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TERMINATING AMERICA’S WARS:
THE GULF WAR AND KOSOVO

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ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis asks two questions: What factors have contributed to the termination of recent United States wars, and how can elements of national power be applied successfully to terminate the future wars of the United States? To answer these questions, this thesis proposes a model of war termination that examines the objectives, interest, power, and strategy of each warring side as they produce military outcomes and generate costs for each side. As one side contemplates the decision to negotiate a settlement, the war termination process begins. Each side’s updated objectives and their bargaining strength will determine the apportionment of a settlement outcome. Success in war termination cannot be measured be objectives attained through a settlement outcome. The benefits received from the post-hostility conditions must be examined as well.

This model was used to examine the termination process in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. These case studies indicate several similarities and differences between the Gulf War and Kosovo. With these conditions in mind, the United States must maintain cohesive military coalitions, attack the internal power positions of enemy leadership, and coordinate all elements of national power—military, diplomatic and economic. In addition to identifying political objectives in future wars, the United States ought to also clearly define its desired end state so that the elements of national power are applied to a sustained peace rather than a short-term fix.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the United States liberated Kuwait and achieved a decisive victory over Iraq. Americans celebrated and rallied around the returning troops. Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkoff led the June military parade down New York’s 5th Avenue. Both were Vietnam veterans for whom the Gulf War allowed the United States to exorcise the “ghosts of Vietnam.” For them, the victory parade of the Gulf War became a cathartic event that eliminated America’s Vietnam albatross just as decisively as United States forces had routed the Iraqi army.

As the gleam and glitter of the victory parade faded, however, critics like retired Marine General Bernard Trainor questioned the nature of America’s victory in Gulf War that had “stopped short” of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Why did the United States fail to continue its offensive to Baghdad and topple Saddam Hussein? Why were significant portions of the Iraqi Republican National Guard allowed to survive? Why did the United States fail to support the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq? These questions, voiced by a variety of sources, tarnished the bright victory enjoyed by the United States and its allies.

Ten years after the Gulf War, renewed military action against Iraq with the goal of displacing Saddam Hussein and eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production seems possible. Military action against Iraq may once again become necessary because in 1991 political officials and military leaders had not thought through the war termination phase of the Gulf War.

This Gulf War example demonstrates the importance of studying war termination. Hoping to prevent war, international relations literature has traditionally focused on the origins of war. Fewer studies have examined how wars can be terminated once they have begun. A review of the war termination literature indicates that the following questions demand further study:

- What factors have contributed to the termination of recent United States wars?
- How can elements of national power be applied successfully to terminate future wars fought by the United States?
To answer these questions, this thesis will examine existing theories of war termination and propose an independent model of the war termination process. This model will guide two case studies of wars recently fought by the United States—the Gulf War and the War for Kosovo. By determining how these wars were terminated and what factors contributed to and detracted from success in termination, this thesis will seek to inform policymakers and military leaders as they contemplate using military force in future wars to achieve the political objectives of the United States.

A. THE WAR TERMINATION PROCESS

Before examining the theories of war termination, war termination must be defined. Broadly speaking, war termination is the process by which war ends. Michael Handel refines this definition by arguing that war termination is a “process of negotiating or dictating the terms of peace.” Thus, the transition from war to peace is made through the process of war termination. While war is dominated by individual military processes, war termination is fundamentally a political process, albeit one that is influenced by military outcomes.

Viewing war termination as a process begs the question: when does that process begin and end? In keeping with the war termination literature, this thesis conceives the war termination process as beginning when one side contemplates pursuit of a negotiated settlement. The end of the war termination process can be more difficult to define. Does it end when the last bullet has been fired, when belligerents agree upon a cease-fire, or when a peace settlement has been signed? While a war technically ends when the last round is fired, that ending is predicated on an agreement of a peace settlement. Thus, war termination examines how military conflict ends and how peace agreements are settled. Randle subdivides the peace settlement into three phases: preliminary agreements, military agreements and political agreements. These phases encompass the structure and agenda of talks, the agreements on cease-fires and disposition of forces, and the agreements resolving political differences, all of which are necessary elements of a peace settlement and important aspects of war termination study.

2 Handel, 198.
3 Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace
This understanding of war termination assumes that war is an activity of hostilities between warring parties. Often, the term conflict is used interchangeably with war, and war termination may be referred to as conflict termination. While these phrases generally have the same meaning, conflict resolution scholars may generate some confusion by making a sharp distinction between the terms war and conflict. Janice Stein notes this distinction when she defines interstate conflict as “incompatible objectives between state actors.” Stein views conflict as a condition, rather than an activity between two states, while war is viewed as a “violent mode of interaction” between those states. Conflict, as a condition, may be resolved in a variety of manners, with war being only one means of resolution. This terminology highlights the different approaches taken by war termination and conflict resolution scholarship. War termination focuses on the achievement of political objectives; conflict resolution focuses on solving underlying conflicts. Stein views conflict resolution as a larger process, of which war and war termination may be sub-processes. War termination may not be perfectly linked with conflict resolution, though. In fact, the termination of a war may not contribute towards resolving the underlying conflict. The Israeli and Palestinian wars of 1967 and 1973 are examples of wars that were terminated, yet failed to resolve the underlying conflict that continues to present day.

Before examining the process of war termination, the possible outcomes of war must be established. Paul Pillar offers the most detailed typology of war endings. Pillar organizes the possible endings of war into the following outcomes:

- Absorption
- Extermination/Expulsion
- Withdrawal
- International Organization

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8 Stein, 15.

9 Stein, 13.
• Capitulation
• Negotiation Before/After Armistice.

Absorption refers to wars without a definite conclusion that were subsumed by larger wars. Extermination/Expulsion refers to wars that feature either the complete decimation of a belligerent or the physical removal of a belligerent from a territory. Withdrawal refers to decisions made by both sides to end the war through simple withdrawal from combat without an explicit agreement to end the war. An explicit agreement to end a war might be imposed by an international organization. Capitulation occurs when one side imposes an agreement upon the other side. Finally, an agreement to end war could be negotiated by each side either before or after the sign an armistice. Quincy Wright and Janice Stein distinguish between formal and informal modes of war termination. Formal modes include signed peace settlements or armistices. Informal modes refer to withdrawal without a peace settlement, resumption of status quo situations, or cease-fires that lack follow-on peace agreements.

Categorizing wars by outcomes allows researchers to discover trends in those outcomes. Two key elements are evident in wars before the First World War. First, Quincy Wright determines from his study of 311 wars from 1480 to 1970 that wars were increasingly terminated by formal peace treaties until the First World War. Second, Paul Pillar concludes that in wars before the First World War, an established divide existed between military operations (conducted by generals) and the post-war negotiations (conducted by diplomats). Because generals were rarely allowed to become proconsuls (Napoleon provides a rare exception) and political leaders could hardly ignore their political duties to travel with their armies, Pillar reasons that a military/diplomatic divide was created to balance military initiative with policy control by political leaders. Pillar also suggests that increasing communications technology, which allows for the simultaneous conduct of war and diplomacy, has made that conduct more prevalent in the 20th Century.

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12 Stein, 4.
13 Wright, 53.
14 Pillar, 32-36.
Since the Second World War, Wright notes that wars have been terminated less conclusively than in the past. Wright argues that usually wars are begun without declaration, ended without a peace treaty and commonly feature violations of the laws of war and neutrality. Stein echoes this argument by demonstrating that informal mechanisms of war termination are becoming standard modalities of war, while formal termination procedures, such as peace treaties, are becoming less relevant. Pillar’s concludes from his study of wars from 1800-1980 that interstate war terminates by negotiation (this includes negotiation before and after armistice) two out of three times. Spurred by technology that allows states to fight and negotiate simultaneously, negotiation before an armistice is becoming a more common war ending than negotiation after an armistice. Capitulation, though, has been decreasing. Pillar offers three explanations for this decrease. Historically, the development of nuclear weapons and the potential for superpower conflict in the Cold War may have produced incentives to keep wars limited. Second, growing interdependence has influenced non-belligerent states, particularly the great powers under the auspices of international organizations, to intervene in conflicts before capitulations occur. Finally, Pillar argues that capitulations might be decreasing because war outcomes have become less accepted by parties as a decision mechanism for political disagreements. In essence, Pillar is arguing that norms might be slowly shifting away from the acceptance of war as a means to resolve differences. While Pillar offers these explanations as conjectures, the overall trends of war termination—growing informalities, less conclusive results, and greater negotiation while fighting—must be considered in termination studies. Additionally, pursuing more developed explanations for these trends should become a focus for further war termination scholarship.

B. FACTORS OF WAR

What factors of war are important to war termination? A preliminary examination of these factors will be undertaken as a prelude to the more exhaustive look in Chapter 2.

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15 Wright, 61.
16 Wright, 54.
17 Stein, 3.
18 Pillar, 25.
19 See Pillar, 32 and Stein, 13-14.
20 Pillar, 27.
of how these variables fit together within specific theories and models. Many variables considered within the war terminology literature can be grouped under four separate categories: objectives, interest, power, and strategy. Simply put, objectives are what you want, interest is how much you want it, power is the resources at your disposal to get what you want, and strategy is how one applies power to achieve its objectives. Each of these categories will be explored and further defined.

1. Objectives

Objectives are the specific, desired results from war. Wars are fought because of opposing objectives. Often there are stated and unstated. Announced publicly by political leaders, stated objectives might not include all objectives actually considered by policymakers. This occurs when politicians do not want commit themselves towards goals that may not be achievable. Also, stated objectives may serve purposes other than actually expressing the desired results of war—they send messages to opposing belligerents, they may rally domestic political support, or the may be used to influence the balance of intra-governmental political power. Therefore, a scholar may need to distinguish between stated objectives and unstated objectives.

Objectives also have political and military components. Political objectives refer to the overarching political ends desired, and military objectives identify the military requirements that support these political desires. Another a hierarchy of strategic, operational and tactical levels may be used to classify objectives. At the strategic level, objectives determine the desired end state that governs the use of all elements of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, and informational. Operational objectives cover the totality of military objectives that are pursued to achieve the strategic objectives. Tactical objectives refer to the specific ends pursued by military forces that support achievement of operational objectives. This thesis will consider operational and tactical objectives as elements of strategy rather than objectives. The factor of objectives will focus solely on strategic objectives because they explain the highest political desires for fighting war and require reconciliation by belligerents before a war can be terminated.
2. **Interest**

Along with objectives, another important variable for war termination studies is interest. Interest encapsulates the sheer amount of desire a belligerent has for the objectives over which the war is fought. Inevitably, interest will be related to war objectives, particularly when objectives are supremely important for survival of the warring entity. As objectives become more important for survival, interest will naturally become higher. Interest includes the importance a war has for the nation as a whole, which should determine the popular support for a war. In addition, interest in war may be affected by the war’s impact on the internal political power of sub-actors. Ideally, a comparison can be made to determine the belligerent who holds the greater interest in a war. Although in some cases complex motivations driven by a multiplicity of factors may prevent comparative assessment of interest.

3. **Power**

Power represents another influential variable in the termination of wars. Power can determined by traditional net assessments of the military might held by the belligerents involved in war. Difficulties often arise, though, when trying to calculate military power, particularly in limited war.\(^{21}\) The economic resources and mobilization devoted to a war will depend on the state of mind held by political leaders and the populace.\(^ {22}\) This state of mind will be primarily influenced by interest and objectives. Fred Iklé distinguishes between two elements of power: actual strength and latent strength. Actual strength refers to the troops and machinery actually fighting a war, while latent strength refers the troops and machinery that could feasibly be applied towards war.\(^ {23}\) Power can be measured along a continuum running from weak to strong power. The interaction of power can be explored, as well. Asymmetric power balances exist in wars between a weak and a strong power, while symmetrical power balances indicate two equal powers.

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\(^{22}\) Iklé, 21.
\(^{23}\) Iklé, 22.
4. Strategy

Strategy is the final variable considered by war termination studies. Strategy not only involves military plans to defeat an opponent, but also includes the plan for converting that victory or outcome into a political outcome set by the objectives of a war. The concern of translating military success into political success can be found at the highest levels of strategy. Pillar differentiates between a strategy of direct achievement and negotiated settlement.24 A state pursuing a strategy of direct achievement uses military force achieve objectives that directly fulfill the overall political objectives of the war. This strategy might work well when territorial differences lie at the heart of the political differences. If State A desires to reclaim land previously ceded to State B, then State A could use military force to seize control and eject State B from the claimed territory. In this example, the State A pursued a strategy of direct achievement of political objectives. This example also shows how nicely political and military objectives can match in some cases. This match allows for a common understanding in State A of the desired end state and the military objectives needed to achieve that end state. Pillar contrasts direct achievement with negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement generally occurs when intractable issues are at stake and military objectives translate less easily into political objectives. In these cases, a state aiming for a negotiated settlement would use force to inflict costs upon an enemy to induce a preferred settlement. Pillar argues that three factors influence a state’s decision to pursue a strategy of negotiated settlement or a direct approach: the expectation that objectives can be attained through negotiation or a direct approach; the power available to achieve those objectives; and, finally, the costs and benefits perceived from both approaches.25 The decision of which strategy to pursue might change during a war, especially since these three factors will change.26 A cursory examination of these strategies would lead to the posit that in a decisive war, war termination would occur more as a direct result of the application of overwhelming force, while in a stalemated war, termination would occur more as a

24 Pillar, 45-46. Cimbala, 1, offers a similar comparison of strategies with his distinction between coercive military strategies and traditional military strategies. A coercive military strategy uses force to induce the enemy to bargain, while traditional military strategies use force to defeat the enemy’s army. Iklé, 28, discusses a related strategic decision in war: to fight militarily or to inflict costs on population.
25 Pillar, 46-47.
26 Pillar, 48.
negotiated settlement. Regardless, virtually all wars demonstrate some level of
negotiated settlement.27 Even in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, the United
States strategy of unconditional surrender28 still allowed the Japanese to negotiate the
retention of the emperor.

Power and strategy combine interactively between belligerents to generate
military success, and military success, along with military defeat, can influence the
bargaining positions of belligerents and may determine the outcome of the war
termination process. While a position of military success is certainly more desirable than
a position of military defeat, military success does not guarantee fulfillment of political
objectives. History is replete of examples where military victory failed to translate into
political success. Defining what constitutes success becomes essential in measuring the
impact of military victory (or defeat) on the achievement of political objectives.

C. STUDYING WAR TERMINATION: CONSIDERATIONS AND RECENT
TRENDS

These four variables—objectives, power, interest, and strategy—encompass most
variables examined with war termination theory. Understanding how these variables are
grouped together in various theories and models and using those theories to examine
cases of war termination can further the understanding of war termination by
policymakers. As Wright, Stein, and Pillar argue, the acceptance of war outcomes has
diminished, and war is becoming less of a decisive-making mechanism as political results
are becoming more difficult to achieve in war. Additionally, as shown by Pillar’s study,
wars will be increasing resolved through negotiation, which magnifies the importance of
understanding how all variables contribute to outcomes through the war termination
process. Finally, as General Wesley Clark argues in Waging Modern War, future wars of
the United States will require a common understanding and tight overlapping of political
and military objectives.29

This thesis contends that studying the termination of recent wars fought by the
United States can be helpful to policymakers contemplating future wars of the United

27 A lonely counter-example is the Second Punic War where the Romans completely exterminated the
Carthaginians and salted the earth so nothing would ever grow again.
28 Even though unconditional surrender is commonly understood as a war aim, when studying war
termination it should be considered as a strategy that aims to achieve overarching political objectives.
States. As a prescriptive concept, superior manipulation of the war termination process can provide for the achievement of aims more quickly, with less cost, and with the highest return. Additionally, effective war termination can provide for the most positive post-war situation, which can translate into an enduring peace. Properly executed, war termination holds great promise for policymakers. In addition, a study of war termination can help states avoid what Clausewitz describes as a common pitfall—the failure to plan termination before embarking upon a war. Military preparation often focuses on the means of combat, while politicians focus on diplomacy. Missing from these preparations is a synergistic cooperation between politicians and military leadership to translate the military means into desired ends. This synergy should occur long before entering the process of war termination.

While all wars are unique and mistakes can arise from preparations geared to “fighting the last war,” similarities seem to exist with recent United States wars since Vietnam. These wars—the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—have been asymmetric power wars featuring the United States against inferior military powers. In these wars, the United States has principally relied upon dominating airpower to overwhelm the enemy and influence the opposition negotiating strategy. The United States has aimed for decisive victories to accomplish United States objectives and terminate wars quickly. Finally, diplomacy and warfighting have become inextricable, with both realms becoming more closely tied and related. Future wars, particularly those associated with the war on terrorism, should exhibit similar qualities as these recent wars.

Despite their similarities, recent United States wars have had many differences, which enhance their value for comparative case studies. While similarities help to refine theory towards particular wars fought by the United States, the differences prevent theory refinement from degenerating into an interpretive account with little application outside a specific war.

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29 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), xxiv.
31 Keckeméti, 113.
32 Clausewitz, 579.
33 Iklé, 18.
The process of war termination has become increasingly important for the United States to consider in future wars. Fred Iklé argues that the most important question when considering military action is how a state will use that action to bring about an enemy surrender or to get him to the bargaining table.\textsuperscript{34} This chapter emphasized the need for concepts of war termination to explain these outcomes and provided a common understanding of the phenomena before turning to a look at the specific theories and models of the process of war termination.

