THE IRISH DEFENSE FORCES: OPTIONS FOR FUTURE HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Irish Defense Forces have conducted peacekeeping operations since 1958. Many of these have had a humanitarian aspect. Since 1994, however, the Defense Forces have become involved in dedicated humanitarian operations, notably in Africa, Central America, and the Balkans. These operations have been unorthodox in that they have deployed unarmed troops, who are on special leave, in civilian attire and under the auspices of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or Irish governmental organizations such as the Agency for Personal Service Overseas (APSO). These organizations acknowledge that Irish operations have been successful in the limited sense that they have temporarily benefitted both the host nations and their citizens, but it is debatable whether they are successful in terms of sustainability and security. They have also lacked a proper command structure, thereby leading to a potential breakdown in discipline. In their favor, they contribute to a far better military/civilian relationship than do orthodox military humanitarian operations.

This thesis will examine whether there are better ways of conducting such operations, in the light of recent changes in the international environment, such as Ireland’s membership of Partnership for Peace, developments regarding the Special High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), European security evolvement, and other options.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AoR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>APSO</td>
<td>Association for Personal Services Overseas</td>
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<td>ARW</td>
<td>Army Ranger Wing</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Strategic Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Complex Humanitarian Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comdt.</td>
<td>Commandant (Major equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRISEX</td>
<td>Crisis exercise (WEU/NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D COS (Ops)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D COS (Sp)</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFHQ</td>
<td>Defence Forces Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFR</td>
<td>Defence Force Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFTC</td>
<td>Defence Forces Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJAG</td>
<td>Deputy Judge-Advocate General</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>D Ops</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>European Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EAPMC</td>
<td>European Atlantic Partners’ Military Committee</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Strategic Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCÁ</td>
<td><em>Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil</em> (Local Defence Force)</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>Geneva protocol</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance Operations</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Civic Assistance</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (Bosnia I Herzegovina)</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>Interim Force in East Timor</td>
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<td>IHSG</td>
<td>Irish Honduran Support Group</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>IRSG</td>
<td>Irish Rwandan Support Group</td>
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<td>JES</td>
<td>Joint military exercise study (WEU/NATO)</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Law of War</td>
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<td>MCWG</td>
<td>Military Committee Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLOH</td>
<td>Military Law Operational Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations other than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Operational Speciality</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process (PfP)</td>
</tr>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Partnership Coordination Cell (Mons, Belgium)</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Permanent Defence Forces</td>
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<td>PDFFORRA</td>
<td>Permanent Defence Force Other Ranks’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIMS</td>
<td>PfP Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMF</td>
<td>Political-Military Framework (for PfP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RACO</td>
<td>Representative Association of Commissioned Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Reserve Defence Forces Representative Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDFRA</td>
<td>Reserve Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force (Bosnia I Herzegovina)</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Partners Europe</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Special High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNREO</td>
<td>UN Rwanda Emergency Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>UN Standby Arrangement Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervisory Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>US Military Academy</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Background

The Irish Defense Forces have conducted humanitarian operations for several years. This thesis will examine whether there are better ways of carrying out such operations than heretofore. This chapter will introduce the Irish Defense Forces and will describe their organization and roles. It will concentrate on the Irish experience in, and methods of selection and preparation for, overseas service. In particular, it will identify how Irish soldiers were sent on humanitarian operations into Africa, Central America and the Balkans, and why they were unarmed, dressed in civilian attire, on special leave, and under the auspices of international, governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The thesis will introduce how changes in the security environment for Ireland (membership in the Partnership for Peace, commitment to the European Rapid Reaction Force) might impact on her modus operandi for conducting humanitarian operations. Finally, this chapter will incorporate a research methodology that will provide a set of parameters within which solutions will be sought through the remainder of the thesis.

The Irish Defense Forces

The Irish Defense Forces consist of the Permanent Defense Force (PDF) and the Reserve Defense Force (RDF). The PDF includes the Army, Naval Service, and the Air Corps. The RDF comprises An Fórsa Cosanta Áitiúil (FCÁ--Local Defense Force), which is the Army Reserve, and An Slua Muirí (the Naval Reserve). Like most armed forces in the world today, the PDF has undergone reductions in strength and a revision of
roles over recent years. In the year 2001, approximately 10,500 men and women serve in the PDF: 8,500 in the Regular Army, about 1,000 in the Naval Service, and about another 1,000 in the Air Corps. Their disposition is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Organisation of Irish Permanent Defence Forces. (Source: Irish Defence Forces)

The President of Ireland is the Supreme Commander of the Defense Forces. The government exercises military command through the Minister for Defense. The senior
military officer is the Chief of Staff (COS), and there are two deputy Chiefs of Staff
(DCOS), one for operations (Ops) and one for support (Sp).

Territorially, the Republic of Ireland is divided into three areas for administrative
and operational reasons, and in each area there is an infantry brigade. Each brigade
consists of three light infantry battalions, a logistics battalion, a field artillery regiment,
and a cavalry squadron. The strength of the artillery regiment is equivalent to a battalion
(officially, 470 personnel; in practice, normally fewer); that of a cavalry squadron to an
infantry company (officially, 133 personnel). There is also an engineer company, a
signals company, and military police company, as well as a training center in each
brigade. In addition to the three-brigade structure, there are also two logistics bases (one
each in Dublin and the Curragh, a military installation thirty miles southwest of Dublin),
a Defense Forces Training Center (DFTC, in the Curragh), and a number of special
establishments, such as the Equitation School, army bands, and the Army Ranger Wing, a
Special Forces unit. In the case of the corps (or branches) that support the infantry, a
corps director and staff are provided to coordinate the purchase of specialized equipment
and the execution of specialized training.

The three-brigade group structure allocates distinct operational areas of
responsibility for each of the brigades. One has primary responsibility for operational
tasks in the western border area in Ulster (in the North) and Connacht (in the West); the
second for operational tasks in the eastern border area, as well as the greater Dublin and
Leinster area; and the third, for operational tasks in Munster (in the south of Ireland) and
part of Connacht. The brigade group structure is intended to be based on strengthened
combat and combat support elements and streamlined combat service support elements.
However, quick arithmetic will indicate that, with a strength of roughly 2,000, each
brigade operates at less than the normal full complement. This, combined with a high
operational tempo, has had implications for the formation of units to serve overseas, as
will be explained later in this thesis.

The high level of operational commitments has been a feature of Irish military life
for many years, because of the so-called “Troubles” in Northern Ireland. It has continued
despite the declaration of a cease-fire by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1997. The
main reason for the high tempo of military operations is that the Irish Police force--the
Gárda Síochána--is a predominantly unarmed force, the members of which require armed
protection in carrying out of many of their duties. This applies particularly during the
escorting of large amounts of cash between banks, of explosives to building sites and
quarters, and of IRA and other subversive prisoners between courts and prisons. The
carrying out of these “police” tasks is a source of dissatisfaction to the military authorities
because of the drain on troops (who should, in a military sense, more properly be
engaged in training). On 6 September 2000, the Chief of Staff called for a reduction in
these duties:

The Chief-of-Staff of the Defence Forces has said that the Army should play a
reduced role in the performance of civic duties such as escorting cash
consignments and providing border controls. Lieutenant General David Stapleton
said that the cost and time of these “unsoldierly duties” could be better spent on
training soldiers for the expanding overseas peacekeeping missions . . . the Chief-
of-Staff believes that the forces’ civic duties should be radically reduced if they
are going to have a more robust role in overseas service.

However, the next day the Minister for Defense, Michael Smith,
rejected a call by the Chief-of-Staff of the Defence Forces that the Army should
play a reduced role in the performance of civic duties. Yesterday, Lieutenant
General David Stapleton described tasks such as escorting cash consignments and
providing border controls as “unsoldierly duties”. Today, Mr Smith told RTÉ News that the Defence Forces had an important role to play in providing cash and prisoner escorts. He agreed that the threat from subversives was diminishing. But he said that it was in the national interest that the Defence Forces assist with such escorts when requested to by the Gardaí, as long as a subversive threat existed in the country.

The high operational tempo that results from these tasks means, in effect, that individual units are so committed that they cannot be released as whole units for overseas service. Instead, composite units are formed that are made up of elements from parent units (such as a platoon per battalion). These are then trained for the forthcoming mission. The following two sections will describe the ways in which units designated for overseas service are formed.

**Overseas Service**

The participation of Ireland’s Defense Forces--Óglaigh na hÉireann--in peacekeeping did not begin until after Ireland became a member of the United Nations in 1955. Since 1958, the Defense Forces have had a continuous involvement in peacekeeping missions, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. However, in recent years, following the end of the Cold War, Irish Defense Forces personnel were also deployed to many other parts of the world as peacekeepers. Personnel served at various times as observers in Central America, Russia, Georgia, former Yugoslavia, Albania, the Middle East, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Namibia, Western Sahara, South Africa, and East Timor.

The vast majority of overseas missions with the United Nations has involved light infantry battalions from the Defense Forces. These have been deployed, first in the (former Belgian) Congo in the 1960s, then in Cyprus in the late sixties and early
seventies, and, finally, in Lebanon from 1978 to the present. There are two aspects of these units that are relevant in the context of this thesis: the units’ humanitarian involvement and their methods of selection and formation.

All Irish battalions overseas have been involved in humanitarian operations. Each overseas battalion carries out widespread humanitarian functions, including medical support to the local communities and villages (which takes the form of the provision of clinics and medical supplies). The battalions that have been part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have “adopted” the orphanage in Tibnin, the main town in the Irish area of operations; that is, troops run projects to raise funds, and they also assist on a voluntary basis in the running of the orphanage. In addition to this, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs (the Irish State Department) provides funding to help schools, clinics, and civil engineering projects in the area. Over the years, while humanitarian work was not the primary focus of the Irish peacekeeping effort overseas, it made up a significant component of it.

The Overseas Selection Process

The method of selection and formation of units to serve on overseas peacekeeping missions is also significant in the context of this paper, because it differs from the normal procedure, used by most armed forces, of sending dedicated units. That is, instead of sending, for example, the 1st Battalion to Lebanon, or scheduling, as the Americans do, a specific unit to do a tour of duty in six months’ time, the Irish have consistently formed up ad hoc units from the entire resources of the regular (i.e., full-time) units of the Defense Forces. For example, a naval telegrapher can serve (and often does serve) as a signaler with a rifle (infantry) company in Lebanon. The main reason for this is the high
operational tempo, to which I have referred earlier. However, it is also true that that no single battalion or unit in Ireland has been considered to be of a sufficient strength, or state of readiness, to be deployed overseas without a great deal of preparation. The single exception to this is the Army Ranger Wing (ARW), a Special Forces unit; an ARW platoon was deployed on short notice to INTERFET, the Australian-led peacekeeping mission to East Timor. Instead, overseas units are formed from elements that “parent units” must contribute several months in advance. The normal “contribution” of each domestic battalion to an overseas battalion is a platoon, meaning that each brigade contributes a company. The combat support and combat service support units contribute pro rata. These elements conduct preparatory training: first in their parent unit locations, then in their brigade areas. Finally, they undergo collective training at a central location. The function of the training period before deployment is to hone existing skills for peacekeeping duties (they are already trained soldiers, and many of them will have undergone this particular overseas training several times) and particularly to build an ésprit-de-corps and unit cohesion for the new unit. At any one time, a parent battalion may have one platoon detached in preparation for overseas service, one actually deployed overseas, and one on repatriation leave, prior to rejoining the unit.

The method of selection ensures that those soldiers who are deployed have met certain minimum standards of performance and conduct. Normally, a soldier must first volunteer in writing, although in recent years the lack of volunteers in certain specialized categories (MOSs) has meant that a few (engineers, medics, and MPs) have had to be detailed. While every soldier is liable for overseas service (the legalities are explained in chapter 2), it is considered preferable that only those who volunteer in writing for a
specific tour be sent—so that, apart from any other reason, it makes it more difficult for
them to complain afterwards. Volunteer soldiers must then be recommended by their
commanding officer, who will only do so if the soldier is of a sufficiently high standard.
Here, however, a dichotomy exists: a CO is responsible for maintaining the operational
efficiency of his own unit, so will not necessarily recommend all his men who volunteer
for an overseas mission. In general, a battalion commander will recommend up to a
platoon for service on any tour. Any volunteers over and above that are documented as
being “suitable but not recommended due to exigencies of the service” and will normally
be the first to be selected for the next tour.

When selected, a soldier passes through parent unit training (normally three
weeks at platoon level), then parent brigade training (four weeks at company level), and
finally defense force centralized training (two weeks at battalion level), which includes
battle inoculation, firepower demonstrations, and ceremonial training—the “ministerial
march-past,” or formal parade, in front of the Minister for Defense. The important point
is that, at all levels of training, the soldier is tested and his performance monitored, so
that if he does not meet the required standard, he is returned to his unit. Army
regulations, training syllabi, and manuals govern the whole selection and training
process.

The foregoing is the normal training pattern for an overseas battalion. A variation
occurs when a different type of mission is planned. In such a case, the soldiers must
(normally) volunteer and be recommended by their CO, but often specific MOSs (that are
in short supply) are needed, so specific individuals are targeted. The tendency is
obviously for the officer in charge of a forthcoming mission to try and select individuals
he knows have performed well on other missions. This must be balanced (by the
manpower officer who is on each brigade staff) against fairness, so that those who
volunteer, although not known by a future commander, can be given a fair chance of
being selected. There is no doubt that over twenty-three years, officers, non
commissioned officers (NCOs), and senior soldiers have become less than excited about
a forthcoming tour to Lebanon, as most will have already served there several times.
However, a “new” mission is always in demand, so the officer leading it can normally
afford to be more choosy in making his selection. It is true to say, then, that those
soldiers who are selected and who make it through the training for overseas are either of a
high standard or belong to MOSs that are in very short supply in the Defence Forces. To
date, the system has worked and the personnel have invariably performed well.

Importance of Overseas Service

In September 1993, the Irish Government restated the roles of the Defense Forces
and defined one of them as being: *To participate in United Nations missions in the cause
of international peace*. There is no doubt that Ireland’s participation in peacekeeping
operations has promoted a positive image of Ireland and its Defense Forces both within
the international community at the United Nations and among all sides in the mission
areas. The Irish Government and the Defense Forces both regard this extensive Irish
participation in peacekeeping in very positive terms. The Defense Forces may be said to
have contributed more than most to Ireland’s national interest abroad. The accession of
Ireland to a seat on the UN Security Council in January 2001 is probably due in no small
measure to its role in peacekeeping. This thesis will now consider specifically
humanitarian operations, staring with the tour in Rwanda.

The civil war that began in Rwanda in October 1990, along with several political and economic upheavals, was the result of exacerbated ethnic tensions that culminated on 6 April 1994 when President Juvenal Habyarimana, a member of the Hutu majority, was killed as his plane was shot down near Kigali Airport. Extremists from the minority Tutsi ethnic group were believed to be behind the attack. In the genocide that followed, roughly 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by members of the majority Hutu tribe. Eventually, the Tutsis defeated the Hutus and ended the genocide in July 1994, but approximately two million Hutu refugees--many fearing Tutsi retribution--fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The media images of this human tragedy were transmitted across the world.

The reaction in Ireland, in common with the rest of the world, was horror. As in any crisis, when the pictures of starving and destitute people start to appear on television screens, viewers begin to demand that “something has to be done.” The responsibility for “doing this” is invariably laid at the feet of the politicians. Ireland has a tradition of sending charitable aid to the victims of disasters abroad, and its help in financial terms has always been one of the highest per capita in the world. In addition to this, Irish missionaries have served the people of the Third World not only in a spiritual but also in a temporal way, organising them in self-help projects. Many Irish people have relatives, or personally know individuals, who are missionaries abroad. Irish children are used to participating in raffles and charitable fundraisers for “the Missions” as they grow up. Politicians are particularly susceptible to requests for assistance concerning the Third
World. The then President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, who was later to become the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited the African Great Lakes area. So when the Rwanda crisis was on all the front pages and television screens and when certain NGOs (in particular, GOAL, in the person of its chairman John O’Shea, a former journalist) came up with the idea that soldiers should be sent to help, the political response was positive.

