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THESIS

WHY THE ‘WORLD’S POLICEMAN’ CANNOT RETIRE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ‘EAST TIMOR MODEL’

by

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June 2002

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The United States has sought a willing regional actor to carry a larger share of the burden to maintain Southeast Asian security and stability—without diminishing its regional leadership role—since assuming the position from the British after WWII. In 1999, Australia led a peacekeeping force into East Timor, ostensibly fulfilling a long held desire by the United States to reduce its worldwide commitments. However, as other international organizations have demonstrated, the United States is obliged to accept a disproportionate burden of providing the public good of international security and stability. In Southeast Asia, where post-colonial states such as Indonesia are narrowly avoiding disintegration, the United States as the regional hegemon, must recognize its responsibility to carry a disproportionate share of the costs to maintain stability. In endeavoring to replicate the approach to the East Timor crisis and use it as a model for future peacekeeping scenarios, the United States will not consistently find a regional actor to duplicate the role Australia performed. Without U.S. leadership, and absent a UN force or regional actor capable of quickly deploying a peacekeeping force to a rapidly deteriorating situation, it is implausible that a comparable future crisis will be resolved without unacceptable humanitarian costs.
WHY THE ‘WORLD’S POLICEMAN’ CANNOT RETIRE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ‘EAST TIMOR MODEL’

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ABSTRACT

The United States has sought a willing regional actor to carry a larger share of the burden to maintain Southeast Asian security and stability—without diminishing its regional leadership role—since assuming the position from the British after WWII. In 1999, Australia led a peacekeeping force into East Timor, ostensibly fulfilling a long held desire by the United States to reduce its worldwide commitments. However, as other international organizations have demonstrated, the United States is obliged to accept a disproportionate burden of providing the public good of international security and stability. In Southeast Asia, where post-colonial states such as Indonesia are narrowly avoiding disintegration, the United States as the regional hegemon, must recognize its responsibility to carry a disproportionate share of the costs to maintain stability. In endeavoring to replicate the approach to the East Timor crisis and use it as a model for future peacekeeping scenarios, the United States will not consistently find a regional actor to duplicate the role Australia performed. Without U.S. leadership, and absent a UN force or regional actor capable of quickly deploying a peacekeeping force to a rapidly deteriorating situation, it is implausible that a comparable future crisis will be resolved without unacceptable humanitarian costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The most plausible near-term threat to Southeast Asian security and stability is internal state failure and its potential for transnational escalation. Unfortunately, “no framework exists in Asia to cope with civil wars or massive domestic violence.”¹ The United Nations, under increasing international demands to intervene without the appropriate financial or military means to do so, has sought regional actors throughout the world to respond to civil unrest, particularly ones involving humanitarian disasters. Complicating this predicament is the United States’ desire to reduce its global military commitments by requiring—particularly during the War Against Terror—regional actors or organizations, historically considered free riders, to lead and resolve these crises with limited U.S. support. This was modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, henceforth the East Timor Model (ETM). The ETM is assessed to have the following five characteristics:

1. An internal security crisis is capable through unrestrained escalation to diminish regional stability. Thus, the situation would call for a legitimate, UN Security Council mandated international intervention conducted by a multilateral coalition of the willing.
2. Peace operations provide a “collective good” to countries that have interests in the region by maintaining peace and stability.
3. A regional actor—which has been a free rider upon the United States—is now willing and capable to lead a peacekeeping operation.
4. Due to geographic proximity and the increasing interdependence of global economies, regional actors have a larger interest than the United States in maintaining regional peace and security.
5. The United States is willing to subordinate its military forces under the direction of a foreign commander.

The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate that the absence of one of the characteristics of the model will prevent it from being replicated in a future Southeast Asian peacekeeping operation (PKO). Although the first characteristic has not always been a requirement for international intervention, Kosovo being the most recent example, a UN mandate is the

international and Southeast Asia norm established for conducting multilateral PKOs. Peace operations will provide a collective good for a region if international intervention prevents escalation and maintains regional stability, and therefore the second characteristic is assumed accurate for future PKOs. However, this thesis will demonstrate that the third characteristic of the ETM is untenable in the Asia-Pacific, thus making the model flawed. Finding a willing and capable actor amongst East Asian states and regional intergovernmental organizations—which historically expected the United States to provide the military forces to maintain stability—will not be found so long as the United States continues as the regional hegemon. Consequently, absent this actor, this flaw prevents the ETM from successfully and routinely being replicated and therefore implemented into a future Southeast Asian PKO, despite the apparent success of Australia’s leadership role in East Timor.2

The fourth characteristic of the ETM assumes intuitively that as the Asian economies grow increasingly interdependent and by the sheer proximity to a regional crisis, the countries of the Asia-Pacific will have a greater interest in maintaining stability than the United States. Finally—while often a contentious domestic issue within the United States—it is not forbidden by law or absent historic precedence to place U.S. forces under the command of a foreign military officer. Therefore, characteristic five will not be an impediment to replicating the ETM.

Thus, regrettably for Southeast Asia (SEA) and the ETM, there are no suitable mechanisms or actors in the region capable of substituting in the United States leadership role in a large-scale intervention—as desired under the third characteristic of the East Timor Model—for two reasons. First, cooperative security, embraced by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), is only useful for interstate conflict avoidance and transnational concerns—not internal conflict resolution. Secondly, the region’s middle powers and current free riders (Japan, Australia, and China) are unable to intervene in a timely fashion under current domestic and international political conditions, nor do they have sufficient military capabilities to lead such an operation independently. Accordingly, this thesis argues that the United

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2 The intent of this thesis is not to dispute or conclude when it is appropriate or authorized for either the United States, the UN, or another regional actor, to intervene, but whether the latter of these are able politically and militarily.
States will not routinely find a willing and capable actor within the region to lead PKOs and reduce its current obligation. Rather, this thesis demonstrates that the United States—as the regional hegemon and leader—will be required to carry a disproportionate burden to maintain regional peace while the other actors will continue to be free riders.

B. BACKGROUND

1. Security in Southeast Asia

If the twentieth century might be called the century of totalitarianism, with a barbed-wired fence as its symbol, so the twenty-first century may one day be known as the century of the mini-state, its emblem the mass grave pit surrounded by onlookers in breathing masks.

Mohammed Ayoob argues that the security problematic of Third World States has domestic, regional, and global dimensions, but that the “primary layer that flavors the entire cake is the domestic one.” Brian Job goes further, arguing that internal threat to and from the regime in power, not external threats to existence of the nation-state, are the primary if not the exclusive security concern of the Third World States. Ayoob argues in a separate article that two realities of the current international scene must be reviewed to accurately understand the reality confronting the 21st century. The first is the fact that the majority of conflicts since the end of World War II have been located in the Third World. The second is the equally unassailable fact that most conflicts in the Third World have been primarily intrastate in character or have possessed a substantial intrastate dimension, even if they appear to the outside observer to be interstate conflicts. Scholars, including Kalevi J. Holsti and Evan Luard, have documented the validity of these arguments through empirical data. These two trends—concentration of conflicts in the Third World and the internal nature and source of conflict—have been exacerbated by the conclusion of the Cold War and recently confirmed by the figures presented in the

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7 Cited in Ayoob (2001), 127.
SIPRI Yearbook 2001. The Yearbook demonstrates that, of the twenty-five major armed conflicts around the world in 2000, all but two were intrastate in character. Accordingly, within Southeast Asia, internal conflicts, not interstate conflict, have been the prominent feature of the Asian political landscape.8 After World War II, Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coup d’état, regional rebellions, and revolutions, and innumerable racial, ethnic, and religious riots and unrests.9 Thus, “if nationalism was the most powerful and destructive political force of the twentieth century, subnationalism threatens to be the bloodiest force of this century.”10 This is demonstrated explicitly in the post-colonial states of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia.

