Defeating Terrorism: 
Strategic Issue Analyses

Edited by
Colonel John R. Martin

January 2002
**Report Date:** 00Jan2002  
**Report Type:** N/A  
**Dates Covered (from... to):** -

**Title and Subtitle:** Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses

**Author(s):** Colonel John R. Martin

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

**Performing Organization Report Number:**

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es):**  
Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)

**Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s):**

**Distribution/Availability Statement:**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**Abstract:**  
see report

**Subject Terms:**

**Report Classification:** unclassified  
Classification of this page: unclassified

**Classification of Abstract:** unclassified  
Limitation of Abstract: SAR

**Number of Pages:** 103
CONTENTS

Foreword ................................................................. v

Introduction .............................................................. vii

1. Terrorism Viewed Historically
   Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II and Colonel John R. Martin ........................................ 1

2. War Aims and War Termination
   Dr. Stephen Biddle ................................................... 7

3. Beware of Unintended Consequences
   Dr. Conrad C. Crane .................................................. 13

4. Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War on Terrorism
   Is Not Perceived as a War on Islam
   Dr. Sami G. Hajjar .................................................... 17

5. State Support for Terrorism
   Dr. Steven Metz ....................................................... 21

6. Maintaining Strategic Balance while Fighting Terrorism
   Dr. Conrad C. Crane .................................................. 27

7. Homeland Security Issues: A Strategic Perspective
   Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II .................................................... 31

8. The Military’s Role in the New Domestic Security Environment:
   Will Army Missions Change?
   Colonel Dallas D. Owens ............................................. 37

9. Defining Preparedness: Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism
   Colonel John R. Martin ............................................. 43

10. The Campaign against Terrorism: Finding the Right Mix
    of Foreign Policy Instruments
    Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie .................................... 47

11. The Carrot and Stick Challenge
    Dr. Gordon Rudd and Colonel John R. Martin ............................................. 53

12. Potential Changes in U.S. Civil-Military Relations
    Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich and Dr. Conrad C. Crane ................................ 59
13. Maintaining Public Support for Military Operations
   Dr. Leonard Wong .......................................................... 65

14. Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare
   Dr. Martin L. Cook ....................................................... 71

15. Coalition Partners: Pakistan
   Dr. Steven Metz .......................................................... 75

16. Coalition Partners: India
   Dr. Andrew Scobell ....................................................... 79

17. Central Asia and the War on Terrorism: Towards a New Alignment
   Dr. Stephen J. Blank ..................................................... 83

18. Russia and the U.S. War on Terrorism
   Dr. Stephen J. Blank ..................................................... 87

19. Coalition Partners: China
   Dr. Andrew Scobell ....................................................... 93

20. Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on Terrorism
   Dr. Andrew Scobell ....................................................... 97

21. Terrorism: Sounding Roland’s Horn across the Atlantic
   Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen ................................ 101

About the Authors .......................................................... 107
FOREWORD

After the horrendous attacks of September 11, 2001, the Strategic Studies Institute marshalled its analytical resources to provide insights on how best to defeat the terrorist threat and wage the war on terrorism. This collection of essays represents the initial contributions made by the Institute. They were designed to provide senior Army leadership with context, information, and policy options as they made strategic decisions in the earliest days of the war. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to share this collection with the broader national security community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
INTRODUCTION

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. Because national leaders were pressed to issue orders on the prosecution of the war on terrorism, it was necessary to produce these papers on a very short time-line. This got the ideas included in the articles into the hands of decisionmakers as quickly as possible, giving them better understanding of factors affecting their various decisions. Issue analysis was never short-changed in this process, but authors were asked to provide “think pieces” quickly and to worry less about references and footnotes and more about capturing strategic insights. The shortened time-line in some cases also meant that it was possible to provide only an understanding of the context of the decision; specific policy recommendations were considered something that could be developed later if not included in these papers.

Even given these caveats, these papers represent an extraordinary amount of intellectual energy expended in only a few weeks. They have already been distributed to many senior leaders, but it still seemed appropriate to publish them formally. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.

The first paper provides historical perspective, but as you read many of the other essays, you will note several common and recurring themes. The first point is that this war can be won. Even now, some analysts question the stated war aims and doubt the possibility of victory. Nobody suggests it will be anything less than a complex undertaking, but victory is possible—although that probably only means a “new normalcy,” not the comparatively halcyon days of the prewar situation. Conversely, the war on terrorism can be lost if missteps produce unintended strategic consequences. One way to do that would be to ignore the other parts of the world where America’s interests lie. President Bush and the administration appear to have dodged this pitfall thus far, but they still must work to avoid expanding the war unnecessarily. As the struggle against terrorism proceeds, it is perhaps best to allow other elements of national power—not the military—to take the lead. The military will still be an essential component, but should be a buttress to the diplomatic, economic, and information elements as they attempt to end the scourge of terrorism with a minimum amount of further warfare.

The war on terrorism will require a restructuring of the military; it is less apparent that the military will have to grow significantly. In particular, the homeland defense mission will require a heretofore missing emphasis that will necessitate quantitative and qualitative changes in the active and reserve components. The defense establishment needs to place a high priority on defining the requirements; apportioning them appropriately; and developing the forces necessary to fight the war on terrorism, defend the homeland, maintain strategic balance and adapt and accelerate transformation.

Any expansion of the war requires a clear-cut rationale—both international and domestic. The regional essays, separately edited by Dr. Steve Metz, give global perspectives on the war on terrorism. They focus initially on the regions where the war is being actively
fought, but look through the wider lens as well. Both regions that were previously lower on the U.S. priority and possible future peer competitors must be considered before other terrorist targets are attacked with any of the elements of national power.

It is still impossible to tell, of course, exactly how this war will end. It is possible even now, though, to give some advice and insights that will lead to the best possible conclusions to the war. If American leaders continue to concentrate on winning the war, not just winning the early battles, the result will be a world free from mass-casualty terror, a world where American values of liberty and open markets can continue to flourish.
Terrorism has come in many guises through the centuries, reflecting changes in terrorists’ conceptions of the best targets and methods to use to achieve their political ends. Until the 20th century, most terrorism was directed against “tyrants” or their agents. This style of terrorism traces its roots at least as far back as Biblical times and was sanctioned by no less than Aristotle and Plutarch. There have been periodic waves of this type of terror, the most historically remarkable being the reign in northern Iran of the hashishim—the Assassins—for almost 200 years, from 1047 to 1296. Another upsurge of assassination attempts afflicted Europe between 1860 and 1911. Although just outside of that period, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 is one of the best-known examples of terrorism by assassination. Assassins have scored some remarkable successes; however, most terrorist groups of this nature have been suppressed fairly quickly.

The 20th century saw a transformation of terrorism through at least two stages. The first was through the use of terror to support larger revolutionary insurgencies. The earliest success was the overthrow of the Russian government and, following a brutal civil war, establishment of Soviet Communism. The breadth of Russian popular dissatisfaction—and the weakening effects of World War I, coupled with Lenin’s German sponsorship—provided nearly ideal conditions. Subsequent communist insurgencies employed terror tactics with varying degrees of success, most frequently against decaying colonial regimes or states only recently decolonized. Although certainly not inspired by communism, Israeli terrorism against the
British and Palestinians was used effectively to support their insurgency and was sufficiently successful to hasten the creation of the state of Israel. Israeli success resonated deeply in the better organized and utterly committed minority Jewish population. In both the Russian revolution and the Israeli insurgency, the objects of terror were normally the civil administrators and the security apparatus, not “the people,” whose support was considered crucial.

The second stage in the 20th century transformation of terrorism was the growth of state sponsorship. States which are unable to confront their enemies conventionally have provided every imaginable assistance to terrorist groups in order to weaken their enemies physically or morally. State sponsorship does not necessarily ensure success, but does allow the fight to be prolonged. State-supported terrorism comes in several forms, including unwitting or inconsequential “support,” as is the case in many liberal democratic states where laws protecting civil rights also allow a form of refuge for some terrorists; unwilling support, but an inability to take counteraction, as with Colombian drug operatives; toleration arising from common goals vis-à-vis the “enemy,” as with Libya or Sudan; and full-blown support, either as a direct instrument of the supporting government or as a happy coincidence of objectives and willingness to pursue them actively together, as is the case of Syria and Iran in support of Hamas and Hezbollah. Syria, for example, has failed miserably in every conventional attempt to destroy Israel, but Syrian—and Iranian—support of Palestinian terrorism has brought some “positive” results, at least from Syria’s view. Israel’s recent tactic of very selectively “eliminating” Palestinian terrorist leadership has been sufficiently successful that it may have provided at least some motivation for the September 11 attacks. Although the original acts of Palestinian terror have brought some international condemnation upon the perpetrators, Israeli responses have resulted in even worse condemnation for Israel. Formal U.N. reprimands weaken Israel’s moral position, which affects its relations with the U.S. Government. Ironically, the attacks have not weakened the Israelis physically; if anything, the attacks have moved the Israelis to new levels of proficiency in eradicating the threat.

Although the Middle East may present some exceptions, terrorism—in whatever guise—rarely achieves its political ends and even then generally only under specific strategic conditions. Terrorism is a tool of the weak; were terrorists strong enough, they would fight conventionally, which holds the promise of quicker results. Because terrorism is pursued by the weak, its infrequent success should be expected. Terrorism’s regular failure also stems from the reprehensible methods employed. Those methods can alienate terrorists from popular support and possibly from state support. Terrorism also can arouse the ire of the opposing state, which usually has the resources to crush terrorist movements if it can muster the will.

Terrorists do succeed on occasion, but the record suggests strongly that very specific conditions need to obtain first. Since the target of terrorism—almost by definition—has the greater resources, only weakness of will can normally keep the state from prevailing.

Even with the will and resources, the target state can lose to terrorists if it lacks the ability to collect comprehensive intelligence and to act rapidly and forcefully on that intelligence. The historical record demonstrates that counterterrorist campaigns are most successful when laws are adapted to address terrorist threats.
Intelligence capabilities must be expanded first, followed quickly by elimination of any excessive concerns for due process that might impede direct action—capture and prosecution, if possible; killing, if not—against terrorists. In America and in other democratic countries, any such expansion of police powers—and any expansion of military involvement in police matters—must be accompanied by adequate safeguards on civil rights. Terrorists are neither legitimate soldiers nor common criminals, so special provisions are required. The dilemma for liberal democratic states is the need to act against terrorists as a national security risk without destroying the essential rule of law. This dilemma makes democracies simultaneously vulnerable and resilient.

The so-called “Battle of Algiers” is worth particular review. In the early 1950s, Algerians started an insurgency in an effort to remove French colonial rule from that country. Repeated insurgent failures led to adoption of terrorist methods. These enraged the French and resulted in the deployment of the French parachute division to Algeria. In a coordinated civil-military campaign of incredible ferocity, the terrorists were destroyed. Closely coordinated intelligence gathering and rapid response to actionable information were chief among the tools employed. Although the French were successful in stopping terrorism in the short term, the paratroopers relied on brutal excesses of torture and bribery, which eventually caught the attention of the French Republic. This ruined the colonists’ political foundation and ultimately cost them the colony.

At some point, the terrorists require a supportive population. That support can be broad-based or can be provided by a committed minority. Increasingly in the late 20th century and beyond, media coverage has been a major factor in either sustaining popular support for terrorists or in separating them from it. As stated previously, state support may not be essential to success of terrorists’ efforts, but can help provide a “popular” base through control of state media organs.

These “lessons of history” may not apply directly to Usama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. Their form of terrorism may be an evolved form that is fundamentally different from that used in the past. Although completely innocent civilian populations have been targeted previously by Palestinians and by the Irish Republican Army, the scale of the September 11 attacks is unique. Americans have been targeted before, but rarely in America. Further, the goal of the attacks may not be simply to inflict enough pain on Americans that the government is forced, as it was in Beirut and Somalia, to acquiesce to another’s aims; it may be an attempt to destroy America.

The attacks stem from a pervasive fear—in the minds of bin Laden and many other Muslims—that American culture is crushing theirs. In today’s geostrategic environment, bin Laden’s stated goal of a separate Islamic world leaves him no real choice but to attack the United States with the goal of destroying American influence. The repressive, extremist regime that he seeks to establish is diametrically opposed to the values Americans hold dear and want to see flourish in the world: freedom, democracy, free markets, human rights. If these opposing views of civilization could coexist peacefully, there would perhaps be concern only at the intersections between them. However, globalization means that no nation can completely exclude itself from the influence of another. For some Americans, that idea carries with it a fear of loss of national identity, but for most it represents only a continuation of the
assimilative process that defines America. For those of bin Laden’s ilk, globalization means that the “evil” influences of the “opulent and arrogant” Western world—particularly from America—can never be kept from “corrupting” the citizens of his Islamic world. Thus, he and his followers must fight the United States, not just to force it to solve the Palestinian question and get it out of the Arabian Peninsula, but to destroy it before U.S. influences irrevocably change Muslim culture. The overwhelming strength of the United States makes it impossible to confront conventionally. As a result, bin Laden turns to terrorism to achieve his political goal—but terrorism is just his current tactic. If he is allowed to continue, he will use any capability he can acquire to press his attack: conventional, unconventional or criminal. It thus behooves the United States to destroy him and his organization and to neutralize any state sponsors before he gains added capabilities.

If bin Laden’s terrorism is similar enough to past terrorism, history suggests that he can be defeated by a strong and resolute government that can separate the terrorists from popular support. Because bin Laden’s support is international and appears broadly-based, concerted coalition action is crucial.

In order to defeat al Qaeda or other similar terrorist organizations, the following actions are essential:

• Laws governing the collection of information on suspected terrorist organizations must be adapted to the nature and degree of the threat. Such adaptations will infringe upon existing civil rights, but not nearly as heavily as do the death and destruction wrought by the terrorists. In order to maintain a balance between civil rights and necessary law enforcement powers, reasonable judicial oversight must be maintained. Within the United States, some expansions of police powers must be pursued, and effective coordination of counterterrorism intelligence gathering and sharing must become the norm. Legislative and executive actions since September 11 attempt to lay the foundation for all of the above requirements, but the definition of the details remains a challenge. Also, a more realistic approach to foreign counterterrorism requirements must be developed if the United States hopes for greater international cooperation. This must include a relaxation of restrictions on the use of weapons supplied through foreign military sales so that they can be employed against terrorists irrespective of the terrorists’ nationality.

• State support must be eliminated, although each type will require specialized approaches. Countries that willingly provide direct support to those who attack the United States should expect to see their regimes replaced, the stated goal in Afghanistan. For other countries providing unwitting or indirect support, concentrated application of international pressure may be enough. The Afghanistan example should make them more receptive to this approach.

• Terrorists must be separated from popular support, a much more difficult matter, especially since the al Qaeda terrorists manifest religious motives widely shared by their fellow Muslims. There must be serious efforts to address the underlying motivations for terrorism without outright capitulation to their demands. Issues must be addressed without making compromises that neglect Israel’s security or fail to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. These efforts must be accompanied by an information campaign highlighting the repugnance of terrorist methods and their ineffectual or counterproductive effect. The heroic image of the perpetrators must be
discredited, preferably by their own religious leaders.

- Finally, American will to fight terrorism must be maintained. This will hinge on several issues. Americans are willing to accept losses if vital interests are involved, tactical success is periodically demonstrated and operational and strategic success is expected eventually. Casualties and tactical failures can be accepted if regular successes by law enforcement and the military are honestly portrayed and widely broadcast. Continuing information operations should be conducted to affirm the justice of U.S. intentions and the reasonableness of military and other actions. The public should not be manipulated, but must believe in the war on terrorism.

American will must be maintained; intrusions on civil liberties must be balanced against the need to gather intelligence and take action against the terrorists; terrorists’ popular support base must be reduced, and state support choked off. These are not easy tasks, but a multidimensional, sophisticated approach focusing on the inherent weaknesses of terrorist organizations will lead to their eventual destruction, both domestically and internationally.
What is our desired end state in this war? Is it achievable? If it is, how will we know when we’ve achieved it? Is this to be an open-ended campaign like the war on drugs, with no real end point likely, or is there hope for a meaningful victory that could someday terminate the conflict? Is there a center of gravity against which decisive effort can be directed and the war won thereby, or is the enemy so amorphous and ubiquitous that we face instead a future of chronic low-level hostilities susceptible only to management or containment and with no real hope of resolution?

In fact, this war can be won, not merely contained. But this will require war aims focused on our enemies’ ideology, not their tactics. And this in turn will demand an especially close interconnection between a war of military violence and an inseparable war of ideas. In fact, the best lens for understanding this new war and its termination requirements may be our last great military-ideological struggle: the Cold War. Just as that conflict used military means to preserve an opportunity to triumph on the battlefield of ideas, so in this conflict we must look to a synergistic interaction between violence to root out terrorists and persuasion to prevent their replacement from among the great mass of politically uncommitted Muslims.

The case for this interconnected framing of war aims, termination conditions, and strategies rests on the answers to four questions: what’s at stake; what’s the real threat to those stakes; what would suffice to end the threat; and how would we know when we’ve achieved this?
What is at Stake?

In objective terms, terrorism was traditionally thought to threaten only small stakes; for many, the real challenge was thus to avoid over-reacting to vivid but minor acts of violence. This war is different. In just 2 hours, the September 11 attacks killed fully a tenth as many Americans as died in the entire Vietnam War. This would be horrible enough as an isolated incident, but we can expect many more such attempts. Unchecked, our enemies could inflict mass casualties on a scale unseen by Americans since the World Wars—yet this time, our dead would be mostly civilians in their very homes and workplaces.

Nor is this all. As we have already seen, global economic health is at risk. The September 11 attacks have already plunged America into near-certain recession. With the world economy’s current weakness, more such strikes could induce far deeper crises both here and abroad. Some describe this as a war for cheap oil, but far more is at stake economically than just the price of gasoline at American service stations. A major, sustained, worldwide economic contraction is entirely possible if we fail to thwart a long-term continuation of mass-casualty attacks. These stakes are thus far closer to those of a major war than to traditional terrorism, and warrant responses appropriate to war in their scope and energy.

What is the Threat?

What—and more important, who—threatens these stakes? Who are our enemies, what do they want, and how much of what they want must be thwarted to secure our vital interests? These questions have yet to be answered clearly. Attempts to date have included evil itself, terrorism, “terrorism of global reach,” al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden. None is satisfactory, and the resulting ambiguity has important strategic consequences.

Calls for a war against “evil,” for example, are rhetorical license without meaningful strategic content. “Terrorism,” by contrast, is a tactic, not an opponent. Declaring a “War on Terrorism” is like declaring a “War on Strategic Bombing” or a “War on Alliances.” As such, it is at once too broad, too narrow, and beside the point. We surely do not seek war with the IRA or the Tamil Tigers, though both are terrorists. Adding “of global reach” doesn’t help: globalization has so eroded the effects of distance that any established terrorist group can reach targets over inter-continental distances—if the IRA isn’t a threat to America, it’s not because they can’t get here or couldn’t build a network here if they so chose. “Reach” isn’t the problem. Intent is: our enemies are those whose intentions embody mass killing of Americans.

Bin Laden and al Qaeda are thus closer, as both clearly harbor such intent. Neither, however, is sufficient. Al Qaeda could now survive without bin Laden; killing him alone would not destroy his organization. More important, al Qaeda itself could be destroyed without eliminating the threat if the ideology it represents survives it. It is al Qaeda’s ideology—and the malign intent this creates and embodies—that pose the real threat. No campaign which leaves this ideology vital and intact can succeed in eliminating the real threat to our vital interests that September 11 unveiled.

What is this ideology, and what makes it so threatening? Two points are most important. First, it is radically separatist. Al Qaeda seeks to preserve a puritanical, strictly fundamentalist Islam by isolating it from the destructive influences of modern, and especially Western, culture. Western ideas are seen as a profound threat to the proper practice of the faith; they see in them
a licentious decadence that both affronts God and corrupts humanity. Only by eliminating the temptation of Western ideas and culture can the community of the faithful properly serve Allah.

In the near term, this mandates expulsion of all Western presence from Arabia; eventually, it implies the need to cleanse all Islam of Western influence. This, in turn, poses major economic risks for a world economy dependent on Arabian and Indonesian oil, and presents insurmountable difficulties for long-standing U.S. commitments to Israel.

Yet even if we left Arabia and abandoned Israel, this would still fall short of satisfying the demands implied by the logic of al Qaeda’s doctrine. In a world of global communication, international broadcasting, and growing cultural interpenetration, it is impossible to imagine a society successfully insulating itself from outside influences for very long. A strictly observant Islamic world of al Qaeda’s design would inevitably find itself in conflict with Western ideas it could not possibly wall off beyond its shores. If the proper practice of Islam and the influence of Western culture are incompatible, and if the former is a central obligation of the faithful, then conflict between the West and al Qaeda’s radically separatist version of Islam is literally existential, and al Qaeda is unlikely ever to accept long-term coexistence even if its other aims were somehow realized. If so, then we cannot satisfy them with any feasible proffer; ultimately, Western concessions are likelier to stimulate further demands than to satisfy such an opponent. Only a global imposition of their interpretation of the faith could be stable and sufficient for them in the long term. Al Qaeda’s separatist ideology thus puts it on an inevitable collision course with our basic way of life.

The second crucial feature of al Qaeda’s ideology is its commitment to violence in pursuit of political empowerment. Separatist religious communities are not problematic in themselves; on the contrary, they have a long tradition in American history. The combination of radical separatism and mass violence, however, is poisonous. Al Qaeda sees violence as both acceptable and necessary, and draws no distinction between military and civilian targets for this violence. Nor does al Qaeda’s doctrine condone passive acceptance of their ideas without active participation in the fighting: bin Laden’s declaration of jihad against the West obligates all followers to armed struggle. In bin Laden’s view, Muslims cannot properly stand on the sideline in this war. Even if only a fraction of bin Laden’s potential followers act on his injunction, the spread of these ideas thus has profound military consequences; we need to be concerned not just with the extent of al Qaeda’s formal membership, but also with the extent of its ideological penetration in the Muslim world.

This combination of radical separatism and jihad is thus dangerous; it is also unusual, and distinguishes al Qaeda from other terrorist groups that have not to date inflicted mass casualties on Americans. Organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah, for example, while violent, have far more limited political aims centered on installing fundamentalist Islamic governments in specific states. Among Middle Eastern terrorist groups, only al Qaeda has yet formulated an ideological program oriented around a radical separatism focusing less on Israel or on the overthrow of individual Arab regimes per se than on the exclusion of Western influence from the entire region. While more traditional terrorist groups could well merge their aims into al Qaeda’s in the future—and especially if the latter sees initial success—they need not, and
have not to date. It is strongly in our interest to dissuade them from doing so. While terrorists of many stripes may threaten Americans, the vital national interests sketched above are threatened only by a much narrower subset represented by al Qaeda alone. Most terrorism does not approach the dangers raised by September 11; the real threat to America is thus much narrower than terrorism as such.

But while al Qaeda is a small minority even among terrorist groups, much less among Islam as a whole, it aspires to majority status in the Muslim world. The export of this ideology beyond the ranks of al Qaeda’s current operatives is thus a profound threat to our vital national interests. This export could take the form of increased membership for al Qaeda or the adoption of al Qaeda’s ideological program by terrorists who now share only some of its aims; either outcome is equally dangerous to us. It will do little good to kill current operatives if, in the meantime, they recruit more new adherents than we have removed. Restricting the ideology’s spread is at least as important as rooting out its current members if we are ever to get on top of the problem.

Our real opponent is thus the ideology that underpins al Qaeda’s terrorist program—it is not terrorism per se, nor even al Qaeda itself. And this implies that our war aims must include not only eliminating al Qaeda’s current operatives, but preventing their ideology from spreading beyond their current membership. To do this will demand the use of force and coercive leverage to root out bin Laden’s terrorists and their state sponsors—but it will also require us to win a war of ideas to persuade the great mass of politically uncommitted Muslims that al Qaeda’s separatist ideology is a dead end. This war of ideas will matter as centrally as the war of bullets for ultimate victory or defeat: if we lose the former, we will surely lose the latter, as the flow of new recruits will inevitably swamp our ability to find and eliminate veteran fighters.

What Would Suffice to End the Threat?

This conception of war aims implies a center of gravity against which a successful campaign could be directed. If we can deny al Qaeda a flow of new recruits, we can eventually destroy it. Al Qaeda’s shadowy, covert nature will make the process of running down its members slow and laborious, but sustained effort can eventually grind down any organization of fixed size. The challenge is to keep al Qaeda’s size fixed in the meantime. If they succeed in exporting their ideas to any significant portion of broader Islam, then we will never be able to cope militarily with the resulting flood of people and resources into Bin Laden’s camp. But if al Qaeda fails to spread its ideas, then even a slow-moving military campaign will eventually snuff it out. The center of gravity in this war thus lies in the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims: if bin Laden succeeds in converting them to his ideology of separatist jihad, then no plausible U.S. military effort will be sufficient to prevail; but if we succeed in winning the war of ideas, then al Qaeda will eventually be destroyed by our accompanying military operations.

To do this it will not be necessary to uncover every last al Qaeda operative—much less to kill every last terrorist worldwide. If we can combine steady progress on the military front with political containment of al Qaeda’s ideology, we will make it ever harder for bin Laden to mount mass casualty suicide attacks (especially in conjunction with energetic efforts in homeland defense). In this, the Weather
Underground offers an instructive metaphor. The Weathermen’s bombing campaign did not end because the FBI arrested its entire membership; some remain at large to this day. Instead, it was the loss of a sympathetic body of supporters and the ensuing recruits and resources that killed the Weathermen as an organization. Many fewer people are willing to risk their lives for an apparently losing cause than will do so in the vanguard of a movement with a future. If we can deny al Qaeda a future by winning the war of ideas, we thus make the military task attainable and victory achievable even if we cannot ever hope to extinguish terrorism as such or annihilate al Qaeda in its entirety.