The question was, what modus operandi should be used? A UN mission was already in the area. UNAMIR (the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) had been criticized for not intervening to stop the killings. However, it had suffered losses at the start of hostilities, and the Belgians, having taken casualties, withdrew their battalion. The UN background report for UNAMIR stated that because of this withdrawal, UNAMIR found it impossible to carry on with its original mandate and instead concentrated on providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons. It continued

Assuming there was no realistic prospect of the two sides agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future, combat and massacres could only be averted by an immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate to allow it to coerce opposing forces into a cease-fire. This would require several thousand additional troops and could require that UNAMIR be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The alternative, the report maintained, was for a small group, headed by the Force Commander, to remain in Kigali to act as an intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-fire. A full relief effort would be impossible, however, without a cease-fire. Finally, the Secretary-General noted that
UNAMIR could be completely withdrawn, although he said that he did not favor this alternative. The cost of withdrawal in human lives could be very severe, he cautioned.

Eventually, on 21 April 1994, the Security Council decided in its resolution 912 (1994) to reduce UNAMIR. It adjusted UNAMIR’s mandate so that it would act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire and assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations. The Security Council also strongly condemned the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Peoples’ Front (RPF). But:

Because of the deterioration in the security situation, the evacuation of humanitarian personnel was recommended on 9 April 1994, and humanitarian activities were temporarily suspended. However, the United Nations agencies participating in the United Nations Disaster Management Team in Rwanda recommenced their coordination efforts in Nairobi within days of the evacuation, under the aegis of the newly-created United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). Efforts at limited cross-border humanitarian assistance proved possible, primarily from Uganda but also from Burundi. A sub-office of UNREO was set up in Kabale, Uganda. "Staffed with personnel seconded by UNHCR and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Kabale office helped coordinate cross border relief efforts into Rwanda. These coordinated efforts included a number of international NGOs and were coordinated closely with the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross."

So it was that the Irish Defense Forces agreed to requests from certain Irish NGOs operating in the area to supply troops to them and to UNHCR to assist in the aid effort.

The following extract from a memo written to the Irish Director of Operations at the time is relevant:

The Defence Forces by Government direction organised and dispatched the Irish Rwandan Support Group (IRSG) to GOMA (ZAIRE) to assist the UNHCR in the relief of distress in the area. Tasks were identified as a result of meetings at UNHCR HQ in GENEVA and a recce to GOMA. The estimated duration of the operation was three (3) months.
The troops involved were mainly officer administrators and logisticians, as well as military engineers, who built and renovated accommodation for refugees. All of these personnel worked directly for UNHCR and the NGOs in order to streamline their relief efforts. The area they worked in is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2. Irish Rwandan Support Group AO. (Source: Microsoft Encarta World Atlas)

Their tasks were laid down in OPORD 18/94 issued by the acting COS on 19 August 1994. Briefly, they were as follows:

1. Assistance with administration and logistics at GOMA airport.

2. Maintenance of the UNHCR vehicle fleet.
The soldiers’ work was successful and drew high praise from those for whom they operated. Indeed, information on the Irish modus operandi was sought:

The work of the Defence Force personnel with NGOs has also been effective, providing selfless leadership and management in distressing conditions. UNHCR and UNREO (Rwandan Emergency Office) have sought details of the Irish system of release of military personnel to work with NGOs.

However, within the Irish military, there was always the apprehension that, as the soldiers were on special leave and working in civilian clothing (as distinct from being in uniform on active duty), any disciplinary problems that might arise would be difficult to deal with under Irish Military Law because of lack of jurisdiction in the countries involved. The Director of Operations’ report goes on to say:

IRSG has been a practical success in the awful conditions applying in its AO. This success has much to do with the dedication of its personnel who have been able to overcome the inherent weaknesses in the genesis and structure of the Group. IRSG is an unarmed civilianised un-uniformed party of military personnel which is on special leave with pay and allowances. IRSG’s legal status is unclear. The powers of its ‘CO’ are not established and have not been tested . . . IRSG is responsible for its own security including preparations for withdrawal in emergency. It has not got the capacity to withdraw unassisted.

The fact that no disciplinary problems arose was due more to the selection process (which ensured only good quality troops being sent) than to the application of any normal military discipline. The lack of a normal, legal military chain of command meant that the longer that the mission (and subsequent similar ones) went on, the more likely problems were to arise.
The then officer in charge of the Overseas subsection in the Directorate of
Operations recommended in his report to the Director of Operations that “in future the
legal and command status be clearly established” and that,

It is apparent from the IRSG experience that the Defence Forces have not got the
capacity to place and support an independent Irish Contingent in a distant
mission. The IRSG reliance on US Military air transport . . . adequately
demonstrates this lack of capacity. . . . The Defence forces should not undertake
similar missions in future without the required capability.14

He continued: “I recommend . . . that the Defence Forces participate in missions
abroad only as a component part of an established, adequately supported and mandated
international force.”15

Despite these recommendations, similar missions were subsequently deployed to
Honduras, after Hurricane Mitch, in 1999 and 2000, and to Albania as the refugee crisis
there grew rapidly during the Kosovo catastrophe. In each case, soldiers (mainly
engineers, medical, and logistical personnel) worked in civilian clothes under the
auspices of either Irish NGOs or the Irish Government’s Agency for Personal Services
Overseas (APSO) without any framework for military discipline. Again, their efforts
were effective, and problems did not arise, because the soldiers were volunteers and the
type of individual involved saw that his work was necessary and that there was no room
for any breach of discipline. This may not always continue to be the case.

Why were groups of soldiers sent overseas in such an unorthodox way? Speed
and an apparent desire to avoid bureaucratic delays were the main reasons.
The Civil Servants from the Department of Defense had a cautious approach. They
pointed out that one cannot just send soldiers into another country. Is there permission?
Even if there is, from whom? Is it the legitimate Government? Who is the legitimate
Government? Will sending soldiers uninvited into another country, without their permission, be tantamount to an act of invasion?

Their points were valid. Establishing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the host nation is one way of solving the problem. This, however, is a lengthy process. During the Rwandan crisis the relevant NGOs were, with the support of the people (and consequently the politicians), calling for quick action. This is how the ad hoc answer was arrived at: give the soldiers special leave; let them go under the auspices of the NGOs; let them wear civilian clothing; give them whatever equipment they need; send the best you can get; tell them to do the best they can . . . but do it NOW.

The officer in charge of the Overseas Sub Section’s report explained:

Under current legislation, a resolution of the Dáil (parliament) is not required if an unarmed contingent of the Defence Forces is dispatched for service with an international UN force which is unarmed or if the contingent consists of not more than 12 members of the PDF. It was therefore decided that the IRSG would be unarmed and not in uniform. Because of this, IRSG personnel were indistinguishable from many NGO personnel working in the area. This proved to be a successful expedient which allowed the (IRS)Group to work in relative freedom.

It was done; and, for all intents and purposes, it worked. Once the troops were gone, the impetus to find a proper framework under which they should operate simply faded. The troops did a good job in Africa; later, in Central America; and later still, in the Balkans. Until now, the system has worked for the Irish Army, and there have not been any significant problems. As of this writing, the Army is gearing up for a third mission to Honduras. While it is not yet clear how the preparations for this will take place, they will probably be as heretofore. The first two missions to Honduras were in response to Hurricane Mitch.
Background: The Missions to Honduras

A further feature of the Irish method of operation (deploying troops for short periods) is that, by acting virtually on their own, the Irish set up and establish facilities that are well utilized while the troops are there, but of which full use may not be made after they leave. In this way, the humanitarian operations principle of perseverance (sustainability) was patently not complied with. The clinic that was built by Irish Engineers of the First Irish Honduran Support Group (1IHSG) near Santa Rosa D’Aguan, Honduras (see figure 2), was acknowledged by all who saw it to be a first-class facility. After that Group left, it fell into disuse because the Honduran Government did not hold Santa Rosa D’Aguan to be one of their priority areas. A second Support Group
redeveloped it early in 2000, but that group could only stay for a few weeks. The Irish Agency for Personal Service Overseas (APSO), under whose auspices the groups operated, had been involved in selecting the site for the clinic. APSO acknowledged that although there was a dire need for a clinic in that area (as there was a local population of over 5,000 people), as far as the Government of Honduras was concerned, the priority of aid should go to the larger town of Trujillo. This town is only twenty-five miles away, but given the poor condition of the roads, the clinic that was already there is beyond the reach of many of the inhabitants of Santa Rosa. The solution, then, appeared to be to cooperate with one of the many foreign (mainly American) medical agencies that visited the area. Contact was made with the medical faculty of the University of Massachusetts. This was the fortuitous result of a chance meeting with a doctor from there who was looking for likely sites to operate a clinic and who was impressed with the facility. This was one of the first times it became apparent that more liaison should be made with, for example, US Military medical services, who are also active in the area.

The primary question of this thesis is: Are there better ways of deploying Irish troops on humanitarian operations than heretofore in order to make their efforts more efficient? Consequent to this, what is the best way to ensure that the job that they do is more effective, that is, that it has a lasting benefit to the host population? Changes in the security environment might affect Ireland’s way of operating.

Change in Situation: The International Security Environment

When troops were sent abroad under the circumstances outlined above, Ireland was, and still is, a neutral member of the UN and the European Union (EU). She had not, and still has not, joined NATO, or the Western European Union (WEU). For several
years, however, Ireland had been examining her situation in regard to her relative isolationism, and moves were being made to become involved with both the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and defense aspects of the EU.

a. The Partnership for Peace

On 1 December 1999, after a great deal of acrimonious debate, Ireland eventually joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The PfP is a program that was launched by NATO in 1994. Its principal objective is to improve the capacity of NATO and partner countries to work together in joint operations. Its focus is on practical cooperation tailored to the individual needs of each country, and its emphasis is on interoperability.

A whole new area of opportunity thus became available to the Defense Forces, especially in the realm of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, because the PfP offered an opportunity to train with other countries for these tasks. This was something that the Irish had never done before. Military personnel looked forward to increased involvement with other forces, as well as professional development.

In 2000, the Irish Government published its “White Paper on Defence,” which, despite many thorough and in–depth submissions from the military authorities, reflected almost exclusively the views of the Department of Defense. Here is what it says about humanitarian operations:

An important continuing element of the Defence Forces contribution overseas is in a humanitarian context. Humanitarian tasks go hand-in-hand with military tasks in many crisis situations. The multi-functional nature of UN peacekeeping in recent years calls for a considerable degree of co-operation in the humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. In Lebanon, for example, the Defence Forces have been able to give assistance, such as support for a local orphanage and the provision of medical clinics, which has greatly improved the quality of life of the local community. Other humanitarian assistance has included the evacuation of and shelter for people during hostilities and assistance with saving harvests etc. In
addition, Defence Forces personnel on secondment to non-governmental organisations have made important contributions to dealing with humanitarian crises, for example, in the aftermath of the hurricane in Honduras in 1999.

It is evident that, apart from the method of seconding personnel to NGOs, the Irish Department of Defense shows in its White Paper that no consideration has been given to any other form of contributing to humanitarian operations, other than what has already taken place. Referring to Partnership for Peace and the Defence Forces, however, the White Paper says the following:

Considerable benefits will accrue to the Defence Forces from participation in PfP, allowing them to enhance their capability for multi-national peacekeeping operations in the future through the medium of interoperability development, training and exercises. PfP will be of value to Ireland in co-operation and planning for Petersberg Tasks. Ireland’s participation in NATO-led UN mandated forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo are examples of the type of situations in which Ireland can benefit from participation in PfP because much of the preparation and training for these new style missions is undertaken by countries under the auspices of PfP. The Defence Forces, in turn, have much to offer to other participating States in terms of the cumulative experience and insight which they have gained over many years in a wide variety of peacekeeping missions. This will give Ireland an influence in how peacekeeping operations will be conducted in the future.

These paragraphs acknowledge that Irish Troops have a great deal to contribute, but do not go much further than that in trying to say how it is expected to happen.

b. EU/WEU

The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in December 1991 and the parallel WEU Declaration were the basis for WEU-EU relations in the period 1991 to 1997. The Treaty established a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that was to “include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to
a common defence." Article J.4.2 provided for the EU to be able to request WEU “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. In its Maastricht Declaration, WEU stated its readiness to respond to such requests, proposing a number of measures to develop a close working relationship between WEU and the EU.

At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European Union committed itself to ensuring that it has the appropriate capabilities needed to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the “Petersberg tasks” (see footnote 19). At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the European Union agreed on a common European headline goal and on new political and military bodies to be set up within the council. The common European headline goal is that by the year 2003, member states will be able to deploy within sixty days and then sustain, for at least one year, forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (50,000 to 60,000 persons). New political and military bodies to be established within the Council include a political and security Committee, a military committee, and a military staff. As an interim measure, the following bodies have been set up within the council in March 2000: a standing interim political and security committee, an interim body of military representatives of Member States’ Chiefs of Defence. Military experts seconded from Member States in order to assist in the work on the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and to form the nucleus of the future Military Staff have also strengthened the Council Secretariat. The European Council has also given the
Secretary General of the WEU a mandate to make full use of WEU assets in the interim period to prepare the EU for exercising its future responsibilities.

In recent years, the EU has had increasing recourse to the operational capabilities of WEU. These operations have been limited, such as a police contingent in Mostar and mine clearance in Croatia. But the significant aspect--and the bottom line--is that the WEU is also cooperating with the EU in planning for humanitarian and evacuation operations.

Research Design

These new developments (Ireland’s involvement with both the PfP, and in a defense context, with the EU) give rise to secondary questions. These are:

1. Can PfP be used as a coordination node for multinational humanitarian operations? If so, how?

2. Procedurally, what has PfP done to facilitate deployments?

3. Can EU/WEU be used as a coordination node for multinational humanitarian operations? If so, how?

4. Procedurally what has the EU/WEU done to facilitate deployments?

5. What do other countries do procedurally to facilitate a rapid deployment of military personnel and units into third countries for humanitarian operations? Would the Scandinavian initiative, the Special high-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) be an option for Ireland in this regard?

6. Should the Irish look for more cooperation with, for example, US Army Reserve Medical Units in order to carry out humanitarian operations more effectively abroad?
An area that will not form part of this thesis is that of representation within the military. In 1990, the Irish Defense Forces were authorized by the government to establish representative associations for officers, other ranks, and for the Reserve. This came about after a period of agitation among the spouses of (mainly) soldiers who, having complained about the rates of pay then prevailing, put forward one of their number for election. The candidate polled sufficiently well as to give serious concern to the government, so that it eventually acceded to demands for representative associations. Accordingly the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO), the Permanent Defence Forces Other Ranks’ Representative Association (PDFORRA), and the Reserve Defense Forces Representative Association (RDFRA) were established. This thesis will not deal in any depth with the effects of representative associations on the Irish Defense Forces, as this is a major subject in itself. It has already been the subject of a thesis by a former Irish student on the US Army Command and General Staff Course, Commandant Michael Gannon, in 1992. This thesis will only mention any implications insofar as they may apply to the selection of personnel for overseas service. Basically, representation in the Irish Defense Forces is permitted in the areas of pay and conditions of service, but operations as a whole area is outside the scope of the representative associations, as laid down in the regulations that govern them. In the past, the regular associations—particularly RACO, the officers’ one—have expressed concerns about reserve component personnel, for example, being selected for overseas service (where regular personnel may have been available), but as the scope of representation does not extend to operations (particularly overseas ones), their concerns were merely noted. No consequent action was taken.
Having examined the various options for operating under the PfP, EU/WEU, UN, neutral and US auspices, this thesis will compare the individual advantages and disadvantages in each case with the present situation as it pertains to Irish participation in humanitarian assistance missions. The concluding chapter will indicate which option is the most appropriate for Ireland to pursue. If, after careful appreciation, it should appear that her present modus operandi is the most suitable for her military, then perhaps this thesis will be in a position to recommend the Irish method as a possible one for other countries to use.

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1 The acronym IDF is not used as in Irish terminology, because after more than forty years’ Irish service in the Middle East, it has come to mean Israeli Defense Forces.

2 In most armies, a brigade, including its “slice” or support elements, will encompass approximately 4,000 to 5,000 personnel.

3 The IRA is the illegal guerilla organization that has waged a campaign of violence against the British presence in Northern Ireland and that has also in the past been involved in many criminal activities in the Republic, such as murder, bank robberies, and kidnappings.

4 RTÉ Irish Radio News at One, 6 Sept 2000

5 Ibid., 7 Sept 2000

6 Three candidates—Ireland, Italy and Norway—contested two Western European seats. Only Ireland obtained the required two-thirds majority with 130 votes; Norway polled 114 and Italy 94.

