BALTIC SECURITY, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEFENSE REFORM: THE CHALLENGES OF OVERCOMMITMENTS AND OVERLAPS

by

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Security policy, NATO, European Union, Baltic Sea Region, Baltic States, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT

Within the European area, the Baltic Sea still is the region where multiple security organizations seek influence to enhance stability and peace. The European Union plans to enlarge into this region and the Baltic States\(^1\) are hot candidates for the next NATO enlargement. On the other hand, the Russian Federation still sees the region as “near abroad” and its “path to the west” and has declared the support of its minorities living there to be of vital interest. As a result, in the Baltic Sea region, the national interests of the U.S. touch those of the Russian Federation. Therefore, this area can be seen as being another crucial test bed for the future relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation.

The different security organizations dealing with the Baltic Sea have proved to be a guarantee for stability and peace. Although there are still overlapping and waste of efforts, the coordination between the supporting nations and the receiving nations on the one hand and between the different organizations on the other hand has clearly increased over the past years. These multiple initiatives try to help the Baltic nations in their effort to restructure their states and societies. But at the same time they slow down progress, because the organizational overhead is too big for the Baltic States.

During the time of the Soviet Union, all military, economic and political relations of the three Baltic Soviet Republics were directly to the center; there existed almost no mutual cooperation between them. This legacy is hard to overcome. Furthermore, after the Baltic States gained independence in the early '90s, a surge of nationalism went through them. As a consequence, opportunities for better cooperation were missed. But today the Baltic States are more willing to coordinate their efforts. Several military cooperation projects under the umbrella of the Baltic Security Assistance Group foster mutual understanding and cooperation.

\(^1\) The term “Baltic States” is used as a reference to the sub region consisting of the three states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, the use of the term “Baltic States” does not imply that the three states are to be treated as a single entity. It is clear that each state is sovereign and has a distinct history and legitimacy of its own.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Within the European area, the Baltic Sea still is the region where multiple security organizations seek influence to enhance stability and peace. The European Union plans to enlarge into the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic States are hot candidates for the next NATO enlargement.

One of the prime times of the region was during the Hanseatic League, which created a system of intense cooperation and shared prosperity. Later on European powers struggled for dominance until the Great Northern war 1700-1721 established Russia as the major Baltic player. After World War II the Baltic Sea region became a region of high tension.

From the viewpoint of the Baltic States, the West ignores them being separate states and treats them wrongly as one big state. Furthermore, military cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is made more difficult by the fact that the security situation in the Baltic Sea does not seem to be of primary importance to others than the three Baltic States themselves.

There are several overlapping institutions and organizations that deal with the Baltic Sea region. The Nordic council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, EU, NATO, OSCE etc. Additional Baltic Institutions are: Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council, Baltic Council of Ministers. On a regional level there exist e.g. the union of the Baltic Sea cities and the association of the Baltic Sea chambers of commerce.

There are positive as well as negative aspects of Baltic cooperation. It is flexible in its character and respects individual paces of the Baltic States in their way to EU and NATO, but it was very difficult to initiate Baltic cooperation, because there is no real history of it.

Today there are a lot of different initiatives that overlap and thus create a administrative overcommitment that the Baltic States cannot master. The Baltic Sea Council tried to streamline the different approaches and initiatives. On the military side the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) serves the purpose of coordinating the
international support for the three new independent Baltic nations. There are several
distinct initiatives under the BALTSEA umbrella. These projects proceed well, but the
transitional period of the Baltic States’ armed forces is not over yet.

After the decline of the Soviet Union the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania declared their independence and inherited large, mostly Russian minorities.
The issue of nationalism and its effects on the Russian speaking minorities proved to be
destabilizing for the region. Furthermore, this issue has gained importance because of the
planned NATO accession of the Baltic States and their future accession to the European
Union.

The history of the Baltic States under Soviet rule is still a taboo as far as Baltic
coop eration and collaboration is concerned and this helps to sustain the above-mentioned
simplification “Soviet equates Russian”. Out of fear of the Big Brother as well as disdain
for the Russian workers, Estonia and Latvia did not grant them civil rights in the mid
1990s. The resulting increase in Russian homeland nationalism again fueled the radical
powers in the Baltic States.

There was little cooperation between the Baltic States during Soviet time. Until
today there are forces in the Baltic States that resist cooperation with the excuse of
special national needs.

In the late 1980s the Baltic Soviet republics were known as the “Soviet West”.
Furthermore, Russia sought a strategic influence on NATO’s role in European security.
Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defense Reform

Throughout the Baltic region the emergence of soft security lead to more
cooperation. Weak performance of one Baltic State has negative repercussions for all.
The integration of Russia into the Baltic Sea security system is advancing.

Today the Baltic States are more willing to coordinate their efforts than they were
right after they had gained independence.

As the Baltic States became more stable and normality set in, the relations
towards Russia normalized too. Today it is without question that the Baltic Region’s
security can only be achieved with Russia as partner. It is generally accepted that the Baltic States will be invited to join NATO in fall of 2002. The problems of overstretching and over-commitment will not be solved by the act of accession to NATO. However, in time better management and the evolving administrative capabilities of the Baltic States will decrease the problems.

One possible solution is to integrate the national security structures firmly into NATO’s multinational structures. Thus the small Baltic States could gain a relatively high degree of influence and on the other hand would avoid the trap of developing nationalist movements in the military structures.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Baltic Sea region has been for centuries a focus point for trade, and international activity. Since the 9th century different peoples and nationalities have settled in the region. One of the prime times of the region was during the Hanseatic League, which created a system of intense cooperation and shared prosperity. Later on European powers struggled for dominance until the Great Northern war 1700-1721 established Russia as the major Baltic player.

After World War II the Baltic Sea region became a region of high tension. During the Cold War, with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, two military blocks faced each other full of mistrust.

Now, some 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea is developing into a “future EU lake”\(^2\) and has a chance to once again become a region of cooperation and shared prosperity.

Assessing the Security situation of the Baltic countries then U.S. secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated in a speech in Vilnius in July 1997: “…perhaps no part of Europe has suffered more from old pattern of geopolitics then the Baltic states… and no part of Europe will benefit more if we are successful in overcoming these old patterns and replace them with new habits of cooperation.”\(^3\)

The fast development of the region and its knotted skein of organizations and committees on the international, national, regional or even local level makes it very interesting for scholarly research. The effects of Baltic Security, NATO Enlargement and Defense Reform and the Challenges of Overcommitments and Overlaps influence the relation not only between local nations but also between the European Union (EU), NATO, Russia, and the USA.


Russia is still the major security concern for the Baltic States as was exemplified by then Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs in September 1996 when he said: “It is not easy to sleep next to elephants.”4 However, the relations between Russia and the Baltic States on a local plane as well as the relations to NATO and the EU seem to be improving after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 and the joint initiatives to counter worldwide terrorism.

Another issue concerning cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is the reappearance of nationalism in the wake of the Baltic States gaining independence. Coupled with it is the question of solving minority rights, especially that of the Russian speaking minorities in the newly independent states.

But also the old Soviet perception of politics as a “zero-sum game where one participant can win only as much as the rest of the players lose”5 still influences factions within the Baltic States and gives rise to nationalist tendencies.

From the viewpoint of the Baltic States, the West ignores them being separate states and treats them wrongly as one big state. Deputy Foreign Minister of Lithuania Vygaudas Ušackas, declared in a speech at the symposium on EU enlargement and Baltic Sea security in Helsinki on 12 October, 2000:

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have their own lives. They are, first of all, sovereign states with their own models of state administration and domestic policies. They had their own separate histories for centuries and were at times influenced by different factors. Again—needless to say—they have unique cultures, which, among other things, include jokes about one another.6

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A. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of the thesis is to promote the scholarly debate about the effects of the overlapping of different security systems around the Baltic Sea. As the author—in his previous assignment in the German MOD—has been the German representative in the Baltic Security Assistance Group – Working Group (BALTSEA WG), the research for this thesis helped to gain a deeper personal understanding of the underlying processes.

The Thesis will show that the different security systems around the Baltic Sea have proved to be a guarantee for stability and peace. Although there are still overlapping and waste of efforts, the coordination between the supporting nations and the receiving nations on the one hand and between the different organizations on the other hand has clearly increased over the past years. During the time of the Soviet Union, all military, economic and political relations of the Baltic Soviet Republics were directly to the center; there existed almost no cooperation between them. This heritage is hard to overcome.

Following research questions will be addressed:

Are these multiple initiatives helpful for the Baltic nations—this means more effective support in their effort to restructure their states and societies? Or are they a hindrance to progress, because the organizational overhead is too big for the Baltic States?

After the Baltic States gained independence in the early '90s, a surge of nationalism went through them. Are the Baltic States today willing to coordinate their efforts, or does nationalism still prevent a close cooperation?

The evolution of post-Soviet security and defense structures in the Baltic Sea region is one of the great challenges since the demise of the Soviet Union. Are the evolving new structures a chance for cooperation?
B. AREA OF RESEARCH

This thesis attempts to bring scholarship and direct personal knowledge together. To reach this goal, scholar works, articles, and sources from the Internet, the German Fachinformationszentrum der Bundeswehr – the information center of the German armed forces, and direct information from German military advisers in the Baltic region are used to gain a better insight into actual problems.

C. THESIS CONTENTS

The second chapter of this thesis deals with the overlapping of different security systems such as NATO, EU, OSCE, Russia-Europe, Nordic council and Baltic Sea council etc and its effects on cooperation. It will analyze the positive and negative effects of overlapping systems and address the efforts to streamline the Baltic cooperation. For the military support and cooperation the initiatives under the umbrella of the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) are described with their external and internal problems. The chances of the BALTSEA process are also evaluated.

The third chapter addresses the effects of nationalism and the resulting minority problems in the Baltic States on cooperation and security. After a short overview over the history of the Baltic States, the beginnings of nationalist movements are described. The Russification attempts of Tsarist Russia created a resistance and a closing of ranks within the Baltic States. Then I will show the development of minorities since the 1920s and the perception of Russians in the eyes of the Baltic population. Russian nationalism and nationalism in the Baltic States are addressed later in the chapter. The effects of nationalism on cooperation and western reactions to counter nationalism especially the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia are shown. The chapter closes with some remarks on the normalization of Russian-Baltic relation and a short conclusion.

