WILL A MATURE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY ENCOURAGE MILITARY SOLUTIONS IN THE EAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGION?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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“The longer we live in peace, the less aware we become of the danger.”

Introduction

A state’s national security strategy offers a window onto its core objectives. The military instrument of national power focuses on ways to achieve those objectives through the application of military power. Thus, the emphasis a state places on developing its military capabilities normally reflects the significance it places on attaining those objectives.

It is from this premise that the theater strategic significance of the People’s Republic of China’s development of a theater ballistic missile (TBM) capability and its impact on East Asia-Pacific regional security will be discussed. A mature Chinese TBM capability, without a countervailing U.S. and allied TBM capability and TBM Defense (TBMD), may alter the balance of power that underwrites the status quo in the region, and provide China with a perceived ‘window of opportunity’ to achieve its objectives and establish itself as a dominant regional power. Such dominance may allow China to consolidate claims over strategically significant islands and maritime areas.

China’s growing military power offers “an array of potential challenges” to China’s neighbors, the United States and its allies. While some commentaries may downplay China’s intentions because of its retrograde symmetrical military capabilities with the United States, this paper argues that the emerging ballistic missile capabilities may create significant asymmetrical opportunities for China to shape the regional security environment to its liking and diminish U.S. influence in the region. That said, this paper offers Theater Security Cooperation measures that the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) may consider to mitigate these challenges.
This paper begins by describing China’s regional goals and intentions through a discussion of sovereignty tenets and claims, and security drivers. It then looks at China’s asymmetric military capabilities and potential employment with special emphasis on its emerging TBM assets. Following that, the paper turns to potential U.S. theater strategic and operational shaping and response options. The final section explores the United States’ desired end-state and the mechanisms that PACOM could employ to achieve and maintain that end-state. The paper concludes that China’s emergent TBM capability may very well foster a fundamental shift in China’s resolve to seek satisfaction of its sovereignty claims through military means. PACOM’s interaction and dialogue with China through theater security contacts become even more imperative.

**China’s Regional Goals and Intentions**

This section discusses those objects that China values and, as the evidence shows, has been willing to use force and/or military coercion to defend in order to extend its interest in the maritime realm of PACOM’s AOR. Beijing’s security drivers focus on those objects that emphasize its sovereignty and recognition of its maritime claims. Based on the growth of China’s TBM capability, Beijing may be entering a ‘window of opportunity’ whereby the lack of TBMD may allow attainment of its national objects.

To appreciate the emphasis Beijing places on its sovereignty, it is critical to reflect briefly on China’s core national objectives. As one scholar states, “[i]f one were to distill all of the statements of China’s national security objectives, both specific and implicit, that have been publicly declared or adduced over the last few years they could be distilled to three simple words: **sovereignty**, **modernity**, and **stability**.”\(^{iv}\) (emphasis in the original) For China, as a consequence of the occupation of its territory and foreign
dominance of politics and economy within living memory, sovereignty as a national goal may surpass all other concerns. Thus, the supporting national goals of modernity and stability will not be developed here, except to note that ensuring access to the South China Sea’s potentially rich oil and natural gas resources also is an important security driver that enables self sufficiency and economic growth, and further emphasizes sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China’s concept of sovereignty, interestingly, goes much farther than traditional concepts of “freedom from external control.” This expansive view includes:

1) reuniting with China those territories claimed by Beijing;
2) settling land border disputes and demarcations for maritime areas;
3) eliminating intrusive foreign interference with internal social and political matters; and,
4) abating international influence on Beijing to enter into multilateral agreements wherein China’s freedom of action might be restricted.

China’s intense fixation on sovereignty offers some insight into why Beijing might use military force to achieve its goals. As one commentator notes, “[h]istorical evidence suggests that over the last 50 years Chinese leaders have been consistent in the use of force to secure their interests.” Moreover, there now is an “emotional nationalism that posits unification with Taiwan as the elemental embodiment of China’s sovereignty, national honor, and prestige, and views [reunification] … as a non-negotiated condition for the restoration of China’s rightful place in the international arena.”

China’s consolidation of sovereignty claims takes place in military, diplomatic and legal contexts. While clearly a military confrontation over reunification of Taiwan
would work at the highest end of the escalation spectrum, the likelihood of such an occurrence is less than the potential for incremental skirmishes over disputed islands in the South China Sea.

