement of Kilpatrick’s cavalry. Kilpatrick realizing he faced determined Confederate infantry from prepared positions requested infantry support to help clear the blocked route.

That evening elements of the Twentieth Army Corps began a night march in the direction of the Averasboro. Fighting resumed at dawn on 16 March with more and more Federal forces of the Twentieth Army Corps arriving to support Kilpatrick. By the afternoon hours the full weight of Slocum’s Left Wing began to push Hardee’s forces back to his third and final line of defense. With cessation of fighting at nightfall, the Federal’s were now positioned to initiate action the next morning in order to clear Hardee out the way. Outnumbered and in danger of being flanked Hardee chose to withdraw during the evening hours of 16 March.
During the course of the battle problems with Union logistics support occurred in regards to transportation, ammunition, and medical support. The terrible conditions of the roads brought on by continuous rainfall made difficult the movement of any logistic support by Sherman’s wagons. Slocum’s problems were compounded by the lack of a suitable road network. The Fayetteville and Raleigh Plank Road was a narrow route in which both Sherman’s entire cavalry division and Slocum’s Left Wing moved on to reach Averasboro. The effects of such heavy traffic quickly made the road a quagmire for the movement of foot marching infantry let alone wagon traffic. The single route invited disaster with its capability diminished greatly due to the weather.

The road’s degraded movement capacity affected the movement of troop formations and distribution of supplies during the battle. Competition for space resulted on the road between combat units moving north to join the battle and the supply wagons of those units already engaged in the fighting. Delays occurred as supply wagons awaited passage of infantry formations and vice versa.

Ammunition resupply problems occurred because of a combination of both distribution and availability. The ordnance trains of several units were unable to move forward fast enough due to the degraded capability of the road. Besides distribution, the availability of the ammunition affected the performance of the Ninth Ohio Cavalry Regiment. The weather had rendered the unit’s ammunition “utterly worthless” and resupply impossible. The Ninth Ohio was one of the few regiments in Sherman’s Army armed with the Smith Carbine. Because the Smith Carbine fired a special round, immediate resupply was not available from the ordnance trains. Overall, the fighting at
Averasboro consumed enough ammunition that it required the immediate resupply of twenty wagonloads of small arms and six wagonloads of artillery.\textsuperscript{36}

The third and final logistic shortfall occurred because Hardee’s determined resistance at Averasboro resulted in an unanticipated heavy number of wounded for Sherman. Total losses in Slocum’s Left Wing and Kilpatrick’s Cavalry resulting from the action at Averasboro was 95 killed and 533 wounded.\textsuperscript{37} The aftermath of the battle created significant problems for the medical staffs of both armies in regards to treatment and evacuation of the wounded. The 533 wounded Federals quickly exceeded the capability of the ambulances positioned forward with the lead divisions of both the Twentieth and Fourteenth Army Corps.

Roughly fourteen miles to the southeast, Geary’s Division escorted the remaining elements of the corps wagon trains. Based on the intensity of combat during the course of 16 March, Geary was sent instructions that evening from the Twentieth Army Corps Headquarters to immediately “send all empty wagons and ambulances possible to the corps to transport wounded.”\textsuperscript{38} The train was organized and placed under the charge of Captain Summers, assistant quartermaster of Third Brigade, but because of the traffic conditions of the road the element did not depart until around 6:00 a.m. the following morning. By noon on the seventeenth, Geary received another message from the corps headquarters to send an additional wagon from the consolidated trains “loaded with hard bread and coffee for the wounded.”\textsuperscript{39}

The morning of 17 March revealed the reality of the situation when Sherman’s men discovered abandoned Confederate positions and with them the disturbing realities of the consequences of war. Unfortunately to the demise of both the local residences and
the Federal surgeons, hundreds of abandoned Confederate wounded were left in the surrounding areas with the hope that mercy and better care were forthcoming. John McBride of the 33rd Indiana described the Confederate retreat along the road from Smithville to Averasboro as “disorderly and demoralizing” based on the scene of how “rejected wagons and ambulances were filled with the enemy’s dead and dying and wounded.” Nothing more than limited health care was provided, and those lucky enough to survive became dependant upon the good graces of the locals. No government issued rations or medical supplies were left behind to aid in the care of the Confederate wounded. The Federal surgeons remained in the area long enough only to stabilize Sherman’s wounded and coordinate their evacuation on army ground transportation assets. To make up for the shortfall in ambulances, the wounded men were transported in supply wagons (figure 11).

Because such a large number of wounded men required transportation in the wagons, the ninety-five men killed in action were given temporary burials in the grounds surrounding the makeshift field hospitals. Slocum directed the Twentieth Army Corps Commander to “make details for interring all the dead, keeping an exact of the number, our own and rebel.” The detail of men performed the task under the direction of the provost marshal for the purpose of burying their deceased comrades. These Union men were not only responsible for burying their own men but their antagonists as well. The soldier in 31st Wisconsin Abel C. Stelle was on that detail and remembered on 17 March how he helped bury “thirty-nine Johnnies in one line of works.” The Union soldiers buried in Smithville were later transferred to a Federal cemetery established in Raleigh, North Carolina.