The fourth chapter analyzes the evolution of post-Soviet security and defense structures. They are a chance to achieve more cooperation within the whole region. To start with, the development of Russia’s northwestern security strategy and its implications for the Baltic Sea region are discussed.
The next point analyzes the Nordic approach to Baltic Sea security. After a short history, the Nordic security concepts are described.

Another issue is the development of Estonia’s security structures after the declaration of independence. The military and the civil control thereof are used as *pars pro toto* for all the Baltic States. Notwithstanding their sovereignty and individuality, the basic transformation problems from Soviet style to Western style structures are the same in all three Baltic States.

The next point deals with the effects these transformations have on cooperation. The chapter ends with a short conclusion.

Chapter five is the conclusion. It shows that the overlapping of the different security systems leads to overstretching of the Baltic States, because their administration still is to small and inexperienced. Because they try to please everybody they fail with the implementation of the agreed upon activities and reforms. Another point is that nationalism slowed down cooperation within the Baltic States in the mid 1990s. And still today there are factions within the political landscape that dwell on nationalism, although its influence is diminishing. The developing western style security systems present a chance for the Baltic region to develop into a center of cooperation and shared prosperity.
II. THE OVERLAPPING OF DIFFERENT SECURITY SYSTEMS SUCH AS NATO, EU, OSCE, RUSSIA-EUROPE, NORDIC COUNCIL AND BALTIC SEA COUNCIL ETC. AND ITS EFFECTS ON COOPERATION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the topic of overlapping security systems around the Baltic Sea. During the Cold War the Baltic Sea region held a very high strategic value. The Soviet Union regarded the Baltic Sea as a *mare nostrum* and had with its harbor in Kaliningrad a stronghold in the “backyard of NATO”. After the declarations of independence by the three Baltic States in 1991 and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region lost its central strategic value. However, in the years to come some 95% of the coastal line of the Baltic Sea will be a part of the European Union, the more than 50 million people living there will produce more than 33% of the economy of Europe. With Russia’s declaration to expand her relationship with the Union, “the Baltic Sea has been called a future ‘inner EU lake.’”

Since the newly gained independence of the three Baltic States, a multitude of efforts for closer cooperation in the Baltic Sea region have led to a knotted skein of organizations and committees on the national, regional or even local level.

The British weekly “The Economist” declared these multilateral activities to be a “paper-mountain and lots of hot air” that often can be traced back to pure self-promotion of the initiators. Furthermore, military cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is made more difficult by the fact that the security situation in the Baltic Sea does not seem to be of primary importance to others than the three Baltic States themselves. If you look at

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7 “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Jürgen Koppelin, Dr. Helmut Haussmann, Ulrich Irmer, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der F.D.P.,” *Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 14/4026*, 30 August 2000, 1.


9 “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage…,” 1.

10 *The Economist* as cited in “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage…,” 2.
all the other states in the region, with the possible exception of Poland, security is not the topmost priority of any of them.11

The central thesis of this chapter is that the Baltic States have very limited administrative capabilities (both military and political).12 As a result, the overlapping and the multitude of non-coordinated initiatives lead to over-commitment of the Baltic States. Too much effort is spent attending the different conferences and working groups, therefore limiting the ability to implement the results of the conferences. Furthermore, the different initiatives often have different standard operating procedures (SOPs) and different objectives thus decreasing overall efficiency. The result is that the Baltic States are not able to fully benefit of the help they are offered.

B. OVERLAPPING ZONES OF INTEREST OR RESPONSIBILITY

There are several institutions and organizations that deal with the Baltic Sea region in an overlapping manner. On the political plane there are:

- The Nordic Institutions consisting of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. These institutions have a long tradition dealing with economic and soft security issues.

- The Council of the Baltic Sea States. Founded in 1992, it enhances stability and economic prosperity through cooperation. One of the main goals is the political, economic and cultural strengthening of the region with activities of the regional or sub-regional level. Security issues are neither excluded nor explicitly included.

- Even though EU and WEU are almost completely fused13, they still have different members and have to be mentioned separately. The three Baltic

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13 Before the WEU can be dissolved entirely, some legal problems have to be solved. There is the question of the associate members Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey; and the two organizations West European Armaments Group (WEAG) and its executive organ the West
States are possible candidates for the next EU enlargement. Especially Estonia has been granted “first round”-candidate status and is currently negotiating the terms of accession.

- NATO with its Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). The three Baltic States are members of PfP, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and also possible candidates for the next NATO enlargement.\footnote{Katja Ridderbusch, “Bald sieben neue NATO-Staaten,” \textit{Die Welt}, 15 May 2002, available online from http://www.welt.de/daten/2002/05/15/0515eu332011.htx.}


- Additional Baltic Institutions are: Baltic Assembly, Baltic Council, Baltic Council of Ministers. These institutions are built after their Nordic role models.

- The conference of the sub-regions.

- The union of the Baltic Sea cities.

On the non-governmental plane there are many initiatives—including but not limited to:

- The Association of the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce.

- Several harbor treaties

- The so-called Social Hansa.

- Furthermore, there are a multitude of multilateral, border crossing projects for cooperation e.g. the cultural “Ars Baltica”, regional information highways, environmental projects and youth and student exchanges.\footnote{Ausra Park and Trevor C. Salmon, “Evolving Lithuanian security options in the context of NATO, WEU and EU responses,” \textit{European security}, 8 (1999), 21 June 1999, 122.}
The following table 1 shows NATO and EU members plus participating nations in the BALTSEA process and their membership in security organizations. It can be easily imagined how difficult the relations between the different organizations are, because all the nations dealing with security around the Baltic Sea are members of different organizations.

At first glance two different types can be discriminated: those with military and non-military dimension. The fact that the borders are blurred adds to the difficulties. On the more military side there is NATO, and there are the non-aligned states. On the non-military side there are the Nordic group and the EU. The WEU, although it is in the process of being incorporated in the EU at the moment, still has its own set of rules and gives the EU a distinct military option as well.

In the everyday business this means for the Baltic States that they have to deal with completely different sets of rules, treaties and SOPs. If Estonia for example has to deal with Germany it has to follow different rules depending whether it is a NATO issue, a EU or—with respect to arms cooperation—still a WEU issue. When dealing with Denmark it is even more complicated. Is it a NATO issue, a EU issue or perhaps a WEU issue18 or can the problem be addressed within the Nordic framework?

Within a conference where the participating nations belong to “overlapping institutions” it sometimes is very hard to find the common basis from which to start. To give a short example: the issue of validity of driving permits for members of armed forces can be approached on basis of the EU acquis communitaire, NATO’s Standard of Forces Agreements, or a new set of bilateral treaties.

Furthermore, the Baltic Sea nations’ different memberships in international organizations, and defense alliances or their affiliations with these organizations, hinder an effective cooperation on the military sector.19

17 “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage…,” 1.
18 Denmark being an observer of the “political” WEU—but a full member in the WEU’s still remaining and working sub-organizations as WEAG and WEAO.
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<th>NATO</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.  NATO and EU states (plus BALTSEA participants) and their membership in some of the different organizations that deal with the Baltic Sea region.25-26

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20 All European NATO nations are full members of WEU’s armament organizations WEAO / WEAG.

21 The Baltic States are invited to negotiations in the format 5+3.

22 France participates not fully in NATO’s integrated military structure.

23 EEA stands for European Economic Area; Iceland and Norway are European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members and are granted this “quasi-member-status” of “EU-associates.”

24 Russia is a member of the newly created NATO-Russia Council, which has replaced the existing NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This new forum will “operate on the principle of consensus”, allowing NATO members and Russia to work “as equal partners in areas of common interest while preserving NATO's prerogative to act independently”, Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik, Iceland, 14-15 May 2002, available online from http://www.nato.int.


C. ASPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BALTIC STATES.

1. Positive Aspects

Baltic cooperation is flexible in its character and respects individual paces of the Baltic States in their way to EU and NATO. The co-operation dates back to 1934 with the signing of the treaty of “Good Understanding and Co-operation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Geneva.” After they regained their independence the Baltic States began their cooperation, as it exists today. There are many initiatives at different levels such as:

The Baltic Assembly is a structure for co-operation among the three parliaments with a secretariat in Riga and convenes twice a year. Although its resolutions are not legally binding, it nevertheless serves as a forum for preparing documents of cooperation.

The Baltic Council of Ministers was established in 1994. It serves to facilitate co-operation between the governments and meets twice a year. It has several committees dealing with topics from Foreign Affairs to Culture.

The Baltic Council meets every spring as a joint session of the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council of Ministers. Reports are prepared to show the status of the co-operation between the States.

Within these Initiatives the Baltic nations coordinate their efforts and try to define their common positions.

2. Negative Aspects

It was very difficult to initiate Baltic cooperation, because there is no real history of Baltic cooperation. Even in the interwar period of the first sovereign Baltic republics, cooperation was the exception, not the rule.

Despite the existing military treaty, military co-operation between Estonia and Latvia was really very meager…. During the whole period of their independence [between WWI and WWII], the Baltic States were not able
to agree upon common defence plans in case of a threat. The self-interests of each state seemed to be more important than the common interests.28

Forty years of Soviet occupation established only relations to the center, whereas cooperation between the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union was not encouraged.

Shortly after the Baltic States regained their independence, the newly established economic ties degraded to mere lip service. “These days [1993] the rhetoric of cooperation is merely a whisper. And the reality of it is virtually nonexistent. There are three separate currencies, customs posts on the borders, and no joint projects. The trade between them remains a minuscule percentage, by some estimates less than 5 percent, of their overall commerce.”29 In 1999 Gerd Föhrenbach observed that the multitude of tri-and multilateral initiatives does not mean that there is a working cooperation. In real life the governments often pursue different goals and do not coordinate with their neighbors.30

“Tensions and disputes began to surface among the three Baltic States. Mechanisms for implementing the programmes [sic!] were lacking; disputes concerning customs regulations, visa requirements, and sea border delimitation became serious hurdles; and, existing trilateral institutions became semi-dormant.”31 After the meeting of the Baltic prime ministers in June 1997, the strains in the relationship became official, as the meeting ended without a joint statement in support of Baltic cooperation.32

Even the cooperation with the Nordic states in the format 5+3 was not very successful, especially in the realm of security. “Finland and Sweden promoted the idea of neutrality, while the other three Scandinavian states supported the Baltic aspiration to become members of NATO.”33

31 Ausra Park and Trevor C. Salmon, 107.
32 Ibid., 107.
33 Ibid., 107.
Military cooperation had no priority with the Baltic States. The more the Baltic States were sure about the Russian acceptance of their full independence, the more the enthusiasm to commonly established military elements and cooperation in security issues decreased. As a result, after 1995, the common military activities of the Baltic States are more because of the efforts of outside nations who—by joining the activities—quasi enforce their implementation. And finally, on 23 January 1996 the defense ministers of the Baltic republics informed the European public that they had abandoned their plans for a military alliance.