“Armed conflict between Southeast Asian countries—except for small-scale border conflicts—is only a remote possibility.”11 Of much greater security concern are political and social instability within the ASEAN countries themselves, and the risk that serious upheaval or fragmentation, especially in Indonesia, will infect other parts of Southeast Asia. Internal conflicts within ASEAN states have been perceived and addressed by the involved governments as threats to not only their domestic security but also their national security. Muthia Alagappa argues that internal security concerns in Asia can be traced to conflict over two issues—national identity and political legitimacy. A key consequence of the Southeast Asian colonial period was the establishment of Asian political units out of multiethnic “territorialisms.”12 The inheritance of colonial boundaries established the idea of a nation in these former colonies, which melded multiple ethnicities together, often without the traditional sense of either civic nationalism or the political legitimacy to effectively prevent the potential for state failure.

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9 Ibid., 616.

10 Beichman, 4.


12 Territorialisms is a word utilized by Alagappa to describe countries that are post-colonial with inherited borders as defined by the former colonial rulers.
This incessant and continual confrontation, with the potential for state-failure, explains a significant and often overlooked way towards explaining Asian security practices.

Alagappa counters both Mohammed Ayoob’s and Brian Job’s views as having limited analytical use in Southeast Asia for three reasons. First, the Asian countries, barring Japan, are far from prototypical Third World states as described by these scholars. Secondly, Asian states are concerned not only with internal threats but also with international threats. A third limitation of the weak-state thesis is its inability to accommodate change in one or more attributes of statehood. Alagappa argues that there has been a substantial strengthening of Asian national identities, thus limiting the use of Ayoob and Job’s theses. Alagappa’s argument that Southeast Asian nations should not be contemporarily classified as Third World has merit. However, one cannot ignore the fact that internal ethnic and sub-national conflict consistently plagues Southeast Asian states for reasons indistinguishable from Third World nation-state clashes. Thus, whether Southeast nations are defined as Third World or not, Ayoob’s and Job’s thesis provides a plausible theoretical framework to understand and predict a reasonable likelihood of internal state failure within Southeast Asia in the near future.

Nevertheless, multiple academic sources propose that there are no major military conflicts or immediate, ominous threats in Southeast Asia. Richard Ellings and Sheldon Simon argue that there is relative optimism for the future, but events outside the region have paradoxically increased the insecurity in the region—the rise of China and the end of the Cold War, which concluded America’s justification for a strong military presence in the region. In Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000, the contributors to this collection also argue that while there is reason for optimism, there are signs that regional stability in Asia Pacific is fragile. They refer to the growing difficulties in large-power relationships, particularly in regards to China and the United States. In RAND’s The United States and Asia, the authors specifically list as one of the region’s concerns, besides the hotspots of North Korea and Taiwan, the disintegration of Indonesia.

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However, the study does not offer a U.S. strategy that would entail resolving internal conflict in Indonesia militarily—the fourth most populous country in the world, with significant U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Australian interests. While it appears that the RAND study clearly intends to focus U.S. strategy on future threats, it appears that the U.S. government, in agreement with this thesis, is concerned about Southeast Asia, as evident in the remarks given by Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State in June 2001:

In Southeast Asia and the neighborhood near Australia, the odds of any two nations going to war are decidedly low. The circumstances under which militaries are going to be asked to undertake operational tasks are more likely to be in situations other than war -- non-combatant evacuations, humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy activities.15

Thus, while the literature on Asian security demonstrates the greater concern of individual countries for internal security over the rising threat of China or the re-militarization of Japan, no study provides a comprehensive analysis to evaluate the potential problems with *resolving* such conflict when diplomatic means fail.

Throughout the globe, both collective and cooperative security have become the core of conflict prevention, and in this respect, Southeast Asia is no different. However, regional security cooperation is new to Asia. Multilateral cooperation and international law were not features of historic interstate systems in Asia. Cooperation in Southeast Asia has been directed toward building trust and confidence among member states. *Cooperative security* in Southeast Asia has been successfully exercised through ASEAN and ARF. However, “of the security concepts in use in Asia-Pacific security discourse, one of the most ambiguous is cooperative security” and “now the most commonly invoked security concept in the …region.”16 Thus, defining cooperative security is subject to interpretation. Nonetheless, the concept is credited with playing a significant role in Southeast Asian conflict prevention, but it has had no success in intrastate conflict

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15 *U.S. State Department Perspective On The Australian Alliance*, June 29, 2001. This is the text of remarks made by Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State, for the conference “The U.S.-Australian Alliance in an East Asian Context” at the University of Sydney.

resolution. Unfortunately, “conflict containment and conflict termination are to be handled outside the ARF by appropriate states and arrangements.” Thus, ASEAN through ARF “has contributed much more to conflict avoidance among its members than to conflict resolution.” Paradoxically, although cooperative security through ASEAN has successfully prevented interstate conflict, it has no capability to prevent intra-state conflict.

2. The UN: The Regionalization of Peacekeeping

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan says PKOs have sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department. “But that description is too generous,” he adds. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing the flames.” Since the end of the Cold War, the international environment has seen a significant increase in the demand and need for UN peacekeeping forces. Because of weak mandates, shortage of funds, ill-trained soldiers, paucity of troops, absence of basic military equipment and mismanagement at the ground level, the PKOs have often resulted in disaster as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Rwanda. Because of these failures, the UN convened an independent panel, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, to review the causes. What was to become known as the Brahimi Report was a seventy-page report that explicitly cited the failures of the UN. An excerpt is offered below:

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree, it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. [emphasis added] There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many

places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.20

The Brahimi report describes both the causes and solutions to the problems. However, for political reasons there is not a feasible short-term solution to convince contributing countries whose payments are in arrears to provide the funding they are assessed. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the forces supplied to the UN for PKOs are from the poorer nations, which provide soldiers more for financial than for ideological or political reasons. Each soldier is paid a little less that $1,000 a month, an amount equivalent to more than twice the salaries paid in most home countries.21 Those countries that have the best-trained forces, generally from the West, avoid a key role in UN or regional peacekeeping unless it has a bearing on national interests.

Consider the list of the top-ten countries providing forces to UN peacekeeping operations as of Jan 31, 200222:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Contributions Military and Civilian Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bangladesh</td>
<td>6,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pakistan</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nigeria</td>
<td>3,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. India</td>
<td>2,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ghana</td>
<td>2,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Jordan</td>
<td>1,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kenya</td>
<td>1,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Australia</td>
<td>1,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ukraine</td>
<td>1,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Portugal</td>
<td>1,139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excepting Australia, which is still heavily committed to East Timor, noticeably absent are those countries with the best-funded and trained militaries in the world. The United States is eighteenth, while traditional peacekeepers like Canada have significantly

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21 Deen, 23.
reduced their commitments under fiscal constraints and are now 32\textsuperscript{nd}, providing only 305 personnel.

The Brahimi report lays out a corrective plan to reinvigorate UN peace operations, and “leader after leader took the rostrum to give explicit or implicit support to the Brahimi prescriptions. Among them was President Clinton, who called for a greater UN role in humanitarian interventions.”\textsuperscript{23} As Michael Hirsh critically points out: “that to think these recommendations will be carried out, now or ever, is to strain common sense to the breaking point.”\textsuperscript{24} He goes further to state that demands for a more robust UN force, including combat-ready “stand-by” units, have existed for decades, and that is little hope that they will evolve today. The peacekeeping recommendations are estimated to cost $200 million a year to implement while outstanding contributions as of 31 December 2001 still hovered $1.9 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{25} The Brahimi Report paints a bleak picture and clearly demonstrates causes behind the UN failure in peacekeeping operations. Disappointingly, the report cannot miraculously provide a means to rectify the problems it describes.

The solution, at least in the interim to overcome this problem is the emergence of UN-sanctioned “regio-cops.”\textsuperscript{26} This solution suggests that the UN would become the legitimizer of regionally organized peacekeeping forces, as in the first characteristic of the East Timor Model. This has international legal legitimacy due to Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the United Nations which states: “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.” Regional solutions to civil conflict resolution have been utilized sparingly to date. Some have argued, however, that the use of UN approved regional peacekeepers will help solve the critical problem of keeping humanitarian intervention aligned with national interests. It is assumed therefore, that countries, who

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} United Nations Peacekeeping homepage, found online at: http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf
\textsuperscript{26} Hirsh, 5.
are “coalitions of the willing,” particularly as regionalism creates closer and more economically interdependent economies would have an interest to “police their backyard.” Finally, regionalism addresses another failure recognized by the Brahimi Report—how to command a multi-national polyglot force of nations that do not share common military customs and are culturally diverse. While regional peacemaking sounds good on paper, few regions have the capacity, whether financially, militarily or politically, to conduct such an operation. This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia. Consequently, this thesis shows that the convergence of regionalization by the UN and an attempt to utilize the ETM would leave Southeast Asia without a mechanism or an actor to lead and subsequently assist in solving a domestic conflict.

