SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, HOW LARGE HAS THE AMERICAN POLITY (CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC) ALLOWED THE UNITED STATES ARMY TO BE?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


During the post-Cold War era (9 November 1989 to 10 September 2001) a number of factors influenced the American polity (Congress and the American public) with regards to the size of the U.S. Army. The research question investigates how these factors influenced the U.S. Army size and whether the Army ever was not ready to conduct assigned missions because of these factors. These influences began with the fall of the Berlin Wall and continued with the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union. The need for a large military force diminished when the USSR imploded and the US was the sole remaining superpower. The American polity called for a “peace dividend” and a dramatic drawdown of Army budget outlays and force structure occurred. The attitudes of the American public changed with regards to the military. A perceived military-civilian “gap” arose during this period of great turmoil. Also, during this period of time four Base Realignment and Closure commissions were conducted and reduced the Army infrastructure both in Continental United States and Overseas of Continental United States locations. The number of deployments that the Army conducted increased considerably, with more missions of peacekeeping and peace making rather than combat operations.
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<td>AFV</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>Army of Excellence</td>
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<td>Army Tactical Missile System</td>
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<td>CAA</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Confederation of Independent States</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic Information Military Economic</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
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<td>FOA</td>
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<td>Interim Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>LCD</td>
<td>Limited Conversion Division</td>
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<td>NEA</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>Total Army Analysis</td>
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<td>TICS/TIMS</td>
<td>Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Toxic Industrial Materials</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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The United States of America has and continues to have a large standing active duty
army along with significant reserve and civilian components. This Army endured a number of
substantial changes in which the threat and environmental conditions associated with the threat
existed during times of relative peace. The environment the Army operated in changed
significantly after the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War era is generally regarded as the
starting the date the Berlin Wall fell 9 November 1989. The Warsaw Pact dissolved and the
Soviet Union became the Confederation of Independent States (CIS). The US Army was
suddenly no longer poised against the single monolithic threat of the Soviet Union. The Cold
War was over and the size and usefulness of the Army came into question. Questions
surrounding the size of the Army were most prevalent. It is true that the Army fluctuates in size
during wartime and times of peace. Nations whatever taste they may have for peace, they must
hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or in other words they must have an army
(Toqueville 1956, 274). The standing army came under scrutiny early in the history of the US.
Most of this uneasiness is based on perceptions of immigrants about the feudal and monarchial
systems of Europe. The citizens of the US wanted no part of a large standing army that could be
the instrument of a cruel ruler, when they founded this new republic. This issue is still constantly
debated and extorted. However, the current concerns are over dollars spent, the usefulness of a
military, national debt, and other domestic issues. With these concerns, a common problem is the
constant struggle to field and maintain a viable army in times of peace and train to ensure that the
army has the resources available to prepare for times of conflict. A persistent and repeated error
through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active
effort, planning, the expenditure of resources and sacrifice, just as war does (Kagan 1996, 567).
Thus it takes effort to maintain a viable army to counter threats to national security interests. It is not a task that is solved overnight or with a single event. After World War II, the Truman administration regarded the American military program accordingly should no longer be regarded as a thrust toward an immediate goal but as an effort to maintain constant readiness over a prolonged period of time (Weigley 1977, 78). The requirement for this effort is constant and continues even after conflict resolution.

Since the effort to defend a country is continuous, it exhibits some rather unique characteristics. A primary concern that is inherent to this effort is the size of the ground forces that defend a nation. This will invariably impact on the level of training, organizational structure, equipment, and number of career soldiers. These factors also influence the types of units developed, the differentiation of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers and the ability to maintain readiness of the force. The force structure necessary to perpetuate fielding of new equipment and training of new soldiers to use this equipment is a function of capability. This force is required to have certain capabilities. Questions concerning the number of capabilities arise and give way to arguments of size. The question of size also comes into consideration when a “base force” is identified. This base force is defined as “minimum level necessary to protect US interests and continue to play a leading role in shaping international events” (Kaufmann 1992, 7). This may seem at first to an ambiguous answer to a very important question. However, the base force takes into account the concept of a vast array of units required to deploy capabilities inherent to those forces, and the ability of those forces to conduct and sustain combat operations.

The U.S. Army in the Post-Cold War

During the post-Cold War era, the need for a large standing army came under intense scrutiny. During the post-Cold War downsizing, the Army greatly decreased purchase of new equipment and largely deferred development of its next generation of weapons (Bruner 2001, 1). The lack of modernization left the service with a number of problems. Not only were new
systems not procured, the inventory of vehicles and weapon systems aged. These older systems
cost more to maintain. Weapon systems also cost more to maintain ready due to a number of
other factors. These systems require maintenance and refitting of new features. New engines,
weapon upgrades, force protection initiatives, and communication systems all add to the cost of
maintaining equipment. The additional funding required did not appear in appropriations for the
US Army. Thus, some relatively modern weapons and support systems were neglected while
some were updated. During this time and into the post-Cold War era, the base unit of Army
divisions was seen in five distinct types. These are armored, mechanized, light, airborne, and air
assault.

During the post-Cold War era, funding influenced the development of new force structure
based on these division types. One new design based on a division and another based on a
medium-brigade design. These forces included the Force XXI digital division and the Interim
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). These two units initially developed to include more technology
in the Force XXI unit and be more deployable in the case of the IBCT. One constant in these two
designs was funding issues required leverage against risk. During the post-Cold War the Army
fought for every dollar to maintain its legacy force. The legacy force is mainly composed of
mechanized and armored units left over from the Cold War. The Army had to maintain a portion
of this force and develop new force designs. Force XXI division is based upon a legacy (heavy
force) unit reduced by over 3,000 soldiers (Force XXI 2001). However, the Force XXI expands
the area that the division operates, controls, and sees from twenty-five kilometers to sixty
kilometers (Bess 1994, 14). This reduction in soldiers and increase in area covered is explained
through increased efficiency within the design of the unit and large introduction of digital
enablers. These enablers will allow the division to operate in, exercise control over, and see
further in an area twice the size the Army of Excellence was required to at the end of the Cold
War. The Army of Excellence (AOE) is the force design that deployed and operated during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The AOE did not have either or both the amount and variety of
digital enablers to leverage capabilities against specific threat and risk. This leverage gives more
capability with less force structure.

The Cold War heavy Army of Excellence (AOE) divisions were replaced with Limited
Conversion Division (LCD). The primary distinction between the two force structures is the
removal of a company out of the maneuver battalions. The standard maneuver battalion believed
to be more efficient was reduced by one maneuver company. This no longer allowed the
maneuver battalions of the post-Cold War to be tactically arrayed two up and one back with one
uncommitted reserve. The reserve is taken out of the three remaining maneuver companies. The
unit is enhanced with some improvements in communications and is required to do more with
less.

During the post-Cold War era, the Department of the Army experienced great and
monumental change. The Department of the Army began the largest drawdown of the Army
since the end of World War II. The active Army reduced from 780,000 soldiers to 480,000 in
Fiscal Year 99 included a force cut of 38 percent (Vollrath and Hamilton 1999, 6). The number
of active divisions reduced from eighteen in 1989 to ten in 1995. The national defense spending
reduced from 5.9 percent GNP to 2.8 percent GNP in fiscal year (FY) 2001. There was a 40
percent reduction, relative to size, in Army funding since the end of the Cold War. This reduction
and increase in deployments was based on a number of factors. One of these was Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE). The reduction of forces in Europe was based upon the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with the current members of the Economic Union, Russian
Federation, and the USA (2001). This treaty called for the rapid and sharp reduction of
conventional forces in Europe. Forces would be predominately based in the continental US and
deploy to areas of conflict. This was a dramatic change to the large forward-positioned forces
established and maintained in Europe following the end of World War II. During the execution
of the CFE and due in part to the shift in forward positioning policy, the greatest number of deployments since World War II occurred during the post-Cold War era. The Army deployments increased 26 percent to 68 percent in the last twelve years (Cordesman 1999, 3).

**Thesis Question**

The thesis question concerns the size of the US Army since the end of the Cold War (9 November 1989) until 10 September 2001. This question centers on congressional appropriations, public approval, and BRAC recommendations that potentially impact on the size of this army. These three influences are part of the policy and decision making of the American polity. They are interrelated and directly impact on the size, capability, and positioning of the US Army. The thesis question is, Since the end of the Cold War until 10 September 2001, how large has the American polity (Congress and the public) allowed the US Army to be?

These are subordinate questions to this thesis. How much has the American polity (Congress appropriations and public opinion) spent on the Army during the post-Cold War era? What is the percentage of government spending used for the development and maintenance of the Army as a portion of total government spending? What is public opinion (Gallup polls) for the spending of tax dollars on the care and sustainment of the US Army? What is the impact of political spending (BRAC) on the efficiency of the US Army? Has the US Army ever entered a conflict, during the post-Cold War era, unprepared because it did not achieve enough public support (funding) to stay prepared?

This research is significant in relation to the sizing of the Army serving the USA. Ultimately, history could assist the development of forces in the future. This assistance will include type of forces, doctrine, equipment, training, and institutional sustainment. Understanding the impact of the American polity on the size of the Army will also enable future officers to better articulate needs and requirements of the force. This articulation is necessary during the interaction of soldiers and the US Congress on issues of the budget and defense policy.
This allows the proper-sized Army to be developed, trained, and maintained. The thesis will also highlight time during the post-Cold War when the Army was not ready and the American polity was one of the reasons for this lack of readiness.

Assumptions

As earlier noted, the US Army is always under constant scrutiny and has been subjected to criticism during the history of the USA. However, one underlying assumption is that the USA still needs an army and that other defense services cannot do the same mission or perform the same functions. Another assumption is that the army is a legitimate organization that counters a threat or multiple threats that may impact on national security interests either domestic or abroad. Another assumption is that the BRAC decision(s) is the closest process that equates politics and monetary gain to the Army. This is a problem that requires the Army to quantify the need for an Army in economic terms. The bases and activities situated within the continental US represent economic stability, political power, and a satisfied congressional constituency. Preservation and protection of these bases and activities almost always supersedes the efficiencies gained by the Army if some were no longer operational. Current figures place this inefficiency at 25 percent (BRACO 2001), which means that the Army is operating 25 percent more infrastructure than necessary to develop, train, and maintain itself. This is a financial drain on the US Army resources and is almost all due to the political considerations surrounding the closing of bases and activities within congressional districts.

Limitations

The research on this subject is limited to the size of the Army from the end of the Cold War until 10 September 2001. It is during this period of not overt conflict and relative peace that the American policies were often tempered with the use of US Army assets. During periods of peace the protection and preservation of culture and government hinge upon the democracy surviving intact and threats to national interests being countered.
This thesis is limited to the size of the US Army from the end of the Cold War (9 November 1989) until 10 September 2001. Another limitation is the measurable impacts the American polity has on the sizing function of the US Army. There is not readily available instruments which measure how much one branch of Congress or one individual impacts the size of the US Army. These influences are inferred based on the results of various Gallup Polls during the post-Cold War era.