Without doubt, the reunification of Taiwan is the most prominent component of China’s sovereignty claims. In China’s Defense White Paper 2000,\textsuperscript{ix} Beijing proclaims that the “[s]ettlement of the Taiwan issue and realization of the complete unification of China embodies the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation,” and “[t]he Chinese government … will never give in or compromise on the fundamental issues concerning state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Set perpetually in contrast to this position, the Taiwan Relations Act\textsuperscript{x} provides Taiwan with the capabilities to negate reunification on terms or on a timetable as stipulated by Beijing.

As Taiwan has renounced offensive intentions against China, Beijing's security drivers for reunification rely on its prestige and national honor. Moreover, a consequence of China’s reunification with Taiwan would be the incorporation of Taiwan’s maritime claims\textsuperscript{xi} with the attendant sovereignty over the territorial sea and access to resources eastward in its exclusive economic zone. Additionally, operations from Taiwan’s east coast would offer a substantial security buffer out into the Pacific Ocean. China would be better positioned “to prosecute sea-denial operations and sea-lane disruption against the other Northeastern Asian states and …[America], should the need arise.”\textsuperscript{xii}

As China places such significance on sovereignty, it is no surprise that Beijing's military strategists focus on potential contingencies involving maritime disputes over islands that China claims but whose ownership is disputed by other states.\textsuperscript{xiii}
A predominance of the islands China claims are within the South China Sea. The disputed islands not only are geographically strategic, but their ownership would establish sovereignty over the potential offshore oil and natural gas deposits. China links these resources to national economic development. (A listing that outlines the specific territorial claims of the claimants in the South China Sea is found at table 1.)

Although China states a willingness to peaceably resolve the contested claims and jointly to exploit the South China Sea resources, China, nonetheless, refuses "to renounce claims or abjure the use of force." Beijing's actions have been labeled as “creeping assertions” with a strategy of “slow intensity conflict.” One of the most telling examples of this assertiveness is Beijing's use of military power in Mischief Reef against the Philippines in 1995. China unilaterally provoked an incident designed to alter the status quo while professing the desire to resolve the conflict peaceably.

China's security drivers towards its South China Sea claims weigh heavily to ensuring access to the natural resources to feed its economic growth. China, who claims sovereignty over virtually all of the South China Sea, passed a law in 1992, asserting China's “ownership … [of] a large number of [] islands, including the Paracels, the Spratlys, and Taiwan.” In the same 1992 law, China requires prior permission for foreign warships to pass through its territorial sea. While this provision is inconsistent with the law of the sea, it is consistent with China’s efforts to enhance security.

In the last decade, China has taken “advantage of unique historical circumstances, primarily availability of foreign technology combined with its growing wealth,” to steadily modernize its military forces. Among China’s procurements, there appears “a far greater focus on items which have a direct relevance to conflict scenarios with
Taiwan.” For instance, "key [focus] on hardware components – improved C2I capability, a significant … reliance on foreign weapons and technologies, and a strong interest in antiship and land-attack cruise missiles all suggest an improvement in capabilities and resolve regarding a possible confrontation with Taiwan.”

Thus, as Beijing’s military strategy turns away from continental defense and reorients towards a combined defense of land and China’s claimed maritime territories, Beijing's intentions regarding Taiwan appears to be sharpening.

A window of opportunity, a consequence of world events such as the United States’ focus on the war against terror and the heightening conflict in the Middle East, allow China greater influence in the East Asia-Pacific region as United States attention is diverted elsewhere. “Even without resort to conflict, any increased presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships in the South China Sea would exert a psychological effect on regional states.” The momentum Beijing may nationally embrace following resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 also may also embolden its aspirations to solidify other territorial goals.

China’s creeping occupation, growing economy and military modernization make it more difficult to address the growing influence that China is achieving in the region. By taking advantage of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of “the U.S.-Soviet Union-China strategic triangle,” China supports the ASEAN Regional Forum and fosters the “emergence of regional powers and regional organizations” with the goal of minimizing United States influence. Beijing actively encourages mutual economic growth among China and the ASEAN countries through trade. China’s “potential to
emerge as a major regional power predisposed Southeast Asian states to enhance their cooperation with China.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

Beijing encourages bilateral relations with Indonesia at a time when Indonesia’s relations with the United States are strained over human rights issues. Beijing’s influence with North Korea has increased, and China is fostering a closer security relationship with Russia, in part to stabilize the continental issue.