The International Defence Advisory Board (IDAB), created in 1995 according to the wishes of the Baltic States, points out some problems in its final report. The consequences of the Soviet occupation created “a culture demanding conformity not initiative, control not delegation, compartmentalization not co-operation, and secrecy not transparency.” In addition, the report mentions structural problems in the administration and governments of the three States. “Deeper down, at the very heart of governance, we see a lack of effective co-ordination which could have serious adverse effects if the system were put under strain, either through the heightening of internal risk or through major civil emergency.”

D. THE EFFORTS TO STREAMLINE BALTIC COOPERATION

The Baltic Sea Council tried to streamline the different approaches and initiatives. Germany when it took the chair of the Baltic Sea Council, 1 July 2000, was committed to create tight links between the multilateral regional cooperation and the activities of the European Union. While creating coherence, what matters most is that regional cooperation, e.g. within the context of the Baltic Sea Council, understands itself as a complement and a bridge of the European Union with its programs towards non-members.... [In addition,] the political intentions, that are summarized in the action-plan “Nordic

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36 Ibid.
dimension” will be picked up by the Baltic Sea Council; and an understanding about common priorities will be achieved.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1998, during the Nyborg summit, a secretariat for the Baltic Sea Council was institutionalized. Its tasks are to provide technical and organizational help for the chairmen of the committee of high representatives of the Baltic Sea Council and the three working groups. Therefore, it shall create continuity and foster a more intense coordination of the Baltic Sea Council itself, create and maintain the documentation and the database of the Council and implement the public relations- and information-strategy. In addition, it has to maintain contacts with other organizations that are active in the Baltic Sea region and the agencies of the member nations.\textsuperscript{38}

During the Baltic Sea summit in Kolding, in April 2000, the heads of state decided to bring the complete regional cooperation of the participating countries under the umbrella of the Baltic Sea Council. The hope is to enhance the flow of information and create transparency without creating further bureaucratic overhead.\textsuperscript{39}

E. THE BALTSEA PROCESS

1. Overview Over the Initiatives Under the BALTSEA Umbrella

The BALTSEA PROCESS has several fora on the ministerial level. 17 nations neighboring the Baltic Sea or interested in helping the Baltic States are members of one or more of the fora. The nations are\textsuperscript{40}: BEL, CAN, CHE, DNK, DEU, EST, FIN, FRA, GBR, ISL, LVA, LTU, NDL, NOR, POL, SWE and USA. The goal of BALTSEA is to help the Baltic States to develop into stable democracies through military help, joint programs and “coaching”. Ultimate goal is a “baltification” of the initiatives—in the end all the initiatives for cooperation shall be run by the Baltic States themselves.

The BALTSEA process consists of six initiatives:

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{37} “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage…,” 5.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 6-7.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{40} Country abbreviations are used according to ISO 3166.
BALTSEA: The Baltic Security Assistance Group serves the purpose of coordinating the international support for the three new independent Baltic nations. Normally there are at least three meetings scheduled per year. The chair of the Group changes every September. Since the year 2000 FIN provides the chairman and the secretary of the group. A subgroup named BALTSEA Working Group (BWG) gathers and screens information through use of a web-based database the Baltic Information Database (BID). The goal is to recognize overlapping and shortfalls within the different fields of support and to coordinate with the supporting nations and the receiving nations.41

BALTRON: The goal of the Baltic Naval Squadron is to enhance maritime cooperation and skills; and to enable the Baltic States in the future to participate in peace missions, minesweeping and search and rescue missions. It has reached the level of common fleet exercises within the Baltic Sea. Under the German chairmanship training and education on board of the minesweepers and in the newly established tactical/technical training center have reached a high level. The BALTRON steering group is now held dormant and even the working group reduces its work more and more to consulting functions. In toto, the BALTRON is successful in its “baltification” e.g. in the gradual turnover of responsibility to the Baltic States.42

BALTNET: The Baltic Air Surveillance Network shall enable the Baltic States to guard their airspace. It shall provide a recognized air picture for civilian and military purposes. Although it has achieved a high status of readiness, it will reach full operational capabilities only after the procurement of new Radar systems. The Steering group under Norwegian Chairmanship has been dormant since Feb. 2000.43

BALTDEFCOL: The Baltic Defence College is located in Tartu in Estonia and has started its regular courses in August 1999. It is meant to provide higher military education (field-grade officers or comparable civilian employees) for all military personnel and civilian members of the ministries of defense of the three Baltic States.

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43 Ibid., 6.
The supporting states have detached teachers, administrators and provided teaching material. Within the next five to ten years the Baltic States are meant to take over the BALTDEFCOL.44

BALTBAT: The Baltic Battalion was commissioned 1994 as the common Baltic States’ asset for peacekeeping missions. A light infantry battalion with some 720 personnel, it has already participated (even if only with a company deployed) in the NATO peacekeeping mission SFOR. Under the chairmanship of Denmark the BALTBAT is restructured to ensure higher efficiency. Three national “feeder battalions” shall guarantee a high status of readiness and especially full personnel strength.45

BALTCCIS: The Baltic Command Control Information System is a German proposal of 2001. It consists of a digital backbone network that covers the three Baltic States. Within this network, different services such as personnel management, logistics, air surveillance, e-mail etc. can be implemented in a modular approach.46

2. External Problems for the BALTSEA Process

The most basic external problems for the BALTSEA Process stem from the overlapping of the different Security Organizations and Institutions, activities as mentioned above. These problems can be split up into several groups. One of the issues is that within the different organizations there are distinct Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) that are not compatible with each other.

For example, in the Estonia Defence Forces (EDF) different level English language courses are conducted. “During the years 2000-2001 almost 190 military personnel participate [sic!] in courses in Tartu and Pärnu conducted by [the Military Educational System] MEE, of whom as of May 2001 103 have received STANAG47

44 Bericht Sonderbeauftragter Zusammenarbeit Ost, 8.
47 STANAG stands for Standardization Agreement. English tests include hearing, reading, writing, and talking and are conducted according to STANAG 6001. Participants receive a rating according to the Standardized Language Profile (SLP).
certificates.” Previously, Estonia had conducted all its English testing in the armed forces according to the US Department of Defense tests, because of its orientation towards and language laboratories donated by the USA. They faced problems with the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and participation in NATO peacekeeping missions, because the NATO Standardized Language Profile (SLP) system of English tests is incompatible to the national US tests. Switching from one test system to another seems not very troublesome, but given the administrative constraints there are profound problems. They start with the task of creating a whole new set of tests that comply with STANAG standards. Then teachers must be familiarized and trained. Curriculums for the preparatory classes and teaching materiel have to be changed too. And given the numbers of personnel to be trained this area is critical to the EDF.

This example shows that even when organizations as NATO, Nordic Council etc. do not actively compete with each other the mere fact of their different approaches and SOPs creates more workload for the Baltic States.

Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, the commander of the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) in Tartu stresses another point in his assessment.

In some cases important advice from a NATO authority representative is directly contrary to earlier advice coming from another senior alliance representative. The reason may be that the advice mirrors the immediate concerns of some alliance members instead of aiming to encourage steps that would support the membership of the three states.49

Additionally there is the issue of sensitive or secure information that creates problems when members of the same Working Group cannot share their information, because they are from countries without a security agreement.

Another issue is the partnership between Finland and Estonia on the one hand and Poland and Lithuania on the other. These special relations—although not at all offensive by nature, intention or outcome—create problems for the co-operation. The reason is that Estonia and Lithuania hope to gain special help and advantages in the process of NATO


and EU accession from their partners, and are not quite willing to share these within the group of three of them as Baltic States. Lithuanian Vice Minister of National Defence Dr. P. Malakauskas, acknowledged in a speech to the Foreign Defence Attaché Association in Vilnius in 2000, “still, even now, cases occur when the parties in the Baltic cooperation behave as if it were a zero-sum game where one participant can win only as much as the rest of the players lose.”

Finally there are the different initiatives within NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) itself. As with the membership in the regional organizations mentioned above, BALTSEA nations are involved in different levels of PfP. As a result the nations do not have the same experience with the PfP and they often refer to different procedures. This lack of common references to SOP further slows down negotiations.

3. Internal Problems of the BALTSEA Process

In addition to the external problems, there are also internal obstacles. In the beginning of the BALTSEA process the donating nations did not coordinate their efforts sufficiently. Between the donating states there even was a “rivalry in Baltic cooperation efforts.” A Danish Officer sees “a touch of competition” between Sweden and Denmark for the leading role in the Baltic Sea cooperation.

Brigadier General Clemmesen states that “there have been too many cases of supporting states’ representatives actively undermining each other’s support projects, creating serious problems and delays for the Baltic state.” These extreme results of the lack of coordination between donating states belong to the past as the donating countries try to share the financial burdens through better coordination.


One of the most challenging problems within the system of BALTSEA is the downsizing of military forces and budgets of the supporting countries. This has two diametrical effects. On the one hand more surplus material is donated to the Baltic States. On the other hand less personnel can be send to assist, less money can be spent to support the running costs of the donated material. One of the results is, that although there is more material available, the Baltic States do not have enough money to cover the lifecycle costs or to buy spare parts to maintain it in working condition.

Another point is the old Soviet thinking of secrecy and mistrust that prevails in parts of the armed forces and the ministries. Soviet trained officers are still the majority of the field grade officers and they have problems adjusting to the new procedures of openness and information sharing.

The absence of a functioning personnel management system—be it computerized or manual—leads to the fact that human resources are used inefficiently within the armed forces of the Baltic States. This is especially regrettable because officers trained in Western nations cannot be tracked and adequately used as multipliers.

In addition there exists a motley mixture of material, doctrines and differently trained personnel in the armed forces. As several countries donated huge amounts of material and trained personnel in their respective doctrines and procedures, the Baltic States have now the gargantuan tasks of first creating their own procedures and then integrating all different existing methods into one.

The above-mentioned internal problems can be summarized into one: the armed forces of each of the Baltic States are overstretched. The multitude of critical tasks to be performed simultaneously leads to shortfalls and inefficiency. The transitional period of the armed forces of the Baltic States is not over yet.

