MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

The Emperor’s New Clothes –
SF Force Structure and EAF Force Protection

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR DAVID W. MARTTALA

CONFERENCE GROUP FOUR

AY 2001-02

Mentor: Dr. Wray R. Johnson
Approved: ____________________________
Date: _________________

Mentor: LTC Jon S. Lehr, USA
Approved: ____________________________
Date: _________________
The Emperor's New Clothes--SF Force Structure and EAF Force Protection

Unclassified

Marttala, David W.;

USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University, MCCDC
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA22134-5068

USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street, MCCDC
Quantico, VA22134-5068

APUBLIC RELEASE

See report.

Unclassified

Public Release

79

EM114, (blank)
fenster@dtic.mil

International Area Code
Area Code Telephone Number
703767-9007
DSN
427-9007

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18
The Emperor’s New Clothes – SF Force Structure and EAF Force Protection

Following the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers barracks, the USAF revamped its Security Forces (SF) force structure as part of a new “force protection” strategy. Unfortunately, these initiatives represent marginal shifts in capability that have left the EAF vulnerable to the modern threat. The global, hyperasymmetric threat manifested at Khobar Towers – and in similar subsequent attacks – is of wholly different character than threats of any prior period. Coupled with the evolving Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF) concept for 21st-century Air Force employment, this threat requires a fundamental change in the way the USAF conceives, plans, and executes force protection. SF roles, core competencies, and essential tasks for force protection must be rigorously assessed from a threat-based perspective. Force protection against the modern threat does not cleanly fit within traditional SF task definitions. Security Forces must re-tool their Mission Essential Task List and restructure available forces and resources to more effectively orient combat power on the threat. Within current resource constraints, some present SF functions must be outsourced or reassigned, other present functions must be expanded, and some new tasks must be assimilated. Existing joint doctrine must be fully operationalized to fill the gaps in USAF force protection capability.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS PAPER SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMS COVER SHEET</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 1: USAF BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 2: SF FORCE STRUCTURE EVOLUTION</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 3: THREAT</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 4: EAF FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 5: RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART 6: CONCLUSION</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT 8</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Illustrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Standard USAF Security Police Squadron Organization, RVN</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Combat Security Police Squadron Organization</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Summary of Attacks on US Air Bases, RVN: Pre- and Post-Tet</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>820 SFG Organization</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by type)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by region)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by target)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>US Casualties in International Terrorist Attacks</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Traditional Threat Concept – Base Defense</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>Proposed Threat Concept – Force Protection</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Current Security Forces Task Proficiency</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>Event Probability and Consequences</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>Security Forces Deployment Trends</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>Proposed SF Core Competencies and Essential Tasks</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15</td>
<td>Functional Outsourcing Recommendations</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

This paper examines the current capability of United States Air Force Security Forces (SF) to protect the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) against modern threats. In this paper, I make some relatively distinctive observations about the threat we face and the efficacy of current SF capabilities to counter that threat. This paper is in no way intended to diminish the valiant contributions of the unsung SF personnel who protect USAF people and assets. Rather, this paper was conceived from a strong belief in the dedication and talent of our Security Forces, and a determination that there exists a better way to do business.

I would like to thank my faculty mentors, Dr. Wray R. Johnson (Colonel, USAF Ret) and LTC Jon S. Lehr (USA, Infantry) for their encouragement, and for their organizational and conceptual advice throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank several people who provided invaluable assistance identifying and obtaining sources: Colonel (USAF, Ret) Nick Keck for information and references on the RAF Regiment; Mrs. Theresa Anthony and Mrs. Catherine MacLaren of the Marine Corps Research Center staff for their assistance with interlibrary loans of several obscure research sources; and Mrs. Yvonne Kincaid of the Air Force History Support Office, Bolling Air Force Base, for her time-saving assistance accessing and organizing microfilm records. Most importantly, to my wife Lisa, thanks for your encouragement and support.

-- Defensor Fortis --
Executive Summary

Title: The Emperor’s New Clothes – SF Force Structure and EAF Force Protection

Author: David W. Marttala (Major, United States Air Force)

Thesis: The United States Air Force Security Forces career field is ineffectively postured to counter the modern asymmetric threat to Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF).

Discussion: Most modern debates over force protection issues view the 1996 attack on the American barracks at Khobar Towers as the defining watershed event. “Force Protection” became a popular, catchall moniker for efforts to counter a repeat of the Khobar attack. Among the various responses to Khobar Towers, the USAF instituted several significant changes to the SF force structure in the name of force protection. These adjustments were based on sound lessons learned from over five decades of historical experience combating threats to airfields.

Unfortunately, while effecting a number of long-needed improvements in SF capabilities, the cumulative effect of the past 5 years of change falls short of addressing the emerging threat. The new threat – which will remain dominant as long as the United States retains its superpower status – is of wholly different character than threats of any prior period. The evolution of this threat has been subtle yet significant. Since Khobar Towers, the threat has progressively metastasized, first shifting to US territory with the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, followed by the attack on the US Cole, and finally presenting itself in the form of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

Since the new threat is fundamentally different, it requires a corresponding fundamental change in the way we think about, plan for, and execute force protection. However, SF force protection initiatives to date have not effectively targeted this new threat because they represent changes at the margin of our capability. This paper attempts to characterize current EAF force protection vulnerabilities and recommend changes to the SF force structure that will more effectively counter those vulnerabilities. Force protection against the modern threat does not cleanly fit within traditional stove-piped task classifications of law enforcement, weapon system security, air base defense, or even combating terrorism – it requires a rigorous threat-based analysis of Security Forces roles, core competencies, and essential tasks.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Security Forces must re-tool their Mission Essential Task List and restructure available forces and resources to more effectively orient combat power against the modern threat. Force capabilities must address the truly global nature of the threat with respect to the evolving EAF concept for 21st-century Air Force employment. Force capabilities must be re-balanced and prioritized within realistic resource constraints. Some present SF functions must be outsourced or reassigned, other present functions must be expanded, and some new tasks must be assimilated into the SF functional area. Existing joint doctrine must be fully operationalized to fill the gaps in our capability to engage the highest-risk threats to air bases.
INTRODUCTION

The United States Air Force Security Forces career field is ineffectively postured to counter the modern asymmetric threat to Expeditionary Aerospace Forces (EAF). This shortfall comes at a time when the USAF increasingly deploys from home station to a relatively small number of overseas operating locations, and faces a threat to its operational resources and personnel that is fundamentally different from any previous threat.

The EAF has emerged as the defining concept for the USAF in the 21st century. The essence of the EAF concept is that all airmen – whether permanently assigned to bases in the Continental United States (CONUS) or overseas (i.e., OCONUS: other than CONUS) – will be active participants in a more agile, responsive aerospace force. This force, based primarily within the CONUS, will be capable of rapidly and precisely projecting tailored aerospace force packages anywhere in the world to implement national strategy.1 Now more than ever, the USAF is “leaning forward” as a global force-in-readiness.

At the same time, the modern threat to United States civil and military resources has become more complex. Until 1990 America faced two primary outside threats: (1) foreign military forces directing conventional or unconventional attack against our combat power at CONUS or OCONUS military locations, most likely in a traditional wartime environment; and (2) relatively limited terrorist attacks on military assets2 or corporate interests located overseas. In the last decade, however, the threat environment has changed dramatically. With the possible exception of North Korea and the People's Republic of China, the threat of symmetric military attack virtually evaporated with the end of the cold war. Meanwhile, terrorist action has reached a new

---

1 United State Air Force EAF Support Cell (AF/XOPE), Brochure, Expeditionary Aerospace Force, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force), n.d. The EAF concept calls for permanent Main Operating Bases (MOB) located CONUS and OCONUS to share the responsibility for global power projection to OCONUS Forward Operating Bases (FOB).
level of asymmetry, more frequently aimed at unlikely targets and using unexpected means to strike at unanticipated times – even on our home soil. This increasing threat globalization and asymmetry is a direct result of the United States’ sole superpower status and the frustration of disenfranchised elements that see no other way to effectively challenge U.S. policy.

The simultaneous globalization of mission and threat presents a historically unique risk to the EAF, and a complex challenge for USAF Security Forces effectively charged as lead agents for ensuring EAF force protection (FP). Over the past five years the Security Forces (SF) career field has made significant force structure changes in an attempt to meet this challenge. However, those adjustments reflect a service-wide failure to adequately conceptualize the threat to the EAF, and have resulted in a force that is inadequately organized, trained, equipped, and supported to effectively deter or mitigate the most likely hazards we face today. Current and developing SF force structure produces a greater capability to defeat late Cold War-era threats, while simultaneously producing a decided inability to protect forces against current and emerging threats. A comprehensive restructuring of SF roles and functions is critical to prevent a widening gap between force protection capabilities and threats to the EAF well into the future.

This paper attempts to characterize current EAF vulnerabilities with respect to the modern threat and recommend changes to the SF force structure that will more effectively counter those vulnerabilities. The paper will begin by analyzing the USAF base defense efforts in

---

2 In this paper, the term “military assets” collectively refers to physical resources and combatants.
3 In this paper, the term “force structure” refers to the apportionment of resources between peacetime missions (LE-law enforcement, SEC-weapons system security and CT-combating terrorism) and the wartime mission of air base defense (ABD). “Force structure” encompasses corresponding organization, training, and equipment to perform these missions. In sum, “force structure” can be considered as the overall posture of the career field to accomplish certain missions.
4 This paper defines “force protection” as a collection of offensive and defensive measures to prevent and mitigate hostile actions against personnel and resources not engaged in direct combat. Definitions of “force protection” are discussed further in part 5 of this paper. Within the security forces career field, force protection is best achieved through a variety of core capabilities, including aspects of ABD, LE, SEC, and CT. The full array of proposed force protection skill requirements will be discussed in Parts 5 and 6 of this paper.
South Vietnam in order to identify critical force protection “lessons learned.” In part two, the paper will describe the post-Vietnam evolution of the Security Forces career field and its current force structure. Part three briefly overviews the EAF concept of operations and describes the modern threat to the EAF. The analysis in part four will compare the South Vietnam base defense “lessons learned” to the EAF construct to assess current SF force protection capabilities. Finally, the paper will offer recommendations to more effectively orient SF capabilities to achieve positive EAF force protection within existing resource limitations.

Resource constraints regularly influence force structuring decisions contrary to military necessity, and the case study in part one demonstrates this point: an encouraging USAF initiative for base defense in South Vietnam was scrapped shortly after implementation solely because of fiscal and political limits on manpower.

PART 1: USAF BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

This part of the paper describes the execution of USAF air base defense (ABD) efforts in South Vietnam by comparing the performance of standard security police (SP) units against specially trained combat SP units. These two types of units will be compared in terms of organization, training, and performance in order to develop lessons learned for modern force protection. First however, it is important to understand the development of USAF ABD doctrine and policy in the pre-Vietnam period.

USAF Air Base Defense Before 1965

Threat: The relative immaturity of early airpower meant that enemy forces typically paid scant attention to air base attack prior to World War II. Consequently, the notion of base defense
remained an undeveloped, untested, and largely theoretical concept.\(^5\) Beginning in 1939, however, airpower played a progressively more significant combat role. Italian Air Marshal Giulio Douhet’s maxim\(^6\) on the vulnerability of aircraft on the ground increasingly appealed to military planners, and ground attack on air bases was seen as a means of gaining asymmetric advantage over this new capability. According to historian John Kreis, attacks on air bases grew in intensity and employed a variety of methods, including paratroops, glider forces, air raids, and ground assaults.\(^7\) Consequently, in 1942 the U.S. Army Air Forces formed Air Base Security Battalions, planning for a total of 296 such units to defend against local ground attack. As the Allied powers began to dominate the European theater, however, the threat to air bases declined and the security battalions were inactivated by the end of the war.\(^8\)

During the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) – anticipating a ground threat to air bases – developed a policy whereby Air Police served as cadre for provisional air base defense task forces organized and employed as small infantry units.\(^9\) Once again, U.S. air bases were for the most part safe from attack.\(^10\) North Korean guerrillas virtually ignored air bases during the war, and Air Police wound up performing resource protection duties to prevent theft and pilferage.\(^11\) Thus, a disconnect arose between the perceived threat implicit in Air Force policy and the actual threat on the ground.\(^12\)

---


\(^6\) In 1921, General Giulio Douhet wrote “it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.” See Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air* (Washington, D.C: Office of Air Force History, 1983—originally published in 1921), 53-4; cited in Alan Vick, *Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995), xiii-xiv.