This war of ideas, moreover, is one in which we enjoy important long-term advantages. Al Qaeda promulgates a repressive, sexist, authoritarian distortion of Islam that is unattractive not only to us, but to the great majority of Muslims as well. Most Muslims—like most Americans—do not want their daughters excluded from education. They do not want women relegated to veils and denied a meaningful life outside the home. They do not believe the state should punish people for the clothes they wear or the music they enjoy. And they do not see anyone who disagrees with them as an enemy of God whose ideas must be snuffed out and whose life can be taken in the name of Allah. Most Muslims see a God of peace and forgiveness, not a God of hate and violence. The mainstream practice of Islam is today so distant from al Qaeda’s twisted extremism that we need only prevent it from being hijacked by a splinter group whose views are now rejected by the majority of Muslims in Arabia and beyond.

We must be careful, however, to avoid waging this war of ideas in ways that give al Qaeda crucial ammunition. Many now worry about this, but see the problem in chiefly military terms: they oppose attacks on Muslim states like Iraq or Syria as alienating potential allies. Valid or not, however, a different danger of at least equal magnitude lies in the conduct of our ideological campaign: we must not abet bin Laden’s effort to portray us as cultural imperialists bent on destroying Islam and imposing Western licentiousness. To avoid this implies at least two requirements.

First, we cannot approach this campaign as a war to convert Muslims to our way of life. Our aim must be to promote a third way: neither separatist extremism nor imposed Westernism. Al Qaeda and the Islamic mainstream are now so far apart that many such opportunities should exist for enabling the legitimate religious yearnings of everyday Muslims to see political expression without creating a dualistic struggle with Western ideals. A central strategic challenge will be to identify such alternatives and promote them—especially where these alternatives threaten repressive political regimes whose corruption is seen by mainstream Muslims as inconsistent with their ideals.

Second, we must counter common perceptions of the West now being promulgated in much of the Arab world. We are routinely caricatured as rapacious libertines with no greater moral compass than vulgar materialism. These widely-held misperceptions make stable coexistence and effective opposition to extremist fundamentalism much harder. To overturn them will require a positive effort to provide a more accurate picture of America, our ideals, and our culture. This effort must walk a fine line between informing others and imposing our way of life—but our ability to promote a stable Islamic “third way” that does not define itself in violent opposition to us depends in part on escaping the demonized portrayal of ourselves now so common in the Arab world.
These challenges are not trivial, but they can be surmounted. And the ideological battlefield on which they are to be met is one where we enjoy important advantages if we conduct the campaign properly.

**How Would We Know When the War Has Been Won?**

Unlike World War II or Operation DESERT STORM, this war will not end at an appointed hour by the signing of a peace agreement or the declaration of a cease fire. But it can have a discernable ending. Our desired end state is the isolation of a remnant of al Qaeda into a small band of harried individuals living in deep cover as fugitives from the law, cut off from any base of popular support, despairing of any real hope of establishing their views through political power, and with no successor organization waiting in the wings to take up their struggle on behalf of a sympathetic people. Like the Weathermen, al Qaeda’s ability to threaten vital American interests would then be broken even if survivors remain, and even if these prove able to mount occasional terrorist incidents of conventional scale. Orthodox terrorism is not an existential threat to America; mass casualty terrorism on the scale of September 11 and the ability to sustain this, by contrast, is not achievable by bands of isolated individuals. The record to date suggests that this requires a degree of organization and profound commitment characteristic only of an institution like al Qaeda, and it is within our power to defeat al Qaeda as an institution even if we cannot kill every individual terrorist in the world.

The arrival of this day will not be apparent at the time, but will become ever clearer as the absence of mass fatality attacks on Americans grows prolonged. Just as the Cold War’s end was clear mainly in retrospect, so we can expect that the end of this war will be proclaimed by historians rather than by soldiers. Looking backwards today, we can say that the fall of Communist Poland, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and the breakup of the Soviet Union signaled a period within which the Cold War ended, though no single event can be said to have provided more than a symbolic finale. Likewise looking forward from today, there will come a time when we can be confident that we have seen the end of al Qaeda, but we cannot expect to be able to proclaim it at any single moment. End, however, it shall—if we formulate our aims and our strategies properly.
The noted British military theorist Basil Liddell Hart wrote in one of his many books that “War is the realm of the unexpected.” Military actions often produce unintended results that can negate positive gains and may even worsen the long-term situation. American planners must keep this hard truth in mind as they develop the continuing war against terrorism.

Reverberations from Choices in the Application of Force.

Strategic choices about the use of force often produce unexpected effects at all levels of war: tactical, operational and strategic. As an example, look at the norm for the initial American employment of military power. In an effort to achieve objectives quickly, limited air strikes often constitute the dominant part of early phases of an operation. This selection is driven in part by the rapid response capability of aerial assets and the desire to avoid friendly casualties and collateral damage, but is further motivated by hopes that goals can be achieved by committing a minimum of resources. Adherents of this strategy also assert that it is advantageous because it still allows levels of force to be gradually escalated to send signals of American resolve and to increase pressure on enemy decisionmakers. Coalition partners tend to prefer this approach. However, lessons from Vietnam, the Balkans, and even early operations in Afghanistan show that this course of action can actually stiffen enemy resistance rather than break it, providing opponents with time to develop countermeasures and become inured to military pressure, and increasing enemy confidence in their ability to hold out. In the long run, the gradual escalation of force tends to cost more resources and prolongs conflict. There is much to be said for delaying action until an

Conclusions:
- Prolonged destructive military action, especially with airpower, strains coalitions and fosters resentment. The best approach is to apply overwhelming force in short decisive campaigns, even if that requires time to build up resources in theater.
- Relying on local ground forces for combat reduces American leverage to shape the postwar environment, encouraging conditions that undermine political stability and increasing requirements for military peace operations.
- No matter how widespread American operations against terrorism are, attacks on numerous targets in Muslim countries will foster the perspective that the United States is engaged in a war against Islam.
- The United States must avoid appearing to be engaged solely in an attempt to maintain its hegemony or the status quo. Accordingly it should be wary of becoming tied too closely to repressive regimes, and should encourage reform in so-called “moderate” Arab governments.
overwhelming application of military power is possible. One can knock out an opponent quickly with a single, well-placed blow to the head, but the foe will repeatedly recover and require further fighting. It is quicker and more efficient in the long run to apply overwhelming force continuously until that opponent is permanently eliminated as a threat.

Once the air effort over Afghanistan was substantially increased and coordinated with major offensive efforts by local allies, it achieved great military success—so great, in fact, that many now hope to apply the same formula elsewhere. However, the application of American airpower in combat operations can often cause unintended consequences at the strategic level of war. The precise nature of the strikes in Afghanistan was supposed to help sustain international support for the operation by showing U.S. concern for minimizing collateral damage. However, the international reaction to the bombing campaign revealed the difficulties inherent in projecting an image of clean, surgical war to garner public support and reassure allies. Americans who emphasize the surgical nature of airpower must realize that the rest of the world does not view aerial bombardment the same way. When bombing commences, U.S. leaders tout the accuracy shown in strike videos, but the world press immediately invokes images of the carpet bombing of Tokyo and Dresden. A tactical effect was felt almost immediately as Pakistani volunteers—inspired to defend Afghanistan by the perceived brutality of the bombing and emboldened by its initial apparent ineffectiveness—compensated for some of the Taliban casualties from the initial American attacks. The strategic impact took just a bit longer, having to wait until inflated expectations for precision—both in intelligence and bombing—increased the impact of inevitable collateral damage. It should have come as no surprise when pictures of dead Afghan women and children started to be paraded across international television screens. These images evoke much more sympathy in the Third World than pictures of the ruins of the World Trade Center.

This effect is heightened by the impression that bombing is another example of American bullying of weaker nations, and reinforces the perception that the United States is not really committed to serious action. As one European commentator noted after Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, “Now we know what Americans are willing to kill for; but what are Americans willing to die for?” No course of action produces more coalition challenges than a prolonged campaign that makes it look as though America is “beating up” a weaker country. In such a situation, increasing numbers of civilian casualties inevitably erode international support for military action. And the backlash from the significant destruction wreaked by air attacks can threaten the very peace such tactics aim to achieve. Many Serbs still resent NATO’s bombing of their country, and billions of dollars will be necessary to repair the resulting damage and revive Balkan economies. Journalists have noted much hatred of Americans in Afghan towns where inhabitants feel they were improperly targeted by U.S. bombs. Even air attacks on military targets in mountain redoubts and cave complexes have produced enough civilian casualties to bring accusations of disproportionate and unacceptable force from international aid organizations.

Because of its reluctance to commit its own landpower in Afghanistan, America has had to rely on the forces of the Northern Alliance. This reliance also has produced unintended strategic consequences. The operational success of their forces has
emboldened the Northern Alliance to demand a major—if not leading—role in the new government, a situation unacceptable to majority Pashtun tribes. Press reports about their execution of prisoners have caused international alarm. Aid convoys are being looted or stopped, and local warlords are reasserting control of many areas liberated from the Taliban. Though the role of the Northern Alliance was instrumental in achieving tactical and operational success in Afghanistan, without moderation and control their actions might still endanger the strategic goal of a stable country that will not foster future terrorism. Similar problems appear to be arising with tribes in other parts of the country, as various warlords jockey for territory and bargaining leverage. A recent analysis of 52 wars since 1960 reveals that 50 percent of peace deals break down within 5 years, and the situation in Afghanistan is worse than most. Another study on peace-building in the 1990s warns “using local factions and warlords to provide the ground component of a military campaign can only undermine the political goals of diplomatic relations for a post-war state.” The consequence of limiting American ground involvement in the initial stages of combat operations in the country might be to increase its necessity in the long run, both in persistent fighting to root out al Qaeda and in keeping the peace after such combat is ended.

**Broadening the War.**

Those conducting the war on terrorism must remain focused on reducing the unintended consequences of near-term activities that could endanger the accomplishment of long-term objectives. Without such foresight, the backlash from the campaign in Afghanistan could make future operations in the war on terrorism more difficult. Many pundits have commented on the dangers of destabilizing Pakistan, and losing support from moderate Islamic states. Without a clear blueprint for the course of the war, the United States could find current actions antagonizing key allies for the next phase.

But there is an even greater danger in the future. As the United States pursues its war against terrorism, planners must keep in mind the ultimate goal of eliminating, or at least significantly reducing, the terrorist threat against the nation and its interests. It will do no good to wipe out al Qaeda while sowing the seeds that ensure the rise of similar organizations. This will require a hard look at how American actions are perceived.

The phrase is often quoted that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” and reflects the fact that terrorism is an approach sometimes taken by the weak against the strong to induce change. A broad war against all terrorist groups will reinforce Third World perceptions that the United States wants to retain its hegemony by enforcing the status quo at all costs. This argument was first made in the 1960s and 1970s by a school of revisionist diplomatic historians who argued that American economic prosperity depended on a world of order, stability, and open markets; according to this view national policies have aimed to maintain those characteristics in the international system. This viewpoint encouraged much cynicism about American ideals at home and abroad, and will do the same again if revived by a war that appears to value stability over human rights.

U.S. leaders should reevaluate relations with so-called “moderate” Arab regimes in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where most popular political aspirations are repressed and where many terrorists have been produced—including Osama bin Laden and most of the hijackers of September 11. The United States would probably benefit significantly if it could
influence those regimes to reform. Continually propping them up and maintaining the status quo risks a revolutionary explosion in the long term, and will insure a new crop of terrorists in the short term.

Some who argue for a broader conflict suggest expanding the war to include non-Islamic groups outside the Middle East, believing such action will obviate the argument that the United States is engaged in a war against Islam. A possible unintended consequence from that approach is that it might drive these other groups to adopt mass-casualty methods—and perhaps a common cause with al Qaeda—thus increasing the overall threat level for Americans. Whether or not operations in non-Arab countries are attempted, attacks against multiple targets in Arab countries will still reinforce the perception of a crusade against Islam. The end result of broad attacks will just be to stretch American resources while still antagonizing an Islamic public easily convinced of its victimization.

Avoiding future terrorism will also require that planners thoroughly analyze concessions required to obtain support from some states. Becoming identified with repressive regimes such as that in Uzbekistan might ultimately do us more harm than good. American dealings with Pakistan, essential as they have been, have endangered a growing relationship with democratic India. Short-term requests for support can also backfire in other ways. Though the U.S. request for a small number of Turkish soldiers provides visible evidence of Muslim support on the ground for the war against terrorism, the long-term impact of that action on an important NATO ally where the vast majority of the public is against American policy in Afghanistan should be carefully considered.

**Conclusions.**

To avoid sending the wrong message to future foes, military actions must be decisive in achieving operational and strategic goals. Rapidity is always preferred, but decisiveness is the most essential requirement. Failure to achieve such results—as is too often risked when quick action is overvalued or commitments are too limited—would diminish America’s image as a power to be respected. This would further embolden other groups and nations to challenge the United States and its interests, and make others less likely to trust our promises of support. National Command Authorities and the Joint Staff’s military planners must ensure that immediate regional actions—and their unintended consequences—don’t compromise the long-term strategic goals of the war on terrorism. Winning battles is not as important as winning the war.
The war on terrorism will undoubtedly fail if it is perceived as a war on Islam and generates a call for Muslim solidarity in a holy war against the United States and the other powers combating terrorism. Understanding how to avoid that perception first requires some familiarity with the concept of jihad. Strictly speaking, translating jihad as “holy war” is incorrect. *Harb mukaddasah* is the Arabic phrase for holy war. The Arabic word *jihad* means striving or exertion. In an Islamic context, it would mean striving in the way of God: perpetually struggling for the triumph of the word of God among men, doing good deeds and performing the prescribed duties of the faith. A Muslim strives in the way of God with his sword, tongue, and wealth, thus giving the concept of jihad a multifaceted nature that applies to the individual believer and the community.

One meaning of jihad is the duty of preaching the faith, since Islam is a proselytizing religion: “And let there be from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency” (Qur’an 3:104). This meaning of jihad could be accomplished through such activities as teaching, preaching, publishing, and establishing Islamic centers and schools.

Another meaning of jihad is in the sense of fighting: “Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged: and Allah is indeed able to give them victory” (Qur’an 22:39). The word *qital* (Arabic for fighting in the narrow sense—fight as it appears in this Qur’anic verse) as used here is not synonymous with the broader concept of jihad, which includes fighting where the context so requires. Jihad in the sense of fighting has always been a defensive principle. Muslims were allowed to fight only in self-defense and were forbidden to be aggressive. Furthermore, Muslim scholars are generally in agreement that jihad in the sense of fighting must meet several conditions to be religiously sanctioned. There must be a just cause for the conflict, it must be declared by the right authority, and the fighting must be waged in accordance with Islamic ethical principles, including

The war on terrorism will undoubtedly fail if it is perceived as a war on Islam and generates a call for Muslim solidarity in a holy war against the United States and the other powers combating terrorism. Understanding how to avoid that perception first requires some familiarity with the concept of jihad. Strictly speaking, translating jihad as “holy war” is incorrect. *Harb mukaddasah* is the Arabic phrase for holy war. The Arabic word *jihad* means striving or exertion. In an Islamic context, it would mean striving in the way of God: perpetually struggling for the triumph of the word of God among men, doing good deeds and performing the prescribed duties of the faith. A Muslim strives in the way of God with his sword, tongue, and wealth, thus giving the concept of jihad a multifaceted nature that applies to the individual believer and the community.

One meaning of jihad is the duty of preaching the faith, since Islam is a proselytizing religion: “And let there be from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency” (Qur’an 3:104). This meaning of jihad could be accomplished through such activities as teaching, preaching, publishing, and establishing Islamic centers and schools.

Another meaning of jihad is in the sense of fighting: “Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged: and Allah is indeed able to give them victory” (Qur’an 22:39). The word *qital* (Arabic for fighting in the narrow sense—fight as it appears in this Qur’anic verse) as used here is not synonymous with the broader concept of jihad, which includes fighting where the context so requires. Jihad in the sense of fighting has always been a defensive principle. Muslims were allowed to fight only in self-defense and were forbidden to be aggressive. Furthermore, Muslim scholars are generally in agreement that jihad in the sense of fighting must meet several conditions to be religiously sanctioned. There must be a just cause for the conflict, it must be declared by the right authority, and the fighting must be waged in accordance with Islamic ethical principles, including

Conclusions:
- U.S. cannot prevent extremists from declaring jihad in response to military attacks.
- Imperative for the U.S. to limit appeal of such calls with diplomacy and restrained rhetoric.
- U.S. should try to discredit those calling for jihad.
- At least initially, U.S. should limit targeted groups to al Qaida and its direct supporters while avoiding widespread attacks that would look like war against Islam.
sparing the lives of women, children, and the elderly.

The United States can do little, if anything, to prevent Muslim extremists—including al Qaida’s Osama bin Laden and the Taliban’s Mullah Mohammad Umar—from declaring jihad in response to U.S. military action against them. Questions about the “right authority” to call jihad will constrain the number of Muslims who would answer that call. However, an abundance of anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Islamic worlds—sentiments generated over the past several decades by U.S. pro-Israeli and perceived anti-Islam policies and compounded by deteriorating socioeconomic conditions—guarantee that a call to jihad by the Taliban and bin Laden will fall on many receptive ears across the Islamic world. “Striving with sword, tongue, or wealth”; those who do respond might be enough to cause the stability of friendly Arab and other Muslim nations to be of concern. The United States could make that response even greater by expanding military action beyond bin Laden and the Taliban regime that harbors him. If that happens—at least without some conclusive evidence proving a connection to the attacks of September 11—there is a high risk that other “religious authorities” would be enticed to join in the call for jihad against the “aggressor.” Emotional broadcasts of war conditions showing Muslim mujahideen being defeated by American and other Western forces would do more than call into question the stability of friendly Muslim states; it would put at significant risk the U.S. ability to prosecute the war on terrorism to a successful end.

How then should we extract justice for the attack on our country on September 11? How can we wage a war on terrorism and not elicit a holy war in response? Refraining from military action against Afghanistan, the Taliban, and al Qaida—or any other country or organization suspected of involvement in terrorism—would be a simple answer. Use of the other instruments of U.S. national power—diplomatic, economic, and informational—would not engender holy war. Neither would it appease the American public, which expects some form of military revenge for the deaths of thousands of citizens from America and around the world. The suggestion of not responding militarily also has the serious flaw of being an incentive for extremists in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world to engage in further acts of terrorism. It would promote the belief that the United States would refrain from military response because of American leaders’ fear that the threat to declare jihad would be heeded by Muslims across the Islamic world.

Rather than being concerned with avoiding even illegitimate calls for “holy war”—a situation over which the United States has no control save for the absurd option of not responding militarily—the focus should be on how to contain the validity of a bin Laden or Taliban declaration of jihad to their immediate adherents and like-minded extremists. Perhaps only rewriting the history of U.S. policies and strategies toward the Arab and Islamic worlds since World War II would ensure success in this endeavor. However, the Bush administration has thus far made many proper moves in responding to the crisis. Declaring war on terrorism, not on Islam, was one of the most critical. It leaves no doubt, at least in national rhetoric, that America’s enemies are those who pervert Islam with unacceptable violence. Building an international coalition with partners from the Arab and Islamic worlds is also key. This gives great credibility to the U.S.-led efforts, just as was the case in the Gulf War, when Arab allies demonstrated that aggression by an Arab and Muslim country would not be tolerated. Use of all
the elements of national power—not just the military one—is also important in containing the response to the call for jihad. It is hard to justify fighting the antiterrorism coalition when it is providing humanitarian assistance and other economic incentives to assist Muslims.

The military action—with the immediate task of defeating bin Laden and his training bases in Afghanistan—is only the first part of a complex campaign. The United States must take several additional actions to contain any call for jihad. First, it should work to discredit the legitimacy of a jihad declaration by an entity that sanctions terrorism. The desired outcome would be an Islamic world convinced that American military response is in self-defense against criminals who will repeat their deeds unless stopped. To contain any fallout from the inevitable calls to jihad, the United States should work with its closest Muslim allies to nudge Egypt—the seat of Al-Azhar Mosque and the center of orthodox Sunni theology—to question bin Laden’s qualifications and authority to issue fatwas (religious edicts) and to declare jihad. It is strongly in the U.S. interest to increase across the Islamic world the numbers of mufti (clerics) articulating this point of view. The brief exposition of the meaning of jihad outlined above suggests important errors in bin Laden’s call, such as his declaration of offensive war against innocents, and raises serious doubts about the qualifications of bin Laden and the Taliban to declare a jihad of any kind. Bin Laden’s doctrine—claiming legitimacy for the use of terror in a jihad against a strong enemy—could and should be refuted by Muslim clerics. A well-prepared psyops team will be able to play a major positive role in this effort.

The temptation exists to go after several “affiliates” of al Qaida. Many of these—like Hamas and Hizbollah—are scattered across the Arab world and are viewed by most Arabs and Muslims as organizations engaged in legitimate self-defense and national liberation efforts. Overt military action against such groups would be a grave strategic error if the United States wishes to contain the spread of the call to jihad. More grave would be a military campaign against so-called “rogue” states that for some time have graced the State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism. In such an eventuality, containing the appearance that the United States was waging a war against Islam might be impossible.

The United States has much to lose if it is unsuccessful in its efforts to avoid its war on terrorism being characterized as a war against Islam. Military action is unavoidable—although it must be accompanied throughout the war by use of the non-military elements of power—but it must be carefully applied to avoid the specter of a Muslim world united behind bin Laden.
In today's world, a terrorist movement can be built and operate without state support. Terrorists can fund themselves via crime or even legitimate business ventures and charities. They can obtain information and intelligence via open sources. They can communicate and coordinate their activities using the global information infrastructure, protected by various forms of encryption. And they can train almost anywhere by simply renting an isolated house or farm. Still, state support certainly makes terrorism easier and more effective. Eliminating it is an important but complex part of the war on terrorism.

**Modes of State Support to Terrorism.**

In the contemporary security environment, there are three modes of state support to terrorism. Each requires a different U.S. response. What can be called *Category I* states provide protection, logistics, training, intelligence, or equipment to terrorists as a part of national policy or strategy. While this sort of activity has a long history, it became particularly common during the Cold War. Support for terrorism and for other forms of low intensity conflict was seen as a way that some Soviet clients, particularly East
Germany, North Korea, Bulgaria, Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Iraq, could attack the West and Israel while minimizing the chances of escalation. Many of these Category I supporters developed terrorist support industries, providing large scale training facilities as well as intelligence and other forms of direct operational support.

The end of the Cold War did great damage to the global terrorist support network. With the Soviet Union no longer offering protection, state sponsors were vulnerable to direct punishment. The end of Soviet economic support led states like Cuba and Syria to seek integration into the global economy and global community. Support for terrorism is, of course, a major obstacle to this. Today the remaining Category I supporters go to great lengths to cover their involvement with terrorism or provide only limited forms of support. There are no “full spectrum” supporters today. Most Category I support now takes the form of either sanctuary without direct operational support (e.g., Afghanistan) or intelligence assistance from a segment of a state’s security forces sometimes acting without the explicit approval of national leaders.

Category II supporters do not back terrorism as an element of national policy, but tolerate it to some degree. This often grows from an assessment that the risks and costs of eradicating terrorist networks outweigh the expected benefits—letting sleeping dogs lie. In effect, Category II states have a tacit modus vivendi with terrorists. In exchange for turning a blind eye, the regime is not targeted. In some Category II states, terrorists have the sympathy of segments of the military or other security services, so the regime may feel that pressuring them may cause dangerous schisms within the government. Egypt and Pakistan seem to fit this model. Some Category II states may tolerate terrorist activity to deflect attention from their own shortcomings or repression. In the Islamic world, for instance, allowing radicals to blame Israel or the United States for poverty, misery, and so forth removes attention from the flaws of the region’s leaders and systems. The toleration of virulent anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere is an example. Finally, some Category II states may provide sanctuary for terrorists simply out of an inability to police and control parts of their national territory.

Category III support is what might be called “structural.” It comes from the presence of legal protections of privacy and freedoms of movement and association, limits on internal surveillance and security organizations, well-developed communication and transportation infrastructures, and émigré communities, all providing a hospitable environment for some kinds of terrorists. The governments of Category III states do not support or approve of terrorism; most actively seek to exterminate it, but find their efforts constrained by the legal system and values of their states. The United States, Canada, and Germany are examples.

Addressing State Support to Terrorism.

Stopping and deterring state support to terrorism should, when possible, be pursued through diplomatic, legal, and multilateral channels. One element of this should be strengthening the international legal proscriptions on support for terrorism. Attempts to do this have been underway for years, but have been hindered by ideological and political considerations. Even defining the problem is difficult since one man’s “terrorist” can be another man’s “freedom fighter.” In recent years, though, a basic legal framework has begun to take shape. For instance, the 1994 and 1996
Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism of the United Nations General Assembly condemned all terrorist acts and methods regardless of political, philosophical, ideological, ethnic, or religious considerations. This was further strengthened in Resolution 1269 (October 19, 1999) in which the U.N. Security Council: “Unequivocally condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace and security.”


This legal structure, though, has some serious flaws. The first is the continuing problem of defining terrorism. While there is little debate that the September 11 attacks on the United States constituted terrorism, many other uses of force are harder to categorize. Second, the existing international legal structure largely treats terrorism as a crime rather than an act of war. This creates friction and ambiguities in any attempts to deal with it. Third, like much of international law, no formal enforcement mechanism exists to deal with terrorism.