A preliminary analysis would suggest that the East Timor intervention of 1999 marks a departure for SEA. Firstly, the humanitarian issue was the chief rationale offered for the deployment of INTERFET. With respect to this issue, this thesis will argue that missions like INTERFET—led by the lone regional actor willing to lead such an operation, Australia—was an anomaly, not a model for the future. Secondly, “the actions of the Australia-led coalition do not indicate a wider regional acceptance of the norm of humanitarian intervention.” This thesis will demonstrate Australia cannot militarily and politically lead a larger or distant operation like UNTAC in Cambodia, which required vast numbers of troops and equipment. Consequently, this thesis also concludes that neither ASEAN nor other regional powers—namely China and Japan—has the current capability both militarily and politically to intercede without large-scale US involvement and leadership. Furthermore—as demonstrated by two books intended as policy recommendations for the Bush Administration—the approach of employing regional actors without the means to conduct such operations would validate Southeast Asian countries’ concerns that United States policy towards their region continues to be ad hoc and reactive rather than reflecting a policy with strategic focus. As a result, this

thesis will argue that were the United States to employ the East Timor Model under the existing regional conditions it would further demonstrate a lack of U.S. commitment to the region and have enormous implications for future regional security issues.

3. US Policy Towards Peacekeeping Operations

In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S. Army Ranger mission in Somalia in 1993, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 on May 3, 1994, (PDD-25). This directive was a policy directive outlining the administration's position on reforming multilateral peace operations. The result of a 14-month inter-agency review of U.S. policy regarding multinational peacekeeping operations, PDD-25 sets forth several stringent requirements that must be satisfied before the United States will participate in international peacekeeping operations and suggests ways in which the U.N. could improve its management of such operations. This directive, and its affect upon U.S. involvement in PKOs became known as the “Clinton Doctrine.” In simplified terms, it was to clarify when the United States would support and involve itself militarily in PKOs. The result was a policy of attempting to reduce the involvement of U.S. combat forces in every PKO that evolved, and suggested an alternative in which the United States would support with other than intervention forces, such as logistics, communications and financial support. The policy approach was utilized in Kosovo and, of significance for this thesis, in East Timor.

The administration of President George W. Bush, while criticizing many elements of PDD 25, agrees with the general notion that the United States should distance itself from the role of “global policeman” and hand over responsibility for regional security to friendly and capable countries. Condoleeza Rice, in an essay written during George W. Bush’s campaign in the summer of 2000, criticized the Clinton administration for over-deploying military forces without regard for vital U.S. interests. As a solution to preventing the military from being involved wherever a civil or humanitarian conflict erupts, she suggests that a regional actor might better carry out these tasks. Utilizing East Timor as a model for future interventions to preserve the U.S. military from being deployed to every peacekeeping and humanitarian crisis, she recommended a policy that

views the capabilities of the regional actors in Asia-Pacific, as she would like them to be rather than what they are. In statements to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell made the Bush Administration’s stance on regional engagement is Southeast Asia clear. He said the United States would prefer to let regional security groupings deal with regional security problems, “rather than America feeling it has to respond to every 911 call that’s out there.” In regards to Southeast Asia, Powell’s comments emphasized the role for Australia. “We can’t do it alone,” Powell said.

We need friends and allies to help us as we look at the security challenges in the new century. In the Pacific, for example, we are very, very pleased the Australia, our firm ally, has [shown] keen interest in what’s been happening in Indonesia. And so we will coordinate our policies, but let our ally, Australia, take the lead as they have so well in that troubled country.31

Consequently, for the purpose of this research, this thesis will pre-suppose that this will be the attempted policy approach the Bush Administration will adhere to when considering future peacekeeping operations.

The attempt to reduce the financial and military toll associated with being a regional hegemon is not new to U.S. policy and revisits a long held approach to American foreign policy which began in East Asia with the Guam Doctrine. Historically, in a unipolar world, the reigning global policeman has attempted to prevent “imperial overreach” and reduce the economic and military drain which ultimately led to the demise of both the Romans and the British. In similar fashion, the United States has attempted to reduce its military commitments throughout the world by asking other actors to contribute a larger portion of providing the public and collective good of peacekeeping, allowing it to retire from being the world’s policeman. Akin to the international relations theory accredited to Charles P. Kindleberger, and based on organizational theories of Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, *hegemonic stability theory* proposed that the world needs a hegemon to maintain a stable liberal global

According to this theory, however, the system is plagued by the “free rider syndrome.” Accordingly, smaller or less powerful countries do not bear a proportionate contribution to maintain the stability of the system. Consequently, the hegemon, the United States must carry a disproportionate share of the costs. This appears to be the case in the Asia-Pacific, whereas the United States has historically carried a disproportionate share of maintaining regional stability a “collective or public good.” However, according to Joseph Nye,

To a large extent maintaining international order is a public good—something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others. A small country can benefit from peace in its region, freedom of the seas, suppression of terrorism, open trade, control of infectious diseases or stability in financial markets at the same time as the United States does without diminishing the benefits to the United States or others.\(^{33}\)

Thus, all the ‘members’ of East Asia’s regional society benefit and share the “collective good” of stability the United States provides, albeit at a higher cost to the United States, the region’s hegemon.

Without question stability is important in East Asia, a region in which trade with the United States continues to grow, and consequently the United States benefits if it maintains it. However, this thesis will demonstrate that only the United States, as a large beneficiary to Southeast Asian stability, and in accordance with the theories of Charles Kindleberger and Mancur Olson, must continue to bear the disproportionate share of leadership roles in future PKOs in the region. Alternatively, the United States must accept the responsibility to lead, which allows others to become, ‘free riders,’ because “the alternative is that the collective bus does not move at all.”\(^{34}\) Stated more succinctly, if the United States does not accept the responsibility to lead the operation, it is highly unlikely another actor—China, Japan, Australia, or ASEAN—will be willing to


\(^{34}\) Ibid., 240.
contribute a larger percentage of the cost to provide a collective good without receiving a larger fraction of that good.

4. Methodology

Having demonstrated the likelihood of internal state failure within Southeast Asia which would require international intervention, this thesis will utilize a case study method to evaluate the current and potential for the regional and international actors to stop acting as “free riders” and accept a larger role in conflict resolution within Southeast Asia through PKOs. Utilizing primarily secondary sources and limited primary sources, the thesis will assess the political and military limitations of ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and China, to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of these actors to participate unilaterally or multilaterally in a Southeast Asian peacekeeping operation or humanitarian intervention. The selection of these countries is based on their individual strategic interests, for both security and economic reasons, in Southeast Asia. This does not assume that other countries, particularly South Korea would not to contribute to a Southeast Asian PKO. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is restricted from a large-scale contribution of troops and the assumption of a leadership role so long as the Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK) provides a significant threat to the Korean peninsula. Thus, after making such an assessment, the thesis will conclude that the East Timor Model (ETM) is an idealistic policy approach, and will not successfully be implemented until the United States is willing to shirk from the responsibility as the regional leader and hegemon of Southeast Asia.
II. AUSTRALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Australia undertook its most significant military operations since the Vietnam War. Australia’s leadership role of the multinational force—INTERFET—ostensibly fulfilled the role the United States and the United Nations had sought. Even though Australia played this role in East Timor, it would be overly simplistic to assume that it will fulfill this role in the future and fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM. It would appear, both from the accolades lauded upon Australia by the United States and the UN and their own “back patting,” that Australia is a willing leader for future peacekeeping missions in Southeast Asia. However, as for any country, Australia has both political and military limitations that would preclude automatically assuming this leadership role. To understand this prospective role of Australia, a review of its foreign policy, with emphasis on relations with the United States and Indonesia, will be covered in this chapter. After completing this, a careful examination of Australia’s role in the East Timor crisis must be accomplished to fully understand why it led International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Lastly, to evaluate Australia’s military capabilities for future regional peacekeeping operations, particularly as a leader, this chapter will portray the military limitations this middle power confronts. Ultimately what this chapter will demonstrate is that Australia’s leadership in East Timor, although deemed a success, ostensibly exposed Australia’s political and military limitations to act in a similar function in the future and raises questions about the validity of Australia fulfilling the third characteristic of the ETM consistently. Consequently, this chapter argues the model (ETM) is in actuality an anomaly that will not be repeated unless identical parameters are replicated.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

Australia is a European country in Asia. Since 1901, the federation has attained its security, based on its unique situation, by fostering relationships with both the United Kingdom until WWII and with the United States thereafter. Australia, as a member of the Commonwealth, looked initially to Great Britain to fulfill its security requirements.
“Indeed, prior to the end of World War II, foreign policy, if it existed at all, merely revolved around Australia’s supporting and endorsing initiatives that came out of London.”