The Federals believed the road to Goldsboro opened with Hardee’s retreat in the direction of Smithfield. Slocum ordered the Fourteenth Army Corps to assume the lead element of the Left Wing, and proceed in the direction of Goldsboro.

As the Slocum’s Left Wing resumed its moment towards Goldsboro, unbeknownst to the Federal commanders, Johnston had concentrated his army. Hardee’s delay at Averasboro bought Johnston the time necessary to concentrate enough combat power capable of possibly defeating an isolated element of Sherman’s army. Johnston realized the only opportunity he had entailed catching an isolated corps of Sherman’s army in a surprise attack. Circumstances just so happened to occur near the village of Bentonville, where on the morning of 19 March Johnston initiated a surprise attack against Davis’s Fourteenth Army Corps. Johnston initially had success, but Confederate
leadership blunders cost him the initiative and allowed Slocum the opportunity to concentrate enough forces to repulse the Southerners offensive élan.

The arrival of Howard’s Right Wing on 20 March allowed Sherman to wrestle the initiative totally away from Johnston. Despite the concentration of both Union Wings towards his front, Johnston’s Army remained in place despite the possibilities for disaster. By the third day of the battle, Johnston clearly beaten, risked everything by not withdrawing. He came close to disaster on 21 March when General Mower’s Division of the Seventeenth Army Corps initiated an unauthorized attack that penetrated Johnston’s flank. One of the most controversial decisions of the battle and the campaign came when Sherman ordered Mower to halt the assault and to return to his original position. Sherman clearly had Johnston in a desperate situation and chose to allow his adversary to withdraw. Johnston immediately set his army in motion by withdrawing towards Smithfield. With the close of the battle, the Carolina Campaign had effectively come to an end. Upon completing care for the Union wounded, the army could now proceed towards Goldsboro, where Schofield and Terry commands were due to arrive in several days.

Sherman felt that the logistic status of his army prevented him from carrying an all-out assault against Johnston’s force at Bentonville. In his memoirs he writes, “We had been out from Savannah since the latter part of January, and our wagon-trains contained but little food.” With news of Schofield and Terry approaching Goldsboro, Sherman felt it was in his best interests to keep the army in place and start the trains in motion towards Schofield for resupply. His ambulance resources were stretched thin and needed to travel almost twenty-five miles to complete the journey to Goldsboro.
The fighting over the three-day period has made the Battle of Bentonville one of the bloodiest battles of the war during 1865.\textsuperscript{46} Sherman’s forces alone suffered in the action 194 killed and 1,112 wounded.\textsuperscript{47} Because of the intensity of the fight, the two areas of logistics impacting on the battle the most were ammunition resupply and combat health support.

The amount of ammunition expenditure for Sherman’s artillery helps to illustrate the ferocity of the fight. The three Twentieth Army Corps artillery batteries engaged in the battle alone consumed 460 rounds of ammunition. This explains why Geary, still performing escort duty for the Twentieth Army Corps trains at the time of the battle once again received an order to send immediately forward “all remaining ambulances and all the empty wagons of the corps, also the ammunition and supply wagons.”\textsuperscript{48}

The intensity of the battle resulted in large numbers of wounded requiring medical care. The Union surgeons established hospitals at various locations on the battlefield, the most notable being the Fourteenth Army Corps hospital located at the private residence of John Harper. The two-story home served an estimated 500 Union wounded. Surgeon Moore wrote in his campaign report that “although this battle occurred nearly at the close of a long march of two months’ duration, without an opportunity of replenishing supplies, there was no lack of any article essential to the comfort of the wounded.”\textsuperscript{49}

Following the battle, Confederate Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Griffith, 1st Kentucky Cavalry, sent scouts back towards the direction of Bentonville in an effort to gather intelligence in regards to the losses suffered by the Federals. His scouts reported the locals as saying, “They [Federals] employed all their ambulances and 200 wagons
constantly and actively, from Sunday afternoon until Thursday night, removing their dead and wounded. They admit a heavy loss in the Fourteenth Army Corps. 50

The activity Griffith observed was elements of the Right Wing and Kilpatrick’s Cavalry who Sherman had directed to remain at Bentonville through 22 March in order to bury the dead and remove the wounded. 51

Sherman proceeded in the direction of Goldsborough ahead of his wings. He made contact with General Terry’s command first near Cox Bridge and then the two men proceeded to ride into Goldsboro where the two of them met General Schofield on 23 March, thus completing the junctures of the armies. By 24 March both wings of Sherman’s Army had arrived at Goldsboro and initiated the process of refitting and reorganizing the army.