\textsuperscript{34} Iklé, 17.
II. THEORIES OF WAR TERMINATION

Chapter One established the boundaries of the war termination process. This chapter develops a set of analytical tools useful for a standardized and intensive examination of the war termination processes occurring in the Gulf War and the War for Kosovo. Unfortunately, war termination theory has failed to coalesce around a singular concept or paradigm. In fact, war termination theories and models widely vary in their approaches, variable determinations, and relevance to policymakers. This chapter will propose a model of war that emphasizes the factors judged important for an examination of war termination. Second, this chapter will detail the historical development of war termination theories and will demonstrate the benefits of the proposed model for examining cases of war termination. Drawing upon the proposed model, this chapter will conclude by developing specific questions to guide the case studies.

A. A MODEL OF WAR TERMINATION

This thesis proposes to develop a model to study cases of war termination. This model defines war as the actual hostilities embedded within an overall conflict between two or more sides. The factors of war considered in Chapter One—objectives, interest, power, and strategy—encapsulate the key areas that influence the military outcomes of war. Each military outcome that occurs, whether a city captured or a ground division destroyed, also generates costs for each side.

The war termination process begins as one side contemplates trying to settle the war. Each side’s objectives, bargaining strength, and bargaining skill determine the outcome of settlement process. Objectives are important in war termination because they determine how irreconcilable the differences are between belligerents. As each side’s objectives become more irreconcilable, the overall likelihood of a settlement diminishes because each side is less willing to accede to the other’s demands. Extremely unpalatable objectives pursued by an opponent can cause a belligerent to resist settlement even in the face of great costs.

While comparing objectives emphasizes each side’s competing demands, settlement outcome also relies upon the respective bargaining power possessed by each
side. Bargaining power, in this sense, serves more as a classification than a quantifiable variable. Many factors determine a side’s bargaining power—military outcome, residual military strength, allied and domestic support, and the effects of war costs. The military outcome of a war provides the most important indication of bargaining strength. In stalematized wars, each side tends to have more equivalent bargaining power. If each side found the other’s demands (as determined by objectives) equally unacceptable, the terms of settlement should likely be resolved with a balanced compromise. In wars with asymmetric military outcomes (i.e., one side decisively defeats the other), bargaining power will likely be asymmetric as well.

Several ways exist in to evaluate success in terminating war. Achievement of political objectives provide an immediate and important yardstick. Of course, obtaining political objectives must be balanced against the costs incurred by a belligerent. In addition, the benefits and costs obtained in the post-hostility phase must be examined as well. Merely achieving all its objectives does not mean that a side terminated the war successfully. If war termination generates an untenable situation or if the cost incurred were too high, the victory must be considered a Pyrrhic one. Each of these lines of analysis helps determine the overall success of each side in terminating war.

B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WAR TERMINATION THEORY

Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* provides an essential starting point for an examination of war termination theories. In offering prescriptive advice for political and military leaders involved in terminating war, Clausewitz assumes that policymakers seek to achieve their political objectives through war. Policymakers choose to pursue “politics by other means” as an enterprise to realize benefits; implicitly, those benefits of war are realized through the war termination process. While Clausewitz focuses on the general conduct and operation of war and does not solely examine war termination as a specific subprocess, his principles provide key underpinnings for a theoretical understanding of war termination.

Clausewitz develops two key concepts that illuminate the war termination process—the rational calculus of war and the generous peace. Clausewitz’s concept of the rational calculus of war simply argues that, if the costs of a war for a state outweigh
its benefits, then peace should be pursued. Using a rational calculus of war, Clausewitz argues that war termination may occur when a state faces the prospects of interminable conflict as a result of military stalemate or when the costs of achieving victory, should that be possible, would be prohibitive.\textsuperscript{35} States in these situations ought to sue for peace and seek a settlement.\textsuperscript{36} Clausewitz is aware that barriers do exist to the actual application of the rational calculus of war. Often, domestic political considerations may prevent leaders from seeking peace despite the rational arguments for doing so. Additionally, other factors such as the passions of war and the desire to recoup sunk costs prevent application of the rational calculus of war. Clausewitz admonishes leaders to surmount these barriers and adopt a rationalist approach to the war termination process.\textsuperscript{37}

Even if war is conducted rationally, Clausewitz notes how each side’s varying desire for peace can impede war termination:

\begin{quote}
the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the probability of further successes and the amount of effort these would require. If such incentives were of equal strength on both sides, the two would resolve their political disputes by meeting half way. If the incentive grows on one side, it should diminish on the other. Peace will result so long as their sum total is sufficient—though the side that feels the lesser urge for peace will naturally get the better bargain.
\end{quote}

This statement by Clausewitz has several implications. First, Clausewitz argues that a belligerent’s desire to terminate war (i.e., the desire for peace) is based on the future potential for successful military outcomes and the expected future costs of continuing the war. Secondly, one side’s growing desire to terminate war (perhaps because of increasing costs or decreasing future potential for military success) will be offset by the other side’s decreasing desire for termination. When termination does occur, the likely outcome will reflect the strength of each side’s desires for peace.

Clausewitz echoes Sun Tzu in his development of the concept of the generous peace by arguing that the victor must create common interests with the enemy in terminating war.\textsuperscript{38} Because Clausewitz feels war should be a rational enterprise, he argues that effective termination requires the winner to consider the long-term interests of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{36} Clausewitz, 92.
\textsuperscript{37} Clausewitz, 585-86.
\end{footnotes}
the loser. Clausewitz refers to the Napoleonic wars in developing this concept. Napoleon achieved decisive victories over his enemies, but since his terms of victory were so harsh, Napoleon drove opposing states to band together and fight until he was eventually overwhelmed. Napoleon’s primary failure was political, not military; by overlooking his opponent’s long-term interests, he failed to secure a lasting peace.39

Surrender-based war termination theories emerged after the First and Second World Wars. H.A. Calahan argued that war termination hinges upon the losing side submitting to the will of the winner.40 Paul Kecskemeti adopts a similar view by using Clausewitz’s *On War* to demonstrate that rational war termination requires the losing side to understand its responsibility for surrendering.41 The surrender-based models misapply Clausewitzian thought, though, because they fail to acknowledge that both sides are required to terminate a war. Wars with asymmetric military outcomes, characterized by one side exacting an overwhelming military defeat upon the other, can be deceiving since the loser appears to determine when hostilities will end. When faced with increasing costs from the war and diminishing opportunities to reverse the military outcome, the loser surrenders and terminates the war. Scrutiny, though, reveals the dual consent required for termination. The winner determines its minimum demands and broadcasts these demands to the loser. Implicitly, then, the winner agrees to terminate a war based on an expectation of fulfilled demands. The loser follows by agreeing, at least tentatively, to the winner’s demands and, thereby, consummating war termination. By focusing on the responsibilities of the “losing side,” the surrender based models fail to explain how each side makes its decision to terminate based on the likely settlement outcomes and the future costs and military outcomes generated through continuing war.

1. **War Termination: Influences from Korea and Vietnam**

The Korean War and especially the lengthy and costly Vietnam War not only generated a heightened interest in war termination studies, they also altered the existing paradigms. War termination studies, which previously focused on strategic surrender, now became focused on strategic stalemate. Some scholars, such as Fred Iklé, developed

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38 Handel, 197.
39 Handel, 197.
41 Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat* (Stanford, Calif.:
rationalist theories to amplify Clausewitzian thought and assist policymakers. Others, such as Jessica Stein, offered critiques of scholarship focused on rational war termination. Finally, the emerging statistical revolution led some scholars to simplify the war termination process into discrete dependent and independent variables to facilitate statistical analysis.

Fred Iklé, in *Every War Must End*, draws upon Clausewitzian thought to provide prescriptive advice for policymakers considering war as a policy option. Iklé details several historical examples of wars embarked upon by policymakers who failed to develop clear understandings of how war termination would be accomplished to support their political objectives. These examples highlight violations of Clausewitz’s dictum that “no one starts a war…without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” Iklé also conducts a detailed examination of the barriers that have prevented the belligerents from properly applying the rational calculus of war during war termination.

Iklé examines two competing approaches to war termination—rational and bureaucratic. The rational approach assumes that governments operate as a unitary actor and decisions are made according to cost/benefit analysis. The key variables influencing war decisions are the benefits of peace, the benefits of war, and the costs of war. However, Iklé argues that governments are not unitary actors and that sub-actors often influence policy. This bureaucratic approach recognizes other variables influencing war decisions that do not relate to overall cost/benefit analysis. Wars may serve many purposes, some of which are realized by the war effort, itself, and the war preparations. Iklé cogently describes the need for bureaucratic considerations in the war termination process by arguing that, “If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one.” Iklé uses both approaches in his historical inquiry to provide two important sets of prescriptions for policymakers.

42 Clausewitz, 579.
43 Iklé, 15.
44 Iklé, 14.
45 Iklé, 16.
concerning escalation in war and suing for peace. This thesis will examine these sets of “lessons learned.”

Iklé’s first main insight is that escalation in war can have a varying effect on war termination. Iklé sees escalation leading to war termination through the complete destruction of the enemy or by inducing the enemy towards settlement.46 These pathways more or less correspond to the strategies, examined in the first chapter, of pursuing a direct achievement or a negotiated settlement. In his historical inquiry, Iklé notes that, as a general rule, escalation succeeds only by leading to a defeat of the enemy’s military or by forcing an opponent to change a government.47 In these cases, escalation success occurs with powerful and overwhelming uses of force that overwhelm an opponent. Gradual escalation was found to be useful only as it contributed to the military defeat of an enemy; gradual escalation was not found useful in influencing a negotiated settlement.48 Iklé also notes that prolongation of war may serve as a form of escalation. Whenever considering escalation of hostilities, political and military leaders must consider the element of time as it interrelates with escalation to achieve war termination.

Iklé also notes several limitations to a belligerent’s desire to escalate. A side might be concerned that any military gains of escalation could be erased with an opponent’s reciprocating escalation. A belligerent might also worry that escalation could increase the costs of war to an intolerable level. For example, escalation could cause a war to migrate to a belligerent’s own territory. Often, belligerents might limit any escalation of conflict to avoid stoking internal dissension to war. Finally, a state’s requirement for military reserves to deal with other potential threats outside of a particular war may limit escalation.49 Despite these barriers to escalation, Iklé finds that weak parties often escalate in war; in some cases, the escalating parties might even be nearly defeated. These states choose to pursue “escalation fantasies,” rather than pursuing the more rational choice of suing for peace.50

46 Iklé, 41-42.
47 Iklé, 55.
48 Iklé, 55-56.
49 Iklé, 40.
50 Iklé, 56.
Along with his insight on the varying effects of escalation, Iklé expands Clausewitz’s insight that “suing for peace” is an extraordinarily difficult action for states to make, more difficult, in fact, than a rational analysis would indicate. The behavioral and cognitive impediments to rational, unitary actor decision-making lead to Iklé’s admonitions for policymakers. First, politicians must understand the difficulty of ending war before making the initial decision to commit to war. Properly rational politicians will decide to commit to war only if the probable benefits outweigh the expected costs. These rational politicians might also assume that if costs happen to exceed any expected benefits, then the war could be terminated. By demonstrating the difficulty of terminating war and, thus, the irreversibility of the war decision, Iklé suggests that policymakers consider the war option only when expected benefits outweigh costs by high margins. Iklé’s analysis also speaks to policymakers embroiled in war. Understanding the non-rational influences on decision-making should better prepare policymakers to surmount their impact. The key rational decision considered by Iklé is the decision to sue for peace once costs have exceeded expected benefits. Fundamentally, Iklé believes that while war termination is rarely conducted as a rational enterprise, it ought to be.

While rationalism offers useful prescriptive advice for policymakers, descriptive and explanatory applications of rationalism may fail because war is often begun, waged and terminated in a manner that fails to fit a rationalist model. Rapoport notes that war can be viewed as a fight or a game.51 Viewing war as a game follows the rationalist mode, while viewing war as a fight stresses the hatreds and irrational dynamics that emerge in war and distort the rational paradigm. Fight-like interpretations have lead to a value-based approach to war termination that focuses on understanding the nature of conflicted values between belligerents as essential prerequisites to explaining the process of war termination. The value-based view of war highlights the underlying conflicts of war that introduce formidable barriers to war termination.52

Adopting a value-based approach, Janice Stein proposes that war termination, as an area of research, should be subsumed by the study of conflict resolution. Drawing

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52 Randle, 11.
upon the differences between conflict and war, examined in the first chapter, she considers conflict resolution as the only desirable outcome of war. Stein further argues that war termination studies have a misplaced focus since the termination of a war can lead to either decreased or increased conflict. If a war ends with limited stabilization followed by renewed hostilities, then termination should be judged as a failure. Stein rejects most war termination theories because their overly rationalist focus on war termination can obscure underlying value-based conflicts.

Binary war-ending theories were also developed in this period to simplify Clausewitzian thought and allow for the incorporation of statistical analysis. Binary war-ending theories identified two discrete dependent variables—war ends or war continues—and identified specific factors that resulted in these outcomes. Klingberg and Voevodsky offer rationalist approaches to war termination analysis by examining the relationship between battle casualties and war termination. They both attempt to determine specific battle casualty thresholds that states can endure before seeking war termination. Richardson develops a psychological approach to war cost analysis with his war moods theory. When a war begins, war fever sweeps the domestic populace. As the costs of war mount, eventually, war weariness will replace war fever in the populace forcing that side to sue for peace.

Stein’s value-based theory of conflict resolution and the binary war ending theories are primarily explanatory because they aim to determine what factors influence the ending of war and the development of a peace settlement. They might be useful in a prescriptive manner, especially in cases where policymakers are resigned to a stalemate and simply desire to terminate a war rather than achieve a specific outcome. However, this thesis finds these theories less relevant since they fail to support research that seeks to inform a particular side in how to receive the best outcome from war. For this thesis, conflict resolution and mere termination are less important than achieving the political objectives of war.

53 Stein, 17.
Binary war-outcome theories also developed in this period. These theories, like their war-ending counterparts, attempted to reduce the war termination process into two dependent variables that could be subjected to statistical analysis. However, instead of asking what makes a war end, these theories ask what makes a war end in victory. Binary war-outcome theories examine whether a belligerent won or lost the war. Andrew Mack offers the most important binary war outcome theory to explain the outcome of the Vietnam War in his landmark article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.” Andrew Mack limits his analysis to wars between a weak power state and strong power state. In these asymmetric power wars, Mack determines that interest explains success or failure. In Mack’s analysis, the strong power side will have a diminished interest in a war’s outcome because survival is not at stake. The decreased interest in an outcome will increase the political vulnerabilities of the strong power side and lead to defeat.56

One final, notable work from this period is from Robert Randle, who offers a purely descriptive model outlined in his book, The Origins of Peace. Unlike other theories considered, Randle’s model does not attempt to establish causality. Instead, Randle offers a roadmap that details how war terminations generally occur and what the outcomes will likely entail. Randle’s incorporates rationalism, bureaucratic interests and conflicting values in his model of war termination.

Randle’s first model of a peace settlement concerns wars that end with a negotiated settlement. Randle divides the peace settlement into three distinct phases, with six key factors influencing all three phases. Randle highlights the most influential factors, war aims, and notes the important interaction that war aims has with three of the other factors influencing peace settlements. This model of peace settlements is outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Model of Peace Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Settlement Phases</th>
<th>Influential Factors</th>
<th>Factors Interacting with War Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary</td>
<td>War Aims of Parties</td>
<td>Military Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military Situation</td>
<td>Coalition Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Coalition Relations</td>
<td>Domestic Conditions of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Conditions of Parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War Oriented Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other State System Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Randle offers several important observations of the three phases of settlement. While each phase has particular characteristics, the phases may overlap in reality. The preliminary phase includes peace feelers that belligerents may use to help determine whether they should negotiate and whether conditions should be required for negotiations. Preliminary negotiations may utilize third parties to pass information between belligerents. Peace feelers can also be made publicly or overtly. Preliminary negotiations settle the agenda items, conditions, and procedures of actual talks. Randle notes that in stalemated wars, stringent conditions are less likely to be placed on negotiations.

The military phase of negotiations is primarily concerned with the cessation of hostilities. One outcome of this phase will be whether a ceasefire will have conditions attached to it. This phase determines the disposition of forces including any military withdrawals and accepted stationing of forces. The military phase also includes technical questions concerning the disposition of security forces and agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war. Military settlements frequently require mechanisms to supervise the agreement implementation and procedures to adjudicate violations. The success

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57 Adapted from Figure I-1: The Peace Settlement Process from Randle, 5.
58 Randle, 24-26.
59 Randle, 26-27.
60 Randle, 27.
61 Randle, 29.
62 Randle, 30.
and failure of military operations will tend to have the greatest influence on the outcome of the military settlement phase.

Randle argues that the political settlement phase is governed by the War Outcome Model, listed in Table 2. This model views the various war aims of each belligerent as inputs to a system that is influenced by external war-oriented actors, the state system, and the bargaining strength of each belligerent to yield different types of political outcomes.

Table 2. War Outcome Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Aims</th>
<th>System Influences</th>
<th>Political Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominance</td>
<td>External War Orientated Actors</td>
<td>Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status Quo</td>
<td>State System</td>
<td>Persons affected by war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of the state</td>
<td>Bargaining Position of Belligerents, determined by…</td>
<td>Security guarantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>• Military Situation</td>
<td>Resumption of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retributive</td>
<td>• Domestic Support</td>
<td>Adjustment of disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
<td>• Coalition Support</td>
<td>Penalties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Randle classifies war aims pursued by the belligerents. **Dominance** as a war aim includes objectives such as acquiring territory, acquiring resources, or controlling the internal policies of another state. A **status quo** war aim includes objectives such as maintaining a dominant position, maintaining an existing condition, or accomplishing a defensive status quo war. **Consolidation** war aims attempt to bring other territory under the control of the belligerent according to a legitimizing principle, such as national self-determination. **Ideological** war aims are driven by either religious or political aims. Wars of **retribution** aim to inflict punishment upon other states in response to previous wrongs. Finally, a state might capitalize on existing conditions by conducting an **opportunistic** war. Belligerents often have different war aims, and war aims may change during a war.