4. **Chances of the BALTSEA Process**

In the last few years promising results with BALTDEFCOL, BALTRON and BALTBAT were achieved, leading to progress in the baltification of the three initiatives. At the same time regional cooperation is growing through combined and joint exercises
and training. The first graduates of the BALTDEFCOL have returned to their duties creating the first stages of an alumni-network of understanding. The supporting nations are coordinating their efforts through the BALTSEA Working Group and have changed their help from one-time donation to lifecycle help. This help consists of training, donations of spare parts and even high-level maintenance for material abroad.

During the last year Poland offered the Baltic States advice resulting of its special experiences with NATO accession. These insights and lessons learned proved to be very helpful in dealing with everyday problems. Furthermore it marked the beginning of normalization in the relations between Poland and Lithuania.

F. CONCLUSION

To draw a bottom line, the network of security systems around the Baltic Sea has proved to be a guarantee for stability and peace. Although there are still overlapping activities and a waste of efforts the co-ordination between the supporting nations and the receiving nations on the one hand and between the different organizations on the other hand has increased clearly over the past years. For the Baltic States this means more effective support in their effort to restructure their states and societies.

Over the past years coordination between the donating nations has increased and thus the offers to the Baltic States are better manageable for them. Also the shortfalls and inefficiency produced by the overstretched of their armed forces will decrease over time, as normality sets in and more trained personnel will be available.

In spite of all the above-mentioned problems and shortfalls, there is no alternative for the Baltic States to intensive regional co-operation to stabilize the region and to maintain a stable economy. Solely national or bi-national developments belong to the past simply because the Baltic States are too small and cannot afford wasting money and efforts.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM AND THE RESULTING MINORITY PROBLEMS IN THE BALTIC STATES ON COOPERATION AND SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the 9\textsuperscript{th} century, different peoples and nationalities have settled the Baltic region. This can be clearly seen by the different languages that are spoken in this region and the mixed settlements of the different peoples.\textsuperscript{54,55} When the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declared their independence from the Soviet Union, they inherited large, mostly Russian speaking minorities. The question of these minorities in regard to “nationalizing” nationalism\textsuperscript{56} of the Baltic States and homeland nationalism\textsuperscript{57} of the Russian Federation (RF) is still unsolved. These two conflicting forms of nationalism are the cause for the strained relations between each of the Baltic states and the Russian Federation. Furthermore, this issue has gained importance because of the planned NATO accession of the Baltic States and their future accession to the European Union.

This chapter will provide a short overview over the history of Baltic nationalism and the resulting minority problems. In addition it will emphasize the current prevailing perception of each other, the Baltic States and the Russian Federation, for to show, that despite all differences the Baltic States will have to solve their minority problems together with Russian Federation in order to stabilize the region. Furthermore, prove will be given that nationalism has hindered a deeper cooperation between the Baltic States.


\textsuperscript{56} Form of nationalism found in newly independent states. It uses state power to strengthen the weak “core nation”. The justification is seen in the period of “occupation” by other nationalities. See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 5

\textsuperscript{57} Form of a transborder nationalism. A neighboring state reserves the right to support, monitor, and protect the minorities of its ethnonational kin in other states. See Rogers Brubaker, 5.
B. SHORT OVERVIEW OVER THE HISTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES.

1. Estonia

Estonia\textsuperscript{58} came in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century under the rule of Kiev Duke Jaroslav. In the 13\textsuperscript{th} century the Order of German Knights conquered the region and began Christianization of the Danes and Estonians. In the 16\textsuperscript{th} century the region came under Swedish rule until after Czar Peter I. won over the Swedish King Carl XII. With the peace of Nystad, 1721, the region became part of the Russian empire.\textsuperscript{59,60} Under Russian rule the autonomy of Estonia—the German knight order still had a big influence—was gradually reduced. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century a strong policy of russification started. The Russian revolution of 1905 saw heavy uproars and fierce fights that were eventually crushed by the government. After WWI in the very night from 24 to 25 February 1918—between the departure of the Red Army and the arrival of the German troops—the independence of Estonia was proclaimed.\textsuperscript{61} After Germany capitulated, the Red Army returned but was temporarily defeated by Estonian forces. In the peace of Dorpat, 2 February 1920, Soviet Russia recognized the independence of Estonia.

With the Hitler-Stalin pact, 23 August 1939 and its secret amendment, Estonia fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. In June 1940 Soviet troops invaded Estonia that became a Soviet republic on 6 August 1940. Vast Soviet deportations in 1941 and 1944 as well as the German occupation from 1941 to 1944 took a heavy toll on Estonian intelligentsia and farmers.\textsuperscript{62,63}

2. Latvia

In the 12\textsuperscript{th} century the Christianization of the pagan tribes began. Starting in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century the Order of German Knights and the German Order ruled the region. After

\textsuperscript{58} The name Estonia is used for better reference to the territory of the later Estonian state.

\textsuperscript{59} Bertrand Hudault, 66.

\textsuperscript{60} “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”, Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut & F.A. Brockhaus AG, 2000, Software.


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 178.

\textsuperscript{63} “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”
the fall of the order-state in the 16th century, parts fell to Poland and to Sweden. Since the 18th century the whole territory belonged to Russia. A Latvian national government proclaimed independence on 18 November 1918.64 Shortly after, in December 1918 a Soviet government consisting of émigré Latvians proclaimed the independence and had vast parts of the region occupied by the Red Army. During the following year the national government could re-conquer most parts of the land and the renewed declaration of independence was accepted by Soviet Russia with the treaty of Riga in August 1920.65

After a coup d'état in 1934 Latvia was under authoritarian rule. On 5 August 1940—one day prior to Estonia—Latvia was forced to join the Soviet Union.

During the occupation by Nazi-Germany the Jewish population was mostly killed.

After the re-conquest of Latvia by the Red Army in 1945 some 115,000 Latvians fled to the west. Small Latvian units waged a long guerilla war against the new occupation troops. In 1949 some 43,000 farmers were deported in the verge of forced collectivization.66

3. Lithuania

In the beginning of the 9th century the Lithuanian tribes were forced north by the Slavs and settled down in the region. Duke Mindaugas unified the tribes in 1240, but after his assassination in 1263 the land split up again.67

In the 14th and 15th century Lithuania68 was a vast kingdom that reached till the Oka and Dnjepr rivers in the east. After converting to Christianity, Archduke Jagaila married the Polish princess Hedwig and became King Wladyslav II. The then joined Polish and Lithuanian armies defeated the Order of German Knights in the battle of

64 Anatol Lieven, 423.
65 “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”
66 Ibid.
67 Bertrand Hudault, 68.
68 The name Lithuania is used for both states, the medieval and the modern, knowing that their territories differ vastly.
Tannenberg in 1410. In the following decades more and more Lithuanian regions were lost to the pushing Russian empire.

With the three divisions of Poland 1772, 1773 and 1775 between Austria, Prussia and Russia, the eastern parts of Lithuania came to Russia and the northwestern part came to Prussia.\textsuperscript{69}

In 1915 German troops occupied Lithuania. With German consent, Lithuania proclaimed its independence on 11 December 1917 and once more on 16 February 1918.\textsuperscript{70} After an attempt to annex Lithuania failed, Soviet Russia accepted Lithuanian independence in 1920.

In 1926 a coup d'état brought Lithuania under authoritarian rule. In 1939 Germany forced Lithuania to give up the Memelland. In 1940 Soviet troops occupied the land and Lithuania was forced to join the Soviet Union on 3 August 1940. Immediately afterwards the deportation of the intelligentsia began. Following the events of World War II, Lithuania was occupied by Nazi-Germany. During that time 95\% of the Jews were killed.

The invasion of the Red Army in 1944 started an emigration wave to the west; the following guerilla warfare against the “new occupant” was extremely fierce and bitter. Some 60,000 people were killed.\textsuperscript{71}

C. THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

In the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century various nationalities settled in the Baltic region. Of these minorities the German was the most dominant, but between 1850s and 1920s the influence and numbers of Estonian and Latvian minorities were growing faster and overtook that of the other minorities.

The nationalist movements constituted themselves in the form of national clubs and newspapers in Riga, Reval and Dorpat. The Estonian singers movement gained

\textsuperscript{69} F.W. Putzger, 116.
\textsuperscript{70} Anatol Lieven, 423.
\textsuperscript{71} “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”
growing influence. The nationalist Estonians and Latvians were primarily fighting for equal rights in regard to the German minority—mostly the Junker and knights.

1. Russification

Beginning with the late 19th century there were several russification campaigns. E.g. Russian was made the only official language for courts and subsequently German judges and lawyers—who spoke no Russian—were expelled. The new appointed Russian speakers, however, were completely inexperienced with the German law they had to use.

In 1887 the school system including the universities were russified, the Estonian and Latvian languages were classified as dialects.

During the Russian revolution of 1905, heavy fighting took place in the Baltic region. Revolutionary nationalists mostly killed German landlords and burned their estates. The Russian army, as retaliation, burned villages. This led to extreme strains between the Baltic and German minorities.

After World War II famine and revolution raged once more through the region. But after the fighting German and Baltic minorities found themselves united against the Communists.

2. Development of the Minorities from the 1920s Until Today

The following tables describe the development of the minorities beginning with the 1920s until today. The figures need some explanations though. Due to the data available the figures are not quite comparable. It must be taken into account that the German minority was almost completely expelled or killed after World War II. At the same time the overall populations decreased significantly. Table 1 gives a starting point.

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72 Junker were German squires that owned most of the land.
73 Ibid.
74 Anatol Lieven, 57.
75 “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”
76 Ibid.
with the German minorities still living in the Baltic region. Table 2 shows the situation after World War II and the deportations. Estonia has a big and Latvia a small increase in minorities. Lithuania, on the other hand, is ethnically far more homogenous after World War II. This trend is even more visible in Table 3. The reason lies in the big industrial complexes in northern Estonia and Latvia, which brought many workers into the countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% of minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>26.6</td>
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Table 2. Percentage of minorities

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% of RUS minorities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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Table 3. Percentage of Russian minority

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<th>Country</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Byelorussian</th>
<th>Finn</th>
<th>Polish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>65.10%</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>56.50%</td>
<td>30.40%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>80.60%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Percentage of titular nationalities and large minorities dated Jan 2001


A survivor of the Soviet OMON\(^{82}\) raid on a Lithuanian border post in July 1991, which left seven Lithuanian border guards killed, was once quoted:

\(^{77}\) Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present, Cambridge MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 281

\(^{78}\) Anatol Lieven, 183.