\(^7\) Kreis, xv.


\(^9\) Ibid, 5.

\(^10\) Kreis, 349.

\(^11\) Fox, 6.

\(^12\) This disconnect was acknowledged in a Far East Air Forces report on the conduct of the Korean War. *Ibid*, 6.
Throughout the Vietnam conflict enemy air forces suffered from air inferiority and did not operate south of the military demarcation line.\textsuperscript{13} During the early period of U.S. presence in Southeast Asia (through late 1964), enemy ground forces disregarded U.S. air bases; consequently, base defenses remained untested and overlooked by senior U.S. leadership.\textsuperscript{14}

**Service Responsibilities:** In September 1947, the Army and Air Force signed an agreement that stated, “Each department will be responsible for the security of its own installations.”\textsuperscript{15} The 1948 Key West Agreement among the services failed to explicitly assign responsibility for defense of air force bases.\textsuperscript{16} In 1959, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, explained that base defense was not generically associated with any single service; rather, *UNAAF* required unified or specified commanders to determine the responsible service for local base defense, define areas of operation, and establish appropriate command relationships.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, through the 1950s, U.S. joint military guidance was consistently vague in terms of defining responsibilities for defense of U.S. Air Force bases.

**Doctrine and Strategy:** From inception, doctrine for the protection of U.S. air bases has evolved as an outgrowth of maturing national military strategy. In the 1950s, President Truman's containment doctrine was underwritten by the strategy of massive retaliation. Estimates of enemy threats to the U.S. nuclear arsenal postulated attacks by highly trained, clandestine teams, resulting in an Air Staff emphasis on interior base security rather than external base defense.\textsuperscript{18} The Kennedy administration continued the policy of containment, but its adoption of a flexible response strategy indirectly led to a need for a counterinsurgency capability. Unfortunately, the

\textsuperscript{13} Kreis, 349-50.  
\textsuperscript{14} Fox, 12.  
\textsuperscript{15} *Ibid,* 4.  
\textsuperscript{16} *Ibid,* 4.  
\textsuperscript{17} *Ibid,* 4-5.  
\textsuperscript{18} *Ibid,* 7-8.
Air Force failed to adequately develop such a doctrine, to include base defense of deployed forces, and remained fixated on internal security against covert threats.  

**External Division of Roles and Tasks:** Throughout the Vietnam conflict, responsibility for base defense outside the perimeter fenceline was assigned to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), while the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) military police were tasked with internal security.  

Doctrinal stagnation proved painfully evident with the first ground attack on a USAF operating location in Vietnam, Bien Hoa Air Base, on 1 November 1964.  

Despite Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), acknowledgement of base defense deficiencies highlighted in this attack, CINCPAC and U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) continued to rely on South Vietnamese defense forces.  

Following attacks on U.S. Army bases at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed U.S. Marines and U.S. Army troops to deploy in an external defense role at Da Nang Air Base and the Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area, respectively.  

U.S. counterinsurgency strategy eventually shifted from static defense to an offensive search-and-destroy orientation, resulting in General Westmoreland’s (COMUSMACV) December 1965 decision on base defense responsibilities, under his UNAAF authority: “I have in mind the necessity for patrolling, for outposts, and for reaction forces…all service units and all forces of whatever service who find

---

22 *Ibid*, 19. See also Leslie E. Gaskins, “Combat Security Police Program: Air Staff Briefing,” 8 January 1969, unpublished briefing slides in the Air Force History Support Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. microfilm collection, reel no. K1054, frames 43-4. On 22 December 1964, the Commander, 13th Air Force, observed: “The only way off base mortar and small arms fire can be prevented from attacking our aircraft is for the US Army or US Marines to occupy the area surrounding these airfields. We can’t depend on the RVN to accomplish this, and it would take at least a battalion of U.S. troops to do the job adequately. No increase in air police personnel – 10, 100 or 500 – can accomplish this job because they are not trained, organized or equipped for this type operation.” In August 1965, the Deputy Commander, USMACV, responded: “It is true major installations have priority for defense, but only against a strong VC mass attack. There are no plans to tie down U.S. troops to the defense of U.S. airbases against mortar or sneak attack. *It costs too much in troops.*” [emphasis added].  
themselves operating without infantry protection…will be organized, trained and exercised to perform…defensive and security functions which I have just discussed…self-defense is not an optional matter, but an urgent necessity.”24 In January 1966, 2d Air Division interpreted this directive to mean that Air Police would defend strictly from within the base perimeter, neglecting Westmoreland’s instructions for external defense operations.25 The division of responsibilities resulting from this confused guidance – USAF internal security and RVN and Free World Forces (FWF – primarily Republic of Korea and Royal Australian Air Force personnel)26 for external defense – characterized the force protection concept of operations for the remainder of the Vietnam conflict.27 One exception was the U.S. Marine contingent at Da Nang, which provided external defense for most of the conflict.28

Apart from the specific context of Vietnam, however, the Defense Department maintained its vague definition of air base defense responsibilities. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, published on 17 June 1966, emphasized the Army’s responsibility for conducting land war and “to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.”29 Every Air Force function assigned in this document was directly associated with air warfare.30 As historian John Kreis has observed: “Throughout the post-World War II period, the American military, while occasionally losing planes to aerial assault, lived a charmed existence. It has not faced in combat an enemy determined to destroy it, so there was no

---

24 *Ibid*, 23-8
27 Although the term “force protection” did not arise until the 1990s, in this paper it will be applied to equivalent operations from earlier time periods.
compelling need to resolve differences of opinion as to base defense responsibility.”

**USAF ABD After 1965**

The air base attack threat in South Vietnam came in the form of Viet Cong (VC) communist insurgents and regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, who shared similar purposes, organization, tactics, weapons, and equipment. The VC/NVA used four principal types of attack against air bases: standoff attack – the most common, simple, economical, and effective; sapper raids; sabotage; and battalion-sized assaults. Standoff attacks used “a weapon… launched at a distance sufficient to allow the attacking personnel to evade defensive fire from the target area….Thus, at least risk to themselves, the Communists could inflict damage on costly combat resources, striking at times and places of their choice.”

Standoff attacks used mortars, recoilless rifles, and rockets; effective ranges for these attacks extended to 5,700 meters for 120 mm mortars and 11,000 meters for 122 mm rockets. Attacks generally entailed extensive pre-mission reconnaissance, operated under cover of darkness, launched between 3 and 36 rounds, and lasted between 2 and 20 minutes. The sapper raid was designed to use a very small team to inflict maximum damage rather than casualties. Battalion-sized attacks occurred on only two occasions, at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Bases during the 1968 Tet Offensive. In both of these attacks, the enemy’s loss of tactical surprise and the presence of sizeable friendly joint service forces combined to produce successful U.S. defenses. Finally, sabotage was the least significant form of attack, occurring in only one notable case out of 475 recorded attacks.

---

31 Kreis, 350.
32 Fox, 29-31.
33 *Ibid*, 41.
34 *Ibid*, 41.
between 1964 and 1973. Although it is impossible to determine with complete certainty, the most likely explanation for the infrequency of sabotage is the deterrent effect of the USAF internal security emphasis. To put this threat in perspective, it is useful to note that the USAF lost more fixed-wing aircraft in Vietnam as a result of the various types of ground attack than were shot down by MiGs – 99 versus 62.

**Standard SP Units:** The United States Air Force initially relied on sister services for airfield defense in Southeast Asia, but beginning in late 1965 assumed primary responsibility for this mission and formed SP squadrons at each of the 10 major bases in the Republic of Vietnam. Although these squadrons were deployed primarily for base defense, they were also charged with various law enforcement tasks such as traffic control, criminal investigations, and customs inspection. Initially, the squadrons were organized and trained based upon peacetime roles and missions at bases in CONUS, reflecting the Air Force’s Cold War doctrinal fixation.

**Organization:** Security Police squadrons deployed to South Vietnam were cobbled together from individuals assigned to CONUS units, shipped overseas, then assembled, organized, and trained for air base defense duty. One Army officer who observed the SP defense squadrons in action commented: “Security police are deployed as individuals much as peacetime interior guards along based perimeters, without unit integrity. Yet they have been required repeatedly to fight, as small tactical units, locally superior hostile tactical forces.” The standard SP unit employed the same administrative organization found in CONUS SP units (see Figure 1), which possessed minimal tactical capability. SP flights contained no tactical sub-units such as the fire teams found in Army units; the closest such element was the ad hoc 13-man

---

39 *Vick*, 69.
40 *Fox*, 79.
quick-reaction team, which was used exclusively as a standby reserve force.\textsuperscript{44} Manpower authorizations were wholly deficient for executing proper base defense, mainly due to the limitations of the DoD 525,000-man ceiling on U.S. combat troops permanently assigned to the RVN.\textsuperscript{45} In addition, the rotation cycle consistently produced actual unit strength substantially below reported strength. Personnel were carried “on the books” even while enroute to or from the unit, on rest and recreation leave, or otherwise not present for duty.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Standard USAF Security Police Squadron Organization, RVN}
\label{fig:organisation}
\end{figure}

\textit{Training}: Finally, “the ceaseless demand for 100 percent annual trained replacements soon exhausted the pool of skilled airman and more and more apprentices (81130) and helpers (81010) were shipped to RVN air bases. This trend triggered a vastly expanded on-the-job

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 79.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 81.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 81.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 84. This ceiling was raised to 549,000 effective 6 April 1968.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, 82-5.}
\end{footnotes}
By 1967, of the 46,000 airmen in country (of all USAF specialties), 30 percent were enrolled in the OJT Program.\textsuperscript{48} The relatively insignificant amount of time remaining for training on combat-related skills required at the deployed location – which differed greatly from the set of skills required in the home base-oriented training material – coupled with the short tours of duty in theater, created what Headquarters Pacific Air Forces termed an “alarming” training problem.\textsuperscript{49} “Vietnam is no place to start training individuals in the use of weapons and tactics.”\textsuperscript{50}

**Combat Security Police Squadrons (Safeside):** An attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base on 13 April 1966 highlighted base defense inadequacies and led the USAF Chief of Staff to direct an experimental program assessing the feasibility of specially trained, organized, and equipped units for air base defense. This program, referred to as Safeside, commenced with the formation of the 1041st Security Police Squadron (Test) on 1 July 1966.\textsuperscript{51} The unit was organized as a field extension of the Air Staff Inspector General’s office, and assigned the following tasks:

- Evaluating advanced security *equipment* including intrusion detection and surveillance devices, communications equipment, weapons, and vehicles.
- Evaluating Air Force Security Police *training* methods and requirements for the local ground defense of air bases.
- Acquiring the experience necessary to develop Air Force *doctrine* for air bases located in limited war or insurgent environments [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{52}

The test squadron was comprised of volunteers and selectees from security police and other specialties such as intelligence, communications, medical, and supply.\textsuperscript{53} These personnel spent

---

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, 86.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, 87.
\textsuperscript{49} Lee, 4.
\textsuperscript{51} Lee, 45. See also John W. Brokaw, “Air Force Police – A History (XXXIII).” *Tiger Flight* 10, no. 2 (March/April 2001): 20. Cited hereafter as Brokaw, XXXIII. Originally named the 1041st Security Strike Force Test Squadron, the unit was renamed over objections from a U.S. Army general that only the Army had ground “strike” forces.
15 weeks undergoing training based on material selected from the U.S. Army Infantry School and Ranger training course, and then reported to Phu Cat Air Base, RVN, from 16 January through 4 July 1967 to provide “surveillance and protection in depth along specified portions of the base perimeter.”

Lt Gen Momyer, Commander, Seventh Air Force, commented on the results of the test program. His remarks are summarized as follows:

**Doctrine/Organization**
- USAF forces are capable of providing an increased capability to defend their own resources against sapper attack.
- Static defense does not work against insurgent warfare; active patrolling is essential.
- Sectorizing base defense command and control detracts from the security posture.
- Failure to fully integrate test unit and standard SP personnel degraded security.