Randle argues that the three key elements—external war-orientated actors, the state system, and the bargaining strength of each party—will determine a war’s settlement outcome. War oriented actors are “states, factions, and organizations whose

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63 Randle, 8.
64 Randle, 36.
65 Randle, 32-34
policies and interests are oriented towards the issues of the war." Randle distinguishes war-oriented actors from actual belligerents. An ally, actually engaged in war, would be considered a belligerent. If an ally refrained from direct warfare, it would considered a war-oriented actor. Possible war-orientated actors include the allies of belligerents, great powers, regional states affected by a war, or international organizations involved in conflict. As a war ending becomes more likely, war oriented actors seek to become engaged in a peace settlement role and attempt to influence the peace process according to their interests. Sometimes, war oriented actors might desire a war to continue, influencing them to prevent belligerents from settling. When war oriented actors have no direct interest in a war resolution they may serve as effective “peace brokers.”

While Randle describes important details of the war termination process, his view suffers from its overly mechanistic approach to wars. His heavy reliance on schematic diagrams of wars, along with his view of an input/output process of war simplifies yet distorts reality. The fundamental problem with Randle’s approach is that war becomes an independent system that generates outcomes based on specific inputs.

2. Post-Vietnam: Rational Choice and Institutional Approaches to War Termination

Simplifying the Clausewitzian view of war termination, Donald Wittman follows the earlier war-ending theories with his explanatory theory of why wars end. Assuming the conduct of war according to the costs and benefits of rational analysis, Wittman stipulates that the decision of a unitary actor to end war and accept a settlement is based on which choice will maximize benefits and minimize costs. Wittman refers to this cost/benefit analysis in terms of the utility of settlement and the utility of continuing war. War termination occurs when utility of settlement is greater than utility of continuing war for both sides. Wittman calculates a state’s utility of continuing a war based on several factors including:

66 Randle, 35.
67 Randle, 15
68 Randle, 15.
69 Randle, 16.
70 Randle, 17.
71 Randle, 17.
• costs of war,  
• probabilities of winning and losing, and  
• utilities (i.e., the benefits) of winning and losing.73

Wittman develops a series of utility curves to illustrate a comparison between the belligerents’ utilities of continuing war and utilities of settlement. Wittman uses these utility curves to develop a series of hypotheses. This thesis will consider one hypothesis concerning the probabilities of winning.

Wittman’s hypothesis states that changes in a belligerent’s perception of future military success will not affect the overall likelihood of war termination.74 Wittman argues that a state, facing an increased potential for military success, will also increase its demands for settlement. This results in a shrinking of the domain of likely settlements. However, as that side’s likelihood of future military success increases, Wittman reasons that the other side will face a likely decrease in its potential military success. Facing a decreased potential for success will force that side to decrease its demands for a settlement, thus expanding the overall domain of acceptable settlements. Wittman’s analysis provides deductive analysis to support Clausewitz’s discussion of the varying desires of peace associated with the changing prospects for military success. Wittman shows that changes in the potential for future military success do not affect overall termination likelihood because settlement demands are correspondingly adjusted.

Mitchell and Nicholson refine Wittman’s theory of rational war ending by considering the behavior of non-unitary actors. Arguing that preference formation processes of groups must be considered within the overall process of war termination, they combine the rational and institutional schools of thought to generate a more detailed theory. Mitchell and Nicholson distinguish between the following types of sub-actors:

• Unitary decision maker,  
• Unitary decision maker with equal factions,  
• Equal factions within a hierarchy,  
• Coalition of equals, and  
• Hierarchical coalition.75

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73 Wittman, 745.  
74 Wittman, 749-50.  
75 Mitchell and Nicholson, 517.
The key insight offered by Mitchell and Nicholson is that when sub-actors have acceptance authority (defined as the ability to make a settlement deal binding for the other sub-actor) over a negotiated settlement, they can increase the potential for settlement. When a sub-actor has a veto power (defined as the ability to overrule another sub-actor’s settlement arrangement), they will decrease the potential for settlement. Mitchell and Nicholson highlight the importance that sub-actors and their organizations have on the war termination process.

Paul Bracken and Adam Yarmolinsky develop purely institutional war ending theories. Bracken argues that the most important factor in war continuation is the “preservation of existing institutional structures.” Bracken supports his explanatory theory by examining the termination of the First World War. Bracken views the protection of internal power as a key element in determining the war’s termination. Institutional factors may create a barrier to war termination requiring the destruction of the enemy’s military or the removal of a political establishment. Institutional factors may support war termination when a side pursues termination to support internal power arrangements.

Yarmolinsky limits his explanatory theory to the influence military institutions have on war termination. Yarmolinsky argues that the focus of military institutions on warfighting creates institutional barriers for war termination. These barriers are created by biased estimates of future military success, overconfidence, and a cultural reluctance to sue for peace. Bracken and Yarmolinsky offer important insights to the war termination process, and institutional factor should be recognized as influential agents in the war termination process.

Paul Pillar expands on the work of earlier rational choice theorists to incorporate bargaining models in his negotiating theory of war termination. Pillar’s theory reduces the war termination process into a bargaining problem between two sides. This theory...
draws upon the rationalist school of thought and assumes that each state operates as a unitary actor. Pillar focuses on three issues of war termination: the factors influencing belligerents to seek negotiations, negotiations of ceasefires, and the operation of settlement negotiations. In describing negotiations, Pillar divides them into three distinct phases and describes the dynamics of the offers that occur within those phases. By offering a theory that explains the operation of the war termination bargaining process and how the use of military force influences that process, Pillar targets his theory for policymakers desiring a “better deal” in the war termination process.

Pillar’s analysis of the sequence of negotiations serves as a descriptive account of how negotiation occurs in war termination. Pillar views the war termination process as a sequence that includes the decision to negotiate, cease-fire negotiations, and the three phases of negotiations. The decision to negotiate in war is a complex decision influenced by many factors. Some belligerents, adopting a strategy of direct achievement, plan to achieve their objectives without any negotiations. For negotiations to occur, however, both sides must pursue a strategy of negotiated settlement. The actual military situation of a war influences whether a state decides to pursue a strategy of direct achievement or negotiated settlement and often guides the state’s decision to negotiate. The decision to negotiate, though, has two parts: whether a state should negotiate and when the state should negotiate. States pursuing a strategy of negotiated settlement may wish to delay the negotiations until a more favorable time. Often, states may attempt to time negotiations with military successes. This timing can easily backfire, though. The military success might be so successful that an opportunistic belligerent may shift to a strategy of direct achievement and forgo negotiations, altogether. Additionally, an opponent may refuse negotiations because of its poor military situation and hold out for an improved military situation. This shows the difficulty war participants have in reaching a decision to negotiate. Pillar suggests that perceptions of future success or failure may be more important than the current military situation or the military power of each participant in influencing the decision to negotiate. A perception of future military success may discourage negotiations, while perceptions of future failure might encourage
negotiations.\textsuperscript{83} Pillar finds that a \textit{shared} perception of future military outcomes is perhaps the most important factor in influencing two sides to enter into negotiations.\textsuperscript{84}

When belligerents make negotiations contingent upon an opponent’s acceptance of conditions they may create a barrier to negotiations. These conditions can carry many forms, such as specification of the site and participants of the negotiations, conduct of the war during the negotiations, and substantive aspects of a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{85} These conditions can create specific barriers to the decision to negotiate. Specifying the site and participants, in advance, may create problems when the legitimacy of one side is in question. Also, conditions on the conduct of war create difficulties when disagreement exists over the legitimate conduct of war.\textsuperscript{86} In general, though, conditions placed on negotiations affect the decision to negotiate in three ways. First, they influence the potential peace agreement. This happens directly when conditions are set for substantive issues. This happens indirectly when specifying the site and participants or when specifying the conduct of the war. In these cases, the conditions affect the bargaining strength of each belligerent, which, in turn, may affect a peace settlement outcome. Second, conditions influence the decision to negotiate if they are used for generating favorable side-effects. As mentioned, a state being adversely affected by side-effects will be discouraged from actually entering negotiations. Third, conditions on the conduct of war will affect the military situation, which will influence the costs associated with continuing the war and influence the ability of each belligerent to continue the war should negotiations fail.\textsuperscript{87}

Along with the decision to negotiate, Pillar also examines whether states may agree to a cease-fire. One important influence on this decision is whether a state is using force to achieve its objectives directly or to inflict costs on an opponent. Sides using force to inflict pain are less likely to agree to a cease-fire because their bargaining position depends on their ability to inflict costs on their opponent. Additionally, the expectation of future military success influences a decision to negotiate. Increased

\textsuperscript{83} Pillar, 49-51.  
\textsuperscript{84} Pillar, 58-59.  
\textsuperscript{85} Pillar, 69.  
\textsuperscript{86} Pillar, 73-75.  
\textsuperscript{87} Pillar, 69-70.
likelihood of success will decrease the likelihood of agreement to a cease-fire.\(^{88}\) Sometimes, states in poor military situations will to agree to cease-fires to reinforce their military strength. This could improve their bargaining strength in negotiations directly or allow them to resume hostilities later.\(^{89}\)

Making the decision to negotiate and agreeing on a cease-fire serve as precursors to the actual process of negotiations. Pillar divides this negotiation process into three phases.

- **Phase One:** “Feeling out” the other side to determine whether a settlement is possible.
- **Phase Two:** Shaping the main outline of settlement to determine whether a settlement is probable.
- **Phase Three:** Final adjudication of settlement.

Phase One of negotiations features uncertainty between sides. Each belligerent aims to increase its knowledge of the other side’s bargaining position without making costly concessions. The uncertainty during this phase influences each side to make extreme demands with their initial offers.\(^{90}\) During this phase, each side will also have different influences on their offers. States may be concerned with domestic or allied support, which may limit an initial hard-line approach. In addition, pre-negotiation peace feelers may influence the initial offers by increasing one side’s knowledge of the other side’s bargaining position. Finally, preparation for negotiations influences a state’s offer. Belligerents unprepared for negotiations might make weak initial offers.\(^{91}\) Concessions in Phase One are generally reciprocating.\(^{92}\) After each side makes its initial offer and subsequent concessions, Phase One ends when an agreement becomes possible.

Phase Two features concessions that are genuine offers. In this phase, future projections of an opponent’s concessions can be made. Concessions are usually viewed as a sign of weakening bargaining strength. This perception leads to non-reciprocating

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\(^{88}\) Pillar 86-87
\(^{89}\) Pillar, 87-88.
\(^{90}\) Pillar, 102-103.
\(^{91}\) Pillar, 104-105.
\(^{92}\) Pillar, 103.
concessions. Phase Two ends when one side makes a major concession that creates the overall shape of agreement, and a settlement becomes probable.

During Phase Three imposing costs becomes less important as each side has already endured a “waiting game.” Because concessions directly influence the utility of an agreement, they are viewed less as an indication of weakness or strength. Instead, each side’s interest becomes more important in determining the outcome of a settlement in Phase Three. As a deal becomes more likely, bargaining behavior tends to become more reciprocating. Belligerents deal with quantitative and qualitative issues differently in Phase Three. Quantitative issues are usually resolved by “splitting the difference,” although unbalanced interest over an issue can result in a more asymmetric outcome. Quantitative issues are usually resolved completely in favor of one side or the other. Some outcomes feature issues resolved in favor of one side, and other outcomes will be resolved in favor of the other side.

Binary war-outcome theories also continued to thrive after the Vietnam War. Many of these theories, using rationalist assumptions, identify military power, measured in various forms, as a decisive factor in predicting war outcome. Some of these theories also examine military factors in concert with other factors. Wayman, Singer, and Goertz determine that war initiators win when their military power, expressed by a capability ratio and resource allocations, exceeds that of their opponent. Some war outcome theories focus on separate issues such as costs or benefits of victory. Bueno de Mesquita concludes that belligerents expecting high benefits from war outcome tend to initiate wars and win. Other binary war-outcome theories may draw upon institutionalist approaches. Lake argues that democracies will generate more support from their populaces in war and form overwhelming coalitions. Thus, democracies are more likely to win. Moaz uses an institutionalist approach in considering asymmetric power wars.

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93 Pillar, 112-113.
94 Pillar, 119.
95 Pillar, 121.
Moaz shows that the stronger side will tend to expand its war objectives. These expanded war aims assist the weak side in developing coalition support and may lead to a weak side victory. These theories suffer gravely from their simplifications. The proxies used to determine military power are likely irrelevant, and their correlations fail to prove any meaningful causality.

In a final example of binary war-outcome theory, Ivan Arreguín-Toft refutes Mack’s interest asymmetry theory with his strategic interaction theory. Arreguín-Toft’s limits his analysis, like Mack, to asymmetric power wars. In these wars, Arreguín-Toft argues that each side has a choice between two strategies: direct and indirect. Direct strategies target an enemy’s forces and aim to diminish his ability to fight. Indirect strategies aim targets the will of an enemy. Arreguín-Toft predicts the winners of asymmetric power conflicts based on the interaction of strategies. When the strong power uses the same strategy as the weak power (Direct-Direct and Indirect-Indirect combinations), then the strong power should win. When the strong power uses a different strategy as the weak power (Indirect-Direct and Direct-Indirect combinations), the weak power will tend to win. Arreguín-Toft backs these predictions with statistical analysis of wars from 1800-1998.

The simplistic assumptions of binary war-outcome theories, predominately used as explanatory theories, have less relevance to policymakers. Additionally, these theories illuminate very narrow aspects of the war termination process, and more comprehensive examinations of war outcomes challenge the emphasis that binary war-outcome theories place on winning and losing.

The Gulf War generated another spark of interest in war termination, but political scientist took few excursions into this field. Instead, military and historical analyses of the Gulf War featured differing critiques of the termination process in the Gulf War. Some of these evaluations grooping for useful theory looked to the Vietnam-era political

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102 A notable exception is Stephen J. Cimbala. Cimbala applied his war termination concepts developed in the 1980s to understand termination of superpower war towards the more limited wars and uses of force in the 1990s.
science work for analytical leverage.\footnote{32} Interestingly, little theory development of war termination occurred within the political science field throughout the 1990s, despite several important and interesting applications of force by the United States. One insight from this historical analysis of war termination is that war termination studies tend to become popular after wars. However, just as most war termination studies argue that a state should develop its plans for war termination before engaging in war, the field of political science, strategic studies, and conflict studies must devote energy to examining war termination before wars rather than after them.

3. Advantages of War Termination Model

Several problems exist with existing theories of war termination. Many theories, considering only a narrow aspect of war termination that may occur in a single war, develop a specific theory to explain that war’s outcome. Unfortunately, theoretical developments from an individual case usually have little relevance in explaining other cases of war termination. Furthermore, while binary war-ending and war-outcome theories have simplified the war termination outcome into discrete values for statistical analysis, those analyses have not shown any particularly interesting or relevant details in explaining war termination or in providing prescriptive advice to policymakers. The denouement of war results in many new pathways, each of which has beneficial and costly implications for the belligerents of war. Only the study of the complexity of each war’s outcome can yield an understanding of war termination.

The model offered in the first section overcomes many deficiencies found in existing theory. First, it can broadly incorporate many of the theories examined and can be applied to any war. By focusing on a few broad, but common factors that exist in all wars, the model offered can allow for a quick comparison of the differences and similarities of terminations of war. While the use of common factors allows for a purely interpretivist approach in understanding a singular war, policy applications can be made by drawing on trends that occur the termination of a series of wars. In particular, the common factors of the theory can be “black boxed” (i.e., assumed as constant factors) when analyzing a series of wars to yield further insights.

\footnote{For example, see Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," \textit{Military Review} (October 1992): 42-54, and James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War}
C. METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDY APPROACH

This thesis will examine two recent wars fought by the United States. These wars were chosen for study because they have the most relevance in providing a useful understanding of issues involved in terminating America’s wars. These wars will be examined using the model developed in the first section of this chapter. The theories explored during this chapter will also be kept in mind as the analysis proceeds.

This thesis will consider its dependent variables as the outcomes of war and the independent variables as the general factors of war—objectives, interest, power, and strategy—that generate military outcomes, create costs for the each side, and influence the final war termination factors of objectives and bargaining strength. However, establishing strict mechanisms of causality will not occur because several lines of analysis will be conducted. The outcomes of war will be examined in different ways, including:

- Where the initial objectives of the war achieved. Were follow-on objectives achieved?
- How well were the objectives achieved in terms of time and costs?
- What were the costs and benefits realized during post-hostilities?
- What factors lead to a failure or diminished success in war?

Furthermore, the factors of termination outlined in the model will be examined at each war’s inception and as they evolved during the war. The thesis will also examine each war in terms of competing settlement offers and the war termination factors influencing those offers. The goal of this thesis is to provide a detailed and systemic examination of war termination and determine how elements of national power can be applied to terminate war successfully.
III. TERMINATING THE GULF WAR

Gen. Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, distributed selected passages of Fred Iklé’s *Every War Must End* to policymakers in the Defense Department and to the uniformed members of his staff in the autumn of 1990 as the United States began its planning for Gulf War.104 The “lessons” of the Vietnam War, together with Iklé’s Vietnam-era analysis of war termination, would guide the actions of United States in the closing hours of the Gulf War. Objectives would be clear and limited to avoid “mission creep.” It was also Powell’s intention that the United States would allow neither institutional nor irrational factors to prevent the termination of the Gulf War in a manner beneficial to United States’ interests.