\(^{82}\) OMON stands for “special purpose militia detachments”. They are military units under the command of the ministry of interior.
As a cosmopolitan I look at Russia with affection, being fascinated by its nature and culture. As a European I look at Russia with considerably reduced optimism. As a citizen of a small country I am frightened and full of mistrust.83

Being in the position of small countries next to Russia, a large percentage of the Baltic population perceives especially the Russian speaking minorities as a threat and as colonists, independent of how long these people have been living in the Baltic region.

The antipathy derives mostly from the terror during the Stalin era and subsequent russification attempts. After World War II the industrialization with mostly heavy industries was one of the highest-ranking Soviet goals. Needed to man the new factories, many Russian workers and their families settled down in the Baltic Soviet republics.84

After Gorbachev's perestroika the long held feelings surfaced and combined with a feeling of economic failure and exploitation.

In Latvia, for example, Russians manned many factories which the Latvians saw as not primarily serving their own country but the needs and interests of the Soviet economy. Exploitation by centralized planning and forces industrialization without regard for the environment had to be replaced, ...by the development of truly national economies, which would use resources to their own benefit.85

In principle, the nationalist feelings often had a definitive economic touch. The two fields were connected as will be shown later on.

There are certain regional differences concerning the Russian-speaking people within the Baltic States. As a result of the buildup of heavy industries in Lithuania as well as in Estonia in the Tallinn area the Russian speakers were mostly industrial workers. In the north of Estonia especially in the Narva area the Russian speakers were both workers

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84 Anatol Lieven, 183.

and managers of the companies.\textsuperscript{86} In Latvia, however, the majority of the middle class were Russian speakers who were generally better educated as native Latvians.\textsuperscript{87}

Despite the above mentioned facts there are widespread prejudices concerning the Russians speakers. Most of them are exaggerated but often there is a grain of truth. The most common "impression" is that all Russians are filthy and lazy. The really bad condition of the big cities especially Riga with its high percentage of Russians was seen as a proof. Besides, Russians were blamed for the grave economic problems, the pollution and ruthless exploitation of nature. Furthermore, they were seen as Moscow's 5\textsuperscript{th} column, ready to subdue the Baltic strive for independence. One of the more pronounced right wing activists, Aivars Garda, published a controversial book in which he calls the Russian 'colonists' a 'cancer' and urges a struggle against internal and external enemies.\textsuperscript{88}

The main reason that led to the Baltic prejudices against the Russians is the fact that most Balts falsely equate “Russian” with “Soviet”. This has several implications. First, many Balts do not make a difference between citizens of the former Soviet Union and persons of Russian nationality. Therefore anybody who speaks the Russian language is seen as a Russian even though he might be a Georgian, Armenian or Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{89} Second, many Balts do not discriminate between the Soviet Union as a whole and the Russian Federation, thus blaming all atrocities during the purges and generally the Soviet rule on the Russians.

D. RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

1. The Kaliningrad Problem

Following World War II, the Soviet Union re-drew the East European map, conceding certain former German territory to Poland in exchange for annexed Polish territory in the East. The Kaliningrad-oblast as part of the former German East-Prussia

\textsuperscript{86} Anatol Lieven, 187.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Nils Muiznieks, “Latvia's faux pas”, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2002, 89.
\textsuperscript{89} Anatol Lieven, 185.
Königsberg remained a Soviet annexed territory and still is part of the Russian Federation.

With the enlargement of NATO or the EU the Oblast Kaliningrad will be completely surrounded by systems that Russian foreign and security policy may perceive as a “threat”. If the cooperation within the new NATO-Russia Council\(^\text{90-91}\) will substantially alter this perception remains to be seen. Still, there are enough economic problems with the EU. If Lithuania is admitted to the EU, it will have to enforce the Schengen treaty. As a result, citizens of Kaliningrad must have visa to cross the Lithuanian border. This will have a severe impact on Kaliningrad’s economy, because it curtails small border trade. At the same time Kaliningrads’s “shadow economy”—which part of the population needs to survive—will be hit too, when smuggling in cut off. Trade and transit will be more difficult since the EU has definite rules and tariffs in dealing with non-EU states.

On the other hand the Baltic States are strongly dependent on Russian energy especially natural gas and oil. Russian politicians used this dependency to put pressure on the Baltic States. Again, with EU rules on trade and tariffs, thus we have an important impact on the Baltic States and their economies.

2. Russian Homeland Nationalism Towards the Baltic States

The crisis of Russia in the 1990s did recast security issues in the Baltic Sea region. Although the risk of military conflict was reduced, there were emerging concerns about the Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia.\(^\text{92}\) The protection of Russian minorities abroad—sometimes resembling strong homeland nationalism—was a definite goal of Russian foreign policy. “In Estonia there are about 409,000 Russians among a total population of 1,453,000 ... In Latvia the Russian minority numbers around 700,000

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\(^{91}\) See also chapter IV A. 2.

in a population of 2.4 million."93 The rights of these minorities have stood in the way of a solution for border issues between Russia and the two states.

The Russian statement in 1998 that the Soviet-era regime in the Baltics was established according to legal procedures hence was a legitimate regime enhances this.94 Furthermore, the Baltic populations were subsequently perceived by many Russians to be changing into ruthless wreckers who allowed their initially commendable project to take an extremist, nationalistic and ultimately destructive course. In such a perspective, part of the guilt for the break-up of the Soviet Union is placed on the Baltic nations.95

This feeling of threat from the Baltic States was partly the result of overt Russian homeland nationalism that explicitly embraces minorities living abroad in neighboring countries.

Russia ... has been anything but reticent; its official homeland nationalism has been conspicuously visible. Public pronouncements on the right, and the obligation, to protect Russians in the near abroad have become a staple of official Russian discourse, figuring prominently in almost all accounts of Russian foreign policy priorities.96

The emphasis on the minorities of Russians living in the near abroad—a vaguely defined region around the Russian state—is in itself the result of a recent development. Under Soviet regime there was no clearly defined Russian nationalism because the boundaries between “Soviet” and “Russian” were blurred. So, Russian nationalism e.g. in the military or the Communist Party was mostly directed against other nationalities within the boundaries, the system of the Soviet Union. Russians saw Russia mainly as the dominant center of the Soviet empire. So up to the last months before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was no separate Russian identity, no perception of a Russian nation with a distinct people. The “Russian citizenship law adopted on 28 November

94 Olav F. Knudsen, 7.
95 Olav F. Knudsen, 9.
1991, ... calls a citizen of the RF [Russian Federation] not russkii (ethnic Russian), but rossiyanin (defined in civic terms regardless of ethnicity).”97 Behind that still laid a concept of a common Union identity that based the citizenship on a territorial definition. “Thus the law pointed to a mixture of RF and Union identities as the identities of the people whom the RF leadership believed it was governing”98 At that time there was no homeland nationalism present in the RF government. So, then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev pointed out that “Russians and Russian speakers in the newly independent states did not constitute a specific problem for the Russian government”99

Nevertheless, for the Baltic States as well as for the Ukraine this new citizenship law presented a threat as it allowed people living outside the RF territory to simply apply for Russian citizen status as long as they had no other citizenship of another newly independent state. The possibility of their large Russian minorities becoming Russian citizens provoked harsh protest against the law from Estonia and Ukraine and led to its termination in 1994.

In the RF—under the influence of the nationalist opposition forces in 1993-1994—the attitude of the Yeltsin government towards Russians living “near abroad” changed. In official speeches and resolutions they “began to be described as Rossiiskaya diaspora, for whom the RF was the homeland (rodina). ... In his 1994 New Year Address to the nation Yeltsin specifically appealed to the Diaspora by saying 'Dear compatriots (sootechestvenniki)! You are inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We were and we will be together”.

The problem with this new definition of Russianness was that out of the 30 million Russian speakers living in the “near abroad” only 800,000 were RF citizens. Therefore, the Russian government tried to persuade the neighboring states to accept dual citizenship. This was denied by all states except Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. This political failure promoted the government to shift back to a more diffuse common Union

98 Ibid., 356.
99 Ibid., 356.
100 Ibid., 356.
identity whereas at the same time it tried to strengthen the loyalty and national idea within the RF.

For the neighboring states the above mentioned changes in Russian nationalism were always a cause for concern. They perceived the inclusion of Russians and Russian speakers living on their territory into RF policy as a threat to their national sovereignty.

E. NATIONALISM IN THE BALTIC STATES

1. Lithuania

The re-emerged Lithuanian nationalism is rooted in a deep mysticism combined with pagan and catholic liturgical elements.¹⁰¹ Because there were no large minorities in Lithuania after World War II, the new government granted all persons living on its territory equal citizenship. This ensured their legal status, but did not protect them from the nationalizing pressures within the government and society.¹⁰²

2. Estonia and Latvia

Unlike in Lithuania there are considerable minorities in these countries. Therefore the titular nationalities felt threatened and never offered equal rights to these minorities. As in the RF, a distinct development towards a strong “nationalizing” nationalism is visible within these countries. During the first steps to independence the outspoken opinion was to create a new state with equal rights for all nationalities living in its territory.¹⁰³ It cannot be determined with certainty whether this was the genuine goal or whether it was just lip service to appease the Soviet Union and later the RF. However, the idea to build a new state for all nationalities was strong. This can be seen by the fact that a significant part (although no majority) of the Russian minority in the Baltic States also supported the secession from the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴ After the new independence was gained, a radicalization of the national policy took place. Whereas the more nationalist politicians loudly voiced their ideas, the more moderate ones often did not oppose them

¹⁰¹ Anatol Lieven, 110.
¹⁰² “Der Brockhaus multimedial 2001 premium”
¹⁰³ Anatol Lieven, 302.
¹⁰⁴ Anatol Lieven, 200.
out of fear to help the reactionary forces and endanger the separatist movement.\textsuperscript{105} (It is interesting to note, that in the early history of the Soviet Union many of the more moderate Bolsheviks were silenced in a similar way. Namely, if they would oppose the radicals they would help the reactionary forces and endanger the success of the revolution.)