While policymakers in Canberra were prepared to differ with the British on substantive issues such as immigration, relations with Japan, and regional security, it was always in context of influencing Imperial policy and rarely, if ever, in support of creating independent Australian policy designs. Consequently, Australia had a slow development of an independent foreign policy, despite an interest otherwise, particularly in regards to issues regarding Asia-Pacific. Ultimately during the first four decades of the federation’s existence, Australia had limited flexibility in regards to foreign relations without first consulting with London. As Evans and Grant suggest, the period from 1901 to 1939 is thus characterized not by the evolution of a foreign policy per se, but by a belief that Australian diplomacy necessarily had to be conducted, if not on behalf of, at least in conjunction with British officials.

During the Second World War, due to Japan’s aggression and Britain’s abandonment, Australia’s thinking regarding both security and foreign policy began to change. During this period, Canberra increasingly looked toward the United States, rather than Britain, to provide a security umbrella. The dominant role played by the United States in the Pacific War was the decisive factor that determined the fate of Australia’s foreign policy at the end of the WWII. It was determined then by a growing consensus that it was the United States, and not the United Kingdom, that would best guarantee Australia’s forward defense in Asia. Australia, by the end of the war, had found a new guarantor of its security; its capability to maneuver freely, however, had not yet developed. As Evans and Grant point out, Australia had merely turned from one protector to another and in many ways continued to see its own policies as intimately tied to the global objective of major external powers.

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37 Ibid., 21.

38 Chalk, 7.

39 Evans and Grant, 22.
Australia’s postwar foreign policy was framed by the American doctrine of containment, a result of the “loss of China,” the French defeat in Indochina in 1954 and the Korean War, in which Australia contributed troops. Australian Prime Minister Menzies, defined a related concept to containment, and referred to it as “forward defense.” Ostensibly, Australia indicated a willingness to be the Western Bloc’s primary southern “anchor” by engaging in joint actions with the United States and its major allies.

The ultimate expression of this geopolitical outlook, however, was the commitment to send combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 to curtail what Prime Minister Menzies described as ‘China’s drive south between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”40

Although Vietnam was beyond Australia’s national interests, it paralleled the decision to send troops to Europe in both World Wars. To illustrate the logic behind the decision to support the United States, when countries like Canada did not, the Australian embassy gave the following justification for involvement in Vietnam:

Our objective should be to achieve such a habitual closeness of relations with the U.S. and sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need, after we have shown all reasonable restraint and good sense, the U.S. would have little option but to respond as we would want.41

Quasi-abandonment of Australia by the United States after enunciating the Guam Doctrine by Richard Nixon in 1969 painstakingly revealed the need for Australia and other Southeast Asian American allies of their needs to provide more for their own defense. The Guam Doctrine was first announced in July 1969 and then passed by the United States Congress in February 1970. It stated whereas the United States was prepared to extend its nuclear umbrella to allies in the Asia-Pacific, henceforth the expectation would be for those allies to assume primary responsibility for their own defense. This, coupled with a rising integration of Australia into Southeast Asian political and economic affairs, created a catalyst for Australia to renew its foreign policy design.

40 Chalk, 7.
With the election of Australia’s first Labor government in twenty-three years in 1972, the new government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, immediately asserted that Australia had its own unique interests which should be evaluated and determined in light of the country’s specific circumstances and not as part of the United State’s global objective.42

Under the Labor government, Australia revised its foreign policy, and it subsequently downplayed the centrality of the American (forward defense) alliance system, and placed greater emphasis on regional engagement and self-reliance (which realistically didn’t materialize until the late 1980s or early 1990s). This period of foreign policy revision was short lived, as the Whitlam government was upended by the election of Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983) who promptly returned to the previous pattern of a pro-American foreign policy. Although Fraser did not specifically reverse the foreign policy initiatives of the preceding administration, he consciously reaffirmed the Australian-American Alliance as a simple, cheap, and effective way of securing the country’s interests in Asia.43

Under the administration of Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who governed from 1983 until 1991, Australia continued to embrace a vigorous alliance with the United States. Throughout the 1980s, Australia steadfastly supported the West’s Cold War in opposition to the U.S.S.R. However, in the late 1980s, Australia began to chart a more independent foreign policy by attempting to establish more integrated and substantive economic links to the north. First by initiating the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process in 1989, and secondly, Prime Minister Hawke sought to situate Australia as an active participant in regional middle power diplomacy.44

This evolution towards self-reliance was enunciated in the 1987 Defence White Paper, which for the first time spelled out a coherent policy of security self-reliance to be manifested through its initiatives to protect the “air-sea gap” to Australia’s north. The strategic imperative inherent in this paradigmatic shift was extremely important in that it

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42 Evans and Grant, 26 and 326.
43 Ibid., 27.
44 Chalk, 10.
allowed foreign ministers to think about the promotion of regional defense and stability in a more dynamic, flexible, and systematic manner than ever before.\textsuperscript{45}

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, Australia has witnessed two governments from opposing parties. During this period, Australia’s geopolitical shift toward Asia gained momentum, especially under the reduced threat of the Soviets in the Pacific, which allowed Australia to independently assess the imperatives of its foreign policy without the heavy hand of the United States. No longer seeing itself as threatened, and convinced that protection may cease to be provided by the United States, Australia began to aggressively pursue the autonomous foreign policy it had begun to pursue in the mid-1970s. Australia began to pursue a network of new regional ties, demonstrated by their proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), which was specifically advanced as a metaphor for Asian dialogue and mutual confidence building.\textsuperscript{46} In attempts to strengthen Australia’s integration, Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991-1996) traveled frequently throughout the region.

Through a heavy program of overseas visits and by cultivating close personal partnerships with regional leaders, the prime minister set about articulating the notion of politically and economically integrated region of which Australia was unequivocally a part.\textsuperscript{47}

The conceptual foundation upon which the Keating government built these regional relationships was comprehensive engagement. The framework provided by comprehensive engagement, which originated in the late 1980s, was a policy to shift Canberra’s policies away from dependency on the United States to an orientation that emphasized Australia’s Asia-Pacific geographic reality. The goal was to foster a Southeast Asian community of peace and security, of which Australia was geographically if not culturally a part of. Under the Keating government, Australia vigorously endeavored to play a constructive role in Southeast Asian multilateral diplomacy. This


\textsuperscript{46} Evans and Grant, 117.

\textsuperscript{47} Chalk, 12.
was played out through both Track I and Track II initiatives. In summing up these efforts, Nancy Viviani offered these remarks:

In the [1980s and] 1990s the Hawke Government embarked on an explicit strategy to enmesh Australia with Asia across [a wide] range of relations, to initiate a new regional security strategy...By the end of 1995 the Keating Government could, and did claim success on...these accounts...These were very substantial achievements given the history of the...long entrenched fears of Asia, and the cultural and family ties to [the West].