Despite its enormous military capability and Powell’s foresight and planning, the United States nevertheless had difficulty translating military victory into political success. This chapter will explore the war termination process of the Gulf War using the model developed in the second chapter. This chapter is organized in three sections: First, it seeks to define the parameters of the war termination process found in the Persian Gulf War and determine the variables of strategy, interest, power, and objectives held by each side. A second section will examine the actual war termination process in terms of competing offers and the influences on those competing offers. Third, this chapter will evaluate the war termination outcome for the United States.

A. INITIAL FACTORS OF THE GULF WAR

Early in the morning on August 2, 1990, Iraq’s military forces, massed along the Kuwait/Iraq border, invaded Kuwait and quickly captured the capital, Kuwait City. The Bush administration, caught by surprise, scrambled to develop a coherent policy response. Stiffened by early encouragement from Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, President George Bush denounced Iraq’s invasion and made plans to block any move by Saddam Hussein against Saudi Arabia’s oilfields south of Kuwait. The Bush Administration generated coalition support, particularly from Iraq’s fellow Arabic countries of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to deploy almost a quarter of a million troops and

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their equipment to the Kuwait/Saudi border. As the standoff continued into October, the United States become convinced, however, that a defensive policy would be insufficient to guarantee the interest of the United States. Working with its allies and the Security Council of the UN, which passed the pivotal Resolution 678 that authorized the use of force against Iraq for failure to comply with previous UN Resolutions, the United States transitioned towards an offensive policy to eject Iraq from Kuwait. The United States deployed additional troops to Saudi Arabia, and by January 15, 1991, made the final preparations for offensive operations against Iraq. Domestic support for military action was expressed through a joint resolution narrowly passed by the Democrat-controlled Congress.

The United States began offensive operations on January 16 with a six-week air campaign against Iraqi strategic and tactical targets. On February 24, coalition ground forces launched a second phase by striking at Iraqi defensive positions in southern Kuwait. The coalition forces prosecuted a 100-hour ground war that ejected Iraqi troops from Kuwait and delivered a crippling defeat of Iraqi forces. On Feb 28, the United States announced a ceasefire, and Saddam Hussein agreed to the United States’ demands for full compliance with a slate of 12 U.N. resolutions.

1. Pre-Hostilities

The conflicting interests between the United States and Iraq began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Cash-starved from its eight year war with Iran and from its sustained military build-up, Iraq capitalized on historical claims to Kuwaiti territory and on accusations of mischievous drilling techniques by Kuwait to justify the Iraqi military excursion.\(^{105}\) Saddam Hussein miscalculated that the Iraqi invasion would become a fait accompli generating initial international recriminations that would eventual subside into a reluctant acceptance. Iraq’s belligerency created multiple concerns for the United States. Immediately, Iraq could threaten the free flow of oil from the Middle East; its absorption of the Kuwaiti oil fields gave it almost 20 percent of the world’s known oil supply. Furthermore, Iraq could double these oil reserves by invading the lightly defended oil

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fields of Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s position in Kuwait would generate much needed financial capital for the drained coffers of Ba’athist regime and boost Iraqi hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East. Regional stability would be threatened.

At first, the United States attempted conflict resolution short of war. An unlikely alliance with Saudi Arabia permitted the quick deployment of a defensive force to deter any further Iraqi expansions. Furious activity within the Security Council led to the passage of twelve UN resolutions condemning Iraq’s invasion. Iraq was diplomatically isolated from western powers, from other Arab states, and, perhaps most importantly, from the Soviet Union, which joined the United States in calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The UN resolutions also set up a legal framework for the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq. Despite these actions, Iraq refused to retreat, and the Bush Administration decided that pressure short of war would be unsuccessful in resolving the conflict.

Iraq’s desire to take over Kuwait suggests why diplomatic and economic sanctions could not alter Iraqi behavior. Ken Matthews, author of *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, argues that Iraq’s preferences in Kuwait were, in preference order:

- Retain control of Kuwait with a war
- Retain control of Kuwait without a war
- Evacuate Kuwait with a war
- Evacuate Kuwait without a war.  

Matthews bases the ordering of the last two preferences on Saddam’s requirement to project an impression of omnipotent power for internal consumption in Iraq. Leaving Kuwait, short of war, would be the worst outcome for Saddam because “losing face, humiliation, and avoiding the battle are outcomes that are not tolerable in the ‘macho’ Islamic/Arab culture or at least in Saddam Hussein’s set of values.” Because withdrawal under duress was more preferable for Saddam than withdrawal short of fighting, pressure short of war was likely to fail. One important implication stems from

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106 Freedman and Karsh, 74.
108 Matthews, 221. Byman, Pollack and Waxman, 132, reach the same conclusion.
Matthew’s analysis. Maintenance of Saddam’s internal power exercised a dominant influence on his decision not to retreat. The importance of internal power would become the major influence on Saddam’s actions and strategies. Of course, the choice of a particular outcome detailed in Matthew’s list required decisions made by both parties of the conflict: Saddam would determine whether to withdrawal or stay in Kuwait; the United States and the coalition forces would decide whether to go to war or rely on measures short of war.

2. United States and Coalition War Factors

The United States decided to pursue war as its option less than three months after Iraq’s initial invasion. The formal objectives pursued by the United States and adopted in U.N. Resolution 678 included:

- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government;
- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf;
- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.\(^{109}\)

These stated objectives can be distilled into two political objectives. First, the United States required a reversal of the Iraqi invasion. Second, the United States had to ensure the security and stability of the Gulf. This second objective implied a United States requirement to control, limit, or dispose of Saddam Hussein to prevent future recalcitrance. Merely, turning back the clock on the invasion of Kuwait could not guarantee peace and security. This could only be achieved through limiting Saddam’s power, controlling acts of aggression, or disposing of Saddam altogether. The military objectives pursued by the United States proves the importance of this second objective in that a primary military objective of the ground war was the destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard.

The military objectives were developed from the political objectives. During the air campaign, especially in the first few weeks, the United States attacked strategic targets to induce Saddam to agree to the 12 U.N. resolutions. The United States attacked Iraqi leadership; military infrastructure including air defense networks, command and

control facilities, and WMD facilities; and civilian infrastructure including oil facilities and electric power grids.\(^{110}\) As the ground war grew close, the United States shifted target sets toward likely Iraqi ground opposition in Kuwait and Iraq. The ground war had two military objectives: drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and destroy the Republican guard.\(^{111}\) These two military objectives matched up directly to the political objectives of reversing the Iraqi invasion and maintaining peace and security in region.

Different factors boosted and diminished United States interest in the Gulf War. While United States survival seemed hardly at stake and other oil markets existed (particularly once Saudi Arabia’s oil fields were secure by the end of September),\(^{112}\) Iraq’s actions would be damaging to United States’ economic interests. Additionally, as war grew close, the United States had invested its credibility upon forcing Saddam’s withdrawal. A United States’ failure could undermine the credibility of United States foreign policy. Matthews argues the United States’ decisions to oppose Iraq diplomatically, economically, and with military deployments narrowed the United States’ options and a generated momentum for war. Furthermore, the Bush Administration questioned whether the United States could prosecute a war against Iraq if it waited a year or longer before initiating hostilities. Allied support would ebb over time, and the longer Saddam lingered in Kuwait, the more likely the international community would accept his occupation as a new status quo.

The United States had a distinct military power advantage in the Gulf War. Significant post-Cold War drawdowns had yet to occur, and the United States had a highly trained and technologically advanced force. Before the war, military planners were confident of the United States success despite pessimistic predictions of American losses. While the United States had enough military power to eject Saddam’s forces from Kuwait and to destroy the Republican Guard, the effort to do so, it was believed, would be a costly one.


\(^{111}\) See Gordon and Trainor, 427-429.

\(^{112}\) See Gordon and Trainor, 57, for Gen. Schwarzkopf’s recollection that he finally felt confident of the United States ability to repulse an Iraqi attack on September 24 when the first heavy armored division completed deployment to the desert.
United States strategy reflected its advantageous military power along with its concern over possible American casualties. Driving this strategy was General Powell’s shared understanding with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), over the need to use overwhelming force. The two-phased war plan featured reliance on United States military advantages of airpower. Initially, the United States would pursue a negotiated settlement without compromising United States demands. In fact, throughout the air war, air campaign planners felt that airpower alone could induce Saddam’s acceptance of United States demands and avert a potentially costly ground war. This coercive strategy was backed by the ground war’s direct achievement strategy of ejecting Iraqi forces and launching a left hook across the desert to destroy the Republican guard divisions. Throughout the planning and conduct of the war, there was an uneasy tension between between Air Force planners and Army ground force commanders in determining whether air target sets should focus on strategic or tactical targets.113

3. Iraqi War Factors

The interrelationships of its objectives, interests, power, and strategy would influence Iraq’s military outcomes, as well. On the eve of war, Saddam’s primary objective of retaining control of Kuwait was influenced by his desire to maintain internal power, avoid a looming economic crisis, and enhance Iraq’s overall power and influence vis-à-vis its Middle East neighbors. Saddam’s level of interest in retaining Kuwait is more difficult to gauge. Saddam’s high interest in maintaining and expanding his internal and external power had led to his unpredicted decision to invade Kuwait. Saddam also had high interest in achieving some level of victory in a defensive war against the United States insofar as the war effort contributed to his internal power. As the war against the United States began to jeopardize Saddam’s internal power base, Saddam’s decision-making calculus would prioritize his primary interest of maintaining power. Unlike the United States, Saddam narrowly interpreted Iraqi national interests as the maintenance and expansion of his individual regime.

Iraqi forces hoped to negate an extreme military disadvantage by pursuing a defensive strategy. Iraq’s military constructed extensive defensive fortifications along

113 Gordon and Trainor, 309-331.
the Kuwait/Saudi border and stationed its forces to maximize firepower on advancing coalition forces. Despite having little chance of completely halting a coalition advance, Iraq hoped to impose severe costs on coalition forces. While Iraq’s status as the world’s four largest army inspired caution on the coalition side, that caution was rapidly shown to have been misplaced. Iraq’s army proved to be a paper tiger once the war began, and the United States’ military power advantage would become increasingly pronounced.

Table 3. Objectives, Interest, Power, and Strategies of the United States and Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>• Reverse Iraqi invasion of Kuwait • Create peace and security in the Region</td>
<td>• Protect regime; remain in Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>• Moderate—driven by desires for stability, economic prosperity, and foreign policy credibility</td>
<td>• High, for protecting regime • Moderate, Remain in Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>• Overwhelming military advantage • Concern with casualties, domestic support, coalition support</td>
<td>• Lack of morale, C², air defenses, logistics support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>• Coerce agreement from Iraq • Eject Iraq from Kuwait • Destroy Republican Guard</td>
<td>• Defensive war—inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and force a settlement.</td>
</tr>
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4. International Influences

The United States and Iraq were the key opposed parties in the Gulf War, particularly as decision-making entities in the war termination phase. However, several actors—European and Arab coalition partners and the Security Council members, China and the Soviet Union— influenced both the conduct of war and war termination, particularly in terms of objectives and power. The Arab states were concerned with United States’ domination in the region, and required assurances that the United States would respect their regional concerns with its war plans. The Soviet Union and China were particularly concerned with possible expanding objectives that would establish the United States as a hegemonic regional power and establish an international precedence for trumping state sovereignty. These actors sought to limit the United States’ stated objectives, expressed in U.N. Resolution 678, to exclude overthrowing Saddam’s regime. Coalition partners did enhance the power of the United States to wage war, particularly
through geography. By allowing deployments on its soil, Saudi Arabia provided an important staging and forward operations area along the Saudi and Iraq/Kuwait border. Additionally, world support was zero-sum game for each side in the Gulf War; the more support enjoyed by the United States directly equated to less support for Iraq. By cultivating international support, the United States isolated Saddam and limited potential external military support.

The variables of objectives, interest, and power, and strategy combined with support of war-oriented actors created a unique situation on the eve of hostilities between the United States and Iraq. These factors would continue to influence actions on both sides throughout hostilities. As costs to both sides mounted, eventually these variables would coalesce into the respective bargaining strengths and final objectives sought by each side in the war termination process.

B. GULF WAR TERMINATION PROCESS

The war termination process in the Gulf War is better understood if one compares it with war termination in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Korea and Vietnam were lengthy wars featuring periods of military stalemate. The Gulf War was short and decisive. During Korea and Vietnam, the participants negotiated while fighting. During the Gulf War, formal negotiations were not pursued until after hostilities ceased. As defined in the first chapter, the war termination process begins as one side contemplates whether to negotiate for peace. During the Gulf War, the war termination phase overlapped directly with hostilities. This paper examines the following war termination landmarks: pre-hostilities negotiations at Geneva, air campaign concessions, and ground war concessions.

1. Geneva Conference

On November 30, 1990, one day after the Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 678, President Bush announced his intention to “go the extra mile” for peace by holding direct talks between Iraq and the United States. Iraq and the United States agreed to a meeting between Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz on January 9, 1991, just five days before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal set by Resolution 678. During the negotiations, Secretary Baker issued a
letter to Aziz reiterating the United States’ position that Iraq must make a full withdrawal from Kuwait and accept all U.N resolutions. The letter also included a threat that Iraq would face a “terrible price” if it used chemical weapons or biological weapons during any hostilities. After reading the letter, Aziz refused to deliver it to Saddam Hussein. Neither side compromised in the remaining stilted negotiations, and the Geneva conference failed to achieve a settlement.\footnote{Freedman and Karsh, 253-60.}

The President’s motivation for holding talks was based on a desire to exercise a positive influence on domestic political opinion in the United States, in particular to influence the upcoming congressional vote on authorization of force. Unfortunately, the Geneva talks limited the potential for early war termination because they reinforced Saddam’s conception of the United States as unwilling to expend costs in a direct conflict with Iraq. After President Bush’s announcement of the extra mile, Saddam was ecstatic. The impending war now seemed less likely; the United States, he believed, must be having second thoughts about prosecuting a war against Iraq.\footnote{Freedman and Karsh, 236.} Arab coalition partners were concerned that Bush was now sending a message of weakness at a time when the coalition should be sending a message of strength.\footnote{} The Geneva conference may have enhanced the President’s domestic position; the congressional authorization of force was voted by a narrow margin on January 12, 1991. Also, the Geneva conference may have reinforced Saddam’s recalcitrance; Saddam’s stubborn resolve not negotiate until the air campaign was well underway. After the Geneva conference, French diplomats and the U.N. Secretary General attempted a last minute flurry of diplomacy. But they failed to make any progress towards a settlement.

\subsection*{2. Air Campaign}

On January 16, 1991, one day after the U.N. deadline expired, coalition forces initiated the air campaign against Iraq. Over the course of the next six weeks, coalition airpower delivered crippling attacks against the Iraqi infrastructure and military forces. The costs inflicted by the coalition forces would affect Saddam’s calculations and strategies and push Iraq closer to accepting the allied settlement conditions. Iraq quickly responded to the coalition air war by launching ballistic missile attacks against civilian
population centers in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Saddam hoped to inflame Israel into launching independent attacks on Iraq. Saddam calculated that broadening the war to include Israel would disrupt coalition support by Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria. Intense United States pressure on Israel, coupled with deployments of defensive Patriot missiles and a conscious re-scripting of air target sets to include Scud sites in Western Iraq, helped to restrain Israel’s actions. As coalition air forces inflicted greater amounts of devastation, Saddam’s failure to elicit an Israeli military response led to increased desperation and a new twist in the Iraqi strategy.

Iraq’s plans to inflict severe costs on the coalition forces by fighting a defensive war had ceded the strategic initiative to the United States. Becoming increasingly inpatient by the end of the second week of the allied air campaign, Saddam ordered offensive ground operations that culminated in the battle of Khafji. Hoping to shift the war’s momentum and inflict high casualties on coalition forces, Iraq plans called for two divisions to strike across the Kuwaiti/Saudi border on January 29, 1991. One division would maneuver directly along the coast and attack the Saudi city of Ra’s al Khafji. The second division would attack Marine forces staged on the border and then maneuver east toward the coast to capture Al Mish’ab, a city located south of Khafji used to supply the Marine forces. As the second division of Iraqi forces encountered Marine units stationed along the border, the quick reaction of the Marines in applying air power and maneuvering its armored units thwarted the Iraqi advance. The first Iraqi division attacking Khafji successfully captured the city, but a hastily arranged counter-attack returned the city to allied control the following day. Saddam failed to strike a heavy blow against the allied forces or, at least, to invite an allied ground attack into his Iraqi defensive formations. Forcing a negotiated settlement through a defensive war strategy was becoming increasingly problematic.