**Training**
- Test unit personnel performed excellently in trained skills
- More skills should be added (i.e. - linguistics, paratroop insertion, and social-political training) to foster information exchange with local population; organic, dedicated intelligence capability is a must to exploit local information sources.

**Equipment**
- Sensors displayed mixed results in terms of detection capability and reliability; sensors cannot realistically replace personnel for perimeter detection.
- The existing nontactical radios are inadequate for combat use.
- Security police lack a satisfactory tactical response vehicle.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force decided to establish five operational Combat Security Police Squadrons (CSPS) based on the Safeside test, the *initial concept* being to form a large, self-contained force capable of rapid global deployment to provide bare base ground defense in hostile environments. Despite this high-level endorsement, however, the Southeast Asia manpower ceiling and other problems stalled development until the Tet Offensive renewed USAF concerns over base defense vulnerabilities. By March 1968, the USAF had deployed the first of three dedicated base defense squadrons to Phan Rang Air Base under what became

---

52 Ibid, 45.
53 Brokaw, XXXIII, 21.
54 Lee, 45-46.
known as the “Safeside II” program.\textsuperscript{57} The Air Force concluded that a principal lesson from Tet was that the Air Force had insufficient organic reserve forces to withstand multiple, sizeable enemy attacks.\textsuperscript{58} Accordingly, the stated purpose of Combat Security Police units was as a theater reserve, to “provide a contingency force during high threat periods to thwart or stand off coordinated ground attacks until outside assistance could be received.”\textsuperscript{59} More specifically, the Commander, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, stated his “intent [was] not to fragment [the] squadron on [an] individual basis.”\textsuperscript{60}

The emphasis on squadron integrity soon faded however, and just before deployment Seventh Air Force began directing Safeside squadron “mission creep.”\textsuperscript{61} The initial unit – the 821st Combat Security Police Squadron – developed a capability to deploy 33-man sections to threatened bases across the RVN, in concert with an emerging Seventh Air Force policy that emphasized the unit’s reinforcement and temporary augmentation role.\textsuperscript{62} Despite the original intent to deploy the force as an integral whole, the realities of combat theater manpower shortages forced a resort to piecemeal dispersal. These units were eventually parceled out on a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Lee, 46-7.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Fox, 84.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Lee, 47-8. In the case of the attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base, U.S. Army units in the area provided crucial, unplanned tactical reinforcement in this attack, without which the defense of the base would have been questionable.
\item \textsuperscript{59} *Ibid*, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Headquarters Seventh Air Force, Message to CINCPACAF/IGS, Subject: \textit{Security of Air Bases in RVN}, 110815Z Mar 68, Air Force History Support Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. microfilm collection, reel no. K7238, frame 1855. Seventh Air Force clearly was interested in using the Safeside program to provide a pool of additional “temporary duty” security police manpower beyond the permanent assignment constraints of the DoD manpower ceiling: “7AF completely capable of providing necessary in-country training in shortest time…Unit need not be fully organized, trained, equipped and manned in entirety before dispatch…Most pressing immediate need is for official establishment of unit and incremental deployment of personnel.”
\item \textsuperscript{62} Lee, 49. 821 CSPS personnel were even envisioned to augment squadrons which sustained manpower losses due to “rotation…heavy work schedules and fatigue.”
\end{itemize}
semi-permanent basis across 10 different RVN air bases.\textsuperscript{63} However, the stated theater-reinforcement mission tended to work against local commanders entrusting Safesiders with defense of an independent sector; no base wanted to be left in the lurch because a portion of their defensive scheme went suddenly unmanned due to higher priorities somewhere else in-country. Ultimately the Safeside program was discontinued in December 1969 due to funding constraints and the DoD headspace ceiling.\textsuperscript{64}

**Organization:** The CSPS were organized strictly along tactical lines. Freed from the responsibility for various administrative and law enforcement functions that accompanied standard SP units, the Safeside II squadrons featured a high degree of tactical flexibility and oriented every organizational asset on the enemy. The typical Safeside unit had over 550 personnel allocated among a squadron headquarters and three combat operations flights. The flights were further organized into standing elements and fire teams (see Figure 2). In addition, supplemental weapons, surveillance, and military working dog elements provided the ability to reallocate combat power multipliers among flights and sections without disrupting the squadron organizational structure.

**Training:** The initial 821st CSPS deployment was so hurried that troops received only 200 hours of training over a 23-day period, nearly 80 percent of which consisted of weapons and tactics instruction.\textsuperscript{65} Training was conducted at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, under the auspices of Tactical Air Command’s relocated Detachment 1, 82nd Combat SP Wing.\textsuperscript{66} Thereafter, as the second and third CSP squadrons were formed, they underwent a 16-week training program at Schofield Barracks. In August 1968 this school was relocated to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

\textsuperscript{64} Fox, 111.
where expanded initial training was provided to CSP squadrons not deployed to the RVN.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{Figure 2. Combat Security Police Squadron Organization}

Sources: Compiled from Fox, 111; Gaskins, frame 74.

\textbf{SPS-CSPS Comparison:} Standard SP units and Safeside units obviously faced the same enemy threat, but they were tasked, organized, trained, and equipped in fundamentally different ways. The standard SP units were configured and trained for covert internal threats rather than conventional external threats such as that faced in South Vietnam. The Safeside squadrons,

\textsuperscript{67} Gaskins, frames 47, 53-4; Fox, 110-11. The second and third squadrons were designated the 822nd and 823rd CSPS, respectively. Despite their unique designations, while deployed to the RVN all CSP squadrons bore the temporary designation “821st CSPS” (see Brokaw, XXXIV, 20). Only one of the three squadrons was deployed to
however, were dedicated to executing one mission only: base defense. This singleness of purpose facilitated a number of advantages for the Safeside squadrons. Organizationally, the more flexible Safeside units were able to apply decisive combat power when and where necessary in a fluid tactical environment. The standard SP units were less capable of rapidly shifting forces as needed to counter enemy attacks.

Safeside units also had a great advantage over their standard SP counterparts in terms of their training on infantry-style tactics and weapons. Even the hastily-trained March 1968 Safeside deployment included substantially more infantry and weapons training than standard units received. Although unclassified records of actual unit performance in combat are limited, one indication of Safeside effectiveness is that while the 1041st SPS(T) was deployed to Phu Cat Air Base their proactive patrol and ambush tactics contacted the enemy 43 times, killing several VC/NVA soldiers. However, since there were no attacks at Phu Cat until February 1968, it is impossible to precisely measure Safeside base defense effectiveness compared to that of the standard SP squadrons. Clearly though, the diffuse missions of the standard SP units – exacerbated by the OJT and theater rotation policies described earlier – limited their expertise.

The Safeside units came equipped with a greater complement of weaponry than did the standard SP unit. Furthermore,

CSP equipment was kept in much better condition than the normal SP units maintained theirs, particularly with regard to weapons…in CSP units an individual (or crew) is permanently assigned a weapon…the fact that vehicles, Starlight scopes, communication gear and other equipment remained in top condition is that CSP units also maintained a motor pool, a communications shop and an armory in addition to their own medical section and messing facilities.

---

the RVN at any specific time. It seems reasonable to presume that the “sharing” of the 821st designation was concocted to prevent allegations of disingenuous circumvention of the DoD manpower ceiling.


69 PACAF Lessons Learned, frame 796.
The Safeside program was conceived as a decisive regional reaction force, but since the 821st CSPS forces in country only equated to slightly over 10 percent of the SP contingent in the RVN, the bulk of standard SP unit deficiencies remained a significant problem in day-to-day theater air base defense. According to the Seventh Air Force Director of Security Police at the time, the 1968 Tet Offensive battalion-sized attacks on Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa air bases indicated several weaknesses in USAF air base defense capability: “(1) insufficient numbers of Security Police forces; (2) lack of heavy weapons; and (3) inadequate training in light infantry tactics and techniques” [emphasis added].

**Lessons Learned:** A number of equally important lessons learned can be drawn from this examination of air base defense in Vietnam. First, when provided an adequate investment in quality training, proper equipment, tactical organization, and a sufficiently succinct role, USAF Security Police can serve as a highly capable defense force against ground threats.

Second, the enemy will always adjust to what he perceives to be our strengths and vulnerabilities. As Lee observes,

> The variety of strategies and tactics available to the enemy is limited only by the types and quantity of weapons at his disposal. He is inclined to select targets which provide the greatest payoff for the expenditures incurred. As each change or improvement in base defense has taken place, the enemy shifted the method and tactics of his attacks. Consequently, air base defense efforts in SEA have been an evolutionary development to provide the best level of security and defense against a spectrum of potential threats.

Conventional wisdom holds that Tet marked a turning point, where successful USAF perimeter defenses forced enemy tactics toward standoff attacks and away from penetrating attacks.

---

70 Fox, 82.
71 Colonel Albert Feldman, Director of Security Police, 7AF, 2 July 1969 interview, cited in Lee, 25-6. This opinion appears relatively widespread. Despite the general policy inconsistency between the PACAF and 7AF Security Police staffs, they at least agreed on this point: “most security police squadrons were inadequately trained in the use and care of heavy weapons [within the SP lexicon, the term “heavy weapons” is generally applied to weapons heavier than a standard M-16 – such as the M-60 7.62 mm and M-2 .50 caliber machine guns]….SP units lacked a knowledge of small arms tactics.” (see PACAF Lessons Learned, frame 796).
72 Lee, x.
However, this view is only partially supported by the evidence. While standoff attacks certainly increased – by nearly a full order of magnitude after January 1968 – sapper attacks never represented a substantial portion of the attack spectrum. In fact, during the 3-year periods immediately before and after Tet, there was no significant shift in the proportion of standoff to sapper attacks (see Figure 3). Clearly, enemy tactics sought to engage perceived weaknesses in air base defenses, rather than attack strengths head-on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Standoff</th>
<th>Sapper</th>
<th>Standoff/Sapper</th>
<th>Sabotage</th>
<th>Small Arms-Probe</th>
<th>Major Attack</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>Pre-Tet</td>
<td>Post-Tet</td>
<td>Pre-Tet</td>
<td>Post-Tet</td>
<td>Pre-Tet</td>
<td>Post-Tet</td>
<td>Pre-Tet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper. Loc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bien Hoa</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Binh Thuy</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Da Nang</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nha Trang</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pleiku</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tan Son Nhu</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other (sites)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Air Bases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Phu Cat</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Phan Rang</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tuy Hoa</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Summary of Attacks on US Air Bases, RVN: Pre- and Post-Tet
(Pre-Tet: 1 Jan 65 – 30 Jan 68; Post-Tet: 31 Jan 68 – 1 Jun 71)
Sources: compiled from Lee, 73-74; Dennison and Porter, 62-70; Berger, 259.

Third, overly broad roles and functions lead to performance deficiencies. There is a definite link between breadth of assigned role and the proficiency of troops in associated skills. A 1969

---

73 Vick, 128-53; Fox, 206. Understandably, there are some problems with the construction of historical attack data – for instance, it is unclear how many of the “Small Arms-Probes” attacks listed in Figure 3 actually represent aborted attacks of another type, or were in support of a subsequent standoff attack. Furthermore, Vick cites 493 attacks in Vietnam, whereas Fox reports 475. Despite these tabulation differences, their figures reflect similar distributions of attack types.
Pacific Air Forces Report remarked, “Undoubtedly, the absence of a specific ground combat defense mission has limited USAF development of air base defense systems. USAF Security Police have been unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain light infantry training…. They have not received official recognition for their tactical mission in SEA.” 74 This problem was dramatically highlighted by the training dilemma facing undermanned SP commanders in the RVN who were increasingly reliant upon junior troops: neither the initial training those troops had received nor their OJT upgrade training material prepared them to defend against the actual threat in country. 

Fourth, “A contingency force, by its nature, is a waste until the force is needed.” 75 Highly-trained cadre employed merely as theater response or augmentation forces are generally incapable of directly preventing or denying enemy ground attacks. In the event of prolonged battles they may be able to respond in time to defeat an ongoing attack, but such events were rare in Vietnam. 76 They may also indirectly influence the nature of attacks by virtue of the enemy adjusting to perceived defensive response capabilities, but the enemy will continue to launch attacks unless we take aggressive, proactive measures to interdict his combat power beforehand.