The United States could address these shortcomings first by leading an effort to codify an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. The United States should insist that terrorism or support to terrorism be treated as a threat to international peace and security and thus an act of war. Then the international community should develop the same sort of enforcement mechanisms that address other threats to international peace and security, specifically a procedure by which the United Nations authorizes collective security to address the threat under Chapter VII of the Charter. At the same time, the United States should refine the National Security Strategy to deal with each of the three types of terrorist supporters. Eradicating Category I support will often require coercion, to include armed force. U.S. policy should specify that overt support to terrorists who target U.S. citizens or the United States is an act of war, and will be treated as such. After all, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

To deter Category I supporters requires that the United States be able to project decisive force around the world. The Army’s contribution to this is vital. While the United States would always prefer not to project landpower to a distant state, having the ability to do so and, if appropriate, replace a regime, is a deterrent. If decisive action is taken against a Category I supporter of terrorism, the Army may also play a vital role in post-conflict reconstitution of the state by providing security and other forms of support to a multinational force or international organization. In instances where a Category I supporter is willing to change its behavior, the United States should be willing to provide political, economic, and perhaps even military inducements. Army engagement programs including IMET, MTTs, and combined exercises could be part of this.
To stop and deter Category II support, the United States must provide inducements to eradicate terrorist networks, support for doing so, and, in some cases, punishment for failing to do so. The inducements could include economic steps like preferential market access and debt relief, or political ones like increased attention to a diplomatic problem of concern to the Category II supporters. Punishments for Category II supporters that fail to take serious steps could also include a range of political and economic actions. For instance, the United States could expand the system for listing state sponsors. The current list, which is prepared by the State Department, focuses on Category I type support. It might also include Category II support from nations not making strenuous efforts to deal with terrorist support networks within their territory. Various types of economic and political inducements could be tied to this list. As with policies to promote democracy and counter narcotrafficking, the United States should oppose World Bank or IMF funding to Category II states on the State Department’s list. In addition, the United States should instigate an effort to create a multinational legal forum to try to punish terrorists. This would limit the vulnerability of Category II states to retribution as they brought terrorists to justice.

Each Category III state, including the United States, must assess its legal system and security organization to become more effective at countering terrorism while protecting national values. Among Category III states, the United States should take the lead in improving intelligence sharing and cooperation in eradicating terrorist support infrastructure, particularly financial flows.

Conclusions.

Addressing state support for terrorism will require a broad effort on the part of the United States, integrating economic, diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence steps. The Army can contribute to this by:

• Analyzing state support to terrorism in terms of three categories: Category I support entails protection, logistics, training, intelligence, or equipment provided terrorists as a part of national policy or strategy; Category II support is when a regime does not back terrorism as an element of national policy but tolerates it; Category III support provides some terrorists a hospitable environment, growing from the presence of legal protections on privacy and freedom of movement, limits on internal surveillance and security organizations, well-developed infrastructure, and émigré communities.

• Further develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to be able to punish Category I supporters of terrorism and to contribute to multinational reconstruction of those that are punished. Make this a focus mission for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams.

• Develop Army doctrine, concepts, and forces to provide engagement and other types of support activities to Category II states attempting to eradicate terrorism within their territories, to include concepts and organizations designed specifically to support regional partners and allies rather than having support to partners as a secondary mission.

Use Army wargaming and strategic planning capabilities to create a program designed specifically to improve the counterterrorism concepts, doctrine, and organizations of the U.S. military, other U.S. Government agencies, and partner nations, with a focus on deterring Category
I supporters, augmenting the capabilities of Category II supporters, and increasing cooperation and communication among Category III supporters.
The recent terrorist attacks on New York and Washington have focused the attention of the nation and its military on immediately combating this serious threat. The dominant National Military Strategy paradigm of the 1990s—"shape, respond, and prepare"—was in the process of being redone by the Bush administration prior to the attacks, but still provides a concise way of broadly describing the tasks the military must perform. Along with its sister Services, the Army is currently concentrating almost exclusively on responding and even more narrowly on actions to punish and prevent terrorism. President Bush and his cabinet have been clear that this will be a long struggle, however, and the Army must not neglect its many other important shaping and preparing missions during that time. A victory over terrorism will be meaningless if it is not accompanied by the continuing spread of peace, security, democracy, and free market ideas that those other military missions support.

U.S. needs and interests require a broad and balanced security focus. While the Army will understandably place high priority on contributing to winning the war against terrorism, the service must simultaneously conduct operations along four other axes. It must continue its involvement in day-to-day engagement activities around the world, sustain its capability to conduct peace operations, remain ready to fight and deter major wars, and maintain momentum for transformation. The Army was already stretched by its operational tempo before September 11; the new demands will only exacerbate that situation. However, they must not divert the Service from accomplishing its other essential missions.

First, the Army must not allow an increased emphasis on force protection and other operations against terrorism to deflect it from supporting regional CINCs in their efforts to remain engaged overseas. Through its 150,000 forward-stationed and deployed forces, the Army provides over 60 percent of America’s forces committed to engagement. Often such involvement can shape the regional environment to prevent conflicts or facilitate responses when they occur. The U.S. ability to conduct current

---

**Conclusions:**
- While fighting terrorism, the Army must maintain its ability to remain engaged in the world, perform peace operations, fight and deter wars, and execute transformation.
- The service will quickly need an expanded and restructured active force with increased intelligence/CS/CSS/SOF assets.
- Reserve Component mobilization plans need to be reexamined with their forces reorganized for new missions and reapportioned with the Active Component.
- Reconfiguring the force to better combat terrorism should reinforce and accelerate transformation efforts.
operations against Afghanistan was aided considerably by 82d Airborne Division exercises with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1997. Remaining engaged around the world now will similarly facilitate operations when the next unexpected crisis occurs and will also help prevent crises from occurring in the first place. The coalitions forming to combat different aspects of terrorism include a number of new partners and should provide even more opportunities for military-to-military contacts and other engagement activities.

Even while initiating new operations against terrorism, the Army will still have forces involved in numerous peacekeeping missions and must resist calls to withdraw from these missions to provide resources for the war on terrorism. The current Army missions in Bosnia and Kosovo remain important, though future similar assignments should not be lightly accepted because of the strain these seemingly unending deployments impose on existing forces. However, there will be times—even while fighting the war on terrorism—when national interests will require humanitarian assistance and secure peace operations that only American military forces can provide. Effective and efficient “peace-building” efforts must remain an important element of any national security strategy. The current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that post-conflict societies can become breeding grounds for crime and terrorism if some sort of order is not imposed.

To prevent peacekeeping assignments from dragging on and tying up scarce assets, the Army and supporting agencies must become better at nation-building. Though President Bush has again reiterated his resistance to that mission, long-term solutions to create a more stable world will require the United States to engage in it, and only the Army can really do it in an environment of questionable security. Success in stabilization operations and success in the war against terrorism will be closely linked because of the cause-effect relationship that exists between them and because of the similarity of unit requirements. The service should be daunted by—and prepare for—the responsibilities it might assume to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan after bin Laden and his supporters are rooted out.

The Army must also retain its ability to deter and fight wars. Cross-border wars of aggression are not the most likely type of conflict predicted for the future, but they are certainly not impossible and clearly require forces ready to fight them. In fact, it is precisely because forces are ready to fight them that they are so unlikely. Even in the war on terrorism, where major combat forces will likely have only limited utility, they will still be essential if operations expand to take on states that support terrorism. The most powerful military force on the planet remains a joint force based around a heavy corps, and those units must not be allowed to atrophy. Cross border incursions remain a threat in Asia and the Middle East. The Bush administration’s stern warning to Iraq not to attempt to take advantage of America’s concentration on terrorism would not be an effective deterrent without the joint force—including landpower—to back it up.

While the Army must continue to emphasize the importance of a balanced joint force to fight and deter wars, it must also simultaneously maintain its focus on long-term transformation. The evolving requirements of the war against terrorism will highlight even more the necessity for lighter, smarter, more lethal, and more agile forces. As originally conceived, transformation was to prepare the Army for future wars. That concept needs to be shaped by the new geostrategic focus on
terrorism and then probably should be accelerated to allow the new capabilities to bring increased levels of effectiveness to the war on terrorism.

**Force Structure Considerations.**

When combined with ongoing missions and responsibilities, the demands of the new focus on fighting terrorism will strain the Army considerably and highlight many shortfalls in its structure. The force that fought and won Operation DESERT STORM is long gone. The current Army is really too small to fight a major land war against a state like Iraq without even more coalition landpower augmentation than it received in the Gulf War, but it is also deficient in many elements necessary to fight terrorism, provide for homeland defense, and conduct peace operations. The number of active component intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, military police, and engineer units must be increased, not only to perform contemporary peacekeeping and stabilization functions, but also to meet the new demands of the war against terrorism, including significantly increased force protection requirements around the world.

Performing all these missions will also be very stressful on the National Guard and Army Reserve. They will be pulled between future significant and immediate requirements for homeland security, the recent demands of peace operations, and the need to support or participate in the overseas fight against terrorism. If more of the Reserve Components are committed to duties at home, deployment schedules for the Balkans could be affected, increasing the burden on active forces for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. The 50,000 reservists being called up and National Guard troops providing airport security are only the beginning of a long-term commitment to homeland security and consequence management which, if the mission remains with the Reserve Components, might seriously compromise their ability to support a major theater war. Current mobilization plans clearly need review and probably need significant revision.

The war against terrorism is only one of many essential missions the Army must perform. The service must be very forthright with Congress and the Bush administration about the additional forces needed to conduct its myriad of important duties. The HQDA staff should immediately develop plans and gather support to begin the process of expanding and restructuring the force. Recruiting, training, and equipping new soldiers and units will take time. While Reserve Component mobilization and some economy of force efforts might suffice in the short term to meet Army requirements, these arrangements cannot be maintained for a long period without debilitating the force and raising the level of risk for long-term missions.

In summary, maintaining strategic balance will require more than just better guidance, planning, and training. Increased force structure—accompanied by revisions in the makeup of that structure and by reallocation between the Active and Reserve Components—will be necessary to enhance the Army’s ability to fight the war against terrorism while simultaneously keeping the peace in other areas. The simultaneous and ongoing demands for homeland security, anti-terrorist strikes, peace operations, and deterring war will require more land forces, especially in the Active Component, and mostly in the areas of CS, CSS, and SOF. Increasing intelligence assets will be especially crucial. Forces will need to be reapportioned between the Active and Reserve Components and reserve units reconfigured to handle new and existing long-term requirements. At the same time, the Service
cannot become so focused on current operations that the momentum and direction of transformation is lost. The world changed on September 11, 2001, and the Army must adjust accordingly. But its long-term vision remains viable, and the course to reach it must be maintained.
This paper provides a brief analysis of the U.S. homeland’s current threats and vulnerabilities, outlines a general strategy for homeland defense and the war against terrorism, and discusses some salient issues related to command and control.

Assumptions.

The U.S. will continue to wage a multi-lateral and sustained war against all terrorist organizations with “global reach” and their state (and nonstate) sponsors. Hence, homeland security requires a long-term perspective.

Unless significant legislative changes occur, the U.S. military will perform most homeland security missions in support of other federal agencies.

The U.S. will remain politically and economically engaged in the world. It will maintain sufficient military presence overseas to deter aggression and honor its alliance and treaty commitments.

Conclusions:

- The new war being waged against America is a form of asymmetric warfare using terror tactics, not a standard terrorism campaign.
- DoD’s role is evolving but will likely remain largely a supporting one in homeland defense.
- The new threat environment and the numerous “vulnerabilities” within the homeland require a new way of thinking about “threats” and how to address them.
- Assessments of critical infrastructure and key assets require updating.
- NMD will remain a critical component of homeland defense.
- The nation needs a Federal Defense Plan to complement the Federal Response Plan (FRP) that exists for consequence management.

Threats and Vulnerabilities.

Terrorism. Despite heightened awareness and increased security efforts since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. remains vulnerable to a wide variety of terrorist attacks. On October 5, 2001, for instance, the Project on Government Oversight reported that America’s ten nuclear weapons research and production facilities are still inadequately protected. A report recently published by the Henry L. Stimson Center revealed that the 850,000 sites that produce, consume, and store hazardous chemical materials in the U.S. remain virtually unprotected.

Furthermore, while much attention remains focused on the war overseas, domestic terrorist organizations—e.g., the “Michigan Militia,” the “Order,” and the “Aryan Nations”—remain at large and dangerous. Until September 11, 2001, international and domestic terrorists had claimed 670 lives on U.S. soil in over 2,700
incidents, with white racist groups causing the majority (51 percent) of deaths. Domestic terrorist groups could well retaliate in response to the federal government’s introduction of increased security measures in the aftermath of September 11.

Although the number of international and domestic terrorist attacks has declined in the 1990s, the lethality of those attacks has risen dramatically. This rising lethality can be looked at in one of two ways: 1) as the emergence of a “new” or “apocalyptic” brand of terrorism bent on producing mass casualties, or 2) as a new or “asymmetric” form of warfare that employs terror tactics. The first view tends to regard “terrorism” as an aggregate, placing disparate terrorist groups—such as the Aryan Nations, the IRA, and al-Qaeda—into a single category. In so doing, it obscures their ideological, political, and cultural differences. An understanding of such differences is critical to the development of effective strategies for defeating such groups. The IRA has shown a proclivity to employ small-scale attacks that do not involve large numbers of casualties and which damage infrastructure such as power grids. These are clearly not the tactics of the al-Qaeda group. The motives of al-Qaeda, unlike those of the IRA or the Aryan Nations, have unique religious and cultural underpinnings which, if not understood, could result in an escalation of the current conflict or lead to other negative strategic consequences for the U.S., its allies, and coalition partners. Thus, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to terrorism could lead to an inappropriate strategy for defending the homeland and for conducting military operations overseas.

The U.S. Army and DoD would do better, therefore, to take the view that America is engaged in a new or asymmetric style of warfare perpetrated by certain states and nonstate actors who prefer terror tactics. This view permits the disaggregation of “terrorism” based on useful criteria such as political and cultural motives, enabling a better understanding of a particular group’s strengths and weaknesses. It also facilitates development of a more integrated national security strategy, one that provides for a comprehensive defense of the homeland while also dealing with nonstate actors and their state sponsors. Third, it allows the U.S. Army to demonstrate the strategic relevance of its core competencies and its transformation programs. The Army should also stress how the campaign in Afghanistan has highlighted the limitations of an airpower-centric approach to warfare.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive/High-Yield (CBRNE) Weapons. CBRNE weapons continue to proliferate. Seventeen countries—including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea—have active chemical and biological weapons programs. While it remains difficult to manufacture, deliver, and activate certain types of CBRNE weapons, the apparent availability of “free-lance” expertise from the former Soviet Union combined with today’s rapid pace of technological innovation suggests that potential adversaries will succeed in overcoming these difficulties sooner rather than later. The recent decision to increase the reserve of smallpox and anthrax vaccines is, therefore, encouraging.

Critical (and Other) Infrastructure. In 1997, the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) assessed the vulnerability of the nation’s critical infrastructure. At that time, U.S. critical infrastructure included: 400 airports; 1,900 seaports; 6,000 bus and rail transit terminals; 1,700 inland river terminals; 1.4 million miles of oil and natural gas pipelines; and other banking, financial, and energy-related networks. The Commission assessed the Energy, Physical
Distribution, and Banking and Finance sectors as either well-protected or relatively resilient to an attack, while it regarded the Vital Human Services and Information and Communications sectors as highly vulnerable to cyber and physical forms of attack.

The PCCIP admitted that it did not know enough about water-borne pathogens and the threat they could pose if released into the nation’s water supply. The American Waterworks Association (AWWA) maintains that the sheer volume, chlorine content, and multiple filtration systems built into major water supplies make them resistant to contamination by all but a few pathogens. At risk, however, are smaller water supplies.

Unfortunately, the PCCIP also completely overlooked the nation’s agricultural infrastructure. While the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is confident that it can respond to “natural, accidental, and inadvertent introductions” of exotic diseases and pests into the food supply and agricultural system, it admits that it is incapable of addressing the “widespread intentional introduction” of such threats. The number of pathogens and other agents that could devastate U.S. livestock and crops are numerous and inexpensive to develop. Since the U.S. produces some 30-50 percent of many of the world’s foodstuffs, an agricultural crisis could have global implications.

The PCCIP also failed to consider the entertainment and recreational industries—amusement parks, sports arenas, shopping malls, and other locations where large numbers of people gather. While not necessarily critical to the nation’s ability to function, these are the types of targets that al-Qaeda and other such organizations seem inclined to strike. A successful CBRNE attack against Disney World or a major sports arena, for example, could result not only in thousands of casualties, but in adverse economic consequences as well.

The PCCIP’s oversights combined with the rapid pace of urbanization and economic development, even since 1997, suggest that the Commission’s assessment requires immediate updating. By way of illustration, in 1999 the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), an interagency office housed at the FBI, identified a list of just over 200 key national assets requiring protection. However, its FY01 report is expected to include a total of 4,385 key assets.

The Cyber Threat. In February 2000, the Director of the CIA testified before Congress that the foreign cyber threat was growing rapidly. More than one dozen countries—including Russia, the PRC, and several states of concern—have developed, or are developing, the means to launch strategic-level cyber attacks. The interconnectedness of much of the nation’s infrastructure means that a successful cyber attack against one sector will likely result in adverse effects in others.

Ballistic Missiles. Today, more than 25 countries possess ballistic missile programs, though only two, Russia and China, currently have missiles capable of reaching the U.S. The Rumsfeld Commission reported that North Korea and Iran could build ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. within 5 years of deciding to do so. Iraq could have the same capability within 10 years of such a decision. It is difficult, if not impossible, to know precisely when one of these states might take such a decision. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have also been known sponsors of terrorism for some time. In other words, America’s war against terrorism could lead in time to a confrontation with one or more states capable of targeting the U.S. with ballistic missiles.
Cruise Missiles. Cruise missiles include a wide variety of types, ranging from relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the more expensive U.S.-made Tomahawks. Intelligence estimates indicate that some 80,000 cruise missiles of numerous types will exist by 2010. More than 75 countries already possess some kind of cruise missiles, and the technology for developing them is proliferating rapidly. Many types in existence today can be concealed in and launched from standard shipping containers. On average, 1500 ships carrying standard containers navigate the Pacific and Atlantic oceans within cruise-missile range of the United States every day.

“Threats” versus Vulnerabilities.

Today’s threat environment reflects the influences of a faster-paced and more interconnected world. In this environment, the traditional notion that “a threat = capabilities x intentions” remains valid for conventional warfare, but has serious deficiencies when applied to America’s “New War.” In the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, terrorists demonstrated an ability to use common materials—box knives and airliners filled with fuel—rather than uniquely military “capabilities.” The so-called capabilities of al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups are, therefore, limited only by their imagination and their ability to gain access to the specific items they want to use.

Moreover, the general intention of such groups is self-evident, namely, to hurt the U.S. in whatever way possible. Yet, the specific intentions of individual tactical cells—such as which targets will be attacked, when, and how—are much more difficult to divine and are clearly much more important. The traditional definition of “threat” essentially provided a useful calculus for the strategy of deterrence that characterized the Cold War. However, it is inadequate for the new security environment in which an enormous number of vulnerabilities exist, and where many of the players do not readily conform with the “rational-actor” model.

National Missile Defense (NMD). America’s war on terrorism will make NMD more important to U.S. security despite the fact that attacks so far have been largely “asymmetric.” Since a long war against terrorism and its state-sponsors runs the risk of escalating into a war against one or more states of concern, the U.S. is effectively in a race against time to develop some type of comprehensive missile defense system. Reports that development of an NMD system will proceed are, therefore, encouraging. The U.S. should maintain a global perspective when it comes to missile defense, since an attack against an ally or strategic partner could adversely affect America’s ability to protect its interests.

A Strategy for Defense. Most government-sponsored studies of homeland security have focused primarily on issues related to consequence management. Indeed, defense seems a nearly impossible task, given the large number of potential targets, the vast number of scenarios, and the overall financial expenditures that an effective defense would likely require. While consequence management is clearly important, the events of September 11, 2001, demonstrate that the absence of a comprehensive, preventive strategy for homeland defense can result in an enormous loss of lives and even greater financial costs than prudent defensive measures would have entailed.

One of the first actions that the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) should undertake, therefore, is to develop a comprehensive strategy for homeland defense. A Federal Defense Plan would provide a critical element in that strategy.
DoD’s strategists and war planners could provide valuable assistance in the development of both. One possible outline for a homeland defense strategy follows:

1. Prevention: Hardening potential targets—whether nuclear reactors or shopping malls—against attack. This measure will require thorough vulnerability analyses involving all forms of attack.

2. Active Countermeasures: Systematic surveillance and preemptive confrontation with known terrorist sympathizers and supporters, increased law enforcement and/or military presence, and an active publicity campaign designed to let terrorists know that the U.S. is prepared to respond.

3. Aggressive Intelligence: Proactive intelligence gathering, analysis, dissemination, and sharing among appropriate national (and international) agencies, allies and coalition partners, and state and local law enforcement authorities. This is the most essential and yet most complicated component due to legal constraints regarding the collection of intelligence on U.S. citizens.

4. Development of Indicators: A set of triggering events that could be used to focus intelligence efforts and/or initiate countermeasures.

5. Anticipatory Crisis Response: Multilateral, global response mechanisms designed in anticipation of terrorist attacks. This component would include coordination (particularly with Canada and Mexico), training, readiness evaluation, and rehearsals of what to do and how to do it in the event of an attack.

This model served the U.S. well in the Gulf War (1990-91) by helping military and civilian officials deter or defeat Iraqi terrorist attacks. It offers a clear reminder that effective homeland defense requires a global perspective, particularly with regard to intelligence.

Successful execution of any strategy will require effective management by an overarching organization, such as the OHS. While personal influence, individual leadership skills and direct access to the President will help, ultimately the OHS’s effectiveness will depend upon the degree of budgetary and legal authority it has over the more than 40 federal and other organizations that play a role in homeland security.

Command and Control. Military command and control in homeland defense could take a variety of forms, from enlarging Joint Task Force-Civil Support to standing up a unified combatant command.

Recent studies that recommend against standing up a U.S. combatant command might have arrived at the right answer for the wrong reasons. One study split the overarching mission of homeland security into two parts: defense of the U.S. and support to civil authorities. The author saw little advantage in combining the two parts of the overall mission under one command, a command that, if current plans remain in effect, would not have assigned forces. Instead, he recommended that UCP'01 reflect a short-term fix by (1) consolidating civil support functions at JFCOM through the realignment of DOMS from the Army to OSD and the Joint System, and (2) assigning NMD to SPACECOM.

However, such objections do not stand up to closer scrutiny. First, whether a synergy exists between the two homeland security missions—and whether this is a valid criterion for not putting them under a single command—are matters of judgment. One could combine both missions under one command to facilitate coordination and reduce possible conflicts over resources. Second, the fact that forces are not currently assigned does not necessarily preclude their assignment at a later date. The problem of defending the homeland is

35
larger than the solution a revised UCP could provide. The nation needs a Federal Defense Plan to complement the Federal Response Plan that exists for consequence management.

A more compelling reason for not creating a “CINC America” is that current laws prohibit the military from collecting and storing intelligence on U.S. citizens. Until those laws are changed, a military combatant commander cannot gather the intelligence necessary to take proactive steps in defense of the homeland. Accordingly, a combatant commander would do little more than respond to “taskings” for military forces by the FBI or other lead federal agencies. It is far from certain that the courts would grant exceptions to the law, even under a wartime footing. At issue are privacy rights and civil liberties, the preservation of which remains an enduring vital interest of the U.S. and its citizens.

If legislative changes do not occur, then the establishment of a para-military civil defense force might offer a better long-term solution for defending the homeland. A civil defense force would not fall under the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act and could perform a variety of functions, such as protecting key national assets and augmenting local law enforcement, border guards, customs officials, and the Coast Guard. It could come under the control of an organization similar to the OHS.
The Issue.

Events on September 11, 2001, changed many aspects of the domestic security environment. Those changes will ultimately redefine the military role in domestic security, which will subsequently affect Army missions. After a solid analysis of the new or revised missions, the Army will be required to adjust its force structure significantly and adapt to major DoD structural changes, particularly those necessitated by development of the Homeland Security Agency.

The military's role in domestic security has evolved over many years and is constrained by the Constitution of the United States and subsequent laws. That evolution has been engendered by periodic changes in the domestic security environment, either when new requirements were identified or when old methods of dealing with previously-identified requirements were found to be inadequate. The military's current role in domestic security is officially defined by a collection of DoD and other agency documents. This paper will examine the major changes for the military role and will determine which of those are likely to result in significant changes for the Army's mission. The domestic security environment is divided into two dimensions for purposes of examining the issues pertinent to military roles and missions. The first, crisis management, is the prevention of events that threaten national security. The second, consequence management, deals with those times when prevention fails, and the military and others respond to those events to minimize damage and effect recovery. Consequence management also covers the actions taken to provide consequences for the perpetrator of the event. Any examination of changes in requirements—or assignment of responsibility for those requirements—in domestic security must consider both prevention actions and response actions.

Conclusions:

- Events on September 11, 2001, changed aspects of the domestic security environment that will ultimately redefine military roles and affect Army missions for domestic security.
- New or enhanced Army missions are in the areas of internal air defense, international response, intelligence sharing, immigration support, national level coordination, law enforcement support, and infrastructure protection.
- The Army’s Active Component is likely to require additional air defense, intelligence, and information operations forces.
- The Army’s Reserve Components are likely to require significant additional increases in military police forces and minor increases in air defense, intelligence, and information operations forces.

Colonel Dallas D. Owens
Prevention and Response
Requirements.