As the air campaign gradually shifted from its strategic focus towards an operational focus on Iraq military targets in Kuwait, Saddam’s defensive strategy began to increasingly conflict with his overarching objective of maintaining political power. The early attacks on Iraqi infrastructure threatened his control by inflicting hardships on the population. Allied destruction of his ground forces further threatened Saddam’s

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power base. Saddam’s attempt to disrupt the coalition forces with missile attacks on Israel, along with the attempt to jump-start the hostilities at Khafji, proved unsuccessful. These factors influenced Saddam’s subtle shift in strategy to pursue negotiations with coalition forces. On February 15, 1991, Saddam made his first major concession by agreeing to withdrawal from Kuwait in return for extreme concessions by the coalition forces, including a commitment to resolve the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. This concession underscored Saddam’s weakening position. Nevertheless, by attaching extreme conditions, Saddam hoped to limit the internal and external perception of weakness. By the fifth week of bombing Saddam’s preference ordering of outcomes had shifted. Ken Matthew’s pre-war preference ordering for Saddam, examined earlier in this chapter, can be modified. Saddam’s updated preference ordering included the following:

- Retain control of Kuwait with a ground war
- Retain control of Kuwait without a ground war
- Evacuate Kuwait without a ground war, alliance makes concessions (Conditional Withdrawal)
- Evacuate Kuwait with a ground war (Withdrawal through War)
- Evacuate Kuwait without a ground war, no allied concessions (Unconditional Withdrawal)

Why did Saddam develop a more nuanced preference for withdrawal? As the allied air campaign continued to deliver brutal attacks on Iraqi military forces, Iraq’s unrealistic prospects for fighting a successful defensive war rendered the first two preferences unfeasible. Furthermore, the devastating air attacks on Iraq diminished the desirability of the withdrawal through war option. Saddam had originally preferred this option to any withdrawal short of war because it would not damage his internal power base as greatly. However, this preference was predicated on the assumption that Iraqi forces would offer credible resistance to the coalition forces. A routing of Iraqi forces by the coalition could severely damage Saddam’s internal power base through elimination of an important coercive tool. Saddam’s growing concern with the likely costs of a ground war elevated the option of conditional withdrawal above withdrawal through war. Interestingly, Saddam’s preference for an unconditional surrender still ranked below that of fighting a war. Presumably, the war option could better serve maintenance of Saddam’s internal power base. This calculation by Saddam can be partially explained by Soviet intervention in pursuit of a settlement.
The Soviet Union had sat on the sidelines during the few weeks of the air war. During a visit to Washington on 26-30 January, the Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, discussed Soviet concerns with the conduct of the allied air war. Anxious to placate the Soviet Union and maintain solidarity against Iraq, Secretary Baker developed a joint communiqué with Bessmertnykh on 30 January. Without White House clearance, the communiqué called for a ceasefire and a joint United States/Soviet effort to broker a Middle East peace plan between Israel and Palestine in return for an Iraqi commitment to withdrawal from Kuwait. This seeming concession by the United States raised the ire of Israel at particularly sensitive time, as the United States was applying intense pressure to prevent Israel’s entry into the war. The State Department quickly backtracked, describing the communiqué as a reiteration of stated Iraqi policy that implied no linkage with the Israeli/Palestinian peace process.117

In early February, Tariq Aziz pressed members of the Non-Aligned Movement to support Iraq’s stand against the United States. Iran and India collaborated on a six-point peace plan that was presented before a meeting of non-aligned states in Belgrade on February 11-12, 1991. Several non-aligned states continued their diplomatic activity in the United Nations, but lacking the support of the coalition states, their diplomacy carried no real impact. The Soviet Union’s entrée to active negotiations would create a more serious drive for negotiations. On February 9, Gorbachev issued a presidential statement that criticized Iraq for its refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. Gorbachev also criticized the United States for its use of military force that risked going beyond the U.N. mandate. Signaling its intention to mediate the conflict, the Soviets also announced that Yevgeny Primakov, as a personal emissary of Gorbachev, would travel to Iraq and discuss withdrawal with Saddam Hussein.

Primakov’s visit to Baghdad failed to generate any immediate concessions from Saddam. While Primakov was optimistic upon his return to Moscow, Iraq statements concerning the visit were more pessimistic. As Soviet diplomacy continued, Iraqi Radio issued an important concession on the 15th of February over the Iraqi National Radio: Iraq was prepared to comply fully with U.N. Resolution 660. Saddam’s concession carried extreme conditions, though. In return for withdrawal, Iraq listed a series

117 Freedman and Karsh, 375-376.
demands: Sanctions against Iraq should cease, Iraq’s debt should be absolved, economic aid should be provided to Iraq to rebuild war damaged infrastructure, international recognition should be given to Iraq’s historic claim on Kuwait territory, and Israel must pull-out of all Palestinian occupied territories. United States and Great Britain quickly dismissed Saddam’s proposal, reiterating their position that Iraq must accede to all twelve U.N. resolutions. Soviet diplomacy continued undeterred. On February 18, Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz traveled to Moscow for negotiations with Gorbachev. The Soviets presented Aziz a four-point plan that called for the following:

- Immediate withdrawal from Kuwait
- Threats to Iraq and Saddam’s leadership would be removed after withdrawal
- Sanctions would end upon withdrawal
- Iraqi withdrawal would be linked with the Israeli/Palestinian peace process.

Coalition forces, including the French, were unenthusiastic with the Soviet proposal because it included apparent concessions by the coalition and it was vague on the time requirements involved in withdrawal. Aziz received the plan and quickly returned to Iraq for consultation with Saddam Hussein. On February 21, 1991, Saddam delivered a national speech while Aziz traveled to the Soviet Union to respond to the four-point plan. Despite Saddam’s particularly vitriolic and uncompromising speech, Aziz negotiated earnestly with the Soviet Union. Aziz and Gorbachev produced an eight-point peace plan that moved the Iraqi position much closer to the United States demands and included two key Iraqi compromises: Iraq was willing to forgo its claim on Kuwait and drop any linkage with the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. As the coalition leaders conferred on this development, word reached the United States that Iraqi forces had set fire to over 100 oil wells reinforcing President Bush’s inclination to reject the Soviet arranged proposal. Receiving coalition support, President Bush spoke publicly early on the morning of February 22. In his speech, Bush rejected the eight-point plan and delivered an ultimatum to Iraq. Iraq must begin its withdrawal from Kuwait by noon (2000 Iraqi time) Saturday, February 23. In Moscow, Aziz and Gorbachev responded by offering an improved six-point plan. Iraq formally agreed to the six-point plan on the morning of February 23. Washington dismissed the plan because it fell short of the demands required by President Bush. Despite furious last minute activity in the United
Nations, the February 23 deadline passed without any indications of an Iraqi withdrawal. President Bush spoke shortly after the deadline. The leading American military commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, had been given orders “to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.” The ground war had begun.

3. Ground War

The advent of the Ground War constrained Saddam’s options. Without any serious hope of forcing the coalition forces to back off their demand for an Iraqi unconditional withdrawal, Saddam’s strategy was reduced to enduring the allied punishment and salvaging his ground forces. In fact, a few days before the beginning of the allied ground campaign, Saddam began withdrawing some of his elite Republican Guard forces.\(^{118}\) On the second day of the ground war, the UN Security Council affirmed the United States position that any ceasefire would require Iraq’s acceptance of the 12 U.N. Resolutions. Afterwards on February 25, 1991, Baghdad Radio announced that Iraqi troops would begin withdrawing from Kuwait in accordance with the first U.N. Resolution 660. The same announcement reiterated Iraq’s historical claim to Kuwait, and linked the aggression of coalition forces with the Palestinian cause.\(^{119}\) That same day, Tariq Aziz passed a more conciliatory message to the Soviet ambassador in Baghdad that Iraq would comply with Resolution 660. Aziz also pressed the Soviets to assist Iraq in securing a ceasefire in the United Nations. The Bush administration flatly rejected Iraq’s offer. President Bush delivered a statement demanding Iraqi acceptance of all 12 U.N. resolutions, along with the need of Iraqi soldiers to “lay down their arms.” Bush also stiffened the United States demands by insisting that Saddam Hussein make his concessions, “personally and publicly.”\(^{120}\)

Iraqi resistance quickly falter in the face of coalition ground operations. The diversionary advance by the Marines broke through Iraqi defenses to secure Kuwait City. On February 26, Iraqi troops evacuated Kuwait City and traveled north to the Iraq city of Basra. Intense air attacks against retreating Iraqi forces were quickly dubbed, “The

\(^{118}\) Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (New York: Routledge, 1992), 381-382.
\(^{119}\) Hiro, 384.
\(^{120}\) Hiro, 386.
Highway of Death.” The “left hook” forces advanced slowly, but soon engaged several Iraqi Divisions. On February 27, Tariq Aziz forwarded a letter to the U.N. Security Council requesting a ceasefire. In return, the Iraqis agreed to accept of some of U.N. Resolutions. The Security Council, dominated by the coalition states, remained firm. That evening as President Bush and his advisors were considering whether to announce a ceasefire, Iraq forwarded a second letter accepting all U.N. resolutions in return for a ceasefire.

That night President Bush announced to the world, “Kuwait was liberated.” In return for ceasefire, President Bush required Iraq’s compliance with all U.N. resolutions. In addition, Bush required Iraq to release all coalition and Kuwaiti POWs and detainees and to inform the United States of the position of all land and sea mines. Hours later Iraq agreed to these ceasefire requirements.

Several factors influenced the United States’ decision to call for a ceasefire, a watershed decision in the termination of the Gulf War. Foremost was concern over the stark and destructive images played around the world on news channels, such as CNN, that portrayed the United States as an aggressor against fleeing troops. Second, miscommunication from Schwarzkopf led White House decision-makers to overestimate the amount of damage inflicted upon the Iraqi military, particularly the Republican Guard. As the White House was considering whether to announce a ceasefire, General Schwarzkopf, in a briefing to reporters, announced that, “the gate was closed” for escaping Iraqi military forces. In a later phone call with General Powell, Schwarzkopf agreed to declare an immediate ceasefire with Iraq. Finally, Iraq’s agreement to accede to all U.N. resolutions influenced President Bush to announce a ceasefire. An overarching concern for the White House and, particularly, for General Powell was concern that the United States would continue beyond a “rational calculation” of termination.

122 Hiro, 392.
123 See Powell, 522-525 and Gordon and Trainor, 423-426. Gordon and Trainor, 429-432 also argue that Schwarzkopf failed to appreciate the Iraqi military weaknesses and should have sped up his ground war plans.
124 Powell, 521.
As the ground situation settled, Iraq and the United States agreed to hold a military ceasefire conference at the village of Safwan. General Schwarzkopf, as the senior coalition officer, embarked for the conference with little political guidance. During the Safwan meeting, Schwarzkopf arranged for POW exchanges and Iraqi disclosure of mine locations. The Iraqis acceded without resistance. The next topic broached was an establishment of a no-fire zone between U.S. and Iraq positions. The Iraqi officials, concerned with U.S. presence on Iraqi territory, pressed for assurances that United States would respect Iraqi territory and quickly withdrawal. Schwarzkopf readily agreed. The final topic discussed was airspace security. Schwarzkopf demanded that Iraq keep all flights grounded while Coalition flights were continuing to patrol Iraqi airspace. Iraqi officers reluctantly agreed, but requested that Iraq be allowed to fly its helicopters arguing that they were needed for transportation since many roads and bridges had been destroyed. Schwarzkopf again agreed to the Iraqi request. Final concerns raised by the Iraqi officers about the position of coalition forces in Iraq’s territory evoked a remarkable concession by Schwarzkopf, “There will not be one single coalition force member in the recognized borders of Iraq, as soon as, as rapidly as we can get them out.”

Over the course of the next month, a welter of internal chaos would break out in Iraq while the United States became a passive actor. In southern Iraq, the large Shia population revolted against Saddam Hussein. Emboldened by President Bush’s calls for the Iraqi people “to rise up and displace Saddam Hussein,” the Shias seized control of several cities and towns south of Baghdad. The Iraq military quickly regrouped and conducted extensive military operations smashing the rebellion. Eventually, the outgunned rebels were defeated city by city, with particularly bloody encounters fought in the cities of Karbala and Najef. In the north, the Kurdish population somewhat belatedly launched its revolt and quickly seized control of northern Iraq. Once Saddam had defeated the Shia rebels, he shifted his military forces to the north and began a systematic campaign to punish the Kurds and reclaim Iraqi sovereign territory. Iraq, taking advantage of the United States’ ceasefire that allowed them to fly their

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125 See Gordon and Trainor, 444-447 for an account of the Safwan meeting, including the quotation by Schwarzkopf.
heliocopterd, used helicopters gunnery to support their campaigns against the Shias and Kurds. One month after Safwan, the U.N. passed a resolution outlining the requirements Iraq must meet for a permanent ceasefire. They included the following stipulations:

- The ceasefire would become formal upon Iraqi acceptance
- Iraq must respect the dispute Kuwaiti border
- Military observers would be dispatched to the disputed Kuwaiti border
- Iraq must remove and destroy all WMD and ballistic missile capabilities and facilities and allow inspectors to verify these actions.
- Iraq was liable for war damages.
- Iraq must pledge not support international terrorism.

Three days later, Iraq agreed to the U.N. resolution and formally terminated the Gulf War.

C. WAR TERMINATION OUTCOMES

The concepts of winning and losing are useful in describing the outcome of the Gulf War. The United States won because its forces imposed a lopsided military outcome and because its objectives were largely achieved. Conversely, Iraq lost because its military forces were soundly defeated and its initial objectives went unattained. However, reducing war outcome to a binary categorization simplifies yet obscures the realities of war termination. This section will attempt to produce a deeper understanding of the war termination process by evaluating the war’s outcome using two separate criteria. First, the Gulf War’s outcome will be evaluated in terms of the objectives achieved by the United States objectives. Next, the Gulf War’s outcome will be evaluated in terms of post-war benefits for the coalition. Finally, this section will relate these two measures providing a broader evaluation of the United States’ success in terminating the Gulf War.

The United States had two political objectives in the Gulf War: reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and providing for peace and security in the Gulf. The United States achieved the first objective, but the second objective was only partially attained. The first objective provided the United States with its raison d’etre in the Gulf War. Its simplicity guided military planning, made the war understandable to the American populace and helped cement the coalition states together. By any interpretation of the Gulf War, this
objective was accomplished. Because the second objective was less clear, though, evaluating whether the United States met this objective becomes more difficult.

In several ways, the Gulf War’s outcome did provide for peace and security by limiting Iraq’s ability to attack its neighbors in the future. The very act of forcing Saddam’s military out of Kuwait reinforced international norms against inter-state belligerence. Saddam could likely assume that any future Iraqi “adventures” would result in a similar response by the world community and the United States. Despite the rhetoric played across Iraqi radio to the contrary, the complete military defeat of Iraq damaged Saddam’s internal image in Iraq. Furthermore, by destroying a large portion of Saddam’s army, the coalition forces reduced Iraq’s military capability and limited the military’s ability to support Saddam’s internal and external coercion. Finally, the United States was able to extract legal justification through the permanent ceasefire to enact an inspections regime and to punish future Iraqi violations through economic sanctions.

Despite these real accomplishments, Iraq remains a threat to the peace and security of the Middle East. By allowing large portions of Iraq’s military to escape, the United States failed to achieve its military objective of destroying the Republican Guard. These forces would easily dominate and extinguish the revolutions sought by the Shias and the Kurds. In part, because the coalition failed to destroy the Iraqi military, Saddam would retain his political power and thwart the post-war program of the United States. Iraq’s obstreperous post-war behavior demonstrates that Saddam, in power, is an inherently destabilizing and threatening force to the Middle East. Therefore, the objective of establishing peace and security in the Middle East could never be fully attained while Saddam retained power.

Evaluating the war’s outcome in terms of post-war benefits for the United States broadens the evaluation somewhat. Iraq has become a reoccurring headache for the United States since the Gulf War. The United States has expended considerable means—military, economic, diplomatic—to restrain Iraq’s vociferous behavior. In terms of a beneficial post-war situation, fighting the war was more preferable than not fighting the war.
Two options existed for the United States to dispose of Saddam. The United States could have supported the internal revolt more robustly, or the United States could have acted directly to toppled Saddam. Several means could have supported the first option. The United States had the opportunity to destroy the Republican Guard forces in theater and prevent their flight from Iraq. These forces gave Saddam the capability to suppress the post-war revolutions. Second, the United States could have actively supported the internal revolutions through diplomatic, informational, and, perhaps, economic means. Finally, the United States could have exerted much greater coercive influence on Saddam after the war. The concessions at Safwan signaled to Iraq that the United States was anxious to withdrawal giving Saddam an key opportunity to regain his iron grip on Iraq after the war.

The second option of directly toppling Saddam had several disadvantages despite being likely to succeed. First, directly toppling Saddam would have raised the ire of the coalition partners and the world community and would have probably ended support for United States’ actions through the U.N. Second, the United States would be thrust into an expansive nation-building program for which preparations had not been made and domestic support had not been raised. Both of these options, supporting internal opposition and toppling Saddam, also had a potential downside. Overthrowing Saddam risked fragmentation of Iraq along ethnic fissures. Replacing a rogue state with a failed state may not have benefited the peace and security of Iraq.

As discussed in the second chapter, the failure to achieve post-war benefits occurs because the objectives were not achieved or because the wrong objectives were pursued. In the Gulf War, both cases seem to apply to the United States. First, the implicit, underlying objective of controlling or disposing Saddam was not emphasized publicly or internally. By not emphasizing this objective, Bush administration limited the post-war planning for regime change and justified the failure of military commanders to achieve their objective of destroying the Republican Guard. Additionally, the negotiations at Safwan and the failure to capitalize on the United States’ post-war position for coercion limited the ability to influence the post-war events. The United States achieved diminished post-war benefits because of poor execution and the failure to emphasize important objectives.
Several closing points must be made about the application of the theories of war termination to the Gulf War. First, Clausewitz’s rational calculus underlies the analysis of this chapter. Applying cost/benefit analysis to Saddam’s likely preferences explained his actions. The United States, too, based its decision to announce a ceasefire on cost/benefit analysis. Assuming its objectives were achieved, the United States ended the war because it was worried about the costs of continuing. The primary concern came from possible further damage to America’s international image resulting from the negative images of the death and destruction wrought by American troops on fleeing Iraqis.