In 1996, John Howard and his Liberal-Nationalist coalition formed a new government in Canberra. Since that time, and for a variety of external reasons, there has been a gradual re-adoption of a strong relationship with the United States. This, in reality was a rejection of the notion of a self-reliant self-defense as the rise of China and the instability of Southeast Asia were made readily apparent after 1997. While this revision does not imply a rejection and under emphasis of Southeast Asia, it merely reflected the realities that confronted the region in the post-Cold War as the early 1990s honeymoon ended. Australia continued to play a constructive role in both Track I and Track II multilateral diplomacy. Additionally, Canberra’s response to the East Asian financial crisis demonstrated Australia’s understanding of its importance to Southeast Asia, both unilaterally and in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, by providing loans to the wrecked economies.

While some critics of John Howard’s government existed early during his tenure, a new round began both from within Australia and from Southeast Asian countries after the pronouncement of the “Howard Doctrine” in 1999. In Australia’s magazine the Bulletin, John Howard unveiled a doctrine in which he proclaimed Australia should take a new place in Asia. He was quoted as stating, “[Australia] has a particular responsibility to do things above and beyond in this part of the world” and was prepared to take on the role of America’s “deputy” in the region. The new strategy implied that the United States was the “globo-cop” or world’s sheriff. The strategy included two core elements.

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First, Australia would assume a more active role in Asian security matters, including further interventions as needed. Second, Australia would undertake this role as “deputy” to the United States.\textsuperscript{50} By implication, and to allow for this foreign policy shift, Howard promised to increase Australian Defense spending to enable and expand the Australian Defence Force capabilities. This so-called doctrine, at least openly, did not last long, as the Thai and Malaysian governments immediately condemned the moved.

Barely a week passed before John Howard “was hastily denying parentage of the so-called Howard doctrine.”\textsuperscript{51} This was in response to the angry reactions from politicians and academics in countries such as Malaysia who said the remark “smacks of arrogance.”\textsuperscript{52} The critics suggested Australia does not have the moral right to appoint itself the deputy of the United States to maintain security in Asia. In response, Prime Minister Howard rescinded his remarks in parliament stating “The government does not see Australia as playing the role of deputy for the United States, or indeed any other country in the region.”\textsuperscript{53} He went even further by remarking on America’s role as the world’s policeman by stating “And neither does the government see the United States itself…as a regional policeman.”\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, this issuance and subsequent withdrawal of this policy highlighted the Howard government’s re-adherence to a continued salience of the U.S.-Australia alliance. However, overall engagement with Asia, and more specifically with Southeast Asia, continues to form a basic objective of Australian foreign policy. The key country to this relationship is Indonesia, not the least because of its size, but also its geographic proximity, strategic influence, a preeminent position within ASEAN. Thus, it is essential that one understand Australian-Indonesian relations to completely understand the East Timor crisis.

\textsuperscript{53} Saludo, “Backtracking from the Howard Doctrine: The Real Problem is not Australia’s Supposed Peacekeeping.”
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
C. AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

To successfully determine the causes prompting Australia to take its leadership role in INTERFET, the following section will address the operation within the context of Australian-Indonesian relations. Fully understanding this relationship will provide insight into Australia’s potential role in future interventions in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, a country often depicted on the verge of collapse. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne address this subject by posing an important question in regards to Australian regional foreign relations. They asked whether the decision to mobilize support for an intervention force in East Timor represented a voluntary “U-turn” or should it be thought of as a change of direction forced upon the Australian government by events. Simply stated, did Australia’s intervention into East Timor represent a complete shift from a “Jakarta First” policy? If it was, what were the causes? If not, was INTERFET an isolated incident that will not be replicated in the future? The intent of this section is to demonstrate that INTERFET represented a shift, not a U-turn and that the conditions that required intervention into East Timor will not be recurrent. Thus, the Australia’s leadership role in future INTERFET-type operations will not easily be replicated in the future without significant political restraints and constraints.

“Until 1998 there had been a consensus in Australia foreign policy that good relations with Indonesia were more important than the self-determination of the Timorese.” This policy has been consistently been framed within the confines of Australian national security and economic interests. To further understand the factors that cause this Jakarta First Policy requires a brief historical evaluation of Australian-Indonesian relations.

Peter Chalk divides Australia’s foreign relations with Indonesia into three periods, 1) the early years; 1945-1965, 2) the new order; 1965-1988; and 3) 1988 to the Present. The period between 1945 and 1949 were cordial as Australia supported the Indonesian struggle for independence. The years between 1950 and 1965 were somewhat strained

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56 Ibid.
and dominated both by attitudes and predilections of the Sukarno government and the perceived imperatives of Cold War ideological politics. Relations began to improve with the emergence of Suharto’s “New Order” government and the election of Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, which saw Indonesia realign with the West and adopt a “regional good neighbor” policy and Australia began its initial emphasis on an Asia-Pacific policy.

Throughout the 1970s, Australian and Indonesian relations strengthened, and it was under this political environment that the East Timor issue erupted in 1975. In the weeks proceeding Jakarta’s invasion of the territory, both Australia’s prime minister and the United States administration under President Ford secretly intimated that neither Australia, nor the United States would actively oppose an Indonesian takeover of the former Portuguese colony. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, 80s and most of the 90s, Canberra did not oppose the annexation, a position contrary to the UN. The cause for Australia’s not only de facto but eventual de jure recognition in 1979 of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor was justified by both Australian strategic and economic interests.

From a strategic point of view, Indonesia has a population that is ten times larger than its southern neighbor, causing concern for Australians of the potential threat several hundred miles north of its sparsely populated northern coast. “Rather than engaging in a costly Cold War with its northern neighbor, policy-makers preferred promoting a ‘stable pro-Western government in Jakarta and maintaining friendly relations with it.’” While security may be the primary justification for the “Jakarta First” policy, economic reasons were not far behind. Indonesia provides a large market, low-cost labor source for Australian industry, and abundant natural resources. As the security threat from Indonesia waned, the economic prerogatives began to replace the cause for Australia’s continued muted stance on East Timor despite domestic animosity to the Indonesian

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58 In September 2000, declassified files detailing intelligence excerpts between Australia and Indonesia in 1974 to 1976 provided solid evidence of Canberra’s complicity in Jakarta’s 1975 invasion of East Timor. Recently released files regarding President Ford’s conversation with President Suharto two days before the invasion demonstrated the US support for Indonesia’s forthcoming actions.

invasion. The privileged status of oil resources, particularly in the context of the oil crisis of the 1970s, played a significant role, particularly in respect to developing and exploiting the resources in the Timor Gap. To seal Australia’s policy towards East Timor, Jakarta specifically linked the initiation of negotiations of the Timor Gap to gain Australia’s formal recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over their annexed claim.

Wheeler and Dunne propose a third reason for Australia’s policy towards East Timor, besides security and economic reasons. They argue that the “Jakarta First” concerns include a regional dimension. These reasons include supporting Indonesia’s attempt to maintain the archipelago together in confrontation with other secessionists’ movements and to accommodate ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs as Australia expanded its regional economic outreach. In culmination, these reasons—security, economic and regional interests—caused Australian “appeasement” to Indonesian occupation of East Timor until 1999.

As the relationship between Indonesia and Australia developed, it was ostensibly confirmed by new economic and security agreements. In 1989, Australia signed the Timor Gap treaty, permitting joint exploitation of oil and gas reserves. In 1995, Keating and Suharto signed an Agreement to Maintain Security (AMS). This was the first bilateral security agreement entered into by Indonesia. Although not a full-fledged alliance in the sense of imposing formal defense commitments, the AMS nevertheless represented an extremely significant development. “Not only did the accord lend further credibility to Australia’s desire to constructively engage with its Southeastern Asian neighbors, it was also highly important in a symbolic sense.” However, domestic situations would develop in the latter half of the 1990s—the 1997 Asian financial crisis and Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998—to create an opportunity for both Australia’s “accommodationalist” policy and Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor to be significantly changed.

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60 The Timor Gap is the zone between Timor and the northwestern coast of Australia.
61 Wheeler and Dunne, 811.
62 Chalk, 27.
By the end of 1998, it became apparent that a shift in Australia’s and Indonesia’s policy and thinking was about to occur. Due to both external and internal political relations, the leader of Indonesia’s interim government, President Habibie, announced that he was prepared to offer “special status” for East Timor, while stating that this would be conditional on Indonesia’s continued sovereignty over East Timor. “Whatever the balance between endogenous and exogenous factors in creating a new context for the Timor question, the effect was to disturb the settled assumptions that had previously shaped Indonesian-Australian bilateral relations.”