7 Background report for UNAMIR, prepared by the UN Department of Public Information

8 Ibid.

9 Memo from OIC Overseas Sub Section to Director of Operations, 10 March 1995.

10 Report on visit to IRSG by Director of Operations to Chief of Staff, October 1994, para. 7.
11 Ibid., para. 10.

12 Ibid., para. 20.

13 Interviews with participants of all ranks have disclosed no disciplinary incidents.

14 Director of Operations IRSG Report, para. 10.

15 Ibid., para. 11.

16 Memo from OIC Overseas Sub Section to Director of Operations, 10 March 1995, para. 7a.


19 Ibid., paras 6.3.8 to 6.3.10. The Petersberg Tasks are named after the conference center near Bonn in Germany where they were adopted in 1992. They include humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and international crisis management roles developed to meet the new global problems that have arisen since the end of the Cold War. The Petersberg Tasks will be implemented by the Western European Union (WEU) at the express request of the EU. Participation in the Petersberg tasks will be on a voluntary and case by case basis.


21 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The first chapter of this thesis has been an attempt to summarize Irish humanitarian operations to date, and the modus operandi in which troops were selected, raised into units, activated, and deployed. This chapter will review existing literature on these and similar types of operations and on relevant options that are available for the future, and will also examine Partnership for Peace, European, and American documentation dealing with humanitarian operations.

Irish Humanitarian Operations

There is not a great deal of written information or literature available on Irish humanitarian operations, because there have been so few of them. In examining those that have taken place, reliance has been made on after-action reports from, and personal interviews with, those soldiers who have served in Africa, Honduras, and the Balkans.

Personal interviews have been conducted in order to ascertain the opinions of the NGOs and governmental organizations for whom the troops worked and under whose auspices they served (specifically, GOAL and APSO). They have given honest appraisals of the soldiers’ productivity and work practices, given that for all intents and purposes they were working as civilians at the time. When asked to what extent if any they would again seek Irish troops to assist them in their efforts, and whether they would prefer a more orthodox system of military support, invariably their points of view have indicated that as far as they are concerned, they would be happy for the present arrangements to continue. It is probably fair to say that the concept of military discipline
(the main problem area from the military point of view) is somewhat irrelevant to them, so long as their own aims and objectives are being met. The benefits of operating together has worked both ways: several Army officers have retired and taken up full-time positions with NGOs or international organizations, such as the Red Cross, as a direct result of having been deployed with them while serving in the military.

US Humanitarian Operations

This thesis will look at US Military humanitarian operations for the sake of comparison, and context. There is far more literature available regarding these operations. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus has been narrowed into an attempt to ascertain answers to the following questions:

1. What is the current US doctrine on humanitarian operations? The comprehensive document in this area is the US Field Manual 100-23-1, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, which is a joint document that “describes US military JTF involvement in HA operations.” It goes on to describe “the interaction among military and civilian agencies in terms of three main levels of effort: strategic, operational and tactical.” This FM is useful in that it gives the doctrinal ideal in terms of how a mission should be carried out. However, it admits that it “pertains to large-scale situations requiring a military response in the form of a joint task force.”

Nevertheless, it also deals comprehensively with the interaction between the JTF and the civilian agencies that will be in theatre and, as such, is a useful beginning in the search for a workable solution to the question of deployment of Irish troops abroad. The FM deals in great detail with how US forces should carry out humanitarian operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and while there is no equivalent Irish
document, it is interesting to compare similarities and differences in the manner that the Irish conducted their missions. The principles remain the same in both cases: these will be examined below. The FM identifies three basic types of humanitarian assistance (HA) operations:

1. Those coordinated by the UN
2. Those where the US acts in concert with other coalition forces
3. Those where the US responds unilaterally

“Ireland” could be substituted for the “US” in these three instances, but in this paper, I will examine mainly the options of Ireland’s participation with PfP and the EU. As far as the UN is concerned, the FM says:

The UN often experiences significant time delays as the organization works through the process of achieving international consensus. A unilateral or multinational response to a crisis situation may be faster than a parallel UN response.4

This will, of course, have implications where speed of response is of the essence.

Although the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Secretary for State) said, “The current legal position continues to be . . . namely (that) we will not participate in operations which do not have a UN mandate;5 He was referring to the new European Rapid Reaction Force (which will be dealt with in Chapter 4 of this paper). The Irish did operate under a UN mandate in Africa but not in Central America. It was not necessary that they should do so in the latter case because they were working under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs suborganization, APSO. The Honduran mission was unilateral; those who served in the Balkans could be said to have been in a multinational environment.

It is important to look at the principles identified in Chapter 1 of FM 100-23-1 and to see to what extent they have applied to the Irish operations. They are:
Objective: *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.* In all cases, the Irish military depended to a large extent on civilian organizations to set the conditions, if not the objectives themselves. In Africa and the Balkans, Irish troops worked for different organizations and helped *them* to achieve *their* goals. The Irish DOD had little other aim than to provide troops to help where needed. In Honduras, the goal was set by the Irish governmental organization, APSO: their representative had personally walked a 200-mile stretch of the Caribbean coast and had selected the area where the aid effort was to be concentrated. An Army reconnaissance party did visit the area in advance of the main body, but their main aim was to ensure that the task, as set by APSO, was achievable. In this case I am not suggesting that this system did not work: on the contrary, there is no doubt that the best agency to make the assessment of what was required was APSO. This is likely to be the case in future operations: that the local in-country team, be it governmental or NGO, should make the initial assessment. The military can then judge its feasibility or otherwise.

Unity of Effort: *Seek unity of effort towards every objective.* In all cases, this principle applied. The officers and soldiers applied military problem-solving techniques to accomplishing the missions as identified by them in cooperation with the civilian organizations. It made for good teamwork, harmonious relations, and effective operations. This is the area that was commented on most favorably by the civilians.

Perseverance: *Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities to support strategic aims.* The Irish did not apply this principle in any case, but because of the special situation they were in (supporting the government agencies or NGOs), it is arguable that they did not need to. In all three missions, the intent was to
have fixed-time tours, with definite exit timetables. They left the “clearing up” or “handing over” to the government agencies or NGOs. There was no acrimony here: as these were the lead agencies in any case, it was up to them to plan the long-term strategy.

**Security:** *Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.*

Each Irish mission was unarmed and depended on other agencies for protection and evacuation. This is, of course, the normal situation for civilian government agencies and NGOs; and in each case, the environment was permissive. As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, the original rationale in sending unarmed troops was to avoid the bureaucratic delays that would result in getting a Dáil (Parliamentary) resolution. Until the relevant legislation is changed—the Irish Defence Act, 1954—this situation is likely to remain, particularly for short-term missions.

**Restraint:** *Apply appropriate military capability prudently.* Given the foregoing, this does not apply.

**Legitimacy:** *Promote the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.* There was no question of the legitimacy of what the troops were doing: they were operating under the auspices of the government agencies and NGOs who sponsored them. This question needs to be examined further in the light of another US document, the Military Law Operational Handbook, and this analysis will be conducted in chapter 3.

Also useful in looking at how the US military prepares for HA operations is the National Security Council’s *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations: including Presidential Directive 56* published in 1998. This is
intended to assist both military and civilian participants in humanitarian operations; again, it has guidance that could be useful in an Irish context.

2. **What are their legal considerations or constraints?** *The US Military Law Operational Handbook* is invaluable in this regard. The subject of legal matters are dealt with in more detail in chapter 3.

3. **What are the recommendations of military officers who have direct experience of such operations?** *The DOD Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program: Concepts, Trends, Medical Challenges* by Major Linda L. Eb ling of the US Air Force, is a “hands-on” study by a medical officer. Eb ling states her purpose as “to clearly define and evaluate the DOD HCA program in the context of MOOTW.” She analyses strengths and weaknesses in the program, noting values in terms of training and experience that accrue to the military, in addition to the benefits that the host nation receives. This study also assesses the purposes and limits of HCA (under Title 10, United States Code) and differentiates between humanitarian assistance (HA) and HCA. Current trends highlight past, present, and potential benefits of this program. The challenges she identifies involve: implementing program improvements, measuring program performance and effectiveness, and defining military roles relevant to training, long term benefits, and the politico-military interface.

4. **What are the recommendations of military officers who have conducted research into the conduct of such operations?** “*Si Vis Pacem, Para Pacem: Training for Humanitarian Emergencies*” by Major John A. Nagl, US Army, and Cadet Elizabeth O. Young, USMA, is a valuable source of thought for the future of HAO. Nagl and Young look at the time and resources given to preparing for HA and other MOOTW missions in
the context of their increasing frequency and importance. They identify the fact that “even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each complex humanitarian emergency (CHE) as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.” And “The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc.” Their study highlights the reasons that the US Army in particular needs to train more thoroughly for peacekeeping operations than it has been doing to date.

The thesis research into the humanitarian aspects of PfP, EU/WEU and SHIRBRIG has concentrated mainly on factsheets and documentation emanating from those respective organizations, as well as from interviews conducted with Irish Officers serving there. In the former two cases in particular, there is practically a constant flow of literature, so I have concentrated mainly on the Irish presentation documents to PfP, and on the following EU documents:


2. **Noordwijk Declaration** (14 November 1994)

3. **Marseilles Declaration** (13 November 2000)

Finally, interviews with officers, both American and European, who have worked with the PfP, have added the value of experience to that of written records in that area.
1 FM 100-23-1, Executive Summary: Multiservice Procedures for HA operations, vi.

2 Ibid., vi.

3 Ibid., Overview, vi.

4 Ibid., 1-3.

5 Brian Cowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in The Irish Times, 18 Nov 2000.


8 Forwarded to me by a colleague serving in the EU.
CHAPTER 3
LEGAL ASPECTS OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Irish Situation

This thesis will examine whether there are better ways for the Irish Defense Forces to carry out humanitarian operations than heretofore. As part of this examination, this chapter will consider the question: what are the legal implications of soldiers who are operating in a conflict zone, but who are wearing civilian clothes, are unarmed, and are conspicuously working for aid agencies? This chapter will look at the legal position on these tours of duty from both an Irish and an American point of view.

The legal procedures that were involved in the setting up and carrying out of such missions were basically simple. While the soldiers were on leave (albeit with pay and allowances), they were de facto civilians and were considered to be in the same category as aid workers employed by the organizations to whom they were seconded. The legal framework and the relevant legislation that allowed Irish troops to serve overseas in the manner in which they did were explained by Lt. Col. Pat Godfrey, who works for the Deputy Judge Advocate General (DJAG) in Dublin.

He said that the following provisions of the Irish Constitution are relevant to Ireland’s overseas relations and military service:

*Article 29: Internal Relations*
1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.
2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.
3. Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its (dealings) with other States.
Article 15.6 Exclusive Right of the Oireachtas (Government) to have Armed Forces.

6.1. The right to raise and maintain military or armed forces is vested exclusively in the Oireachtas.

2. No military or armed force, other than a military or armed force raised and maintained by the Oireachtas, shall be raised or maintained for any purpose whatsoever.

Lt. Col. Godfrey added that The Defence Act 1954 (as amended) is the legislation governing the Defence Forces. Section 85, which deals with service of members of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF), is relevant:

Every officer and man of the Permanent Defence Force shall be liable at all times to render military service within the State and, if he is employed on a State ship or service aircraft, be liable at all times while so employed to render military service outside the territorial seas of the State.

Lt. Col. Godfrey went on to explain that provision for service with United Nations Forces is governed by The Defence (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1960. This act provides that all members of the PDF are liable for service with United Nations forces performing duties of “a police character,” that is, peacekeeping duties. The Defence Amendment Act 1993 extended this liability to nonpeacekeeping duties (for example, the Mission to Somalia, UNOSOM). The 1960 Act also provides that a resolution of the Dáil is required before troops are dispatched with such forces, unless they are unarmed, or consist of less than twelve persons, or if they are intended to replace in whole or in part an existing contingent.

Lt. Col. Godfrey continued to say that, while members of the Permanent Defence Force currently serve both with various United Nations missions and United Nations authorised missions (e.g., SFOR), they also serve with diplomatic missions such as the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). There is no specific provision for service with such diplomatic missions. However, in effect, each person is seconded (although that word is not used) to these missions. “There is precedence for persons to be seconded to various organisations within the State, under Defense Force Regulations (DFR) A 15.

They operate in a civilian capacity and are not part of a force or contingent of the Defence Forces. Furthermore no military command structure is put in place. Similar if not even less formal arrangements existed in the case of the Humanitarian Missions some years ago. Our Attorney General has advised that while there is no liability or onus for such service there is nothing improper provided the persons concerned consent to such service.

Lt. Col. Godfrey said that in his own view this is not an ideal situation. It would be preferable if Irish legislation were to provide for service with such missions in the same way as it is provided in the case of United Nations service.

International Situation

The concept of legitimacy is one of the principles of humanitarian operations defined in the US Army Field Manual 100-23-1, referred to in chapter 2. It says:

Legitimacy: Promote the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

Legitimacy has two aspects: the legal right of the soldiers to operate where they were, and the acceptance of them by the people. There was no question of the legitimacy of what the troops were doing: they were operating under the auspices of the government agencies and NGOs who sponsored them. In all cases they were welcomed by the local people. Legitimacy will be examined further in the light of another US document, the Military Law Operational Handbook.
This latter document was invaluable in looking at the international legal framework of humanitarian operations. Naturally, it is written from an American perspective. It is also written, as its name suggests, from an operational viewpoint. It answers questions, such as the above-mentioned one, that is, How does one explain the legality of troops operating in civilian attire in peace operations?

In peace operations, such as those in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, the question frequently arises whether the LOW (Law of War) legally applies to those operations. The issue hinges on whether the peace operations forces undertake a combatant role. It has thus far been the US, UN and NATO opinion that their forces have not become combatants, despite carrying out some offensive-type operations. . . . it is . . . the position of the US, UN and NATO that their forces will apply the “principles and spirit” of the LOW in these operations.5

This approach is consistent with US DOD policy to comply with the LOW “in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.” Now that we know that the LOW applies, how do we differentiate between combatants and civilians? The specific status of combatants are defined in the 1949 Geneva Convention, as well as the 1977 Geneva protocols. (Although the US has not ratified GP I and II, approximately 150 nations have, and the US considers many of the provisions of the protocols to be applicable as customary international law). These definitions are as follows:

1949 Geneva Convention definition: armed forces of a party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a Party to the conflict that are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of armed forces of a government not recognized by a detaining authority or occupying power.
Geneva Protocol I definition: Article 43 states that members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, except medical personnel and chaplains, are combatants. Article 44(3) allows that a belligerent attains combatant status by merely carrying his arms openly during each military engagement, and when visible to an adversary while deploying for an attack.7
Note that GP I thus drops the requirement for a fixed recognizable sign. In this case, the US believes this does not reflect customary international law and diminishes the distinction between combatants and civilians, thus undercutting the effectiveness of the LOW.

The definition of civilians is clear. GP I states that “civilians are persons who are not members of the enemy’s armed forces, and who do not take part in the hostilities.”8 The Military Law Operational Handbook gives a “practitioner definition”: “Civilians are all persons who are not obviously: (1) taking part in hostilities or (2) part of a belligerent force (to be part of the force, they must be integrated into that force).”9 Insofar as Irish troops are involved in the type of humanitarian operations that have been described, who are on special leave, wearing civilian attire, are unarmed, and are under the auspices of civilian organizations such as UNHCR and NGOs; they must be considered civilians and legitimate noncombatants. They are entitled to protection as such.


2 The Irish Constitution provides for a Unitary State (unlike for example the United States, which provides for a Federal System). It is also a written constitution (like the United States, but unlike the United Kingdom). It can only be amended by a referendum of the people. The present Constitution dates back to 1937. It replaced the Constitution of the Irish Free State, which was enacted at gaining Independence in 1921.

3 Lt. Col. Godfrey was referring to Defence Force Regulations, which are the legal instruments governing the Defence Forces.

4 Interview with Lt. Col. Godfrey.


6 DoD directive 5100.77, para E (1)(b), quoted in MLOH.
7 Quoted in MLOH, 5-5

8 Geneva Protocol I, articles 50 and 51, quoted in MLOH.

9 MLOH, Chapter 7, “Civilian Protection Law,” 7-6.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS: OPTIONS FOR FUTURE IRISH HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

Are there better ways of deploying Irish troops on humanitarian operations than has been the case until now? This chapter will analyse the following options:

1. Ireland and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
2. Ireland and the EU/WEU
3. Ireland and SHIRBRIG
4. Relevant aspects of US Humanitarian Assistance Operations
5. Continuing to deploy as at present.