The history of the Baltic States under Soviet rule is still a taboo as far as Baltic cooperation and collaboration is concerned and this helps to sustain the above-mentioned simplification “Soviet equates Russian”. The growing nationalism in Estonia and Latvia led to harassment of the minorities, that found their legal expression in the citizenship laws of Estonia in 1992 and Latvia in 1993. The Estonian law granted citizenship to all persons living within the territory since before 1940 and their descendants. Others could apply for citizenship after they had lived for at least 2 years in Estonia, and passed a difficult language and history test. Furthermore they had to swear allegiance to the constitution. The Latvian law also had the pre-1940 clause in it, but demanded that applicants had lived for 10 years in Latvia, had good “conversational” language skills, and a legal income. Quotas and an explicit exclusion of former Soviet military personnel made the law even stricter. The diffuse formulas like “good conversational” language skills and legal income opened the doors for injustice, harassment and corruption.\textsuperscript{106}

Basically the Estonian as well as the Latvian citizenship law excluded all minorities from voting and deprived them of all political representation. Other examples of harassment are the refusal of residence permits to ex-service personnel and people coming home after having worked abroad. The residence permits are necessary to fulfill the 2 and 10-year threshold before one can apply for citizenship. In Riga—a city with historically a Russian majority of about 63 %—the old “Moscow District”—historically called the \textit{Moskauer Vorstadt}—has been renamed “Latgale”. Street-signs in Russian have been removed or the streets renamed.

\textsuperscript{105} Anatol Lieven, 83.
\textsuperscript{106} Anatol Lieven, 185.
Recently a street in Riga was named after the Chechen leader Dudajev, who also posthumously received the highest Estonian national decoration.\textsuperscript{107} Additionally there is a quiet discrimination against Russian speaking students of Baltic universities.

This led to a hardening of positions within the RF government. The resulting increase in Russian homeland nationalism again fueled the radical powers in the Baltic States.

\section{NATIONALISM AND COOPERATION}

“In the West, they are used to saying ‘the three Baltic States’ but in practical conditions, each of us was bound to the center by separate links…. There was little cooperation between the Baltic States during Soviet time. Now we have to create that from zero.”\textsuperscript{108} These words from then leader of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party Algirdas Saudargas seemed to promise hope for a closer Baltic cooperation. But in 1993 “the rhetoric of cooperation is barely a whisper. And the reality of it is virtually nonexistent.”\textsuperscript{109} All countries have separate currencies and customs regulations strangle the little trade between them. “’The Baltic countries are still victims of the role they played in the Soviet economic structure,’ says a Western diplomat here. ‘They don’t have much they can supply to each other.’”\textsuperscript{110} This statement does not show the whole picture; often there is a mental border against sharing as well as the actual inability.

During the conferences of the BALTSEA WG quite often the old Soviet mindset surfaced of “a zero-sum game where one participant can win only as much as the rest of the players lose”\textsuperscript{111}. There seemed to be an unwillingness to share information and know

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\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 2.
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how between the Baltic States in conjunction with a subliminal derogatory attitude towards the other’s efforts.

Sometimes reports about national progress in specific fields concluded with statements why one’s own state was better or further advanced than the others—and perhaps therefore more worthy to be granted accession to NATO.

Until today there are forces in the Baltic States that resist cooperation with the excuse of special national needs. This attitude seems to be stronger in branches of the military that have no prior history of cooperation. In 1999 the effort to coordinate the logistic cooperation between the Baltic States was severely hampered by one state’s information technique branch. They initially insisted on developing a national solution from the scratch although the other two countries had already decided to implement a Danish sponsored system. Had they succeeded, the whole planning for interoperability and data exchange capabilities within the overarching Baltic networking strategy BALTCCIS would have been in vain.

In many of the now successful cases of Baltic cooperation the donor countries had to overcome resistance of the Baltic States and often quasi enforced their realization by coupling their participation to Baltic willingness to cooperate.\textsuperscript{112} Bottom line, these nationalist tendencies seem to recede in the last years, but they can still delay crucial decisions.

G. REACTIONS OF THE WEST

The first steps to independence of the Baltic States were warmly welcomed by the west. The old bonds between Poland and Lithuania, and Finland and Estonia were reestablished. The Baltic communities living in the Diaspora (e.g. in the U.S.) renewed their ties with their old countries. As a result, the west was generally friendly to the Baltic case and disapproved the emerging Russian homeland nationalism. The minority problem in the Baltic States was not recognized as such.

1. The CSCE/OSCE Mission to Estonia

This changed only after the RF raised a formal complaint in 1992 in the context of the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), since 1994 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As a consequence a CSCE mission was established in Estonia in December 1992 with an office in Tallinn and two other offices in Jõhvi and in Narva\(^{113}\).

The mandate contained in the Terms of Reference consists of the following elements:

- establish and maintain contacts with competent authorities on both the national and the local level, in particular with those responsible for citizenship, migration, language questions, social services and employment;

- establish and maintain contacts with relevant non-governmental institutions and organizations, including political parties, trade unions and mass media organizations;

- collect information and serve as a clearing-house for information, technical assistance and advice on matters relating to the status of the communities in Estonia and the rights and duties of their members;

- contribute to the efforts of Estonian national and local authorities to re-create a civic society, inter alia through the promotion of local mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and understanding;

- keeping in mind the temporary nature of the Mission, consider ways and means of transferring its responsibilities to institutions or organizations representing the local population.\(^{114}\)

According to the Terms of Reference, the authorized strength of the Mission was 6 members.\(^{115}\)

\(^{113}\) “Mission survey”, OSCE online, available online from http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey03.htm

\(^{114}\) Ibid.

\(^{115}\) Ibid.
2. The CSCE/OSCE Mission to Latvia

Another mission was launched in Riga in Latvia, September 1993 after the passing of the citizenship law.\textsuperscript{116}

The mandate of the Mission, spelled out in the CSO [Committee of Senior Officials] decision of September 1993 and reiterated in the Terms of Reference, consists of the following elements:

- address citizenship issues and other related matters and be at the disposal of the Latvian Government and authorities for advice on such issues;
- provide information and advice to institutions, organizations and individuals with an interest in a dialogue on these issues;
- gather information and report on developments relevant to the full realization of CSCE principles, norms and commitments.

The initial size authorized in the Terms of Reference was 4 members, with an option to increase the number of Mission members to a total of 6. At the 3rd meeting of the Permanent Committee on 21 December 1993, the number of Mission members was increased by two. At the 29th meeting of the Permanent Committee on 21 July 1994, the authorized size of the Mission was increased by one additional member to a total of 7.\textsuperscript{117}

Both CSCE/OSCE-missions were terminated on 31 December 2001.

Further pressure on the Baltic States is brought by the European Union, because the solution to border problems and the issue of minority rights are high on the agenda prior to an accession.

H. NORMALIZATION OF RUSSIAN-BALTIC RELATIONS

The issue of nationalism and baltification of minorities has lost some of its severeness over the last few years. With the economic upswing since 1995 the high rates

\textsuperscript{116} “Mission survey”, OSCE online, available online from http://www.osce.org/publications/survey/survey05.htm

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
of unemployment that fueled tensions between the populaces came down. In general, the Economies of the Baltic States are becoming stable market oriented economies with better job opportunities than the Russian economy. The good economies have a side effect on the minority questions. On the one hand economic growth defuses the problem by providing jobs and income for all groups; on the other hand the good economies keep the minorities from emigrating.

Despite being excluded from the Baltic political process, the Russians have gained some benefits from the Baltic economic success. In recent years, very few Russians have left to return to Russia. They have concluded that, things being as they are, it is better to be a second-class citizen in Estonia or Latvia than to be a first-class citizen in Russia.119

Therefore the prosperous economy hinders the “simple Central Asian solution” where large parts of the Russian minorities have already emigrated back to Russia. A recent social study on youths in Estonia shows that although there were reservations from Estonian youths towards Russians, Russian youths “saw Estonians almost as positively as they saw themselves.”120 As the youth holds the future, this can be seen as a sign for the improving ethnic relations.

I. CONCLUSION

History shows that the three Baltic States despite all similarities had different starting points for their path into independence. The most striking is the amount of minorities and the resulting changes in domestic politics and citizenship laws. Here Lithuania had clearly the easier starting point. However, over the last years this advantage seems to have faded under the influence of the growing economy in Latvia and Estonia.

The integral nationalism of the Baltic States and the homeland nationalism of the Russian Federation escalated in the early 1990s but seem to decline now. Possible reason

are the more stable Russian government under President Putin and the pressures on the Baltic States from the European Union and NATO to settle their minority problems prior to accession. Furthermore the OSCE missions can be regarded as success.

Apart from external pressures to solve the minority problems the transition to a market oriented economy needs the help of all parts of society. Therefore, an exclusion of a large part of the workforce will be detrimental to prosperity.

To draw a conclusion, the Baltic States with their geographic position neighboring Russia can benefit immensely from future trade and economic prosperity. But this is only possible when the minority questions especially concerning the Russian minority are solved. Furthermore a close cooperation on military and economic fields will be mandatory given the size of the countries, the gargantuan tasks of reorganizing the old soviet structures and their available budgets.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POST-SOVIET SECURITY AND DEFENSE STRUCTURES AS A CHANCE TO ACHIEVE MORE COOPERATION

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA’S NORTHWESTERN SECURITY POLICY

1. Short History

The Russian northwestern policy did not begin in the 18th century, however, with the decisive victory over Sweden in the Great Northern War 1700-1721, Russia conquered the Baltic lands. Thus, Czar Peter the Great opened the window to the west and Russia became a major Baltic player. For more than two centuries thereafter, the Baltic countries were under Russian authority and performed their Westernizing role for the Russian empire. “Although they might be geographically the westernmost extension of Russia, that is, the West of the East, the Baltic countries were culturally the easternmost extension of Germany, or the East of the West.”121 The Russian political authorities preserved the special economic position of the Baltic Germans, because they paid taxes, had connections to the West and provided many educated officials. This preservation was known as the Baltisches Sonderrecht (Baltic Special Order).

The brief period of independence of the Baltic States between the World Wars was seen by the Soviet Union as the consequence of a temporary weakness resulting of the Revolution and World War I. So, in 1939 and 1940 the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic States forcing them to become Soviet republics. But unlike Peter the Great, Stalin and his successors ruthlessly suppressed any western connection and ideas.

Only in the last decades of the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries once again became the window to the west. “During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union began to allow local Baltic initiatives in some cultural, social, and economic areas, and these initiatives quickly emulated Western models.”122 In the late 1980s the Baltic Soviet republics were known as the “Soviet West”.