According to a book published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 2001 on the Government’s policy shift, under John Howard, during the 1998-2000 period two key considerations provided the catalyst. First, there was a concern that, despite Habibie’s announcement in June 1998, there had been no progress in the tripartite talks between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN. The situation on the ground was increasingly volatile and “Australia was concerned that if growing defiance towards Indonesian rule was met by renewed TNI [Indonesian Military] repression, the situation in East Timor could deteriorate beyond control.” Second, there was growing support in Australia, after Suharto’s fall, for self-determination of the Timorese.

Peter Chalk expands on this policy departure and includes the following factors that explain, Australia’s and particularly John Howard’s shift in policy between late 1998 and February 2000.

- First, assessments carried out by the DFAT began to suggest that Indonesia could simultaneously handle its own traumatic transition towards democracy while dealing with the loss of East Timor.
- Second, a comprehensive review, which sought the opinions of Timorese political leaders and refuges on the questions of autonomy versus independence, determined that even a nominal connection to Jakarta would probably be unacceptable to the majority of the territory’s population.
- Third, personal interjections by the foreign minister, Alexander Downer, fed into an increasingly active diplomatic line vis-à-vis Indonesia. Of particular importance was his insistence that, just as in Cambodia, Australia was faced with an historic opportunity to craft a resolution to a

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63 Wheeler and Dunne, 812.
long-standing conflict, which had generated considerable political debate and interest in Australia.

- Finally, Habibie’s totally unexpected declaration in January 1999 that a rejection of his offer of autonomy would result in separation and independence changed the entire geopolitical context of the East Timor conflict. This announcement not only provided an opening for more activist agenda that Downer was beginning to push at the time, it also essentially presented the Australian government with a fait accompli that simply could not be ignored. In this sense, it has been suggested Canberra was simply reacting to events in Jakarta itself rather than striking out on a fundamentally different and radical East Timor policy of its own making.65

In December, Prime Minister John Howard personally wrote to Indonesia’s interim president Habibie urging gradual Indonesian disengagement from East Timor. On 12 January, the Australian Government proclaimed, in conjunction to revealing Howard’s December letter, support for autonomy and eventual vote on the self-determination in East Timor, “abrogating the implicit proscription entailed by AMS.”66 This may have annoyed Habibie, yet on 27 January 1999 he proposed that if the East Timorese rejected a proposal for autonomy within Indonesia, he would ask the People’s Consultative Assembly to grant them independence. On 5 May, an agreement was signed by the UN, Portugal, and Indonesia to allow an UN-supervised ballot. “A key and controversial element in the agreement was that the TNI had sole responsibility for law and order. The consequences of this decision were disastrous.”67

As the violence in East Timor spread, either with the support of the Indonesian military or their simple disregard for the unraveling situation—TNI proved incapable of restraining the violence. As this occurred Australia became an early advocate of UN intervention. Naively, the international community proceeded with the referendum for independence. As the results of the vote became clear, in which the 78.5% of the Timorese voted for independence, and the murderous rampage of Indonesian backed pro-integrationist militias made immediate external intervention paramount.

65 Chalk, 41.
66 Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, 180.
67 Wheeler and Dunne, 812.
In this context, with no coherent regional security structure in place to offer credible alternative authority, and the United States holding back from taking the initiative, the UN Security Council approved the formation of INTERFET under Australian leadership.\(^6^8\)

On 4 September, Kofi Annan announced the results of the ballot. After an election that was relatively void of conflict and intimidation from the pro-Indonesia militias, the results of the ballot resulted in rampaging militiamen killing key figures of the independence movement and terrorizing pro-secession civilians. Witnesses to the violence estimated that in just days over 1000 Timorese had been killed.\(^6^9\) According to Jeffrey Bartholet of \textit{Newsweek}, “Dili was an apocalyptic landscape.”\(^7^0\) Although President Habibie ordered the TNI to restore order and gave assurances that both Indonesian military and police units could comply, it quickly became apparent that he was not in a position to either direct or ensure compliance with such an order. Consequently, it became clear that to end the violence in East Timor a peacekeeping force would need to be deployed to the battered island.

While the UN Security Council and the Secretary General began diplomatic attempts to subdue the violence, Australian news sources splashed the violent images across the country, thus galvanizing the public to demand action to end the atrocities. “A major factor behind this public reaction was the sense of shame Australia’s continuing betrayal of the people of East Timor; support for an armed intervention to protect the East Timorese was a way of trying to absolve the country of its past guilt.” Australian politicians were equally outraged and remorseful of Australia’s past “blind eye” towards the Timorese, and equally frustrated by the inability to prevent the escalation of violence. Despite a twenty-four year policy of Jakarta First, Howard announced, in conjunction with enunciation of the Howard Doctrine, on 5 September that Australia was prepared to lead a multinational force into East Timor. However, “he was explicit that military intervention without Indonesian approval was not an option.”\(^7^1\) Evident obviously was

\(^{68}\) Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, 181.  
\(^{69}\) Done Greenlees and Robert Garran, “Marching Into Tragedy,” \textit{The Australian}, 8 September 1999.  
\(^{71}\) Wheeler and Dunne, 817.
the constraint and importance of sovereignty, which helps forecast the willingness of Australia to act in such a manner in the future.

After various forms of international coercion, most notably the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) threat to cancel the post-financial crisis bailout funds, Habibie accepted international peacekeepers. Consequently, the Indonesian government ‘consented’ to the deployment, but there were attempts by TNI and the Indonesian parliament to veto any Australian participation in any UN force.72 This position paralleled ASEAN states’ views, but it was apparent it was Australia not a member of the regional organization that had both the political will and the military capability to deploy to East Timor. Other options, included a strictly UN peacekeeping force led by and comprised of Asian states. While an alternative, it would have taken months to assemble and deploy. Further, deploying a strictly UN force may have restricted the capability to quell the violence that had plagued the situation and may have actually caused an escalation.

On 14 September, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer formally wrote to the UN Secretary-General with the offer to lead a multinational force. The formal endorsement of this offer by the Security Council, in conjunction with the President Habibie’s acceptance of international assistance, made possible the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1264 on 15 September that authorized INTERFET. The vanguard of the international peacekeeping force arrived in East Timor on 20 September. Although Indonesia had consented to the deployment, Habibie’s previous inability to restrain TNI would suggest the possibility of an unfriendly welcome. Canberra could not be “absolutely clear,” argues James Cotton, “that the Indonesian military would comply with the will of the UN and cooperate with the international force.”73 Although the Australians were not confronted with significant opposition, they were prepared for the possibility.74

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73 James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” 137.
74 Wheeler and Dunne, 825.
According to Wheeler and Dunne, Australia’s leadership role in INTERFET marks an important departure for both Australia’s “Jakarta First” policy and previous Western interventions. “The case of INTERFET is particularly significant in this respect because Australia’s vital interests were clearly not being served by its armed rescue of the East Timorese.”75 From 1975 to 1999, there was consistent Australian bi-partisan support for a “Jakarta First” policy. However, what is yet to be determined was whether it was the Howard Doctrine or the humanitarian catastrophe that persuaded the Australian government to act. Clearly there was domestic outrage of the atrocities occurring a mere 300 miles north of Darwin, but what wasn’t tested was Australia’s continued commitment if the situation endured and resulted in a lengthy deployment of troops, causalities of even a limited number, or significantly deteriorated Australian-South East Asian relations. Further, as James Cotton points out, “If the territory concerned had not been East Timor, Australia would not had assumed the leadership role.”76

If the Howard Doctrine was the root cause for Australia taking the lead, which implies Australia was playing the part of a U.S. deputy, a dilemma results when Australian and American interests diverge. Further, as indicated by the outrage at the announcement of the doctrine amongst Southeast Asian nations. “Anti-Australian sentiment and violence has emerged throughout Indonesia, and relations with Australia’s other northern neighbors have suffered due to the correct perception that Australia has backed away from its commitment to integrate with Asia as enunciated by the Keating Labor government.”77 Even if Australian and U.S. interest converge on the requirements to replicate an East Timor-like situation and Australia deems it necessary to intervene in a future scenario, some glaring military limitations were evident in Australia’s participation in INTERFET. As demonstrated in the following section INTERFET, relative to other UN PKOs, was limited in size, and the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was pushed to the envelop of its operating capacity.