It is important to note that it was not just a routine matter for Ireland to join the PfP, or to commit troops to the European Union’s proposed Rapid Reaction Force (as will be explained later in this chapter). There is, and was, a great deal of public and political wrangling and debate before any of these events took place. The reason for this is Ireland’s almost paranoid view of neutrality. The following discussion describes the background to how this view was formed.

Ireland and Neutrality

Ireland achieved independence for twenty-six of its thirty-two counties in 1921 and has been a neutral country ever since. She maintained her neutrality throughout the Second World War despite severe criticism from her powerful neighbor, the UK, and despite the fact that many thousands of Irishmen from the then “Free State” served in the British forces. The Irish sometimes point to the fact that the United States was also neutral until the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This carries no
weight with the British, who felt particularly bad that they had recently returned three important seaports to the Free State, thereby forcing the British Royal Navy to travel much further from safe havens in order to protect British convoys. By virtue of a clause in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the harbor defenses at Cork, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly were to remain under the control of British government, after the rest of Ireland became independent. These became known as the Treaty Ports and would have been invaluable to the British both for the protection of merchant shipping and for the prosecution of war against the U-boats. The fact that Britain had retained these ports after the treaty was to become an irritant to Anglo-Irish relations during the interwar years especially after Éamonn De Valera (a former IRA activist) became prime minister of the Irish Free State in 1932. The Treaty also stated that the defenses at the Treaty Ports could not be extended or repositioned without the consent of the Free State government. Whether they could be used during hostilities depended on that government’s attitude at the appropriate time. In any event, they were returned unconditionally by the British in 1938. After war broke out between Britain and Germany, this denial of the Ports led subsequently to extremely bad feelings on the part of the beleaguered British; and Irish contingency plans during the “Emergency” (the Irish euphemism for the Second World War) were directed as much at defending against a British invasion from Northern Ireland, as against a German sea assault. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill did not mince his words after the war when he stated:

The sense of envelopment, which might at any moment turn to strangulation, lay heavy upon us. We had only the Northwestern approach between Ulster and Scotland through which to bring in the means of life and to send out the forces of war. Owing to the action of Mr. de Valera, so much at variance with the temper and instinct of thousands of Southern Irishmen who hastened to the battle-front to
prove their ancient valour, the approaches which the Southern Irish ports and airfields could so easily have guarded were closed by the hostile aircraft and U-boats. This was indeed a deadly moment in our life, and if it had not been for the loyalty and friendship of Northern Ireland we should have been forced to come to close quarters with Mr. de Valera or perish for ever from the earth. However, with a restraint and poise to which, I say, history will find few parallels, His Majesty’s Government never laid a violent hand upon them though at times it would have been quite easy and quite natural.

De Valera’s response was that, despite Britain’s opinion to the contrary, Ireland had a right to her neutrality. On 16 May 45 he broadcast:

Mr. Churchill makes it clear that in certain circumstances, he would have violated our neutrality . . . he would justify his action by Britain’s necessity . . . this, if accepted, would mean that Britain’s necessity would become a moral code . . . when this necessity was sufficiently great, other peoples’ rights were not to count. . . . It is quite true that other great powers believe in this same code in their own regard, and have behaved in accordance with it. That is precisely why we have the disastrous succession of wars. . . . If his contention be admitted in our regard, like justification can be framed for similar acts of aggression elsewhere . . . no small nation, adjoining a great power, could ever hope to be permitted to go its own way in peace.

Indeed, after the United States entered the War in 1941, he had stated:

There is scarcely a family here which has not a member or a near relative in that country, in addition to the ties of blood, there has been (between) our two nations a long association of friendship and regard, continuing uninterruptedly from America’s struggle for independence down to our own. The part which American friendship played in helping us to win the freedom we enjoy in this part of Ireland has been gratefully recognized and acknowledged by our people. It would be unnatural, then, if we did not sympathize in this total manner with the people of the U.S.A. and if we did not feel with them in all the anxiety and trials which this war has brought upon them.

People who do not understand our conditions have asked how America’s entry into the war will affect our neutrality here. The policy of the state remains unchanged . . . From the moment this war began, there was, for this state, only one policy possible, neutrality. Our circumstances, our history, the incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our country, made any other policy impossible. Any other policy would have divided our people and for a divided nation to fling itself into this war would have been to commit suicide.
The notion of neutrality, then, has become something of a “sacred cow” for the Irish people--not, perhaps, to the same extent as the Swiss, but it is considered a vital aspect of Ireland’s hard-won independence nevertheless. Neutrality is not written into the Constitution, but over the years has evolved into a pragmatic policy.

This emphasis on neutrality has been the subject of a great deal of acrimonious debate in Ireland over the years. However, the official terminology for the description of Irish defense policy as military neutrality is misleading. The submission to the Irish government made by the Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO) for the white paper on defense in 1999 goes on to say:

Neutrality is a status assumed by a State in time of war. The basic raison d’être of neutrality is the desire to avoid involvement in time of war. When Ireland abstained from World War Two for pragmatic reasons, the status became embedded in the public psyche as a moral stance to take in all circumstances. Alliances, for whatever reason, were and are seen as intrinsically wrong, though successive Taosigh (Theeshig: Prime Ministers) have all noted that though ‘neutral’ we were not impartial when it came to the choice between the Western democracies and the Soviet Bloc. In point of fact, Ireland did not act impartially in World War Two, and the Allies received much covert support from the State. By 1945, however, public perception was that a successful policy of neutrality had spared Ireland from the horrors of total war.

When the Irish Government decided that Ireland should become a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) it had a considerable task to persuade the people in general that this was not an abrogation of neutrality.

Ireland and the Partnership for Peace

Does Partnership for Peace (PfP) offer a better way of deploying Irish troops on humanitarian operations, than the system of forming ad hoc units that has been the dase to date?
It was not just a matter of form for Ireland to join PfP. A large proportion of the Irish population was under the misconception that PfP was only a “back-door to NATO” and that various interests in government were being disingenuous in this regard. Although there was no requirement for the Government to consult with the people in the form of a referendum, because Ireland was not entering into any form of an alliance, nevertheless, it was felt that it was desirable that, as far as possible, public approval should be widespread. Anti-NATO and left wing groups (including, for example, the Green Party) were quick to take advantage of the public disquiet and lack of understanding of the issues involved. It did not help that the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, had earlier when in opposition criticized PfP. Many critics referred to this:

Joining NATO’s PfP would bring us more costs than benefits. It represents a fundamental departure from a UN-oriented neutrality policy towards a policy that sees NATO acting as world policeman. Mr. Bertie Ahern, then leader of the Opposition, showed in a Dáil (Parliament) speech on foreign affairs on March 28th, 1996 why NATO’s PfP was not the place for us: “The case for concluding a bilateral pact with NATO under the Partnership for Peace has not been made. It is true that a number of countries have joined, including neutral ones, but they are all situated geographically on either side of the former East-West divide or in the former Soviet Union. . . . The countries who have joined are all close to potential zones of instability.

Some are in a half-way house and cannot wait to join NATO as full members. Others want a half-way house between membership of NATO and neutrality, giving them an eachway bet. Yet others, part of the former Soviet Union, have no doubt joined for a mixture of economic and security reasons. Irish membership of PfP will be seen in a different light.

Ahern had gone on to promise that his Party, if elected into power, would allow a referendum:

In March 1996, Bertie Ahern stated in the Dáil that any attempt to join NATO’s PfP without a referendum would be a “serious breach of faith and fundamentally undemocratic.” He continued: “While the Government may reassure the public that there are no implications for our neutrality, and that may be technically true at this time, it will be seen by other countries as a gratuitous signal that Ireland is
moving away from its neutrality and towards gradual incorporation into NATO and the WEU in due course.6

What really amounted to a scare campaign was initiated, and it is certainly arguable that, if a referendum on joining PfP were held, it may not have passed. In the event, none was necessary, and Ahern decided not to hold one. Ireland became a member of PfP in December 1999, although a significant proportion of the population had wanted a referendum:

An MRBI poll in May 1999 showed that 71 per cent of the Irish people wanted a referendum . . . in the Dáil the Labour Party, the Greens, Sinn Féin, Independents . . . and an increasing number of Fianna Fáil (Government Party) backbenchers . . . have all called for a referendum.7

The Government tried to explain to the people what PfP is, and what benefits would accrue to Ireland as a whole and to the Defense Forces in particular. The PfP is a program that was introduced by NATO in 1994 as a basis for cooperation between NATO and non-NATO member countries. It had the stated goal of increasing stability and security throughout Europe. Its basic aims, laid out in 1994, continue to be valid. They include the following:

- Increasing transparency in national defense planning and military budgeting;
- Ensuring democratic control of national armed forces; and
- Developing, over the long term, Partner country forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members.

The PfP has become a permanent feature of the European security architecture. There is a biennial training program, in which both Allies and partners participate. This program now contains more than 2,000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to workshops consisting of a small group of participants.
As the PfP process develops, political consultation between partner countries and NATO has also been extended. PfP comes within the overall framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). PfP cooperation covers a wide range of defence-related activities, including air defence, communications, crisis management, democratic control of defence structures, defence planning and budgeting, military training and exercises, peacekeeping operations and logistics. The basis for the partnership is a series of individually developed programs between each partner country and NATO, suited to the needs and wishes of the partner country concerned. Therefore, any country joins on the basis of a “shopping list”; that is, it signs up for exactly whatever aspects of the program in which it wishes to participate.

In 1997, the NATO allies decided to enhance PfP by giving it a more operational role, providing for greater involvement of the partners in decision making and planning, and strengthening its dimension of political consultation. This decision was made partly on the basis of experience gained through the multinational cooperation that has taken place through the IFOR (Implementation Force) and subsequently SFOR (Stabilization Force) peacekeeping missions in Bosnia.

The PfP was further developed in 1999, developing its success by increasing and strengthening activities in political, security, military, and institutional fields. The role of the partner countries has been considerably increased in the daily work of the PfP, particularly with the establishment of partnership staff elements at several NATO headquarters. In this way, officers from NATO and partner countries are integrated into international staff functions on a permanent basis. Irish officers are posted at two locations: NATO/PfP headquarters in Brussels, and SHAPE in Mons.
At the NATO Summit held in Washington in 1999, Heads of State and Government endorsed an “Enhanced and More Operational PfP.” This move was built on experience gained so far and provides direction for the operational partnership of the twenty-first century. The enhanced and more operational PfP is built on the following three elements:

1. A Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations
2. An expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP)
3. Enhanced practical military and defence-related cooperation covering the full spectrum of cooperation in PfP.

Central to this third element is the “Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations” initiative that places increased emphasis on improving the military effectiveness of multinational forces. It aims to increase military cooperation still further to help partners develop forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members in future crisis response operations. These NATO-led operations are governed by the Political-Military Framework (PMF), which was also endorsed at the Washington Summit having been in preparation since the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Sintra, Portugal, in 1997. The intent of the PMF is the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations to enable partners to participate in the planning and execution of PfP activities as closely as practically feasible and to ensure that Partners joining future NATO-led PfP operations be afforded appropriate opportunities to contribute to the provision of political guidance and for oversight of such operations.

What does this mean for Ireland? The Finnish representative at the Oberammergau conference, Mrs. Kalkku, gave a “neutral” view of the PMF:

We all recognize the value of carrying out crisis management operations with wide participation—involving not only Allied troops, but also Partner and third nation contributions... participation offers Partner countries a good opportunity to gain experience and improve interoperability together with the
Alliance . . . the framework should above all facilitate Partner participation in operations—to draw Partners closer to the preparatory phase as well as to the decision-making process and command arrangements. . . . Together with PARP, it could help Partners to make more meaningful contributions. At least, the PMF is an instrument which can help to strengthen the Partnership.

Mrs. Kalkku went on to say:

In the course of the planning and consultation phase, those partners who have been recognized as potential contributors are to be informed of and involved in all relevant aspects of planning and preparatory activities. . . . Partners should be fully involved in the decision-shaping process of NAC . . . during the execution phase itself, contributing partners would be part of the process providing political guidance and oversight to the ongoing operation, including significant changes in the OPLAN and ROE, preparation of the exit strategy and the withdrawal planning. Partners would also fill posts in headquarters which are in direct line of command of the operation in which they participate.

Ms. Kalkku argues for an increase in the number of EAPMC (European-Atlantic Partners’ Military Committee) and MCWG (Military Committee Working Group) meetings for SFOR and KFOR contributors, as well as more involvement for non-NATO members at these meetings. This is certainly something with which Ireland could concur, because, as Mrs. Kalkku says, “things which may appear self-evident for NATO and its Members may not always be that self-evident for Partners who operate outside the Alliance framework.” It is at the end of her address, however, that she makes a particularly relevant point as regards neutral countries’ participation in NATO-led operations:

Participation in command arrangements needs to be looked at as well, in the light of the PMF. The practice seems to vary from one operation to another. If a smaller headquarters core is deployed, Partner troop contributors might be willing to offer modules or individuals to augment it. Even in the case of a sliced approach for a headquarters, consideration could be given to Partner participation.
The basis for Ireland’s becoming a member is Ireland’s “Presentation Document for the Partnership for Peace Program” (Annex A). Paragraphs 7, 12, and 13 deal with humanitarian and the Petersberg tasks, respectively, and are particularly important in the context of this paper. Paragraph 7 states that Ireland looks forward to contributing to PfP activities in the area of peacekeeping, and also notes the increase in demands on the international community to respond to humanitarian crises in recent years. Paragraph 12 also says that Ireland wishes to play an active part in humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks--the Petersberg tasks--in support of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It acknowledges that Ireland sees PfP in general, and the PARP in particular, as having an important role to play in cooperation and planning, for participation in such tasks.

Paragraph 13 specifically refers to humanitarian operations already carried out by Irish soldiers:

Irish Defence Forces personnel have been actively involved in humanitarian assistance. They provide assistance to the civil authorities in response to natural or other disasters. In the context of their international peacekeeping role, Irish peacekeeping contingents have engaged in humanitarian efforts aimed at assisting local communities to develop a self-help philosophy; and Irish Defence forces personnel have served on a Voluntary basis with UNHCR and Irish aid agencies on several continents. In the light of this experience, Ireland is interested in the development of cooperation, and the exchange of experience and expertise in the area of humanitarian operations. Ireland has also noted with interest the development within the PfP framework of cooperation on civil emergency planning and disaster relief.16

So there is no doubt that Ireland is interested in using PfP as a means of participating in humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks. But the questions remain, how and when?
PfP is in a state of evolution and so far has mainly been involved with training (with the emphasis on interoperability) rather than operations. As PfP develops in the future, participation by Ireland in humanitarian operations will become more feasible. At present, however, it would appear that Ireland would be better advised to consider PfP for training purposes and to look at other options for operations.

One area that Ireland should consider joining as soon as possible is the PfP Information Management System (PIMS). The PIMS is a US Department of Defense (DOD) program, which uses Information Technology to strengthen bilateral cooperation through collaborative database development activities between America and the Partner countries. The PIMS is not a NATO system, but it is intended to support and enhance the PfP program. As the program evolves, the US and partners will continue to develop databases on topics of mutual and regional concern to foster both PfP and bilateral goals.

The mission of the PIMS is:

To strengthen US-Partner relations and the Partnership for Peace Program through a cooperative development effort employing dedicated communication and information technologies that establish a common infrastructure supporting both collective cost avoidance and interoperability.

The program was established on the premise that each partner has relevant and pertinent information to contribute and is also in the best position to determine its own information requirements. All users collaborate to develop a database that provides information resources for them and future coalition partners.

Cost sharing provides an economical means of accommodating individual needs for processing, connectivity, maintenance, system familiarization, and other technical services, when PIMS hardware is required. The terms of both arrangements are implemented through Memoranda of Agreement between US DOD and PIMS-installed Partners.
The communications architecture provides reliable and economical PIMS access even in austere environments. A collaborative equipment suite, consisting of one server and several personal computer may be fielded to support the developmental efforts of PIMS participants a community which includes Partners and NATO organizations.