Sherman recalls the condition of his army as it arrived in Goldsboro when he writes:

We had in mid-winter accomplished the whole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days, averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reached Goldsboro’ with the army in superb order, and the trains almost as fresh as when we had started from Atlanta. 52

In contrast to Sherman’s description of his army, a soldier in Schofield’s Army described his men as “very hard . . . hatless head, frazzled pants, threadbare shirts, torn shoes or barefoot, faces blackened by Carolina pine smoke.” 53 Substantiating the above characterization of Sherman’s men is an account written by Lieutenant Colonel Abraham J. Seay of the 31st and 32nd Missouri Infantry (US). Seay writes:

Many of our men are without shoes and blankets, and but little clothing of any kind, but their health and morale were never better. They feel that under the leadership of “Old Tecumseh” one more short and vigorous campaign must end this the most wicked rebellion of modern times. We have marched over a hostile
country almost impassable by reason of its numerous swamps and streams, at a
season of the year when the weather is most unfavorable, subsisting on the
country.  

Sherman remained in Goldsboro for seventeen days until he completed the
refitting of his army. A total restructuring of the army occurred with the arrival of
Schofield’s Army of the Ohio. Sherman now commanded an army of over 90,000 men
consisting of three separate wings: Slocum’s left, Schofield’s center, and Howard’s right.  

So ended one of the US Army’s greatest military achievements during the
American Civil War. The Carolina Campaign lasted almost two months, in some of the
worst weather and terrain along a path that stretched over 400 miles. Sherman’s
accomplishment was nothing short of a logistic triumph. A major contribution to his
success was from the efforts of his logisticians who enabled his army to conduct such a
military operation.


3 Ibid., 260.

4 Joseph T. Glatthar, “Union Soldiers and Their Attitudes on Sherman’s Savannah

5 Glatthar, *Union Soldiers and Their Attitudes on Sherman’s Savannah and
Carolina Campaigns*, 197.

6 Ibid., 210.


9 Ibid., 287.

10 Bradley, *Last Stand in the Carolinas: Battle of Bentonville*, 37.

12 Sherman, Memoirs, 2, 299.

13 Ibid., 292.

14 Slocum, Sherman’s March from Savannah to Bentonville, 687.

15 Sherman, Memoirs, 2, 292.


17 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47 pt 2, 736.

18 Surgeon General’s Office, United States Army, The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War, vol. 2 (formerly The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion), (Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1990), 240.

19 Ibid., 240.


25 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 188.


30 Sherman, Memoirs, 2, 298.


32 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 693.


36 OR, ser.1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 693.


38 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 693.


40 John Randall McBride, *History of Thirty-Third Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry During the Four Years of the Civil War, from Sept. 16, 1861 to July 21, 1865* (Indianapolis: Wm. R. Buford, 1900), 173.


46 Bradley, *Last Stand in the Carolinas: Battle of Bentonville*, 404.

47 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 76.


49 OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, 188.


51 Barrett, *Sherman’s March Through the Carolinas*, 185.


93
Glatthar, *Union Soldiers and Their Attitudes on Sherman’s Savannah and Carolina Campaigns*, 12.

55
CHAPTER 5
CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

The challenge for the logistician is determining the correct amount to ensure neither too meager or too excessive is the case.\(^1\)

In the current operating environment, commanders and their staff face the challenging task of determining the right balance of logistics support required to sustain assigned combat forces. This balanced force mixture is referred to as the “tooth-to-tail ratio.” Sherman faced the same challenge prior to the conduct of his Carolina Campaign. In order to logistically sustain his army Sherman chose to carry out the campaign based upon his previous successes. The benefit of proven methods, allowed Sherman to balance the force mixture in regards to tooth to tail. He eliminated nonessential cargo and reduced the amount of artillery pieces to lessen the burden on logistics. Sherman prioritized supplies in regards to what is critical in regards to the campaign, such as ammunition, rations and medical items and reaffirmed the system of foraging as the means of logistics resupply.

Sherman as a commander recognized the importance of detailed logistic planning. The importance of integrating logistics support into a campaign plan was as true for General Sherman in the conduct of his Carolina Campaign as it is today. He understood that logistic support is an enabler that allows the generation and sustainment of combat operations. Sherman realized that it is the overall responsibility of the force commander to ensure integration of logistic support into overall operations. He integrated logistics throughout all phases of the campaign and all three levels of war, strategic through tactical.
During the Savannah Campaign, Sherman proved foraging successful as a means of sustaining his army at the tactical level. However, the requirements of the Carolina Campaign presented different challenges and required Sherman to analyze his logistics operations beyond the tactical level. Success during the campaign depended on both operational and strategic logistic support.

To facilitate an analysis of Sherman’s logistic support during the Carolina Campaign this chapter will use the eight CSS characteristics as defined in US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. The CSS characteristics help commanders and their staffs view the support considerations required to plan, prepare, and execute successful operations. These characteristics identified by the force commander “as having priority during an operation; become the foundation for preparing the concept of support.” The order the eight characteristics are discussed in this chapter has no relationship to priority, because their importance will vary with regard to each operation.

**Responsiveness**

The first characteristic, responsiveness, means “providing the right support in the right place at the right time.” The ability to forecast future operational requirements and accumulate their asset, while maintaining minimum reserves, is imperative for success. Previous logistic doctrine emphasized “stockpiling” as a means of anticipating future demands. In times of limited resources, stockpiling is counterproductive in regards to efficient operations.