122 Ibid., 335.
After their secession, the Baltic States were seen by many Russians as ruthless wreckers that brought by the demise of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{123} And even in the late 1990s many still see the “…political and military independence of the Baltic States as the regrettable consequence of an abnormal Russian weakness, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the confusion and disorder of succeeding Russian governments.”\textsuperscript{124}

2. The New Russian National Security Concept

“Before 1997, the only formulated basis for security policy-making had been the 1993 military doctrine. This meant, that there appeared to be no political consensus about the general security strategy or indeed about Russian foreign policy as such.”\textsuperscript{125} The concept stated that there were no external threats resulting from aggressions against Russia. The dominant security threats were seen to be of an internal kind.\textsuperscript{126} Perceived by the Yeltsin administration, the 1997 concept was based upon the need for Western cooperation with the political reforms and economic help. Thus, it was a concept of integration with the West. At the same time it tried to strengthen the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Furthermore, Russia sought a strategic influence on NATO’s role in European security. Therefore it agreed to the Permanent Joint Council between Russia and NATO. Yeltsin presented this “…to the Russian population as an effective Russian veto over NATO missions beyond collective self defence of the members territories.”\textsuperscript{127}

After the NATO’s Kosovo campaign, however, there was a shift in the Russian doctrine. The fact that NATO engaged in Kosovo outside its members’ territory against the expressed wish of Russia, undermined the arguments for partnership and integration with the West. As a result, more hard-line Eurasian and slavophile actors gained influence in the security policy elite.

\textsuperscript{124} James Kurth, “The Baltics: between Russia and the West,” 336.
\textsuperscript{126} Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Northwest Strategic Direction,” Military Review, July-August 1999, 54
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
The new national security concept became effective by decree in January 2000. It no longer emphasized internal but external threats to Russia and suggested disengagement from the west and more accent on the military instrument. Notably it made a reference to “a number of states stepping up their efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways.”\(^\text{128}\) Besides listing a number of external threats, the concept concludes, that external military threats levels are rising and that “NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its area of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation.”\(^\text{129}\)

The next big change came because of the events of September 11 and the subsequent “war on terrorism” of the USA. Russia showed understanding and sympathy for the position of the USA, claiming that itself had a long record of terrorist problems in Chechnya. Starting in December 2001, a new initiative was launched to increase the cooperation between NATO and Russia. In the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting at the Level of Foreign Ministers Held in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002

ministers noted with profound satisfaction the successful implementation of their initiative of 7 December 2001 to forge a new relationship between NATO Member States and the Russian Federation. …building on the NATO-Russian Founding Act, Ministers approved … a document which will allow… to decide on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, where NATO Member States and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interests.\(^\text{130}\)

During the Rome Summit on 28 May 2002 NATO Members and Russia renewed their obligations to international law, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In this spirit the NATO-Russia Council was founded to provide “a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint


\(^\text{129}\) Ibid., paragraph 3.

decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.”

As initial agenda NATO and Russia agreed to pursue following cooperative efforts:

- Struggle against Terrorism
- Crisis Management
- Non-Proliferation
- Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures
- Theatre Missile Defence
- Search and Rescue at Sea
- Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform
- Civil Emergencies
- New Threats and Challenges.

3. Implications for the Baltic Sea Region

The new Russian security concept brought back the idea of confrontation, because it linked the sub-regional level with European security and global stability. The military “exercise ZAPAD 99 [(West 99)], which the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff initiated on 22 June 1999, explicitly linked the threat of regional conflict in… [the Baltic Sea] region with nuclear escalation in response to the threat of mass, precision strikes against military targets in the theater.” On the other hand, there are Russian observers who see an emerging “soft-security” regime around the Baltic Sea as a chance

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132 Ibid., 3.
133 Jacob W. Kipp, 52.
for stability and cooperation. Here once more the Russian thrive to strengthen the OSCE in regard to NATO emerges.

Even though the Russian national security concept from 2000 is still valid, the events of September 11 and the subsequent improvement in NATO/US-Russian relations strongly indicate a move in the direction of soft security. This will certainly have a positive influence on the Baltic Sea region.

B. NORDIC APPROACH TO THE BALTIC SEA SECURITY

1. Short History

Scandinavia’s relations with Russia have been hostile at times: Russia and Sweden were rivals for over 300 years. Finland was under pressure from both Russia and the Soviet Union, until—after 1955—it managed its relation to the Soviet Union actively and constructively. Denmark and Norway, on the other hand, tried to balance Swedish and later German power in the Baltic region by maintaining close political and economic ties with pre-revolutionary Russia. In between the two World Wars, Nordic countries had normal relation to the newly founded states around the Baltic Sea.

World War II severed these ties and since the end of it, Scandinavian foreign policies were heavily influenced by the Cold War and the proximity of the Soviet Union.

Ever since the establishment of the Nordic Council in 1953, foreign and security policy has been a taboo—a non topic—in Nordic cooperation. The Soviet Union was overtly suspicious of this new Nordic arrangement, which it considered might become another anti-Russian bloc.... 1956, Finland finally joined the Nordic Council, but the ban on debating foreign and security policy continued....

It was not until the summit at Reykjavik between Reagan and Gorbachev in 1986 that the tensions relaxed. With the end of communism in Europe in the 1990s the “old foreign policy formulas—Swedish and Finnish non-alignment, Danish, Norwegian and

134 Ibid., 59.
Icelandic conditional NATO membership—would no longer adequately serve.” 137 Of course there is no common Nordic foreign policy, but the perspectives of the five distinct countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. However, there are commonalities, which are worthwhile mentioning. “Nordic interests stretch from the western Hemisphere (Greenland) across the north Atlantic into the Baltic to the heart of European Russia.” 138


The Nordic security concepts are influenced by asymmetries in the Nordic memberships: “two out of five Nordics are not members of NATO; two others out of the five are not members of the European Union. (Only Denmark has membership of both.)” 139 These facts produce a quite peculiar setting for the Nordics. If the institutions would be ranked according to their significance for the Nordics, EU and NATO would come first, then followed by the Nordic organizations themselves. Still the cooperation among the Nordic countries is governed by the institutional setup of the Helsinki Agreement of 1962. 140 The Agreement only mandates cooperation in the fields of culture, economic affairs, environment, justice, social affairs and transportation. However, in practice foreign and security policy have extended the field of cooperation beyond a strict interpretation of the agreement. 141

There are signs that a new type of “Nordic balance” may be about to emerge, even if the actors—the Nordic governments—carefully avoid this term. The governments of Sweden and Finland announced, that they count on their EU membership to provide an implicit security effect and therefore, they do not seek NATO membership. Still, they have made the reservation that they “…stand by their freedom to choose the contents and form of their connection with the political and military cooperation emerging in

137 Ibid., 16.
138 Ibid., 17.
140 The Agreement of Cooperation Between Denmark; Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, signed at Helsinki, 23 March 1962. It has been revised and amended several times since then.
Europe.”142 Basically Finland and Sweden now use the term “militarily non aligned” to
describe their status. Insofar they still show restraint towards Russia, but preserve
themselves the right to change this status if need were to arise. This dual approach may
be seen as a tacit warning to Russia, that to much pressure could trigger a westward
alignment of Sweden and Finland.

The “Northern Dimension of the CFSP” European Union was promoted by
Finland in 1997. Jaakko Blomberg, Undersecretary of State in the Finnish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, said in his opening address to the conference on this subject in
November 1997:

Looking back to the assessments made by the Finnish Government during
the accession process, two aspects of the northern dimension stand out. On
the one hand, Finland—together with Sweden, and reinforcing the Danish
contribution—was to bring into the Union Nordic political and social
values and Nordic models of policy-making and conflict resolution. On
the other, with Finland’s accession, the Union was to acquire a common
border with Russia, which Finland pledged to keep secure as well as to
make into a gateway for supportive cooperation with the new and
democratic neighbour.143

With the Northern Dimension of the CFSP the established Nordic policies and the
EU policies moved closer together. One of the catchwords for this new school of thought
is “soft security”. Even if it is not a serious political concept, it is—as a politically
popular idea—of considerable importance.

However, since the spring summit in Reykjavik 2002, it is generally understood
that the three Baltic States will be invited to join NATO in the next enlargement
round.144 This diminishes the value of soft European security measures against hard
NATO guarantees.

142 Tarja Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallén, 15 March 1997, as cited in Ibid., 23.
143 Jaakko Blomberg, Opening Address, Conference on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP,
Helsinki, 7-8 November, 1997.
from http://www.welt.de/daten/2002/05/15/0515eu332011.htx.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF ESTONIA’S SECURITY STRUCTURES

Before achieving independence the defense structures within the Estonian Soviet Republic were directed towards Moscow as the center of the Soviet Union. The Red Army was an imperial institution with very few connections to regional matters. Consequently, for the young Estonian nation the year 1991 marked the beginning of its efforts to create defense structures of its own.

The security history of Estonia can be described as being in three phases. The period of regaining independence from 1988-1991, the intermediate period of maintaining independence and Russian troop withdrawal from 1991-1994, and since 1994 the period of normalization and security building.

By the end of 1991 the

Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) and its General Staff were legally established. The Estonian Ministry of Defence was set up in July 1992. Almost simultaneously an active Estonian involvement began in the politico-military co-operation initiated by NATO. Estonia participated in NACC in 1991, and subsequently in EAPC.”

But these noteworthy achievements did not mean that the EDF were operational, integrated into society or democratically controlled.

To establish a kind of yardstick to assess armed forces in a democracy six indispensable prerequisites to organize and to guarantee a proper civilian direction and control of armed forces are used. Then Major General Harald Kujat, Director, Plans & Policy Division of NATO’s International Military Staff stated them, during a seminar to officials from the three ethnic groups of Bosnia Herzegovina in Sarajevo in 1998. These are essentially:

1. the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces

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2. A significant role of parliament in legislating on defense and security matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in contributing transparency to decisions concerning defense and security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending - using “the power of the purse” in issues related to “the power of the sword”

3. The hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a civilian organ of public administration - a ministry or department of defense - that is charged, as a general rule, with the direction and supervision of its activity.

4. The presence of a well-trained and experienced military corps that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It acknowledges the principle of civilian control, including the principle of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces.

5. The existence of a developed civil society, with a clear understanding of democratic institutions and values, and, as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role and mission of their military.