The research considering the size of the US Army will encounter a number of functions that cannot adequately be addressed. Thus, the limitations of the thesis are critical to understanding the basic problem and not allowing the thesis to grow uncontrollably. The size of the US Army and the functions impacting on that size since the end of the Cold War are important for study during this current period of relative peace. This is especially true based on the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of 11 September 2001. These events and knowledge during the post-Cold War era will shape the course of national defense debate during the current administration and the next ten to fifteen years.
Three Areas of Review

The review of literature for this thesis can be divided into three areas. These areas are characteristics of the US Army, subordinate questions (BRAC, government spending, and Gallup Polls), and the Internet. These areas will be discussed in relation to the post-Cold War time period. Since the time period is so short, the availability of information on this subject area within the time frame is somewhat limited. Thus, the literature will be discussed based on these topics that impact upon the thesis.

To understand the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War era, some basic characteristics inherent to the US Army are examined. One of these basic characteristics is that as an organization it changes slowly. Another characteristic is that it exhibits many of the traits of nonprofit organizations. Still another characteristic, which is related to the slowness of change, is that the US Army is very bureaucratic and sometimes cumbersome. When it is forced to make clear and rapid changes in leadership vision and doctrine it does so very painfully. All of these characteristics contribute to the uniqueness of the US Army. These characteristics must be examined individually to more adequately understand the complexities and the factors that affect the size of this organization. Other aspects that affect the US Army organization include the processes that manage resources that fulfill mission requirements.

Discretionary Spending

First, there are a series of processes where concepts generate requirements or reductions which translates into structuring and sizing issues. These processes are complicated and were created to manage the precious resources required to generate and maintain the US Army. It is built through a number of processes. These processes are initially and were eventually dependent upon appropriations and authorizations. Within the bounds of the Cold War, the impact of
spending on the DOD was very evident. “During the Cold War, the defense sector was consistently the best (most prepared) to absorb additional funds when the government needed to spend more and also the best (most quietly obedient) in taking budget cuts when the government need to reduce spending in favor of other sectors” (Builder 1993, 5). Other sources also believe that the DOD budget can be a viewed as an indicator of overall policy measuring economic conditions. It was easy to accommodate either increases or decreases in threat posture and to combat inflation and recession spending though the use of the DOD budget. “The burden defense places on the economy during the post-Cold War is moving towards depression or isolationist era levels” (Cordesman 1999, 14). The levels today are approaching 3 percent GDP compared to over 6 percent from the latter stages of the Cold War in 1986. In 2001, the DOD budget as a percentage of GDP is 2.9 percent. “National defense, and all other discretionary spending is being steadily squeezed out by exploding nondiscretionary, entitlement spending” (Hansen 2001, 5). Constantly, all aspects of discretionary spending within the US budget are attacked. During the relative political stability and economic growth period accompanying the post-Cold War (1989 to 2001), this period has had a direct influence on the success of these politically motivated attacks.

Another characteristic is that the US Army is a nonprofit organization. As a nonprofit organization, it exhibits characteristics of nonprofit organizations. “One characteristic is that senior management may want to implement change; management is often constrained by the structure of the organization in which it is embedded” (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998, 76). This is definitely true of the US Army. The speed at which major changes occur within the US Army is an indicator that the senior leadership is constrained by the mere structure it may be trying to change. The Army is also an organization that does not show a profit. Some opportunities to gain and maintain efficiency are not always viewed as effective because the motivating factors of profit and shareholder interest are not apparent. Some may view the
citizens of the USA as shareholders; however, the not-for-profit nature of the US Army is still present. Even with the nonprofit characteristic present, the US Army functions as a very bureaucratic organization.

The US Army developed a number of processes to manage itself (money and organization) through its history. “Once the organization solved the problem of control, it found itself heavily bureaucratized and burdened with procedures, rules, and routines which made it increasingly difficult to change even though the efficiencies first realized start to turn into costs” (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 42). This is also true of the US Army. During its development as an organization, rules and regulations often control the actions and manner in which the US Army acts toward events as they occur.

The US Army is also impacted by the three subordinate questions within the thesis. These are the impact of BRAC commission decisions, overall spending, and Gallup Poll results. Much is written about these three areas during the post-Cold War time period.

Thus, the sizing function of the US Army has and can be influenced easily by the spending. Through discretionary spending the Congress impacts on the fundamental size, structure, and capabilities of the US Army. Some capabilities and capacities appear and diminish with this constant expanding and shrinking of the force structure. The public must understand and support the development and maintenance of an army to allow politicians to appropriate and fund programs to keep the army sustained. The size of the US Army during the post-Cold War era is a subject full of contentious debate. The discussion regarding the adequate size and structure of the Army is the focus of a number of studies. Many of these (Lewis 1989, 1990; and Kauffmann 1992) were the products of outside agency reviews. They are supposedly objective based on the fact they were performed by organizations outside the DOD and the Department of the Army. These studies primarily focused on the size of the Army relating the buildup during the Reagan administration and searching for a “peace dividend” due to the end of the Cold War. Since the
1960s the defense budget has faced increasing competition from the nondefense sector of the federal budget (Lewis 1990). This competition only further emphasizes the need to accurately articulate and ensure the Congress fully understands the defense budget issues. To maintain legitimacy, organizations need to scan the environment for changes in audience reactions and to foresee emerging challenges and stockpile goodwill and support among the public (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998).

American Public Perceptions

The Army continues to struggle with interaction with the public and identifying emerging threats. These threats also come in the form of public opinion, especially concerning their impact on defense spending. In 1998, 26 percent of Americans surveyed stated that the US needs to spend more (Gillespie 1999). That compares with 17 percent who gave the same response in 1993. This corresponds to a drop in the number of Americans who believe too much money is being spent on defense, from 42 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 1998 (Gillespie 1999). Also, during the election of 2000, defense was not one of the top concerns. However, 70 percent of American believe it is important for the US to be number one in the world militarily (Jones 2000). Despite the support highlighted on the survey, the US Army continues to struggle to maintain relevancy in the public’s mind. Politicians continue to use discretionary spending to leverage against constituency concerns. These can often translate into increases in other government spending.

To attain an efficient force structure, the conventional view of defense economic planners is to maximize some objective, such as strategic deterrence (Weida and Gertcher 1987). It can be viewed as an economic problem. The country is constantly struggling with how much is enough and how much does it cost. At this critical point in history, the mismatch between the nation’s military strategy and the resources required to implement it grows larger every day. “If left unresolved, these shortfalls threaten the viability of today’s All-Volunteer Force (AFV) and risk a
return of the hollow military of the 1970s” (Wilson 2000, 114). Matching the size of the US army to the threat is a constant challenge even when the threat is adequately articulated and economic indicators are positive.

The Army is also constantly struggling because it never sees itself as having an independent sense of mission or purpose apart from the country’s (Builder 1991). The Army continues to try and please both the political masters and public opinion. How can the Army define and explain the capabilities needed in this time of great change? The short answer is, it cannot. What can be defined and explained are the military capabilities that can (and cannot) be provided at any given level of funding (Builder 1993).

A frightening prospect of peacetime is the reduction of standing armies (Kaplan 2000). It is more accurate to think that the need for an Army will only increase in the future. The idea that a world at peace will mean less violence is naïve (Kaplan 2000). Violence will continue to occur in the world. The most devastating problem is that posture levels tend to be less volatile than budgets over time. It is easier to do just about anything—enhance readiness, modernize weaponry, or increase sustainability level—than it is to constitute new force structure (Lewis 1989). So when armies are reduced, the country is doubly at risk. This is due to the nature and time involved in raising an army after one is disassembled after a conflict.

**Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)**

Since the end of the Cold War, another process BRAC, is trying to impact on the infrastructure the Army maintains. During the four BRAC rounds over the previous thirteen years, a number of politically motivated decisions impacted on the Army’s ability to become more efficient. To date, the Army has already closed or realigned 139 of the 139 bases designated by the four BRAC commissions, this includes a total of CONUS closings 112 with an annual BRAC recurring savings of $944 million (BRACO 2001). These political decisions inhibit the Army from applying business practices to a nonprofit organization to increase
efficiency. The Army is not allowed to close certain bases and activities due to the jobs and other economic considerations. This efficiency would also allow the Army to spend money on research and development and acquisition. Two areas of spending where expenditures are historically high during the start-up phase.

Summary

Much of the literature concerning the thesis topic is concentrated in the last decade. During this period, government revenue surplus caused a rising debate on the issues surrounding the funding of defense programs. This period also saw the rapid increase of deployments and especially the increased use of US Army assets. The US Army deployed more during the years between 1989 and 2001 than it did during the time period from the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War. The validity and actual outcomes of these deployments are still under current debate. However, these deployments impacted on the levels of funding and readiness of active duty units. Money was cut from the DOD budget, and the number of deployments did not stop. In fact, they increased during the time period. This eroded aspects of readiness and the availability of forces aligned against preplanned operational contingencies (Cordesmann 1999). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 debated the levels of funding and numbers in force structure of not just the US Army but the entire DOD. The end of the time period considered for this thesis is 10 September 2001, a few weeks prior to the release of the QDR 2001. Any actions beyond the publication of the QDR of 2001 are the subject of predictions based on analysis of the results.

Beyond the outcome of the QDR of 2001, the Internet plays a key role in the distribution of information in society. Representatives of the government, private citizens, and lobby organizations now have the ability to influence changes in the spending and consequently the sizing of the US Army. The Internet connects the American public in a manner that no other medium has or can up to this point in history. The explosion of its use during the post-Cold War
time period is even reflected in the number of sources of references for even this thesis. These sources are the same citizens, representatives of government, and lobby interest groups discussed earlier (Builder 1993; Cordesmann 1999; Hansen 2001). They all have a vested interest in the manner the Army is sized and the capabilities that appear within that force structure. The Internet will continue in the future to be a medium in which vast amounts of information are exchanged that can influence politicians and policy.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

The research methodology used in this thesis is documentation review and quantitative analysis of this data. This allows for a comprehensive and historical interpretation of the facts concerning the thesis. The information for this methodology already exists so no generation or outside collection of external data is required. One disadvantage inherent to this method is the requirement to clearly state what information is used and searched during the discovery phase of this thesis. Another disadvantage to this method is that the research is restricted to the data that already exists.

This thesis is research into an area that is significantly important to the security of the US as a nation. Understanding the factors that affect the sizing of the US Army is key to being able to influence those factors that affect the size and capability of the US Army into the twenty-first century and to counter new threats to national security. The larger implications of this thesis include understanding which factors influence force sizing and how they affect the force sizing. Being able to articulate the manner in which these factors influence the size of the US Army is critical for the military to adequately determine risk and portray that risk to decision makers within the US Government. The ability to quantify and explain risk is significant in implementing force structure decisions that reflect national security strategy (NSS). This thesis is somewhat unique due to the fact that most of the literature available for research focuses on just one of the three factors described in this thesis. Many of the works contributed to the understanding of force sizing are primarily concerned with developing in detail all the ways just one factor affects the nature and size of the US Army. This research is more thorough in one area; however, many of the writers do not consider or develop any arguments concerning other issues that affect the sizing of the US Army. The writing on this subject in the past primarily
concerned the Cold War. Planners for forty years enjoyed a remarkable stability in the
unquestionable urgencies of the Cold War. The nation’s most vital interest--its survival--was
directly threatened by an aggressive adversary (Builder 1991). The new post-Cold War era
required a new look at the threat and national security interests and what factors were used in
determining the size of the US Army.