Impediments to rational decision-making did not seem to occur in the Gulf War for several reasons. First, the war was extremely short—only seven weeks. Institutional factors, explored in the second chapter, that prevent the operation of war as a rational enterprise did not have the time to develop in the Gulf War. Additionally, value-based impediments failed to surface because there were no underlying ethnic or cultural hatreds between each side.

Several models of war termination, including Clausewitz, Wittman, and Pillar predicted that a side enjoying military success would expand its war aims, while the side experiencing military failure should have contracting war aims. War termination becomes difficult because this seesaw effect influences the desires for war termination. Clausewitz argues that as “the incentive grows on one side, it should diminish on the other.”126 While Iraq’s military failures forced it objectives to contracted, the war aims of the United States remained fixed, despite its military success. Two explanations seem relevant. First, the influence of Vietnam and the concern of mission creep had an extraordinary influence on the war planning of the United States. Second, the reliance on coalition support reduced the war aims to its lowest common denominator and prevented further expansion.

The negotiation and bargaining models were less helpful in explaining the settlement outcome of the Gulf War, mainly because of the one-sided military outcome. Still Iraqi demands followed a negotiating trajectory that matched the military outcome of

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126 Clausewitz, 92.
the war. As the war progressed, extreme Iraqi demands softened until Iraq grudgingly accepted the United States demand for complete acceptance of all U.N. resolutions. Because of its military success, the United States dictated the terms of peace to Iraq. Despite its advantageous bargaining position, the United States failed to generate a beneficial post-hostility position. The overriding concern held by the United States that termination might be sought too late, after rational calculations would dictate, biased the United States in terminating the war too early. With Saddam remaining in power, the United States was unable to impose a generous peace as suggested by Clausewitz. Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memoirs:

   One of my very few abiding regrets is that I was not here to see the issue through. The failure to disarm Saddam Hussein and to follow through the victory so that he was publicly humiliated in the eyes of his subjects and Islamic neighbors was a mistake which stemmed from the excessive emphasis placed right from the start on international consensus. The opinion of the U.N. counted for too much and the military objective of defeat for too little. And so Saddam Hussein was left with the standing and the means to terrorize his people and foment more trouble. In war there is much to be said for magnanimity in victory. But not before victory.127

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IV. TERMINATING KOSOVO

On the eve of its fiftieth anniversary, NATO embarked on a 78-day air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO’s objective was to force Yugoslavia to grant political autonomy to the province of Kosovo and, thereby, avert a potential humanitarian crisis. In fact, neither of NATO’s political objectives were achieved, nor did Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic achieve his political objective of maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslav federation and quelling a rebellion of Kosovar Albanians. This chapter asks two questions from NATO’s first war: What factors contributed to the termination of the war for Kosovo? Second, how well did the United States and NATO apply elements of national power to achieve their objectives?

The war took place in the Balkans, a region churned by ethnic, religious and ideological rivalry. The two parties warring on the ground, the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, have an especially contentious ethnic conflict, with rival claims over the historically important province of Kosovo heightening tensions. This historic dispute was resurrected in 1989 when Milosevic, then president of Serbia, curtailed the long-standing autonomy enjoyed by the province of Kosovo and re-introduced direct Serbian political control. The Albanians responded by organizing a rival shadow government and by following a policy of “nonviolent protest” against Serbian control through the early to mid-1990s. As the bloody wars in Bosnia and Croatia concluded with the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, tensions began to mount in nearby Kosovo. Increasing Serbian repression stoked the flames of a Kosovar revolt and spawned the birth of the militant Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the mid-1990s. Overt terrorist activity by KLA in 1997 provoked harsh Serbian response, so by the following year, Europe faced another ethnic war in the Balkans. This time, however, NATO was particularly keen to prevent a repeat of the Bosnian crisis.

This chapter will examine the competing objectives, interests, power, and strategy of NATO/United States and Serbia as the war for Kosovo began. Next, this chapter will examine the war in terms of competing settlement offers and the factors influencing those offers. Third, it will assess which factors most influenced the decision of each side to
terminate the war. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the outcome of the war for each side and determine which factors detracted from the United States and NATO’s successful outcome.

A. INITIAL FACTORS OF WAR

With distinct objectives and interest at the beginning of the war, NATO and Serbia would develop different strategies based on the military power balances between the two sides. The interactions of these factors would determine the outcome of the war. This section examines the state of objectives, interest, power, and strategy of each side as the Kosovo War began.

1. Objectives

President Bill Clinton, in his statement to the American nation on the opening day of NATO bombing, outlined three objectives for the United States and NATO. Allied forces were “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course, to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serb military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”\(^{128}\) Just weeks before, Serbian representatives in Paris refused to sign a peace agreement developed at the Rambouillet conference. The Contact Group\(^{129}\) had administered the Rambouillet conference and brought Serbia and Kosovar Albanian representatives together to work out a political settlement between the two sides. Albanian representatives had signed the peace agreement, and NATO incorrectly assumed that limited military action could force Serbia to sign the agreement as well.

Maintaining sovereignty over Kosovo was an important objective for the Serbian government and Milosevic. The Rambouillet agreement guaranteed the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo’s political future would be tied to a Kosovar referendum. This prospect of an autonomous Kosovo was unacceptable for Milosevic and the Serbian

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\(^{128}\) “Statement by the President to the Nation” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 24, 1999)

\(^{129}\) The Contact Group included representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the European Union Presidency, and the European Commission. See Hosmer, 7, footnote 1.
populace. In addition, the Serbs wanted to protect the Serb people living in Kosovo from separatist violence.

2. Interest

Serbia had a greater stake in the outcome of Kosovo than did NATO. The role played by Kosovo in Serbia’s history and the fact that Kosovo was the birthplace of the Serbian Orthodox Church impacted the strong popular support among Serbs for actions taken in Kosovo. For the Serbs, military action against Kosovo separatism translated into a war for the integrity of Greater Serbia. Milosevic had great personal interest in pursuing the war because Serbian control of Kosovo had been a signature political issue that contributed to his ascension to power. The humanitarian reasons for NATO’s offensive, far removed from survival concerns, indicated NATO’s lower interest in pursuing the war. However, two factors boosted NATO’s interest. First, the atrocities committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from 1991 to 1995 were fresh in the minds of NATO leadership. In these conflicts, NATO intervened to stop conflicts that had already begun. In Kosovo, NATO hoped to act before a major humanitarian crisis occurred. Second, throughout the 1998 and early 1999, NATO had become an increasingly active player in trying to resolve the crisis. NATO’s credibility had become tied to resolution of the conflict in Kosovo, and this raised NATO’s interest in prosecuting the war. Regardless, NATO’s lower interest in the war influenced its choice of strategy and contributed to its concern with minimizing the costs of war for allied forces.

3. Power

In terms of military power, NATO had an overwhelming capability vis-à-vis Serbia. The combined Gross National Product (GNP) of NATO countries was 900 times greater than Yugoslavia. The defense spending of NATO was 300 times greater than Yugoslavia. Through the course of the air war, NATO would fly 37,465 sorties, while the Serbs failed to employ a credible air defense. When Milosevic finally relented,

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130 Hosmer, 13.
131 Stephen T. Hosmer, Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 9.
NATO had tripled its initial forces to 912 aircraft and 35 ships. Without direct external military support from Russia, Yugoslavia’s options were limited by the disparate military power balance between the warring sides.

4. Strategy

Serbia’s low power and high interest led to Milosevic’s choice of strategy. Milosevic would endure the aerial assault and use the images of NATO’s destruction to attack popular support for the war in NATO countries, especially in countries such as Germany and Italy that had large pacifist populations. Serbia also hoped to use its strong diplomatic ties with Russia to pressure NATO. Since President Clinton had expressly ruled out the possibility of a ground invasion, Milosevic planned to take advantage of his military power on the ground in Kosovo and launch a counter-insurgency operation against the KLA. In conjunction with attacks against the KLA, paramilitary and police forces also planned a brutal campaign to drive the general Kosovar Albanian population into neighboring Macedonia and Albania. Milosevic hoped to realize two benefits from this “ethnic cleansing” campaign. First, it would eliminate support for the KLA within Kosovo. Traditional strategies of counterinsurgency call for a 10 to 1 ratio of troops to terrorists to defeat insurgents within a population. Lacking this troop ratio, Milosevic instead choose to follow Mao’s dictum by pursuing a more blunt strategy of forcing the exodus of the entire population to “drain the sea in which the rebel fish swam.” Milosevic could also realize another benefit. The ethnic cleansing campaign would change the ethnic composition of Kosovo and limit the viability of future independence movements. This lead the Serbian forces to systematically strip Kosovar Albanians of identity papers to prevent their return. Tim Judah, author of Kosovo: War and Revenge, suggests that the Serbs may have even planned to use Kosovo as a future home for the 600,000 Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. Finally, it appears likely that Milosevic calculated that an enormous refugee crisis would threaten NATO resolve, and, in fact, “Serbia could demonstrate that NATO attacks would produce even more refugees.”

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135 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 250-51.
136 Posen, 53.
The United States and NATO began the war with a very simplistic strategy: NATO would conduct limited air strikes against Serbia to coerce acceptance of the Rambouillet settlement. Most political leaders of NATO assumed that Milosevic would agree to the settlement after “a little light bombing.”137 This miscalculation was largely based on the historical misreading of Milosevic. Operation Deliberate Force, launched in August 1995, had induced Milosevic to accede to less than ideal demands with the Dayton accords. This precedent offered a poor guide to Milosevic’s behavior in Kosovo, however, because it ignored key differences between the situation in Bosnia in 1995 and that in Kosovo in 1999. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs had already taken huge military losses on the ground. Additionally, NATO had deployed a credible ground force, and its air attacks were launched against the Serbs in Bosnia, not in Serbia proper, thereby avoiding a surge of nationalism amongst the Serbian populace.138 Another misread event occurred in October 1998 when the threat of bombing had caused Milosevic to agree to end the violence in Kosovo and accept observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But these limited numbers of unarmed observers still allowed Milosevic to control the situation in Kosovo. Along with this misapplication of historical precedent, Judah argues that poor intelligence influenced the NATO leaders to rely on vague hopes that allied bombing would entice the Serb populace to dispose of Milosevic.139

While it pursued a strategy of “light bombing” to coerce Milosevic, the United States expressly removed the ground option from consideration. While this decision was made to assuage the domestic public’s concern that the war would generate significant costs, Belgrade considered this decision as an indication of NATO’s lack of resolve.140 The NATO strategy failed initially because it lacked a back-up plan in the case that Milosevic would holdout. In addition, Milosevic’s refusal to concede meant that NATO had no way directly to prevent further violence and forcing a political settlement.

137 Judah, 229. See also Roberts, 111.
138 Roberts, 110-111
139 Judah, 229
140 Roberts, 110.
B. WAR TERMINATION PROCESS

Understanding the termination process of Kosovo requires an examination of the entire war because, from the start, each side escalated its military actions while softening its demands. The eventual settlement outcome bridged the two initial positions of NATO and Milosevic. Because of its stronger bargaining position, NATO was able to secure greater concessions from Milosevic.

The air campaign against Serbia began on March 24, 1999, shortly after President Clinton announced the impeding hostilities to the American people. Phase I of air attacks was launched against Yugoslav air defenses and fixed military installations.\textsuperscript{141} As NATO launched its air attacks, Milosevic quickly escalated the ground war in Kosovo. Earlier in February, Milosevic had ordered the commencement of Operation Horseshoe, which aimed to expel the Albanian population. Until NATO bombing began, the Serbs executed this operation discretely. The advent of the air war seemed to lift all restraints of Milosevic as the Serbian military and police forces now openly drove large numbers of Kosovar Albanians from their homes and across the borders.\textsuperscript{142} By the end of the war, almost one million inhabitants fled Kosovo, and half a million people were displaced within Kosovo.\textsuperscript{143}

By March 29, 1999, NATO realized that Phase I “light bombing” was not going to force the acquiescence of Milosevic. Despite internal disputes, especially from the Italians and Greeks who wanted NATO to announce a bombing pause, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) directed the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, General Wesley Clark, to commence Phase II of air operations. Phase II moved the emphasis from attacking air defenses to attacking the force concentrations and logistics of the Yugoslav army and police forces that threatened the Kosovar Albanians. The NAC choose to commence Phase II earlier than anticipated because of the escalating Serb atrocities.\textsuperscript{144}

Bad weather hampered the execution of Phase II. To prevent lost aircraft, NATO pilots were also under strict guidelines not to fly beneath 15,000 ft. above sea level. This

\textsuperscript{141} Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 13.
\textsuperscript{142} See Figure 4-1, Refugees from Kosovo: March 1999 to August 1999, in Daalder and O’Hanlon, 109.
\textsuperscript{143} Roberts, 113.
\textsuperscript{144} Lambeth, 25-26.
guidance, along the poor weather, prevented NATO forces from have any serious impact on the ethnic cleansing operations within Kosovo. By the sixth day of the air campaign, General Clark requested authority to prosecute Phase III air operations that would attack dual-use targets of strategic value including political headquarters, industries supporting the military, roads and bridges supporting logistics to Kosovo, and the electricity grids. The NAC rebuffed General Clark, but did grant limited approval to attack specified targets on the Phase III list. What become known as Phase II+ began on March 30. The pattern of the initial air war against Serbia, therefore, was a gradual escalation of force that avoided any devastating or overwhelming attacks against strategic targets. Benjamin Lambeth compares the “slow-motion escalation” of Operation Allied Force to the flawed targeting strategy of Operation Rolling Thunder conducted in the Vietnam War a generation earlier.145

On April 6, Milosevic requested a ceasefire for Orthodox Easter, but that ceasefire was conditioned on the acceptance of absolute Serbian control of Kosovo.146 That same day NATO and the United States released their revised objectives for the war. These included:

- A verifiable end to Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians.
- Serb military, para-military, and police withdrawal from Kosovo.
- Serb agreement to stationing of international security force in Kosovo.
- Serb acceptance of safe return for all refugees in Kosovo.
- Serb reassurances that the political dispute of Kosovo would proceed based on the terms of the Rambouillet conference.

Because its initial objectives were unachievable given the levels of military force it had so far applied, NATO was forced to modify and clarify its objectives.

NATO’s air war created a climate of popular support for Milosevic in Serbia. Waves of patriotic euphoria swept the nation. Black and white bull’s-eye targets became a popular emblem for rallying citizens. The rally-around-the-flag effect stymied political opposition to Milosevic.147 Internationally, Russia and China reacted strongly to United States attacks against Yugoslavia. Both these countries had opposed the inclusion of language in the U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for the use of force against

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145 Lambeth, 29.
146 Posen, 45.
147 Hosmer, 50-51.
Yugoslavia to force its acceptance of a political settlement. Historic ties between Russia and Serbia influenced Moscow to denounce the United States and NATO and to push for U.N. Resolutions condemning NATO’s action.148

As NATO proceeded through the fifth week of bombing with increased sorties against dual-use targets as a part of Phase II+, Milosevic continued to deploy military troops, police, and paramilitary into Kosovo to support the ethnic cleansing operation. In fact, by this time Milosevic’s capability against the Kosovar Albanians had increased rather than diminished. Milosevic also showed no interest in accepting NATO’s conditions. Meanwhile, European governments experienced great consternation at the possibility of open-ended hostilities against Yugoslavia. Germany’s governing leftist Social Democratic Party, which had formed a coalition government with the pacifist Green Party, was particularly keen to resolve the war with a minimal use of force. On April 14, internal pressure influenced Germany to break with NATO and introduce its own six-point plan for peace. This plan softened the April 6 demands of NATO by calling for a final settlement to be negotiated by the G-8 (which included Russia), rather than NATO. It also required a U.N. Security Council resolution to affirm the settlement process. The plan designated the United Nations, rather than NATO, as the primary administrator of post-war Kosovo, and it called for a 24-hour bombing pause after Serbia’s withdrawal announcement. At the heart of the German proposal was an opportunity for Russia to take an active role in negotiating a settlement for Kosovo.149

NATO’s 50-year anniversary summit in Washington on April 23-24 proved to be a symbolic turning point in the war. The National Security Advisor to President Clinton, Sandy Berger, claimed that NATO leaders at the summit agreed, “we will not lose. We will not lose. Whatever it takes, we will not lose.” The consensus to continue the war against Serbia lead to an even greater escalation of air sorties against strategic targets150 and the deployment of greater numbers of airplanes into the theater.151 Daalder and O’Hanlon argue that the success of the Washington summit was largely due to the fact that it prevented the emergence of a rift. In this way, NATO demonstrated its resolve.