In many critical ways Beijing’s regional goals and intentions are not in concert with those of the United States. Beijing does “not subscribe to the U.S. argument that Washington’s bilateral military alliances in the region are necessarily stabilizing.”\textsuperscript{xxix} Moreover, “[t]he United States, through its forward military presence, has the \textit{potential} to act as the great spoiler to [one] of Beijing’s \textit{core} security concerns: Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{xxx} (emphasis in original) While the PLA continues to modernize, an enhanced TBM capability offers China numerous military options that it would not otherwise have, such as the real possibility to deter and/or thwart an American intervention into a regional crisis. This is potentially a tremendous boost to Chinese political prestige and its regional power.

\textbf{China’s Asymmetrical Military Capabilities}\textsuperscript{xxi}

China’s asymmetrical military capabilities are best assessed by reviewing how Beijing reacted to perceived incursions into claimed territory, and how Beijing used military exercises to shape its security environment. In particular, it is necessary to look at the asymmetric employment of conventional weapons and forces, with specific focus on the potential of TBMs as leverage towards Taiwan and United States interests. The PLA and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) do not need to match the United
States and U.S. Navy in the traditional metrics of military power to achieve their regional objectives. It is the far reaching consequences of TBMs that offer the possibility of military parity.

China’s reactions to numerous perceived incursions into claimed territory offer some insight into the absolute nature of Beijing’s resolve to assert sovereignty. For instance, in 1988, China and Vietnam fought at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, and the PLAN sank several Vietnamese boats and killed over 70 sailors. In 1995, China occupied the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef. In 1996, China and the Philippines clashed near Campones Island. In March 2001, a PLAN warship ordered a USNS research vessel that was gathering hydrographic acoustic performance data in China’s exclusive economic zone to alter course and exit the zone. In April 2001, a Chinese fighter collided with and crippled a USN EP-3E reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea.

The latter incident prompted demands from Beijing for the cessation of U.S. surveillance flights over Chinese territory. Based on Chinese concepts of sovereignty, such incursions into areas that China views as national territory are greeted with incessant warnings from Beijing over foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs.

China further used military exercises and training to press regional interests. Probably the most prominent example occurred in 1996 when China conducted provocative missile exercises opposite Taiwan on the eve of Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election. These exercises inspired short-term economic panic and severely impeded sea and air traffic around Taiwan. Moreover, as a consequence of the exercise, Taipei “reduced the size and scope of military exercises and played down other
activities which Beijing might misconstrue as provocative and destabilizing.\textsuperscript{xxxviii}

Another exercise aimed at manipulating Taiwanese actions occurred in July 1999, when “China reacted to the statement by the Taiwanese President that the two should deal with each other on a ‘state-to-state’ level by conducting military exercises in Fujian province and by directing Chinese fighters to fly close to the ‘centerline’ in the straits.”\textsuperscript{xxxix}

The latest Chinese military exercise designed to influence Taiwanese actions and caution United States responses took place in August 2001. The purpose of the exercise was reported “as a warm-up for the invasion of Taiwan itself” with “a secondary goal … to practice attacking foreign aircraft carriers that might come to Taiwan’s aid.”\textsuperscript{xl} The signals Beijing sends may offer insight into the resolve the U.S. and its allies could anticipate. The value China places on the Taiwanese issue is enormous.

Beijing, recognizing its military's inferiority, focuses on asymmetric employment through “operational planning … [to] seek local superiority in order to achieve mission objectives.”\textsuperscript{xli} The PLA understands the enhanced value that technology brings to the battle space, but clearly is aware that “high-tech arms are not flawless.”\textsuperscript{xlii} Consequently, the PLA holds firm to “its long standing principle ‘we fight our way, you fight your way’ (\textit{wo da wode, ni da nide}).”\textsuperscript{xliii} For example, the capability to degrade or destroy an adversary’s command and control (C2) infrastructure may negate an enemy’s overwhelming advantage in firepower. Thus, the PLA would be expected to attack critical nodes in the enemy’s C2 systems.

The PLA have several flexible deterrent options (FDOs) available to influence the theater strategic environment, short of TBM deployment. These include: “escalation of invasion exercises; information warfare attacks; harassment of Taiwanese commercial
shipping; testing ballistic missiles near Taiwan; and, seizure of Taiwanese offshore islands.”