The system has beneficial implications for Partner countries such as Ireland that wish to share information on a range of subjects, to include peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Ireland is the only PfP participant that is not either connected or pending connection to the system. This is a pity, particularly given Ireland’s advances in the area of Information Technology in recent years.

It is worth looking at the experiences of another so-called neutral country with regards to PfP. The Swedish Armed Forces, like Ireland’s, have been involved for many years in both peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. One of their representatives explained their position as follows:

I’m convinced that there has not been any Swedish participation in a PfP operation and to my knowledge there are no organizational goals to go in that direction. Instead, the NATO command structure is seen as vital to success, and the PfP is seen as a means to provide additional forces with appropriate interoperability. Consequently, I don’t see it as possible for a non-NATO partner to take the lead in an operation, but (perhaps) for parts of it, for instance . . . the lead nation for CIMIC units. Another aspect is the political one: the NAC as the authorizer of operations wouldn’t rely on an “outsider” to take the lead for one of their missions. Furthermore I believe that the NATO will not undertake operations that are not important enough to have a substantial involvement of the U.S. and possibly the UK, France, and/or Germany. The EU collective security initiative will probably fill that gap.

The PfP continues to evolve, and both the Swedes and NATO view it as a dynamic process that will progressively draw the alliance and partners closer to each other. But for the present it will probably remain as a training rather than an operational opportunity. Despite what the Irish said in their presentation document, it is probable that
they, like the Swedes, will concentrate on using the EU collective security initiative, rather than PfP, as a possible method for participating in humanitarian operations.

Ireland and the European Union/Western European Union

Do the new developments in the European security environment offer better ways of deploying Irish troops on humanitarian operations than before?

The European Defence Ministers’ Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 21 November 2000 was attended by the Irish Minister of State for Defence (i.e., deputy Minister), Mr. Séamus Brennan, because the Minister for Defence was abroad with the President. At the meeting, EU member states pledged some 66,000 troops to an EU Rapid Reaction Force. This was in line with what had been proposed at both the Cologne European Council in June 1999 and the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. In Cologne, the European Union committed itself to ensuring that it has the appropriate capabilities needed to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the “Petersberg tasks.” In Helsinki, the European Union agreed on a common European headline goal and on new political and military bodies to be set up within the council. The common European headline goal is that by the year 2003, Member States will be able to deploy within 60 days and then sustain, for at least one year, forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, in operations up to corps level (50,000-60,000 soldiers).

But according to some, the old spectre of a threat to neutrality was starting to reappear:

Such rapid EU developments are proof to the neutrality lobby of the disingenuousness of the Irish Government. This may not be the standing European army run by Brussels they warned of, but it is a European army. And
the purpose, they say, is not just the humanitarian/crisis management role—the so-called Petersberg tasks—agreed in Maastricht, but a larger endeavor, to project the EU on the world stage as a military superpower. Neutral Ireland is being sucked in.

After the Brussels meeting on 21 November 2000, the European foreign ministers met their defense colleagues to ratify their decisions (the EU does not have a defense council). Speaking after the meeting, Mr. Brennan emphasized, “The conference is doing no more than achieving the headline goal for possible use in Petersberg tasks, as set out in the appropriate provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.” The establishment of a capability “does not imply the creation of a European army,” he said, noting that “the centrality of the UN and the primary role of the UN Security Council is explicitly recognised by the EU.”

Mr. Brennan added that “Ireland will consider participation in EU-led crisis management in every instance on a case-by-case basis, and has made clear it will only participate in missions authorized by the UN.”

Despite these assurances, however,

Romano Prodi (president-elect of the EU Commission) . . . shocked more than the neutrals, a few days ago, with comments in Latvia on their security preoccupations, declaring that “any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression the whole EU; this is the highest guarantee.” In reality, it was a political promise, which had no treaty status. . . . Mr. Prodi’s words will do little to rebut Russian claims that the EU and NATO eastern enlargement processes are the same thing. Nor does it help Ireland’s claim, and that of both Finland and Sweden, that the rapid development of an EU military capacity is entirely about Petersberg tasks.

The perceived erosion of neutrality goes on. As the new military and political structures are being put into place, observers will note that both of them are interim, while the lawyers work out whether their permanent constitution requires treaty changes. This is of considerable concern to Irish diplomats desperately trying to avoid triggering a
referendum in Ireland; they argue that, as the new structures simply give effect to the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, no constitutionally significant treaty changes will arise. But “Green MEP (Member of the European Parliament) Patricia McKenna pledges she will be taking legal advice on the issue and demanding a referendum on what she insists are developments that go well beyond what the people voted for on Amsterdam.”

Despite the unease, the Government is proceeding undeterred. Mr. Brennan set out the Irish commitment of a light infantry battalion of 750, a Ranger unit, and some headquarters, national support or observer elements: a total of 850 personnel.

The convergence of European aims and Irish commitment to supporting those aims had been foreshadowed in the Noordwijk Declaration of 1994, which asserted:

the importance for WEU to be able to play a more significant and effective role in facing humanitarian emergencies caused by international crises or natural catastrophes. Taking account of the leading role of the European Union as a major body for coordination of European humanitarian assistance, Ministers stress that it is one of the roles of WEU to provide for a European instrument of reaction in cases where, due to the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the need for military protection, military means must be employed. Consequently, WEU has to be able to count on immediately available capabilities and arrangements which allow a rapid response to such emergencies.

This WEU role is due to transition in due course to the EU, although the WEU may continue to run exercises as far away as 2005. The Marseilles Declaration of 13 November 2000 recognized the transition plan which had been approved on 17 October 2000 by the Chiefs of Defense Staffs. Acknowledging the “crucial role played by the WEU . . . to the development of European security and defense architecture” and welcoming “the progress made by the EU in the field of European security and defense policy,” the Ministers “approved the WEU residual functions and structures which will be in place by 1 July 2001 at the latest . . . to fulfil the commitments of the modified
Brussels Treaty. The Ministers “requested that the necessary administrative and accommodation measures now be taken, to ensure that the residual WEU structures are in place when the EU becomes operational.”

The situation in early 2001 is that the Irish have made a commitment to support a European Rapid Reaction Force. How is that force likely to operate and how can Ireland use the new arrangements to her advantage operationally? What relevance does it have for strictly humanitarian operations? What are the EU/WEU operational roles, and how may they be assessed in terms of Ireland’s potential to contribute in the area of humanitarian operations?

As mentioned above, the council secretariat has been strengthened by military officers seconded from member states in order to assist in the work on the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and to form the nucleus of the future EU military staff. Pending the assimilation of the WEU functions into the EU, the European Council has given Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the WEU, a mandate to make full use of WEU assets in the interim period to prepare the EU for exercising its future responsibilities. In recent years, the EU has had recourse to the operational capabilities of WEU in areas, such as police in Mostar, observers in Africa, mine clearance in Croatia, police in Albania, and satellite monitoring of the situation in Kosovo.

WEU is also cooperating with the EU in planning for humanitarian and evacuation operations. Their procedures in the event of a crisis are given in Annex B. In order to test these procedures, a WEU exercise policy was agreed to and a rolling five-year exercise program was drawn up. CRISEX 1995/96 was the first WEU exercise; CRISEX 1998 took place in November 1998. Then, to prepare for the eventuality of a
European-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities, WEU and NATO undertook in February 2000 a joint exercise (CMX/CRISEX 2000). During the course of this exercise, Ireland “contributed” a platoon of infantry in a security role to protect NGOs in “Kiloland.” As the exercise developed, the relevance for the Defense Forces was to see what level of troop contribution could be made, based on the requirements from WEU/NATO for the “operation” and taking into account real world commitments at the time. The exercise was realistic, save only in one respect: in reality, Ireland would send a reconnaissance party to make an assessment “on the ground.” Otherwise, the procedures for providing troops for a peacekeeping operation would have been essentially the same. The specific relevance for this thesis— that of providing a unit of troops for a humanitarian operation—is that Ireland was able to participate. The only difference in real life might have been in terms of the type of unit, and therefore, in terms of the selection of the personnel involved. In any case, the WEU model for providing troops would be workable as far as Ireland is concerned.

A further five-year exercise program has also been established (at the WEU Exercise Conference on 21 March 2000). This will consist of a Joint (military) Exercise Study (JES) in 2001, which is planned to be a follow-on exercise to CRISEX 2000. Its aim is “to enhance interoperability and develop joint WEU-NATO operational capabilities and procedures for establishing an operational headquarters (OHQ) in order to conduct a WEU-led CJTF-related operation.” The “objectives are to contribute to the development of procedures for establishing an OHQ, using European command arrangements, as well as to contribute to the development of the modalities for WEU
nations’ participation in the various levels of a WEU-led CJTF-related operation. Further exercises “for WEU autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets are envisaged for the years 2002 and 2004 . . . using NATO assets . . . for 2003 and 2005.” The exercises form a progression.

While the Director of the WEU specifies that these are WEU exercises, he acknowledges in his conclusion that “most of these documents (including those pertaining to exercises) being an essential part of the WEU military acquis (assets), could be transferred to the EU if it was so decided.” These exercises will be valuable for Ireland and the Defense Forces should play as full a role as possible.

So long as Ireland can be afforded the luxury of sufficient time to respond to and comply with a request from the EU (or the WEU operating on its behalf), she should find either organization to be a suitable vehicle for participating in humanitarian operations. It is in both Ireland’s own interest as well as that of the EU/WEU, that such an operation should take place: not alone to encourage the Irish Defense Forces to prepare a properly organized unit (or even individual personnel) to take part, but also to reassure the people of Ireland that her soldiers can participate fully within a European environment without prejudicing Ireland’s neutrality. In the meantime, Ireland must continue to play as full a part in all the joint training exercises and other activities that she can.

Ireland and SHIRBRIG

Would SHIRBRIG--the Special High-Readiness Brigade, a Scandinavian initiative--be a worthwhile option for Ireland to pursue in terms of deploying Irish troops on humanitarian operations?
On 1 April 1999, Frances Fitzgerald, the shadow Minister for Defense, asked the Minister for Defense during question time in the Dáil (Parliament) “if (whether) the Defence Forces are becoming involved in United Nations Standby Arrangement Systems (UNSAS) and the SHIRBRIG initiative.” The Minister replied:

During the course of my visit to the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 14-17 October 1998, I signed . . . a memorandum of understanding which commits Ireland to the United Nations stand-by arrangements system. UNSAS gives the UN a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities that Ireland would have available at a given state of readiness for a UN peacekeeping operation. Ireland has committed a maximum of 850 military personnel for UN service at any one time under UNSAS. There would, however, be no obligation to participate in any particular mission and Dáil approval would be required for the dispatch of a contingent to a specific operation. As regards . . . SHIRBRIG, this initiative was sponsored by Denmark with a view to the establishment of a high readiness multinational brigade, composed of contributions to the UNSAS with the aim of deploying troops at short notice to troubled spots around the world. Ireland has been keeping a watching brief on this initiative. The question of participation by Ireland in SHIRBRIG is being considered in the light of the legal and practical implications which the concept would raise for Ireland.

This is where the matter rests. Ireland has not joined SHIRBRIG but does have Observer status at SHIRBRIG meetings. It is possible that SHIRBRIG could present a worthwhile option for Ireland, especially in terms of humanitarian operations.

What are UNSAS and SHIRBRIG? In 1993 a United Nations Planning Team was mandated to:

Develop a system of stand-by forces, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the world, within an agreed response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and missions.

The system was known as the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) and was based upon commitments by member states to contribute specified resources to the UN. The system, however, had some limitations: some of the allocated forces were already engaged in operations (for example, the bulk of the troops promised by the Irish
Minister for Defense were already deployed, most of them in the Middle East), while others were not fully prepared; and none of the units were trained for interoperability before deployment. Consequently, the UNSAS did not—initially, at any rate—provide the UN with a well-prepared rapid deployment capability.

In order to address this, the secretary general recommended in his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” in January 1995 that the UN should consider the idea of a rapid deployment force, consisting of units from a number of member states, trained to the same standard, using the same operating procedures and interoperable equipment, and taking part in combined exercises at regular intervals in order to make the force available for deployment at short notice. A number of member states with extensive experience and high standards in the field of peacekeeping decided to establish a working group to explore the option of creating a rapid deployment force within the framework of UNSAS.

The working group addressed the key considerations involved in creating such a force and formulated a concept and outline structure for a Multinational High readiness Brigade. They produced a report in August 1996 (Annex C to this thesis). The main points of this report were:

1. The brigade should be capable of peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks under Chapter VI of the UN Charter

2. There should be a brigade pool, to allow for countries not wishing to participate in certain missions

3. The brigade should be able to operate independently away from home-based support structures, where no host nation support is at hand, and where basic infrastructure is poor or non-existent.
Also, the brigade should be deployable at 15 to 30 days’ notice, should be self-sufficient for 60 days, and should be prepared to stay for six months, after which period the mission would either be terminated or replaced.\footnote{41}

On 15 December 1996, the following countries signed a Letter of Intent on cooperating on the establishment of a framework for a multinational force (SHIRBRIG), organized according to the recommendations of the working group: Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. This was followed by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on setting up a Steering Committee to supervise the establishment of the Brigade, and a MOU on establishing a permanent planning element (the PLANELM), an element to exercise all the predeployment functions of SHIRBRIG, and on deployment, to become the nucleus of the deployed SHIRBRIG staff.\footnote{42}

All participating nations have signed a MOU on SHIRBRIG. Future new participants are all asked to participate fully in the establishment, training, and employment of SHIRBRIG. Currently, the member nations are Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Sweden. Finland has signed all the membership documents less the PLANELM MOU. Spain has signed the Letter of Intent and Steering Committee MOU. Portugal and Slovenia have signed the Letter of Intent.\footnote{43}

SHIRBRIG was declared available to the UN after the end of January 2000. This meant that the SHIRBRIG nations were now prepared to enter into consultation with the United Nations secretariat on SHIRBRIG’s possible use as an integral formation on future missions.\footnote{44}
It is important to note that the first recommendation of the working group’s report was that the brigade should be capable of “peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks.” The first task in which it became involved, described below, would be primarily a peacekeeping one. This does not mean that in the future, Ireland could not consider SHIRBRIG as a viable option through which it could contribute to a humanitarian mission.

The outline organization of SHIRBRIG is shown at figure 4.

Figure 4: SHIRBRIG Organization. (Source: SHIRBRIG Factsheet.)

It did not take long for SHIRBRIG to be tested. Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1312, which authorized the establishment of the United Nations mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with effect from 31 July 2000, and Security Council resolution 1320, which authorized deployment of up to 4,200 troops in UNMEE,
SHIRBRIG nations were asked by the UN to consider providing units. The elements include the SHIRBRIG commander as the force commander, fifty-five brigade staff officers and noncommissioned officers who form part of the force headquarters, one headquarters company (Denmark), and one reinforced infantry battalion (Dutch and Canadian).45

These elements commenced deployment in the mission area on 15 November 2000 in a mission initially scheduled to last less than six months, to 15 March, but later extended to September 2001.46

While the SHIRBRIG format provided the kernel for UNMEE force, other nations also took part.47 This appears to have been a good opportunity for Ireland to provide assistance should she wish to become involved in another UN mission. She did not, however, due mainly to her commitments which already saw her stretched beyond the UNSAS figure of 850 troops. While it is possible and even probable that Ireland would have been in a position to provide some form of unit or at least observers, she decided not to become involved. The significant point here is that, at the same time, a further medical mission to Honduras was being planned: the only explanation for the intention to participate in a unilateral mission, and not the UN/SHIRBRIG one, seems to be that in the former, the Defense Forces could be masters of their own destiny and not be beholden to any third organization. In other words, while Ireland would as usual have reserved the right to withdraw from the UN Mission if necessary, she had the control to decide the length of time her own mission to Honduras could last.

This is significant. Naturally, Ireland prefers to retain control as far as she can in terms of new missions. This means that she will be reluctant to commit to UN or other
missions unless she can be sure that she can sustain her support for a considerable period. She is, after all, a loyal and dependable member of such long-term missions as UNIFIL (23 years), UNTSO (43 years) and both SFOR and KFOR. Therefore, although UNMEE is scheduled to be a short-term operation, so was UNIFIL (an interim force!). The best assessment available from Defense Force headquarters in Dublin is that, while Ireland maintains an interest in the developments with regards to SHIRBRIG, the focus for her attention in the near future (for providing troops for any type of long-term mission) will probably be in the context of the EU.