75 Ibid.
76 Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” 132.
77 Huntley and Hayes, 182.
D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS

James Cotton demonstrated that the ADF equipment and systems performed surprisingly well considering the urgency of the INTERFET operation. However, he later cautions that the “the logistics systems were fully stretched to deliver this result. If elements of the Indonesian military had opposed it, even surreptitiously, the operation would have run into severe difficulties.”78 Even INTERFET commander Major General Peter Cosgrove candidly pointed out “the Australian logistics contingent supported the whole [INTERFET] force—well above design capacity.”79 In reality, it was almost a miracle that the Australian logistics system successfully supported the entire INTERFET operation. Comments by United States Marines who participated in INTERFET supported this argument and frankly stated that the ADF was “tapped out” and essentially the 11th and 13th Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) provided almost in entirety the movement of supplies by helicopters provided by the MEU’s Aviation Combat Element.80

While the Australians would have been sufficiently able to support and sustain the ADF, what became apparent was that the coalition leader had to be prepared to provide whatever support was necessary for the entire force and its components. This included not only food and shelter but also, on occasion, munitions, communications facilities, and transport. This is standard in other coalition operations, particularly those led by the United States. However, Australia was confronted with supporting countries that routinely do not work together and are not modern, well-equipped militaries like members of NATO.

Arguably, the 5,000 Australian soldiers deployed to East Timor did a commendable job, but, as demonstrated, stretched the Australia to the limit. However as the Economist points out, “If conflict had called for a simultaneous intervention, Australia would probably not have been able to respond.”81 Can Australia really be

78 Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” 137.
80 Author interview with Major Chad Sbragia, USMC, Battalion Landing Team 1/1 Operations Officer on December 15, 2001.
depended upon to be Southeast Asia’s “Brushfire Brigade?”82 The ADF, certainly not in size but in capability, is one of the most potent military forces in Asia-Pacific. It has a modern Air Force, Navy and Army, but it is significantly restricted to within several hundred nautical miles of Australia. Without any aircraft carriers and limited numbers of air-to-air refuelers, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is unlikely to provide air cover for an amphibious task force or ground forces deployed offshore. While the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is also very capable, there are a limited amount of troop carrying ships, and those are incapable of operating more than a handful of assault and logistic support helicopters. Furthermore, the RAN is unable to provide Naval Gunfire Support, which would be a requirement if the RAAF cannot provide close air support (CAS).83

The Australian government has recognized these deficiencies and has begun to appropriate funding to meet these shortfalls. However, much of this equipment is still several years away.84 Ultimately this raises questions about the military capability of the ADF to lead future multinational peacekeeping operations, even if the political will to do so is present. While INTERFET demanded approximately 5,000 ADF troops, other PKOs throughout the world have often exceeded 20,000 troops—clearly out of the capability of the ADF. Another point that needs to be articulated was the U.S. support for INTERFET. While the United States clearly was supporting the ADF, the choice of American forces questions the validity of their claim to be only supporting logistically. While it is true that the United States did not put Marines into East Timor, the support was clearly not just logistics support.85 The Marines provided combat support of Australian and other INTERFET forces ashore, not logistical support. Considering that the Marine CH-53E helicopters supporting the ADF were armed with door mounted .50 caliber machine guns, and that the Marines had a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) force staged in the event that an aircraft went down either through

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83 Ibid., 25-27.
85 According to FMFM 4-1 Combat Service Support “includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services, and other services require by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield.”
hostile fire or malfunction, it clearly is a falsification to deem the United States in support of INTERFET as merely providing logistics support. Furthermore, while not on the ground, there were still 2,200 Marines deployed on Amphibious ships and in a position, while not tasked specifically, to provide a reserve or quick reaction force for the Australians. The equipment associated with these Marines included attack helicopters (AH-1Ws), attack jets (AV-8Bs), potent M1A1 Tanks and other mechanized and capable platforms to provide the needed fire support if required. Thus, it is unrealistic to simply state that the United States merely provided logistics support to the ADF, and certainly calls into question the accuracy of portraying the East Timor Model as a feasible model for future operations.

E. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE

While Australia may have demonstrated the leadership to lead peacekeeping operations, thus allowing the United States to limit its commitment worldwide, it should be apparent there is no guarantee that Australia is willing politically and capable military to provide such a role in the near future.

Australia’s interest in East Timor was an anomaly, and no other nation in the region looks like a viable candidate for leading future humanitarian interventions in the territories of failing states. There is little evidence that the East Timor experience has influenced the regional security perspective.

Furthermore, in opposition to Australia role as the U.S. deputy, Charles Hill argues against this in an essay written for the Hoover Digest.

When one regional power, in this case Australia, intervenes in another regional power’s problem, we are headed back toward a dangerous world in which nations compete for spheres of influence. The very concept of international security is undermined when conflicts are left to neighbors to solve and when the United States hesitates to venture out of its own NATO-area sphere of influence.

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86 Refer to: Operation Stabilise Planning Guidance and Initial Mission Taskings, Commanding Officer, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC) and Commander Amphibious Squadron One, 19 Oct 99.
87 Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention,” 139.
While the military capability may exist in the future, Australia will clearly be restrained politically, both from regional neighbors and domestically, to routinely act as the regional policeman.
III. ASEAN

A. INTRODUCTION

ASEAN was formally established at Bangkok on 8 August 1967. It brought together five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines—in one of the most divergent group of states to form a regional organization. As an institution that promotes regional cooperation, ASEAN has prevented conflict amongst its member states since its origin. Paradoxically, the largest threat to a majority of the ASEAN member states has been domestic in nature, but the organization has had no success preventing or resolving civil war and internal state conflict within its membership. The primary explanation for this has been the organization’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Consequently, the intent of this chapter is to historically review the origins of ASEAN. After completing this, the chapter will assess the potential for change in the near future and evaluate the prospect that ASEAN as a collective regional organization or an individual ASEAN member would lead an intervention in a member state’s internal affairs, particularly in regards to a humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping operation, and satisfy the third characteristic of the ETM.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

Soon after the conclusion of World War II, there were several attempts to involve Asian countries in regional cooperation, but all involved and were initiated by external powers. “The conflictual nature of major-power relations and the interpretation of security dynamics at the various levels prevented the development of regional cooperation among Asian countries.”89 The first indigenous efforts toward Asian regional cooperation took place in the maritime Southeast Asia. Malaya (now Malaysia), the Philippines, and Thailand formed the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961. However, the Philippine claim to Sabah and the Indonesian confrontation halted the development of ASA from 1963 until 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) succeeded it. ASEAN represented a collection of states that were not only dissimilar in terms of physical size, ethnic composition, socio-cultural heritage and identity, colonial experience and postcolonial polities, they had limited cause or experience to ensure success. According to the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) of 8 August 1967, it is clear that the organization emphasized economic, social, and cultural cooperation, rather than political cooperation. While this is the formally articulated purpose, it is clear that security was a key concern from its inception.

Muthia Alagappa defines several reasons which lay behind the formation of ASEAN: fear of internal and international communism, reduced faith in or mistrust of external powers; Indonesia’s decision to pursue its “active and independent” foreign policy through regional cooperation; the desire on the part of Malaysia and Singapore to constrain Indonesia and bring it into a more cooperative framework; considerations of regime consolidation in nearly all member states; and the desire to concentrate on economic development.90 Nevertheless, these alone do not provide the required ingredients for a successful regional organization amongst countries without significant cultural and political homogeneity. According to Amitav Acharya, without a common ethnic or cultural bond, the basis for a regionalism had to be constructed through interaction. “Such interactions could only be purposeful if they were consistent and rule based, employing those rules which would ensure peaceful conduct among the member states. To this end, ASEAN’s founders over a period of a decade from its inception adopted and specified a set of norms for intra-regional relations.”91

While not formally developed, ASEAN discovered its informal political/security roles in its early years through the containing of the Malaysian/Philippine dispute over Sabah and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration.92 These roles and subsequent evolving norms hail from organizations, both global and regional, and from the Southeast Asian social, cultural, and political milieu. Evidence of both these sources is apparent in a variety of documents that have been issued by ASEAN. Often cited as the “ASEAN way,” defining

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90 Ibid., 107.
92 Harada and Tanaka, 328.
these ideals requires a closer look at the treaties that established the principles upon which ASEAN is grounded. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed in Bali in 1976 outlined the following principles:

- Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of all nations.
- The right for every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another.
- Settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means.
- Renunciation of the threat of use of force.