Other unconventional FDOs may include Beijing’s initiation of heightened tensions emanating from Pyongyang, based on China and North Korea’s close security ties, thereby galvanizing U.S. attention to the potential of a two-front war. Other scenarios potentially could include a China-initiated military crisis entangling a multilateral maritime dispute in the South China Sea of such significance as to disrupt freedom of navigation and SLOCs. Such a FDO could cause severe disruption in ship borne trade and oil imports with huge economic security consequences to the region, and in particular, to South Korea and Japan. Additionally, China also could sponsor PLAN “pirate” attacks on commercial traffic in the region and raise economic security costs.

Addressing force employment options, China focuses on how to defeat a superior naval force without developing a corresponding symmetrical fleet. Potential options are shore-based missiles and aircraft, torpedoes launched from submarines and small patrol boats and speedboats, and focused attacks on naval logistics.

China also has a range of options based on her ballistic missile force. China’s ballistic missile inventory has grown rapidly, in quantity and sophistication, as compared to her conventional weapon inventory. Table 2 provides a listing of the characteristics of the theater ballistic missiles China has in service.

Beijing’s TBM force offers regional predominance that can be used for deterrence, leverage or intimidation to shape the regional theater. Coercion offers extremely low cost as it is likely to meet with only a limited, passive response from the
United States. Moreover, China's mere possession of TBMs offers the possibility of resolution without resort to force. Of note, “Chinese defense planners have apparently recognized that conventional, high-explosive missile warheads add an important deterrent and warfighting dimension, especially in regional conflict scenarios, permitting stand-off targeting.”

The promise of TBMs’ asymmetrical impact, in conjunction with other military capabilities, could offer Beijing the sense that its objectives may be obtained at an acceptable cost in blood, treasure and time. TBMs offer China two distinct advantages – ballistic missiles are a weapon system produced domestically, whereas China is farther behind in producing complex advanced systems for combat aircraft and warships; and moreover, TBMs target a military weakness of the United States and its allies as currently there is a lack of effective TBMD.

They offer China significant force projection capability at a minimalist cost. It is estimated that the cost to China, per TBM, is approximately $500,000. Thus, TBMs are cheap and could promise a direct strategic and operational effect on the mind of the adversary either through intimidation or the rapid and relatively precise destruction of his C4 and defense capabilities, such as airfields and defense grids. Moreover, as exhibited in 1996, TBMs work exceptional well in keeping aircraft carrier battle groups at arms-length from the impact area. Based on China’s accelerated production of TBMs, over 250 short-ranged ballistic missiles (CSS-6 and CSS-7) now are deployed opposite Taiwan. By 2007, production estimates reach over 650.

Further, these redeployable missiles may be positioned against regional targets such as Japan, South Korea and the U.S. forces stationed there. Target sets may include
airfields, ports, air defense installation, surface to surface missile bases, C4I systems, logistics centers, population and industrial centers, aircraft carriers and other naval vessels. In the last few years, however, the focus has shifted to Taiwan. By 2005, the Pentagon “estimates that China’s missile deployment … will constitute a significant strategic advantage against which Taiwan may have little defense.” Moreover, these “enhanced capabilities developed initially to bring Taiwan into line will also provide the basis for projecting power into the South China Sea and for contesting sea control.” Given the mobility of the launchers these assets can be flexibly employed in a wide range of regional contingencies either as signal, deterrence, or for actual combat operations.

China, through its TBM system, is developing power-projection capability to deter and, if required, defeat enemies in military conflict over resources and territory around its periphery. One author writes that the rapid growth of China’s ballistic missile inventory in recent years lowers the cost to Beijing and the military leadership of resorting to military conflict. As Beijing’s recent history bears out, military conflict is a cost China willingly pays to ensure influence over territorial integrity, maritime claims, resource security and Taiwan. Thus, Beijing’s TBM capability deserves serious attention as it has the potential to provide debilitating consequences if effective.

**Potential U.S Theater Policy, Strategy and Operational Options**

Given the value that Beijing and the Chinese people place on objectives that run counter to US interests in the region, and the potential utility of TBM in pursuing these objectives, there are three interrelated sets of options that the United States can use to deter and/or prevent Beijing from moving toward regional dominance. These include the
U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program, measured military and diplomatic responses, and development and employment of TBMD capabilities within the region.

While U.S. policy is to “take no position as to the legal merits of competing claims of sovereignty”\textsuperscript{1xi} in the South China Sea, the United States exercises through the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program its rights to freely navigate and overfly international waters and international straits in the region. The PACOM-sponsored and highly visible routine operations by U.S. naval and air forces throughout the Western Pacific, to include the South China Sea, are designed to emphasize internationally recognized navigation rights and freedoms as provided in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, the FON Program “operate[s] as a safeguard for freedoms essential to national security and global stability, such as strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution.”\textsuperscript{1xii} The FON Program ensures there is no acquiescence to China’s claims that are not in conformance with the law of the sea.