Sherman’s arrival at Savannah and his ability to almost immediately set the army in motion for the Carolina Campaign occurred because supplies necessary to refit his army were on hand in pre-positioned vessels along the coast. The War Department’s
efforts to forecast future requirements and pre-position such assets forward along the coast enabled Sherman to regenerate combat power immediately upon his capture of Fort McAllister. The following order from the Quartermaster General of the Army Major General Meigs illustrates the steps taken by the US Army at the strategic level to support Sherman upon his arrival at the coast:

DECEMBER 6, 1864.

Bvt. Brigadier General S. VAN VLIET,
Quartermaster, New York:

GENERAL: General Sherman appears to be approaching the Atlantic coast, and it is determined to send supplies to meet him at Port Royal, or rather to await there until he establishes his base of supplies. In the letter of this office date November 3 last an estimate of supplies was sent to you for a force of 30,000 men. It is believed that the force with General Sherman will reach 60,000 men, of which 10,000 will be cavalry, and that he will have with him from sixty to eighty pieces of artillery, and about 30,000 horses and mules. . . . Colonel S. L. Brown, chief of the forage division, has been ordered to send daily to Port Royal forage for 30,000 animals. I notice that in the letter of 3rd of November last no blankets were ordered. I presume, however, that under the general order to send clothing to refit 30,000 men, General Vinton turned over to you a proper proportion of blankets. You will call upon General Vinton for the following clothing and equipage, which you will send to Port Royal as soon as possible, there to await news from General Sherman, which will determined the ultimate destination of the supplies. They will be subject to the orders of General Foster, through the chief quartermaster of the Department of the South, Major C. W. Thomas:

Clothing--30,000 sack coats; 30,000 trousers; 60,000 shirts; 60,000 pairs drawers; 60,000 pairs socks; 100,000 pairs shoes and boots; 20,000 forage caps; 10,000 greatcoats; 20,000 blankets, unless this number has already been shipped; 10,000 waterproof blankets. . . .

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General, Brevet Major-General. 4

In addition to the efforts described above, the logistics activities conducted along the coast of North Carolina at Morehead City provide an example of responsiveness at
both the strategic and operational levels. The War Department’s commitment and movement of additional railroad assets to the seaport enabled General Easton and Colonel Wright the ability to increase the distribution capability of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad. Sherman’s staff identified the railroad as lacking the necessary capacity to sustain the large movement of men and materiel inland as required for the later phase of the Carolina Campaign. In response, the War Department provided additional assets that allowed the Construction Corps, augmented with detailed men from available forces to put the railroad in suitable working order. Along with the repair of the railroad, the expansion of the wharf at Morehead City allowed for the discharge of up to eight vessels simultaneously.\textsuperscript{5} Table 7 depicts the amount of materiel shipped in response to the identified shortfall.

Table 7. Rail Movement from 15 February to 1 May 1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Number of Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morehead City</td>
<td>Front</td>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Berne</td>
<td>Front</td>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morehead City</td>
<td>Front</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Incidents occurred during the campaign that illustrate a failure of the logistic system to provide responsive logistics support to Sherman’s Army. The inability of the US Army to resupply Sherman’s men at Fayetteville with uniform items, particularly shoes and stockings exposed weaknesses in the campaign support plan. Major Thomas
W. Osborn, the Right Wing’s Chief of Artillery, expressed his utter disappointment in regards to the failure to resupply the army with uniform items. He wrote:

"One vessel loaded with forage for animals has come up, much to the disgust of all concerned, when hard bread and clothing could just as well have been sent up. Sending this steamer with forage shows a great lack of appreciation by the commander at Wilmington of the real necessities of this Army." 6

Although Major Osborn’s words expressed the general consensus of the situation, the failure occurred because insufficient quantities did not reach the theater from strategic depots in the North. Or in the case of those supplies available, the Quartermaster Department had pre-positioned the bulk of shoes up the coast at Morehead City. The location of the logistic base at Morehead City did not allow for the rapid resupply of Sherman at Fayetteville. Sherman delayed resuming his movement in Fayetteville to allow for the possibility of receiving critical items of supply. A minimal amount of uniform items arrived in Fayetteville the day after Sherman resumed his march towards Goldsboro. Upon notification of receipt of these items, Sherman directed the two wing commanders to divide the numbers between their formations. By not anticipating and pre-positioning the necessary uniform requirements at Wilmington, resupply of Sherman’s army did not occur.

**Simplicity**

The next characteristic, simplicity, is defined as “avoiding complexity in both planning and executing CSS operations.” 7 A method of ensuring simplicity in logistics planning is to rely on those methods that are time proven in regards to standard operating procedures. Sherman’s past campaign experiences provided such methods in regards to logistic support during the campaign. The techniques used by his subordinates for
foraging, organization of the trains, and quantities of supply basic loads allowed Sherman to keep his support concept simple. By not changing the task organization of the army drastically, he kept unit integrity, which allowed for units to keep familiar techniques and procedures in regards to logistics the same as the previous campaign. The reduction in artillery pieces is the only major changed instituted by Sherman prior to departing Savannah. This action resulted in further simplifying the logistics support necessary by reducing the number of animals and wagons required to support the artillery.