With perhaps one exception, no new preventive requirements were discovered in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11. Before the attack, there were valid requirements to identify potential enemies, deny them entry into the United States, and to apprehend those who nonetheless were able to enter and would commit criminal acts. These roles were primarily performed, respectively, by the intelligence community, immigration services, and the Department of Justice. The military provide some minor amount of support to the intelligence collection effort and some likewise small amount of assistance to immigration agencies (primarily border patrol support). Military support to law enforcement is generally proscribed by law. The one potentially new or—more accurately—renewed requirement is for internal air defense, i.e., prevention of a similar attack in which terrorists use the airplane as a bomb. Air marshals and airport security offices will play a major role in this effort, but the air defense role is uniquely suited to the military since no other agency has the necessary equipment, training, and response time to perform the role adequately.

In the response category, there has been no change in the requirement to respond, either domestically or internationally. However, there has been a subtle shift in the meaning of the international response. After a criminal incident of this nature, American citizens expect immediate response in the form of domestic disaster assistance, normally coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with military support provided as necessary. They also expect the perpetrators to be caught and brought to justice as quickly as possible. Domestically, this role is normally performed by the Department of Justice, working with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. This requirement remains valid, but the magnitude of the attack has caused it to be characterized as an act of war, making the military the expected main means of dealing with the perpetrators. This role is the norm for international response, but the domestic division of responsibility between civilian law enforcement agencies and the military is yet to be defined completely.

Internationally, the military is currently at center stage in responding to the attack. The stage is shared by the Department of State, but for the purpose of finding and rooting out Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, at least in Afghanistan, the military is clearly in the lead, with the State Department supporting with diplomatic efforts to obtain basing rights, maintain coalitions, etc. Subsequent stages of the war may find the lead role taken by the Department of State as the push for military action dissipates.

The military is comfortable with its traditional role as international responder, but there are new strategic implications to success or failure. The traditional battle-war linkage has become a more direct battle-national perception linkage. In other words, a successful battle or operation would lead not only to the longer-term goal of “winning a war,” but also to the establishment and sustainment of the perception of security by the populace of the homeland. Failed operations no longer represent a short-term setback with tangential effects on popular opinion; they may have immediate consequences for feelings of security. The requirement for public success for every operation will be an enormous burden on the military.
Prevention and Response Failures.

In the prevention category, intelligence is most often noted publicly as a failure. Most cite inadequate coordination and insufficient resources as the major causes for that failure. The resource issue surrounds both personnel (type and number) and funds, with a major focus on human intelligence. Correcting this failure, particularly the human intelligence aspect, will take long-term investment that recognizes the difficulty and risk in identifying and infiltrating terrorist cells. The coordination issue involves intelligence sharing, both national and international, and is linked to the coordination of the collection and dissemination effort. The military has little stake in the collection issue, but has significant stake in intelligence sharing.

Response failures continue to be identified. Domestically, the creation of a cabinet-level post for homeland defense indicates some recognition that improvements in response coordination are needed. The actual events did not create this recognition, but they drove home its importance and immediacy. Infrastructure security measures have been condemned on many fronts; again, few of the inadequacies came as a surprise. Recognition of domestic inadequacies has two consequences for the military. As a supporting agency, the oversight and coordination role at the cabinet level will have some effect on how support is provided, but that effect will only gradually be felt as the post evolves. Infrastructure protection will affect the military in the short term with assignments of missions to complement capabilities of law enforcement to protect selected key assets. Concurrently, force protection requirements have increased at military facilities, its own internal key infrastructure.

Army Missions.

The impact on military roles will affect Army missions when the Army is the appropriate service for performing the military role. New missions include:

Internal Air Defense: Though much of this mission will fall to the Air Force, the Army may be expected to provide air defense for fixed key infrastructure. This mission is similar to or an extension of that proposed as part of the missile defense program, which has significant force structure implications.

Recommendation: Determine the Army’s mission and analyze the adequacy of existing structure. If the requirement is large, constant, and long term, the Army’s Active Component (AC) will require additional air defense forces. The Reserve Component could provide near-term support while the AC restructures.

International Response: The Army will not necessarily see changes at the tactical level, depending on how battles are conducted. It will be a challenge to Army leadership to ensure that the perceived requirement to succeed in every battle does not affect the performance of its units.

Recommendation: The Army can attempt to shield its units from undue pressures, but the CINC’s and DoD have more ability than the services to meet this challenge. The military should also anticipate an occasional tactical failure and assume such failures will become public. A plan should be prepared to minimize the impact of such failures on the public perception of increased threat to its security and to strategic goals.

Intelligence Sharing: Though not a new mission for the Army, the new emphasis will have some impact on the Army as a collector and user of intelligence. The greatest burden is likely to be in the requirement to receive greater amounts of
intelligence at the higher echelons of the Army. Receiving more may require additional assets to interpret and disseminate what is received. The great danger is that more would be received, but not disseminated to the units that need it most.

**Recommendation:** The Army should reassess its ability to receive, interpret, and disseminate intelligence. If that ability proves insufficient, intelligence assets should be increased.

**Immigration Support:** The Army’s mission for immigration support has traditionally been in the areas of command and control and communications. The law enforcement nature of border patrolling is beyond what the Army sees as its domestic role and is not legally appropriate under most routine circumstances. However, the Army National Guard—in state status, not federal—may perform law enforcement functions. The Army’s position will probably remain one of only providing short-term support, preferably not of a law enforcement nature, until immigration can expand capacity to the needed level.

**Recommendation:** Anticipating a long-term demand for intermittent support, the Army needs to analyze the skills needed for such support and make the minor changes in RC force structure necessary to meet that requirement. The RC is the most appropriate force to meet the requirement because of its intermittent and short-term nature.

**National Level Coordination:** Clearly a perception exists that coordination of homeland security has “failed,” but it is not yet certain what the new office will do to correct that failure or how successful those corrections will be. At this point, it is equally clear that the military will need to respond to new coordination demands, but specifics are lacking. Likewise, the Army’s mission in this coordination scheme is not yet apparent. The DoD will continue to make internal adjustments and the Army’s mission will become more clear over the next few months. The Army’s mission for support to civilian authorities will receive new emphasis and reorganization recommendations like those provided by the Hart-Rudman Commission will receive new consideration.

**Recommendation:** The overall military reorganization will largely determine the Army’s reaction. However, the Army should resist pressures to restructure radically—at the expense of important long-term issues—to address immediate concerns. Restructuring responsibilities and staffs to coordinate DoD response better is certainly necessary. Some force restructuring is also needed, but many recommendations being proposed, both internal to DoD and in Congress, may not be beneficial to either the Army or the Nation.

**Law Enforcement Support:** Under the general rubric of “security,” a labor-intensive Army mission resulted from the 11 September attacks. The guards at airports and Army facilities were the highest profile Army missions. These missions were not new, but the “off-site” security requirements are a unique and potentially large twist to expected consequence management. If this mission is seen as a long-term or frequently-spiking requirement, there are definite force structure implications. The Army’s military police are already in high demand with peacekeeping and routine installation requirements. Significant additional requirements certainly exceed capabilities. If the current novel funding status of Army National Guard airport security portends things to come, the Active and Reserve Components both need more military police structure. Indeed, it is possible to have soldiers other than military police perform

---

40
security missions and many security missions are only marginally law enforcement in nature, but it is wise to have appropriately trained soldiers perform missions that even loosely fall into the category of law enforcement duties.

**Recommendation:** See Infrastructure Protection.

**Infrastructure Protection:** The mission of infrastructure protection clearly crosses the boundaries of two, and possibly three, missions already discussed: domestic air defense, law enforcement, and (possibly) immigration support. The preferred mission for the Army is to have long-term responsibility for its own facilities, but only short-term enhancement missions for nonmilitary infrastructure. If the latter become long term or the short-term spikes become frequent, the Army’s force structure would certainly be affected. The nature of those effects would depend on the magnitude of the mission and types of infrastructure selected for protection. For instance, information network protection missions are far different than port security protection, both in manpower levels and skills.

**Recommendation:** Each of the three related missions (domestic air defense, law enforcement, and immigration support) and infrastructure protection have minor force structure impacts. Cumulative impacts, though, are potentially significant. For the AC, those impacts may be for additional air defense, intelligence, and information operations forces. For the RC, implications are for significantly more military police forces and minor increases in the three types having impacts on the AC. Most of these requirements likely will be met with existing structure. The AC will need to make difficult choices to shift forces, but the RC should have less difficulty. The Army National Guard has previously committed to providing increased combat support and combat service support forces through their Division Redesign program. Traditionally, the Army Reserve also readily changes its force structure to remain complementary to active forces.

**Endnotes.**

1. For consequence management, the defining documents are the Federal Response Plan, U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, DoD Directive 5100.1 (Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components), and the 3025 series of DoD Directives on Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Domestically, the DoD role is clearly one of support to a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) in either crisis management (LFA: Department of Justice) or consequence management (LFA: Federal Emergency Management Agency). For consequence management, missions would be the outcome of taskings by the LFA, subsequent to Requests For Assistance (RFAs) from local and State first responders. For crisis management, the LFA would request assistance as appropriate to the nature of the threat.
2. The Hart-Rudmann Commission and others identified this need prior to the event.
NINE

Defining Preparedness:
Army Force Structure in the War on Terrorism

Colonel John R. Martin

Conclusions:
- Significant growth of Army force structure will be required to prosecute the war on terrorism successfully. Virtually all mission task-organized forces will have increases, but the predominant growth will be in homeland defense and the forces needed to fight the antiterrorism battle overseas.
- Reduction in forces assigned to other missions is not prudent. The Army still needs the forces to transform, to constitute a strategic reserve and to maintain a strategic balance around the world.
- The Reserve Components should constitute the majority of the forces for consequence management, but forces for homeland defense should come predominantly from the Active Component.
- The strategic reserve should retain its combat structure, giving it the flexibility to perform a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict.

The deployment of Army forces, both to Afghanistan to fight terrorists and throughout the United States for homeland defense, places additional strain on an Army force structure that is already overcommitted. It should already be obvious to military planners, but as war efforts continue at home and abroad, it will become increasingly clear that the Army needs a significant increase in its force structure. There will be no corresponding reduction in the requirements for the Army’s numerous other missions: worldwide engagement, transformation, strategic reserve. The increased requirements for homeland defense and the overseas war on terrorism are permanent—or at least long term—and will require major force structure growth, restructuring of the force and reapportionment among the Active and Reserve Components.

To assess the adequacy of its force structure, the Army develops a simultaneity stack of mission task-organized forces (MTOFs). This list of MTOFs represents the forces needed by the Army when the United States is confronted with a demanding domestic and global environment, presenting the Army with several simultaneous major missions. To be judged adequate, the evaluated force structure must be capable to some degree of simultaneously accomplishing all the missions in that stack. Since a realistic scenario is used instead of the “worst case,” some acceptable level of risk is assumed. Because the Nation has maintained much of the strategic focus that pertained prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, the simultaneity stack after that date retains several MTOFs with only marginal changes. The increases in the other MTOFs, though, will produce significant change in the total force structure—both its size and composition—and in the allocation of that structure between the Active and Reserve Components.
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the simultaneity stack was evolving, reflecting the focus of the new administration and its review of the national security strategy. Perhaps the most significant change involved the forces to conduct major combat operations. Previous administrations felt that it was essential to maintain the forces to fight two major theater wars (MTWs) simultaneously. The new administration believed that the probability of simultaneous MTWs was low enough to justify a new measure. Forces would have to be able to fight a “large” MTW and a “small” one at roughly the same time. It was understood, at least implicitly, that these forces would also have to be able to defeat enemies who might choose to fight asymmetrically. After September 11, the defeat of terrorism became an explicit part of this element of the simultaneity stack; requirements grew and the mission element assumed a much-higher priority.

The other simultaneity stack element to get a major priority boost after September 11 was the homeland security MTOF. Although many indicators before that date suggested homeland security needed attention, it continued to be given low priority, primarily because of constraints in the budget. With inadequate funds to accomplish all of its missions, the Army placed homeland security on a lower priority so it could maintain its appropriate focus on fighting major wars and marshal its resources for current readiness and transformation. With the exception of national missile defense, most of the homeland security effort was focused on consequence management, not homeland defense, either passive or active. As a direct result of the attacks, both elements of homeland security are receiving increased attention, which should quickly validate the need for added capabilities to defend the United States and its interests and to react when attack inevitably occurs. Whether those capabilities are produced or not depends upon budget sufficiency and proper prioritization. Neither is yet assured.

Some voices have called for reduction of the amount of forces allocated to the deterrence MTOF. These are the forces used by each regional Commander-in-Chief to execute his day-to-day requirements to shape a particular part of the world. This MTOF also includes the forces needed to conduct critical smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) in areas such as the Balkans and the Sinai. Fortunately, the voices calling for deterrence reductions are not prevailing. To maintain strategic balance while fighting the war on terrorism, the United States must continue to focus a large amount of its forces in locations where the risk of conflict is low. That risk will remain low—a prerequisite for fighting the war on terrorism—only if U.S. forces maintain adequate levels of engagement worldwide. Although some limited economies might be possible, any cuts would be quickly subsumed by the need to increase force protection for units exposed to terrorist action.

The transformation MTOF is also getting increased attention since September 11. While some call for reduction of transformation to allow concentration on the current war, most call instead for transformation to be adapted to the post-September 11 geostrategic environment and to be accelerated. In any event, the forces required to execute transformation properly will increase, although probably not by an order of magnitude.

Other MTOFs in the simultaneity stack—the generating force, forces to conduct noncritical SSCs, the strategic reserve—are not significantly different after September 11. Those forces needed to generate and project power overseas have
increased force protection concerns, but they should be captured under the homeland security MTOF. The same force protection requirements apply to the noncritical SSC units, although those requirements must be documented inside that MTOF. The size of the strategic reserve, a hedge against uncertainty, is also probably not noticeably different.

It is clear that the force structure requirements for the Army have increased. The size of that increase will be a function of the breadth of the war aims. If the military continues to take the lead in carrying the war to Iraq, Libya, Colombia, the Philippines or wherever, a major expansion of the force will be required, probably at some point requiring resumption of the draft. If the target list is not expanded unnecessarily and the other elements of national power—diplomatic, economic and information—are given the lead, significant military increases will still be required, but they can perhaps be produced without resort to extraordinary methods.

One of the major changes must occur in the homeland security forces. Governor Ridge and others are calling for the Army National Guard (ARNG) to take the bulk of this mission. In the short term, Reserve Component forces are critical in accomplishing this mission, particularly the homeland defense portion. They are the only sources of available manpower to provide critical infrastructure protection. This mission, though, ultimately will not be a part-time mission. In the long term, forces assigned to it must be full-time soldiers. Civil defense forces—perhaps part of a national gendarmerie—should be constructed to provide the personnel to man critical defensive positions, but an Active Component element should provide leadership and possibly a rapid reaction force. Equipping and training the civil defense force should also be an Active Component responsibility.

Because consequence management requirements present themselves only infrequently, the predominance of the force structure allocated to this mission should continue to reside with the Reserve Components. With the majority of its structure consisting of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is already tailored for this mission. However, those forces will generally be required for MTWs or SSCs. Additional forces must be grown, either in the USAR or the ARNG. The ARNG Division Redesign, although started years before the terrorist attacks, continues to be an important initiative as it converts low-priority combat structure to CS and CSS. Alternatively, the Army could add the warfighting CS/CSS requirements to the active structure and allow the Reserve Component to focus on consequence management. This would move away from the paradigm that requires reserve force mobilization any time the Army deploys, but has the advantage of replacing the reserve forces that are regularly being used in an active role supporting ongoing contingency operations.

The strategic reserve probably changes less than any of the other MTOFs. Preparation for the unexpected requires a flexible force, but one that is focused on contributing units at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict. The combat structure of the strategic reserve must therefore be retained, but those flexible forces may also be of intermittent value in homeland defense and consequence management.

As defeating terrorism remains a high priority, the composition of some forces may need to change. The Army should begin now to build more special operations forces (SOF), but must not do so to the detriment of larger combat formations. Although only
SOF and air power have been used in significant strength thus far, the war on terrorism can still require a “D-Day,” where major land, sea and air forces combine to defeat a strong state sponsor of terrorism.

Army transformation must be assessed in light of the war on terrorism and some adaptation is undoubtedly needed. Before September 11, though, it seemed safe to take some risk with the transformation process, allowing some units to “stand down” while transforming. It is still important that they be stood down, but it is imprudent to assume away the risk inherent in standing down forces. There must be enough force structure to allow units—perhaps two to three brigade combat teams at once—to undergo transformation without adversely affecting the accomplishment of other missions in the simultaneity stack.

The forces needed to accomplish other missions in the stack—deterrence, force generation, strategic reserve—need to be only incrementally larger than before September 11. However, because accomplishment of those missions is critical if the war on terrorism is to be successful, the forces for those “other” missions must be considered as essential as those in the front line in Afghanistan or guarding critical infrastructure in the homeland. The Army must immediately acknowledge the need for increased force structure; take prompt action to organize, equip, man and train the units required; and apportion them appropriately between the Active and Reserve Components. Broad war aims expected to be implemented quickly will make successful completion of this task critical.
Conclusions:

- If the U.N. is to play a strong and helpful role in the fight against terrorism, as well as in the stabilization of failing or failed states, the United States will have to give that organization full moral and financial support.
- Several specific flashpoints in the world call for U.S. diplomatic and military-to-military engagement, and possibly greater policy flexibility. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Indian/Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir are only two such cases.
- “Nation building” or “peace building” does not necessarily call for the long-term presence of U.S. military forces, but does require the attention and resources of the world’s leading power, along with the parallel civil-military assets of its allies.
- The United States must strengthen the range of its human assets and internal capabilities to influence global affairs. No amount of technology can replace the human element required to gather and assess intelligence, conduct diplomacy, and promote military cooperation.
- Our best insurance for the future will be set upon three supports: a strong and united democratic country, a more capable homeland defense, and a more effective capacity to project national power—including landpower—overseas.

Foreign Policy Implications of September 11.

Until September 11, American foreign policy elites debated the utility of various approaches to grand strategy. Should the United States adhere to a policy of cooperative security or, mindful of our unique power, should we pursue a policy of primacy? The latter would be tempting. With apparently no other nation in position to challenge American authority and with the strongest economy and military forces in the world, we could consider a unilateral approach to international affairs. Some pundits have argued that we had already chosen the unilateral approach and that our choice had been reflected in the rejection of a series of international treaties and protocols during the first nine months of 2001.

Whatever arguments may have obtained before September 11, the reality of U.S. interdependence with the rest of the world readily became apparent as we sought to respond to the most significant attack upon continental American soil since British forces burned Washington in 1814. Immediately after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Government chose a policy of coalition building to seek and destroy terrorists and their organizations throughout the world. This policy will have far reaching implications for U.S. foreign policy in the
years ahead and will strongly influence the structures of our regional and bilateral relations worldwide.

Four implications of this policy are immediately apparent:

• The United States will have to breathe new life into its relationship with the United Nations. If that organization is to play a strong and helpful role in the fight against terrorism, as well as in the reconstruction and stabilization of failed states, we will have to give it full moral and financial support.

• Several specific flashpoints in the world call for U.S. diplomatic engagement and possibly greater policy flexibility. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Indian/Pakistani confrontation over Kashmir need the attention of the United States, perhaps in concert with other significant powers.

• The United States must commit itself to long-term development efforts in states where instability can threaten the security of the entire region. “Nation building” or “peace building” does not necessarily call for the long-term presence of U.S. military forces, but it does require the attention and resources of the world’s leading power along with the parallel assets of its allies.

• The United States must strengthen the range of its human assets and internal capabilities to influence global affairs. No amount of technology can replace the human element required to assess intelligence, conduct diplomacy, influence public opinion, and promote military cooperation.

**Strengthening the Role of the United Nations.**

For many years, an article of faith among foreign diplomats was that the United States gained politically far more from the existence of the U.N. than any other country. While many nations may have worked against U.S. interests in the General Assembly, most concluded that the United States used its seat in the Security Council to achieve its ends with remarkable success. Only in recent years, as the United States began to fall behind in its dues and as U.S. politicians disparaged the organization, did observers begin to question whether we lacked the will to use the organization we had worked so hard to establish after World War II.

With the strong support of the Secretary General and the Security Council for a new effort against terrorism and with an understanding that all member states are obliged to help fight terrorism, the U.S. Government has been handed an opportunity to reengage with the organization in meaningful ways. The recent payment of dues, as well as the acknowledgement of President Bush that the U.N. can help with nation building and stabilization, holds promise for a revitalized relationship. For the United States to retain credibility, however, we must pay our dues on time and cooperate in as many joint ventures with the U.N. as is feasible. Strengthening the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as its important humanitarian assistance organizations, should be high on the list of American priorities at the U.N.

**Dealing with Flashpoints.**

While there can be no justification for the horrific acts of terror the world witnessed on September 11, we need to understand some of the frustrations which fuel disaffection and alienation from the norms of international behavior. Undoubtedly, no amount of diplomatic or other positive activity by the United States will turn the hatred of a relatively small group of hardened ideologues, but we should examine the causes of so much resentment of the United States among the broader Middle East population. The unresolved
conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis remains a festering sore which will continue to breed atrocities if we and other international partners do not take action. The cycle of violence must be stopped. Yet it is hard to see how this can be done without recognizing Israel’s right to exist on the one hand and a state of Palestine and the limitation of Israeli settlements on the other. The issue of governance and protection of holy sites in Jerusalem is perhaps even more inflammatory. It is hard to overestimate the degree of feeling in Israel and the Arab states on this issue. Unless a plan is devised allowing for unbiased international administration of these sites, long-term peace is unlikely, and the United States will continue to be pulled into the maelstrom.

Likewise, the international community can ill afford to stand by as India and Pakistan, both possessing nuclear weapons, continue to struggle over Kashmir. Volatile and subject to pressure from internal radical fundamentalist groups, Pakistan needs help to find its way out of a self-defeating confrontation which drains resources and fuels political intertemperance. Should Pakistanimplode, the consequences for the region and, indeed, the world could be costly. As Pakistan and India sit at a strategically important point in the world, it seems unlikely that one nation serving as a mediator would be sufficient to overcome the various balance of power interests which could militate against a solution. This conflict best lends itself to mediation by a carefully selected contact group of three to five nations.

The continued rogue status of Iraq is equally worrisome. Saddam Hussein shows no signs of retreating from his desire to develop weapons of mass destruction, but he appears to be winning the propaganda war. Broad sanctions against Iraq are unenforceable, and continued allied efforts to contain his activities are losing international support. Forceful ejection of Saddam militarily would be costly and politically disastrous under current circumstances, as we work to build an international coalition against terrorism. A policy of containment and development of a finer regional understanding of the threat that he poses to his neighbors would be our best strategy at this time. Such a strategy should be supplemented, nonetheless, with renewed and quiet warnings to Saddam that any use of WMD by his government will be met with his own certain destruction.

Laying the Groundwork for Stability.

Where there is hunger and dire poverty, nothing will advance in the absence of humanitarian assistance. It is the sine qua non of existence where all else has failed, but it is not sufficient to ensure a stable future. In states threatened by poverty, weakened by corrupt governments, and devoid of representative structures, instability and violence are liable to emerge, particularly in a world in which increasingly accessible views of material prosperity elsewhere inflame the appetites of those who have been denied. Demagogues with ethnic or ideological agendas easily manipulate such passions.

If the United States wishes to remove the breeding ground of radicalism and political violence, there is no substitute for nation building. There is no cheap ticket to success. A mixture of development assistance, strengthening of education and health care systems, and, above all, an emphasis on good governance will be required. The good news is that, in addition to the U.S. military, the United States is richly endowed with governmental and nongovernmental organizations which can address these issues, provided sufficient resources exist. It is time we regard this
challenge not solely as a development issue, but as a national security one.

Happily, we don’t have to tackle these challenges alone in developing countries. We have partners in Europe and Japan who have demonstrated interest and commitment through generous assistance which, on a per capita basis, far exceeds our own. In any event, in order to avoid charges of seeking hegemony either in individual states or regions of the world, we will find it advantageous to strengthen our development partnerships in the OECD and the U.N.

In our efforts to confront global terrorism, we undoubtedly will deal more closely with states from which we have kept at some distance in the past. Uzbekistan is a prime example. With a government which is corrupt and undemocratic and a record further blemished by the existence of thousands of political prisoners, Uzbekistan hardly lends itself to traditional American assistance. Yet if the United States is to embrace Uzbekistan for practical security reasons, then we must extend our development assistance to it as well, including emphasis on education, good governance, and the development of democratic structures.

While the United States cannot naively seek to make the world in its own image, we must surely recognize, after years of experience with failed states, that good governance and legitimate forms of popular representation are essential to development. Flexibility will be required in states fragmented by ethnic or religious division. Federal structures, governments of national unity, and proportional representation systems, all of which avoid the chimera of “winner take all” solutions, may be particularly applicable. Further, systems which acknowledge the importance of traditional leaders and fold them into modern governance may be helpful. We should not delude ourselves, however. Nation building and the development of democratic processes are hard work. Failure to address these issues, on the other hand, is even more costly.

Americans regard our technical prowess, economic strength, and proficient military as the primary building blocks of our security. Ironically, while these factors are enormously important, they are most significant as support for America’s greatest strength: our democratic tradition. In a world where ideology may eschew wealth and guerrilla bands and terrorists may avoid confrontation with overwhelming military force, our genius for good governance and public education may be our most effective long-term weapon. In northwestern Pakistan, where children may be fed, housed, and schooled in narrow, mind-bending madrasahs, the most effective program we could support would be the provision of excellent and accessible government schools which meet the needs of young minds and bodies. In countries struggling to make governments and economies perform, the provision of financial expertise and governance training is essential. And, in utterly failed states, the international community, under the leadership of the U.N., may wish to consider return to international trusteeship, much as is being done in East Timor. There is no question that economic assistance and debt relief must be matched by the development of good governance capacity and educational opportunity.