PACOM can also employ a series of FDO through tailored diplomatic and military efforts to positively influence the balance of powers in the East Asia-Pacific region. As noted in the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,\textsuperscript{1xiii} “[c]ountries in the region watch our level of commitment as a key determinant of regional peace and stability.” Without a forward deployed presence, China would be perceived as the victor, and the region would head towards a greater “pattern of deference and accommodation towards Beijing.”\textsuperscript{1xiv} Specifically, PACOM should request consideration of basing the F-22A in the Pacific theater and also request an increase in forward-deployed AEGIS assets.
The “definitional shift in Japan’s defense contributions to the [situations in] ‘areas surrounding Japan’,“ should be contemplated for extension to the security alliance with South Korea. The underlying security premise appears similar – that North Korea (with potential Chinese involvement and/or encouragement) “continues to pose a threat not only on the [Korean] Peninsula but to common regional security.” By expanding the security alliance with South Korea, it would be clear that there would be South Korean “rear area support to U.S. forces responding to a regional contingency.” Likewise, China may be faced with "U.S.-[Korea] collaboration in a Taiwan crisis."

There may be an economic dimension to slowing China’s regional dominance. Japan is China’s number-one trade partner, and the largest provider of foreign direct investment and official development aid. South Korea is China’s third largest trade partner, with the United States and Taiwan as numbers two and four. Thus, should conflict disrupt economic cooperation and trade with China, the “economic cost [would be] insurmountable and would irrevocably disrupt its economic development.” PACOM should discuss these realities with PLA counterparts to underscore the potential cost of conflict.

Another option, while not offering as much potential following President Bush’s April 2001 statement that “we do [have an obligation to defend Taiwan], and the Chinese must understand that,” is ambiguity of U.S. intentions and intensity of response to regional conflict.

More concrete options would include hardening the C4I systems of U.S. and alliance partners based on indications that these components would be targeted for attack. Additionally, the U.S. and Taiwan would benefit from an investment in enhanced
minesweeping capabilities and advanced antisubmarine warfare assets (P-3s). Another option would be to reflag Taiwanese commercial carriers, similar to the reflagging of Kuwait tankers in the Gulf, to raise the consequences should China interfere with Taiwanese economic livelihood.

The most persuasive response to China’s emerging TBM systems is to employ a TBMD. This is also the response that generates the most controversy. The issue, cast from China’s frame of reference, is that it is a U.S. TBM defense system that would destabilize security in the region, not China’s maturing offensive TBM. Without a deployed TBMD, U.S. allies will be forced to construct their own defenses – building their own TBMD systems and/or increasing their ballistic missile inventory – with the consequent lack of confidence in U.S. defense commitments. The Pentagon notes that "ballistic missiles … provide a military capability that has the greatest potential to put U.S. forward-based forces at risk and to threaten U.S. allies and friends." Therefore, the United States has decided on the necessity to deploy TBMD to protect forward deployed U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific-Region. TBM as a new metric in determining relative military power must be addressed and (where necessary) countered. It must be taken seriously throughout DoD, and in our regional security arrangements.

Stabilization of the disparate growth in China's maturing TBM capability by deploying TBMD architecture, when available, to United States allies and friends in the region is a necessity. Without a bona fide defense, the United States' regional strategy based on a stable and prosperous East Asia and Pacific may be muted.

That being said, PACOM should explore similar TBMD development for South Korea as that currently underway with Japan. While Taiwan already has "deployed
[a] Modified Air Defense Systems (MADS), a PATRIOT derivative which provides some very limited point defense against short range ballistic missiles,\textsuperscript{dxxix} PACOM should argue that the technology to put into effect a lower-tier TBMD system for Taiwan be made available that "could adequately defend most of Taiwan's critical assets."\textsuperscript{dxxx}

China's TBMs now offer a perceived asymmetrical advantage. What China will do with it remains uncertain. One scholar notes that "[t]he most dangerous period in cross-strait relations may be between the years 2005 and 2010,"\textsuperscript{dxxxi} citing a potential Chinese leadership change, a robust missile inventory, and the U.S.-Japan TBMD system completion in 2007. How the U.S. manages the relationships in the region will continue to be of the highest importance.