Flexibility

The third characteristic is flexibility. Flexibility allows logistic support elements to adjust to “changing situations, missions, and concept of operations.”8 As a means to adjusting to changes, flexibility allows improvisation in order to overcome shortfalls in the current logistics plan or undefined circumstances.

Sherman’s staff and his subordinate commanders demonstrated flexibility in regards to the issue of displaced civilians and contraband slaves. These noncombatants impacted the campaign by burdening the logistic system in regards to food and transportation. When Sherman reached Fayetteville, North Carolina, his army had increased in upwards of 10,000 additional civilians. At Fayetteville, Sherman directed the evacuation of all noncombatants not employed by the force sent to the port city of Wilmington. To ensure safety and proper control, Sherman committed military forces from his army’s formation with the mission of evacuating the noncombatants. In addition to committing forces, Sherman authorized the use of government transportation to assist in the evacuation. Each vessel on its return trips to Wilmington backhauled as many noncombatants as possible. The evacuation allowed Sherman’s Army to unburden itself
of such additional logistical requirements. More importantly, it allowed Sherman the freedom of movement in regards to maneuvering his army to meet the potential threat of Johnston concentrating Confederate forces.

At the tactical level, the Battle of Averasboro brought about an unexpected large number of Union casualties. The number of wounded quickly exceeded the capability of the ambulances assigned to Slocum’s Left Wing. The shortfall in the number of available ambulances significantly degraded the ability to evacuate the wounded men off the battlefield. In addition, the wounded needed further transport to the planned general hospitals established in the Goldsboro vicinity. In order overcome this deficiency, the Left Wing used all available supply wagons as nonstandard evacuation means in order to overcome the problem. Those wagons not designated to carry critical supplies were detailed to the medical staff for use as transport.

An element of flexibility is the ability to improvise in order to overcome shortages or acquire additional sources of supply. During Sherman’s occupation of Fayetteville, the medical staff of the Fourteenth Army Corps captured a quantity of medical supplies consisting of quinine and morphine, which they promptly issued out to the division hospitals.9

**Attainability**

Following flexibility is the characteristic of attainability. Attainability is the actions which commanders generate “the minimum essential supplies and services to begin operations.”10 This precludes unnecessary stockpiling or commitment of limited logistics resources, such as transportation assets to nonmission essential tasks.
Throughout the campaign commanders and their staff exhibited an understanding of the importance of attainability. For example, Sherman wasted little time in preparing his army for movement into the Carolinas. He issued specific guidance necessary for his staff and subordinates to plan accordingly. In previous campaigns during the war, army commanders used logistics as a reason for lack of military action. One such example is General Rosecrans, who in preparation for his upcoming Tullahoma Campaign in early 1863 balked for weeks at the War Departments urging to initiate movement. Sherman’s leadership personality did not tolerate such delays. He did not allow problems with logistics preparations to totally influence his judgment as to when the army initiated movement. Sherman knew the acceptable levels of risks in regards to his supply levels and planned accordingly. As a commander, he understood the concept that as long as his army remained idle it consumed supplies. Remaining inactive to allow for logistics buildup is not always the suitable option.

**Sustainability**

The fifth characteristic, sustainability is “the ability to maintain continuous support during all phases of campaigns, and major operations.” Logistics planners must identify the support requirements necessary throughout the operation and synchronize the delivery of such assets.

Sherman’s words, “Where other people live we can.” are based on his operational experiences gained from his previous two campaigns of Atlanta and Savannah. Sherman authorized the use of foraging as the primary means of sustaining the army in preparation for the Carolina Campaign. As the army consumed government supplies from the trains, foraging allowed for the units to replenish those stocks issued. Overall
the concept proved successful during the campaign; however, at times units failed to acquire or receive resupply. Sherman himself noted the danger of relying on foraging when he described to his wife the following situation: “As long as we move we can gather food and forage, but as soon as we stop trouble begins.”\textsuperscript{13}

Typically, shortfalls resulted because of a unit’s position in the line of march. A brigade tasked to perform escort duty for the trains usually reached camp late in the night and received the last of items remaining from the days forage activities. The second shortfall in regards to foraging is the unlawful acts perpetrated against the civilian populace. At times acts of indiscriminate destruction occurred along the route that had nothing to do with acquiring subsistence for the army. The Right Wing Commander, General Howard explained the shortcomings of foraging when he wrote: “In spite of every precaution to check it, the system of foraging operated to loosen the restraints of discipline, and many acts were committed that every right-minded officer deprecates.”\textsuperscript{14}

Foraging demonstrated the ability to replenish perishable items; however, the lack of no established line of communication to the rear prevented resupply of other necessary supplies, such as uniform items. The hardships of the campaign exacted a heavy toll on the uniforms of the men. Shortages existed prior to departing Savannah and only increased as the army moved through the Carolinas. By the time the men reached Goldsboro, the situation had reached emergency levels. Sherman’s staff failed to account for the hardships of the campaign and plan accordingly. At the time of the army’s departure from the Savannah area, there existed no replacement items for soldier clothing in the trains. Surprisingly, the lack of proper clothing for the men did not affect the daily sick call rate for Sherman’s army, which compared favorably to his previous campaigns.
This is an amazing fact considering the Carolina Campaign occurred during the winter months in such damp, cold weather. Credit is due to Sherman’s medical staff in their efforts of purging the army of men not capable of operating in the rigorous environment brought on by the campaign.