It was just such a predicament that Seventh Air Force sought to avoid by finally distributing the Safeside forces among various bases. Seventh Air Force’s dilemma was manifest: maintaining integrity among these specially trained and equipped squadrons and thereby accepting the risk that, absent adequate pre-attack intelligence, they might never get in the fight. There were essentially two choices: assign the 821st CSPS to the defense of a single large base, or split the force across all ten major bases and locations. In choosing between these two options, however, Safeside had only a marginal impact on the quality of base defense theater-wide. Not

74 Lee, 4.
75 Lee, 60.
76 Evidence on this point is sparse, but anecdotal attack data presented in Fox, 224-227, indicates that most attacks lasted less than an hour, and the majority only a few minutes.
surprisingly, Pacific Air Forces was somewhat displeased with the manner in which Seventh Air Force had employed the Safeside manpower, announcing later that “CSP units achieve their maximum effectiveness when unit integrity is maintained.” Indeed, it is doubtful whether the post-Tet, piecemealed Safeside sections significantly prevented or mitigated air base attacks.

The Safeside squadrons demonstrated the inherent potential of units expressly organized, trained, and equipped for a dedicated protective role against an accurately conceptualized threat. A small, highly trained cadre cannot ameliorate larger deficiencies among the defense force charged with the daily protection of the base. Plagued by insufficient manpower, inadequate weaponry, and poor tactical training, the standard SP units were limited in their defensive capability. Although terminated three years after inception, the Safeside experience would re-emerge years later to influence ABD doctrine and SF force structure.

PART 2: SECURITY FORCES FORCE STRUCTURE EVOLUTION

The post-Vietnam development of the SF career field took place within an evolving strategic political environment that witnessed the advent of modern terrorism. Against this backdrop the USAF struggled to properly configure SF roles and resources to defend against wartime and peacetime threats to its military assets. This part of the paper reviews significant ABD program developments in the wake of Vietnam, discusses the comprehensive restructuring of the SF field following the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, and briefly describes current SSF force structure.

USAF Air Base Defense Programs 1973 – 1995

The Legacy of Safeside: The post-Vietnam strategic environment was dominated by a cold

77 PACAF Lessons Learned, frame 795.
war between the superpowers, their competing military nuclear strategies, and an emphasis on security of the respective nuclear stockpiles. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, popular attention turned to the potential for a major theater war in two regions – the Far East and the Middle East. The threat of nuclear proliferation raised doubts among many pundits whether or not the Cold War was really over or had merely shifted from a superpower-dominated contest into a multi-power arena. Throughout this period, the USAF Security Police function performed three types of missions: (1) weapons system security (e.g., protecting critical aircraft and munitions resources); (2) general installation policing (e.g., law enforcement); and (3) air base ground defense – the “go-to-war” mission. Implicit within these three principal missions was a responsibility to provide a local antiterrorism capability. The first two missions comprised the daily role of two separate Air Force Specialty Codes: security and law enforcement, respectively. The base defense program was maintained through periodic “ancillary training” but was not a key focus of daily attention within SP units. Among those familiar with security police base defense units in Vietnam, there was much debate over whether Safeside represented a bad concept, or simply a good idea never fully implemented. However, there existed a common wisdom within SP units that base defense involved a set of highly perishable skills that were for the most part different from the skills SPs performed and trained for as a part of their daily duty. Regardless of judgments regarding the value of the Safeside concept, a general recognition existed within the career field that base defense expertise was languishing through lack of emphasis from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s.

**JSA 8 and 9:** In 1984 the Air Force decided to get serious about base defense; the Communist specter loomed large and base vulnerability to ground attack was a huge concern. As part of a larger effort to bypass the bureaucratic staff morass and improve near-term joint
cooperation, the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army signed Joint Service Agreements (JSA) 8 and 9.\textsuperscript{78} JSA 8 provided for Army external defense of air bases and JSA 9 provided for Army training of USAF security police for ABD.\textsuperscript{79} Both agreements were predicated on two key points: first, the need to protect the Air Force’s ability to generate and sustain air power for joint operations; and second, the Army’s fundamental expertise in land combat.\textsuperscript{80} JSA 9 was terminated in 1993 as the Air Force reinstated its own base defense training school.\textsuperscript{81}

A larger debate concerned the application of JSA 8. The question stemmed from the extent to which the agreement constituted an ongoing, continuous Army responsibility for air base defense, or merely acted as an on-call response force when ground threats directly exceeded Air Force self-defense capabilities. According to a 1997 USAF Security Forces White Paper, JSA 8 applies only in wartime.\textsuperscript{82} But a close reading of the document reveals a decidedly vague assignment of responsibilities reminiscent of Korean-War and Vietnam-era documents (see Appendix A). Paragraph 3 of the agreement states, “The Army is responsible for providing forces for ABGD [Air Base Ground Defense] operations outside the designated boundaries of designated USAF bases and installations.”\textsuperscript{83} The term “ABGD” is defined in the agreement as “local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attack directed against USAF air bases and installations” [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{84} These passages seem to indicate clear assignment of a requirement for a continuous Army external defense presence, regardless of whether the base is involved in

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 52-3.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, 53, 125.
\textsuperscript{82} AF/SF White Paper, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{83} Davis, 130.
declared war operations. However, paragraph 3a includes the following caveat: “When assigned the ABGD mission to counter the level I and II threats to specific USAF bases or installations, Army forces will be under the operational control of those Air Force base or installation commanders” [emphasis added]. The agreement further states that Air Force base commanders are responsible for the “local” ground defense of their installations and that the Air Force will “submit requirements” for ABGD to the Army along with a list of locations requiring defense.

The upshot of this well-intended but disappointingly ineffectual agreement is that base defense responsibilities for most peacetime scenarios – absent a specific ABGD mission from a theater CINC – remain as ill-defined as they were in 1947. Most commanders in the field are unclear as to exactly what level of Army defense support to expect and when it may appear. A common myth is that “large numbers of Army Military Police (MPs) [are] awaiting just off base for the beck and call of the air base commander.” Despite the JSA 8 requirement for a joint working group and bi-service annual ABGD requirements review, no further progress has been made in the clarification of air base defense responsibilities.

**Impact of the Khobar Towers Attack**

Most modern debates over force protection issues view the 1996 attack on the American barracks at Khobar Towers as the defining watershed event. “Force Protection” became a popular, catchall moniker for efforts to counter a repeat of the Khobar attack. Among the various responses to Khobar Towers, the USAF instituted several significant changes to the Security Police force structure in an effort to deter and mitigate future attacks. These decisions were based in large part on lessons drawn from over five decades of historical experience.

---

84 Ibid, 126.
85 Ibid, 130.
86 Ibid, 130-1.
combating threats to airfields. Many positive benefits flowed from this major shift in the career field, but in many cases unintended primary and secondary effects – along with an evolving threat – have since threatened the readiness of the career field.

**Career Field Merger:** One of the first developments of the force protection movement was the consolidation of the security, law enforcement, and combat arms training and maintenance (marksmanship training) career fields into a single enlisted specialty. This merger was executed between 1996 and 1998, along with renaming the Security Police field “Security Forces” (SF), with the expectation that, in an era of declining manpower-to-requirements balances, it would “[increase] the utility of security force members by reducing specialization.” Unfortunately, the actual effect has been that the junior enlisted SF corps became task saturated to the point where they are insufficiently trained in any of the established disciplines.

**820 SFG:** Another major element in SF restructuring was the creation of the 820th Security Forces Group. This unit was conceived along much the same lines as the historic Safeside units. The unit was conceived as:

…a full-time, self-contained force, capable of deploying as part of the initial Air Force contingent…organized to support multiple, concurrent small-scale contingency operations, as well as major theater wars…[the mission is] to provide the Air Force with a highly trained, dedicated protection force that can operate in any environment. If the deployment were to extend over time, follow-on forces would assume established force protection operations. The initial cadre would redeploy and prepare for the next contingency. As rotations in and out of this unit occur, personnel will impart their skills to other organizations throughout the Air Force.

Originally garrisoned at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, with a number of geographically separated flights, the initial 820 SFG concept of operations relied heavily on a strong cadre of

---

88 HQ AF/SF,  6.
89 As part of the SF merger, all members of SF units were authorized wear of a new beret crest based on the original design of the 821st CSPS beret crest worn in the RVN.
permanently-assigned headquarters leadership personnel. When deployed, elements of the headquarters would link-up with one or more of the detached flights to form a deployment force protection contingent. Currently, the 820 SFG and three permanently assigned squadrons are based at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia.

The 820 SFG mission is to “Provide fully-integrated, highly capable and responsive force protection for Expeditionary Air Forces.”\textsuperscript{91} One of the unit’s major strengths is the variety of organic specialties it contains, including security forces, civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence, and medical specialists, among others.\textsuperscript{92} Assigned strength totals 594 personnel – 187 in each squadron and 33 in the group headquarters (see Figure 4).\textsuperscript{93}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 4. 820 SFG Organization}

Source: 820 SFG Briefing, 9.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{90} HQ AF/SF, 3.
\textsuperscript{91} Headquarters 820th Security Forces Group. “Mission Briefing” (18 briefing slides), 18 Oct 01, 2. Cited hereafter as 820 SFG Briefing.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 6.
820 SFG training consists primarily of “Army courses to obtain related, useful skills…enhanc[ing] the versatility and widen[ing] the experience base of the unit.” This training includes airborne, Ranger, pathfinder, air assault, and other courses. The unit has also recently embarked on an experimental program to train members in counter-sniper skills. In addition, the Group has sent some of its members to the USAF “Level II” Force Protection course, which provides intermediate force protection planning and awareness instruction. The Group always has one of its three squadrons on overseas deployment, with another “on call” and the third in reconstitution and training.

**Current SF Force Structure**

The Security Forces career field currently has approximately 22,000 enlisted personnel assigned and 767 officers. Among the enlisted members, slightly under 14,000 (63 percent) are in grades E-1 through E-4; just over 10,100 (46 percent) are in the grades of E-1 through E-4 and have not yet upgraded to the 5-Skill Level. Thus, the majority of personnel in standard SF units are first-term enlistees who are trained at the helper and apprentice level, insufficiently

---

94 Ibid, 12.
96 820 SFG Briefing, 11.
98 AFPC Airman. USAF enlisted career field training is organized along a tiered system of five progressive “skill levels.” Skill levels are coded for simultaneous identification of career field and proficiency level within Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC), which are used to characterize members’ qualifications and the requirements of particular billets within an organization. Thus, a new SF technical school graduate is identified as a Helper (“1-Level”), and after completing a supplemental distance learning course is recognized as an Apprentice (“3-level”). Additional specialty training qualifies a member as a Journeyman (“5-Level”), Craftsman (“7-Level”), and eventually Superintendent (“9-Level”). For further discussion see U.S. Air Force Instruction 36-2201, Developing, Managing, and Conducting Training (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Air Force, 26 April 2000), Chapter 3 and Attachment 4, URL: <http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubs/publist.asp?puborg=AF&series=36>, accessed 2 February 2002; and U.S. Air Force Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) 3P0X1/X1A/X1B Parts I-II, Security Forces Specialty, Military Working Dog Handler Specialty, Combat Arms Specialty (Washington, DC: Headquarters,
skilled in policing, security, base defense, or antiterrorism tasks to perform many of these functions in an independent manner. This is not the result of sub-par recruitment, lack of motivation, or even defective unit leadership, but the direct product of task-saturation.

The 820th Security Forces Group contains 502 enlisted security forces personnel\(^9\) – roughly 2-1/2 percent of the SF enlisted force. The Group assumes no home-station main operating base (MOB) policing or security duties, as it is “operational” only when in deployed status. As indicated by the bulk of its training program, the 820 SFG is geared primarily toward infantry-style defense tactics against conventional ground forces. Additionally, there have been indications ever since the unit’s inception of the potential for “mission creep” – outside inquiries concerning the addition of such tasks as non-permissive airfield seizure have been presented infrequently over the past five years.

Thus, the late 1990s saw the Security Forces confronted with a highly diverse set of responsibilities covering a wide spectrum of threats, and an inherent discord between their peacetime and wartime roles. Within this environment, SF restructuring sought to create a force protection capability against the emerging terrorist threat by emphasizing the ABD capabilities of a multi-skilled policing-security force, and creating a specialized force protection unit a là Safeside. The immediate risk was decreasing proficiency of over-tasked personnel. The key question to be answered was whether such a force structure was viable against 21st-century threats facing the U.S. Air Force.