While the resolutions to many of these areas are policy questions and decisions that are beyond the authority of PACOM, nonetheless, there are several concrete actions that the U.S. Navy and PACOM can take in the near to mid-term to enhance our ability to respond to the challenges posed by Chinese ambitions and TBM capabilities.

\textbf{PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)}\textsuperscript{lxxii} Strategy -- Or How To Obtain The Desired End-State

This final section explores avenues available to PACOM to shape\textsuperscript{lxxiii} the East Asia-Pacific region in light of China's asymmetrical TBM capability. First, the desired end-state will be discussed in terms of the consequences of inaction and the benefits of prolonging the status quo in the relationship between China and Taiwan. Then, this section offers suggestions to obtain and maintain that desired end-state.

The consequences of inaction, or failure to match defense to offense, are tangible. China, through her increasing TBM inventory, is experiencing growth in her "comprehensive national power."\textsuperscript{dxxxiv} As noted above, with the perceived 'window of
opportunity' for Taiwanese reunification closing, Beijing and the PLA may not abide "an indefinite rejection by Taiwan of China's demands for negotiation on the basis of the 'one-China' principle."\textsuperscript{ldxxxv}

As Taiwan evolves more resolutely towards democratic principles and institutions, the political disparity between China and Taiwan widens. Thus, Beijing may feel compelled to act sooner rather than later. The opportunity to reunify Taiwan looms larger in the absence of a matching defense to China's emerging TBMs. The very reasons that the United States' position favors the status quo in the relationship between China and Taiwan also are the same reasons that nudge China to want to change that relationship. Within the current international economic and social order, Taiwan operates with de facto independence.

Taiwanese leaders have gone far "to consolidate [its] international position."\textsuperscript{ldxxxvi} Taiwan's strive for international legitimacy as the "world's only Chinese democracy," gains support "in the eyes of Western popular opinion."\textsuperscript{ldxxvii} As Taiwan's recent admission as an observer to the World Health Organization and member of the World Trade Organization demonstrate, Taiwan has gained accepted quasi-independent status.

Additionally, a prolonged status quo offers Taiwan the time to integrate defensive measures to counter a TBM threat (hardening C2 positions, preparing a homeland defense, etc.) As the United States' refinement of the TBMD architecture advances, Taiwan and the U.S. will be in a better position to evaluate what would constitute "sufficient defense capability … consistent with the requirements and intentions of the Taiwan Relations Act."\textsuperscript{ldxxxviii}
The element of time is a plus factor in the economic integration of China through the WTO into the world economies. China also would benefit from time to exploit the permanent normal trade relations status with the United States.

By maintaining the status quo, PACOM has more time to constructively engage with the PLA. There is a real need to "reach[] out to multiple levels of [the PLA's] officer corps and to its strategic thinkers to obtain a mutual and better understanding of intentions and capabilities." Avenues to enhance theater security cooperation all depend on encouraging dialogue and transparency. As one author notes, "a more capable PLA need not be regarded as a challenge per se; it is the … intent behind China's rearmament, married to greater military capabilities, that generates concern."xci

PACOM should embrace all opportunities for mutual exchange with China. The Military Maritime Safety Agreement xci is a good first step. Moreover, PACOM should support an agreement similar to that entered into with the former Soviet Union on coordination of 'dangerous military activities.' This level of transparency would open avenues of communication at the operator's level. Offers to conduct components of Foreign Military Interaction should be explored. However, an open and frank exchange faces serious challenges because we simultaneously pursue an enhanced security partnership with Taiwan. Nonetheless, China’s TBM s pose a real threat to stability and serious efforts to dialogue must continue.

PACOM should continue to focus on military activities that address concerns of the regional states, including China such as suppression of piracy, drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration. U.S. naval presence is a key factor in stabilizing the region's waterways, a fact that is grudgingly recognized by the Chinese whose energy
security and continued trade is dependent on the maritime security provided by a robust U.S. Navy presence in the region. Port calls throughout the region, and in particular to Hong Kong and other mainland Chinese ports, should be reinvigorated. Small bilateral exercises should be conducted with the southeastern Asian states to build communication pathways and to strengthen professional military relationships. Dialogue sponsored by conferences, International Military Education and Training, workshops and personnel exchanges should increase.

In particular, PACOM should focus TSC activities with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to foster openness, access, interoperability, build capabilities and strengthen regional ties and stability. These states have radical factions in their population that are inimical to U.S. interests, and U.S. relations have fluctuated mainly downward during the last decade. Such efforts could undercut the growing influence and leverage Beijing seeks throughout the region.