Aspects of US Humanitarian Operations

Although humanitarian assistance forms but a minor part of their focus for operations, the US Military have amassed a great deal of experience through the sheer scale of what they have done. The US differentiates between Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) operations. HA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration, and is designed to assist the authorities in the host nation, where possible. HCA is more long-term, and is a component of the US Nation Assistance Program. As far as Ireland is concerned, these differences are probably irrelevant insofar as any Irish operations will necessarily be short-term. However, in the course of their efforts, the Americans have produced manuals and doctrine that offer great benefits to Irish military humanitarian operations. There are three main areas in which the Irish could learn from America’s experience:

1. How to organize and deploy units, and rotate them to sustain an operation. In an ideal world, the Irish military would have sufficient personnel to deploy successive units in order to maintain an operation over an extended period. This is not, however, the
case at present. The accession of Ireland onto the Security Council of the United Nations makes it entirely appropriate that Ireland’s military should have such a capability, so as to allow it to be more effective in helping in humanitarian situations, and thereby to have a more meaningful impact on foreign policy. This is a matter for the Department of Foreign Affairs to recommend, and for the military to implement. It may, however, require an education of the public and the politicians (through a public relations campaign) that a main feature of the military’s capability is that it can be used to save peoples’ lives.

2. **How to fund deployments.** It has traditionally been the case that Ireland has not been wealthy enough to fund military missions abroad. Until recently, practically all of our missions have been under the auspices of the United Nations, and therefore funded (albeit several years in arrears) by them. This situation has changed, however, in the last few years, as Ireland’s economy has improved (to a large extent, through American investment). Ireland now provides troops to a large number of non-UN missions for which she must pay the bill. It is generally acknowledged that her economy has never been so good, so there is now a tremendous opportunity for Ireland to fund humanitarian missions that, apart from the good they can do to the host nation and its population, can also assist in promoting Ireland’s image and therefore influence abroad. This is particularly relevant in the context of her accession to the Security Council.

3. **How to train for HA operations.** The US military is still developing its training methodology. In looking at US operations and assessing how Ireland can learn from the US experience, cognizance will also be taken as to whether there are any aspects of Ireland’s experience that could benefit the US military.
A relevant example of US Military humanitarian operations follows. Comparable in intent, if not in scale, to the Irish Army’s missions to Honduras, was the tour of duty of a group of engineers from the US Air Force Reserve’s 913th Airlift Wing, from Willow Grove Air Reserve Station in Pennsylvania. Lt. Col. Duane Maslowski led forty members of his unit on a two-week tour to Honduras in support of Joint Task Force Sula. “JTF Sula was the first of five New Horizons 1999 humanitarian operations to help promote peace and stability in . . . the region . . . trying to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in October.”

The engineers from Willow Grove nearly completed a latrine and a two-room addition to a school in the Urraco Sur area of El Progreso, thirty miles from the Caribbean Sea. Their fortnight’s tour was followed by a rotation from the 439th Airlift Wing, Westover Air Reserve base, Massachusetts, who were to finish the project. The 913th had been preceded by a group from the 910th Airlift Wing, Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport ARS, Ohio, and two groups from the 452nd Air Mobility Wing, March ARB, California. In addition, reserve engineers from the 307th Rapid Engineer Deployable--Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana., and Kelly AFB, Texas, drilled several new water wells in the Sula River Valley.

The comparison ends. The US operation was under HCA as already described. The Irish missions to Honduras involved deploying roughly forty engineers and some medical personnel for three months, building a clinic and kindergarten, returning home, and sending a follow-up party a year later to refurbish the clinic and to carry out medical operations there for a fortnight. The US Air Force Reserve groups each did a two-week
stint as part of a larger operation known as New Horizons 1999. The project was “originally planned to involve about 4,000 troops and cost the United States about $34 million. New Horizons ‘99 was expanded after Hurricane Mitch to include more than 20,000 service members at a cost of about $70 million.”

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Charles L. Cragin, commented:

Since the early 1980s, members of the various reserve components have regularly trained and worked side by side with the people of Latin America. New Horizons ‘99 is part of our nation’s ongoing citizen-to-citizen commitment to this region. It represents an outstanding opportunity for our reserve forces to receive excellent real-world training and at the same time help people who have a compelling need.

That latter sentence is exactly what Ireland wants--or, to put it more correctly, what her Defense Forces want--for her Regular and her Reserve forces, particularly her Medical and Engineer units and personnel: an opportunity to receive real-world training and, at the same time, help people who are in need. The obvious difference between the Irish and US militaries is the disparity in resources: both in the size of the forces involved, as well as the budgets allocated (the second Irish Honduran Support Group had an operational budget of IR£100,000 [roughly $120,000] of which about IR£60,000 [$72,000] was spent). The Americans were able to mount a large-scale, effective operation, whereby the small Irish effort, although significant in terms of what was achieved with limited resources, fell short of meeting one of the main principles of humanitarian operations, that of perseverance. The sustainability of the operation was completely at the behest of the governmental organization involved, APSO. The implication for Ireland’s Defense Forces is that Ireland needs to secure increased financial resources as well as an increase in the numbers of troops or units available to
deploy. An alternative might be for APSO to coordinate with other militaries, such as the US, to sustain an operation. However, this is a matter for APSO and is outside the scope of this paper.

Yet, despite the undeniably great efforts made in New Horizons ’99, there seems to be room for improvement in the preparation for and conduct of American humanitarian operations. Ireland can also benefit from the lessons to be learned. While the Reserve and National Guard Units of the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines carry out a large proportion of these operations, the active duty Army gives them less emphasis: “Even though peace operations . . . are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE (complex humanitarian emergency) as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.”

John Nagl and Elizabeth Young point out that:

The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.

One of the main difficulties that exists is that of interagency relations, especially between the military and civilian organizations, and in particular NGOs and PVOs.

The military will be called upon again to support humanitarian relief efforts when they exceed the capacity of humanitarian agencies to handle them. Improved planning and coordination is particularly important between the armed forces and the international organizations and NGOs that specialize in humanitarian relief.

It is in this latter area that the Irish have been particularly successful. This fact is relevant to this thesis because it offers lessons that may be valuable to the conduct of humanitarian operations in general. By becoming seconded to the NGOs and civilian
organizations, the soldiers have invariably improved the performance of those
organizations by applying military administrative techniques, while at a stroke improving
the regard that the civilian aid workers have for the military. In addition, the arrangement
has the added benefit of facilitating relationships with any military forces who might be
operating in the region (because, of course, of the understanding that exists between
military personnel). The US military, however, must overcome the confusions and
personality clashes that naturally result from a potent force, newly arrived in an area of
operations, meeting and having to cooperate with what often seem to be relatively
disorganized groups of civilians. These latter, because they have been in the area for a
(sometimes slightly) longer period, often feel themselves to be relative experts compared
to the newcomers. They often resent being asked to cooperate with the military, or to
allow themselves to come under their control (even in tense security situations), looking
on it as an imposition and an unwarranted constraint on their freedom of action and
movement.

This difficulty is relevant to the US military, and the Army has been taking steps
to deal with it. Since 1995 the US Military Academy at West Point has been running a
program of summer internships with NGOs. The program is called the Peace Operations
Internship Program, and it has three objectives:

1. To improve cadet knowledge of and appreciation for other cultures.
2. To support Army operations by producing graduates knowledgeable of the
   NGO-military relationship in Peace Operations.
3. To gain an appreciation for the requirements of effective interagency
   operations.

The officer in charge of the program, MAJ Sue Bryant, stated that through the
program, the cadets and the NGOs learn to work together and appreciate one another’s
strengths; it facilitates the “building of mutual respect for times down the road when it will matter.” The program has been quite successful; she acknowledged; however, that there are still stereotypical difficulties: “We (the military) are the control freaks and the NGOs are the hippies who don’t know how to do logistical support worth anything.”

The program has sent cadets all over the world to an impressive number of missions, from Nepal to Mozambique to Central America and the Middle East.

While it may be too early to say whether this program has achieved its long-term objective (that of producing Officers sympathetic to the concerns and modi operandi of NGOs), it certainly seems to be a method of overcoming the mutual lack of understanding that exists. The Marine Corps is also considering a similar initiative as part of its Partnership with Industry program: beginning in August 2001, it is intended that Marines will also spend some time working for NGOs. The idea, like the West Point program, is both that the NGOs will benefit from the military expertise and that the experience of working together towards a common goal will break down any barriers of mistrust that may exist between the NGOs and the military.

For the US Military, then, these programs seem to be a step in the right direction. If they are seen to work to the benefit of both the military and the NGOs, it will be interesting to see whether the military is willing to take it a stage further, as the Irish have done: that is, of sending teams and even units to work with the NGOs, as civilians, and under their auspices. All of the indications are to the contrary. Despite the sending of cadets and or marines as interns, there are no signs that the US will depart from its current practice of sending conventional military units to carry out humanitarian
operations, to work alongside and in partnership with--but not under the auspices of--NGOs or PVOs.

The training for these operations can, in a multinational environment, be carried out under the auspices of the PfP. As has already been described, Ireland can benefit from such training. Unilateral training is presently conducted in Ireland purely by the ad hoc unit that has been formed up; this is sometimes done in conjunction with APSO. In the case of the Honduras group, both APSO and military instructors combined to produce a syllabus and training program that included instructors from both organizations. The syllabus was useful, incorporating as it did country briefs from civilian and military personnel who had had experience in the region. There is a definite need for a generic humanitarian operations training program which can be adapted for specific missions, and this should be a joint effort on the part of both APSO and the military. Both organizations have excellent training facilities, either of which would be appropriate: APSO’s headquarters in Dublin, or the Army’s UN School in the Defense forces training center in the Curragh, thirty miles southwest of Dublin. The American FM 100-23-1 and the Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations both contain relevant and appropriate information that could be incorporated into an Irish doctrine. The production of a training doctrine, syllabus, and program should in themselves be an area of further study as a result of this paper.

Ireland, then, should aspire to having fully manned and equipped units of medical, engineer and logistic personnel, in order to contribute fully to her full potential in terms of humanitarian operations. While this might remain just that--an aspiration--she should certainly increase the budget for the provision of humanitarian missions in order to
further her influence and impact abroad, especially in the light of her presence on the Security Council. As a very minimum, she must immediately prepare a plan for a generic syllabus of training for all humanitarian operations; this should be done in conjunction with APSO. This syllabus should then be made available to any NGO that requires it, and as a matter of course, regular training should take place with APSO and NGOs as time permits. The benefits of this should be extensive for future operations, and the lessons learnt may well be of benefit to other nations, including the US. Its applications may well extend into the programs of PfP, the EU/WEU and any other similar groupings that may require such training.

1 Éamonn De Valera’s response to Churchill, broadcast on Irish Radio 2RN on 16 May 1945.

2 Éamonn De Valera’s Speech: Irish Neutrality; Cork, Ireland, 12 December 1941 [As monitored by the B.B.C.].


4 Ibid., para 3.2.

5 Anthony Coughlan, senior lecturer in social policy at Trinity College, Dublin, and secretary of the National Platform organisation, writing in The Irish Times, 12 February 99.


7 Ibid.

8 NATO PfP Fact Sheet, updated 6 September 2000.

9 Ibid.

10 Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 24 April 1999.


Mrs. Elina Kalkku, Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of Finland to NATO, to PfP Planning Symposium in Oberammergau, Germany, 20/21 January 2000.

Ibid.

Ibid.


NATO PfP Fact Sheet.

Ibid.


See note 15 to Chapter 1. The Petersberg Tasks are named after the conference center near Bonn in Germany where they were adopted in 1992. They include humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, peacemaking and international crisis management roles developed to meet the new global problems that have arisen since the end of the Cold War. The Petersberg Tasks will be implemented by the Western European Union (WEU) at the express request of the EU. Participation in the Petersberg tasks will be on a voluntary and case by case basis.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Noordwijk Declaration, para. 35.

Preamble, WEU Council of Ministers Meeting, Marseilles, France, 13 November 2000

Ibid.

Ibid., para.1.
WEU Today, WEU Secretariat, Brussels, 2000 gives the missions as follows:

1. July 1994 to October 1996: WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU Administration of Mostar.
2. 22 November 1996: the Council of the European Union adopted a decision on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, requesting WEU to examine urgently how it could contribute to the EU’s humanitarian efforts for the refugees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes (Africa) region. The WEU sent observers.
3. 9 November 1998: the EU Council adopted a decision on the basis of Article J.4.2. requesting WEU to implement an EU specific action in the field of assistance for mine clearance in Croatia (WEU Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia--WEUDAM). At Marseilles in Nov 2000, it was decided that “The Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia will be continued under the responsibility of Sweden in the WEU framework until 9 May 2001 when its present mandate expires.”
4. 13 November 1998: the EU Council adopted a further decision under Article J.4.2., by which the WEU Satellite Center would contribute to the monitoring of the situation in Kosovo.
5. March 1999: the EU Council adopted another decision under Article J.4.2., turning WEU’s MAPE mission on police cooperation in Albania into an EU-requested operation. Previously, the MAPE mission had already been receiving EU support through the Commission-administered PHARE program for Public Administration reform in Albania. In the Marseilles Declaration, the “Ministers noted the European Union’s agreement in principle to take over in due course the direct management of the MAPE Mission. . . . WEU is ready to extend the mission under its present terms for an interim period beyond the end of the current mandate on 31 December 2000.

Report of Director of WEU Military Staff, November 2000, para. 2. C. (2).

Ibid.

Ibid., para 2a.

2002: Non-NATO: Pol-Mil level, including an Operational HQ (OHQ)
2003: WEU/NATO: Pol-Mil level, including a NATO OHQ in WEU chain of command. May involve NATO CJTF HQ nucleus.
2004: Non-NATO: Mil strategic and operational-tactical levels; should include a OHQ and FHQ (Force HQ).
2005: WEU/NATO: WEU-led CJTF exercise (NATO CJTF) with subordinate component commands.

Report of Director of WEU Military Staff, November 2000, para. J.
38 Dáil Debates *Official Reports*, 1 April 1999.

39 Ibid.

40 SHIRBRIG *Factsheet*, Background.

41 Working Group Report, SHIRBRIG *Factsheet*. See Annex “C” to this Chapter.

42 SHIRBRIG *Factsheet*, Background.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 SHIRBRIG *Factsheet*, News.

46 UNDPKO Background Report, UNMEE.

47 These countries included Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Benin, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zambia.


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.


54 Statement: Peace Operations Internship Program; USMA, West Point.

55 Telephone interview with MAJ Bryant, USMA, West Point, 26 February 2001.

56 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

As Ireland moves to take up her seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, diplomats and politicians will be acutely aware that one of the main reasons that she received sufficient support to arrive in that position is that her record in peacekeeping throughout the world has been so impressive, particularly in relation to her size. Although as a nation, Ireland does not have an “agenda” as compared to other larger states, nevertheless she has a moral voice that can carry weight beyond her small population and national power. Ireland’s strength lies in her moral authority conditioned by her neutrality combined with her vast peacekeeping experience. The White Paper prepared by the Department of Defense, which is now Government policy, recognizes this, and sees Ireland’s future military roles overseas as being within the parameters of peacekeeping and the Petersberg tasks.

It is in Ireland’s interest to ensure that the conduct of international relations is undertaken in accordance with international law and democratic principles. This is supported and reinforced in a very direct way by Ireland’s willingness to provide peacekeepers to the troubled spots of the world.

It is vital, then, in her own national interest, that her peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations should be planned and executed as efficiently and effectively as possible, and that adequate resources should be made available to ensure their unequivocal success. The White Paper, however, goes on to qualify our commitment:

Notwithstanding Ireland’s continuing support for the UN, the scale of our commitment must be kept under review and the Government have decided that there should be a rigorous review of the sustainability of the current level of commitment in the light of decisions on restructuring set out in the White Paper.
In other words, the commitment will continue, so long as it does not cost too much. This thrust of the White Paper, prepared mainly by Department of Defense civil servants, has been criticized by many as being an attempt merely to cut costs and to save money without acknowledging the tremendous good that can accrue to our national interest. A member of the government-appointed review board, set up to examine the workings of the Defense Forces, commented as follows:

If this is what a defence policy is, I am very confused. I don’t see this as a vision of Ireland as an independent nation-state, determined to take its place in the international environment and asserting its neutrality and sovereignty. With only four pages on policy and most of the rest of the 76-page document dedicated to military structures, the approach was one of “simply trying to save money at all costs.”