\(^{99}\) United States Air Force, 23 October 2001), 7-18, URL:<http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubfiles/af/cfetp/cfetp3p0x1x1ax1b/cfetp3p0x1x1ax1b.pdf>, accessed 19 February 2002.

\(^9\) 820 SFG Briefing, 6.
PART 3: THREAT

Every successful military operation is built on a coherent understanding of the mission and the threat. Similarly, a sound force structure must focus on delivering the specific friendly capabilities to counter those of the enemy. This part of the paper describes the EAF concept of operation, and then presents a detailed discussion of threats facing the EAF. In fact, this section describes the modern threat to the EAF as unique in history. The threat is unprecedented to a degree that calls for a new analytical framework in order to accurately assess existing force protection levels, conceive appropriate force protection capabilities, and develop a force structure to produce those capabilities. Accordingly, this section offers such a framework, which will enable the assessment and force structure recommendations presented later in the paper.

**EAF Concept of Operation**

As stated earlier, the EAF concept is one in which all airmen – regardless of their permanent base of assignment – are members of a deployment-ready, agile aerospace force capable of rapid global engagement. This philosophy is visibly manifested in the scheduling, training, and rotating deployment of Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces (AETF) to support ongoing, preplanned overseas force presence operations (e.g., Operations NORTHERN WATCH, DESERT STORM, etc.), as well as to provide an on-call wing representing the nucleus of a contingency response force. The building blocks of the planned and on-call deployment capability are referred to as Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF), and include aircraft, crews, and support personnel and equipment from numerous geographically separated USAF bases. There are ten AEFs. Every 15 months, five AEFs sequentially assemble as AETFs, deploying for 90-day periods supporting preplanned operations. After this 15-month “life cycle” expires, the other
five AEFs deploy for 90 days each. In addition, there are two standing wings that provide an on-call contingency deployment capability.

A major factor in the birth of the EAF concept was an interest in providing the warfighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs) forces that are better tailored to their operational needs. Although no two AETFs contain the same mixture of aircraft, a generic operational force structure for an AETF is represented by 12 F-15Es, 24 F-16Cs, and 6 B-1s. Security Forces deployed in support of an AETF typically equate to the size of a large SF squadron, 200-400 personnel. The overarching principle is that AEFs are tailorable and scaleable from pre-designated, scheduled “buckets” of combat power and combat service support capability.

Another driving factor behind the development of the EAF concept was the trend of declining manpower and increasing deployments within a number of critical career fields, such as rated aircrew members, maintenance personnel, and security forces. In fact, between 1990 and 1998, security forces manning dropped over 36 percent while their deployment requirements increased some 31 percent. On paper, the plan indicates AEF members should only be susceptible to deployment once every 30 months (when their AEF deploys every other “life-cycle”). In practice, however, training requirements, medical exclusions, and the fact that the AEF schedules were constructed with little “wiggle room” means that many Air Force members – particularly Security Forces personnel – deploy much more frequently than anticipated.

**Threats to the EAF**

A key aspect of the EAF is that it encompasses all USAF bases and personnel. Thus, threats to the EAF include not only those against forward-deployed forces, but also those facing

---

101. Ibid, xxiv.
102. Figures and chart from AF/SF, 6.
CONUS bases as well. This section will characterize the threats to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Main Operating Bases (MOBs) by presenting a new analytical typology, and describe the impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the evolving threat to the EAF. Since the threat to USAF FOBs and MOBs is derived from the threat to the U.S. in general, however, it is important to first understand the nature and history of the terrorist threat to America.

**Historical Anti-US Terrorism:** The history of international terrorism attacks against US targets shows that most attacks during the 1990s relied primarily upon traditional terrorist methods – bombings in particular (see Figure 5). Most attacks tend to use such methods in an attempt to generate high casualty-to-effort effects. However, until very recently anti-US attacks have almost exclusively targeted OCONUS corporate targets (see Figures 6 and 7). Moreover, the US has been spared the brunt of the international terrorism plague – its 200 attacks from 1994-2000 represent roughly 7-1/2 percent of attacks worldwide, and US casualties due to international terrorism represented 8 percent of global casualties during the same period. Most of the US-directed attacks have been of small scale, punctuated by occasional “spectacular” events such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the *USS Cole* (see Figure 8). However, this pattern indicates an increasing tempo and level of violence among these “spectacular” attacks, along with an increasing willingness to target non-traditional victims – noncombatant military personnel and U.S. civilians. According to a recent Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, recent trends “may indicate a desire to inflict higher casualties on what are generally less protected civilian targets.”

---


Figure 5. International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by type)

Figure 6. International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by region)

---

105 U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, is an annual publication of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, normally printed in April of each year. Data for this figure was compiled from annual reports (at page numbers listed) for the following years: 1994 (p.67), 1995 (p. 73), 1996 (p. 74), 1997 (p. 86), 1998 (p. 96), 1999 (p. 106), and 2000 (p.88).

Figure 7. International Terrorist Anti-US Attacks (by target)

Source: US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, annual volumes (1994-2000).\(^{107}\)

Figure 8. US Casualties in International Terrorist Attacks


\(^{108}\) *Ibid*, 1994 (p.67) and 2000 (p. 87).
Finally, large-scale attacks have progressively invaded US territory, culminating with the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. The Congressional Research Service observes, “US public perception of terrorism as primarily an overseas issue was dramatically changed by the September 2001 attacks.”

Clearly, the modern threat to America is increasingly deadly, more asymmetric, and striking closer to home than ever before. As one of the most visible global symbols of American strength and values, the EAF faces a more geographically diffuse and increasingly lethal threat. For the first time, protection of CONUS USAF assets is an issue on par with defense of forward positioned and deployed forces.

**Threats to the EAF – A New View:** Figure 9 depicts the traditional USAF view of the threat to people and resources. This view – most commonly associated with “wartime” ABGD operations – classified threats based primarily on size of the attacking force and their respective tactics, training, and organization (collectively referred to here as “composition”).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Attacking Force</th>
<th>Composition of Attacking Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bn or Greater</td>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals/Teams</td>
<td>Agents/terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sympathizers/saboteurs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9. Traditional Threat Concept – Base Defense**

---

109 Perl, CRS-1.
Because of USAF historical experience with threats we commonly faced before, the threat estimate focused on military forces of state belligerents threatening symmetrical attack on our direct combat power assets (aircraft parking areas, munitions dumps, critical mission infrastructure such as power grids, etc.). Since historically these threats occurred episodically, the traditional concept viewed these threats as acute problems requiring temporary treatment, rather than as a chronic affliction necessitating wholesale remediation. Most critically, the threat was viewed as an anomaly exclusive to OCONUS bases and operating locations.

This paper presents a new typology for considering threats in the emerging geo-political security environment. The typology depicted in Figure 10 discards the conventional descriptive variables of force size and composition and instead considers the two most distinguishing

![Figure 10. Proposed Threat Concept – Force Protection](image-url)
features of the modern threat: the attacker’s level of commitment (the vertical axis in the chart) and his preferred degree of asymmetry (horizontal axis). Within this Force Protection threat typology, moderately committed attackers are those who may spend little time or resources preparing for or executing their attack, and may even engage targets of opportunity; these attackers are not prepared to freely risk death for their cause. Highly committed attackers will expend more significant resources to plan and execute an attack, and while cognizant of their personal peril do not risk death except as a last resort to defend others or defend vital national assets. Extremely committed attackers will tend to commit extensive resources and time to an attack – years rather than months or weeks – and are commonly willing to sacrifice their lives to achieve their objective.

Asymmetry refers to the degree to which the attacker chooses tactics congruent with those employed by the defender. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia explains that

…symmetric engagements are battles between similar forces where superior correlation of forces and technological advantage are important to ensure victory and minimize losses. Asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat…. Asymmetric attacks afford devastating ways to attack or create enemy weaknesses and can avoid casualties and save resources. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production).\(^\text{110}\)

Fully symmetric attacks are relatively rare among modern military events. A fully asymmetric attack might involve the covert release of a biological agent into the ventilation system of a childcare facility. Clearly, the upper bound of asymmetry is limited only by technology and the attacker’s imagination.

**Impact of the Sep 11 Attacks:** The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) announced a clear recognition of the modern threat-resource environment in its September 2001 report, released just days after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. According to the QDR, “We can be clear about trends, but uncertain about events. We can identify threats, but cannot know when or where America or its friends will be attacked….Adapting to surprise – adapting quickly and decisively – must therefore be a condition of planning.”

 Attacks on US assets are becoming increasingly asymmetric as symmetrically weak non-state aggressors seek more decisive effects by striking us at locations, times, and in manners that we least expect. The September 11 attacks were a tragic example of the new threat. Attacks today occur with no warning. Among non-military targets, attacks now extend to CONUS locations. Indeed, the QDR went so far as to state, “The United States will not be able to develop its military forces and plans solely to confront a specific adversary in a specific geographic area. Instead, the United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities.” There is every reason to expect that CONUS military locations will be struck in the very near future. Extreme levels of commitment have always been a characteristic of terrorist attack, but the USAF has traditionally categorized terrorism as a low-level (Level I) *base defense* threat because it demonstrated moderate asymmetry and limited mass effects. However, the combination of lethality and surprise presented by modern terrorism suggests terrorism poses the *most dangerous* daily hazard to our forces – more so than large-scale symmetric threats of the past. In many ways, modern terrorism represents a hyper-asymmetric force protection threat of an order never previously encountered.

---

PART 4: EAF FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT

This section builds upon the lessons learned from the USAF experience in Vietnam to assess EAF force protection. This analysis will demonstrate the manner in which the nature of the EAF construct amplifies specific vulnerabilities of current SF force structure, and consequently produces systemic gaps in our ability to effectively counter the modern threat. The lessons of Vietnam-era air base defense include the need to accurately conceive the threat, the importance of properly delimiting roles and responsibilities, the hazards of marginalization, the adaptability of the enemy, and the costs of ignoring core competency service-centricism.

An accurate conception of the threat is critical: In Vietnam, USAF generally succeeded in preventing debilitating attacks on airfield resources because the enemy’s tactics stayed within “the box” of traditional base defense-minded threat concepts and therefore remained largely congruent with resident SF capabilities. Today, the threat is literally outside the box, requiring a fundamental shift in the way we conceptualize the threat. This visible recognition of the modern threat will drive all other actions we take to deter, defeat, and mitigate the threat.

Despite overwhelming conscious discourse concerning the modern threat, the USAF has failed to adjust the SF force structure to effectively protect against it. By merely varying the ratios of traditional SF defensive capabilities and calling it force protection, the USAF has subconsciously ignored the fundamental disconnect between the highest-probability threat and our means of dealing with it. Unfortunately, while effecting a number of long-needed improvements in SF capabilities, the cumulative impact of the past five years of change has fallen short of addressing the emerging threat.

The new threat – which will remain dominant as long as the United States retains its
superpower status – is of a wholly different character than threats of any prior period. The evolution of this threat has been subtle yet significant. Since Khobar Towers, the threat has progressively metastasized and invaded US soil, first with the attacks on the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, then with the attack on the USS Cole, and finally presenting itself in the form of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Most importantly, the future threat is likely to continue evolving in the same direction. According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command 2000 Annual Report to Congress:

> It is quite likely that a competent adversary [in the next 20 years] may be able to deny U.S. advantages in precision firepower and maneuver with a variety of precision counters. These adversaries will likely offset technological inferiority with robust asymmetric approaches that will exploit the advantage of the strategic defense. They will incite popular will, threaten with ballistic or cruise missiles and mass casualty weapons, deny regional or local access, create unacceptable risks in the littoral, disrupt the precision firepower environment, conduct low-risk attacks on U.S. civilian and military computer networks, use terrorism in the U.S. homeland, and field significant internal security and ground forces.¹¹³

The new threat is fundamentally different, and requires a corresponding fundamental change in the way we think about, plan for, and execute force protection.