148 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 127.
149 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 166.
150 Lambeth, 38.
151 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 143.
British negotiations behind the scenes also helped to open the door for consideration of the use of ground forces. While NATO did not publicly reveal that it was considering this strategic option, it did follow up the summit with orders to General Clark to begin a formal reassessment of all ground campaign plans against Serbia.\footnote{Daalder and O’Hanlon, 138.} Finally, the Washington Summit opened the door for cooperation between United States and Russia. The demonstration of NATO resolve had served to convince Russia that it would not split the coalition. On the final day of the summit, President Yeltsin made a special phone call to President Clinton urging him to cooperate in ending the Balkan’s conflict.\footnote{Daalder and O’Hanlon,}

Russia’s strident opposition to the NATO campaign and support for Milosevic was beginning to wane. Milosevic had already raised the ire of the Russian government with his support of the attempted 1991 coup by communist hard-liners against Yeltsin. In addition, Milosevic’s involvement in a series of Balkan conflicts had forced Russia to expend its limited post-Cold War political capital to support politically questionable Serbian objectives. Russia, too, had been a member of the Contact Group and supported the Rambouillet process. Most likely, Russia would have been relieved if Milosevic had signed the agreement. Finally, Russia could ill afford to jeopardize its relations with the West as it depended on western financial support to fuel its economic recovery.\footnote{Hosmer makes these four points. See Hosmer, 43-44.}

With its lackluster success in forcing Milosevic to capitulate, the United States welcomed Russian involvement in the negotiations. Russian involvement, also, sent a message to the American domestic audience that the United States was using its military muscle to force a diplomatic solution. Also, the United States hoped to shore up the rapidly deteriorating relations between Russia, the United States, and NATO caused by the air campaign. The United States envisioned Russia assisting the termination of the war on NATO’s terms through a “dual magnet strategy.” The United States would pull Russia closer to its position, and Russia would force the Serbs to concede.\footnote{Daalder and O’Hanlon.}

On the same day that Germany released its six-point plan, Russia delivered a positive message to the United States. President Yeltsin named Victor Chernomyrdin as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin, a moderate foreign policy voice,
replaced the Prime Minister Ivan Primakov, a strident hard-liner, as the lead Russian voice on Balkan affairs. After the Washington Summit, diplomatic momentum accelerated as Russia cooperated with the United States to influence Milosevic. President Clinton had named Strobe Talbot as his special representative. Talbot was dispatched to confer with Chernomyrdin. In early May, Chernomyrdin traveled to Washington for discussions that nominated Chernomyrdin, Talbot, and Finnish diplomat, Martti Ahtisaari, to form a negotiation group representing the United States, Russia, and Europe. Days later, on May 6, the G-8 foreign ministers meeting released an important statement of principles for a Balkan settlement. While this statement largely matched the NATO demands of 6 April, it did include some concessions to the German six-point plan. For instance, the G-8 statement did not require that all Serb forces had to leave Kosovo. The statement also called for U.N. administration of post-war Kosovo.

On May 10, 1999, Milosevic matched these concessions by informing a U.N. envoy that he would open negotiations based on the G-8 statement. Milosevic also demanded that countries participating in the war against Serbia not be allowed to participate in post-war Kosovo security forces or in any political administration of Kosovo. Days later, Martti Ahtisaari was formally named as the EU envoy, and the three negotiators—Talbot, Chernomyrdin, and Ahtisaari—began to shape a deal for Milosevic. The negotiators agreed on four points. First, Yugoslavian territory and sovereignty would be respected. Second, the U.N. would assume control of an interim administration in Kosovo. Third, international humanitarian agencies and relief workers would be allowed in the region, and, finally, the entire package would be endorsed by the Security Council. Several sticking points prevented the three negotiators from developing a final settlement. They disagreed on the number of Serbian military and police forces that would be allowed to remain in Kosovo. The three also disagreed on a trigger to halt NATO bombing. Chernomyrdin wanted the bombing to stop after Milosevic agreed to a settlement with NATO, while Talbot wanted the bombing to stop only after Milosevic agreed to all five NATO demands. The composition of post-hostility security forces and NATO/Russian involved in those forces was under dispute, as well. Finally, they disagreed on which countries could participate in the security force, with Chernomyrdin

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155 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 167.
pushing Milosevic’s demand that attacking NATO countries could not participate in a post-war Kosovo.156

By mid- to late-May, the Allied bombing campaign began to influence public opinion in Serbia. As strategic attacks on dual-use infrastructure targets caused many physical hardships and generated fear. As a consequence, the defiant public demonstrations began to dwindle.157 Also, public concerns over Serbian military casualties in Kosovo prompted antwar protests in the southern Serbian heartland, an important base for Milosevic’s political support. On May 23, a crowd of 1,000-3,000 people protested in the town of Krusevac. In the following weeks, similar protests against the war in Kosovo were staged in towns across southern Serbia.158 Finally, opposition leaders became more vocal condemning Milosevic and in advocating acceptance of a negotiated settlement. The first sign of splintered political solidarity came on April 25 during a Serbian television interview with Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic urged Milosevic to accept a negotiated settlement and “stop lying to the people in Serbia.”159 While Draskovic was soon fired, he opened the door for condemnation of Milosevic’s actions by the political opposition.

By late May, the stalemate between the three negotiators would be resolved as Russia realized that NATO intended to stand firm with its demands and continue the air campaign. Russian desire to end the conflict forced Chernomyrdin to accept the principles of the NATO demands, including the requirement for Serb forces to evacuate Kosovo. Following this breakthrough, Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic on May 27. In this meeting Milosevic chose to hold out for three conditions: No occupation troops would be allowed from attacking NATO countries; a Russian zone in northern Kosovo would be established; finally, NATO and non-NATO forces would have a separate chain-of-commands. Chernomyrdin brought these conditions to the final meeting between the three negotiators in Bonn. On May 30, the day before this meeting, Yeltsin called President Clinton and committed Russian support for a settlement based on NATO demands. On June 1, the three negotiators agreed on a series of 10 principles that would

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156 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 169-170.
157 Hosmer, 52-53.
158 Hosmer, 58-59.
159 Hosmer, 61.
be presented to Milosevic as a final offer. The negotiators postponed a decision over Russian involvement in post-war Kosovo occupation. On June 2, Ahtisaari and Chenomyrdin presented their plan to Milosevic. He accepted the plan and forwarded it to the Serbian parliament, which approved the plan on the next day.

The Serbs agreed to military-technical talks on June 6. These talks lasted three days and resulted in the Serbian military gaining more time to conduct their withdrawal (15 days as opposed to 7 days) and in a reduction of the buffer zone in Serbia, proper, from 15 miles to 3 miles. The military-technical agreement was signed on June 9. The next day, NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana announced a general ceasefire and termination of bombing against Serbia. Barry Posen suggests that the Serbs, attempting to influence the outcome of the final U.N. Resolution, argued for an earlier ceasefire. They felt that a ceasefire followed by their troop withdrawal, with an extended timeline, would allow them to leverage a more favorable U.N. resolution.\(^\text{160}\) During these last few days of negotiations, ground fighting between the Serbian forces and the KLA continued. In fact, early reports claimed that a June 7 allied cluster bombing attack in support of KLA ground operations against the Serbian forces at Mount Pastrik inflicted heavy damage on the Serbs and convinced the Serbian military to accept the military/technical agreement.\(^\text{161}\) Post-war evidence shows that little actual damage was incurred by the Serbs, though, and the Serbian forces had the freedom of action to conduct ground operations and stretch out the final negotiating sessions to support their demands.\(^\text{162}\) In the end, a limited Serbian military withdrawal was followed by an Allied ceasefire, which was quickly followed by the passage of U.N. Resolution 1244.\(^\text{163}\)

C. FACTORS OF TERMINATION

The Kosovo War was terminated according to the objectives held by each side and the bargaining strength of the participants. This section examines both.

1. Objectives

Each side retreated from the initial objectives pursued at the beginning of the war. The United States was unable to prevent Serbian atrocities and settled for the

\(^{160}\) Posen, 77-78.
\(^{161}\) Roberts, 118.
\(^{162}\) Posen, 65.
\(^{163}\) Posen, 78.
establishment of a post-hostilities protectorate in Kosovo. The United States was able to retain most of its revised objectives announced on April 6. The only real concession came with allowing the United Nations to take a lead role in administering Kosovo. Milosevic sacrificed his initial objectives by agreeing to cede control on Kosovo to an international administration. By insisting on United Nations involvement, Milosevic gained potential Security Council vetoes by Russia and China influencing future resolution of Kosovo’s political status according to Serbian interests.

2. Bargaining Strength

The increasing costs of war and the likelihood that future settlements would be resolved on less palatable terms convinced Milosevic to settle, despite sacrificing his initial objectives. By late May, the cumulative effects of NATO bombing was causing great hardship to Serbian society. In addition, despite early divisions, NATO unity remained strong. As NATO escalated its attacks on Serbian, internal pressure grew within European countries to cease the bombing campaign. Milosevic’s miscalculation in conducting a draconian campaign of ethnic cleansing helped NATO to overcome its reluctance to pursue the war. Milosevic had further hoped to degrade NATO unity with hordes of Balkan refugees. But the opposite effect occurred. The ethnic cleansing campaign and Serb atrocities cemented NATO resolve.

Milosevic’s last strategic hope lay with Russian diplomatic pressure. By the end of May, Russian support for Serbia had dissolved. Yeltsin, after testing NATO resolve, was eager to restore positive relations with the West. After realizing that NATO would not further soften its demands, Russian support mutated into pressure against Milosevic. Without Russian support, the likelihood that Milosevic could receive a better deal became increasingly unlikely.

Two separate hypotheses have been developed to explain Milosevic’s decision to terminate the war and accept a political settlement. The first hypothesis emphasizes Milosevic’s overriding concern with maintaining domestic political power. The second hypothesis assumes that Serbian control and sovereignty over Kosovo was the primary concern for Milosevic. The logic of each hypothesis will be considered.
Stephen Hosmer posits the first hypothesis in his book, *Why Milosevic Decided To Settle When He Did*. Based on historical evidence of Milosevic decision-making, Hosmer argues that internal power maintenance was Milosevic’s overriding concern and his primary consideration in decision-making. Milosevic’s acceptance of the Rambouillet settlement would have threatened his internal power because the populace of Serbia overwhelmingly supported Serbian control of Kosovo and because Milosevic had tied his personal political fortunes to exerting Serbian influence into Kosovo.\(^{164}\) As the increasing costs of war affected the populace, public opinion quickly shifted, and Milosevic was forced to settle or face growing internal opposition.\(^ {165}\) Additionally, the withdrawal of Russian support for Serbia against NATO demands meant that Milosevic would not be able to secure a more favorable deal.\(^ {166}\)

Barry Posen reaches a somewhat different conclusion in his article, “The War for Kosovo.” Posen argues that the historical significance of Kosovo contributed to its importance to Serbia and that maintaining control of Kosovo was the highest priority for Milosevic.\(^ {167}\) Milosevic rejected Rambouillet because it limited Serbian control of Kosovo. Milosevic sought to drive a wedge between the NATO alliance but failed. By early June, the withdrawal of Russian support and NATO commitment proved to Milosevic that the three negotiators’ plan was the best deal he could get. Holding out any longer for an unlikely NATO concession was unadvisable in light of the growing costs to his country. So, Milosevic made a deal.

While these two hypotheses assign different motivations to Milosevic’s decision, they largely agree upon the key factors of this decision. NATO cohesion, the costs associated with strategic air attacks, and the exhaustion of the possibility of Russian diplomatic intervention worked together in force Milosevic to accede to NATO demands. In addition, several minor factors might have provided additional influence on Milosevic. These included a potential ground invasion, political coverage for Milosevic through NATO’s concessions and a possible deal with the Russians to influence a partition outcome.

\(^ {164}\) Hosmer, 7-18.  
\(^ {165}\) Hosmer, 49-64.  
\(^ {166}\) Hosmer, 37-48.  
\(^ {167}\) Posen, 44.
On May 23, President Clinton emphasized that “all options were on the table.” This statement implied that a ground war was being contemplated. While NATO signaled that a ground war was probable by announcing an increase in size of Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and by giving General Clark permission to widen an access road from Albania to Kosovo, these signals were timid and probably went unnoticed by Milosevic. NATO’s tentative invasion plans, which would have required at least three months of preparation and extensive cajoling of NATO members opposing invasion, such as Greece and Italy, probably influenced Russia opinion more than it influenced Milosevic’s decision-making. The resolve of NATO to continue the war through invasion was passed through meetings of the three negotiators, and Chernomyrdin issued this threat to Milosevic when he demanded a final settlement. While a ground invasion could have been a likely outcome had Milosevic failed to accept NATO demands, its influence on his decision-making was probably limited to emphasizing Russia’s lack of support.

The NATO concessions in the final settlement may have influenced Milosevic to settle since these concessions allowed Milosevic to declare victory in the war and reinforce his internal support and his political power base. While NATO did achieve its modified five objectives set on April 6, some aspects of the final settlement embodied in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and in the military-technical agreement were an improvement over the Rambouillet proposal for Milosevic. The United Nations, not the OSCE, became the administrator for Kosovo, which opened the door for Russian input on administration issues. The status-of-forces provision in the Rambouillet agreement allowed NATO forces to have access throughout Yugoslavia; in the final settlement, KFOR was allowed access in Kosovo only. Finally, the UN Resolution dropped Rambouillet’s requirement that the final political status of Kosovo would be resolved in three years and that a referendum of the Kosovo population would influence that status. Despite these concessions, on balance, Milosevic received a worse outcome.

168 Roberts, 118.
169 Posen, 74.
170 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 203-4.
171 Roberts, 118.
172 Hosmer, 117. See also Posen, 79-80.
with the final settlement after the war than he would have likely received at Rambouillet, especially had he negotiated in earnest.\textsuperscript{173}

A final influence on Milosevic’s decision-making may have been a secret arrangement with the Russians to support a partition plan in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{174} A partition outcome in Kosovo may have been a possible strategy of Milosevic from the beginning of the war. If Milosevic had to relinquish control of Kosovo, he would have preferred Serbia to retain the northern part of the province. In fact, Serbian attacks in Kosovo were more destructive in the northern areas of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{175} The Russian insistence on its forces’ inclusion in the northern security zone points to their potential complicity in a partition arrangement. After the military-technical agreement was signed, 200 Russian troops in Bosnia traveled to Kosovo, made a “triumphal entry” to Priština, and then quickly secured the nearby airport. Russia also intended to fly additional troops into Kosovo, but these flights were blocked when neighboring Romania and Bulgaria refused to grant the Russia overflight privileges. While a partition outcome did not develop, Russian support for such a partition might have enticed Milosevic to settle when he did.

D. WAR TERMINATION OUTCOMES

This section examines the outcome of the War for Kosovo in three parts. First, this section will evaluate the success enjoyed by NATO and the United States in the immediate settlement outcome of the war. Second, this section will examine the post-hostilities benefits realized by the United States and NATO. Finally, this section will identify the factors that may have impeded the full realization of success in these two areas.

In the immediate settlement outcome, NATO and the United States did enjoy significant success. They achieved all five of the April 6 modified objectives, including the most difficult tenet for Milosevic to accept—the removal of all Serbian military, police, and para-military forces from Kosovo. By forcing Milosevic to accept its demands, NATO succeeded in proving its relevance and international credibility with the

\textsuperscript{173} Hosmer, 116, points to the UN Resolution 1244’s allowance for Serbia to maintain “hundreds” of troops in Kosovo, compared with Rambouillet’s “thousands” and to greater amount of administration competencies that Serbia would enjoy with the Rambouillet agreement. See also Daalder and O’Hanlon, 199.

\textsuperscript{174} Tim Judah makes this speculation, 284.
war’s denouement. Finally, NATO avoided the costs of military casualties. During the war, only two service men were killed, and they died in training exercises.

For all of its success, though, NATO failed to achieve its initial objectives of the conflict. To restate, President Clinton, on the opening day of the war, claimed that NATO forces must:

- “demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course…”
- “…deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo,”
- “…and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serb military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”

The first objective was achieved, but merely demonstrating resolve should not be included in a list of objectives to be attained in war. A similar objective of “degrading the military capability” of Iraq was used in Operation Desert Fox. Unfortunately, these actions are not really objectives, but rather strategies. They do not describe an end state, and attaining these objectives does not inherently accomplish anything. While they might be attractive to politicians because success can be more easily claimed, these objectives only serve to confuse and obscure the more important objectives that actually detail a desired end state.

The second and third objectives were never realized in Allied Force. 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed by the Serbs during the Kosovo War. Over one and a half million people were driven from their homes. The air campaign was unsuccessful in preventing these atrocities or in damaging the Serbian ground capability in Kosovo. Several reasons explain this failure. First, the 15,000 ft limit for air operations combined with poor weather prevented targeting of Serbian ground forces. Second, Serbian forces took advantage of the rough terrain and effective camouflage and concealment to degrade the effectiveness of NATO air operations. Third, the nature of the Serbian military operation—that is, ethnic cleansing and counter-insurgency—naturally led to dispersed forces that were difficult to engage by airpower. Finally, NATO had no ground elements to achieve its objectives directly.

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175 Posen, 46.
176 “Statement by the President to the Nation” (White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 24, 1999)
The settlement outcome also included several concessions that detracted from NATO’s success. NATO’s primary concession was allowing the United Nations to take a lead role in administering post-war Kosovo. While, NATO control was not a specific objective, NATO did desire a lead position in Kosovo. The other concessions made to Milosevic did not detract from NATO’s success. The status-of-force clause in the Rambouillet agreement was included as a perfunctory element, and Contact Group negotiators were prepared to concede that issue had Milosevic’s diplomats shown any willingness to negotiate. In addition, dropping the inclusion of a Kosovo-wide referendum as a factor to influence the political status of Kosovo did not diminish NATO’s success. That element was only added to the Rambouillet accord in its final days to entice the Kosovar Albanians to sign the agreement. At that point, the Serbs were clearly not going to sign, and NATO required the Kosovar Albanian’s signature to provide political coverage for its impending military strikes.