However, this thesis was developed after researching the idea of determining the threat in
the new post-Cold War era. The Soviet Union and the WARSAW Pact were no longer
considered a threat to the national security interests of the USA. The entire DOD including the
Army was no longer poised against a single major threat to its way of life. Questioning the size
of the US Army in the post-Cold War era until 10 September 2001 came about as a thesis through
this author’s study and experience in the US Army.

The continuing cycle of shrinking and expansion of the US Army is a subject of much
study and debate. The size and makeup of the US Army is very significant and is based in part on
the impact of discretionary spending, public opinion polls, and the BRAC commission
recommendations. Implications based on the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War era
include future national security interests. These translate most often into Army force structure.
The size of the US Army is sometimes dictated by the political overtures associated with
discretionary spending. When economic indicators are good and perceived threats are low then
spending for defense including the Army is reduced. When the economy is good and threats are
more persuasive and carry more political pressure, then spending for discretionary programs, like
the Army, is increased. National security interests are balanced against risk when the threat is
measured against the Army.

Considerations taken into account during the course of this thesis include flexibility on
the dates and the time period studied. The end of the Cold War was a more manageable starting
time and was recommended by members of the thesis committee. Previously, the thesis time
period covered from the end of World War II until the present day. Their guidance and direction on this fact greatly increased the chances of successfully completing this thesis. Also, the attacks of 11 September 2001 generated a new series of conditions and required different decisions to be made concerning the national security interests of the USA. This identified a more precise and easily defined ending point for the research of 10 September 2001. Determining the beginning and ending time period also influenced the manner in which the thesis was researched. The focus is now more narrow, and the factors affecting the sizing of the US Army can now more easily be developed and with greater fidelity.

**Threat**

The first step in this methodology is to analyze the actual requirement for an Army. This requirement is contrasted against the threats to the USA. The threats during the Cold War were relatively simple to quantify. Most citizens, politicians, and service members would answer with the monolithic threat of the USSR. This identification of a tangible and easily agreed-upon threat led to the development, whether prudent or not, of large standing services and nuclear stockpiles. The issue then is the amount of base force nuclear and nonnuclear required to deter threats and to maintain US security in a post-Cold War era. These threats include asymmetric threats (terrorist, non-nation-state actors), rogue nations, rogue alliances, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), toxic industrial chemicals and materials (TICS/TIMS), ballistic missiles, and historical foes. These threats, along with three major factors shape the US Army during the post-Cold War era. These factors include discretionary funding, the results of BRAC decisions, and public opinion (Gallup Polls). The first of these, discretionary funding, made major impacts on the Army force structure during the twelve-year time frame of the post-Cold War era. In determining these impacts a base year of 1999 is used for comparison in relating discretionary spending in the political process. The current literature uses this year most when discussing impacts of discretionary spending on previous and future budgets.
**Spending**

The fiscal 1999 authorization bill was almost 40 percent lower in spending levels authorized than those of a little more than a decade ago. In fact, this represented the lowest level of inflation-adjusted defense spending since before the Korean War (Wilson 2000). During the debates of the 1999 budget, Chairman Floyd Spence of the House National Security Committee was very frustrated and angry. The chiefs of the armed services including the Chief of Staff of the Army had warned him that they could not keep their services ready to fight on a total defense budget of $250 billion a year plus inflation. During Defense Secretary William Cohen’s tenure from January of 1997, he had denied any serious readiness problems from any of the services. Politicians and service chiefs had continually delayed decisions to act and solve the discretionary funding problem during the post-Cold War era. These delays are found in the research and development portions of both the Army and DOD budgets. These areas of discretionary funding were the first to be cut and are historically the last to be filled. Spending of discretionary funds is constantly debated. It is an area where the federal government can make a significant impact on programs based on the priorities of discretionary programs.

Another important aspect of discretionary funding is how a free enterprise system determines the appropriate levels of public goods, defense in particular. Individual citizens are simply not in a position to know the appropriate level of defense expenditures (Weida and Gertcher 1987). Discretionary funding must be considered as a part of the US budget and what percentage of that budget is for defense. One of the easiest ways to do this is as a percentage of the GDP of the country in question. This is a constant measure of spending rather than trying to understand or articulate the difference of spending in 1983 dollars versus 1999 dollars. These types of comparisons usually end up confusing the reader and allow the writer to generate inconsistencies in the analysis of the problem. These comparisons are easily found in the
literature. This literature is historical for the most part and is outlined in the budgets of the post-Cold War era.

A comparison of the discretionary spending during the post-Cold War between these two figures shows a definite and substantive decrease in Army spending. A subsequent analysis of this spending and its affects on force structure should provide adequate evidence to draw conclusions. The sources for this historical material include congressional records of budgets from 1989 until 2001. Also included are an analysis of these budgets by independent sources like the RAND Corporation, and impacts on the US Army. Force structure from the US Army process total army analysis (TAA) will show the basis of allocation of units and risks associated with structuring and decisions not to structure certain type units. This process will also depict the total numbers of divisional (active and reserve) units within the force structure as a measure of total US Army forces. Other historical sources will show impacts on the size of the Army based upon spending as a portion of the gross domestic product.

Public Opinion

The second step in this methodology is to analyze the manner in which this Army is influenced by public opinion decisions of funding. There are a number of actors and activities that influence the funding, building, maintaining, and disposing of this Army. Some of these actors and activities include the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) for authorizations, Army Life Cycle Model, and Gallup Polls. The primary source to show how the public views the US Army is Gallup Polls. The polls used take place during the post-Cold War era and show very well the true nature of the American public’s view of the US Army. These polls should also provide an unbiased view of the US Army by certain sectors of the American public. Polling data will also present a baseline of public perception and possibly provide data to show changes in attitudes based on significant issues occurring within the Army.
BRAC

The third step in this methodology is to investigate how inefficiently the Army continues to operate based upon BRAC decisions. This inefficiency also impacts on budgetary requirements and ultimately force structure. The functions to investigate include the four BRAC rounds, federal laws surrounding BRAC, the last round of BRAC, and the political livelihood versus economic impact of BRAC decisions. Decisions that invoke political underpinnings could also be derived from BRAC decisions. The decisions that were not made with regards to BRAC could also have political significance.

The final step in this methodology is predictions based on the future size of the US Army based on historical analysis, American polity, and BRAC recommendations in the future. Some of these predictions may include the size of the Army, size of the DOD, force structure of DOD, training, recruitment, retention, and retirement. Doctrine following Field Manual 3-0 should reflect some of these changes.

This research methodology should present a complete and nonbiased view of the factors affecting the size of the Army since the end of the Cold War. The thesis statement requires a complete and thorough search of published historical data in order for a complete analysis to occur. This analysis should provide predictive aspects that are based on historical examples. These examples could provide insights into factors that will continue to impact on the sizing of the Army. The conclusions that are found as a result of this thesis should be reasonably unbiased based on the depth of three factors researched and the variety of sources used.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction

The analysis of the thesis of how large the US Army was from 9 November 1989 to 10 September 2001 is in this chapter. The impacts of the American polity on government spending, Gallup and opinion polls, and BRAC decisions on this size are studied. The analysis will include both documentation review and quantitative analysis. The review will include material written on the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War era until 10 September 2001. The quantitative analysis will include statistics from the same time period. Where possible the same value year ($) is used in comparison of spending and savings. There are some different value years ($) used in the analysis because of data availability. There are only slight differences in the overall comparison between different value years ($) and these will not impact on the conclusions or statements derived from the quantitative analysis.

The thesis topic analyzed is how discretionary government spending, Gallup and opinion polls, and BRAC decisions altered the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War period of time. Also studied are any instances where the US Army was not prepared to execute assigned missions during this same time frame. Outside influence on the three basic factors is also investigated. Any significant influence on the three factors has evidence of both documentation review and quantitative analysis.

Whenever a documentation review is undertaken, a good starting point is the most recent actions and material written on the subject in question. For the stated thesis this culminated in the year 2000 during one of the most bitterly contested presidential election in the nation’s history. This review begins by understanding how the American polity made decisions at the voting booth that will impact on the sizing of the military, including the Army, for years to come.
The state of the armed forces became a distinct point of contention. Both candidates offered differing interpretations as to the capabilities, morale, and readiness of the military. At the same time, students of armed forces and society have been pointing to a growing civil-military gap. (Feaver and Kohn 2000)

Even as the end of the last century passed, the American polity was defining and refining the shape of the US army. This is evidenced through the public’s vote in the last presidential election. A major debate raged over military readiness. Then Governor George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of neglecting the military. He stated the US armed forces were a “military in decline” (Spencer 2000, 2). Vice President Al Gore, on the opposite end of the debate simply stated that the military was the “strongest and the best” in the world (Spencer 2000, 2). The election of Bush to the presidency was by a slim electoral margin and without a popular majority of the voting public. The status of the military was one of only a handful of issues both candidates disagreed on. It was a dividing line between two different perceptions of the military and the Army since the end of the Cold War. Because this was one of only a few issues separating the candidates and was significant based upon the direction discretionary spending should take in the new century; it reflected a new direction in policy making. The American polity decided that the time to change was now. This; however, was not a consensus based on the lack of a majority vote. This changed the direction decisions were made at the end of the thesis time period; however, the end of the Cold War signaled the starting point of changing the size of the US Army.

The dramatic drawdown of the Army during the post-Cold War era was the culmination of a variety of changes. “The biggest single change [was] the security environment [at] the end of the Cold War” (Ricks 1996, 4). However, all the changes are not attributable entirely to the fall of the USSR, a monolithic, communist threat so evident during the Cold War. There were a number of other, more complex factors that are attributed to shaping the US Army in the post-Cold War era. The factors discussed include the diminishing threat of the Soviet Union, the drawdown of forces under various treaty arrangements, taking nuclear weapons and force
structure out of active duty army units, and BRAC. Nearly all these are dependent upon the first factor, the perceived or real threat reduction from another superpower. The breakdown of the communist rule and breakup of the Soviet Union caused many of the processes that reduced Army force structure to start or accelerate. The peaceful manner of which the Soviet Union imploded gave the American policy and decision makers the freedom to start and hasten the reduction of US Army force structure.

**Spending**

Discretionary spending within the federal budget then became a method of reducing the military force structure since the perceived threat was greatly diminished. This spending was often depicted as a percentage of a country’s gross national product (GNP) or more recently the GDP. Figure 1 displays the US national defense outlays as both a percentage of the federal outlay and a percentage of the GDP. This figure shows the decreases in discretionary spending on the national level with regards to defense spending in the post-Cold War era.

The percentage of federal outlays was reduced from 26.5 percent to 15.9 percent of the federal budget during the post-Cold War era. The total reduction was 10.6 percent from 1989 to 2001. During the same time the national defense outlays as a percentage of GDP was reduced from 5.6 percent to 2.9 percent. A total reduction of 2.7 percent occurred. The percentage spent on defense as a percentage of GDP is a constant measure used to understand how much a particular country is spending on discretionary programs like defense. Another measure of spending is the Army outlays versus active duty end strength.
Figure 1. Federal Outlays versus GDP. Source: Steven M. Kosiak and Elizabeth E. Heeter, *Analysis of the FY 2001 Defense Budget Request* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000), Table 3, 11.