Traditionally, the SF role as a combined police-security-defense force has required associated capabilities in Air Base Defense, Combating Terrorism (comprised of defensive antiterrorism measures and offensive counterterrorism actions), Weapons System Security, and Law Enforcement. As a result of the SF merger, these capabilities now define the skills on which all SF personnel are trained. Figure 11 portrays the author’s assessment of general SF task proficiency within these core capabilities. The figure displays low, medium, and high

---

assessments for junior\textsuperscript{114} and senior\textsuperscript{115} SF personnel assigned to both standard SF units and the 820th Security Forces Group. The assessments presented here represent the author’s subjective opinion, and generally correlate to typical task execution frequency and training effort. As depicted, Air Base Defense and Combating Terrorism capabilities are assessed as relatively weak among standard SF unit personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capabilities</th>
<th>Career Field Segment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard SF - Junior -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABD</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(KEY: “L”=Low Skilled; “M”=Med Skilled; “H”=Highly Skilled.
“ABD” = Air Base Defense; “CT” = Combating Terrorism;
“SEC” = Weapons System Security; “LE” = Law Enforcement)

\textbf{Figure 11. Current Security Forces Task Proficiency}

Figure 12 portrays the conceptual probability of occurrence for threat events that engage the various traditional SF core competencies, as well as the comparative consequences should such an event succeed. In this depiction, overall risk increases in direct proportion to the cumulative increase in probability and consequence. Although traditional ABD-related threats (e.g., conventional ground attack) are low-frequency events, the consequences of a successful attack would be high. Of even more concern are threats to USAF combating terrorism capabilities. The combination of increasing frequency and very high potential consequences make terrorism – specifically the Level III variant proposed in this paper – the riskiest threat facing the EAF today.

However, SF force protection initiatives to date represent changes at the margin of our capability because they have not directed appropriate capabilities against this new threat.

Because of the resources applied against low-probability conventional ground attack and low-

\textsuperscript{114} E-1 through E-6.
consequence peacetime policing, the EAF is vulnerable to relatively high-probability, high-consequence asymmetric attack at many forward bases and nearly all CONUS bases. Moreover, because of SF task saturation, USAF-wide protection against conventional ground threats is meager, and expertise to handle high occurrence policing events has diminished.

Roles and Competency: When provided an adequate investment in quality training, proper equipment, sound tactical organization, and a logically defined role, USAF Security Forces can provide highly capable defenses against ground threats. However, overly broad role definition has created performance deficiencies within the SF career field. The broad scope of the SF role – encompassing general law enforcement, weapons systems security, tactical air base ground defense, and anti-/counter-terrorism responsibilities – requires an excessive collection of skills which consequently levies an unwieldy training burden on the individual SF member.

\[\text{Figure 12. Event Probability and Consequences}\]

---

\[\text{\textsuperscript{115} E-7 and above, including officers.}\]
In the effort to become masters of many things, Security Forces generally are becoming minimally competent in the various disciplines for which they are responsible. Most enlisted SF personnel perform duties that are predominantly law enforcement oriented or weapons system security oriented, depending on their duty location. This competency imbalance is even more pronounced with respect to the Air Base Defense skill proficiency. Most personnel – particularly those stationed at CONUS bases where the ground threat has been traditionally viewed as low – spend comparatively very little training time on ABD skills. Although the SF career field does not track comprehensive task proficiency or functional competency trends, some anecdotal evidence does exist, that indicates the nature and scope of the competency imbalance problem.

For example, FOAL EAGLE is an annual joint U.S. rear area security exercise conducted each fall in the Republic of Korea. The ABD portion of this exercise – typically held at either Osan or Kunsan Air Base – represents the largest security forces ABD exercise in the USAF. FOAL EAGLE 1998 involved over 750 assigned and Time Phase Force Deployed Data (TPFDD) SF personnel.\footnote{Headquarters 607th Air Operations Group, Director of Security Forces, Letter to 607 AOG/CC and 7 AF/CC, subject: “Foal Eagle 98 Air Base Defense (ABD) Field Training Exercise (FTX) Report,” 13 January 1999, provided on 9 January 2002 by HQ AF/XOFX, 2-4, 6-7.} Defending against traditional Level I, II and III base defense threats, SF personnel in the 1998 exercise displayed many of the symptoms of a perishing skill base:

Defense forces, although motivated, were slow to secure the base against attack. CDOC [Combined Defense Operations Center] provided little direction to the sectors, and did not stress or monitor the Priorities of Work or Routines in Defense. On-duty manning was never established at 100% in order to…establish a secure perimeter…. Extensive delays and numerous fratricide incidents throughout the exercise were the result of ineffective communication [within and between the sector command posts and CDOC]…. [External] patrol zones were not being adhered to…. [Two friendly] ambush patrols ended up in a 20-minute firefight with air base perimeter defensive fighting positions…. [Mortar gun crew] initial set up times averaged over two hours…. throughout the exercise the set up times continuously improved…. The average FE Participant lacked minimum knowledge of basic facts concerning the capabilities of their assigned weapons (i.e. maximum effective range, maximum range, etc.)\footnote{Ibid, 12-16, 18.}
In addition, a written ABD test and hands-on practical evaluation were administered to in-place and TPFDD SF personnel before the live exercise. Two aspects stand out: (1) written test scores for in-place (i.e., PACAF-assigned) SF were five percent higher than for CONUS-based TPFDD SF, precisely the same result as the previous year; and (2) practical evaluation scores for in-place SF were 10 percent higher than for CONUS-based SF.\textsuperscript{118} Finally, one performance metric from the live exercise should cause particular concern with respect to countering the modern threat: “Most of the attempted [surveillance and intelligence gathering] entries to the base were successful and once on base OPFOR movement was generally unrestricted.”\textsuperscript{119}

Despite representing one of the rare available cases of comparative ABD skills assessment, the FOAL EAGLE 98 results are by no means unique. SF performance in local and regional ABD exercises typically reflects the role-skill conflicts and episodic ABD training discontinuities inherent among standard SF units. ABD-related skills do not correspond to the law enforcement and weapons system security functions regularly performed by standard SF units, meaning they are not routinely exercised or reinforced in the course of a normal daily duty. In such a situation, training is typically administered to compensate for infrequent skill performance, but training time for ABD-specific skills is nearly nonexistent – most SF personnel are lucky to receive hands-on training in core ABD tasks even a few days each year.

Contrary to the original vision of a collection of highly-skilled SF specialists, excessive task generalization has produced a body of increasingly lower-skill generalists. Despite the capabilities of the 820th Security Forces Group (SFG) – this unit is too small to assume more than a small fraction of ongoing FOB defense duties. Consequently, over the past three years an average of 1,575 of these relatively low-skilled personnel from standard SF units (approximately

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, 29-30.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 28-29.
8% of the SF enlisted force) have been regularly deployed to provide force protection for FOBs.

As the modern threat has passed through its infancy since the Khobar Towers attack, junior enlisted SF personnel have felt the brunt of a far greater workload than faced at any previous time. The EAF concept was moderately successful in mitigating the SF deployment tempo from its implementation in October 1999 through September 2001, during which time the proportion of SF personnel on deployment dropped from roughly 8 percent to 7 percent (see Figure 13). However, a key vulnerability of the EAF scheduling philosophy is the capacity to support surge operations. For instance, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks SF deployments to USAF FOBs nearly doubled in less than 3 weeks, while at the same time MOB SF manning

![Figure 13. Security Forces Deployment Trends](image-url)

**Figure 13. Security Forces Deployment Trends**

requirements accelerated due to the global nature of the threat. General John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff, recently reported that SF personnel were among those stretched most thin in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. According to Air Force Magazine, “Jumper said the AEF rotation schedule may have to be modified as a result of the war effort. He admitted that USAF has had to ‘reach forward’ into future AEFs for some capabilities…. How we get that back into a rhythm now will depend on what the new steady state is.”\(^\text{120}\) Coupled with the emerging global threat and its increasingly asymmetric character, there is every reason to expect that the scope, complexity, and tempo of the SF role will increase.

The result of this exorbitant workload has been significant problems in recruiting and retaining personnel, reduced morale, and deficient training. In fact, the bulk of the enlisted SF force is made up of personnel still trained at an introductory level of proficiency. This deficiency has a very real impact on force protection for both AETF deployments and MOBs, as SF troops at home and forward locations generally possess insufficient skills to provide a proactive force protection capability, and have inadequate time available to participate in training to correct shortfalls in the wide variety of skills for which they are responsible. The situation as structured is a classic “no win” predicament – charged with doing too much, the SF corps as a whole has little opportunity to become expert in any single discipline. The modern threat calls for higher proficiency among all SF ranks at all locations worldwide.

**Marginalization:** Piecemeal improvements in capability are insignificant. For Safeside planners, there were essentially two choices: assign the 821st CSPS to the defense of a single large base, or split the force across all ten major bases and locations. In choosing between these two options, however, Safeside had only a marginal impact on the overall effectiveness of base

defense theater-wide. The same problem arises today in the relationship between the 820 SFG, the remainder of the career field, and the nature of the threat. There simply aren’t enough of the 820 SFG members to overcome the task saturation problems of standard SF units at every base, every day. Consequently, the failure to fundamentally adapt the entire SF specialty to the modern threat promotes failure against conventional Level II ground attacks at OCONUS bases. One result of this means-ends mismatch is that the non-820 SFG personnel have a pitifully low opportunity to train on traditional ABD tasks; in general, standard SF units would have great difficulty defending against a serious conventional ground attack at any level. Moreover, the current force structure promotes vulnerability to the modern Level III force protection threat at MOBs worldwide because none of our SF personnel – 820 SFG members or standard SF unit members – have been trained on an appropriate set of force protection key skills.

**The enemy will always adjust:** As our capabilities improve, degrade, or shift, the enemy will adapt his strategy and tactics to orient on what he perceives to be our critical vulnerability. Failure to consider all likely outcomes of the most recent SF force structure modifications has produced serious vulnerabilities in USAF force protection posture. Shifting effort and resources among traditional SF capabilities has amounted to functional stagnation in the face of a strategically agile, adaptive enemy. To date, however, much talk about “force protection” has produced little innovative, substantive force protection against the new threat.

**Capabilities Mismatch – Service Parochialism:** Professed concerns over unity of command – the need to have organic capabilities in order to achieve operational control over base defense forces – is a dangerous anachronism in today’s joint environment. This viewpoint has created a mismatch between units, missions, and core competencies. The failure to adequately exploit joint service core competencies ignores existing joint agreements and the
realities of future conflict.

Current joint doctrine calls for the US Army to support external air base defense operations in certain ill-defined situations, but failure to clarify the practical meaning of JSA 8 and reconcile it with the provisions of other joint doctrine publications has resulted in an ambiguous assignment of roles and responsibilities. The failure to take advantage of economies of scale within the joint community wastes manpower and resources that could be put to better use in other areas. In a task-saturated mission environment, it is quite unreasonable to expect USAF Security Forces to ever be as competent as forces of the U.S. Army in defending against a conventional ground attack. If future conflict sees a legitimate such threat facing USAF assets, it would make little sense to ignore the capabilities of the U.S. Army to defend the threatened air bases on behalf of the USAF. The resources saved through divesting from ABD represent vital excess USAF capacity from which to develop sound defenses to hyper-asymmetric terrorism.

A number of lessons from the Security Police experience in Vietnam are directly applicable to the modern problem of EAF force protection. Unfortunately, these lessons are generally not well understood and are often misapplied within the Air Force today. Vietnam has been frequently cited as evidence of the requirement to reinvigorate modern-day SF ABD capabilities. However, the most valuable lesson of the Vietnam base defense experience is the need to rigorously analyze threats, roles, and resources. From the legacy of Safeside emerges a clear requirement for clearly characterizing the threat, properly assigning roles and defining tasks, and structuring an appropriate force to protect against the threat. From such a perspective, the wholesale threat evolution of the past decade has produced incremental adjustments in SF roles and force structure. The present SF force is ill-disposed to provide an adequate level of protection against current and emerging threats.
PART 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper recommends a new SF force structure to meet the modern threat. The thrust of this concept is congruent with that called for in the recent QDR – a capabilities-based approach.