From a force deployment and employment perspective, PACOM should continue developing contingency responses to address potential Chinese military actions - at all levels. As the turmoil continues in the South China Sea, PACOM should schedule robust naval presence throughout that area. PACOM should seek implementation of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, that stated that the United States will maintain U.S. bases in Northeast Asia and improve Air Force 'contingency basing;' increase the presence of aircraft carrier battle groups and numbers of surface warships and submarines based in the western Pacific; and, conduct Marine Corps littoral warfare training in the region.
Conclusion

While the growth of China's TBM and military capabilities appears a foregone consequence of its economic growth and current stability, a U.S. passive response to the emerging threat need not be. There is clear consensus that China is not capable of symmetric warfare against the United States and will not be for possibly generations to come. However, the risk assignment should focus on how the balance of power in the East Asia-Pacific region has shifted by China's offensive theater ballistic missiles and the current lack of integrated defense against them. From that perspective, Beijing may have attained a position whereby China can achieve its goals, at an acceptable cost, no matter what the objection. If that is indeed the case, then we must develop and maintain the ability to affect Beijing’s rational calculus. Through a judicious combination of new military capabilities (specifically TBMD), diplomacy, military-to-military contacts, etc., we should endeavor to convince Beijing that resort to force or coercion to achieve its objectives will be prohibitively costly and any capabilities that they do or will possess are insufficient to the task.
NOTES


ii Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, DC: 19 December 2001). “National strategy” is “the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.”


v Ibid., 105.

vi Ibid.

vii Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Impact of a Conflict on China’s Relations With Southeast Asia and Australia,” in The Cost of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War, ed. Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001), 80. Thayer further reflected that from 1949-92, China resorted to force at least 118 times.

viii Ellis Joffe, “Taiwan and the Chinese Military,” in The Cost of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War, ed. Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001), 115. Joffe further expanded on this concept by noting that until Taiwan is reunified, the “great victory in China’s civil war will remain incomplete.” Ibid., 116. Moreover, it is important to note that until 15 November 1971, China was not considered the lawful representative of China to the United Nations, as the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek held that honor. United Nations. The General Assembly. Resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. 1967th plenary meeting, UNGA Res. 2758 (XXVI) (New York: 1971). <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/un2758.XXVI.htm> [15 March 2002]. While China now holds that honor, Taiwan still is not under China’s control.


x Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. Code, Title 22, sec. 3302a (1979), states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”


John Pike, “Spratly Islands,” Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network. 30 January 2000. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/spratly.htm> [04 April 2002]. Mr. Pike notes that “the South China Sea region is the world’s second busiest international sea lane” that is transited by “half of the world’s supertanker traffic.” Additionally, China’s continued economic expansion will depend on access to higher levels of oil – such demand is estimated to increase to “more that double current consumption levels – by 2020.” Ibid.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 3, 55-75, and 121. Article 3 establishes the territorial sea breadth of a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. Articles 55-75, defining the exclusive economic zone, provide sovereign rights to coastal states to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources of the waters above the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. Article 121 provides that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation shall generate no exclusive economic zone.

Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, “Introduction,” in The Costs of Conflict: The Impact on China of a Future War, ed. Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2001), 3. For instance, in a diplomatic initiative to resolve South China Sea disputes, the ASEAN forum drafted a regional code of conduct (ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea) to prevent armed conflicts over territorial disputes. China agreed to talk about the ASEAN draft but not to commit to its principles.


The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (25 February 1992) states in Article 6 that “[f]oreign ships for military purposes shall be subject to approval by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for entering the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China.” This prior permission provision is inconsistent with the innocent passage provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, the security zone that China declared in Article 13 within her contiguous zone is inconsistent with the juridical limits the law of the Sea Convention authorizes for that zone. In China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf Act, June 1998, China claims the right to broad powers to enforce laws in the EEZ. Based on actions taken with respect to U.S. aircraft operating within China’s EEZ, China appears not to recognize the airspace above her EEZ as international airspace and has interfered with and protested U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in the EEZ.


Thayer, 102. The author, quoting Derek Da Cunha, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of China’s Future Security Role in Its ‘Backyard’,” in China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, eds. Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica: Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, National Security Research Division, The RAND Corporation, 1998), 119, stated that “Southeast Asian observers [are] alarmed at the prospect of a more visible presence by the Chinese navy in the South China Sea…. Individually, none of the ASEAN states has the military capability that could successfully oppose a determined Chinese advance into the South China Sea and they are unlikely to have such a capability in the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is a real but silent fear in Southeast Asia attached to the directions in the PLA’s modernization programs and its operational doctrine.”