Likewise, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of military-to-military contacts and assistance. For years, U.S. Special Forces have demonstrated the efficacy of “mil-to-mil” programs in de-mining, peacekeeping, military justice, and civilian/military operations. Equally, the United States has benefited from contacts developed as foreign officers
have attended U.S. military institutions. There may be increased pressure for weapons sales abroad and a growing desire to reduce military personnel tied up in “engagement” activities overseas, but we would do well to remember that our greatest return on investment is precisely in the areas where U.S. forces demonstrate personal interest and competence. There is no substitute for focused, professional military contact.

**Strengthening Our Human Resource Base.**

Our capacity, ultimately, to influence events throughout the world will depend upon the quality of our people on the front lines. If we are to spot the development of political trends, if we are to intercept and cut off dangerous currents, if we are to promote positive programs, we will need to reinforce our cadre of language qualified Foreign Area Officers, Foreign Service Officers, and intelligence officers. We reaped the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War by neglecting our Foreign Area Officers’ careers, failing to hire sufficient numbers of Foreign Service Officers and cutting resources for human intelligence operations for too long. We are currently paying a price. There is no substitute for top notch, professional personnel at diplomatic missions and listening posts throughout the world. This is the backbone of intelligent policy and effective engagement, and if we wish to win the campaign against terrorism, we must effectively fund it.

**Conclusion.**

As realists, we must recognize that the campaign against violence and instability will never end. We may eradicate one form of terrorism, only to see another raise its head. Our best insurance for the future will be set upon three supports: a strong and united democratic country, a more capable homeland defense, and an extremely effective capacity to project our diplomatic, democratic, and military strength overseas. This calls for long-term commitment and the expenditure of significant resources. We must be attuned to local conditions in every region of the world, and we must remain engaged with partners across the full spectrum of social, economic, and political development. If we eschew this responsibility, the forces of instability and violence will find us where we live.
Conclusions:

- As the United States builds and maintains the coalition fighting the war on terrorism, it may obtain some good short-term results from the use of carrots and sticks—rewards and punishments to induce compliance with U.S. desires—but must be wary of potential negative effects in the long term.
- A just cause makes the use of carrots and sticks more effective. The justice of the U.S. cause is easily defined with al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much harder if the war is against all terrorism. The list of targets in the Muslim world must not be unnecessarily expanded.
- Even if countries see the justice of the cause, they may not make it their cause.
- Appeasement cannot be part of the solution, but issues that provide al Qaeda great resonance in the Muslim population—the Palestinian issue, sanctions on Iraq, and U.S. presence on the Arabian peninsula—must be fairly addressed by the U.S.

In an effort to marshal resources against Usama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist organization, the United States has implemented a carrot and stick approach to help build a coalition. Carrots—or rewards—are provided for “voluntary” compliance with implied preferences or explicit direction, while sticks—or punishment—are imposed to coerce compliance. Democracies generally prefer the carrot option, believing that reward will have a more positive or long-lasting effect, and that the reward provided will be viewed either as a due reward for desired performance or as just payment for services rendered. Unfortunately, the perception from the other side may be of a bribe—tainting both the donor and recipient—or of equally distasteful payment from a master to a servant.

Machiavelli did not use the same terms, but essentially argued for the stick over the carrot, noting that it is better for the strong to be feared than loved. He contended that “love” or “gratitude”—in exchange for reward—is inherently fickle, all the more so if it appears to be a bribe. Machiavelli defined two forms of fear: one based on hatred, the other based on respect. Respect is obviously preferred, as hatred will have regressive effects in the long term. Effectively applying these two tools—using carrots and sticks, either together or as options to achieve synergy through their integration—is no small challenge. If carrots and sticks are applied arrogantly by a strong state—without proper regard for those who see them as bribes or arm-twisting—the results may be limited, both immediately and in the longer term. Improperly implemented, carrots and sticks can make the stronger state appear a bully, cost it resources to no advantage, or lead to imposition of punitive action with negative consequences.

To make the carrot and stick more effective, a state must be just and propor-
tional in its application of rewards and punishments, which in turn should be aligned with a just cause. Such a cause must be just in the eyes of other states, not simply in the eyes of the stronger state. In such a situation, the reward for compliance is not seen as a bribe or a payment, but simply as an expected consequence of working for a just cause. If punishment is imposed, it must be seen as a proportional requirement of justice, not the act of a “bully” which cannot buy what it wants. To make America’s just cause compelling to others, their different values and perceptions must be taken into account.

Even if others acknowledge America’s cause and actions as just, there can be no assumption that America’s cause then becomes their cause. The United States does not actively support all just causes with its resources, nor do other states. This is the inherent challenge in structuring a coalition of states with different interests and characteristics. Caution must be applied in any demand that another state align itself with the United States or risk being considered an enemy. In Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, Athens demanded that the state of Melos join an Athenian-led coalition against Sparta. When Melos resisted, stating that it wished to join neither Athens nor Sparta, Athens forced the issue, and stated “. . . the strong will do what it will, while the weak will do what it must.” When Melos refused to join the coalition, Athens had no recourse but to destroy it or lose credibility. When Athens chose the former and destroyed Melos, it had less trouble getting other states to join the coalition, but the fear that caused them to join was not from respect based on justice. When the coalition came under duress later in the war, it came apart because it lacked genuine cohesion, and Athens lost the war. A demand by the United States that other states are either “with it or against it” may make good domestic rhetoric, but will be counterproductive if enforcement is attempted internationally.

The other NATO countries did not need to be bribed or coerced to support America, nor should there be any need to resort to the carrot or stick to sustain their support. The invocation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty—declaring that the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks constituted an attack on all—was a treaty requirement. However, even without that requirement, those states’ comparable values would have led them to recognize the cause as just; they identify with it and have made it their cause.

NATO countries are democracies; as such, their governments represent the will of their people. With nondemocratic states, it is often difficult to determine the will of the people, which may not be the same as the will of their government. When dealing with non-democratic states, their governments may be convinced to comply with American objectives through a carrot and stick approach, but if the people of that state do not see America’s cause as just, then they will believe that their government has been either corrupted or unfairly coerced. In either case, this weakens whatever bond that government has with its people, destabilizing the state, and perhaps instigating insurrection or civil war, neither of which is in a coalition’s interest.

The most obvious carrot or reward used recently is economic assistance. Sanctions have been lifted; direct payments have been made; food and other refugee assistance have been delivered. All of these can be useful, but they may also be more limited and temporary in value than anticipated. If the government or people felt sanctions were improper, then lifting them will be perceived as a correction of a wrong, rather than a gracious act, and may not motivate
the desired action. If the government that receives the economic assistance is either corrupt or perceived by its people as corrupt, the money may be useful to persuade the government, but will have a different effect on the people. If economic assistance is diverted to military forces that the government can use to suppress its own people, the effect may be counterproductive, even if the intent was to enhance the government's role in the military aspects of the coalition.

Use of food to influence directly the people of a country may allow governments to be bypassed to some degree. The altruistic motives of the givers may be genuine, but if the hungry recipients perceive that the food aid is given simply to bring a coalition together, it will appear a simple bribe rather than a just reward. If the hungry identify with al Qaeda or the Taliban, the appearance of such a bribe may not alter their views towards America at all. In fact, they may eat the food with an increased contempt for the United States. Food aid given to the hungry in Pakistan—in bags of grain marked USA—should satisfy hunger for a short period, but it will not correct the long-term causes of hunger and may make the Pakistani people see their government as incapable of feeding them.

President Bush recently started a campaign to have American children donate a dollar each to be used for aid to the Afghan children. This plays well in the United States, but there may be little gained in Afghanistan and the broader Muslim world, where the effort may be seen as a simple and inexpensive propaganda ploy. The real value in such a campaign may be to condition the American people to see the people of Afghanistan as worthy of American assistance. The provider again may be genuinely altruistic, but the perception may be very different, and effects overseas may be very different from those domestically.

The ultimate challenge is to make America's cause just in the eyes of the governments and people of the Middle East countries, whose physical and moral assistance is needed in the war on terrorism. There may be some utility in a simple bribe or use of force, but the returns could only be temporary and potentially counterproductive. If the American cause does not become the cause of others, the intermediate position is to at least make a compelling case that the American cause is just, and to use the carrot and stick approach as just rewards or just punishments to support that cause. How that cause is defined thus becomes crucial.

The al Qaeda terrorist organization must be defined as an aggressor adversary because it has attacked and hurt the United States. The Taliban should be described as America's adversary because they willingly harbor those aggressors. There is great clarity in such a position, and there is no difficulty in defining the terrorist organization or the Taliban. But if the adversary is terrorism, that term must be defined. That is not difficult with NATO allies.

However, many states in the Middle East may not share the same definition of terrorism or may not find terrorism as objectionable if the target of terrorism is an oppressive government. They may see an assault on other terrorist organizations as a more general attack on Islam or as a means to neutralize the aspirations of several groups in the Middle East who have not targeted the United States. Such a view could have two negative results: first, if all terrorist groups are declared targets, such groups that have not targeted the United States may soon do so or provide previously-denied support to al Qaeda. Second, by enlarging the target set beyond
al Qaeda, America makes its position adversarial to those people that identify with the goals of those newly-targeted groups, even though they may not have supported al Qaeda, either its goals or its methods. To have as many Muslim states as possible in the coalition on the war against terrorism is essential. It is thus important that there be no unnecessary enlargement of the states in the Muslim world that are considered targets.

To complement the application of rewards and punishments—or to avoid the challenges of their use—some of the root causes of Muslim disgruntlement must be addressed. The al Qaeda organization has several ways to rationalize their attack on the United States. The primary rationalization is that the values of the West—and the United States in particular—are profane. To them, the ultimate profanity is U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia: a perceived major affront to the Muslim faithful. Secondary objections include American actions towards Iraq and support for Israel with respect to the Palestinian issue. A potential weakness for al Qaeda is that it receives far greater popular support in the Muslim world from its secondary objections to the United States than for its primary objections. There is little question that, if the situations in Iraq and with the Palestinians were resolved, al Qaeda would try to attack the United States. But if either conflict were resolved or American efforts to resolve them appeared more balanced, al Qaeda would gain far less popular support in the process.

Middle East governments, particularly Egypt, have stated that their primary difficulty in supporting the war on terrorism more aggressively is America’s support for Israel, which they perceive to be at the expense of the Palestinians. That perception cannot be denied, but it is fair to say that America’s real intent is not so one-sided. The central concern for Israel is security, and that will not change, but U.S. support for Israeli security should not mean support for settlements in Gaza and the West Bank or oppression of the Palestinians. The central concern for the Palestinians is sovereignty. American support for that goal appears lukewarm, but it can be reinforced without reducing support for Israeli security. American policy is sympathetic to Israeli domestic politics; it could be more overtly sympathetic to Palestinian domestic politics. Beyond domestic politics in either case, a more balanced American approach is in the interest of both Israel and the Palestinians if there is progress towards a resolution. Such a resolution is in the interest of everyone, except terrorist organizations that need popular support to sustain their efforts against the United States.

Some pundits suggest that it would be appeasement to attempt to resolve the Palestinian issue, review and revise sanctions on Iraq, or look for ways to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region without a major military presence there. Since these were bin Laden’s goals—according to this line of reasoning—America should be even more resolute in denying them for fear of showing other terrorists that they can achieve their goals if they can mount a similar attack. It is not appeasement, though, if the United States can isolate al Qaeda from popular support, which may be essential to destroy it. Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda will not see America as less adversarial if the United States makes greater attempts to solve the Palestinian issue, they will instead see that as a threat to their popular support.

A carrot and stick approach may have utility in the effort to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban, although the results may only accrue in the near term. In the longer term, such an approach can be counterproductive.
The carrot and stick approach will have greater utility if perceived to be fairly applied in a just cause. Ultimately, any use of carrots or sticks must be part of a more comprehensive effort to deny al Qaeda the popular support it needs to survive. That effort must demonstrate—with all available means—that America’s cause is just and must create the conditions that lead others to believe that this cause is their cause. That is unnecessary with America’s allies and fellow believers in NATO; the immediate challenge is in the Middle East, both with their governments and their people.
State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations Prior to September 11.

While the state of U.S. civil-military relations prior to September 11, 2001, was generally strong, certain tensions warranted monitoring and attention both within the military profession and across the governmental agencies that interact regularly with the military.

**Imbalance of Power.** Perhaps the most important issue was the improper relationship between the political leadership and the military in the policy-making process. Political leaders should make policy decisions with advice from the military. During the Clinton years, though, the administration’s reluctance to confront the military and the military’s disagreement with many policy initiatives of its elected and appointed masters combined to allow the military to exert undue influence in the policy-making process. Critics contended that the U.S. military did not consistently follow the norm of supporting political objectives—especially those requiring the limited use of force in various peace operations—in good faith, but instead engaged in behaviors that, in effect, had a determinative effect on policy outcomes. Some observers believed that the interjection of conditions, such as the “Powell Doctrine,” into the policy-making process was an overplaying of the military’s designated role as expert advisers.

During the first months of the Bush administration, there were signs of attempts to redress this apparent imbalance—and some military resistance to the change. There were many reports of friction between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over his strategic review, especially concerning the impression that Rumsfeld was ignoring or bypassing them in shaping his policies. Many in Congress also became involved in this dispute over future national security strategy and the structure and transformation of military forces.

**Civil-Military Gap.** Another concern that may have relevance for civil-military
relations in this newly emergent era is the much touted civil-military gap. Years of an all-volunteer force, major downsizing of that force, and recent rounds of base closings have contributed to a growing isolation of the military from the society it serves. Scholars have warned that the implications of this gap may have negative consequences for manning the all-volunteer force and for sustaining the ideal image among the American people of the U.S. military as being comprised of America’s Army, America’s Navy, America’s Air Force, and America’s Marines—that is, forces of America and not forces separate from U.S. society. Concerns also exist about a lack of military experience in civilian leaders, and that generals and admirals will not properly respect congressional oversight from those who are perceived as unqualified.

**Partisanship.** Another source of tension, and closely related to the policymaking imbalance, is the perception of many that political partisanship gradually has been increasing within the U.S. military. The concern is that the U.S. military is losing its adherence to an apolitical ethic. Some critics contend that assumed and perceived preferences of the military—sometimes openly expressed by retirees—were leading to attempts by military institutions to influence unduly the American political process.

**Homeland Security.** Homeland defense issues in civil-military relations were also evident prior to the September 11 attacks. Various strategic reviews were attempting to focus the U.S. military—and the U.S. Army, in particular—on homeland security issues. Perhaps the foremost issue regarding homeland security was the military’s reluctance to accept it as a high-priority mission, relegating it instead to police forces or, at best, the National Guard. The low priority assigned to this mission—similar to that assigned to peacekeeping operations—allows the Service to continue focusing on its warfighting mission. There were several other key emergent challenges in this area. Among these was fulfilling the homeland security mission within a domestic environment where civil liberties remained intact. Another issue was articulating the homeland security mission in such a way that effectively differentiated responsibilities across the U.S. Government, while distinguishing between civilian and military roles.

**Anticipated Changes in U.S. Civil-Military Relations.**

The full impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on civil-military relations is still evolving, but some projections can be made. While a united civil-military front is apparent now, many sources of potential friction and concern remain.

**Imbalance of Power.** The role of the military in the post-September 11 policymaking process may pose particular challenges for both civilian and military participants. Many of the parameters that regulated civil-military relations in the policymaking realm have changed since the attacks. Budget constraints that limited the demands of the Services have been lifted to some extent, Congress and the Executive are united to an unprecedented degree, and the nation as a whole is focused on national security in general and the war on terrorism specifically. Such an environment calls for strict adherence to traditional standards of military professionalism in policy councils. The present process relies heavily on military expertise relevant to the application of force in the attainment of stated political objectives. Military professionals must be careful in their presentation of options to include all potential applications of the military instrument of power without limiting...
choices to those options consistent with a particular preferred doctrine, e.g., the Powell Doctrine. The current strategic challenge does not appear to have a short-term exit strategy and may not be conducive to the application of overwhelming military force, as required by that doctrine. The civilian leadership should not deny military leaders the right to argue in favor of particular options, but they must demand presentation of comprehensive military options on ways and means to achieve political ends. Media reports suggest that Secretary Rumsfeld has been disappointed by the lack of innovative military advice he has received. In general, the military leadership should stay within their roles as expert advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense, even when greater influence may be solicited by other forces—particularly congressional—in the policymaking process. The leadership must still think “out-of-the box” to meet the needs of this new war.

Restrain on the part of military professionals also will be needed especially on the budget front. More monies are available to fight the war on terrorism, but military leaders must subordinate institutional interests to national interests. Some might be tempted to take advantage of the environment to fund other service desires that might not be consistent with the national interest of limiting deficit spending, or which might not be sustainable when public, congressional, and administration support for increased defense spending inevitably declines. Service chiefs must also not become so focused on current needs that they forget about transforming for the future, and must not allow their civilian masters to develop similar myopic views.

While the pre-attack clashes between the Services and Secretary of Defense over his vision of transformation have been muted, the issues still remain. Secretary Rumsfeld’s position in Washington, though, has been strengthened by both his own strong leadership and the unified national support for the military that has accompanied the war on terrorism. The media reports that he wants to revise the Unified Command Plan because of the global nature of the current conflict to create a central command structure more responsive to direction from Washington. This might create new friction with the CINCs as well as the Services.

Civil-Military Gap. Additionally, there may be challenges related to congressional oversight of covert operations. One of the primary objectives of the war on terrorism is to conduct it in such a way that democratic institutions remain intact and that American democratic values are not undermined. The military and the administration must fulfill their responsibilities to be accountable to the American people via complete cooperation with the requisite oversight committees in Congress.

On the positive side, American society is unusually focused on national security issues. The heightened visibility of the military and an appreciation that the armed forces will play an ongoing and crucial role in a protracted war presents opportunities for recruitment, re-enlistment, and—more importantly—the general reconnection of American society with the military. Military experts can also play an important part in exercising the information element of U.S. national power through an educational role that explains the national security challenges at hand and publicizes its myriad successes and challenges in an effort to sustain public support.

Partisanship. Challenges related to political partisanship include maintaining professional standards for nonpartisanship
in the upcoming 2002 mid-term elections and presidential campaign in 2004. Assuming that the war on terrorism will be a long-term effort, it will be incumbent upon the military profession to disconnect consistently their professional support for the war effort with political support for candidates of a particular party that may be conducting the effort.

**Homeland Security.** The defense establishment has not been quick to adopt homeland defense as its primary mission in the wake of the September 11 attacks, preferring to focus on a warfighting campaign in Afghanistan. Critical infrastructure protection and control of borders are still seen as police missions, although National Guardsmen and some Active Component soldiers are involved. The Army must immediately apply the necessary focus and resources to this vital mission, ensuring the homeland is secure enough to allow operations overseas.

Consensus on the ongoing threat of terrorism has heightened awareness that the Pentagon must be ready to provide its capabilities and support to other federal agencies, both in counterterrorism efforts and in a response role. As emerging details of the new Homeland Security Council and Governor Ridge’s powers become clearer, the Army should be actively studying its long-term roles and missions and the implications of participating within such a broad-based homeland security effort. Though the exact scope, powers, and budgetary authority of the new homeland security entity are still unknown, its final form will inevitably include a mix of law enforcement and national security tasks that will call for ongoing collaboration between civilian and military authorities.

The Army and the other services should be thinking about the potential effect these various new relationships will have on the overall state of civil-military relations and on the ability of the services to perform their functional obligations across a comprehensive array of national security threats. As new civil-military relationships are formed—such as that between the Secretary of the Army as DoD’s executive agent for all homeland security matters and Governor Ridge as the head of the Office of Homeland Security—civilian and military participants should strive to ensure that their efforts remain collaborative rather than competitive.

Challenges also exist with regard to the long-term implications of using the Reserve Components (RC) to participate in small scale contingencies and major wars abroad and in the homeland defense role domestically. Active Component (AC) and military leaders must think through such issues as the viability of prolonged employer support for RC utilization, functional specialization of the AC or RC for homeland security and finding funds for equipment and proper training.

A new focus on homeland security will also highlight a number of legal issues. *Posse comitatus* considerations need to be examined to insure optimum military involvement in domestic operations to combat terrorism. Other legal issues that need to be resolved include permissible methods to obtain critical intelligence domestically and whether to treat captured terrorists as criminals or POWs.

**Conclusion.**

Clearly the events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in new challenges and opportunities in U.S. civil-military relations. Some of the tensions that existed prior to September 11 seem trivial in light of recent events. Others have taken on a new significance as the current environment could possibly exacerbate pre-existing tensions. U.S. military leaders must provide expert and comprehensive advice in a
complex and uncertain war that does not fall neatly into traditional conceptions of military campaigns. U.S. military leaders also face significant challenges in monitoring their own professionalism in ways that best serve the nation and the profession itself. Finally, a unique opportunity exists to reconnect with American society as America’s Army, an Army that fully accepts its responsibility to protect the homeland and that needs the ongoing support and participation of all Americans to accomplish its many missions.
Conclusions:

- Public support for military action is at levels that parallel public reaction after Pearl Harbor.
- Americans believe military action is appropriate, support a protracted war, and are willing to endure negative consequences from that war.
- Despite favorable polls, public support is bound to be fickle, since most Americans are not really involved with the conflict and are being asked to return to their normal lives where they largely ignored the military.
- Support for military action will diminish unless the military continually shows progress in the war against terrorism, keeps the nation connected to its armed forces, and provides effective domestic security that is mostly unseen.

The American public continues to show an unprecedented level of support for the country’s leaders and institutions since the September 11 attacks. The President’s overall job approval rating of 90 percent exceeded that of President George H. W. Bush after the Gulf War, President Truman after VE day in World War II, and President Roosevelt after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Similarly, approval ratings of Congress achieved a record high, and even the media received high marks in the coverage of the attacks.

Amid this surge in public support for government institutions, public opinion polls are also reflecting extraordinarily widespread support of military action. As late as the end of September, the vast majority of Americans support the general idea of military action against groups or nations responsible for the attacks. Polls show support for retaliatory action at about the 90 percent level, with 89 percent favoring direct military action in Afghanistan, and 73 percent in Iraq.

One of the most remarkable findings in assessing public opinion is the strong support of the American people despite awareness of the possible consequences of military action. In past uses of military power, public opinion may have been affected by the perceived rapidity of the prosecution of the war, the amount of casualties involved, the possible personally detrimental consequences of the war, and the degree of agreement among the country's leaders.

Duration.

Americans appear to be ready for a protracted use of military power. When asked if they would support military action against terrorism even if it lasted a period of several months, 86 percent of Americans responded that they would, and a still-high 69 percent said they would support military action even if it lasted several years. Interestingly, 92 percent of Americans polled said that they expected the war against terrorism to be long, and 94 percent said it would be difficult. Contrast these percentages with the reaction of Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when 51
percent thought the war against the Japanese would be long, and 65 percent thought the war would be difficult.

Despite the realization that this war will likely last several years, Americans are exhibiting an apparent willingness to wait for the right moment to strike at the terrorists. One poll asked those who favored military action if they felt the United States should act immediately against all known terrorist organizations even if it was unclear who orchestrated the attacks, or if the United States should take a more restrained approach of waiting for those responsible to be identified—even if it takes months—before conducting military strikes against them. Only 23 percent favored immediate strikes, while 62 percent favored waiting until those responsible are identified.

Similarly, just 3 weeks ago, some 59 percent of Americans agreed that the United States should take as long as necessary to plan something that will work. That number actually increased to 65 percent 1 week later. In this unique period of history, Americans appear to be willing to accept a long war and long preparation period before military action begins.

Casualties.

Previous debates about the supposed aversion of U.S. casualties by the military, government leaders, or the public appear to be moot. One poll reported that 69 percent of Americans support going to war even if it means “getting into a long war with large numbers of U.S. troops killed or injured.” Another poll specifically asked respondents if they would support a war that might cost the lives of 5,000 U.S. troops and 5,000 U.S. civilians. In each instance, about 80 percent of the respondents continued to indicate that they would support the use of military action.

When a Newsweek poll posed the condition that military action would include a “high likelihood of [non-U.S.] civilian casualties,” 7 out of 10 Americans still supported military action. A subsequent CBS/New York Times poll added the more specific condition of “thousands of innocent civilians” who would be killed, and 60 percent of the respondents still continued to support military action. These findings are remarkable since casualty aversion (at much smaller numbers) and civilian collateral casualties have been dominant facets of any recent debate on public support for military action.

Past possible explanations for casualty aversion in military operations included the perceived lack of vital interests or the nonparticipation of American elites in the operation. With issues such as the economy struggling to avoid recession, half of the country reporting that they are worried about a terrorist attack affecting their own family, and polls indicating that 20 percent of the public personally knew someone who was missing, hurt, or killed in the attacks, casualty aversion is currently not a major factor in public support of the war on terrorism.

Consequences.

One possible consequence of military action is an increase in terrorist attacks. One poll asked public opinion about two courses of action—what would happen if the United States did conduct military operations, and what would happen if it did not. While 43 percent of the public believed that terrorist attacks would increase as a result of U.S. military action, 89 percent believed that the chances of terrorist attacks would increase if the United States did not take military action.

Polls show that Americans support military action against those responsible for terrorism, even when explicitly advised of a
series of possible consequences of such action. Consequences tested in polling include (in addition to casualties and a long war) the reinstatement of the draft, shortages of oil and gas, and the possibility of having less money to spend on such social programs as education and Social Security. The table below shows the details. Americans seem determined to support military action despite personally detrimental consequences.

**Question:** Would you support the U.S. taking military action if you knew each of the following would happen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Oppose (%)</th>
<th>No opinion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. military action would continue for a period of months</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes would be increased</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. ground troops would be used in an invasion</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortages of gas and oil would occur</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There would be less money to spend on domestic programs such as education and Social Security</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A prolonged economic recession would occur</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further terrorist attacks would occur in the U.S.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military draft would be re instituted</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military action would continue for a period of several years</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 American troops would be killed</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent responding “Always” or “Most of the Time.”