That concept reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S. interests…it is possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ…A capabilities-based model – one that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur – broadens the strategic perspective. It requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. 121

For the same reasons as the QDR methodology, the USAF approach to Force Protection should support deterring, preventing, and defeating current and anticipated threat capabilities. This approach should consider risk and resources. Accordingly, SF force structure should orient toward the highest-risk threats commensurate with practical resource constraints. In an era of finite manpower and fiscal limits, the SF structure should be focused on Level II and Level III FP threats – moderate-to-highly committed saboteurs and extremely committed, hyper-asymmetric terrorists. This part of the paper offers a series of recommendations on the proper SF role, core competencies and essential tasks for force protection; proposes outsourcing certain traditional SF capabilities; identifies resulting unit organization, training, and equipment improvements; and recommends reapportioning SF manpower to enhance EAF force protection.

A key assumption in developing these recommendations was that no significant additional resources would be made available for implementation.

A New Role for a New Threat

Most discussions of SF force protection roles fail to first conceptualize force protection in

121 Rumsfeld, 13-14.
practical terms. A sufficiently specific definition of force protection may suggest SF roles and core competencies that fundamentally contrast with traditional SF functions. The USAF definition of “force protection” therefore must be considered before attempting to define the supporting SF role.

Other US services take a far more expansive view of force protection than does the USAF. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps considers force protection to include defense against threats to forces engaged in combat as well as to those not engaged in direct combat. This view includes base defense, self-protection, securing operational lines of communication, antiterrorism, operational security (OPSEC) of friendly plans and movements, and deception operations as examples of force protection measures. Similarly, the U.S. Army defines force protection as follows:

Force protection consists of those actions that prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It coordinates and synchronizes offensive and defensive measures to enable the joint force to perform while degrading opportunities for the enemy. It includes air, space, and missile defense; NBC defense; antiterrorism; defensive-information operations; and security to operational forces and means.

This paper endorses the view that force protection entails broad and diverse requirements, but such an approach carries with it the danger that soon everything becomes “force protection.” The focus on the threat easily may become diluted, and eventually force protection “programs” engender no unique contribution to mission accomplishment. Accordingly, the Air Force should retain its present definition of force protection, as it is sufficiently unique to assign specific force protection roles to defeat the modern threat. However, a key problem to date is that the SF role

---

122 The definition of “force protection” previously espoused in this paper is repeated here for convenience: a collection of offensive and defensive measures to prevent and mitigate hostile actions against personnel and resources not engaged in direct combat.

in executing the force protection for the USAF is neither specifically nor appropriately conceptualized with respect to other functional areas. As a result, SF core competencies to defeat the threat are inadequately identified.

This paper proposes a dual SF role in force protection: first, as executive agent to manage the installation force protection (FP) program; and second, as local provider of a tactical base security capability. Within the scope of executive agency, SF should perform two principal functions: (1) FP program management – responsible for future operations planning, budgetary oversight, FP training, etc.; and (2) FP tactical advisor to the base commander – responsible for base-wide execution of current FP operations. As FP Executive Agent, SF would be responsible for coordinating broad functional area participation in FP planning and execution on behalf of the base commander (e.g., among medical professionals, disaster preparedness experts, civil engineers, etc.). In fact, despite formal statements of force protection as an installation commander’s responsibility, in practice most USAF locations already informally assign force protection “ownership” to the SF unit. As local provider of a tactical base security capability, SF would provide organic ground combat power to deter, prevent, and if necessary defeat Level II and III FP Threats (e.g., SOF, Sympathizers/ Saboteurs, and Agents/Terrorists). This function exploits unique SF core competencies (i.e., “things at which SF are – or can reasonably be expected to be – expert”) that do not exist in sufficient quantity elsewhere in the USAF.

Discussions of the SF role in FP also regularly fall prey to the gap between SF core competencies and the broad nature of FP. The fundamental flaw of SF role definition to date is the subconscious blending of SF tactical core competencies with their appropriate – but separate – role as FP Executive Agent. Consequently, SF core competencies have been too broadly

---

defined. The proposal outlined in this paper explicitly distinguishes between these roles, facilitating clear articulation of specific SF core competencies and corresponding tasks essential to countering our highest-risk threats. The advantage of this approach is that it acknowledges the broad array of SF and non-SF functions necessary to ensure positive FP, while simultaneously identifying a reasonably narrow set of unique SF tactical responsibilities to defeat the modern threat. From this basis, it is possible to directly identify core competencies and associated tasks essential for SF to effectively fulfill their role in modern force protection.

**SF Core Competencies and Essential Tasks**

The 1997 AF/SF White Paper argued that reducing specialization through the merger was just “a start” and that to complete the transition to an effective force protection capability “the Air Force must define every airman’s force protection duty.” However, the emphasis on “every airmen’s role” in force protection overlooked adequate definition of the *SF airman’s role*. Especially in a resource-limited environment, it is critical to orient SF capabilities precisely on the highest-risk threats, and that requires redefinition of SF functions (i.e., core competencies and tasks). The SF roles proposed in this paper suggest two corresponding sets of SF core competencies (CC) shown in Figure 14. In addition, some examples of subordinate essential tasks (ET) are included.

This redefinition of SF capabilities should be linked to a corresponding update of Force Protection tasks in the Air Force Task List (AFTL). Currently, Air Force Task 6.2, “Provide the Capability to Protect the Force,” is defined in part as “to organize, train, equip, provide, and plan for the use of forces to protect and defend our global engagement fighting potential….All Air

---

125 AF/SF, 6.
126 This list, developed based on the author’s experience, attempts to demonstrate the types of tasks essential to achieving stated core competencies; it is intended to be representative, not exhaustive.
Force people, regardless of career field, play a part in the protection of the force.”

- **ROLE I: FP Executive Agent** (executed primarily by SF Officers and Senior NCOs)
  - CC IA: FP Program Management
    -- ET (1): future operations planning
    -- ET (2): budgetary oversight
    -- ET (3): base-wide FP training
    -- ET (4): infrastructure hardening management
  - CC IB: FP Tactical Advisor to Base Commander
    -- ET (5): vulnerability assessment
    -- ET (6): local FP threat intelligence analysis
    -- ET (7): countermeasure development
- **ROLE II: Tactical Security Force Provider** (executed primarily by SF Junior Enlisted)
  - CC IIA: Weapons System Security
    -- ET (8): munitions/missile security
    -- ET (9): aircraft security
  - CC IIB: Antiterrorism Operations
    -- ET (10): base entry control
    -- ET (11): countersurveillance
    -- ET (12): mobile (local) response force
    -- ET (13): special event security
    -- ET (14): protective security operations (VIP protection)
  - CC IIC: Counterterrorism Operations
    -- ET (15): counter-sniper
    -- ET (16): hostage rescue
    -- ET (17): Explosive Ordnance Disposal

**Figure 14. Proposed SF Core Competencies and Essential Tasks**

definition is so broad as to be quite useless in identifying subtasks or measuring performance. For instance, the AFTL identifies five metrics for assessing task 6.2: (1) percent of forces organized for FP capabilities; (2) percent of forces trained for FP capabilities; (3) percent of forces equipped for FP capabilities; (4) percent of forces provided for FP capabilities; and (5) degree to which forces are capable of force protection. The “forces” referred to are not identified, and “force protection capabilities” are so broadly described as to defy meaningful

---

measurement. More importantly, the existing USAF FP task definition conflicts with clear assignment of roles, promoting functional confusion, task saturation, and systemic FP vulnerabilities. The AFTL should be amended to incorporate FP Executive Management and FP Tactical Security as two primary “capabilities tasks”, with USAF-level subtasks corresponding to the proposed Core Competencies. USAF Major Commands and Wings should develop supporting Mission Essential Task Lists tailored to their specific situation.

**Outsourcing Traditional SF Capabilities**

Diminishing resources and increasing requirements are a fact of life. The phrase “do more with less” implies increased efficiency, but in fact has resulted in task overload, task ineffectiveness, and recruiting and retention problems. In recognition of similar conditions throughout the US military, DoD envisions a “transformation” of the services to not only increase the “tooth-to-tail ratio” and increase efficiency, but to reduce overall functional requirements: “Only those functions that must be performed by DoD should be kept by DoD…The test will be whether a function is directly necessary to warfighting.”

The report offers the following functional criteria and execution categories:

1. Functions directly linked to warfighting and best performed by the federal government. In these areas, DoD will invest in the process and technology to improve performance.
2. Functions directly linked to warfighting capability that must be shared by the public and private sectors…
3. Functions not linked to warfighting and best performed by the private sector. In these areas, DoD will seek to privatize or outsource entire functions or define new mechanisms for partnerships with private firms or other public agencies.

---

129 The AFTL hierarchy is based on USAF core competencies, from which are derived supporting USAF capabilities tasks, lower-level USAF subtasks, and command- and base-specific Mission Essential Tasks Lists. In an effort to preserve existing AFTL syntax, “roles” proposed in this paper are recommended as “capabilities tasks” in the AFTL. See AFDD 1-1, i.
130 Rumsfeld, 51.
Similar criteria can be applied to the SF role in force protection to identify – within a zero-sum context – certain traditional SF functions best performed by non-SF units and agencies. Accordingly, this paper will identify candidate outsourcing functions that are (1) not directly linked to execution of the SF roles and core competencies proposed earlier; or (2) more efficiently performed by non-SF entities. Given existing resource constraints, such outsourcing ensures that force protection risk is managed at an acceptable level. In some cases, the reduction in task saturation will enable USAF to exploit significant economies of scale among other USAF units, sister services, and outside agencies. The list in Figure 15 highlights traditional SF functions that meet the outsourcing criteria, proposes appropriate outsourcing candidates, and identifies potential outsourcing mechanisms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Candidate Outsourcing</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Traffic Management</td>
<td>Civilian Police Departments</td>
<td>Establish Concurrent Jurisdiction on USAF Bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor Criminal Code Enforcement/Investigation</td>
<td>Civilian Police Depts.</td>
<td>Establish Concurrent Jurisdiction on USAF Bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony Criminal Investigation</td>
<td>AF Office of Special Investigations</td>
<td>Change governing Air Force Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Base Ground Defense (Level I FP Threats)</td>
<td>US Army forces</td>
<td>Clarify joint doctrine, re-write implementing directives, and establish viable JABGDWG, all in accordance with existing JSA 8.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are existing models of successful outsourcing of roles and functions in the manner proposed herein. For instance, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) has created a unique model.

---

132 The USAF defines “concurrent jurisdiction” as a jurisdictional area within which “a person who is subject to the [U.S. Military] code violates the code and the local criminal law. That act or omission could result in prosecution before a courts-martial, a proper civil tribunal, or in some cases, both. Under concurrent jurisdiction, a person subject to Article 2 of the UCMJ may be tried by courts-martial and by the local state civilian courts. There is rarely dual prosecution. Generally, Air Force policy precludes trying a person by courts-martial if convicted by a civilian court.” See U.S. Air Force Handbook (AFH) 31-218, Vol I, Law Enforcement Missions and Procedures (n.p., 1 September 1997), URL: <http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/pubfiles/af/31/afh31-218/afh31-218.pdf>, accessed 23 February 2002, 15.
occupational specialty and dedicated units for base defense – the RAF Regiment. This unit is similar in function to the USAF 820 SFG. However, whereas the USAF assigns ABD responsibility to standard SF units along with law enforcement and weapons system security functions, the RAF has a separate police force that handles such tasks. This arrangement enables the RAF Regiment and RAF Police to become highly proficient within their respective functional areas.

The time is ripe for reinvigorating languishing joint force protection support arrangements such as that embodied in JSA 8. The 2001 QDR called for a new “joint presence policy” that would “subsume the rotational overseas presence force of all military Services [and] establish steady-state levels of air, land, and naval presence in critical regions around the world. It will synchronize deployments of U.S. forces and facilitate cross-Service trades for presence and deterrence. It will also allow for better coordination in the readiness and tempo of operations of all U.S. forces.” Future deployments of expeditionary aerospace power can and should call on the U.S. Army to provide air base defense forces when the rear area threat estimate dictates a requirement. In addition, the Army can and should be assigned – as functional experts – the mission of steady-state air base defense for OCONUS MOBs that face a legitimate ongoing threat of conventional ground attack. This is not a new idea. In fact, the 1969 PACAF report on base defense in Southeast Asia concluded, “[c]larification of service roles and missions to specifically recognize USAF requirements for a limited ground combat defense mission in a limited war environment would appear to have a profound effect in long-range improvement of air base defense efforts in SEA.”