The Army Outlays versus Active Duty End Strength is shown in figure 2. This graph shows the relationship between total Army dollars spent and the size of the force. Figure 2 depicts the Army outlays versus Army active duty end strength from 1989 to 2001. There was a drastic reduction in the size of the Army by 290,000 soldiers or 40 percent of the force structure. The budget outlay decline was smaller accounting for a 33 percent decrease in 1999 valued dollars from 1989 to 2001.
Figure 2. Army Outlays versus Active Duty End Strength. Source: Steven M. Kosiak and Elizabeth E. Heeter, Analysis of the FY 2001 Defense Budget Request (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000), Table 9, 10.

Congress reduced the Army budget authority by $30.4 Billion in 2001 valued, dollars and its share of the DOD budget decreased from 27 percent to 24 percent as depicted in figure 3. Figure 3 shows the differences of the budget in constant 2001 dollars, current dollars, and the Army budget as a percentage of the DOD budget authority.
These reductions in spending and the elimination of force structure affected the Army during the post-Cold War. Some of the force structure reductions dissolved entire divisions while other cuts were across the board decrements. The significance is in how these cuts are translated to the agent that executes the military policy of the American polity. In many instances during the post-Cold War drawdown, Congress made cuts in both force structure and budget outlays. The cuts show that the Army endured a great deal of change from 1989 to 2001. These cuts were not always made with the best information or guidance. Based on the decreased threat and the American polity calling for decreased spending in defense including a so-called “peace dividend.” However, many of these cuts were made in haste. Most of these across the board
decrements were spread out over an entire organization. This means that no one department, organization, division, or corps was cut; it meant they were all cut. This procedure compounded the effects of the cuts and the cuts compounded the effects of the technique used to execute the reductions. Cuts made require significant reductions in the end state of the Army. The Army was cut from eighteen divisions in FY 89 to sixteen divisions in FY 91 to fourteen divisions in FY 92. The cuts continued to twelve divisions in FY 94 and further reduced to ten divisions in FY 96 (Perry 1995; Cohen 2001). The steady state achieved in just seven years with a 33 percent reduction in force structure. Rather than assessing a risk and taking the cut in one area, all the areas end up being weaker. Eventually issues of readiness emerged in this All-Volunteer Force (AFV) based on the fact that fewer citizens wanted to be a part of even this smaller Army.

The AFV experiment started in the post-Vietnam 1970s. The per capita cost in 1964, the last year of the peacetime draft was $29,140 (in 1999 dollars). In 1999 the figure was $63,812. It cost over twice as much to maintain a person in uniform in the all-volunteer force than it did during the days of conscription (Moskos 2001). Despite this fact, the Army still outlays a considerable amount of money compared to other services per soldier. It costs the Army $14,555 per recruit on active duty as compared with the $12,000 DOD average. That is almost twice what was spent on recruiting a decade ago (US Army Posture Statement FY 01 2001).

**American Public Perception**

Thus, the Army does spend a great deal of money to recruit a citizen into its ranks. Many of these citizens still believe the military is a strong institution based on polling data.

Gallup Polls over the post-Cold War time frame have shown that the American polity, especially the American public, changes their attitudes about the military. The data from a question, Do you, yourself, feel that our national defense is stronger now than it needs to be, not strong enough, or about right at the present time? is shown in figure 4.
The polling data shows that in 1990 before Desert Shield and Desert Storm that a larger percentage of the American public thought the military needed to be stronger, for a total of 16 percent. This percentage dropped over the decade to 6 percent in May 2000. The polling data also showed a higher percentage of the American public thought the strength of the military was about right in 1990, a total of 64 percent. In May 2000, 55 percent thought the military strength was about right. This data shows what the American publics’ perception about the strength of the military. But what about the public opinion on the question, How do you feel about the amount of money the government is spending on the military, too little, about the right amount or too much? (See figure 5.)
Only 9 percent of the American public in 1990 thought that too little was spent on the military, while 50 percent thought that too much money is spent on the military. By 2000, the American public perception of spending on the military changed. A total of 40 percent of Americans polled stated too little was spent and 20 percent said too much. This is almost a total reverse in the perceptions based on the data collected a decade earlier. The about right numbers and no opinion numbers are almost the same in 1990 and 2000. They fluctuated over the course of the decade to once again attain the 1990 levels.

Another historical poll, which is taken annually to answer this question, Tell me how much confidence you have in (the following institutions and organizations) each are: a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little? The aggregate answers of “a great deal and quite a lot” from the 2001 poll are displayed in figure 6.
The results show that the military’s cumulative rating of “a great deal and a lot” of confidence rated number one. This rating was higher than the church, police, Supreme Court, and even faith-based charities. This cumulative rating is one that is taken historically since the end of World War II.

During the years of the post-Cold War era polls reflected a general consensus on the American public’s collective perception of the military. Nearly 59 percent of Americans in 1999 said that it is important for the US to be number one militarily. Another 39 percent say it is enough to be one of the world’s leading powers. This is an interesting contrast to the number of Americans polled that stated it was important for the US to be number one economically (Gillespie 1999). So the percentage of American responding favorably to this poll, conducted
during the Kosovo bombing campaign of 1999, reflects that Americans overwhelmingly find it important for the US to be number one or one of the most important military powers in the world. Another poll that is taken annually measures the American public opinion in the confidence of the people in charge of the major institutions and organizations. These organizations are within the society of the United States.

Of the eleven organizations measured during post-Cold War era, the military rated highest every year. The results of the poll answered the question, As far as people in charge of running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? The institutions measured are displayed from highest to lowest percentage of “great deal of confidence” in table 1. The data regarding the military show only three years out of the thirteen in the post-Cold War era that the military rated a less than 40 percent great deal of confidence. Also, for a total of three years, the percentage was equal to or greater than 50 percent, for a great deal of confidence. Of the other institutions measured during the same time frame, only one, the US Supreme Court ever attained an over 40 percent great deal of confidence rating. This is significant to understanding the perceptions of the American public with regards to the military as an institution within the US society and culture. The percentages show that the military rating has had a distinct trend line of confidence. This confidence in the military, as an institution, also indicates some amount of approval of how well the military does its job.

The American Public during the post-Cold War era held a great deal of confidence in the leaders of the military. During this time period, the percentage of respondents declaring “a great deal of confidence” in the leaders of the military was the highest of any institutions sampled. Only once, in the year 1989, did it tie with a 32 percent “great deal of confidence” rating with major educational institutions. Year after year during the post-Cold War era, the American public perception of the military, in terms of confidence in their leaders, did not diminish in relation to
other institutions. The leaders of the military had the approval of the American public during the post-Cold War period. However, during this time period another function between the Army and the American Polity also existed. The issues surrounding the question of BRAC brought the politics of the military, especially the Army into the forefront of public and congressional debate.

Table 1. American Public Confidence in Institutions During Post-Cold War Era

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X = not asked

Base Realignment and Closure

There were a total of four different BRAC infrastructure reduction recommendations. These took place in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. In order to insulate the base closure process from political pressures, the Congress passed legislation that provided a complex procedure for selecting bases for closure. “The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-526) relied on an independent commission to make [a list of closures and realignments] recommendations, followed by an ‘all or nothing’ fast track vote for approving proposed closures” (BRAC History 2000). Within the confines of this system, once closures started they were extremely difficult to stop. In 1990, then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney submitted a list of bases to Congress for closure consideration. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) rejected the list. As a result of the confrontation, a new set of legislation was proposed and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-150) went into effect. This new BRAC Commission would consist of eight appointed members that would be responsible for overseeing a total of three base closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. These were selected to conform to non election years. Based on the rules of BRAC the commissions’ recommendations for closure and realignment were submitted to the President from the Secretary of Defense for approval or disapproval, of all or part of the findings within a fifteen-day time limit. Then, approved reports were forwarded to Congress for forty-five days, and considered in entirety, without amendment (Whicker and Giannatasio 1997). The results of the four BRAC Commissions, with regards to the Army during the post-Cold War era, are depicted in figure 7.
Currently, the total number of Army completed actions recommended from the four BRAC Commissions (1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995) is 139 of 139. These include a total of 112 closures and 27 realignments in CONUS. “Most of the Army’s overseas reductions are in Europe, where the Army clos[ed] or realign[ed] 622 sites going from 858 installations to well under 300. The number of installations in Korea drop[ped] by 20 percent with a total of 21 closures and four realignments” (ARMYLINK 1997, 2). The total returns and partial returns in DOD of overseas bases (Germany, Panama, and Korea) is 678 (BRACO 2001). As one can see the majority of bases closed within DOD were Army sites. Each of the four completed BRAC Commissions required dollars to complete the closures or realignments. These costs included environmental reparations (especially overseas), disposal of real property, and movement of units to other bases. DOD required each service to “estimate savings produced by management
reforms, consolidations, and reorganizations.” The services have accounting systems to record costs, but no system exists to track savings (Lockwood 2000). However, DOD required that the services provide estimations based on a DOD budget without BRAC. The overall BRAC costs versus savings of the four BRAC commissions is displayed in figure 8.

The data from the GAO study showed the cumulative DOD savings outpaced the cumulative costs around 1997. Since that year the estimated savings are increasing at an even greater pace. The total estimated savings depicted in 2001 is over $14 Billion. This savings trend is what at least part of the American polity wanted to continue in the future. On two different occasions during 1999, the Congress and the President offered additional rounds of BRAC. These rounds were slated for 2001 and 2003 and another for 2001 and 2005. The new rounds
based on 1993 and 1995 BRAC estimates, would yield DOD an additional $3.4 Billion in savings per round per year. However, the Senate Armed Service Committee rejected both of these proposals in its mark up of the FY 2000 defense authorization bill (Lockwood 2000). Beyond these actions to start new rounds of base closures now, there are two major concerns surrounding additional BRAC rounds. These are the direct “intervention,” like that displayed by President Clinton in the 1995 BRAC which will politically impact future rounds and DOD’s contention that there still exists excess base capacity. “This excess capacity impacts on the balance of “reconstitution”–a potential need to increase capacity if the United States is confronted in the future” (Lockwood 2000).

Political “Sticky Fingerprints”

The first of these two concerns occurred when the Secretary of Defense was also trying to begin consultations on a new BRAC Commission. William Cohen sought to obtain additional BRAC rounds in 1997; however, the direct intervention by President Clinton into the BRAC decision process prevented any action on Cohen’s new proposal. In 1995, the “sticky fingerprints of politics” entered the process at several points. “When this occurred the final BRAC [1995] round was nearly jeopardized and the dynamics of support behind the process suffered irreparable damage” (Dunbar 2000).