Political Leadership.

Some studies argue that the degree of consensus exhibited by political leaders is a major determinant of public support for military operations. While no polls specifically attempted to measure political consensus, there has been an unusually high degree of trust placed in the government since the attacks. The public was asked, “How much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” Responses showed in the graph that the trust in government to do the right thing has risen to levels not seen since the 1960s.

**Implications.**

There are two possible scenarios taking place in America today. The first suggests that our nation has returned to an era similar to the early days of the Cold War. People who earnestly desire our demise have threatened our national existence, our shores no longer protect us, and, unless we take action, our way of life is in danger. Civil defense is back, the National Guard has returned to doing more than disaster relief, and intelligence is moving back into a prominent role in national security. As a result, public support of military action is high, and America will indefinitely continue to approve of the use of the military to safeguard the nation.

The other scenario suggests that this current situation is merely a temporary disruption. The public is willing to support military action for months and even longer in order to return to life as it was before September 11. The public, in this scenario, is looking forward to the day when the military finally gets its hands on terrorism and is successful in attempts to “stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.”
Military force is necessary and supported, but only long enough to permit the American public to get back to enjoying “normal” lives again.

Of course, our future probably lies somewhere between these two scenarios. Americans are uniting in this fight because we understand that this is a total war like the Cold War, yet we are also being told to “Do your business around the country. Fly and enjoy America’s great destination spots. Get down to Disney World in Florida. Take your families and enjoy life.” Americans want the single-minded resolve that characterized the fight against communism found early in the Cold War, but our society is also struggling not to “let the terrorists win” by minimizing the changes to everyday life. This unique combination of public expectations has three implications in maintaining public support for military actions.

First, the public desires and expects victory. A surprising 87 percent of Americans said they believe the United States “absolutely must” capture or kill bin Laden and break up al Qaeda, and 8 out of 10 were confident that this would happen. Similarly, 91 percent said the United States must reduce the number of terrorist attacks in the United States, and an equal percentage was confident that this would be done. The military must show the public that their expectations are being met. Tactical successes must be periodically publicized. A decrease in the threat of terrorist attacks will be evident, but the public must be occasionally made aware that its armed forces are why the terrorists are on the run. Part of the strategic planning for this war on terrorism needs to include combining operational security requirements with the realization that public support is part of America’s center of gravity in this war. The focus should not be on “spin” or public relations, but on showing a correlation between military action and a decrease in terrorist activity.

Second, as images of the collapsing towers and burning Pentagon wear off, and Americans realize that their contribution to this war effort is to live as if there were no war, public support will drop as individual involvement in the war decreases. It is hard to mobilize the public when their role is not to ration or to step up security, but to act normal. Part of the message the military sends to the public must emphasize that America’s military is part of America. The public cannot be permitted to disconnect psychologically from the war effort. This may be difficult as much of the war will be conducted by less visible special operations troops instead of entire divisions. It may be time to resurrect notions of national service (not the draft) as military manpower gets stretched beyond current available end strengths. This will be especially crucial for the reserve component in a protracted war. National service will require the sacrifice that pulled the public together in other major wars.

A good interim solution is to immediately offer short-term enlistments (18 months) to college graduates in exchange for college loan repayment. These enlistees could serve a year in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan and then revert to several years in the reserve component. The short-term benefit would be valuable, high quality manpower in the active and reserve components, but the longer lasting and more important result would be an America that is more connected to its armed forces.

Third, there will be an expectation of continuing effectiveness without the visible signs of domestic military action. While armed National Guardsmen patrolling the nation’s airports is a reassuring sight today, the time will come when Americans will question the necessity of such shows of force. After the attacks, it was common to
hear that the United States had finally become just like Israel—an armed country constantly wary of attack. Americans do not want to live like Israelis. Americans want the security, but an overt military presence goes against the American way of life. Planning should take place now on shifting to a domestic security posture that produces a minimal signature. For example, the current combat air patrol protection provided by the augmentation of 26 airbases throughout the United States gives the assurance that the skies are safe, yet the fighters are largely invisible to the traveling public. The military will still have to be actively engaged in the war on terrorism, but it must have a low domestic profile. Despite today’s tolerance of the militarization of America, the public will begin to expect that the arm of the military be strong, yet invisible when used within the shores of the United States.

Public support for military action is at levels that parallel the public reaction after the attack at Pearl Harbor. Americans claim today that they believe military action is appropriate, that they support a protracted war, and that they are willing to endure the negative consequences that may accompany the war. Despite the favorable polls, Americans are bound to be fickle in their support. This war will not be like World War II where every citizen is directly or indirectly involved with the conflict. Americans are being told to return to their normal lives—lives that largely ignored the military before the attacks. As they return to those lives, their support of military action will diminish unless the military continually shows progress in the war against terrorism, keeps the nation connected to its armed forces, and provides domestic security that is effective, but for the most part unseen.
Introduction.

Much has been said and written in recent weeks about the changed nature of “warfare” as it pertains to responding to the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. That attacks of such vast scale are made directly on U.S. soil by nonstate actors poses important new questions for military leaders and planners charged with conceiving an appropriate and effective response.

The established moral and legal traditions of just war are similarly challenged. Forged almost entirely in the context of interstate war, those traditions are also pressed to adapt to the new and unforeseen character of a “war against terrorism.” This paper is a preliminary effort to extrapolate and apply existing fundamental moral principles of just war theory to this novel military and political terrain.

Fundamental Moral Principles.

The theoretical framework of the just war tradition provides two separate moral assessments of uses of military force. The first, jus ad bellum (right or justice toward war) attempts to determine which sets of political and military circumstances are sufficiently grave to warrant a military response. It focuses on the “just cause” element of war, and attempts to determine whether use of force to redress a given wrong has a reasonable hope of success and whether nonviolent alternatives have been attempted (the “last resort” criterion) to redress the grievance. Given the horrendous loss of innocent American (and other) life in these recent attacks, it is without serious question that a just cause exists to use military force in response. However, legitimate questions remain regarding reasonable hope of success given the difficult and diffuse nature of the perpetrators of these events. Indeed, the very definition of success in conflict of this sort is to some degree ambiguous.

The second body of assessments concerns jus in bello, right conduct of military operations. The central ideas here concern discrimination (using force against those who are morally and legally responsible for the attack and not deliberately against others) and proportionality (a reasonable balance between the damage
done in the responding attack and the military value of the targets destroyed).

These fundamental moral principles continue to have force, even in the quite different “war” in which we are now engaged.

**Jus ad bellum Considerations.**

The scale and nature of the terrorist attacks on the United States without question warrant a military response. The important questions about *jus ad bellum* are confined to the other questions the just war tradition requires us to ask regarding the ability to respond to those attacks with military force that will, in fact, respond to the attackers themselves and be effective in responding to the wrong received.

Just cause requires that we identify with accuracy those responsible and hold them to be the sole objects of legitimate attack. Who are those agents? In the first instance, those directly responsible for funding and directing the activities of the now-deceased hijackers. There is a tremendous intelligence demand to identify those agents correctly. But, having identified them to a moral certainty (a standard far short of what would be required by legal criteria of proof, it should be noted) there is no moral objection to targeting them. Indeed, one of the benefits of framing these operations as “war” rather than “law enforcement” is that it does not require the ideal outcome to be the apprehension and trial of the perpetrators. Instead, it countenances their direct elimination by military means if possible.

What of the claim that we may legitimately attack those who harbor terrorists, even if they are not directly involved in authorizing their activities? The justification for attacking them has two aspects: first, it holds them accountable for activities which they knew, or should have known, were being conducted in their territories and did nothing to stop; second, it serves as a deterrent to motivate other states and sponsors to be more vigilant and aware of the activities of such groups on their soil.

How far ought the moral permission to attack parties not directly involved extend? I would propose application of a standard from American civil law: the “reasonable person” (or “reasonable man”) standard of proof. This standard asks not what an individual knew, as a matter of fact, about a given situation or set of facts. Instead, it asks what a reasonable and prudent person in a similar situation should know. Thus, even if a person or government truthfully asserts that they were unaware of the activities of a terrorist cell in their territory, this does not provide moral immunity from attack. This standard asks not what they *did* know, but what they *ought to have known* had they exercised the diligence and degree of inquiry a reasonable person in their circumstance would have exercised.

Also, legitimate targets include more than those who have carried out or are actively engaged in preparing to carry out attacks against U.S. citizens and forces. There will presumably be numerous individuals who, in various ways, assisted or harbored attackers, or who possessed knowledge of planned attacks. From a moral perspective, the circle of legitimate targets surely includes at least these individuals. A rough analog for the principle here is the civil law standard for criminal conspiracy: all those within the circle of the conspiracy are legitimate targets. The analogy is not perfect, but in general it justifies attacks on those who possessed information about the contemplated terrorist activity or who supplied weapons, training, funding, or safe harbor to the actors, even if they did not possess full knowledge of their intent.
**Jus in bello Considerations.**

How do ethical considerations constrain the manner of attack against legitimate adversaries? The traditional requirements of just war continue to have application in this kind of war. Attacks must be *discriminate* and they must be *proportionate*. Discrimination requires that attacks be made on persons and military objects in ways that permit successful attack on them with a minimum of damage to innocent persons and objects. In practical terms, this requires as much precision as possible in determination of the location and nature of targets. Further, it requires choice of weapons and tactics that are most likely accurately to hit the object of the attack with a minimum of damage to surrounding areas and personnel.

Proportionality imposes an essentially common-sense requirement that the damage done in the attack is in some reasonable relation to the value and nature of the target. To use a simple example: if the target is a small cell of individuals in a single building, the obliteration of the entire town in which the structure sits would be disproportionate.

Two important real world considerations bear on this discussion. The first is military necessity. Military necessity permits actions that might otherwise be ethically questionable. For example, if there simply are no practical alternative means of attacking a legitimate target, weapons and tactics that are less than ideal in terms of their discrimination and proportionality may be acceptable. It is important not to confuse military necessity with military convenience. The obligation of military personnel is to assume some risk in the effort to protect innocents. However, situations can certainly arise in which there simply is not time or any alternative means of attacking in a given situation. There, military necessity generates the permission to proceed with the attack.

The other consideration is the tendency of adversaries of this type to co-locate themselves and their military resources with civilians and civilian structures in order to gain some sense of protection from such human shields. Obviously, when possible, every effort should be made to separate legitimate targets from such shields. But when that is not possible, it is acceptable to proceed with the attack, foreseeing that innocent persons and property will be destroyed. The moral principle underlying this judgment is known as “double effect,” and permits such actions insofar as the agent sincerely can claim (as would be the case here) that the destruction of the innocents was not part of the plan or intention, but merely an unavoidable by-product of legitimate military action.

It is important to note, however, that there can be no just war justification for a response to these attacks with attacks of a similar character on other societies. Not only would this constitute an unethical and illegal attack on innocent parties, it would almost certainly erode the moral “high ground” and wide-spread political support the United States currently enjoys.

**The Moral Status of the Adversary.**

The individuals who initiated the terror attacks are clearly not “soldiers” in any moral or legal sense. They, and others who operate as they did from the cover of civilian identities, are not entitled to any of the protections of the war convention. This means that, if captured, they are not entitled to the benevolent quarantine of the POW convention or of domestic criminal law. For the purposes of effective response to these individuals, as well as future deterrence, it may be highly undesirable even if they are captured to carry out the extensive due process of criminal
proceedings. If we can identify culpable individuals to a moral certainty, their swift and direct elimination by military means is morally acceptable and probably preferable in terms of the goals of the policy.

However, as this conflict proceeds, especially if ground operations commence against fixed targets, one may foresee that individuals and groups may come to operate against U.S. forces as organized military units. It is important to keep in mind that, no matter how horrific the origins of this conflict, if and when this occurs and such groups begin to behave as organized units, to carry weapons openly, and to wear some kind of distinctive dress or badge, they become assimilated to the war convention. At that point, close moral and legal analysis will be required to determine the degree to which they become entitled to the status of “combatant” and are given the Geneva Convention protection that status provides. The previous permission for swift elimination applies to the period in which they operate with civilian “cover.” Should elements of the adversary force eventually choose to operate as an organized military force, the long-term importance of universal respect for the Geneva Convention’s provision would make our treating them at that point as soldiers under the law the preferred course of action.
FIFTEEN
Coalition Partners: Pakistan
Dr. Steven Metz

Conclusions:
• Resuscitate and broaden contacts with the Pakistani military through a coordinated NATO engagement plan (with a major role for Turkey); renewed and expanded IMET for Pakistani officers and NCOs; establishment of Pakistani faculty liaison positions at the CGSC, USAWC, TRADOC, and branch schools; provide U.S. instructors at Pakistani PME schools; and explore a new form of engagement that leads to the rotational stationing of a Pakistani company or battalion at a U.S. Army base for training and professional development.
• Support Musharraf while quietly pressuring him to undertake the political and economic reforms necessary for long-term stability.
• In collaboration with the European Union and the United Nations, lead a major effort to find a solution to the Kashmir problem that satisfies that region’s Muslim majority but does not do so at the expense of India’s security.
• Continue debt forgiveness and increased access to the American market, particularly for textiles.
• Provide reconstruction assistance focused on the rebuilding of the educational system.
• Resist any urge to use Pakistani territory for military operations against Afghanistan.
• Broaden and deepen military engagement with India to assure that New Delhi does not see improved ties with Pakistan as a strategic “tilt.”

Pakistan may be the most pivotal coalition partner during the initial phase of the war on terrorism since it has the longest border with and provides the best access to Afghanistan. In a broader sense, Pakistan is crucial because it is the world’s second most populous Islamic state. Its cooperation helps prevent the war on terrorism from becoming a conflict between Islam and Christianity. Pakistan is also a Category II sanctuary for global terrorist movements. And Pakistan has an effective military and intelligence service and thus could serve as an important ally for anti-terrorist operations.

The United States would like to see Pakistan emerge from the war on terrorism as a stable, developing state where religious-based extremists do not find support or recruits. As such, it could provide a model for other Islamic states and play a

* Category I states support terrorist movements as official policy (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). Category II states turn a blind eye or allow terrorist movements to exist because of fear, weakness, or sympathy (e.g. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). Category III states host terrorist activities because their systems of legal and civil rights and their large immigrant communities provide a form of protection (e.g. Germany and the United States).
leading role in building regional stability and prosperity.

This positive outcome is certainly not preordained. Pakistan could disintegrate into a nightmare internal war of ethnic conflict, sectarian violence, and humanitarian disaster. Under such conditions, religious extremists could ally with sympathetic military officers, seize political power, and thus control nuclear weapons.

The ultimate outcome for Pakistan depends on the sagacity of that nation’s leaders and on the wisdom of American strategy.

Context.

Pakistan faces severe constraints and problems that American strategists must consider. From its creation in 1947, Pakistan has had a weak sense of national identity. Composed of a multitude of ethnic groups with different cultures and languages, its only unifying feature was Islam. Pakistan has never decided whether it seeks to be an Iran-style nation ruled by religious leaders or a secular state along the lines of Turkey.

Punjabis, who constitute about 48 percent of Pakistanis, dominate the economy, government, and military. This has created deep resentment among the other ethnic groups. Ethnically Pashtun Pakistanis, who represent about 8 percent of the population, feel as much connection with their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan as with Islamabad. Thus the Taliban has deep reservoirs of support in western Pakistan and in the slums of other cities like Karachi.

Pakistan suffers from rigid class distinctions intermingled with religious considerations. Members of the upper class tend to identify with modernization and the West. Many have been educated in Europe or North America, and all speak English. While some are devoutly religious, most consider the religious extremism popular among the largely illiterate lower classes as a threat.

To avoid inflaming class war, the Pakistani elite has tolerated this extremism. The tendency of the extremists to blame external forces, particularly the United States and Israel, for Pakistan’s problems was a convenient way to deflect attention from the shortcomings of the nation’s leaders and political structures.

Bad governance has been the norm in Pakistan. The first decade of independence established a pattern of political instability and corruption. In combination with rapid population growth, crushing poverty, and ethnic and sectarian conflict, this is incendiary.

Pakistan has experienced cycles of military dictatorship and weak, corrupt civilian governments. In October 1999 the Army deposed Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif when he attempted to replace Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf with a family crony. General Musharraf, while promising a return to civilian rule, has ruled since then, attempting with only modest success to root out corruption, forestall ethnic and regional conflict, control religious extremism, and resuscitate the nation’s stagnant economy.

Pakistan’s external debt burden is crushing with $21 billion coming due in 2002-03. Defense spending consumes a significant portion of government expenditures. These economic problems contributed to a collapse of public education, the public health system, and the criminal justice and law enforcement systems. Foreign investment has nearly dried up. GDP growth during most of the 1990s was less than population growth, leading to a decline in living standards and widespread discontent.

Pakistan’s primary foreign and security problem has been its conflict with India. In
recent decades, this has centered on the status of Kashmir. While this state is overwhelmingly Muslim, its ruler at the time of independence was Hindu and thus sought to join India. Armed conflict ensued which led to India’s occupation of the eastern part. In 1990 Kashmiri militants began an armed insurgency against Indian control. While Islamabad officially denies involvement, it is widely known that Pakistan supports the insurgents. This has led India to label Pakistan a supporter of terrorism. The fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear states makes their conflict one of the most dangerous on earth.

While grappling with these problems, Pakistan developed close ties with the Taliban government in neighboring Afghanistan. The military and intelligence services trained and equipped the mujahedin who fought against the Soviets. Out of the concern that the civil war and disorder in Afghanistan that followed the Soviet withdrawal would spill over, the Pakistani military and security services helped form and support the Taliban, most of whom emerged from the refugee camps and radical religious schools (madrasahs) in Pakistan. (These schools, which are the only source of education for many poor Pakistanis, remain a breeding ground for violent extremism).

Support for the Taliban remains high, particularly in the heavily Pashtun areas like Quetta and Peshawar, among the urban poor in large cities like Karachi, and among the more radically religious segments of the professional classes, including the military and intelligence services.

Pakistan’s Strategy.

The United States’ declaration of war on terrorism forced General Musharraf to abandon his attempts to tolerate or mollify extremism. In effect, he had to choose between alternative futures for his country, one based on an improved relationship with the West and integration into the global economy, the other leading toward the “Talibanization” of Pakistan.

Musharraf has several interlinked objectives:

- Improving ties with the West in order to gain the removal of sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 military coup, deflecting pressure caused by the slowness of the return to civilian rule, attracting economic assistance and investment, and providing a diplomatic counterweight to India, particularly on the Kashmir issue;
- Diminishing the threat from the extremist movements inside Pakistan;
- Avoiding the disintegration of Afghanistan which would create serious refugee problems for Pakistan and potentially engulf the western section of the country; and,
- Preventing the emergence in Kabul of a successor government hostile to Pakistan (on this point, Musharraf supports a coalition government dominated by Pashtuns, who form a majority in Afghanistan).

In September Musharraf pledged “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism,” but out of concern with the backlash among Pakistan’s lower classes and other Taliban sympathizers, stipulated that there be no U.S. forces in Pakistan and that the Pakistani military not be used outside the nation’s borders. He made several attempts to broker a deal with the Taliban leading to the turnover of Osama bin Laden, but all failed.

Musharraf’s government has controlled the anti-American demonstrations that exploded once military operations began and shown a willingness to use force if necessary. He has consolidated his grip on power. The most important step in this was
an October 7 purge of senior military officers and intelligence officials thought to be sympathetic to the Taliban and other extremists. In general, then, he has attempted to go as far as he can in support of the United States and the Afghanistan operation without sparking outright rebellion within Pakistan.

Prognosis.

In the short term, Musharraf appears firmly in control of Pakistan and likely to continue cooperation with the United States. The level of professionalism among the officer corps is high; its senior leaders appear solidly behind Musharraf’s approach. He has expressed his confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are fully under control and cannot be seized by radicals. This is all very important for the United States: if Musharraf should be removed from power, any successor would be less likely to cooperate in the war on terrorism and might be overtly hostile.

Three things could help solidify Musharraf’s position and support. One is if the Afghanistan phase of the war on terrorism is short, leads to minimum civilian casualties and refugee flows, and paves the way for a coalition government and the reconstruction of that battered country. Second is some immediate economic payoff. It is not yet clear whether this will happen. On one hand, the United States, the European Union, and Japan have all taken steps to provide debt relief and other means of economic support. In late September the IMF, with U.S. approval, authorized the final tranche of Pakistan’s $596 million standby loan. On the other hand, the turmoil in South and Central Asia have further deterred investment and increased shipping insurance for goods to and from Pakistan. Third is international involvement leading toward a solution of the Kashmir problem in a way satisfactory to the Muslim majority there.

Musharraf’s position and support could be weakened by several things:

• A protracted military operation in Afghanistan leading to refugee flows and widespread civilian casualties;
• An outright takeover of Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance;
• Anti-terrorist attacks by the United States on other Muslim countries such as Iraq or Libya;
• A significant crackdown on the Muslim insurgents in Kashmir by India;
• Failure on the part of the United States and Europe to produce tangible economic benefits in exchange for Pakistan’s cooperation; or
• The coalescence of opposition from within the Pakistani military.

Conclusion.

Without cooperation from Pakistan, the United States would have a very difficult time completing the first phase of the war on terrorism. But the United States has been burned many times by placing its trust in friendly dictators unwilling or unable to undertake serious political reform. This is the dilemma with Pakistan: the United States may not be able to succeed without Musharraf, but to be associated with him could be risky over the long term if he becomes just another corrupt, repressive military dictator.
While Pakistan may be the most pivotal coalition partner in the initial phase in the war on terrorism, a top U.S. priority in South Asia must be to keep India-Pakistan tensions at the lowest level possible. A successful outcome in this phase of the war not only requires ongoing cooperation with Islamabad but also parallel U.S. engagement with New Delhi. Because of the decades-old animosity between India and Pakistan, especially concerning the territorial dispute over the region of Kashmir, a misstep by the United States, Pakistan, or India could easily lead to a dangerous heightening of tensions between the two nuclear armed South Asian neighbors and possibly escalate into war.

Rightly or wrongly, India continues to see Pakistan as “part of the problem” rather than “part of the solution” in the war. From New Delhi’s perspective, Islamabad is a major exporter of terrorism—first to Afghanistan and then, since the late 1980s, to Kashmir. Indeed, Afghanistan is seen by many Indians as a virtual colony of Pakistan, with the Taliban serving as a proxy of Pakistan’s military.

Context.

At independence from Great Britain in 1947, the subcontinent was partitioned into the predominantly Hindu state of India and predominantly Muslim state of Pakistan because Hindu and Muslim leaders could not agree on a political formula to keep their communities in one country. Although India remains officially a secular state, more than 80 percent of its one billion people are Hindu, and the dominant political party in New Delhi’s current governing coalition is the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (or BJP). Nevertheless, approximately 12 percent of the country’s population is Muslim. Numbering some 120
million, this gives India a Muslim community even larger than that of Pakistan and second only to that of Indonesia.

India today shares approximately a two thousand mile-long border with Pakistan, and it has fought three major wars and one mini-war with Pakistan. All but one of these was fought over Kashmir. The first was fought at Independence in 1947 when the Muslim majority in Kashmir sought to join Pakistan, and the Hindu hereditary ruler appealed for help from India. The result was a war that led to the division of Kashmir into Indian and Pakistani control sectors separated by the so-called Line of Control. A second Indo-Pakistan war was fought over Kashmir in 1965. Six years later the two countries fought another war, this time over the status of East Pakistan. India’s victory meant East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh.

More recently, in 1999 Indian troops fought a small war against Pakistan irregulars in the remote Kargil region of Kashmir. It remains to be seen whether India’s strikes against Pakistani-controlled Kashmir on October 15 of this year will escalate into another full-blown war or simply dissipate.

India and Pakistan are both nuclear powers and therefore the possibility exists of a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Moreover, there are serious questions about command and control mechanisms for nuclear weapons in both countries.

**India’s Strategy.**

India views itself as a natural ally of the United States and an indispensable coalition member of the war. New Delhi is very eager to continue the rapprochement with Washington that began during the Clinton administration and continued in its view until the immediate aftermath of September 11.

India has expressed strong support for the war on terrorism. New Delhi has offered bases, airfields, and intelligence for U.S. forces involved in operations against targets in Afghanistan. India is extremely concerned about Pakistani support for terrorism particularly in the disputed area of Kashmir, especially in the wake of the October 1 car bombing outside the state parliament building in the capital of Srinagar. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee reportedly gave assurances to President Bush prior to October 1 that India would show restraint in Kashmir.

New Delhi supports ongoing U.S. military actions but remains wary about the closer ties developing between the United States and Pakistan. Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf spoke by telephone on October 8. Vajpayee insisted that Pakistan must end support for Islamic terrorists in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and he declined Musharraf’s invitation to meet face-to-face with the Pakistani leader.

India’s main objectives are:

- Further improvement in bilateral relations with the United States;
- The continued existence of a unified Pakistan;
- The defeat of “terrorism” in Kashmir;
- No significant impairment of India’s impressive economic growth.

**Prognosis.**

India will continue to support strongly the war and will remain very interested in expanding security ties and defense cooperation with the United States. At the same time, New Delhi will continue to be extremely concerned about growing U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation.

India will also be extremely sensitive to further terrorist activities in Kashmir. It will be difficult for New Delhi not to retaliate with force in the event of further
terrorist attacks in the disputed territory. Nevertheless, India’s actions will be constrained by the sober recognition that sustained military action against Pakistan-controlled Kashmir would exacerbate the political challenges confronting Islamabad’s military government and perhaps lead to its collapse—the last thing New Delhi wants.

If, for whatever reason, Pakistan’s armed forces intervened in Afghanistan, India would vehemently condemn this, and Indo-Pakistani tensions would heighten.