6. The presence of a reasonable non-governmental component within the defense community capable of participating in public debate on defense and security policy, presenting alternative views and programs.147

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned principles, the development of the EDF is described from the actual beginning of civil-military structures.

In the end of 1992 a small Ministry of Defense (MoD) was established in Estonia.

It consisted of only a few people who were mostly young and uneducated in military affairs, which constricted functions in the defense area. In the beginning, the civil servants in the MoD had no idea what the military forces were doing or any notion of how to execute ministerial oversight, because of the lack of proper education, inexperience in governing state defense affairs, the absence of a tradition of democratic civilian control.148

After this humble beginning the MoD tried to establish more civilian control, by creating a defense policy and a budget system. Naturally these efforts were diametrical to

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the viewpoint of the General Staff (GS) who consisted mainly of old, Soviet trained personnel. In the absence of specific laws and traditions that could have regulated the relation between MoD and GS, conflicts arose almost immediately. Planning was duplicated and often controversial. “There was a short period of time when CHOD [Chief of Defense] did not talk to the Minister of Defense and civil servants from the Ministry were persona non grata in the General Staff building.”149 This confrontation decreased only slowly over the next years. Although the GS accepted the MoD’s right to set the defense policy, nevertheless civilian control over military affairs was often undercut.

In addition, problems with personnel planning and command and control structures diminished the ability of the GS to effectively control the EDF. This can be seen by the mutiny in 1994 in one of the EDF battalions. The Jaegerbattalion refused to obey the orders to relocate. Although security forces, and the police who demilitarized and disbanded the battalion could quickly defuse the situation, it made a lasting impression on the government and the public of Estonia.150

The security goal of Estonia to join NATO proved to be a stabilizing factor for the development of the EDF. Estonia had joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program in February 1994. Later on it joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) by which NATO helps the partners with their defense planning. However, NATO’s early experiences showed that the candidates for enlargement needed more guidance and help. The subsequently established Membership Action Plan (MAP) gave the partners a possibility for self-differentiation in which goals they wanted to achieve and at the same time an outside evaluation by NATO whether they were achieved. Estonia joined the MAP process and used it to re-structure its forces.

In the field of military conceptual thinking, the search for a generally adequate military defense solution for Estonia still continues. In the EDF build-up in general, the envisioned force posture has changed at least twice, and the target force size has been constantly reduced. The drastic decrease of the planned size of the EDF by a factor six between 1992 and 2001 illustrates the difficulty in striking the balance between modern

149 Ibid., 27.
150 Ibid., 29.
requirements, a militarily significant force size (and its equipment) and the economic capabilities of Estonia.\textsuperscript{151}

Today, Estonia has signed bilateral cooperation agreements or Memorandums of Understanding with 18 nations. Additionally, trilateral cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania is established. By 2001 there exist a comprehensive set of documents concerning the security concept, the military strategy, and the service law.

But also the civil society is still bound by the Soviet legacy. “Estonia will soon be ready for Europe as a state, but it is far from being ready as a society,” journalist Andres Langemets wrote in 2000. “Egidijus Aleksandravicius, who runs a Lithuanian foundation says of final year university students that ‘80% are still socialist-minded…For them, the state is extremely important and responsible for everything; personal responsibility is very weak.’\textsuperscript{152} These general statements describe the problems of the citizens to adapt to their democratic responsibilities within the new state.

Bottom line, Estonia has achieved much since 1991. In regard to the above-mentioned “yardstick” the EDF can be seen as a democratic embedded military force. However, Estonia still has to go a long way to overcome its Soviet legacy.

\section*{D. THE EFFECTS ON COOPERATION}

On 15 February 2000, the Lithuanian Vice Minister of National Defence, Dr. P. Malakauskas, spoke before the Foreign Defence Attaché Association in Vilnius. In regard to the Baltic co-operation he mentioned that first, development of the national self-defense capabilities and, second, interoperability with NATO were the two main goals of the Baltic States. These goals were to be pursued by international cooperation. He stated three special features for cooperation:

\textit{First.} The Baltic defence co-operation reflects the situation where the three Baltic States are still building up their defence establishments…. Whereas the strong powers of the Cold War, as well as the militarily non-

\textsuperscript{151} Erik Männik, \textit{Estonian Defence Forces: 10 years of Development}, 24.

aligned nations, face tasks of reducing and restructuring their armed forces to match the new nature of security challenges. 

Second. The bigger part of that defence co-operation happens through multilateral projects and comprises all services of the armed forces. The geographic scope of the external supporters of these projects comprises a good dozen of partners in North America Western and Central Europe. This is a very good example of co-operative security.

Third. Sometimes the Baltic defence co-operation gives you the impression of chaos. Lithuania alone has about 800 co-operative events per year. However, the lack of a system in that whole complex is only apparent. In our case that logic is security through interdependence. The more links we succeed to establish to the neighbours and Western democracies, the less uncertainty there is, and the more stable is our security system during pre-accession period.  

The non-aligned Nations as Sweden and Finland are adapting their defense structures to achieve more interoperability with NATO. Their moving closer to NATO procedures through participation in PfP, leads to less duplicity and misunderstandings.

Another point is under the BALTSEA umbrella military initiatives are better coordinated now, because the Baltic States compete less for attention and “special friends” this is prone to even improve since the accession to NATO of the three Baltic States is openly discussed.

E. CONCLUSION

Throughout the Baltic region the emergence of soft security lead to more cooperation. Especially since September 11 and the rapprochement of the United States and Russia, there is a real chance of the evolution of cooperative security structures.

Internally the Baltic States slowly overcome their soviet type structures and mindsets as the democratic legal framework is firmly in place and the number of western trained officers and civil servants is steadily growing. For example, more than 40% of all


Estonian officers have received different levels of education and training abroad. Furthermore, first alumni of the Baltic Defence College are working in their respective ministries and are beginning to form their civil-military networks.

The “beauty contest” between the Baltic States is over now that all three are likely to be invited into NATO with the next enlargement round. This will strengthen the factions that stand for cooperation rather than a zero-sum game between the nations. As Major General (ret) Dr. Dietrich Genschel (German Army) an expert in Baltic issues and member of the International Defence Advisory Board (IDAB) phrased it:

Whether they like it or not, the Baltics are being looked at in geo-strategic terms as a sub-regional entity. Weak performance of one Baltic State has negative repercussions for all. Inter Baltic co-operation and co-ordination, combined with inter Baltic support by the strong for the weak is imperative for success in striving for NATO membership.

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V. CONCLUSION

After the turbulent beginning in the early 1990s the Baltic States now face the long and tedious way to normality. One aspect that proves this is that the donor countries are no longer competing but cooperating more intensely with each other. Within the BALTSEA initiatives, donor countries ask for support to special projects in order to increase burden sharing. Generally the Baltic States’ acceptance of multilateral projects such as BALTRON, BALTBAT, BALTDEFCOL etc. has increased over the last years. The military has seen the positive results of the initiatives and has found them to be a good argument to secure budgets and funding.

The BALTSEA initiative BALTDEFCOL seems to be the most effective investment into an integrated future. There the administrative and military elites are educated in an international environment through international teachers and with foreign fellow students. They are beginning to form an alumni network that will be able to foster the mutual understanding on the personal level. This includes the intra-national plane (e.g. between MoD and General Staff) as well as the international plane (e.g. between the members in one of the international working groups).

It is generally understood that the Baltic States will be invited to join NATO in fall of 2002 thus their biggest security goal is almost reached. The initiatives within NATO under the BALTSEA umbrella will predictably continue for a long time to come, but their political implications will have changed. As the accession into NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has shown, the transition of military structures from Warsaw Pact to NATO structures is a lengthy process that does not stop at the moment of gaining NATO membership. Therefore, NATO countries will define timeframes during which they will continue to support the Baltic States to transform their administrative and military structures.

The problems of overstretching and over-commitment will not be solved by the act of accession to NATO. However, in time better management and the evolving administrative capabilities of the Baltic States will decrease the problems.
The central point is that despite the already good results with the regional cooperation the way to go is still very long and tedious. Nevertheless, in the long run there is no alternative for the Baltic States because they cannot afford solely national solutions.

The integration of Russia into the Baltic Sea security system is advancing. Even though the BALTSEA process has no Russian participation, in many other initiatives the active participation of Russia is sought. The German Minister of Defense, Scharping, said about the security system for the Baltic Sea region.

In the Baltic Sea region, a multi-layered web of bilateral and multilateral relations has emerged that is lending stability to the region as a whole. The Baltic Council, for example, is the forum in which all countries bordering the Baltic Sea co-operate, countries different in history and policy: members of NATO and members of the European Union, candidates for membership in both organizations, and Russia.157

At the same time he said:

Russia can be sure: NATO will not waiver in reaching out to Russia in transition. We know there is no European security without or against Russia. ... Russia must take on its responsibility in and around Europe and make its contribution towards Euro-Atlantic security.158

In addition, the US strategy, as portrayed by then US Ambassador to Sweden Pickering at the Baltic Sea Conference in Stockholm, states, “the fourth important element of strategy is integrating Russia and the New Independent States into Europe's political, economic and security architecture.”159

Another point leading to hope is the fact that the Baltic States themselves are trying to normalize their relations to Russia. During the Second Annual Stockholm

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158 Rudolf Scharping, 10.

Conference on Baltic Sea security Mr. Algirdas Saudargas said about the Lithuanian policy concerning Russia:

The recent signing of the treaty on border delimitation with Russia is yet another example of the continuous policy of pursuing good neighborly relations that Lithuania has implemented since 1990. ... We are exploring new ways to involve the Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg regions in various regional co-operation initiatives.160

As the Baltic States became more stable and normality set in, the relations towards Russia normalized too. Today it is without question that the Baltic Region’s security can only be achieved with Russia as partner. The recent developments regarding border and minority issues with Russia indicate that the problems may be solved in the near future.

Another field of tension is prone to emerge though: The tensions between NATO as a multinational alliance versus national sovereignty. The Baltic States with their still existent “nationalizing” nationalism will feel these tensions and will have to resolve them. However, as soon as the transitional nation-building phase evolves into normal statehood, hopefully the “nationalizing” nationalism will fade away.

The tension between multinational structures and sovereignty often surfaces within the military. One possible solution is to integrate the national security structures firmly into NATO’s multinational structures. Thus the small Baltic States could gain a relatively high degree of influence and on the other hand would avoid the trap of developing nationalist movements in the military structures.

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