“The White House became involved with the 1995 BRAC process by encouraging the contractor, Lockheed Martin, to bid on the jobs [at air force bases Kelly and McClellan] and keep the work in at the respective bases” (Dunbar 2000). This concept of “privatize in place” began a battle between the Congress and the President. Based on the rules of BRAC, the commissions’ recommendations for closure and realignment were submitted to the President for approval or disapproval, of all or part of the findings, within a fifteen-day time limit. Then, approved reports were forwarded to Congress for forty-five days and considered in entirety, without amendment (Whicker and Giannatasio 1997). President Clinton submitted the 1995 BRAC proposal with the
Kelly and McClellan bases still slated for recommended closure. However, he sent letter of transmittal to Congress that in part read:

Should Congress approve this package [of commission recommended base-closings] but then take action in other legislation to restrict privatization options at McClellan or Kelly, I would regard that action a breach of Public Law 101-510 in the same manner as if the Congress were to attempt to reverse by legislation any other material direction of this or any other BRAC. (Wilson 2000)

This deliberate political interaction with the non partisan BRAC process severely hampered Secretary Cohen’s ability to revive a new round of BRAC Commission recommendations. Aside from this “intervention,” a study conducted on the 1991 and 1993 BRAC commissions some interesting results. This study based on regression formulas, included dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables included pork barrel spending and BRAC recommendations, and the independent variables included powers of states’ governors, ideology of states congressional delegations, and influence of state in presidential election. “Once applied to the conditions of the two BRAC panels [1991 and 1993], the only significant political influence noted was the number of members from a state that sat on key defense related committees in the House” (Whicker and Giannatasio 1997, 13). The overall view was that: “Non-partisan commissions do not change the pattern of political influence on outcome, but rather, their contribution is to allow outcomes to occur at all” (Whicker and Giannatasio 1997, 14). This evidence shows how politicizing BRAC can lead to reduction in the will of the American polity to use this tool to reduce defense and Army infrastructure. However, DOD surprisingly still calls for further cuts using efficiency as the reason to continue BRAC.

While Secretary Cohen tried to restart BRAC dialogue, the DOD published a Defense Reform Initiative Report. Within this report DOD compared defense drawdowns in three major areas. These areas are displayed in figure 9. DOD contends that the CONUS infrastructure did not reduce concurrently with the defense budget and the force size during the rounds of BRAC. Through an exhaustive analysis of the services, DOD states that it still has approximately 23
percent excess base capacity. If this amount is added to the base structure percentage depicted in figure 9 the total is closer in terms of percentage to the amount of reductions that occurred in the defense budget and force structure.


The Army states it is still operating 21 percent excess in basing structure over what its force structure and functions require (BRACO 2001). This seems to logically follow the DOD report of 23 percent excess capacity. The total Army reductions are portrayed in figure 10. The reduction in Army force structure and budget are also similar to the percentages that were found in the DOD report. They mirror the DOD report and are valid when looking at overall reduction in the Army budget, force structure, and base structure figures. Another factor impacting on the
size of the US Army is the number of deployments and their effect on the missions taken during the post-Cold War era.

Readiness and Deployments

Deployments are the final factor of the thesis question. The question of deployments and any impact on the readiness of the US Army during the post-Cold War is investigated. It is studied to the extent of whether the influences of spending Gallup Polls and BRAC with the American polity, ever left the Army not ready to conduct assigned missions. This question is most easily answered by examining the times the Army was called upon to conduct a mission during the post-Cold War era. The characteristics of the mission is important, but it is more important to investigate and find if the Army was not ever ready and was this unpreparedness a
function of spending, public opinion, and the inefficiencies surrounding BRAC. Upon looking at the Army’s missions during the 1989 to 2001 time period, a great number of deployments involving at least a brigade level of Army assets were conducted. In fact the number of deployments during this time frame increased rapidly.

The increase in deployments involved significant portions of the US Army during the post-Cold War. These deployments impacted on the readiness and ability to perform specified wartime missions by siphoning assets away from a downsizing army. The Army was involved in ten major deployments between 1950 and 1989. Since 1990, it has deployed troops in twenty seven major contingencies. That is triple the number of deployments, and an exponential increase in the number of soldiers deployed (Skibbie 1999). These deployments also did not always involve the use of the Army in a “shooting war.”

Much is written about how these deployments undermined the Army’s ability to conduct combat operations. The number of deployments did increase significantly during this time period; however; the Army conducted the missions assigned. Sometimes these missions did not involve combat operations. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) are two phrases associated with these types of operations. If each deployment is reviewed from 1989, Just Cause until 1999 Joint Guardian, the Army possessed the ability to execute each and every one. A total of only five were actually “shooting wars or conflicts” (Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, UNOSOM II, Desert Fox, and Joint Guardian). The only questions surrounding some of these missions are that the American polity was using the military for operations other than those it was developed to counter. The whole system of systems developed during the Cold War to properly identify threat, develop force structure, equipping soldiers and train them were based on a premise of combat operations. The peace-keeping and peace-making missions executed during the 1990s did not fall into this Cold War premise. These operations are included in the remainder of those listed in table 2.
Table 2. Major United States Army Deployments from 1989 to 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>OPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>JUST CAUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>DESERT SHIELD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait</td>
<td>DESERT STORM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>PROVIDE COMFORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>JTF Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>JTF Andrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>PROVIDE PROMISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I/PROVIDE RELIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNITAF/RESTORE HOPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>ABLE SENTRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II/USFORSOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>SUPPORT HOPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>UPHOLD DEMOCRACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>IFOR/Joint ENDEAVOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>SFOR/Joint GUARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>DESERT FOX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>Hurricane MITCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>SHINING HOPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>KFOR/Joint GUARDIAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovo

The only deployment in question from the aspect of the American polity is Joint Guardian. This deployment of Army forces into the theater of operation was delayed but eventually happened. The use of Apaches, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) along with a ground invasion was publicly debated. The debate often centered on whether or not the public supported the use of ground forces in the region. Secretary Cohen at the time stated “There is no consensus for a ground force”, he explained based on a meeting with European defense ministers the day before (Clark 2001, 332). The bottom line was that the option of ground forces was on the table and a plan developed for implementation. However, “a recurring theme was obvious--for whatever reasons, the Pentagon and the National Command Authority had kept their distance from this operation, rather than embracing it from the outset” (Clark 2001, 335). So a decision was made, no decision. Answering the question of using ground forces was delayed until political support from Russia and other allies forced Slobodan Milosovic to accept the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) for the occupation of Kosovo by NATO troops on 14 June 1999. The invasion by force never occurred, nor the use of the Apaches and MLRS deployed to Albania. This fact did not change no matter how many times the CINC General Clark asked for permission. Thus throughout the post-Cold War the Army was never called upon a mission it did not have the capability to accomplish. Whether or not redistribution of resources was required is another issue.

Conclusion

The reduction in size of the US Army and increased deployments over the post-Cold War era caused some underlying issues to emerge. These issues are at the center of relations between the American polity and the Army. These deployments were a function of the American polity and the changing world events. “The bipolar world begat not, as predicted, a multipolar world but a unipolar on with the US standing at its apex” (Krauthammer 1997, 2). This led the US in
the 1990s from being the leader of the “free world” to the unqualified leader of the entire world (Wier 1995). These deployments are an example of how that leadership was exercised or not exercised. Sometimes the American polity had little to do with the process. One example of this is a deployment already examined the NATO operation in Kosovo. The “White House encouragement and direction, found itself seeking to advance American interests and ideals and seeking to leverage Defense resources [however] the Defense Department found itself struggling to protect its own programs and priorities from the grasping reach of the policy planners at State among the National Security Council staff” (Clark 2001, XXVIII). This struggle between the American polity and the military (US Army included) continued until the day before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This event much like the watershed event of the Berlin Wall gave way to a new perception of threat. A new QDR was published shortly thereafter and the American polity perceived complexion of the world changed once again.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. Army in the Post-Cold War

The requirement for a large standing US Army was rather easy to quantify during the Cold War. The Army required a large budget, public support and extensive infrastructure to counter a perceived threat (Soviet Union). This environment transformed from an accelerating buildup after World War II into a static condition. This static condition is often called the Cold War. Until 1989, this environment changed very little between the two chief world powers, the US and the Soviet Union. However, the Berlin Wall fell in November of 1989 and the post-Cold War era began. A considerable number of Americans did not and continue to not understand the need for a large standing Army.

“However, for the first time in its history, with the possible exception of the two decades preceding the Spanish-American War, the US Army [had to] justify its existence to the American people” (Ricks 1996, 1). The post-Cold War era created a change in the way the US Army (and the military) justified itself by and to the American polity. Understanding this changing strategic vision is important to revealing and examining factors affecting the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War. Recognizing the significance and impact of this “relevance justification” had during the course of the post-Cold War is imperative to future strategic interest debates.

Relevance Justification

This relevance justification came in the form of new measurements of what the Army and DOD force structure was required to perform. These new measures were a direct result of not requiring the Army to fight the Soviets in a conventional war on the plains of Central Europe with a heavy armored force. This option dissolved with the demise of the Soviet Union; policy makers and the military found new ways to justify force structure for the defense of national security and military interests. The first of these was “in 1993 [when] the Clinton administration crafted a
This was an effort to balance military requirements with budgetary constraints but also a way to save force structure during the post-Cold War era. The standard was to fight two MRCs simultaneously. This meant forces were deployed to two different areas of the world and fought to different conflicts at the same time. Even then after the Bottom Up Review (BUR) of 1993, this two MRC scenario was questioned. The programmed ten all-active Army divisions after the two MRCs leave little other active force structure to provide other overseas presence or other lower-intensity operations (Rostker, Don, and Watman 1994). While the analysis for the single MRC engagement continued, the planners realized that even four or five Army divisions and a Marine division needed was based upon major assumptions. “The assumptions were optimistic in assuming reasonably prompt national decisions [by the American polity] to mobilize and deploy the force” (Rostker, Don, and Watman 1994, 629).

Around 1995, this framework continued to be exhibited; however, the standard changed to nearly simultaneously. This seems to be a play on words, but the leaders of both the Army and DOD stated that they did not have the strategic lift necessary (even with the reduced force structure) to send troops to two different geographic areas and fight two different fights. Then in 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) changed the name of the conflict zones from MRCs to medium theater wars (MTWs) and added small scale contingencies (SSCs) to the options list. The standard was changed yet again to win-hold-win. This required the military to deploy forces to both areas at the same time, however, only in one area is the enemy engaged and the other MTW “threat” is held in check. When the first MTW enemy is defeated then forces are shifted to the hold theater and that “threat” is defeated.

“The adoption and subsequent transformations had a profound impact on the DOD [including the Army] in force levels, readiness standards, and budgeting” (Binnendijk
and Kugler 2001). One finding is that without this relevance justification strategy the Army could have lost even more force structure. The two-MTW standard had a positive effect on the US policy process. It set limits on post-Cold War reductions (Binnendijk and Kugler 2001). These meant the US Army and the DOD were allowed to keep the required strategic assets intact during the drawdown of forces. Within relevance justification NMS transformed during the post-Cold War era. In each iteration of the strategy the two MRCs and later MTWs cited were usually Southwest Asia (SWA--Kuwait/Iraq) and Northeast Asia (NEA--North Korea). This progressed from a strategy (shown in figure 11) of engaging and winning two MRCs in 1993 until 2001 when Secretary of Defense Rumsfield abandoned the strategy of a two-theater war. A senior official at the time stated, “The two-war requirement is dead. . . . [T]he real questions is one plus what?” (Scarborough 2001, 1). “Now the strategy seems to be one of one plus one-half plus one-half contingencies to determine US [and Army] force requirements” (Binnendijk and Kugler 2001, 5). This centers on a large theater war (LTW) and enough forces to conduct operations in two other SSCs. It is yet to be determined if this will allow the force structure to grow or require the services (including the Army) to justify what is currently within force guidelines.