**Recommendations.**

The United States must work very hard to prevent people from viewing the war on terrorism as a religious struggle between Islam and Hinduism by:

- Continuing to develop and expand its relationship with India while being careful at the same time not to be viewed as leaning toward India at the expense of Pakistan;
- Expanding mil-mil relations on a trajectory comparable with that planned for Pakistan;
- Assisting India to improve command and control systems for its nuclear weapons;
- Urging India to moderate its response to communal unrest and insurgency in Kashmir at least in the short term;
- Encouraging India to seek over the longer term a negotiated solution in Kashmir with the help of an honest broker such as U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan.
SEVENTEEN

Central Asia and the War on Terrorism: Towards a New Alignment

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Introduction.

Although the five Central Asian states are similar, there are significant ethnographical, religious (Sunni versus Shia), and linguistic cleavages among them. Therefore, policies and strategic options that involve them must be tailored to their specific needs and conditions. But if we understand their interests, we should be able to devise successful responses and inducements of an inclusive strategic nature, within whose umbrella we can target specific countries’ needs. Success in doing so will enhance the U.S. coalition’s viability and allow us to exploit the present crisis so that we can bring about a significant and lasting geostrategic realignment in America’s interest.

Impact of the Crisis and Support for U.S. Goals.

The willingness of the Central Asian states to cooperate with the United States varies. Because of this, our assistance should be tailored and go proportionally to those who help us the most.

The most willing to help is the most independent-minded of all these states, Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan seeks maximum freedom of action and distance from both Russia and China, but must deal with what it perceives as a constant threat of Islamic insurgency and terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. It also is obviously contending with not just the threat of internal unrest and insurgency, but Russian and perhaps Chinese pressure to limit any military cooperation with Washington. President Islam Karimov’s regime has stated its willingness to provide the use of air space and one military base for humanitarian missions. It also has allowed 1,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in Uzbekistan, probably at that base. Presumably this involves intelligence cooperation as well.

Kazakhstan, the most distant from the scene of current Central Asian insurgencies and the most abundantly endowed with energy, must always balance Russia and China. Therefore, it generally seeks to diversify its external and defense relationships. It, too, has offered the United States bases and air space.

Turkmenistan has followed a formal policy of neutrality since becoming independent, and perhaps due to that has the best relations with the Taliban of any of

Conclusions:

- Upgrade military engagement, security assistance, and PFP relationships.
- Implement intelligence cooperation and training.
- Link assistance to political and economic reforms.
- Support petroleum pipeline routes through Central Asia to India.
- Provide infrastructure, public health, and ecological assistance.
- Assist developmental NGOs and foundations that work in Central Asia.
these states, often serving as an interlocutor. Thus its support is limited to opening its air space to humanitarian flights.

Tajikistan, the victim of civil war and with a fragile regime sustained mainly by Russian troops, nevertheless has consented to use of its bases. But most likely any further or future cooperation from Tajikistan will remain covert and unspoken. Kyrgyzstan, another small state that depends largely on Russian support, has offered its air corridors for humanitarian flights and has not totally ruled out military cooperation. In this context, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan offer excellent bases for missions directed at Afghanistan and are the real logistical keys to any success in launching missions from Central Asia.

Central Asian Demands or Needs.

At the same time, all these states will expect and also need “compensations” from the United States. These rewards for their support are both short and long term in nature. They are not exclusively military, but the military “compensations” appear to be the most urgent ones. As these are states that face permanent and ongoing threats from terrorists aligned to the drug trade from Afghanistan, they will want military assistance. Uzbek officials, for instance, talk of “annihilating the Taliban.” Specifically, they appear to want upgraded Partnership for Peace (PfP) relationships and improved bilateral relations and assistance in weapons and training, as well as intelligence, from Washington. The longer-term goal is to obtain, if not a security guarantee from Washington and/or NATO, then a permanently functioning U.S. military presence or relationship in and with Uzbekistan. Thus it is hardly surprising that Uzbekistan now wants to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Uzbekistan, and probably the other states as well, want independence from the hegemonic plans of both Russia and China, now enshrined in the Shanghai-6 communiqué of July 2001. That communiqué not only licensed the external power projection of Russian and Chinese forces in Central Asia (the latter signing off on such an agreement for the first time), it also defined terrorism, separatism, and extremism as security threats. Despite Russian offers of cooperation, it is clear that Moscow objects to these states having any meaningful or lasting defense relationship with the United States.

The Central Asia states may not fully be able to escape the Russo-Chinese defense straitjacket, but they certainly wish to have real alternatives to it. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, this is realistic. Perhaps it would be possible to provide some or all of these kinds of assistance. However, the danger for the United States is that it creates too close an identification with these extremely repressive regimes whose policies, including disregard for civil and human rights, massive corruption, authoritarianism, and fierce religious repression, are creating the grounds for insurgency. Not surprisingly, the increasing impoverishment of masses of people as a few grow very rich, the unresolved socio-ecological-economic issues, and an apparently growing identification with Islam as a form of political expression provide fertile grounds for internal and possibly interstate conflict. Thus military and security assistance must be finely calibrated and should not be the only card in our deck.

Economic-Political Needs and Assistance.

All these regimes desperately need large-scale and long-term economic, ecological, and political support. They require
help to obtain favorable terms of trade for their products and access to markets. That means major infrastructural investments in transportation and pipelines to free them of dependence on Russia. Only such investments, coupled at the less glamorous end with developmental programs of a smaller scale such as have worked elsewhere in the Third World, can allow these regimes to make substantial economic progress and eventually a breakthrough. This would include substantive assistance to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, or pending the pacification of Afghanistan, UNOCAL’s proposal for a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as well as the states less endowed with oil and gas, a major realignment can be realized if we can pacify Afghanistan and reverse Pakistan’s support for insurgents in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Kashmir. To the degree that Washington can persuade or, more bluntly, frighten either Tehran or Islamabad into renouncing terrorism and negotiating with their rivals, it can support more alternatives for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as smaller Kyrgyzstan and even the Russian client, Tajikistan, to expand and diversify their international trade. That possibility entails energy pipelines and construction of major infrastructural and transportation outlets that will greatly stimulate all commercial traffic, not just in energy products, among all these states. Such large-scale growth of trade offers Central Asia major security and economic benefits, provided Afghanistan is pacified and becomes the recipient of sustained international efforts at reconstruction. Certainly it would help overcome the logjam concerning pipelines and shatter the material basis for Iranian-Russian alliance, partly directed against Central Asian states and Azerbaijan.

This strategic realignment also offers a possibility for genuine Indo-Pakistani negotiations and reduced tensions between Iran and its neighbors and/or Israel. Either or both of those outcomes would clearly be mutually beneficial for everyone in the Middle East, Central Asia, and/or South Asia. While this vision may seem too audacious, this crisis and the fact that the war will not likely be a short one offer the possibilities for major restructuring of Central Asian alignments to the benefit of local regimes and the United States.

**Recommendations.**

U.S. inducements for support should avoid long-term and binding ties like SOFAs. Rather, we should make the following kinds of military-political-economic offers in return for real support.

- Upgraded bilateral military exercises, training, weapons sales, IMET agreements, and more frequent participation for all who want it in PfP exercises.
- A regular program of intelligence cooperation and training as needed.
- Political assistance to bolster those countries against China and Russia. This assistance can also take the form of the bilateral and multilateral military programs listed above, since those enhance these regimes’ capability to defend themselves or to solicit Western support. However, we cannot ally ourselves with repressive domestic tactics. Ideally, a discussion should begin that requires political and economic reforms as a condition for aid.
- Support for pipelines through those countries to India and beyond, giving producers a real outlet to the sea that is an alternative to Russian and Iranian pressures, pipelines, and ports.
- Large-scale assistance to build roads for rail, truck, and commercial trade south
from Central Asia, tied to the EU Silk Road project.

- Large-scale assistance with water purification and cleanup and development of renewable sources of water.
- Large-scale assistance in public health and pollution cleanup.
- Major financial assistance to NGOs and foundations with a proven record of success that are working to develop areas from the bottom up to parallel the larger, macro-economic projects cited here.
To grasp the impact upon Russia of our new war and the requirements for sustaining Russia’s cooperation, we must distinguish four sets of players in Russia and one set of foreign players besides the United States. President Vladimir Putin must balance the inputs and pressures emanating from these sources. Based on public record, they are the intelligence community, i.e., the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the domestic Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the armed forces, represented by the General Staff. The Central Asian governments also influence Moscow’s thinking from the outside.

The Players in Russia.

The SVR and perhaps FSB apparently have previously offered the United States covert rights to bases in Tajikistan for use against Osama Bin Laden. The Russian government regularly professes deep anxiety about the rapid spread of insurgency in Central Asia supported by bin Laden and the Taliban. The assassination of the latter’s main rival, Ahmad Shah Massoud, military leader of the Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan, might eventually provoke a Taliban offensive towards the Afghan border with Central Asia. That would facilitate the direct spread into Central Asia and beyond of large-scale refugee flows, terrorism, insurgency, and rampant narcotics trading that finances this violence. Russia also argues that these Afghan-based forces are materially implicated in Chechnya.

The SVR and FSB have previously shared intelligence up to a point with their U.S. and Western opposite numbers concerning these terrorists. They clearly view the attacks on America as a basis for a deeper and more enduring intelligence and thus political entente with the West. They also evidently believe that the U.S.-led military alliance will facilitate resolution of the problem of military suppression of either the Central Asian and Afghan-based forces or allow Russia greater scope for action in Chechnya without worldwide opposition. Preliminary indications concerning the expectation of less Western opposition to Russia’s activities in Chechnya seem to be justified. Therefore the SVR and FSB have now revealed their past cooperation with Washington (in general terms) and appear ready to upgrade it. Thus, after Putin’s offer to share intelligence with Washington, it is likely that a deeper and perhaps more regularized

Conclusions:
- Provide Russia expanded trade access to the U.S. market and investment opportunities.
- Develop programs help Russia with the clean up of nuclear materials, ecological repair, and reconstruction of its public health system.
- Provide some form of compensation for an end to proliferation of WMD technology and systems.
mechanism of sharing and cooperation between our two intelligence systems will take place.

The MFA evidently also sees opportunities for gain here, including at least the expectation of Western silence, if not active approbation for Russian activities in Chechnya. Therefore Moscow has steadily proclaimed the tie between the Chechens and Bin Laden’s network. U.S., German, and Italian reactions to Russian policy in Chechnya evidently justify that expectation. The MFA also apparently entertains the hope of future membership in a revamped NATO. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who supports such cooperation, now also urges the establishment of a mechanism with NATO for deeper and more regularized security cooperation with Moscow. Moscow also wants compensation for any cessation of weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability transfers to Iran and other “rogue states” (Iraq and North Korea, among others); a veto, presumably in the U.N., over any action that may be taken against Iraq; presumably membership in the World Trade Organization; and debt forgiveness. Thus it is also urging that the United States act exclusively through the U.N., a bad idea for many reasons.

The point of this gambit is not just approving Russian aims in Chechnya, but also preventing NATO enlargement in 2002, especially to the Baltic, reversing the idea of NATO and Western primacy in providing security to Eastern Europe, and recognizing a privileged place in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for Moscow—the last one being its topmost foreign policy and defense priority. This attempted reconstitution of NATO not only reverses the thrust of Western policy in Europe, it also gives Russia its long-sought-after veto on NATO’s activities without having undergone or affirmed internal reform, defense reform, and acceptance of the territorial status quo in Eurasia, not to mention renouncing its hegemonic aspirations in the CIS. None of these objectives, except for financial and economic assistance, comport with vital U.S. goals that our new war on terrorism does not supersede.

However, Putin’s offer to assist Washington also came about because Moscow cannot control the Central Asian states to the extent that it wishes. His offer followed numerous reports that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and possibly Turkmenistan, would offer the United States overflight rights, access to air bases and intelligence sharing, and that U.S. forces were either in Uzbekistan or en route there. Failing to stop this move by Central Asian governments, Moscow apparently tried to jump on the bandwagon and regain control of it. Moscow wants to retain control over the duration, modalities, and extent of U.S. military and other presence in Central Asia by offering Washington more than would be otherwise expected. It also hopes to obtain the political benefits sketched out above.

The military, led by the General Staff and its Chief, General Anatoly Kvashnin, is clearly the most suspicious element in Russian policymaking. Beyond concern about being dragged into another Afghan or Chechen-like war which it cannot win, or of becoming a target for further terrorist attacks, it also harbors deep suspicions about any U.S. military presence in the CIS under any conditions. Consequently, it not only refused to commit any troops to the operation, it preempted Putin when Ivanov practically ruled out even the kind of cooperation that Putin later supported. We can reliably expect the MOD and General Staff to resolutely oppose any extended U.S. strategic presence in Central Asia and the CIS, generally to seek to limit America’s presence and Russian and Central Asian
cooperation with U.S. forces, and loudly to demand compensations even beyond what we have mentioned.

**Russia’s Offer and Its Ambivalent Role in the War on Terrorism.**

Putin offered the United States intelligence cooperation with the SVR and possibly FSB, opened Russian airspace to humanitarian flights and to search and rescue missions, and offered weapons and arms to Afghan anti-Taliban forces. Putin also tried to pretend that he was graciously offering former Soviet air bases in Central Asia and had coordinated this with those governments to maintain the pretense of Russian hegemony there. But he refrained from offering Russian military or air bases as staging posts for U.S. or coalition forces or from allowing overflight rights to U.S. aircraft in support of military missions. Thus actual operational assistance will be limited strictly to nonmilitary operations. Russia will not directly support attacks on the Taliban. Should the war shift to other theaters known for harboring terrorists, like Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Libya, it is very doubtful that even this limited cooperation will continue.

Indeed, Russia’s actual conduct in the war on terrorism is highly suspect and rather different from its loud anti-terrorist rhetoric. The war in Chechnya largely stems from Putin’s and Yeltsin’s effort to launch a quick, victorious war against an enemy that certainly could be charged with terrorism in Dagestan and perhaps beyond that in Russia, and to do so for domestic electoral purposes. Yet there is no credible evidence of any Chechen terror in Russia since 1999 apart from Dagestan, and there are new charges that the FSB was behind the terrorism of 1999 in Moscow. Although international Islamic fighters are present in Chechnya and ties to Bin Laden do exist, that war is more about Russian issues than about terrorism.

Moreover, Polish scholars have noted that the only power that benefits from ongoing insurgency and terrorism in Central Asia is Russia, since that justifies Russian efforts to project its military power and to advocate integrating Central Asian states around Russia’s armed forces. Yet when those states faced real threats last year, Russian help was minimal and derided by local governments. Furthermore, there are charges within the Russian press that Russian forces allowed the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) to cross into Central Asia by opening the Tajik-Afghan border to them in 2000. Russian troops and commanders in Central Asia have also participated in the drug trade originating there and in Afghanistan. Nuclear smuggling has taken place in Central Asia, and this suggests at least some officials’ or armed forces’ connivance with the smugglers and the intended recipients of this contraband. Finally, Russian intelligence (as the *Washington Times* reported on June 14-15) sold Bin Laden high-tech communications and apparently encryption technology stolen by Robert Hanssen. These facts suggest Russia’s rather unique approach to terrorism, one that the United States should not reward unduly.

**Sustaining the Coalition.**

Most Russian objectives run counter to U.S. goals in Europe and Asia and our new opportunities to gain a lasting influence in Central Asia. Since many Central Asian governments clearly seek some lasting U.S. presence and were disappointed at not getting it, we now have an opportunity to gain that presence while making fewer “side payments” to Russia than might otherwise have been the case. We can offer the following “compensations” to Russia, even
while expanding our visibility in Central Asia.

- We should offer Russia expanded trade access to U.S. market and investment opportunities (provided the legal bases for the latter are implemented).
- We should also offer large-scale public programs to clean up nuclear materials, and help deal with some of the monumental ecological and public health issues there that are beyond Russian control.
- Furthermore, we can and should offer reasonable compensations to induce a cessation of proliferation of all forms of WMD technology and systems (and, if we are able, conventional weaponry as well) to Iran and other rogue states: Iraq, Syria, Libya, etc.
- A very important inducement to Russia is to move rapidly on reducing strategic offensive arms in return for building strategic defenses to levels outlined by President Bush and the administration. This neutralizes some of the Russian military opposition to cooperation, reaffirms our willingness and ability to be a reliable partner, eases many Russian security dilemmas since they cannot afford parity any longer, and conforms to our overall desire to rewrite relations with Russia. Agreement here demonstrates our desire to forge truly nonadversarial relations with Russia. But, at the same time, it does not compromise any of our other existing and still continuing broad strategic-political objectives across Eurasia.
- It would also be helpful to devise, if it is possible, a mechanism for regular intelligence exchanges on terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
- These incentives should not stop or limit our plans for NATO enlargement and our intention to forestall spheres of influence in the CIS.

- Nor is it time to admit Russia into NATO. Indeed, doing so would be an act of the greatest strategic folly because it would utterly compromise NATO’s mission, purpose, and standards for entry, as well as regional security, especially in the Baltic, Balkan, Black Sea, and CIS areas.
- Although there is no doubt of Chechen ties to Bin Laden and other such groups, that war has a different profile and etiology than our current campaign, and they should not be linked. While we may urge the Chechens to sever ties with Bin Laden, we should not refrain from criticizing Russian operations, or more importantly, urging a political solution to the war.
- This crisis offers us an opportunity to achieve other key aims beyond Russia’s integration into the West through strategic arms and economic agreements sketched out above.
- In particular, this crisis provides an opportunity to undermine the essentially anti-American thrust of the Shanghai Cooperation organization that was imposed on Central Asia by Russia and China. That organization’s recent communiqué licenses Chinese and Russia military presences there in the guise of anti-terrorist or anti-separatist operations (terms that could justify Russian assistance over Taiwan).
- Recent events demonstrate not only that the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, still desire a meaningful and multifaceted U.S. presence there, they also show that Russia cannot stop it from taking place. Therefore, we need to prevent this area from becoming not only a site for regular terrorist activities and insurgency, but also a platform for an anti-American coalition aiming to restore Russian hegemony or extend Chinese influence in Asia. Our invited presence there can serve all the strategic objectives of security, energy, and maintaining trade access and Central Asian states’ indepen-
dence that we have previously proclaimed for Central Asia. And we might successfully do so at a smaller cost vis-à-vis Russia than has been imagined.
At a minimum, China’s tacit support or at least nonopposition is crucial to the eventual success of the war on terrorism because Beijing holds one of the permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. China’s active participation in the war is not essential. In fact, the United States should probably not expect much in the way of substantive Chinese support.

Officially, Beijing has offered supportive rhetoric for America’s war on terrorism and has shared intelligence with the United States. Some Chinese analysts see the events of September 11, while tragic, as heralding a brighter future for U.S.-China relations. These analysts see significant potential for U.S.-China cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, which can contribute to an improvement in overall bilateral relations. Other Chinese analysts, however, expect that the United States will single-mindedly and unilaterally pursue its war on terrorism, which will result in a deterioration in relations.

Context.

China’s leaders are very concerned about ethno-religious terrorism in their own country—especially from Islamic extremists seeking greater autonomy or independence from China in the western region of Xinjiang. Xinjiang shares an extended land border with central Asian states (including a short stretch with Afghanistan), Pakistan and Kashmir.

Beijing is also concerned about other “separatist” movements seeking independence in places such as Tibet and Taiwan. These are all seen as constituting serious threats to national security, and China’s leaders are extremely sensitive to the point of paranoia about internal security. The issue of “separatism” tends to be on the agenda alongside the subject of “terrorism.”

During his visit to Shanghai to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) meeting on October 20-21, President Bush got a qualified statement of support for the war from his Chinese counterpart. The first ever face-to-face meeting between the two national leaders went as well as could be expected. The Chinese did not want the issue of terrorism to monopolize the agenda or for President Bush to upstage the Chinese leader.

China’s Strategy.

President Jiang told President Bush on October 8 that China supports efforts to combat terrorism but cautioned him to keep civilian casualties limited. However, as the U.S. and coalition forces continue to conduct
limited military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda, Beijing has heavily censored Chinese media reports of the war. China has sealed its approximately 50 mile-long border with Afghanistan and provided a small amount of humanitarian assistance for the resettlement of Afghan refugees. For now, the Chinese government is also denying visas to passport holders of countries in the Arab world and Southwest Asia, and Chinese airlines and travel agents are declining to sell air tickets to these same individuals.

China’s main objectives are to:
- Prevent terrorist acts and defeat secessionist movements in China;
- Maintain good relations with the United States;
- Ensure stability in Central Asia and cordial relations with the states of the region;
- Secure a stable supply of foreign energy resources;
- Continue economic growth which entails smooth entry into the World Trade Organization (China formally joins the WTO next month).

**Prognosis.**

As time goes on, Beijing could begin to express publicly reservations or condemnation, although Chinese leaders may privately be pleased that terrorist organizations that also pose a threat to China are being destroyed or greatly weakened.

However, if the United States pursues operations beyond the current limited U.S./coalition military action in Afghanistan, there will likely be strong official Chinese condemnation. China fears that the United States might undertake extensive military operations against other states in Southwest Asia or the Middle East (e.g., Iraq) or establish a long-term military presence in the region. This would damage U.S.-China relations and result in closer ties between China and Russia. Both countries would redouble their efforts to oppose U.S. actions via the United Nations and the recently established Shanghai Cooperation Organization (composed of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).

**Recommendations.**

The United States should not expect much actual support from China and should probably be satisfied with no vocal opposition to the war on terrorism.

Nevertheless, Beijing could make some useful contributions, although Washington should not expend valuable political capital in pursuit of these. If the United States does seek substantial help from China in the war, Washington should anticipate Beijing insisting on a significant quid pro quo (e.g., regarding Taiwan). The United States should avoid going down this road. Instead, Washington should play up Beijing’s sense of its status as a great power and Beijing’s desire to be treated like a distinguished member of the community of nations.

If efforts in Afghanistan take place under U.N. auspices (once the Taliban is toppled), China may be willing to provide token military units for peacekeeping or humanitarian relief activities in Afghanistan. At the very least, China may be willing to offer some humanitarian aid. This Chinese involvement might be of considerable value in stressing the broad nature of the antiterrorism coalition and be useful in improving mil-mil relations between the People’s Liberation Army and other armed forces (including U.S. military).

The United States should make every effort to ensure that bilateral relations with China improve. To this end we should:
• Reactivate mil-mil ties with China across the board with a more comprehensive pro-active approach to promote our long-term war on terrorism. The existing “case by case” review of activities should be discarded;
  • Place the topic of counterterrorism prominently on the agenda in mil-mil exchanges;
  • Stress the importance of calm and stability in the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula.
TWENTY

Reaction of Key Asian States to the War on Terrorism

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Conclusions:
• Encourage higher profile military support and major financial contributions by Japan to help rebuild Afghanistan.
• Publicly welcome humanitarian assistance efforts by South Korea but encourage ROK forces to remain in the country to continue to serve as a deterrent against a North Korean attack. Leave U.S. forces deployed as they are on the Korean Peninsula.
• Continue to cultivate good ties with the Philippines and share intelligence on terrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyaf which has links to Osama bin Laden. Do not seek the deployment of Filipino troops in Afghanistan.

This paper surveys the reaction of seven key Asian states to the U.S. war on terrorism following the events of September 11, 2001. Four of these states are allies or good friends of the United States (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines), and the three remaining states are coalition partners or potential coalition partners (Indonesia, Malaysia, and North Korea). Each of these states merits close attention from the United States and its armed forces, either to ensure that a particular country remains in the coalition or at least that it does not actively oppose the coalition.

ALLIES AND FRIENDS

Australia.

Response so far: There has been strong bipartisan and public support in Canberra for the war. Both the government of Prime Minister John Howard and the main opposition Labour Party have been extremely outspoken in their support. Australia has offered SAS (special operations forces), air-to-air refueling aircraft, and intelligence.

Responses to military action: Canberra’s response has been strongly supportive to date, but broader military action outside Afghanistan might cause the erosion of public support and then political support.

What we can expect in the future: Continued strong support, particularly if the incumbent administration wins national parliamentary elections scheduled for November 10.

Policy recommendations: Express public thanks and appreciation for Australian support.

Japan.

Response so far: There has been surprisingly strong official and public support for a U.S. military response in the war. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced a 7-point program, including efforts to clear legal hurdles to allow Self-Defense Forces to serve in support functions for military action against Afghanistan. Compared to the paralysis and timidity Japan displayed during the Gulf War, Tokyo’s response has been remarkably swift and robust.
Responses to military action: Japan has already sent military air transports with relief supplies to Pakistan. Official and public support for limited military action against Afghanistan has been widespread.

What we can expect in the future: Further official backing and qualitative improvement in the level of military support offered to U.S. operations. The continued reactions of South Korea and China to Japan’s initiative to play a larger military role overseas also will be crucial to future actions. This extreme sensitivity to Japanese forces operating abroad is linked to the prolonged and harsh Japanese military occupations of these two countries in the last century. To date Prime Minister Koizumi has actively consulted with his counterparts in Seoul and Beijing, and they have been remarkably receptive. If either Seoul or Beijing voice grave concern at any phase of the war, this could dramatically undercut public support within Japan for such steps. Moreover, there are indications that public support would likely erode quite rapidly if the United States widened the campaign beyond this one country or if Japanese forces suffered casualties.

Policy recommendations: The United States should encourage higher profile military support and major financial contributions by Japan to help rebuild Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States should be realistic about the limits of what Japan will be able or willing to do and not push too far.

South Korea.

Response so far: Seoul has given strong public backing. On September 17, President Kim Dae Jung offered his full support for U.S. strikes against terrorists and stated that South Korea will be part of the coalition fighting the war on terrorism. The ROK Defense Ministry offered some 450 noncombat personnel in medical, air transport, and sea transport units as well as humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees.