NATO’s success in realizing post-war benefits must also be evaluated. The most important success enjoyed by NATO was to reverse the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbs allow the refugees to return home. NATO’s actions eased regional tensions, and prevented the spread of conflict and instability. Despite these palpable successes, the settlement outcome hindered the realization of two important post-war benefits. First, by conceding NATO’s lead in Kosovo and allowing for United Nations’ involvement, all post-hostility operations were made increasingly complex by dual chain-of-commands and by including actors with divergent interests. Second, the Serbian atrocities committed during the war has made the development of a multi-ethnic Kosovo much problematic. With hardships and deaths fresh in their mind, returning Kosovar Albanians conducted many reprisal attacks on Kosovar Serbs. The ethnic cleansing campaign and reprisal attacks reinforced the animosities between the two groups. By allowing the ethnic cleansing campaign to occur, NATO and the United States made rebuilding post-hostilities Kosovo an almost impossible task still being pursued today.

Several factors impeded the success of the United States in the Kosovo. First, NATO failed to have a coherent air power strategy. NATO never decided whether it was pursing a strategic air campaign or an operational campaign to prevent Serb atrocities and
destroy Serbian forces in Kosovo. As shown earlier, the societal costs of the strategic campaign targeting dual-use sites exerted the greatest influence on Milosevic. Furthermore, the operational air campaign failed to diminish Serbian ground capabilities and certainly failed to prevent the ethnic cleansing operations. By conducting its air campaign in a gradual escalation fashion and by failing to exert maximal coercive pressure on Milosevic, NATO lost an opportunity to force Milosevic to concede earlier and with fewer concessions on the part of NATO.

Second, the United States failed to wield a credible and overwhelming force against Yugoslavia. From the beginning, the United States’ reluctance to use ground forces signaled a lack of credibility to Milosevic. Additionally, NATO and the United States failed to use the forces necessary to uphold their political objectives. If ethnic cleansing was to be prevented, ground forces should have been used. Airpower alone could not prevent the ground atrocities. Even if they were not used, deploying and readying ground forces would have signaled greater credibility to Milosevic and perhaps enticed him to concede earlier.

NATO and the United States also failed to identify the final status of post-war Kosovo. NATO had several options. It could impose an international protectorate. It could partition the region. NATO could leave the region to Serbia, or it could fight for Kosovo independence. None of these options was particularly attractive for NATO, and only late in the war did NATO decide that an international protectorate was necessary. Assuming that Milosevic would concede immediately after NATO launched airstrikes, NATO failed to develop an adequate end game. By deciding early to establish an international protectorate, NATO could have deployed forces to the region, prevented many of the atrocities, and been better prepared to carry out post-hostility operations in Kosovo.

Finally, the United States failed to exhibit the necessary leadership in the War for Kosovo in two ways. First, much of the concern with causing collateral damage from air strikes came largely from the United States, rather than the allies. Second, the United States failed to provide the leadership necessary to influence NATO’s decision to insert

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group troops in Kosovo. The United States could have teamed with Great Britain and provided pressure on NATO to force the introduction of ground troops to the region. While many NATO countries opposed the use of ground forces, ultimately the United States choose not to force the issue.
V. CONCLUSION

This conclusion will examine the implications for war termination drawn from the study of the Gulf War and Kosovo. First, this chapter will compare and contrast the way in which these wars were terminated. Second, it will chapter will discuss the implications the two wars might have for terminating future wars of the United States. Finally, it offers an evaluation of the model developed for the study of war termination.

A. TERMINATING THE GULF WAR AND KOSOVO

The case studies of the Gulf War and the War for Kosovo sought answers to two key questions: why did the wars terminate as they did, and how successful were the outcomes for the United States? This section will revisit these questions by comparing and contrasting these two wars.

Each war was terminated in significantly different way. While the Kosovo conflict lasted longer than the Gulf War, the Gulf War featured a much greater escalation of force to include a massive ground campaign. In addition, the two wars differed insofar as one involved an invasion of a neighboring country, while the other was essentially defending its own territory. In the Gulf War, Saddam’s forces invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait, quickly defeated resistance, and effectively removed Kuwaiti forces as a factor in the war. In Kosovo, Serbian forces operated on sovereign Yugoslavian territory, never fully subdued the KLA, and fought a counter-insurgency ground war while enduring NATO bombing.

Each war forced termination through a separate warfighting focus. In the Gulf War, the United States operationally defeated the Iraqi Army leaving Saddam with no choice but to concede. In Kosovo, the targeting of dual-use infrastructure as a strategic application of force inflicted pain on Serbia and provided the most important lever in forcing Milosevic to accept NATO’s demands. While in both wars the United States carried out both strategic and operationally focused military actions, termination seemed to hinge on operational focused actions in Gulf War and strategic focused actions in Kosovo.
Despite these differences, the wars shared several common termination factors. In both wars, the internal power position of the leaders, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, dictated the decision to terminate. Saddam Hussein’s tighter grip on power allowed himself politically to endure greater costs because the Iraqi populace had no means, short of revolution, to challenge his leadership. When the Shia revolts in the South and the Kurdish revolts in the North presented that challenge, Saddam quickly terminated the war and consolidated his forces to repress the uprisings. Furthermore, as the analysis of the third chapter shows, the desire to shore up his internal power base led to the initial invasion of Kuwait and his refusal to back down prior to the ground war against the United States and coalition forces.

In Kosovo, Milosevic’s political position proved important in his decision to terminate. As with Saddam, the desire to consolidate and protect political power explains why Milosevic initially launched counter-insurgency operations in Kosovo and why he refused to accept the Rambouillet agreement. As NATO inflicted greater damage on Serbia, shifting public opinion and growing political opposition forced Milosevic to accept NATO’s agreement. In fact, Milosevic may have been more susceptible to attacks against his political power because Yugoslavia was more politically open than Iraq. Because internal opposition could operate, albeit with restrictions, within Yugoslavia, Milosevic could not have weathered the degree of costs endured by Saddam and have retained power.

The resolve of the United States and its allies proved important in terminating each war. In the Gulf War, the initial willingness of the United States to endure casualties in ground operations was called into question. Until the United States fought Iraqi forces in direct ground combat, Saddam had a reason to refuse capitulation and hope for a face-saving outcome. In Kosovo, Milosevic hoped to inflict costs on the alliance by downing aircraft. In fact, his military leaders estimated in March that Yugoslavian air defenses would shoot down 10-20 allied aircraft within the first two weeks of the operation. Because of the extraordinary measures taken to protect pilots, NATO was able to avoid any combat fatalities and hence avoid a military cost that could challenge its cohesiveness.
In both wars, a unified and cohesive coalition helped influence termination. In the Gulf War, the United States did not require the actual forces contributed from other countries to defeat Saddam’s forces. However, the basing and deployment of forces from Saudi Arabia was essential as a commitment to the coalition and its political objectives. Furthermore, contributions from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria helped to exert diplomatic pressure against Saddam and to limit his hope of enlisting the Arab world in his defense. Saddam tried to attack the coalition early by launching Scud missiles against Israel. But, United States pressure and assurances prevented Israel from entering the war and, thereby, maintained the cohesiveness of the coalition.

In Kosovo, the demonstration of alliance resolve to coerce Milosevic was even more important in forcing termination. NATO dissension could have led to an unraveling of the coalition against Milosevic. The international backlash to Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing operation helped NATO to overcome internal dissension and cement the organization in continuing its war. Because Milosevic’s strategy intended to attack NATO cohesiveness, demonstrating resolve proved essential in forcing Milosevic to accept NATO demands.

B. OUTCOMES OF THE GULF WAR AND KOSOVO

While both wars resulted in victory for the United States and its allies, the political objectives of the wars were not fully accomplished. This section will examine how the United States overlooked an important objective in the Gulf War, and how the United States failed to employ the necessary military means to uphold its initial objectives in the Kosovo War.

In the Gulf War, the United States achieved its political objective of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but the less clear second objective of ensuring peace and security in the Gulf was not properly emphasized. The United States objectives failed to describe the end state required in Iraq. The military objective of destroying the Republican Guard forces hinted at the administration’s desire to render Iraq incapable of follow-on attacks. Relocating Iraq troops out of Kuwait would be unacceptable if they remained intact and capable of threatening the security of the Gulf once American forces had withdrawn. By not destroying the Republican Guard and by not imposing a more stringent military

178 Judah, 232.
settlement, the United States aided Saddam in quelling the Shia revolt in the south and the Kurdish revolt in the north. More successful revolts could have enhanced American foreign policy by removing Saddam. While the administration probably felt that Saddam would be toppled without United States assistance, direct or indirect, the failure to state its true political objectives led to a partial victory and a less than completed success.

In the Kosovo War, the original objectives of the alliance to prevent Serbian atrocities went unfilled, largely because NATO miscalculated that “light bombing” would quickly force Milosevic to resume negotiations. After bracing itself for a more protracted war, NATO reformulated its political objectives and achieved them. While the reformulated objectives—ending Serb atrocities, forcing a Serbian withdrawal of forces, stationing of an international security force, providing for the safe return of refugees, and forcing Serbian acceptance of the Rambouillet political process—were important, NATO never decided what post-hostility Kosovo was going to encompass. Partition, Kosovo independence, and full Serbian political control were unacceptable, but NATO did not fully embrace the only other option, that of establishing an international protectorate, until after the war was concluded. As noted in the fourth chapter, the failure to make this decision early probably led to an extended war and certainly allowed the atrocities to continue. Furthermore, because of these atrocities and the Kosovar reprisals, current peace-building endeavors in Kosovo have been seriously crippled.

C. TERMINATING AMERICA’S FUTURE WARS

The Gulf War and Kosovo were very different from the other wars fought by the United States in the 20th Century. First, the Gulf War and Kosovo featured the United States against another state that had significantly less military power. The United States’ military superiority contributed to each war’s relative brevity. Desert Storm lasted seven weeks; Kosovo lasted 78 days. Asymmetric military power of the United States is likely to be constant in future American wars. Quick wars are likely to be a reoccurring factor, as well. Without any peer competitors, the United States should dominate any potential war against a state adversary. The current “war on terrorism,” advertised as a long war, will certainly deviate from this expectation. However, in some respects the war on terrorism may uphold this expectation, insofar that the separate campaigns of the war on terrorism are likely to be short. In Afghanistan, the United States toppled the Taliban
government within a month. Another possible war against Iraq would likely be quick, as well.

Fundamentally, though, the analysis of war termination considered by this thesis might have limited value to the overall war on terrorism because of one overriding difference. In the wars considered by this thesis, both in the case studies and in the other wars of the 20th Century that guided the formulation of war termination theory, some form of negotiated settlement shaped the war termination process. In the war on terrorism, negotiation is not an option. While the United States will use limited means, its objectives are total—the complete destruction of international radicalized Muslim terrorist networks. Therefore, the guidance from this thesis may have a peripheral application to the war on terrorism. In the campaigns of the war on terrorism, the United States may fight a particular state or sub-state entity supporting the terrorist organization and therefore will have an opportunity to terminate the “war” by forcing overwhelming costs and directly achieving military objectives according to the logic of this thesis.

Following the assumption that future wars of the United States will feature large military power asymmetries and will be conducted quickly, leads to several important insights for future war termination. First, objectives must include a specific end state. Unlike many earlier wars fought by the United States, where the American forces fought for years before a conclusion and likely end state became possible, in future wars military forces will affect the achievement of an end state from a war’s commencement.

Second, future wars of the United States are likely to be fought as a coalition of states. This characteristic is true for the Afghanistan front and likely true for a future war against Iraq. Because the United States will yield superior combat power, attacking the cohesion of a coalition will become an attractive strategy for an opposing belligerent. This generates two implications. First, the United States must be careful when building its alliances. While bringing more states into a coalition generates greater diplomatic pressure against an opposing side, coalition members can potentially limit the United States’ freedom of action, particularly against a wily opponent directly targeting the coalition. Second, the coalition can influence an opponent to terminate by demonstrating resolve and cohesiveness.
A final implication for terminating America’s future wars is that a war’s brevity allows for other elements of national power to become important influences on the termination process. In a longer, more balanced war, defeating an enemy’s force in battle is an essential component of terminating the war successfully. Because of the likely power asymmetries and short duration of future wars, merely defeating an enemy’s force has less sheer import because the United States will assuredly prevail militarily. More important to successful termination is how the United States employs its forces to destroy an enemy’s military capability and to inflict punishment, in conjunction with other elements of national power. In both Kosovo and the Gulf War, diplomatic pressure was important in forcing termination. Diplomatic pressure was applied by the unity of the coalition forces and by influential third party negotiators (i.e., the Soviet Union in the Gulf War and Russia in Kosovo). These conditions may elevate the importance of the timeless requirement that elements of national power to be tightly banded and used in concert to achieve specific objectives and to attain an identified end state.

D. ASSESSING THE MODEL OF WAR TERMINATION

The model of war termination developed in the second chapter was primarily useful in its focus on the dependent variables, that is, the outcomes of war. By rejecting the oversimplifications of binary war-ending and war-outcome theories, the model emphasized the complexity of war termination outcomes through several lines of analysis—it explained why the wars terminated as they did, it determined the success of termination, and it established the factors contributing to and detracting from the success of termination.

The independent variables considered by the model seemed to encapsulate the important factors contributing to outcomes of war without making the examination overly mechanistic. The general factors of war proposed by the model—objectives, interest, power, and strategy—and their influence on military outcomes and the costs of war helped to focus the case studies. The war termination factors influencing the settlement negotiations—objectives and bargaining strength—were adequate in describing the influences on the terms of competing settlement offers. Although bargaining strength, in particular, proved immeasurable, it did serve as a useful term that encompassed elements of strength employed by each side to influence a settlement outcome in its favor. In the
Gulf War, the United States had greater bargaining strength mainly because the war had matured quickly into full ground war that rendered a decisive military outcome and generated high costs for Saddam. This helps explain why the United States remained firm in its demands, while Saddam’s stalwart position gradually eroded into a grudging acceptance of Washington’s demands. In Kosovo, NATO had imposed enough costs to force termination, but its less overwhelming military outcome limited NATO’s bargaining dominance. Through the course of the war, especially when NATO solidarity became questionable, NATO eased several of its demands. Even in its final proposal, NATO conceded United Nations administration in post-war Kosovo.

Bargaining strength and objectives did not explain the military ceasefire negotiations after the Gulf War. The United States, in a dominant position vis-à-vis Iraq, made inexplicable concessions. The failure of competing objectives and bargaining strength to explain the concessions indicates that the negotiators just made simple bargaining mistakes. Gordon and Trainor depict General Schwarzkopf’s failure to comprehend to the greater political situation along with his intense desire to declare victory and withdraw American forces as key factors influencing his actions. In Kosovo, however, bargaining strength and objectives did explain the outcome of the military-technical talks. Because of NATO’s greater bargaining strength, it shaped the agreement according to its objectives. The Serbian desire to delay their withdrawal to influence the pending U.N. Resolution was achieved because they still had residual bargaining strength through their ability to influence events on the ground in Kosovo. While Pillar’s analysis of negotiated settlements may have less relevance to these cases because of the extreme asymmetry of bargaining strength, the negotiations followed his model by moving from the decision to negotiate, to ceasefire agreements, to the final political settlements.

The conceptual insights from Chapter II also illuminated the two case studies. Clausewitz’s rational calculus of war (i.e., seeking peace when the costs outweigh the benefits) and the general cost-benefit analysis of war provided by Iklé guided the analysis of both case studies. Additionally, Clausewitz’s concept of the generous peace had an interesting application to the case studies. In short, Clausewitz advocates keeping an
opponent’s interests in mind after a war. This advice seemed to apply to Kosovo as the United States and international forces administered post-war Kosovo, especially after Milosevic was removed from power. In the Gulf War, Saddam’s inherent recalcitrance argued against the application of the generous peace concept. These cases indicate the importance of removing an opponent’s warring political leadership. In fact, Bracken’s institutional theories of war termination seem relevant. For America’s opponents, maintaining political power became a central factor in their decision to terminate. Furthermore, attacking and removing those political leaders seems requisite to employing Clausewitz’s concept of the generous peace. The current war in Afghanistan would seem to support this finding.

Iklé’s concern with rational and bureaucratic impediments to the proper application of Clausewitz’s rational calculus of war by a warring side, did not appear to be a problem in the two case studies. Influenced by the Vietnam War, Iklé was supremely concerned with a warring side continuing to fight past a rational point. In the Gulf War and Kosovo, though, that proved not to be a concern, and, in fact, the overriding concern in the Gulf War with Iklé’s admonishments may have influenced the United States to stop short. Iklé’s advice on escalation seemed applicable, however. Iklé argued that gradual escalation should be adopted only for its sheer military impact, while coercing an opponent is better served by overwhelming escalation. In the Gulf War, Saddam was unlikely to be coerced short of a massive ground war. In Kosovo, however, gradual escalation was identified as factor that may have prolonged termination.

The search for a model of war termination and the examination of recent war termination activities of the United States aims to provide policymakers with a firm grasp of the difficulties and pitfalls involved in war termination. The model standardized war termination concepts to allow for comparative research. In identifying common factors and their implications for war termination, this thesis should help guide the strategies of future wars by its analysis of our recent wars. Ultimately, this thesis emphasizes the importance of considering war termination before fighting begins, so that policymakers will not fail to uphold Clausewitz’s advice that “no one starts a war…without first being

179 Gordon and Trainor, 444-447.
clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.**180

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180 Clausewitz, 579.
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