Figure 11. “Relevance Justification Post-Cold War Strategy Transformation
From the fall of the Berlin Wall until the summer of 2001, the DOD (including the Army) sought to justify their relevance within the republic. The perceived threat to national security interests was no longer the easily quantifiable Soviet Union and Warsaw pact. This ever-changing strategy to engage perceived threat allowed the military to save force structure and gain justification with the American polity.

**Thesis Question**

Since the end of the Cold War, how large has the American polity (Congress and the public) allowed the US Army to be? The impacts of discretionary spending, public opinion polls, and BRAC decisions on the readiness of the Army from 9 November 1989 until 10 September 2001 were the subordinate questions to the thesis. The measure of readiness was the Army’s ability to perform assigned missions during this post-Cold War era. The Army was not required to conduct combat operations in all of these missions. Whatever the American polity asked the Army to do during this time frame, the Army was committed to accomplish.

**Findings**

Based on the data and evidence presented, the US Army was never required to conduct missions it did not have the capability to accomplish during the post-Cold War era. The standard of the Army conducting all operations assigned during the post-Cold War was never threatened. The Army conducted all missions assigned without regards to discretionary spending, public opinion, and BRAC decisions. However, there were missions and tasks, not asked of the US Army, that is was not prepared to do during this same time period.

During the post-Cold War era the US Army changed dramatically. These changes were the result of the American polity calling for a different Army based on the end of the Cold War and a change in the threat environment. The Army changed doctrine and tactics based on the missions assigned during this time period. “Peace dividend” was the watch phrase of the American polity. Since the neither world (nor America) experienced a World War III, the highest
priority was to reduce force structure and divert discretionary spending elsewhere in the federal budget. “The logic was sound and the means used to initiate these savings were well though out from a political and financial standpoint” (Binder 1990, 16).

Some of the changes included adjusting spending levels, a difference in public opinion, and closing down bases under the auspices of BRAC. The overall readiness of the US Army was not tested because of the strategy employed of “relevance justification,” no Desert Storm-like conflict occurred after 1991. The Army was primarily used to conduct missions that were OOTW. These missions affected Army readiness; however, enough resources existed to accomplish assigned missions. It was a matter of diverting units that were scheduled for training to deploy and to call onto active duty, reserve units to back fill some active duty units. This process and use of assets reflected lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During the dramatic increase in deployments, doctrine, soldiers, and other materiel solutions to problems were found. The bottom line is the US Army did do everything asked. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement operations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo strained Army readiness and used precious resources, but the missions were and continue to be accomplished. Belligerents within these areas of operations were separated, and civilians experienced positive gains in their standard of living and protection of their civil rights.

The only instance where the Army may not have met the “possessed capability to engage” standard was Kosovo in June 1999. “However, this question was not a matter of the Army’s ability or capability, rather the will of the National Command Authority to use the forces requested by the geographic CINC [General Clark]. The simple fact is President Clinton [was] extremely reluctant to consider introducing American ground troops into the conflict in Yugoslavia” (Theros 1999, 1). The leaders of the US did not agree with the assessment by the military that ground troops were necessary. “The fact is that the practical restraints on an effective introduction of ground troops and the costs involved [were] so enormous that they
[were] nearly prohibitive” (Theros 1999, 2). This is the only time during the post-Cold War era that the capability and ability of the Army ever were in question. But there were missions not assigned or executed that the Army previously had the capability to accomplish.

The one mission not asked of the Army is to conduct another major deployment like Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Currently the Army cannot currently conduct a Desert Storm-like operation on the same scale and time period (two corps within six months). There are not enough forces available or enough strategic lift to conduct that size of an operation today in that specified time. “The C-141 fleet is broken. We have less that half the sustained airlift capacity available to us during Desert Storm without calling up the civilian reserve fleet”(Theros 1999, 3). A more appropriate question may be whether or not the Army is required to conduct such an operation. Is the Desert Storm metric becoming more irrelevant (Krepinevich 2001)? A more suitable question could be, What other kinds of contingencies or threats should the Army prepare for? Another question is, Is the Army now required to build force structure based on threat and capabilities?

Other findings associated with the size of the Army during the post-Cold War are outlined below. These take into consideration the subordinate thesis questions regarding discretionary funding, public opinion, and BRAC recommendations.

1. Soldiers were not always taken care of suitably during the post-Cold War drawdown. The long-term impacts of current personnel policy cannot be predicted. A linear regression analysis of the major outputs from this policy over ten years into the future would provide true and useful data in future personnel policy making. Simply stated the human element of the drawdown was not adequately considered nor shaped properly from a readiness and morale standpoint when measured against the standards of businesses. The businesses within the American polity that underwent similar downsizing during the post-Cold War period experienced some of the same reductions in morale based on company downsizing. Some of this reduction is
due to management’s inability to understand the impact of downsizing on its employees. The military experienced a similar problem.

In testimony to the HASC in September of 2000, General Shelton the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “One cause [of concern] is due to the negative effects of a higher than planned tempo of operations on our aging equipment” (Shelton 2000, 2). Does the effects of a higher tempo also impact the morale and readiness of the troops serving in the services? “This area [within] the drawdown process was not clearly thought out centers on the “human element” and its effect on military readiness (St. Jean 1997, 1). The Army did not take into account the drawdown as a continuing process. “Downsizing is usually not a one-time shot. This has certainly been the case for the US Army” (St. Jean 1997, 3). Downsizing of corporate America during the post-Cold War era is business model measure of what happens to employees during reductions.

Just like the Army, there were neither policies nor programs in place to minimize the negative effects of cutting back in corporate downsizing. “Restructuring requires new roles to be clearly defined because there is a relationship between organizational downsizing and employee [soldier] morale” (Wagner 1999, 3). The Army did not do a good job of minimizing this situation.

2. Reductions made to the force structure had little regard to second and third order effects. Like the first finding, reference the lack of attention to the “human element” of the drawdown, cuts were made across organizations with little thought to the future. Cuts in force structure did take place in the form of whole divisions being dissolved; however, other units received decrements that spread over the entire organization. Solutions to manning problems appeared in the form of the Limited Conversion Division (LCD). Removing a battalion from the division and removing a company from each remaining maneuver battalion. The process of taking risk and applying the cuts to just one part of an organization did not apply to units below
Army level. Thus cuts were made across an entire organization weaker, rather than just weak in one unit or department. Reductions on the “margins” over a series of years eventually begin to affect the processes and functions necessary to train, equip, and maintain an army the size, scope, and professional-based, like the US Army. “Kicking the can down the road” scenario of delaying and averting decisions [of further reductions] until later, for whatever reason, only reduces the efficiency of the Army and may give the American polity a false sense of security. The cuts made in the overall Army budget amounted to diverting funding from Research and Development programs to cover costs associated with the increased amount and duration of overseas deployments (Cordesmann 1999).

3. Based on the strong public support shown in polling data it seems that the American public still have a high degree of trust in the leaders of the military establishment. The American public during the post-Cold War has and continues to believe highly in the leaders of the military. This belief supersedes in percentage the faith in a number of highly organized, well-respected organizations including educational institutions, the Supreme Court, organized religion, and medicine. This faith or belief, however; did not translate into a measurable level of support for “status quo” or increased funding in the military during the post-Cold War era. It seems the American public was satisfied with the military leaders and the decisions they made to reduce military spending after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This level of support in the leaders of the military, especially the Army, is quite interesting to note while taking into consideration the numerous sexual misconduct scandals that surfaced during this same time period. The Aberdeen sexual misconduct court martials, the Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney scandal and subsequent dismissal, and the highly publicized case of Major Genera; Hale, all brought the Army onto the front pages of most newspapers in a most unflattering manner. These cases were investigated, adjudicated; (not adequately or fairly in the thinking of some military members), and the Army continued on with the business of sustaining, maintaining, training and equipping
soldiers to fight the nations battles. These cases of misconduct within both the training and senior leader realms of the Army apparently did not dissuade public opinion about the Army. Only a slight dip in the overall percentage of “great deal of confidence” occurred during the 1996 data sample (Taylor 2001).

“In the post-Cold War era, the public mood toward the armed forces [became] more one of indifference. The end of conscription makes military service less salient to the general populace” (Moskos et al. 2000, 20). This indifference is one characteristic of the so-called civilian and military “gap” that is described recently in sociological studies. The overall view of the military and the Army by the American public changed after the end of the Cold War. Military affairs are growing less important to the American people and less in their consciousness (Newcity 1999). The American opinion did change somewhat after the end of the Cold War, but the fact that less Americans have any opinion about the military (including the Army) is even more significant. This allows the subject of national security to slip away from the discussions within households and the workplace. This type of discussion is vital if the American polity is to object to growth or reduction in military forces based on the perceived risk to safety by a threat to national security interests.

The civilian-military gap also affects the Army in another manner. Since the all-volunteer force started in the 1970s, the Army especially has had to recruit soldiers from a public where more and more of the recruits had little exposure to the military. One source indicates that youth interest in military service declined from 32 percent in 1973 to 10 percent in 1999 (McGann 1999). A good economy for most of the post-Cold War era, more opportunities at two-four year universities, and increase in military deployments all led to a perception that the military was not easily selected as a viable career option. This not only further widens the perceived civilian-military gap but impacts on the American public views of the Army.
4. The strain for efficiency versus mission resources required remains unbalanced. Even with the distinct possibility of a politically contaminated BRAC process, like that of 1995, the Army still needs to reduce the infrastructure in a requisite percentage with the reductions in troop and spending levels. The overall reduction of facilities throughout DOD is near 40 percent of the Cold War infrastructure. The Army is still operating almost 20 percent more infrastructure than required, as is the rest of DOD. This creates an enormous burden on the funding and staffing systems within the Army. Savings of both funds and soldiers created through the closing of infrastructure could provide funding necessary for Research and Development or transforming new organizations to meet new threats. This unbalance will continue to hinder efforts as the Army transforms into the Objective Force near 2010-2015.

Recommendations

Based on the experience of the post-Cold War era and the continuing US position as the sole remaining superpower, there a number of recommendations that are key to sustaining a viable army to meet any future threat. That army must be a part of a comprehensive, easily monitored, and heavily grounded on a new future strategic vision of the US. That army should also take note of the lessons of the post-Cold War with respect to discretionary funding, public opinion, and BRAC recommendations while seeking a path into the future. Other issues including the management of change, personnel policies, and the unchanged configurations of staff organizations may have also had a significant impact on the sizing of the US Army.

1. The Army must produce an equitable assessment process and propose now another 20 percent reduction in the infrastructure resources it currently operates. This will create a surplus of another $2 to 6 billion annually for the Army alone. The “current projections of savings [from the 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 BRAC rounds] were just updated and are in excess of $16.7 billion annually” (Kansas City Star 2002, A7). This includes a projected increase of additional $6.6 billion savings annually. The Army should be proactive and list the bases for recommended
closure before the new 2005 BRAC deadline of February 2004. If the Army does this, another $5 to 15 billion savings could be realized in advance of the current law (Kansas City Star 2002). The Army could realize savings and possibly use the funding for Objective Force Programs or to develop capabilities based force structure to counter other threats within the next twelve to eighteen months. This could occur but only if recommendations are forwarded a year in advance of the legislated time frame.