Asymmetries evaluated in the context of an assessment that judges the military balance between forces encompasses more than military capabilities. For instance, other asymmetric factors considered would include “differences between … doctrines, geographical and political situations, and strategic and political calculations… to [the] conflict.” Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (Washington, DC: 2000), 5. [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait_12182000.html] [15 March 2002]. However, for purposes of this paper, the focus will be limited to China’s asymmetrical military capabilities.
James Hackett, “China’s Military Training Sends Very Clear Signals,” San Diego Union Tribune, 26 August 2001. [http://www.taiwanstudies.org/issues/view_story.php3?472] [21 March 2001]. The article reported that the plan was “to conduct simultaneous attacks on a carrier task force by aircraft, surface ships, submarines approaching from different directions, and ballistic and cruise missiles launched from the mainland and guided by surveillance satellites.”

Godwin, 57.

Ibid., 56.

Ibid. Godwin further noted that “PLA forces must avoid fighting in a manner anticipated by the adversary, and should plan to fight at an unexpected time and place.”


Ibid., 70.

Ibid., 71.


Ibid., 171.

Ibid.


Ibid.
Frieman, 169-70.

Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Act, 5.

Ibid.

Frieman, 171.


Thayer, 101.

Kim, 69. Kim also noted that implicit in the definitional shift is “enhanced collaboration between U.S. –allied Japan and South Korea in a contingency, thus opening up the possibility that [South Korea] could be at least indirectly involved in a cross-Strait conflict.” Ibid. However, Kim also implied that this is an implicit understanding that South Korea may not openly acknowledge.


Ibid., sec.2.0.

Kim, 69.

Kim, 65.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Christensen, 35.

Fisher, 1.


Ibid. “The United States is pursuing several [theater missile defense] development programs and plans to deploy these advanced capabilities in layered defense (‘defense-in-depth’) using air-, land-, and sea-based systems.” Ibid., 2. The combination of air-, land-, and sea-based boost phase, upper and lower tier systems in an integrated architecture… are necessary to increase system robustness (kill probability) and efficiency (minimizing resource usage) against the larger inventories of short range ballistic missiles (upper tier systems). Ibid.
Moreover, an integrated early warning capability is paramount for effective response of TBMD.

A National Security Strategy For A Global Age, 48.

Christensen, 40. The United States and Japan are working on the development of an upper-tier theater missile defense capability that is anticipated to be completed in 2007. Ibid.

Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia Pacific-Region, 13.

Ibid.

Christensen, 39.

Theater Security Cooperation, previously called Theater Engagement Plan, will reflect the CINC's deliberate proactive intent and planned military activities designed to shape the theater security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interest and theater objectives. CJCSI 3100.01A.


U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element … helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.


Joffe, 124.

Ibid.

Rahman, 70.

Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia Pacific-Region, 13.

Fisher, 119.

Ibid., 118.


TABLE 1

Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Does not claim any of the islands, but claims part of the South China Seas nearest to it as part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 1984, Brunei declared an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands, and claims all of the islands and most of the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by coordinates or otherwise clearly defined. Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked the region over time, and China is using archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty. In the 19th and early 20th century, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region. China has occupied some of those islands. In 1976, China enforced its claim upon the Paracel Islands by seizing them from Vietnam. China refers to the Paracel Islands as the Xisha Islands, and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna gas field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Claims are based upon the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied three islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland and has built a hotel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Its Spratly claims have clearly defined coordinates, based both upon the proximity principle as well as on the explorations of a Philippine explorer in 1956. In 1971, the Philippines officially claimed 8 islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on the basis of this exploration, arguing that the islands: 1) were not part of the Spratly Islands; and 2) had not belonged to anybody and were open to being claimed. In 1972, they were designated as part of Palawan Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China, and are based upon the same principles. As with China, Taiwan's claims are also not clearly defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islands as an offshore district of the province of Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined. The Vietnamese have followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims. In the 1930's, France claimed the Spratly and Paracel Islands on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam. Vietnam has occupied a number of the Spratly Islands. In addition, Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands, although they were seized by the Chinese in 1974.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 2**
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The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Executive Summary. 28 September 1999.


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U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3100.01A.