Responses to military action: On October 7, the first day of bombing in Afghanistan, a ROK spokesman said South Korea “actively supports” the attacks on Afghanistan, and President Kim ordered increased security around U.S. military installations in the country.

What we can expect in the future: Seoul is likely to remain very supportive of limited action, but this can change in the event of more extensive military action, especially if public opinion turns strongly anti-American. If the United States widens the war beyond Afghanistan, a groundswell of public opposition might put government support in question.

Policy recommendations: The United States should publicly welcome humanitarian assistance efforts by South Korea but encourage ROK forces to remain in the country to continue to serve as a deterrent against a North Korean attack. The United States should also be on guard against doing or saying anything that might be construed as a weakening of resolve or readiness of USFK forces. Therefore, no U.S. forces should be redeployed away from the Korean Peninsula.

Philippines.

Response so far: The Government of the Philippines has offered to cooperate fully with the United States in the war. On October 2, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo very strongly stated that Manila was “prepared to go every step of the way.” Arroyo offered the use of airfields and seaports, logistics support, intelligence, and even combat forces.

Responses to military action: Manila has certainly supported limited military action against targets in Afghanistan and probably will continue to provide solid
support, even if the war on terrorism widens beyond Afghanistan.

What we can expect in the future: Given the Philippines has its own serious homegrown Islamic terrorist/insurgency problem, the United States can expect continued public and substantive support in the war and requests for American assistance in dealing with terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf group based in the Philippines.

Policy recommendations: The United States should continue to cultivate good ties with Philippines and share intelligence on terrorist groups, especially on Abu Sayyaf which has links to Osama bin Laden. Filipino troops should not be deployed in Afghanistan or vicinity because of the perception they are anti-Islamic, given their role in the ongoing Muslim separatist war in the southern Philippines.

COALITION OR POTENTIAL COALITION PARTNERS

Indonesia.

Response so far: Jakarta has made positive official statements but significant and widespread anti-Americanism exists in the world’s most populous Islamic state. In the wake of the October 7 bombing, radical Islamic groups in Indonesia have threatened to storm the U.S. embassy and/or attack U.S. citizens and demanded that the government break diplomatic relations with Washington. President Megawati Sukarnoputri was very supportive of the United States during her recent visit to Washington (pre-October 7).

Responses to military action: However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda expressed “deep concern” on October 8 about the danger to innocents in the ongoing military operations. He said that Indonesia neither supports nor opposes the military strikes against Afghanistan.

Both before and after October 7, radical Islamic groups active in the country threatened to strike at U.S. targets in Indonesia. Since October 7, the rhetoric has become increasingly vociferous, and protests have multiplied. Large demonstrations and fears of violence prompted the U.S. Embassy to take the precaution of closing for several days and authorizing the departure of nonessential personnel and dependents. Although some protests have been violent, many others have been peaceful and, to my knowledge, no U.S. citizens have been injured so far.

What we can expect in the future: There is likely to be continued and even growing Muslim radicalism with a strong anti-U.S. flavor whether military action continues or not. Given the economic problems that will continue to plague the country, Indonesia will remain fertile ground for Islamic extremist groups who share bin Laden’s views. Some of these groups have been (and continue to be?) funded by al Qaeda, or trained by the Taliban. In recent years, hundreds of young Indonesian Muslims have attended Islamic schools in Pakistan.

Policy recommendations: The Indonesian government is in an extremely delicate situation. Washington should not press Jakarta for strong public statements of support or any form of military assistance since it will place President Megawati in an even more precarious position. The United States should be satisfied with moderate expressions of support or no condemnation of the war on terrorism. DoD personnel should keep a very low profile in Indonesia for the foreseeable future.

Malaysia.

Response so far: The United States has received solid support for counterterrorist efforts from this predominantly Muslim state. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar on October 6 stated that the
United States was “justified in its action to wipe out this [terrorist] menace.”

**Responses to military action:** The government of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has issued sternly worded statements condemning terrorism and cracked down on his country’s major opposition party, the Pan Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS). PAS leaders have been vehemently anti-United States.

**What we can expect in the future:** Mahathir will continue to exploit the international situation in order to strengthen his domestic political position. A moderate Muslim state, Malaysia is a key member of the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that met in Qatar on October 10. Significantly, the OIC issued a public statement that did NOT condemn U.S. attacks on Afghanistan. However, the OIC did express concern over the “deaths of innocent civilians.”

**Policy recommendations:** Malaysia can be a pivotal actor in the coalition against terrorism because it is a moderate Muslim state. Malaysian participation or contributions to humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan would send a powerful message that the war is not a war on Islam.

**North Korea.**

**Response so far:** Pyongyang has offered a relatively muted response and termed the events of September 11 “regrettable and tragic.” The United States may ask North Korea for intelligence on terrorism.

**Responses to military action:** However, the Korean Central News Agency issued a October 9 statement warning the United States against embarking on a “vicious cycle of terrorism and retaliation.”

**What we can expect in the future:** Criticism is quite likely if military operations continue, even if they are limited in scope. There could even be heightened bellicose language warning that the United States is pursuing a policy of worldwide aggression that might herald imminent action on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is possible that Pyongyang could see the war as an opportunity to improve ties with the United States and continue its moderate and quite muted response.

**Policy recommendations:** At a minimum, Washington should work closely with Seoul to ensure that the United States and ROK present a strong united front that continues to deter North Korea. If Pyongyang continues to offer a moderate and relatively conciliatory response to the war, Washington could outline to North Korea the steps by which it could get itself off the list of terrorist states.
The United States cannot defeat global terrorism without support from its friends and allies. Europe plays center stage in the counterterrorism campaign. A disinterested Europe can only assist terrorism. As an active U.S. ally, Europe can provide resources, expertise, and access to terrorist citadels, while at the same time strangulating the terrorist cells thriving on its soil. Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom provided immediate, unwavering support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and requires no further edification. Continental Europe is a different matter altogether. Europe's political will and military capabilities can be problematic. The United States must not only understand and allay Europe's fears, but also come to terms with its limited military capabilities. The United States needs to awaken Europe's incredible potential and shape European security for the new millennium.

**European Perspective.**

The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States outraged Europeans, but not in the same manner as it did Americans. Although currently united in principal with the United States to defeat the al Qaeda terrorist network, political will and consensus are likely to wane as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM protracts. This paradox is best explained by seeing how Europeans view terrorism.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. In fact, it is interwoven in the tapestry of its modern history. The terrorist activities of the Serbian Black Hand against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, were the catalyst to World War I. In the interwar period, terrorism was rampant in Germany, Russia, and France as various groups vied for power. The terror bombings during World War II reduced the major cities of Europe to rubble. The Cold War spawned a host of terrorist organizations that seemed to vie with each other for sanguinary publicity. If Europeans are not inured by terrorism, they certainly are numbed by and fearful of it.

Of all the instruments of power to be employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a prominent military option is likely to be the most contentious with Europeans. The arguments against the use of military force would expound the following themes: terrorism does not threaten the survival of
the state—the military is the wrong instrument of power; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM appears to be an open-ended obligation—fear of military adventurism; a military conflict will result in collateral damage—alienation of indigenous populations and added impetus to the terrorist movements; the conflict could easily escalate into a full-fledged war; a long-term war would have severe economic consequences; and because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East and Magreb, Europe is particularly vulnerable to terrorist retaliation from the Muslim community. Although Europeans are not likely to condemn covert operations and discrete military strikes, they do see law enforcement as the primary means of fighting this conflict.

As a backdrop to these fears, many European commentators enjoy counseling against rash action. The common theme is that terrorism is a symptom of poverty, imperialism, great power arrogance, disenfranchised citizenry, and so on—each a possible root to the conflict. Extending their argument, they offer a reasoned approach to resolving the conflict—pacifism, appeasement, international laissez-faire, and modus vivendi. Even though the extent of their influence is not known, such talk does reach a sympathetic ear with Europeans. As the United States learned during the Kosovo conflict, consensus is not a strong suit with Europeans. Given the nebulous nature of a counterterrorism campaign, European consensus regarding tactics, strategy, and objectives is equally not likely.

Fortunately, the U.S. initial approach has impressed the Europeans. One of the greatest concerns following the wake of the terrorist attacks was that the United States would use a “cowboy” approach—shooting first and asking questions later. To the European Union’s relief, the U.S. measured approach and decision to build a counterterrorism coalition have allayed fears and muted criticism. But the United States must go further.

In order to maintain solidarity and consensus with Europe, the United States needs to conduct an active information campaign in Europe. Ambassadors, defense attachés, and TRADOC senior liaison officers must present the U.S. rationale with public statements and articles regarding the campaign strategy. The U.S. State Department should encourage American commentators to appear on European talk shows and news programs. These actions would present the American perspective without the European editorial filter. The problems associated with misstatements and contradictory assertions are small in comparison to the biases that permeate the European media. Without continued dialogue, Europe will lose focus and assume a disinterested posture as the conflict extends over the months and years.

**Military Capabilities.**

Even if the European allies maintain solidarity, their military capabilities are currently insufficient to meet the demands of the imminent conflict. In pursuit of the post-Cold War peace dividend, every European state downsized its armed forces with insufficient, concomitant reforms. Moreover, they made virtually no investments in defense modernization. The armed forces may be smaller, but their divisions are still heavy. With little air- and sealift capabilities, European power projection is still confined to road and rail.

These military discrepancies became woefully apparent during the Kosovo Campaign in 1999, particularly in the realm of avionics, electronic warfare, precision munitions, and C4SIR. NATO’s resultant Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which provides a roadmap for correcting the
deficiencies, is a slow, expensive process—something none of the European states seems willing to shoulder. The conflict will not have a negative impact on NATO enlargement. The campaign against global terrorism has had a unifying effect and is likely to accelerate the desire to increase membership among NATO members and candidates. In times of regional instability, states seek greater security. The danger lies in accelerating the process beyond NATO’s capability to assimilate new partners. NATO should resist this temptation and continue with its thoughtful, measured approach to enlargement.

Despite European proclamations of the Eurocorps being ready by 2003, a more realistic appraisal is 2010. Lack of funding is the main but not the only culprit. Actual troop contributions are below the minimum requirements, the provisional corps headquarters appears mired in nascency, corps combat service support is nonexistent, and the issue of consensus, which has haunted every European defense initiative in the past, is not likely to be resolved any time soon. Furthermore, sufficient strategic air- and sealift capabilities are unlikely to be realized by the end of the decade.

One bright light does shine, however. European Special Operating Forces (SOF) appear to be the most appealing and readily available for employment. Thus far, only the United Kingdom has deployed its Special Air Service (SAS) into Afghanistan along with U.S. forces. Germany is hotly debating whether to authorize the deployment of its Division for Special Operations, composed of a Special Forces Detachment (KSK) and two airborne brigades. The KSK currently numbers 400 out of an authorized strength of 1,000, and the airborne brigades comprise approximately 6,000 paratroopers. The airborne brigades also have K9 platoons for tracking humans as well as sniffing out explosives and mines. France also has a robust SOF capability and, unlike Germany, has plenty of experience. Additionally, several other European countries have SOF, although not as large. In aggregate, Europe possesses a significant SOF capability and, because of its covert nature, the various European countries are likely to contribute these forces with alacrity upon a U.S. request.

Not to be overlooked, Germany, France, Austria, and Italy possess mountain brigades, which can provide enormous assistance in mountain warfare. These brigades are actually the elite forces of their respective ground forces and would be indispensable to any mountain operation. At the very least, their alpine specialists could be attached to the SOF as technical and tactical experts.

Given the penurious military budgets, European militaries are not likely to improve in the near term. The United States can expect financial, infrastructure, combat service support, and discrete personnel participation without reservations, but, given the European propensity to muddy the waters of consensus, it would be more beneficial to the coalition initially to request specific capabilities (SOF, mountain experts, naval, and airpower) under U.S. operational control, rather than a blanket commitment of forces as authorized under NATO’s Article 5.

**Energizing Europe’s Potential**

The United States can recommend a number of initiatives, which would allow Europeans to take an active part in the counterterrorism campaign. European versions of the television show, America’s Most Wanted, would greatly assist governments in identifying and capturing wanted terrorists; HUMINT is still the most powerful resource for intelligence.
Government subsidies will ensure that these shows remain on the air. In this manner, Europe can flush out the terrorist nests and organized crime.

A few European countries have lax drug enforcement laws. Since drugs (especially heroin) are a major source of revenue for terrorist organizations, an anti-drug campaign must address this link. Suggested themes are: “Drug money lines the pockets of terrorists,” “For terrorists, needles have two shots—one in the arm and one in the back,” and “A moment of pleasure can bring a lifetime of grief—don’t give terrorists a chance.” Such efforts have a patriotic appeal and should curtail drug sales.

As an enduring incentive to deprive terrorists of funds, European countries should take the money from frozen terrorist financial accounts and apply it to their own counter-terrorist initiatives, funding the coalition, or compensation for the destruction wrought by terrorists. Terrorists and their financial supporters can pay by more than one means for their crimes against humanity.

The time is ripe for an integrated European Intelligence Agency, perhaps under the aegis of Europol. Such an initiative would greatly enhance intelligence sharing, coordination of assets and effort, and greater powers to apprehend terrorists and organized crime. Such an agency may be harder to establish than an American would think. Given the recent history of secret police (KGB, Gestapo, Stasi), Europeans will be very wary of any organization with overarching powers. In any case, it is time to debate the issue.

In a related issue, greater cohesion is needed among law enforcement agencies. In order to defeat the terrorist network, close cooperation and sharing of information among allies are crucial. Because of the various legal systems involved, domestic law enforcement agencies have greater or lesser access to information. Information or evidence shared from some allied agencies can assist domestic agencies gather probable cause against criminal/terrorist elements operating in their countries. Few law enforcement agencies like to share information; the State Department will need to initiate the process in order for it to gain momentum.

European countries have considerable access to and influence with their former colonies. In fact, their relations are more cooperative than adversarial. The United States should allow these European countries to supplement its efforts with regional consensus building, intelligence gathering, and diplomacy. Every actor in the Middle East believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be resolved before progress against terrorism can be made. Given their connections, Europeans are better placed to take the lead in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The United States need not abandon the peace process, but it should make it a transatlantic initiative.

It is never too early to secure agreements for use of rail, air bases, sea ports, facilities (medical, fuel storage, warehouses, and so on), and over-flights from all relevant NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) members. Such arrangements provide greater flexibility as shifts in priorities and use of force change during the campaign. Land access to future theaters of conflict will allow NATO and PfP nations to participate by deploying heavy units by rail. Lastly, access agreements are easier to secure in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks than later in the conflict.

**Shaping the European Security and Defense Policy**

The European Security and Defense Policy may be moribund, at least as a separate entity from NATO. The current
conflict exemplifies the reality of the Alliance—that no conflict or crisis should be handled unilaterally. Success in modern conflicts requires consensus building, unity of effort, and unity of command. A contingency does not necessarily need the active participation of every member of the Alliance, but it should require the involvement of each member in some capacity.

The United States needs to take a greater role in shaping Europe’s defense capabilities. Conceptually, the Eurocorps has the greatest potential to contribute to this type of conflict, but without U.S. leadership, it is doomed to remain a paper tiger. America is very good at establishing consensus and building coalitions. In a practical sense, the creation of the Eurocorps is a permanent coalition.

First, NATO must secure national contributions for the corps headquarters, the combat service support units, and the ground forces, as well as the air and naval squadrons. Due to their unique character, multinational divisions allow both large and small countries to contribute forces within their means, ranging in size of a specialized company to a brigade. America’s contribution to the ground forces could be an Interim Brigade Combat Team. The Eurocorps should be open to NATO, EU, and PfP countries, but upon alert, must fall under NATO’s command authority. Contributing nations would have the option of not deploying their Eurocorps-designated units if it is not in their interest. The depth of the Eurocorps would not suffer from the nonparticipation of a few.

Second, in order to fill the air- and sealift vacuum, the United States could sell or lease C-17 transports and RO/RO ships to the European Union until its own production capabilities bear fruit. This phase-in/phase-out approach assures that the Eurocorps establishes a power projection capability within a short time.

Third, the Eurocorps allows the contributing countries to focus resources in order to fulfill the DCI. As the Eurocorps is to be a modern force, NATO must attain consensus on standardization of equipment. Either this initiative can be accomplished by a consortium and/or by national contracts. In this manner, newer members with current, obsolete equipment can buy or lease equipment without shouldering an enormous financial burden. This approach enhances interoperability and keeps combat service support at manageable levels.

Fourth, NATO establishes a train-up and certification timeline in order to establish milestones for progress. By instituting a train-to-standard attitude and a sequential collective training schedule, the Eurocorps can be operational within 2-3 years of its establishment.

Lastly, the mission of the Eurocorps does not need to deviate from the Petersberg Tasks. All the tasks contribute to the ultimate objectives of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The basic organization of the Eurocorps is sound, and the proposed 5,000-man police force is a superb idea and helps bridge the capabilities gap between military and law enforcement. The Eurocorps can be rounded out with a Special Forces detachment that can deploy into a crisis region weeks or months in advance of the Eurocorps. The inclusion of a Special Forces group with each member contributing its own forces would greatly enhance the capabilities of the Eurocorps.

The New Vision.

If the United States is the global policeman, then Europe surely should be its deputy. The United States must awaken Europe to the insidious dangers of terrorism by changing how it views terrorism and
infusing it with the resolve to take action. Although its military means are currently limited, Europe does have specific forces which can make an important, immediate contribution. Lastly, the Eurocorps has the potential to allow Europe to assume a greater security role in the world without shouldering heavy military expenditures. The Islamic terrorists thought they would cow and divide the world, instead they have revitalized the transatlantic link.
About the Authors

DR. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2001. He has taught at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and has held research positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia; the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA); and the Kennedy School of Government’s Office of National Security Programs. Dr. Biddle has presented testimony before congressional committees on matters of conventional net assessment and arms control, served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Defense Research Group Panel 7 study on Stable Defense, and is a member of the directing faculty for the Columbia University Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS). His research has won Barchi, Rist, and Impact Prizes from the Military Operations Research Society; most recently, his paper “Why Skill Matters in Combat Outcomes—and How to Include It in Combat Modeling,” won the Society’s 2000 Rist Prize. He holds AB (1981), MPP (1985), and Ph.D. (Public Policy, 1992) degrees, all from Harvard University. Dr. Biddle’s publications include articles in International Security, Survival, The Journal of Politics, Security Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, and Military Operations Research; shorter pieces on military topics in The Wall Street Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, Orbis, and Defense News; various chapters in edited volumes; and 24 IDA and NATO reports.

DR. STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and conference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago.

DR. MARTIN L. COOK has been a Professor of Ethics in the Department of Command, Leadership and Management at the U.S. Army War College since 1998. He previously taught ethics and religion at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Santa Clara University, and the College of William and Mary. Dr. Cook received a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy from the University of Illinois in 1974 and a master’s degree in Religious Studies from the University of Chicago in 1975. He obtained his doctorate in Philosophical Theology and Ethics from the University of Chicago in 1981.

DR. CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S.
Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, *The Journal of Military History*, *The Historian*, and *Aerospace Historian*, as well as in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II currently is assigned as the Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981, was commissioned as an armor officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has also served as an Assistant Professor of European History at the U.S. Military Academy; Squadron S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at the U.S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer at the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA; and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in History from Princeton University. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria is the author of *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War*, published by the University Press of Kansas (2001). He also has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include the *Journal of Military History*, *War in History*, *War & Society*, the *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Parameters*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Military Review*, and *Airpower Journal*.

DR. SAMI G. HAJJAR was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He taught a variety of courses including American Government, Middle East Politics, and Islamic Political Theory at the University of Wyoming as Professor of Political Science from 1966-87. While at Wyoming, he was assigned for 2 years to the Governor’s Office and worked on international trade promotion for the State of Wyoming. In 1987 Dr. Hajjar joined the U.S. Information Agency and was assigned first to Riyadh as Cultural Affairs Officer and in 1990 to Abu Dhabi as Public Affairs Officer, before returning to Washington in 1992 as Gulf Desk Officer. In 1993 he resigned the Foreign Service to become consultant to the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies in Abu Dhabi. In September 1994, he joined the U.S. Army War College as Professor and Director of Middle East Studies. Dr. Hajjar received a B.A. and M.A. in Public Administration from the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri-Columbia in 1969. He is the author of more than 30 professional articles in public administration, political science, and Middle East studies.

DR. DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the Strategic Studies Institute since 1985, first as Strategic Research Analyst and then as Research Professor of National Security Affairs. His 30 years of service in the U.S. Army included two combat tours, a variety of troop and staff assignments, and instructor duty at the U.S. Military Academy and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Dr. Johnson’s current research addresses Army transformation. He is co-author of *Soissons, 1918* (Texas A&M University Press). He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. in History from the University of Michigan, and a Ph.D. in History from Temple University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College and holds a diploma from the U.S. Army War College.

COLONEL JOHN R. MARTIN became Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Institute and Chairman of the Art of War Department in August 2000. He has served extensively in the Republic of Korea, where he commanded an Aviation Company and Battalion. His experience there also includes service with the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and as Commander of a liaison team with the Korean Army. Colonel Martin possesses considerable experience on the Army Staff, having served as a Division Chief with both ODCSOPS and ODCSPER, where he assisted in development of the Army's force structure and programmed manning of that force structure. He served previously with ODCSOPS as the Systems Integrator for the RAH-66 Comanche and as Director of the Washington office of the Defense Language Institute. Just prior to coming to the Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel Martin was deployed operationally to the Balkans for a year, serving sequentially as Chief of Staff of Task Force Falcon in Kosovo and as Executive Assistant to the Commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. A previous operational tour in 1975 took him to Guam to assist Vietnamese refugees. Colonel Martin graduated with highest distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College, Newport, RI. He is also a 1996 graduate of the National War College and holds masters' degrees in National Security Affairs from both institutions. Colonel Martin also holds a master's degree in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, MD. He is a 1974 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

AMBASSADOR MARSHALL F. MCCALLIE is Deputy Commandant for International Affairs at the U.S. Army War College. Previously he served as the Special Coordinator for the African Crisis Response Initiative. He also served as Diplomat in Residence at the Ralph J. Bunche International Affairs Center at Howard University in Washington, DC. Ambassador McCallie has served most of his career in Africa. He completed a 3-year tour as U.S. Ambassador to Namibia from July 1993 to July 1996. Prior to that time, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in South Africa and at the American Embassy in Zambia. During his 27-year career with the U.S. Foreign Service, he has also served as Political Officer in Zaire, Economic Officer in the United Arab Emirates, Political Counselor in Liberia, and Country Desk Officer for Nigeria in the State Department. Ambassador McCallie earned a B.A. in History from Vanderbilt University, and received an M.A. and M.A.L.D. in Development Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

DR. STEVEN METZ is Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute and Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department. He has been with SSI since 1993, previously serving as Research Professor of National Security Affairs and the Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies. Dr. Metz has also been on the faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has served as an advisor to U.S. political organizations, campaigns and commissions; testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; and spoken on military and security issues around the world. He is author of more than 80 articles, essays, and book chapters on such topics as world politics, national security policy, and military strategy. Dr.
Metz’s research has taken him to 25 countries. He is currently examining the changing nature of military strategy and the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan. Dr. Metz holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States; he has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and holds an M.A. degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. He has published articles in a number of scholarly and professional journals to include Infantry Magazine and Military Review. His book, Command Legacy, will be published by Brasseys in the Fall/Winter of 2001.

COLONEL DALLAS D. OWENS became the U.S. Army Reserve Adviser to the Strategic Studies Institute in July 2000. His recent assignments include Mobilization Branch Chief, DCSOPS Army Operations Center; and Transportation Action Officer, Mobility Division, Logistics Directorate (J4), Joint Staff. He holds Sociology degrees from the University of North Carolina (B.A.), Utah State University (M.S.), and the University of Tennessee (Ph.D.), and has served on the faculty of Clemson University, North Carolina State University, University of Virginia, and University of Colorado. His military education includes Infantry OCS and Basic Course, Transportation Basic Course, Quartermaster Advance Course, CAS3, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the National Security Fellowship at Harvard University. Colonel Owens served as a Port Operator with a Transportation Terminal Unit during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and as an Infantryman in Vietnam.

DR. GORDON RUDD attended Virginia Tech, where he was commissioned through ROTC. He served in the U.S. Army for 23 years in Infantry and Special Forces units. He also served as a Joint Staff Officer and as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer, serving a total of 9 years overseas, including tours with the United Nations and NATO. He attended graduate school at Duke University—subsequently earning his doctorate in history—and taught military and Middle East history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Upon retirement from the Army, he joined the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, then moved to the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, where he has served since 1998.

DR. ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute in August 1999 and is SSI’s expert on Asia. He taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University, New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has published articles in such journals as Armed Forces and Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and Political Science Quarterly. Recent articles have focused on China-Taiwan relations and Chinese military modernization. Dr. Scobell holds a B.A. in
History from Whitman College, an M.A. in International Studies from the University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

DR. MARYBETH PETERSON ULRICH is Professor of Government in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. She has also taught at the United States Air Force Academy and at the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Ulrich received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois and a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy. She has written extensively in the field of strategic studies with a special emphasis on civil-military relations and national security democratization issues in postcommunist Europe. Among her publications is a book, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, (1999) and numerous book chapters and articles. Dr. Ulrich is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

DR. LEONARD WONG joined the Strategic Studies Institute in June 2000 after serving 20 years in the U.S. Army. His time in the Army included teaching leadership at the U.S. Military Academy, serving as an analyst in the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate and later in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and serving as the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. He has authored several articles, chapters, and papers on organizational issues in the Army such as downsizing, leadership, and junior officer retention. He is a registered Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and an M.S.B.A. and Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.