2. The Army also needs to gather support and assist in creating a new version of NSC-68, a document that in a large part shaped and defined the Cold War from the US aspect. A NSC-68-like document with nonpartisan support means US long-term national interests would support the American polity, reduce impact of change of public attitude, and prioritize resources based on mutually agreed upon goals and objectives. This document is needed, tempered with post-Cold War lessons and current terrorist threat input. NSC-68 shaped the policy of the military, including the Army, with respect to national interests during the Cold War. Another NSC-68-like document in this the new “nonstate actor” era is necessary. This includes TICS and TIMS, along with the numerous types of current asymmetric threats.

3. The Army needs to break “parochial pottery” and begin functioning as a member of the American polity’s joint services team. By expanding upon the strengths of the Army with include the Officer Education System (OES), Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and entry-level training and facilities, soldiers would be ahead in contributing to the nation’s joint services fight. The Army must continue to work in a joint environment and work with the other services. Based on the deployments during the post-Cold War era, the Army will not likely enter a fight alone. Other services will provide strategic and operational support to any Army operation of the future. This will allow the sharing of certain responsibilities and but still require services to be distinct. This is perhaps the most unlikely recommendation for the Army to implement due to the broad sweeping changes in mind-set required to actually set aside service
rivalry and service parochial pottery. “The services are very capable but they still have not learned and they have not trained and have not exercised sufficiently for us to claim we have a true joint force capability” (Shanker and Dao 2001, 8).

4. The Army should use a different measure to quantify itself to the American polity. The Army currently uses the base unit of divisions to measure force structure and impacts on troop levels. These operating forces are quoted as the base unit when force structure issues are discussed. In reality the divisions within the Army comprise only a small percentage of the total Army force structure. When DOD officials discuss an Air Force wing or a Navy carrier battle group the most if not all of the entire support structure required for that entity is a part of the personnel figures. Within the Army the division is quoted as the base unit in operating forces and does not include corps, army, and theater level units required to support the divisions within the Army force structure. It also does not include TRADOC or the Army Materiel Command as a part of the division force structure numbers; however, without these two organizations no Army division is fielded, trained, maintained, or deployed.

5. There are two types of change within the US Army based on its size, scale and need for continual maintenance of units, soldiers, and equipment. They are programmed and unprogrammed change. It is important to understand the difference between the two and why more unprogrammed change occurred during the post-Cold War era. A number of systems within the Army were designed and implemented to manage budget, personnel, materiel, and doctrine during the 1960s and early 1970s. These systems used a window to implement changes to force structure and to ensure a programmed second and third order effects for the introduction, modification, or reduction of forces within the Army. This change affected the command plan or documentation cycle of the Army. Unit development, changes to organizations, upgrades to equipment, changes in staffing, and a myriad of other variables were inputted into the Army at this time. This programmed change did cause the wheels of the Army to move but only in a lock
step manner with deliberate prior planning and personnel to conduct this planning as keys to the process. Change that is not part of this process is categorized as unprogrammed change. This is the during the post-Cold War era that started when the first unit was identified to be deactivated. This continued during the post-Cold War era with various senior leaders providing input and guidance on this system. Previously, the window to implement change took place twice a year. This system changed in 1997. From that date on, only one window a year exists for the force structure systems of the Army to make programmed changes. Thus, the more unprogrammed changes that occur are now partially based on the decrease in opportunities by 50 percent to commit programmed change. This affects how quickly units are documented new equipment within the unit documentation system. It also dramatically impacts on how fast new force models are documented and produced to place soldiers and equipment against within the overall Army command plan.

6. Reduce the size, number, and makeup of staffs within the Army. The use of outdated Prussian style comes into question when discussing the reductions in force structure and where these reductions are achieved. The Prussian system is very rigid in its design and has not changed much during the hundred plus years since its inception. Often reductions are made to the maneuver or support units; however, staffs have and still are manned in antiquated manner. The nineteenth-century Prussian model developed by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (often called Moltke the Elder to distinguish him from his nephew, who led the German Army into World War I). “Why do we [continue to] change doctrine and build and resource new force structure to oppose new threats, yet we fail to change the one key tool a commander has to make things happen—the staff” (Harman and Cupp 1998, 32)? Many staffs today are not effective. They are required to accomplish too many tasks, or they did not reduce in function or force structure during the post-Cold War era. One major portion of the Army that did not change is the Department of the Army staff. This staff constantly morphs by placing functions outside the
Pentagon and calling these units field operating agencies (FOA). This is due to the manning restrictions placed upon the staff during the drawdown. This became more or less a shell game of moving positions outside the Department of the Army proper out to other posts.

Areas for Further Study

Some items that were not studied but could be affected by the size of the US Army during the post-Cold War era are as follows:

1. Whether or not the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks saved further reductions, 2 divisions called for by Secretary Rumsfeld in the summer of 2001 (Shanker and Dao 2001) in the US Army force structure and possibly the status of US Army as the supreme world land force. “People have been ogling Army force structure as a bill payer for as long as I can remember,” said Thomas Donnelly, deputy executive director of the Project for a New American Century (Peters 2001, 3). The American polity, after the much-contested presidential election, was calling for cuts in the military once again. Leaders of both political parties and the senior leaders within the DOD were looking for ways to reduce the current cost of the military and pay for a ballistic missile defense system with a price tag of $50 billion.

2. Investigating the impact on Doctrine and Materiel tenants based on reduced troop levels in TRADOC and AMC. The drawdown of total force structure equals a little of 300,000 soldiers during the post-Cold War time period. This drawdown coupled with the personnel policy of filling all divisions and corps (beginning in 1999) within the US Army by October 2001 has a number of second- and third-order effects. These effects may include the reduction of the Army’s capability to formulate, test, evaluate, and maintain soldier and materiel solutions to problems today and in the future within TRADOC and AMC. The call to consolidate TRADOC and AMC to become the “resource provider for the Army” also is seen as having merit. The consolidation would allow for greater efficiencies and reduced structure; however, if would hinder the strategic ability of the Army to adapt and anticipate future threats (Cohen and Guch 1991). The long-term
impacts of current personnel policy cannot be predicted; however, the “seed corn” of future
weapon systems, training, and doctrine are impacted by not filling spaces within both the training
and materiel commands. These impacts could be felt in the future. “The education system
[including the Army], and the preservation of an open society with a common Western culture are
as valuable for our national security as our impressive military hardware” (Hanson 2002, 36).

3. The Army has a “critical mass” that cannot be breached if the capabilities and
functions are to continue to exist and provide adequate defense within the framework of the land
based power component. This critical mass is a function of all the processes within the US Army
necessary for it to adequately develop solutions to the threat identified and supported by the
American polity. That support comes in the form of government spending and will of the people.
Those solutions include materiel and soldier answers to counter the threat as defined by the
leaders of the American polity. Within the Army, the functions of TRADOC, AMC, and other
solution-based organizations must stay competent and viable. These organizations find the
solutions to issues and problems for developing, equipping, training, and stationing organizations
within the Army of the future. The capabilities of these organizations must not erode or the
“hollow Army” of the 1970s and the unprepared Army of 1941 will result.

These effects on constrained resources, BRAC issues of pork barrel politics, increased
deployments without increased resources, and internal Army politics all impact on the “critical
mass” of the US Army. They affect the Army as follows:

Pork Barrel Politics BRAC Issues: The politicians as a part of the American polity make
decisions and threats [like those in 1995] that contaminate the process. The political
ramifications of closing bases and the loss of the jobs within a community need to be balanced
against the needs of the entire nation. There a still a large number of facilities left over from the
Cold War that serve some functions but are more of a burden on the budgets of the services. This
strain reduces efficiency within the service (including the Army) and causes resources to be
diverted from other critical functions and tasks. The end result is that the Army cannot nor can it
ever be as efficient and it could if pork barrel politics continue to impact on the resourcing of
Army functions.

**Increased Deployments:** The dramatic increase in deployments of the post-Cold War
Army required ever increasing amount of force structure to be engaged. This impacted on
soldiers very significantly. During the middle of the largest drawdown since World War II the
Army conducted the largest number of deployments in its history. This required soldiers to move
from units being dissolved, to units deploying back to units either dissolving or deploying once
again. This turbulence led to some soldiers developing a perception that the Army could not take
care of them and/or their families. Many soldiers affected then were the first to volunteer to leave
the service when reduction programs came into effect. This is an output from the Army that
requires tremendous resources to accomplish the myriad of missions that the Army did during the
post-Cold War time period.

**Constrained Resources:** Resources within the budget have constantly changed and are in
a cycle of up and down movement. “During the 1960s we spent around $300 B in today’s
dollars. In the 1970s we were near $250 B in today’s dollars, while during the 1980s we spent
around $350 B. Once again defense spending plummeted to about $270 B, the question is
whether Congress will spend more money on defense again” (Mitchell 2001, 26). This cycle
seems to be in an uphill swing based on the fact that the drawdown budgets have brought the
defense budget levels to near 1970s levels, adjusted for inflation. These constrained resources
directly impact the Army in its ability to design, procure, field, and maintain new weapon
systems. To a lesser extent it also impacts on the number of soldiers it can recruit with costly
incentive programs.

**Threat Identified and Solutions Required:** This input into the Army critical mass is
directly responsible for what the force structure is comprised and fielded. These two variables
were quite static during the Cold War, however during the post-Cold War era they become very hard to define. With the “relevance justification” scenario already discussed, the American polity required the Army to change and manage based on a moving standard. The enemy was less well defined and the force structure associated with each MTW allowed the Army some flexibility.

**Deployments:** These take away resources from the Army and do affect readiness. Based on the smaller number of soldiers within the Army, this also causes more soldiers to have to experience multiple deployments and reduces morale. One could state that this hones skills in combat and peacekeeping operations by keeping them practiced. This may be true but the overall impact on the force of today is more likely to be negative based on the dramatic increase in deployments and the nearly 40 percent reduction in force structure during the post-Cold War era.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 12. Factors Impacting on the “Critical Mass” of the U.S. Army
Summary

Downsizing is the “probably the most pervasive yet understudied phenomenon in the business world” (Cameron 1994, 184). This is also true when downsizing is applied to the US Army. By some measures, downsizing has failed abjectly as a tool to achieve the main raison d’etre, reduced costs (Hickok 1997). Under the framework of “saving predictions” BRAC has demonstrated that at least in DOD (and the Army) savings are achievable. Throughout the entire post-Cold War era the Army endured incredible change. This change was not always beneficial to either the Army or the American polity. However, today’s Army is much better off than at any time in history.

For the first time in the nation’s history, the military is generally regarded as the best in the world. (Ricks 1996). There are a number of reasons to substantiate this claim. One reason is in an area that the military is making great strides is performing. That is the growth in number and sophistication of training facilities (Ricks 1996). The unparalleled number and use of training opportunities for all soldiers to experience and learn without a significant threat of career or loss of life. All of these facilities cost money and that that directly impacts on the resources required maintaining a large standing Army of the caliber that the US has today.