Several shortfalls occurred during the campaign, specifically in regards to ammunition resupply. During the Battle of Averasboro, several commanders in Kilpatrick’s Cavalry were unable to carry out orders to attack because their units had exhausted their ammunition loads. These units were subsequently placed in reserve to allow time for the ammunition trains to come up from the rear. The shortage was caused by two factors. First, the ammunition trains could not reach the front due to the congestion and poor conditions of the road. Second, one regiment, which carried the Smith Carbine, discovered the wet conditions caused by the weather rendered their ammunition unserviceable. Because the Smith Carbine required a specific cartridge, the unit was unable to take advantage of captured ordnance acquired in the Confederate arsenals at Columbia, Cheraw, and Fayetteville.

In the area of combat health support the medical staffs were responsive to the needs of Sherman’s Army at all three levels of logistics. The one noted deficiency at the tactical level occurred in ambulance availability. Further analysis revealed that the closer the army was geographically to a major line of communication the impact in evacuation time was minimal. For example, Private August Winters, Company M, 5th Ohio Cavalry, received wounds to his head and arm during the Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads on 10 March. Between, 12 and 14 March, Private Winters was evacuated down river from Fayetteville to Wilmington and by 30 March was admitted to the Grant Hospital in
New York Harbor. Total time of evacuation was twenty days. His evacuation is a great example because it demonstrates evacuation utilizing tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level assets.\(^{15}\)

In comparison, Private John H. Sechler, Company H, 21st Wisconsin Infantry, wounded on 19 March at the Battle of Bentonville did not reach Foster General Hospital in New Bern until on or about 5 April. A total evacuation time of seventeen days transpired to position Private Sechler at a port of embarkation for transport north to Grant Hospital in New York Harbor.\(^{16}\) Several factors contributed to this time period. First, the effect was felt immediately by the shortage of ambulances. Second, the distance from the Bentonville battlefield to the port at New Bern was much greater than from Monroe’s Crossroads to Fayetteville.

**Survivability**

Next is the characteristic of survivability. It is imperative to safeguard support functions or supplies from destruction or degradation. Survivability is those efforts necessary to prevent enemy forces from effecting logistic operations.

Threats to logistics infrastructures concerned Sherman as he developed his campaign support plan. Sherman initially envisioned New Berne as the primary logistics support base and stressed his concerns over its apparent vulnerability to perceive Confederate attacks. He advised the commander of forces in New Berne Brigadier General Palmer to take the necessary actions to ensure combat forces stationed at the port city prepared themselves for an eventual movement of Confederate forces in the city’s direction.
At the tactical level, standard operating procedures during the campaign called for the assignment of a division from each corps with the responsibility of providing support to the consolidated corps trains. Each division commander assigned the task for that day allocated whatever resources manpower wise he felt necessary to perform the mission. Typically a brigade-sized force performed the duties of escort for the trains with the primary task of protecting the wagons from marauding Confederate cavalry. In reality, the detailed men augmented teamsters in facilitating a rapid movement of the wagons by working to clear mired wagons. Weather impacted the operations of the trains more so than the enemy did. The terrible weather that occurred made movement of the wagons very difficult along the march routes. The majority of accounts written by soldiers who performed trains duty recalled such activity as their most unpleasant. Train duty was exhaustive work for the men who operated for hours wading in the freezing waters and mud.

Throughout the campaign few incidences occurred where the trains of the army came under direct enemy action. The capture of eight wagons on 19 March near Bentonville is the campaign’s greatest single loss due to the enemy. Besides the weather, the second greatest threat to the trains happened to be from the army’s own ranks. Pilferaging of government stocks from the trains caused a concern amongst the commanders in the Left Wing.17

Another aspect of survivability is reflected in the joint service operations of the campaign. The use of gunboat escorts by the navy in support of logistic resupply operations occurred in both the Savannah and North Carolina phases of the campaign. The photo in figure 10 shows the tugboat Davidson moving up the Cape Fear River in an
effort to establish communications with Sherman at Fayetteville, North Carolina. Closer examination of the illustration shows a gunboat performing escort duty. The eighty-mile movement occurred along stretches in the river that Confederate Cavalry and local militia attempted to interdict Union vessels with small arms fire and field artillery.

Economy

Economy is the efforts taken by commanders to provide the most efficient logistic support for accomplishment of the mission when resources available are limited. Prioritization and allocation of logistics assets are considered as means to overcome resource shortfalls.