133 Rumsfeld, 33.
134 Lee, 5.
Organization, Training, Equipment, and Manpower

A clarified SF role in force protection will directly eliminate a number of longstanding impediments to SF operational effectiveness in four areas: organization, training, equipment, and manpower. First, under current arrangements, SF are employed in different ways based on their geographic location and according to whether they are operating in a peacetime, contingency, or wartime environment. Standard peacetime CONUS organization of SF units – similar to conditions in the 1960s – follows administrative lines rather than proven tactical principles. Present SF unit organization is ill-defined below the flight level and does not match planned organization for performing wartime functions. The proposed SF roles and functions will foster a common peacetime and wartime organization that emphasizes subunit integrity down to the squad and fire-team level. Furthermore, these roles will enhance readiness by reducing the need to reorganize deployable Unit Type Codes from conflicting home station organizational elements.

Second, the overall reduction in the breadth of essential tasks will stabilize training requirements. SF personnel will routinely execute tasks from every core competency for which they are responsible – every day at every location worldwide. Consequently, both sustainment training and upgrade training will be improved. Furthermore, accession training for new SF members will be improved by narrowing the scope of training requirements, enabling a greater depth and intensity of training. When they arrive at their first operational unit, new SF personnel will be ready to immediately perform duties, with a minimal of local familiarization training. The result will be increased task proficiency and efficiency, and a more expeditionary force.

Similarly, the new commonality of roles, functions, and tasks will eliminate the historic disparity between SF home station equipment and ABD-specific equipment. For example, SF
personnel in CONUS almost exclusively use police-style handheld radios, whereas at deployed
FOBs they use field radio sets that were designed for use in the harsher infantry-style tactical
environment. The common FP role proposed in this paper will simplify equipments
requirements by eliminating the functional disparity between “home station” and “deployed”
locations. Since SF functions will be the same in all scenarios, a common set of equipment can
be used, saving acquisition and maintenance costs, time, and manpower. These savings should
be reinvested in improving capabilities within the core competencies discussed earlier.

Finally, one of the key lessons of the USAF base defense experience in Vietnam was that a
contingency force provides only marginal improvement in overall defense posture. As
demonstrated earlier in this paper, the fundamental evolution of the modern threat to the EAF
calls for comprehensive adjustment across the SF career field. In the absence of wholesale
adjustment in the SF force structure, and lacking a clear definition of appropriate core
competencies to counter the new threat, re-establishment of the Combat Security Police
Squadrons in the form of the 820th SFG appeared to make a great deal of sense at the time.
However, with the benefit of hindsight, in recognition of the progressive emergence of the hyper-
asymmetric threat in the years since the Khobar Towers attack, and in a scarce resource era, the
820th solution no longer fits.

This paper recommends the dissolution of the 820th Security Forces Group concurrent with
the previous recommendation for US Army assumption of the Level I FP function – defending
USAF bases against conventional ground forces. The manpower and resources previously
invested in the 820th SFG should be reapportioned back into the mainstream SF force structure.
The force protection impact will be less visible than that of a readily identifiable specialized unit,
but the incremental increase in capability across the board will be far more meaningful in terms
of global USAF defenses against the modern threat. In the long run, our ability to protect against surprise, hyper-asymmetric attack will be far more robust.

**PART 6: CONCLUSION**

“Maybe we should not have been surprised on September 11th. Yet throughout history, people have been surprised not only by the timing of attacks, but by their character. All too often people focus on one threat or one possibility to the exclusion of all others, suffering from what one scholar of Pearl Harbor called ‘a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.’”

-- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

The force protection approach of trying to do everything and mastering little is passé. The global nature of the EAF requires due consideration of vulnerabilities at all USAF installations – not primarily those at OCONUS locations. This requirement is heightened by a modern hyper-asymmetric threat that has demonstrated true global reach. A rigorous analysis of the modern threat to the EAF, such as that offered in this paper, highlights the extant gap between the threat and SF force protection capabilities. Although a number of more appealing potential solutions exist, those posed in this paper attempt to account for a worst-case scenario of constrained resources. Even assuming some increase in resources available to wage the force protection effort, fiscal prudence will always require that we clearly prioritize threats, identify vulnerabilities, and structure forces to effectively engage the highest-risk adversary threats. The proposals in this paper will standardize SF unit organization, training, and equipment among all locations and employment scenarios, leading to increased efficiency, task proficiency, and improved force protection against the riskiest threat to the EAF. At the same time, the

---

clarification and streamlining of SF roles, core competencies, and essential tasks – together with the functional outsourcing already proposed – obviate the requirement for a “specialized” force protection unit, since baseline competencies of all SF forces will be improved.

Shortly before he left office, General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote that the Department of Defense is moving “toward balance in two key dimensions: between strategy and force structure, and between the demands of today and those of the future. Sustaining this balance is essential to ensuring that U.S. Armed Forces remain preeminent now and well into the 21st Century.”136 With respect to USAF force protection, this paper advocates an approach that will achieve such a balance.

There will be a “next” attack on the USAF, and it is only a matter of time until such an attack occurs in CONUS. The critical question for EAF force protection is whether by that time the USAF will have properly recognized changes in adversary capabilities and intentions, anticipated future developments, and made corresponding adjustments in SF force structure. The proposals outlined in this paper facilitate appropriate orientation of available SF resources on the modern threat, foster a breadth of expertise across the SF career field consistent with the EAF construct, and maximize resource efficiency within the SF force structure and throughout DoD. By adopting such an approach, the USAF can overcome the poverty of expectations and develop effective capabilities to protect the force.

136 Cited in Rumsfeld, 67.
JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT

USA – USAF AGREEMENT FOR THE
GROUND DEFENSE OF
AIR FORCE BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

This Agreement sets policies for the Departments of the Army and the Air Force for the ground defense of Air Force bases and installations.

The policies set forth in this Agreement will be used to guide appropriate Army and Air Force regulations, manuals, publications, and curricula. This Agreement also serves as a basis for future development of joint doctrine and supporting procedures for ground defense of Air Force bases and installations. It recognizes the Army’s fundamental role in land combat and the need to protect the Air Force’s ability to generate and sustain air power for joint airland combat operations. This Agreement is effective immediately and shall remain in effect until rescinded or superseded by mutual written agreement between the Army and the Air Force. It will be reviewed every two years.

JOHN W. WICKHAM, JR.                         CHARLES A. GABRIEL
General,                                                General,
United States Army                                      United States Air Force
Chief of Staff                                          Chief of Staff

1 Atch

137 Davis, 125-131.
JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT
ON
UNITED STATES ARMY – UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
GROUND DEFENSE OF
AIR FORCE BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

ARTICLE I

REFERENCES AND TERMS DEFINED

1. REFERENCES:


   b. JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 1984.


   e. AFR 206-2, Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations, and Activities, 22 September 1983.

   f. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, September 1984.

2. TERMS DEFINED:

   General: The following terms form the basis for the remaining articles of this agreement.

   a. Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD): Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attack directed against USAF air bases and installations.
b. **Base or Installation Boundary**: Normally the dividing line between internal and external defense. The exact location of the dividing line is subject to minor deviation from the local base boundary on a case by case basis to accommodate local conditions. Such delineations should be incorporated into appropriate OPLANS.

c. **Rear Battle**: For the purpose of this Agreement, rear battle consists of those actions taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation), singly or in joint effort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy forces in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles.

d. **Base**: A locality from which operations are projected or supported, or an area or locality containing installations that provide logistic or other mission support (JCS Pub 1).

e. **Base Defense**: The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base or installation so as to insure that the maximal capacity of its facilities is available to US forces (JCS Pub 1).

f. **Installation**: A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular functions. Installations may be elements of a base (JCS Pub 1).

g. **Level I Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by enemy-controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and terrorism.

h. **Level II Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces; raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units; and special mission or unconventional warfare (UW) missions.

i. **Level III Threat**: Enemy activity characterized by battalion size or larger heliborne operations, airborne operations, amphibious operations, ground force deliberate operations, and infiltration operations.
ARTICLE II

BACKGROUND

The references in Article I provide guidance to the Army and the Air Force on rear battle operations, including the ground defense of air bases and installations.

a. The Army has responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the conduct of sustained operations on land, specifically to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, secure, occupy, and defend land areas.

b. The Air Force base or installation commander is the officer responsible for the local ground defense of his base or installations (reference c). The forces of Services other than his own, assigned to his base or installation for the conduct of local ground defense, shall be under his operational control.

2. The Army has responsibility (reference d) for the provision of forces for ABGD operations outside designated Air Force base or installation boundaries.

3. Overseas, a variety of existing arrangements for ABGD are explicitly recognized by international agreements. In some countries, both within the NATO alliance and elsewhere, external ABGD is a host nation responsibility prescribed by status of forces agreements or separate negotiation. In other countries, responsibility is shared between the host nation and US Forces.

ARTICLE III

OBJECTIVE
The objective of this Agreement is to develop combat forces for ABGD to ensure Air Force sortie generation and missile launch capability. ABGD forces must be capable of:

a. Detecting and defeating Levels I and II attacks;

b.Delaying a Level III attack until the arrival of friendly tactical combat elements capable of defeating this level of attack.

ARTICLE IV

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Army and the Air Force will establish a Joint Air Base Ground Defense Working Group (JABGDWG). The tasks of the JABGDWG are to monitor, coordinate, examine, and report to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on the actions necessary to ensure the implementation of policies and preparation of forces for ABGD.

   a. The Army and the Air Forces will appoint co-chairmen for the JABGDWG. Support will be provided by functional staffs from the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and by the appropriate subordinate commands.

   b. The JABGDWG will conduct a yearly review of ABGD requirements in time for joint recommendations to be made in July of each year prior to the initiation of the following DOD POM cycle. This review will recommend specific planning and programming actions designed to ensure mutual support for respective service programs.

2. The Army and the Air Force are jointly responsible for:

   a. Participating in the JABGDWG.

   b. Developing joint doctrine for rear battle, to include ABGD.
c. Coordinating proposed changes in ABGD concepts, doctrine, and force structure.

d. Ensuring the provisions of this Agreement are addressed appropriately in operational and contingency plans to avoid any security degradation.

3. The Army is responsible for providing forces for ABGD operations outside the boundaries of designated USAF bases and installations.

   a. When assigned the ABGD mission to counter the level I and level II threats to specific USAF bases or installations, Army forces will be under the operational control of those Air Force base or installation commanders.

   b. Within 90 days of approval of this Agreement, the Army will provide a transition plan to the JABGDWG for a time-phase transfer of responsibility for external ABGD. Transfer will start 1 October 1985.

   c. The Army will initiate, where feasible, requests for host nations to provide ABGD external to Air Force bases and installations (except as noted in paragraph 4f below).

   d. The Army will provide multi-source intelligence on enemy ground forces for Air Force threat assessments and tactical counterintelligence efforts.

4. The Air Force will provide for physical security and internal defense within the boundaries of its bases and installations.

   a. Air Force base and installation commanders are responsible for the local ground defense of their installations.

   b. As dictated by the threat, environment, and availability of Army or host nation forces provided for external defense, the Air Force, in coordinating with the local ground force commanders, may employ external safeguards to provide early warning and detection of, and reaction to, enemy threats to air bases and installations.
c. The Air Force will provide the command, control, communication and intelligence (C³I) resources required by Air Force base and installation commanders to affect operational control of forces assigned to them for ground defense. C³I provided by both services in supporting rear battle operations will be interoperable.

d. The Air Force will lead in the collection of data and assessment of the overall threat to air bases and installations worldwide. It will retain the lead in Ground Combat Intelligence and Tactical Counterintelligence covering each ABGD area of influence, as defined in reference e.

e. The Air Force will submit requirements for ABGD to the Army, to include a list of locations to be defended, updated as required.

f. The Air Force will seek host nation commitment for ABGD in agreements relating to the use of Collocated Operating Bases (COBS) and Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs).

5. Army and Air Force delineations of responsibilities will not preclude the deployment of forces from either Service to support the other should the tactical situation dictate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works Cited

Secondary Accounts:


Primary Sources:


Government Publications:


**Other Sources:**


---

**Other Works Consulted**

**Government Publications:**

Secondary Accounts:


Memoirs by Participants and Biographies:

The Vietnam Security Police Association offers a variety of first hand participant accounts and unit location maps through its web site ([http://www.vspa.mil](http://www.vspa.mil)).