This is the context of the environment in which the Irish Defense Forces conducts humanitarian operations. This thesis has examined whether there are better ways of deploying Irish troops on such operations than has been the case until now. By looking at the dedicated operations in Honduras, Rwanda-Zaire, and to a lesser extent the Balkans, the methods that have been used to date have been examined.

In summary, this modus operandi has involved a relatively speedy response to a request/initiative from a NGO/governmental agency, whereby a unit--or, more accurately, a group of individuals--has been formed together in order to perform a short-term task overseas. The rigor of the selection process has ensured--so far--that no disciplinary problems have taken place, and a combination of factors, including luck, have militated against any security lapses. On the other hand, by working closely with and under the auspices of the civilian organizations they were sent to help, the Irish troops have avoided many of the pitfalls that can often occur in normal civil-military operations. While the
missions are claimed to have been successful on their own terms (that is, in the limited
good they have done), nevertheless, when measured against the humanitarian assistance
principles of perseverance (sustainability) and security, they fall short. This thesis has
tried, therefore, to take the good aspects of Irish humanitarian operations and see are
there ways of improving the weak aspects.

The options that have been looked at are as follows:

1. Deploying through the medium of the Partnership for Peace
2. Deploying through the medium of the European Union/Western European
Union
3. Deploying through the medium of the Special High Readiness Brigade
4. Lessons applicable from US Humanitarian Operations
5. Continuing to deploy as at present

The Partnership for Peace.

On 19 February 2001, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs announced:

Following on from joining Partnership for Peace, a programme for Ireland’s
participation has recently been agreed. This programme gives particular emphasis
to cooperation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This reflects the
priorities set out in Ireland’s Presentation Document, which was approved by Dáil

This latest paper—the Individual Partnership Programme Document—(the full text
is given as Annex D) outlines the Irish Government’s intention to participate in the
planning and review process (PARP) of the PfP with a view to enhancing
“interoperability” with other members in “tactics, operational cohesion, logistics and
language training. The aim is to create the conditions where contingents from different
countries could cooperate effectively.” The paper is described as an “initial presentation
of Ireland’s broad approach and planned activities”, which had been drawn up “in a flexible form to allow for adjustment in the light of ongoing experience.” One might be forgiven for interpreting it as the product of a Government that had not yet made up its mind.

Readers from some quarters have used the document’s seeming ambiguity to criticize it for their own ends. Although the document states that “Participation in Petersberg Tasks will not affect Ireland’s long-standing policy of military neutrality,” The Irish Times reported on 21 February 2001 that “The document has been rejected by . . . the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, (who) said: ‘Ireland’s commitment to collective security through the United Nations is undermined by our Government’s decision to link itself strongly with NATO, which went to war against Yugoslavia without a UN mandate.’” So, the paranoia continues.

This Government document reinforces what was already stated in the presentation document. The latter stated, in paragraph 12:

Ireland wishes to contribute its UN peacekeeping experience by playing an active part in humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks - the Petersberg tasks - in support of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Ireland sees PfP in general, and the PARP in particular, as having an important role to play in cooperation and planning, for participation in such tasks.

However, Ireland is leaving her options open, and for the time being at least, this “important role” will not extend beyond training for such operations. Such training should begin as soon as possible, because there are many benefits that may accrue from it which may not at this stage be fully appreciated by the Irish. One of these is the PIMS, the PfP Information Management System which could be of enormous (and cost-effective) value. Another is joint training with militaries of the caliber of the US; while
this is done at a miniscule level at present, the potential benefits for Ireland (especially in terms of training exercises leading to joint operations) are immense.

The European Union.

Despite what the PfP Program document seems to imply, it would appear that Ireland is placing her main emphasis for future operations in a strictly European context. At the European Defence Ministers’ Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 21 November 2000, Ireland offered a commitment to the European RRF of a light infantry battalion of 750, a Ranger unit, and some headquarters personnel, as well as national support or observer elements—a total of 850 personnel. While the acting Minister emphasized at that conference that Ireland will consider participation in EU-led crisis management in every instance on a case-by-case basis, and made clear it will only participate in missions authorized by the UN, nevertheless this is the direction she wants to pursue as a main objective. Ireland has been a committed European state, participating fully in the European common currency, for example (where the UK did not), and has benefited greatly, economically, from her membership. The area where Ireland has been conspicuous by her absence is in defense. The time is coming for a more active participation from a defense point of view. In order to protect her neutrality, the commitment of forces to a European RRF, while retaining the right to withhold participation if required, really gives Ireland the best of both worlds. Ireland will find either the EU or the WEU to be a suitable vehicle for participating in humanitarian operations. It is in both Ireland’s own interest as well as that of the EU/WEU, that such an operation should take place: not alone to encourage the Irish Defense Forces to prepare a properly organized unit (or even individual personnel) to take part, but also to
reassure the people of Ireland that her soldiers can participate fully within a European environment without prejudicing her neutrality. It should also convince the Europeans of Ireland’s good intentions in this regard. In the meantime, Ireland must continue to play as full a part in all of the joint training exercises and other activities that she can.

**SHIRBRIG**

The Scandinavian initiative, SHIRBRIG, the Special High-Readiness Brigade, does offer Ireland a further option that could be pursued in terms of conventional peacekeeping. If Ireland had wished to participate, however, the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) would have been an ideal opportunity for this. If she had wanted to, Ireland could also have provided headquarters staff or observers to the operation rather than a whole unit or subunit. Because of her current commitments, however, a contribution to UNMEE could not be sustained for any lengthy period, and so Ireland chose not to participate.

Ireland should continue to maintain an interest in developments with regards to SHIRBRIG. While the focus for her attention in the near future (for providing troops for any type of long-term mission) will probably be in the context of the EU, nevertheless SHIRBRIG should not be excluded as an option. In an interview in the Beirut newspaper, the Daily Star, Minister for Defense, Mr. Smith confirmed there would be two more contingents of Irish troops sent (to Lebanon), but made no commitment to sending troops after that. This would mean the full Irish contingent of 650 troops would remain until October next year (2001). The ending of the UNIFIL mandate and the withdrawal of the Irish commitment would make it easy for the Government to commit troops to the planned European rapid reaction force.

If this happens, Ireland will be in a position to contribute elsewhere. Mr. Smith articulated Ireland’s priority: Europe. She will certainly have light infantry troops;
whether the army will have troops such as medics or engineers for specifically humanitarian operations, remains to be seen. The SHIRBRIG option, however, should remain.

Cooperation with US Humanitarian Operations

The US system of conducting Humanitarian Operations such as “New Horizons” in Central America (a HCA operation as discussed in Chapter 4) would afford an ideal opportunity for Ireland to send a unit of engineers or medics to participate, and, as we have seen, the PfP offers an ideal procedure for this to happen. “New Horizons” has an overseeing headquarters which facilitates visiting units rotating in and out for tours as short as two weeks. On the face of it, this would be the best option for Ireland to pursue, so long as the United States were willing to accept an Irish unit. The trouble is, however, that Ireland does not have a sufficiently strong unit that it can spare to send under such circumstances. At present, it suits Ireland to put together an ad hoc unit and send it as she has been doing, because in a sense, she is not then under any obligations to anyone except the relevant NGO/PVO. A unit working with--and possibly under--the Americans would have to be under some form of command relationship. This may be perceived to cause a problem; it is unwarranted, because Ireland has had no difficulty, for example, placing subunits under tactical control (TACCON) in missions such as INTERFET and KFOR. Yet for whatever reason--probably, convenience--she is happy to continue with the present arrangements. She could consider the preparation of a humanitarian operations unit for a mission with the US, under the PfP procedures: this would probably benefit Ireland, and might give interesting insights to the Americans.
Option 5--Continue as at Present

The one major benefit that accrues from Ireland’s present policy of operating independently and under the auspices of civilian governmental or nongovernmental organizations is that of the civil-military cooperation benefits that result. The US Military Academy and the Marine Corps have both recognised that this is a specific area that needs improvement in US humanitarian operations. The disadvantages of Ireland’s methods of conducting these kinds of missions are that:

1. The generic principle of perseverance (sustainability) is not complied with
2. Neither is that of security
3. The potential problem of discipline remains.

If these operations could be embedded in, for example, an American “New Horizons” or an ongoing European equivalent should it arise, the Irish Defense Forces should avail of the opportunity without hesitation. By preparing a unit for such a mission, the Irish would be forced to apply the manpower, resources, and professional training that it requires. In doing so, not only the Defense Forces will benefit, but so will the individual troops involved, the host nation and its citizens, the hosting military organization, and last but not least, Ireland as a whole, because at last she will have a professional group of soldiers capable of being deployed in response to a requirement for humanitarian assistance anywhere in the world. In the meantime, Ireland should continue to exercise her prerogative of deploying unilateral missions to assist international, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as at present.

In accordance with these circumstances, then, I recommend the following.
Summary and Recommendations

1. Ireland’s Defense Forces should continue to provide humanitarian operations units (consisting of medical personnel, engineers and light infantry) that can be deployed unilaterally.

2. In the foreseeable future, they should be deployed either under the auspices of European Forces (under the EU), or other (possibly US) forces (under the PfP). Reserve personnel should not be excluded.

3. The benefits that will accrue to the national image of Ireland are self-evident to the government, and in particular the Department of Foreign Affairs, especially in relation to Ireland’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations. The promotion of this message is a vital issue for the Defense Forces and their Public Relations section in Defense Force Headquarters.

4. The priority of deployment should be to the EU. In the interim, however, and until such time as the EU becomes functional in this area, Ireland should participate as soon as possible in training under the PfP.

5. Ireland should retain the option of participation in SHIRBRIG. This will have a lower priority than either the EU or the PfP, but there may be times when participation is appropriate. This may occur when Ireland’s commitment to UNIFIL ends in October 2001.

6. All of the above should not preclude the deployment of individuals under civilian auspices as at present, particularly in view of the excellent civil-military cooperation that results. This will be the case for the near-term future. The priority for
these types of operations should diminish, however, in favor of humanitarian operations under options 1 and 2 above.

Suggestions for Further Research

A study should be carried out to establish the composition of a generic humanitarian company, rapidly deployable, to include engineers, medical personnel, logisticians and light infantry. Such units should be in addition to the present establishment of the Defense Forces, and should be of sufficient strength to be capable of being deployed without augmentation from the rest of the Defense Forces. Personnel from other units would then be rotated in and out of the dedicated humanitarian units as required. This would ensure that the same soldiers are not continually being deployed abroad.

The Department of Foreign Affairs may well support the suggestion of increasing the establishment of the Defense Forces in order to form dedicated humanitarian units to participate more actively in missions abroad. Any costs involved may be:

1. Affordable in the context of Ireland’s economic performance at present, and
2. Constitute real value for money (the main strategic aim of DoD) in terms of the advancement of the national interest alone.

As far as the Military is concerned, such units, and the opportunity for participation in humanitarian operations that they will give, will be of benefit in terms of training, interoperability, and experience for its soldiers. It could well be the way forward for Irish humanitarian operations.
Participation in peace support activities by Ireland in the European domain will take place in the context of the Petersberg Tasks and when authorised by the UN.

Mr. Tom Murray, partner in Farrell Grant Sparks (chartered accountants) and author of the 1994 and 1998 reviews of the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps, conducted for the Government by Price Waterhouse, in The Irish Times, 4 March 2000.

Department of Foreign Affairs Press release, 19 February 2001. The “Presentation Document” referred to is attached as Annex “A”.


Irish Government Presentation Document to the PfP (See Annex “A”).

The Irish Times, 28 Sept 2000

Ireland may be unique in having separate strategy statements for both the Department of Defense and for the Defense forces. The mission as defined by DoD is: “To provide value for money military services which meet the needs of Government and the public and encompass an effective civil defense capability.” That of the Defense Forces, which is derived from the DoD one, is: “To contribute to the security of the State by providing for the military defence of its territorial integrity and to fulfil all roles assigned by Government through the deployment of well motivated and effective Defence Forces.”
APPENDIX A
FUTURE IRISH HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

The Presentation Document of Ireland
for the Partnership for Peace Program

1. Ireland wishes to respond positively to the invitation extended in 1994 by NATO to States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the OSCE), to participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Ireland also wishes to participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The broad participation in PfP since 1994 underlines the fact that PfP, including the EAPC, has become an important framework for cooperation and confidence building in its own right.

2. In accepting the invitation to participate in PfP, Ireland restates its commitment to the development of a just and peaceful international society based on the rule of law, democracy; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and the peaceful settlement of disputes. PfP, and the cooperative values which underlie the Partnership, are compatible with these commitments and objectives.

3. Ireland pursues a policy of military neutrality, and does not intend to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ireland’s decision to participate in PfP is in fully in accordance with Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, which has always been pursued in tandem with full and active support for collective security, based on international law.

4. Ireland agrees with the basic concept of PfP: that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Ireland shares the values fundamental to PfP, set out in the PfP Framework Document, including protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy. In joining PfP, Ireland, in common with the other PfP nations, reaffirms its commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration of human rights. Equally, Ireland reaffirms its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all Subsequent documents of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

5. Participation in PfP entails reaffirmation of the commitment of participating states to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control. Ireland reaffirms its commitments and obligations in this area.

6. Ireland plays an active role in UN peacekeeping, and supports the continuing elaboration of effective international strategies and action for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and crisis management. In this connection, Ireland attaches
importance to effective and mutually reinforcing cooperation between those institutions with a role to play in the search for peace and stability in Europe.

7. Ireland welcomes the role that cooperation for peacekeeping, has assumed in Partnership for Peace and looks forward to contributing, to Partnership activities in this area. The calls on the international community to be able to respond to the humanitarian needs of populations in crisis have become increasingly apparent in recent years.

8. In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) came into being as the overarching framework for political and security-related consultations and for enhanced cooperation under PfP. Ireland has welcomed the development of the EAPC as a flexible forum, involving a wide range of European and North American countries, for consultations and cooperation on political and security-related matters of common concern, including regional issues, arms control, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, scientific and environmental issues.

9. Ireland welcomes the intention of the EAPC to examine ways in which it might support global humanitarian action against mines. Ireland also welcomes the initiative to examine how EAPC might contribute to controlling the transfer of small arms, recognizing, the high number of innocent civilian casualties caused by the use of mines and small arms.

10. The following is an indication of areas of general interest for Ireland in the PfP framework:

   I Cooperation on Peacekeeping

11. Since 1958, Irish peacekeepers and military observers have participated in 46,000 individual tours of duty involving 37 UN peacekeeping, missions. Based on this experience, Ireland is prepared to participate in and contribute to cooperation in the Partnership framework in such areas as operational and generic planning, for peacekeeping and peace support, communications, command and control, operational procedures, logistics and training. Ireland’s experience in peacekeeping has underlined the importance of interoperability, which in Ireland’s view is an essential requirement for any multinational peacekeeping or crisis management operation. In this connection, Ireland intends to participate in PfP’s Planning and Review process (PARP). In view of the more complex, challenging and multifunctional nature of UN mandated peacekeeping in recent years, Ireland has also followed with interest PfP’s focus on Civil-Military Cooperation in peacekeeping, and on the humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping.

12. Ireland wishes to contribute its UN peacekeeping experience by playing an active part in humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks - the Petersberg tasks - in support of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Ireland sees PfP in general, and the PARP in particular, as having an important role to play in cooperation and planning, for participation in such tasks.

II Humanitarian Operations

13. Irish Defence Forces personnel have been actively involved in humanitarian assistance. They provide assistance to the civil authorities in response to natural or other disasters. In the context of their international peacekeeping role, Irish peacekeeping contingents have engaged in humanitarian efforts aimed at assisting local communities to develop a self-help philosophy; and Irish Defence forces personnel have served on a Voluntary basis with UNHCR and Irish aid agencies on several continents. In the light of this experience, Ireland is interested in the development of cooperation, and the exchange of experience and expertise in the area of humanitarian operations. Ireland has also noted with interest the development within the PfP framework of cooperation on civil emergency planning and disaster relief.

III Search and Rescue

14. Ireland is interested in the development of cooperation, and exchange of expertise and experience, in the field of civil search and rescue.

IV Cooperation in the protection of the Environment

15. Ireland is interested in the further development of cooperation in the PfP framework with regard to threats to the environment.

V Cooperation in marine matters

16. As a maritime nation, Ireland is interested in the development of cooperation and training in marine techniques, including marine research, technology and development.