As men and material began to flow into the port at Morehead City, the distribution system became overwhelmed. In an effort to alleviate the congestion and competition for rail movement from Morehead City, Schofield issued guidance as to what had priority for movement along the railroad. By prioritizing certain supplies and units for movement, Schofield facilitated a steady movement towards Goldsboro.¹⁸

At the operational level, Sherman issued instructions to Easton and Schofield that the Twenty-third Army Corps wagons were not needed and to halt their movement by vessels to the Carolina coast from up North. Sherman based this decision on the army’s success in acquiring large numbers of additional supply wagons during the march through the Carolinas. This order decreased the burden on an already heavily committed maritime shipping fleet. Although the guidance proved effective in eliminating demands on vessels usage, it proved counterproductive in that it hindered the cross-country movement of supplies inland from the railheads later in the campaign. The shortage of
wagons created distribution shortfalls for Schofield as his forces tried to push supplies out from the rail.

During the campaign commanders regulated the daily ration issue for certain types of supply items. Such control restrictions were necessary when unit foragers encountered difficulties in acquiring local subsistence. Brigadier General N. I. Jackson, Commander, First Division, Twentieth Army Corps, instituted the following control measures: “During the early part of the month only one-half rations of coffee, sugar, and hard bread were issued to the troops, and on the eleventh the rations were ordered to one-quarter rations.”

Integration

The final logistic characteristic is integration. The logisticians must have a clear understanding of the commander’s intent for the conduct of an operation to ensure proper synchronization. The success of the campaign is a direct result of the proper integration of logistics planning and execution into the overall concept of the operation. Sherman issued clear guidance as to how he envisioned the logistics preparation of North Carolina to occur in anticipation of his army’s arrival. By selecting a geographical spot on the map (Goldsboro) as a place to refit his army, Sherman allowed the opportunity for Easton and other logistic staff members to plan properly.

Logistics operations are planned to allow flexibility that enables military forces to receive uninterrupted support throughout an operation even in the event of unexpected changes in conditions. To ensure success it is imperative that the logistics planners strike a balance in regards to the right amount of support that is to be provided to the commander. Sherman accomplished a correct balance of logistic support for use during
the Carolina Campaign. At times shortfalls arose, but his staff and subordinate commanders reacted well to unexpected changes. What sets this campaign apart from his previous is its success weighed heavily not only on the immediate logistical operations under his control but others outside his tactical view. To ensure success Sherman coordinated the logistical support from assets at the strategic level as well as operations. As the force commander, Sherman developed a concept of support that met the force’s needs and ensured that it allowed for flexibility and accommodation in the event of changing situations. The success of his Carolina Campaign is in part due to Sherman’s focus on logistics preparations.


3 Ibid., 12-2.


8 Ibid.


11 Ibid.


15 Surgeon General’s Office, United States Army, *The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War*, vol. 7, 15.

16 Ibid., 194.


CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The US Army operates in an environment where missions range in scope from armed conflict to humanitarian support. These differences in the operational environment present challenges that require detailed planning and execution in regards to logistics support. These challenges that military commanders and logisticians face in the twenty-first century are the same Sherman and his staff encountered during the planning and conduct of the Carolina Campaign.

During the campaign, Sherman’s Army encountered the full spectrum of operations as defined in present day US Army doctrine. These operations ranged from high intensity combat, such as the Battle of Bentonville, to stability and support operations in regards to the handling of thousands of displaced civilians and contraband slaves accompanying the army. The campaign is best remembered for Sherman’s ability to conduct such operations independent from any established supply base or lines of communications. The forty-five-day campaign took an army of over 60,000 men through two states without the security of an established rear line of communication. The success of this operation is in part due to Sherman’s understanding of logistics. Previous historical works on the Carolina Campaign focused a great deal on the system of foraging and Sherman’s famous “bummers” as the answer to logistics support. Foraging played a significant part in the campaign at the tactical level, but other key aspects of logistics ensured Sherman’s success. The War Department invested significant energy and resources into supporting Sherman at the operational and strategic levels as well.
The logistic analysis conducted by both Sherman’s staff and bureau members under the War Department prior to the campaign illustrates the benefits of proper staff estimations and planning. Sherman and his staff had an excellent understanding as to the expected logistics support. Their ability to conceptualize the campaign through the Carolinas allowed them to anticipate the necessary support to refit Sherman’s Army upon its arrival in North Carolina. Other areas significant in the success of campaign are the transportation support provided at the operational and strategic levels, the use of local resources and manpower to supplement military forces, and a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent by the logisticians.

In addition to the successes, this thesis shows that problems existed in regards to overall logistics operations. Keeping the men supplied proved difficult at times and illustrates the shortcomings of operating an army in the field with no logistical support to fall back on. The concept of support plan failed to take into consideration the hardships that accompany a campaign of this magnitude. Subsequently, shortfalls in uniform items quickly surfaced as issues by the time Sherman reached Fayetteville, North Carolina. Foraging proved effective the majority of time; however, incidents occurred where units did not receive a resupply of local items and were forced to restrict the daily issues of government rations.