The per capita cost in 1964, last year of the peacetime draft was $29,140 (in 1999 dollars). In 1999 the figure was $63,812. It cost over twice as much to maintain a person in uniform in the all-volunteer force than it did during the days of conscription (Moskos 2001). Despite this fact, the Army still outlays a considerable amount of money compared to other services per soldier. It costs the Army $14,555 per recruit on active duty as compared with the $12,000 DOD average. That is almost twice what was spent on recruiting a decade ago (Moskos 2001). This outlay of dollars affects the Army and how it does and will continue to conduct business in the future. The DOD budget fell by only 12 percent from 1990 to 1998 in current dollars, but in constant dollars it declined by about 28 percent (Kugler 2001). This is where
analysts currently complain of the DOD “death spiral” is in concerning the reduction of dollars
but the dramatic reduction in spending power. This lack of spending power has impacted the
Army as well as DOD. Even if the budget does increase moderately, the DOD will not be able to
spend its way out of the mounting dilemmas facing it (Kugler 2001). Thus, the need for dramatic
and immediate change in the Army exists now. Some analysts have gone so far to state that a 50
percent cut in force structure will have to be made to help pay for modernization efforts
(Anderson 2001). These cuts were discussed before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001;
however, the need to modernize a large legacy force in the Army still exists.

“Real” Revolution in Army Affairs Needed

The Army needs to change now and change fast. “Future effectiveness is declining
because the persistent mismatch between multiple missions and fiscal resources has left Army
modernization plans in shambles” (Snider and Watkins 2000, 24). The Army and DOD are in a
death spiral for resources to modernize old equipment and develop new systems. Someone must
properly inform the American polity that dramatic change must take if the Army is to remain
relevant. If not, perhaps the shadow of Vietnam regret will show itself like it did to General
Howard K. Johnson the US Army chief of staff under President Lyndon Johnson, late in his life.

I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval office and give my four stars to the
President and tell him, “You have refused to tell the cannot fight a war without
mobilization; you have required me to send men into battle with little hope of their
ultimate victory; and you have force us in the military to violate almost every one of the
principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I
walk out of your door.” Then, added Johnson…“I made the typical mistake of believing
I could do more for the country and the Army if I stayed in that if I got out. I am now
going to my grave with Lapse in moral courage on my back.” (Sweetnam 2000, 63)

The need to stand up and tell the American polity that change must occur is as great as the need to
develop an overarching plan that adequately identifies threat and develops force structure that is
threat and capabilities based. This will maintain the Army in a path of development that stays
within resources and meets the American polity needs. “In truth, any responsible defense review
must be both strategy-driven and resource-constrained” (Flournoy and Tangredi 2001, 1).
To analyze and determine answers to these questions a model is required to measure the questions against. This model must take into account several basic truths of policy making and budget executing under the current system of government and civilian control of the military. That requires that the military conduct an analysis of assigned missions and report back to the civilian controlling agency (the American polity comprised of the Congress and the public) what missions are executable and those that are at risk. If this is done now; however, the system is continually slowed down and is outdated from the days when these “system of systems” were devised to manage resources during the 1960s. This will take into account the proper use of the funds given to the military (Army) by the American polity. During much of the post-Cold War era the business building forces has been humming along quietly, not attracting much public attention (Kugler 2001). DOD stated what was needed and the public believed the stated requirements, and Congress funded it. This is part of the system and checks and balances introduced by the founding fathers and further refined in over two hundred years of republic government. This system also allowed and continues to allow the Army the opportunity to deliver a status of missions to the governing body who appropriates fiscal resources. However, during the post-Cold War era this contract between the American Polity and the Army was not always fulfilled with a complete and accurate picture.

Conclusion

War will not go away. The reality is war will not be outlawed or made obsolete. The more complex, expensive, and lethal weapons become, the more the American polity must remember that they are still just tools, whose effectiveness depends on the discipline, training, and spirit of their users. War and potential war will remain a feature of international politics (Hanson 2002; Cohen 1995). The users within the Army of tomorrow are even more important than the soldiers of today’s Army. The more important strategic issues of what the users and the Army force structure built to counter a future threat and how that structure is managed and
changed will impact the American polity. The need for dollars to change from a “third wave” (Toffler 1993) army into an army capable of self-deploying anywhere in the globe is only increasing. Whether it is a new vehicle to go to the fight or a new form of transportation to take the force to the fight, the need for dollars will not decrease. Just as the reality of war will not diminish, the need to properly identify requirements and manage the spending of those dollars will not lessen. Both of these truths are balanced against the most important factor, which is people. General Crieghton Abrams stated once, “People are not in the Army, they are the Army” (Sweetnam 2000).

The US is the only nation with the capability to move large forces quickly, and sustain them over large distances. This capability to deploy rapidly and to sustain forces at long distances is a key attribute of the US superpower status (Kassing 1994). In the post-Cold War the ability to build, maintain, and exercise strategic mobility is even more important based on the fact that there no longer exists a bipolar world. Conflicts now are regional, asymmetric, ethnic-based, and sometime natural disaster related. The very nature of these conflicts requires a power projection based force when confronted with resource constraints evident today. These resources required reassessment to meet the threats of a radically different post-Cold War environment. If the US is to continue in its role as sole superpower, then changes are required for the Army to meet this challenge.
GLOSSARY

American Polity. The political unit formed based on the US Congress and the opinions of the American Public.

Army Materiel Command. The major subordinate command within the US Army whose charter includes the development, maintenance, improvement, and eventual disposal of materiel solutions and equipment in Army units.

Army Organizational Life Cycle Model. The template for soldiers, equipment, and organizations go through during life of these units, it includes eight functions, the interconnectivity between functions, and the external influences on overall process. These functions are force development, acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, separation. These eight functions are managed by two external inputs into the model. They are command management and leadership and resources. These inputs allow the model to continue and manage how the US Army runs (How the Army Runs 1999, 2-7).

Baseline forces. That force that the administration believes is necessary to counter any and all national security threats with minimal risk associated with defending those interests (Kauffmann 1992, 8).

BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure). Closing and realigning installations is a major part of the Army’s Post-Cold War reformation effort. The year 2001 is the 13th year of BRAC implementation that includes four separate BRAC rounds. All closures and realignments for BRACs 88, 91, 93, and 95 are complete (BRACO 2001).

Center for Army Analysis (CAA). The activity that computer models different war and contingency to compare capabilities of forces currently in the force structure. It identifies those capabilities and/or forces that are not present and determines risk involved (How the Army Runs 5-23).

Civilian-Military Gap. A number of sociologists studying the military as a social organization have described a widening of differences in the values, ethics, and culture between the American public and the military who serve them (Moskos 2001).

Cold War. This war does not have a single beginning date. There are a number of events including the end of World War II (1945), Churchill’s address about the “iron curtain descending over Europe”(1946), Joseph Stalin asserted that World War II was unavoidable and a consequence of “capitalist imperialism”(1946), the Soviets walking out of the first Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura (1948), and the Berlin airlift (1948). The Cold War was undeclared but started and continued during the time period after World War II until 9 November 1989. This is the date the Berlin Wall was torn down. The Soviet led Warsaw Pact later dissolved, as well as, the Soviet Union formed into the Confederation of Independent States (CIS). The CIS later gave way to most of the former Soviet Republics achieving independent nation status. (McCarran Act 1950, 2001)

Force Development. Involves identifying a required capability, determining how to achieve that capability, and designing units and forces structure available to accomplished national
military objectives (creation of forces). Determining personnel and materiel solutions and allocating them under fiscal constrained resources achieves this process (How the Army Runs 2-8).

Force Management. The process of determining force requirements and alternative means of resourcing requirements (Capstone Process). It encompasses all processes associated with the progression from requirements identification through execution of implementing programs (How the Army Runs 5-3).

Gallup Poll. A poll conducted by the Gallup organization that has a statistically sound sample to survey Americans on their views about a particular subject.

Generating Forces. Corps and Echelons Above Corps (EAC) units including TRADOC, AMC, HQDA, Corps headquarters, corps units and EAC units. These units make up the largest number in the active force and primarily support the Operating Forces with materiel acquisition, training, direct leadership and management.

Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). This is a new unit based on a brigade size design with wheeled combat vehicles. The premise of the doctrine covering this design is to develop and field a unit that deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent contain, stabilize or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. Some technical aspects include air transportable, can deploy in 96 hours, and is a significant countermeasure to an armor threat (Robel 2001).

NSC-68. National Security Council document which painted a dire picture of Soviet objectives and capabilities and counseled that only a massive increase in American military preparation (and a new readiness to employ military means) could counter the Communist threat.

Operating Forces. The divisions and armored cavalry regiments and the combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units that comprise those units in the active Army force structure. These also include the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Special Operations Groups, and separate brigades.

Operations Other Than War. These are operations and missions assigned to military organizations that occur in the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Belligerents are not fighting in a consistent basis and/or a force is placed in a geographic area, under the auspices of a agreement, to keep the warring parties from engaging in conflict. These operations often deploy soldiers to other geographic regions and require them to perform tasks not usually associated with their wartime mission.

Political Spending. That spending that is often called “pork barrel” politics. The ways and means congressional delegates forge and maintain relationships with their constituents.

Public opinion. It is the large regional or national polls like Gallup that measure attitudes and concerns of the American public.

Rogue Alliances. Alliances made between rogue nations for a specific purpose or goal. An example is the transfer of technology knowledge between rogue nations to further enhance and develop a ballistic missile’s capabilities.
Rogue Nations. Nation states that do not formally belong to any treated organizations and may or may not be governed by an authoritarian ruler. Some current examples are Serbia, Libya, North Korea and Iraq.

States of Concern. Nation states that due to some reason (proliferation, economic, Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD]) are considered by the US A. to require additional attention to ensure the protection of national interests and/or the interests of allies. Examples of such states would include China, Syria, India, Pakistan, Belarus, and Zimbabwe.

3Rs (Recruitment, retention, retirement). The three major phases of personnel management. Each phase is distinct and important in the overall readiness and effectiveness of the US Army.

Total Army Analysis (TAA). A biennial process that is the fourth phase of force development process to determine organizational authorizations and where these organizational models compete for resourcing (*How the Army Runs* 5-2).

Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Toxic Industrial Materials (TICS/TIMS). A relatively new field of materials that are identified as a threat. They are cheap to produce and easy to employ in a strategic nature against one's enemy military and/or civilian population (Lee 2001).

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The major subordinate command of the US Army charged with conducting the training of all soldiers and developing doctrine that those soldiers are trained upon. This command oversees the training of Initial Entry Trainees (IET), officers, and non-commissioned officers within the U. S. Army.

US Army. The land-based armed forces organization comprised of active duty, reserve, and civilian components. It includes the following major subordinate organizations: TRADOC, which is all the activities and units involved in the development and execution of training solutions for US Army forces; FORSCOM which is a force provider for US Army forces to Commander in Chiefs; AMC which is the developer and provider of materiel solutions for US Army forces; and Headquarters Department of the Army, the command charged with managing the procurement, development, training, and disposition of soldiers and materiel in the support of US Army missions.
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