17. Ireland is of the view that PfP will assist the Irish Defence Forces in improving their capability for multinational peacekeeping and peace support operations in the future, through development of interoperability, training and exercises. Ireland will seek to acquire the necessary training, techniques, operational procedures and peacekeeping doctrines which are essential prerequisites for the new style of peacekeeping and crisis management missions mandated by the UN in recent years. Ireland also wishes to share with other participating States the experience that it has acquired in UN peacekeeping and crisis management.

18. The following assets could be made available for PfP activities subject to national decisions in each case:
Defence Forces assets for training, education and exercise purposes could include an infantry company group - leading to an infantry battalion group, battalion staff elements, specialist detachments, for example engineers, logisticians and exchange personnel;

Facilities available for peacekeeping cooperation in the PfP context could include the UN Training School Ireland at the Curragh, language laboratory resources with their associated infrastructure and courses, and a limited training area.

19. Specific areas of interest to Ireland include:
   Cooperative procedures
   Issues of operational readiness, doctrine, interoperability, training and equipment in relation to enhancing Ireland’s ability to carry out modern multinational operations in the peace support, search and rescue and humanitarian areas;

   Unit training for specific types of missions
   Involvement of units, staffs, specialist detachments and training facilities for conducting, joint planning and participating in training exercises at home and abroad for peace support, search and rescue, and humanitarian missions.

   Activities
   Participation in, and hosting of, appropriate PfP activities such as conferences, seminars, workshops, training, and education courses and exercises associated with peace support operations, search and rescue and humanitarian missions.

20. Ireland intends to appoint representatives to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, which is the location of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), centered in Mons, Belgium.
APPENDIX B
FUTURE IRISH HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

WEU Procedures in the Event of a Crisis.
(From WEU Today, issued by the WEU Secretariat-General, Brussels, January 2000).

If the European Union Council decided that WEU should address a crisis:

The Politico-Military Group, with the support of the Secretariat-General, the Military Staff and the Satellite Center, would be asked to monitor and assess the situation and report to the Council;

Should the Council envisage WEU involvement:

The Military Staff would be asked to draft relevant plans to include the force mission, possible force packages and command and control arrangements. The Military Delegates Committee would give its advice on the relevant planning work.

The Politico-Military Group would present its harmonized political and military advice to the Council.

Should the Council then decide to take action based on one of the options set out in the contingency plan:

The Council would decide on the force mission and composition, the Operation Headquarters and Commander, and the nation to nominate the Force Commander.

It would also designate a Point of Contact to serve as the Operation Commander’s permanent correspondent at WEU Headquarters in Brussels. The Council would subsequently agree the Operation Plan prepared by the Operation Commander and exercise politico-military control of the operation.

An operational budget, to which all participating nations would contribute, would be established in accordance with arrangements agreed by the Council, to cover the common costs of WEU operations. There is also a permanent fund in the regular WEU budget to cover the start-up costs of WEU operations.
APPENDIX C
FUTURE IRISH HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

UN Working Group Report of August 1996 Concerning a Special High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)

The Brigade should have the inherent ability to accomplish likely peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks under Chapter VI of the Charter of United Nation, and to protect itself and associated UN agencies, NGO’s and personnel while doing so.

The possibility that one or more participating Nations might decide not to contribute troops to an actual mission implies the necessity to establish a Brigade Pool comprising a number of units exceeding the force requirement for the Brigade when deployed. The Brigade Pool will ensure that the deployment of the Brigade will not be compromised, if a Participant decides to abstain from providing troops for a specific mission.

The Brigade should have the ability to operate independently at a considerable distance from the home-based support structures for it’s individual elements. Furthermore, the Brigade should have the ability to operate in an environment, where no host nation support is at hand, and where basic infrastructure is poor or non-existent.

These criteria imply a requirement for enhanced multinational logistic co-operation including, where necessary and feasible, the possibility to establish one or more centrally or forward located combined logistic supply bases when the Brigade is deployed.

The Brigade should be self-sufficient for a period of 60 days.

The Brigade should be ready for deployment from point of embarkation at 15 to 30 days notice.

To maintain the Brigade as a tool for rapid reaction, its deployment will be limited to max. 6 months duration. After this period the mission will either be terminated or other forces will replace the Brigade.
1. Introduction

1.1 Ireland joined Partnership for Peace (PfP) on 1 December 1999. In its Presentation Document, prepared at that time, Ireland set out the priority areas for its cooperation in PfP as:
   I. Cooperation in Peacekeeping; II. Humanitarian Operations; III. Search and Rescue; IV. Cooperation in the protection of the Environment. V. Cooperation in Marine matters.

1.2 Following on from the Presentation Document, Ireland has now elaborated its first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) under PfP. The IPP seeks to give practical content to the overall priorities identified in the Presentation Document. Ireland’s first IPP will run until 31 December 2001 when it will be replaced by a revised IPP. The IPP has been elaborated with the assistance of the NATO International Secretariat. However, in accordance with the fundamental principle of self-differentiation, all decisions regarding the content and form of the IPP have been made by the Irish authorities.

2. Ireland’s security and defence policy

2.1 The White Paper on Defence, published in February 2000, provides a medium term policy framework within which Defence policy can evolve to set out a clear strategy for the next ten years. It sets out the strategy for the management and organisation of defence for the next decade with a view to ensuring an appropriate level of defence capability having regard to the changing defence and security environment both at home and abroad.

2.2 Ireland’s commitment to collective security is pursued through the United Nations which has the primary role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. The White Paper on Defence recognises that European security is in a process of transition in which all of the organisations involved, including the European Union (EU), are adapting themselves to the new realities and are engaging in detailed co-operation.

2.3 The EU Treaty of Amsterdam takes account both of the specific character of the security and defence polices of member states and the broader European and global security context. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Treaty of Amsterdam encompasses a new role for the EU in the areas of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, known as Petersberg Tasks. Participation in Petersberg Tasks will not affect Ireland’s long- standing policy of military neutrality. The current challenges facing
the EU relate essentially to peacekeeping and crisis management (certain member States see their hard defence commitments as remaining the preserve of NATO). PfP is of importance in facilitating planning and co-operation for Petersberg Tasks. From Ireland’s perspective, participation in any EU level response would only arise where a UN mandate is in place.

2.4 The participation by the Defence Forces in this emerging environment is an important element of Ireland’s capacity to influence events in a way which is sensitive to this country’s needs and consonant with its military neutrality. Ireland does not intend to become a member of NATO. Ireland’s decision to participate in PfP is in full accordance with Ireland’s policy of military neutrality which has always been pursued in tandem with full and active support for collective security, based on international law.

2.5 Ireland agrees with the basic concept of PfP: that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Ireland shares the stated values fundamental to PfP, set out in the Framework Document including protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy. In joining PfP, Ireland, in common with other PfP nations, reaffirms its commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the United Nations Charter, and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Equally, Ireland reaffirms its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent documents of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

3. Planning and Review Process (PARP)

Ireland intends to participate in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) with a view to enhancing interoperability with our PfP Partners in such areas as tactics, operational cohesion, logistics and language training. The aim is to create the conditions in which different contingents can work together efficiently and effectively. Ireland wishes to contribute its UN peacekeeping experience by playing an active part in humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks - the Petersberg Tasks - in support of the European Union’s CFSP. Ireland sees PfP in general, and the PARP in particular, as having a significant role to play in cooperation and planning for participation in such tasks.

4. PfP Management Arrangements

Ireland has established a delegation based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and has assigned a number of officials both civilian and military to that office. In addition, officials across a number of Government Departments have been specifically involved in developing a response to the PfP agenda. It is intended to develop PfP management arrangements in the light of experience.

5. Democratic Control of the Defence Forces
5.1 The Constitution of Ireland vests supreme command of the Defence Forces in the President and also provides that the exercise of such command shall be regulated by law. The governing legislation is contained in the Defence Acts 1954-98 which provide that military command of, and all executive and administrative powers in relation to, the Defence Forces, including the power to delegate command and authority, shall be exercisable by the Government and through and by the Minister for Defence.

5.2 Under the Defence Acts, 1954-98, the Department has civil and military elements. The civil element is headed by the Secretary General and the military element by the Chief of Staff. Both elements are critical to the management of defence. Under the Ministers and Secretaries Act, the Minister is head of the Department and the Secretary General is the “principal officer” of the Department. As such, the Secretary General is the Minister’s principal policy adviser. Accounting procedures in relation to the expenditure of public funds, including expenditure on Defence, are governed by the Exchequer and Audit Department Act, 1866 and the Comptroller and Auditor General Act, 1993. The Secretary General is the Accounting Officer for the Vote for Defence (which includes all military expenditure) and is accountable to the Committee of Public Accounts of the Parliament for expenditure from the Vote.

5.3 Military command is delegated by the Minister directly to the General Officers Commanding each of the three territorial brigades, the Defence Forces Training Centre and the Air Corps and to the Flag Officer Commanding the Naval Service. Each of these officers is responsible to the Minister for the exercise of the command delegated to him. In practice, matters in relation to command are normally channelled through the Chief of Staff and this position will be maintained. In effect this means that day to day operational control of the Defence Forces rests with the Chief of Staff for which he is directly responsible to the Minister.

5.4 The present top management structure of the Defence Forces is of relatively recent origin. It is based on legislation enacted in 1998 arising from the Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan (1996-98). Previously, the military element of the Department of Defence comprised three military branches, the heads of which had a direct reporting relationship with the Minister. This arrangement was replaced by a unified Defence Forces Headquarters headed by the Chief of Staff. Certain statutory duties in connection with the business of the Defence Forces are assigned to the Chief of Staff, the performance of which he is directly responsible to the Minister for Defence. The Chief of Staff is the principal military adviser to the Minister. His assigned duties emphasise his responsibility for the effectiveness, efficiency and military organisation and economy of the Defence Forces. The focus of the Chief of Staff is also directed towards the overall planning of the development of the Defence Forces and to decisions on major strategic issues affecting the organisation. Subject to the approval of the Minister, the Chief of Staff, in turn, delegates duties to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) and Deputy Chief of Staff (Support).

6. Bilateral Education and Training Opportunities
6.1 In relation to bilateral education and training opportunities, Ireland has developed a flexible and effective working relationship between the Defence Forces and foreign military academies which accommodates requirements for officer and non commissioned officer (nco) education and training. A formal exchange programme exists with the United States in relation to senior officer education at Command and Staff Course level and senior officers have undertaken senior staff courses in France, Germany and the UK. On a case by case basis Irish Defence Forces personnel will continue to attend selected courses in military establishments abroad. Places have been made available at the Irish Defence Forces Training Centre to facilitate officer and other command and staff training for other countries. Located at the Defence Forces Training Centre, the United Nations Training School Ireland was developed to attain best standards in officer, nco and private soldier training and education in peacekeeping and peace support doctrine, tactics and operations. In addition to meeting a Defence Forces need, it shares its expertise with many nations. This takes the form of conducting United Nations Military Observers and Staff Officers Courses.

6.2 Civil Defence will work actively with partners to share information and training in relevant topics. Civil Defence has developed links with Emergency Planning authorities in other states including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, UK and USA. These ongoing links will continue.

7. Objectives of Ireland’s participation in PfP

Ireland’s approach to participation in PfP was set out in the Presentation Document of 1 December 1999 and the five priority areas of Cooperation on International Peacekeeping; Humanitarian operations; Search and Rescue; Cooperation in the protection of the Environment and Cooperation in Marine Matters. Ireland’s objectives for participation in PfP include:

- To promote the development of a just and peaceful international society based on the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- To foster democratic control of armed forces internationally
- To contribute to development of best practice in the areas of international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
- To enhance the capabilities of military officers, civil servants and diplomats engaged in the shaping and executing of security and defence policies.
- To enhance the capabilities, including the area of interoperability, of Ireland’s Defence Forces for peacekeeping, preventative and crisis management operations under UN mandates.
- To enhance the capabilities of Ireland’s Defence Forces, Civil Defence and other relevant organisations to contribute to the areas of civil emergency planning.
- To share information and expertise particularly in the area of international peacekeeping, arms control, civil emergency planning, humanitarian operations, search and rescue, scientific and environmental issues.

8. Policy Parameters
8.1 This is Ireland’s first IPP and therefore provides an initial presentation of Ireland’s broad approach and planned activities. Ireland’s policy approach will be developed in the light of initial experience and the IPP has been drawn up in a flexible form to allow for adjustment in the light of ongoing experience.

8.2 The broad approach and the associated list of proposed activities represent an indicative list which allow for adjustment based on policy development and the availability of financial and other resources. The inclusion of some activities on the list is at this stage an indication of firm interest rather than a definite commitment to implementation.

9. International Peacekeeping

*Overall approach*

9.1 The main focus for Ireland’s participation in PfP derives from our considerable experience in the area of international peacekeeping.

9.2 The White Paper on Defence details Ireland’s overall approach to contributing to international peace support operations. Ireland has a practical as well as a principled interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in Europe and further afield. Ireland’s defence policy will seek to reflect this strategic interest.

9.3 The roles of the Defence Forces give specific recognition to participation in international peace support operations. In this regard, Ireland is committed to the provision of Defence Forces organised, maintained and equipped on conventional military lines.

9.4 Since 1958, Irish peacekeepers and military observers have participated in some 49,000 individual tours of duty involving 51 different missions. Based on this experience, Ireland is prepared to participate in and contribute to cooperation in the PfP framework in such areas as generic planning for peacekeeping and peace support, communications, command and control, operational procedures, logistics and training.

9.5 At present Ireland subscribes to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) under which the State offers to provide up to 850 personnel on overseas service at any given time. This is an expression of policy intent and not a binding commitment. There is no obligation to participate in any particular mission and the approval of Ireland’s parliament (Dáil Éireann) is required for the dispatch of a contingent of the Permanent Defence Force to specific operations. Ireland has also communicated its UNSAS returns to the Western European Union (WEU), at which Ireland has observer status, in the context of measuring and assessing capabilities for EU-led Petersberg Tasks.
9.6 The White Paper on Defence indicates that the aim will be to maintain the overall UNSAS commitment of 850 for the present. A pragmatic approach is required having regard to the broad range of operational demands, and the availability of personnel and the appropriateness of Ireland participating in missions. It will always be the case that domestic national security needs will come first in relation to the deployment of troops and overseas commitments must be kept at a level which is consistent with the domestic situation.

9.7 As the White Paper on Defence also makes clear, humanitarian activities represent an important continuing element of the Defence Forces contribution overseas. Humanitarian tasks go hand-in-hand with military tasks in many crisis situations. The multi-functional nature of UN peacekeeping in recent years calls for a considerable degree of co-operation in the humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping. Ireland is of the view that PfP can provide a framework in which practice in this area can be further developed.

*Multinational formations*

9.8 The location and number of personnel involved in international peace support operations is as set out in Table 1 below.

9.9 The provision of assets which could be made available for PfP activities, subject to national decisions in each case, will be based on the accompanying indicative Partnership Work Programme of this IPP. The Presentation Document indicated that Defence Forces assets for training, education and exercise purposes could include an infantry company group - leading to an infantry battalion group, battalion staff elements, specialist detachments, for example, engineers, logisticians and exchange personnel; and that facilities available for peacekeeping cooperation in the PfP context could include the UN Training School Ireland at the Curragh, language laboratory resources with their associated infrastructure and courses, and a limited training area. The overall provision of assets, based on the indicative work programme, will be kept under review having regard to developments generally in relation to overseas peace support operations particularly at the European level and Ireland’s participation in PARP.

10. Collaboration on Civil Emergency Planning and related areas

The main area of civil defence interest is that of Civil Emergency Planning, but certain topics in Crisis Management, Medical Services, Nuclear Biological and Chemical issues, Humanitarian Mine Action, etc., will be of interest.
Table 1. Defence Forces Peace Support Commitments - August 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>No. Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon)</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR (United Nations Security Force in Kosovo)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR (Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECMM (European Community Monitor Mission)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) Israel, Syria, Lebanon.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM (United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK (United Nations Mission Interim Administration in Kosovo)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNNY (United Nations Headquarters New York)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP (United Nations Military Observer Mission - Prevlaka)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Personnel</strong></td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*It is intended to reduce the Peace Support commitment to the UNSAS ceiling of 850 as soon as possible.*
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<td>31</td>
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<td>13-32</td>
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