The execution of Sherman’s logistics operations during the Carolina Campaign holds lessons for today’s military. This thesis concludes there are several lessons that are relevant in military operations today and will highlight three of them.

The first lesson is that the logistics function of transportation influenced greatly the success of the Carolina Campaign. The transportation of men and material consumed
large amounts of time and energy from Sherman’s quartermasters as well as those responsible for planning and executing at the strategic level, like General Meigs. By December of 1864, the victories won by Union forces had sliced the Confederacy up in terms of geographical regions. This success created an enormous demand on the Quartermaster Department to provide transportation support. General Meigs in discussing the seriousness of the situation wrote:

> The demands upon the department at this time compelled it to take into its service not the fleet which it had gradually acquired by purchase, but nearly every new steam vessel that had been built in the United States to navigate the ocean.¹

The additional requirements generated in support of Sherman’s precampaign operations and those necessary by Schofield along the coast of North Carolina only compounded the problem for Meigs. The Quartermaster Department accomplished such a monumental feat at a time when transportation resources were scarce. Officers today face the same challenges in strategic air and sealift. The Carolina Campaign emphasizes the importance of prioritization and proper integration between the logistic and operational planner in order to negate or overcome such transportation shortfalls.

The availability of transportation for the movement of material at the strategic level allowed Sherman the freedom to maneuver his army as he did operationally. Contingency plans anticipated the possibility of emergency resupply from points along the South Carolina coast. In the event things proved drastic for Sherman in during his movement within the interior regions of South Carolina, the option of breaking out towards the coast existed.

Secondly, the campaign demonstrated the importance of a commander and staff conducting a thorough logistics preparation of the theater. Sherman possessed an ability
to see beyond the tactical level and visualize the support necessary at the operational and strategic levels as well. The intent he conveyed to his staff and subordinates clearly illustrated what he envisioned the logistic infrastructure in North Carolina to provide. Along with a strong commander’s guidance, the logistics staff had a clear understanding of the capabilities already present along the North Carolina coast. Sherman’s logistics planners performed an outstanding job of matching requirements against present capabilities and determined the right amount of resources to negate shortfalls. During the Carolina Campaign examples occurred whereby the existing logistics support structure required expansion in order to fulfill the overall operational requirements. The Port of Morehead City’s capability and the repair of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad originating from there illustrate how requirements were determined and resources in the form of labor and material were allocated. Morehead City’s expansion proves relevant in current times because the army utilized a combination of both military, local civilian labor, and private contractors.

The third lesson to take from the campaign is the cause and effect operations other than war had on the conduct of military operations. The Carolina Campaign presented problems at a scope that required Sherman’s attention. The issue of displaced civilians turned into a politically sensitive concern for the Lincoln administration based on the events of surrounding the actions of one of Sherman’s subordinate divisions during the Savannah Campaign.\(^2\) Sherman defended his subordinate’s action, but the issue of displaced civilians required greater care in the future. As the army moved through the Carolinas thousands of civilian refugees joined the ranks of his force. The complement of civilians consisted of all facets of Southern society ranging from influential families to
poor white farmers. Many of these civilians had strong Union sympathies, which complicated the issue because these people looked upon Sherman as their hope. In addition to the many whites, thousands of former slaves joined and traveled with the formations of the army. All these groups of civilians placed additional burdens on Sherman’s subordinate commanders and staffs.

The campaign offers the opportunity for further study, specifically in the areas of support to displaced civilians and cooperation between military and nongovernmental organizations. The candidate narrowed the focus of the thesis to cover a broader analysis of logistics operations. The impact displaced civilians had on Sherman’s military operations in the Carolinas is significant to justify future study.

The Carolina Campaign provided significant challenges to Union logisticians ranging from the tactical to strategic in nature. Officers today will find the study of the logistics operations carried out during Sherman’s campaign in the Carolinas very beneficial in their professional development. The success of the campaign resulted from Sherman’s ability to anticipate future requirements and coordinate the necessary support at both the operational and strategic levels. General Meigs’ report to the Secretary of War the Honorable Edwin M. Stanton sums up the success of the campaign logistically when he wrote:

This army of nearly 100,000 men needed to be entirely reclad and reshoed; the troops were to be fed while resting, for as soon as the army ceased its march it ceased to supply itself by foraging, and depended upon the supplies from the coast. Nevertheless, on the 7th of April I was able to inform General Sherman that the necessary supplies were in his camps. Every soldier had received a complete outfit of clothing and had been newly shod. The wagons were loaded with rations, and forage.³

Major General Jeff C. Davis, Commander of the Fourteenth Army Corps, was criticized in several newspapers for hastily dismantling his pontoon bridge over Ebenezer Creek. Such action resulted in several thousand contraband slaves being trapped on the other side in the face of approaching Confederate Cavalry. The papers accused Davis of open hostility towards the negroes.

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*Harpers Illustrated Weekly*, 14 February 1863, 102.


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