The following section will analyze the evolution of the most controversial and written about principles, the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, particularly as it applies to the content of this thesis. “Arguably the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism is the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states.” Understanding the source and cause for this principle will allow one to further understand the potential for ASEAN or a member-state to participate or lead a UN sanctioned peacekeeping operation and under what terms they may agree to.

Non-intervention is a by-product of the Westphalian state-system. Defined as the duty of states not to interfere with the internal actions of a sovereign state, “it is the principal practical expression of the right of sovereignty in the context of inter-state relations.” By international law, sovereignty and non-intervention are key elements of the UN system and are guaranteed by the UN charter. Thus, the acceptance of these international norms is not unique for ASEAN. Nevertheless, the historical context in which a majority of the member states of the regional organization became nation-states has given non-intervention a special significance. Why ASEAN states as a group of newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which was never a colony) developing states made non-interference the central tenet of intra-regional relations

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93 Acharya, 47.
94 Ibid., 57.
should not require significant explanation. The ASEAN members all were seeking, and continue to seek both internal stability and regime security. As “new” countries with “weak” state structures and, a lack of regime legitimacy, “the primary threat to national security of the ASEAN states were not external, but internal. The threat from within outweighed the threat from without.”96 Thus, the principle of non-intervention was a cornerstone of ASEAN member-state security, from both the potential of superpower and other member-state involvement in their internal affairs. In the context of the Cold War, ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference was a collective commitment to the survival of its non-communist regimes against the threat of communist subversion.

Consequently, the principle for non-interference was concerned with two parallel, yet separate goals with separate consequences. The principle was associated with both a concern over great power involvement in the region and directed at regulating relations between member-states of ASEAN. As the norms of the organization were universally accepted amongst its members, “certain patterns regarding the implementation of non-intervention emerged in the practice of ASEAN diplomacy.”97 According to Acharya, the implementation on non-intervention in ASEAN had four main dictates:

- Refraining from criticizing the actions of the governments of member-states towards its own people.
- Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to constitute a breach of the principle of non-intervention.
- Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring state.
- Providing political support and material assistance to member-states in their actions against subversive activities.98

While adherence to these dictates has been instrumental to the maintenance of peaceful relations between members of ASEAN, it has not provided a means to collectively resolve domestic conflicts which have the potential to threaten the increasingly economically interdependent region. The 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed the internal fragility of many Southeast Asian states and the relative failure of

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96 Acharya, 58.
97 Kraft, 26.
98 Acharya, 58.
three-decades of nation-building efforts. The rising occurrence of low-intensity civil wars in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand provided evidence of this failure. The financial meltdown, however, and its aftermath cruelly exposed ASEAN’s limitations. In practice, the organization had merely succeeded in using economic growth to ameliorate, rather than solve, problems among its members. Arguably, those states that have been victimized by internal conflicts could have been taken advantage of by their neighbors, but the wholesale acceptance of the non-interference norm has prevailed. Further, not only has the norm been successful at preventing inter-state conflict, it has been utilized as a means of the elites of the region’s authoritarian regimes to commit human rights violations without any protest. “This was clearly manifested in the silence of the members of ASEAN on the case of East Timor following its annexation by Indonesia.”99

1. The Limits of Cooperative Security100

Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia was never intended to supplant the bilateral alliance arrangements of the region’s members but to merely supplement them. Consequently, this has historically prevented both the development of neither a collective security nor collective self-defense regime within the region. Instead, regional cooperation has been directed towards building trust and confidence amongst the members, developing norms and principles to prevent the escalation of inter-state disputes into limited or full-scale conflict. The role of cooperative security is primarily to prevent the region’s internal conflict by non-military means.101 Conflict containment and termination are generally handled outside of the cooperative security arrangement. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is ASEAN’s mechanism for promoting cooperative security amongst the ASEAN and other countries that maintain membership in the organization. The ARF contributes to conflict prevention by facilitating communications, providing information, increasing transparency, and reducing uncertainty. “Even in that

99 Kraft, 27.

100 For a brief explanation of cooperative security as it has been defined in the Asia-Pacific refer to: David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).

realm, its immediate goal is not to institute far-reaching security regimes but to help create a normative context that can lead to the emergence of such regimes in the future.”

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the first comprehensive high-level consultative forum on political and security issues in the Asian-Pacific region. Its first annual working session was held in 1994. Participants were Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, Viet Nam, and the European Union. Now the membership has increased in number to twenty-one, with the participation of Cambodia (1995), India, and Myanmar (1996).

Because the ARF is a cooperative security organization, its major feature is institutionalizing dialogue, not security mechanisms. ARF has been modestly successful in promoting dialogue and has adopted numerous confidence—and security—building measures, particularly with respect to transparency measures, and developed mechanisms to facilitate joint-exercises and training programs. The Second ARF meeting took place in Bandar Seri Begawan in Brunei Darussalam on 1 August 1995. This meeting endorsed the Report of the Chairman and adopted “a gradual evolutionary approach” to security cooperation. The evolution was to take place in three stages:

Stage I  Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures  
Stage II  Development of Preventative Diplomacy Mechanisms  
Stage III  Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms

Stage I was meant to begin immediately in 1996 with Stage II, preventative diplomacy, being a natural follow-up. However, Stage III, which provides mechanisms for the initiation of a regional peacekeeping force etc. will not be established until a later undetermined date. This is enunciated in the ARF Concept Paper, stating:

It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as

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102 Muthiah Alagappa, “Asia Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations.” 637.
they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.\textsuperscript{104}

This is certainly still true today and demonstrated a significant limitation for the ARF in the East Timor situation.

In addition to the ARF not yet pursuing mechanisms for conflict resolution, the forum is further limited in doing this by its inheritance of ASEAN principles. As recently as the 8th Forum in July 2001, the ARF “emphasized the importance of ARF making decision by consensus and on the basis of non-interference into one another's internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{105} Certainly given both the continued adherence to this principle and the absence of any near term mechanism to resolve conflict, particularly civil war, the ARF appears as an unlikely near-term solution to these situations. In a critical description of the ARF, Richard Haass stated the following: “The ARF in particular is a frequently frustrating exercise in ‘convoy diplomacy’—always moving at the speed of the slowest member.”\textsuperscript{106}

As a cooperative security organization, the ARF and its originator ASEAN have proven adept and extremely successful at preventing conflict, however the overall intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that its inability to resolve conflict is grounded in its historic principles.

C. EAST TIMOR

Sonny Inbaraj’s \textit{East Timor: Blood and Tears in ASEAN} is a critical retelling of the tragedy that occurred on Timor. It exposes ASEAN as “an accomplice” to Suharto’s government’s invasion and subsequent handling of East Timor. According to Inbaraj, ASEAN, in the name of the principle of non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs, refused to utter one word of protest or concern about the violence levied upon the East Timorese taking place in their backyard. “ASEAN’s silence on East Timor, however, is no aberration. It is consistent with ASEAN’s shoddy record on questions of

\begin{itemize}
\item[104] ARF Concept Paper, found online at: http://www.aseansec.org/.
\item[106] U.S. State Department Perspective On The Australian Alliance, June 29, 2001.
\end{itemize}
Thus, this chapter uses ASEAN’s handling of East Timor, an incident that provides timely relevance to predicting a response from the organization in a future and analogous situation.

ASEAN’s insistence upon non-interference in domestic affairs throughout the twenty-five year occupation of East Timor by Indonesia is well documented. However, the Dili Massacre in 1991 took the East Timor issue from a relatively obscure situation to a major international news item overnight due to the presence of foreign witnesses. A British television station’s broadcast of footage showing Indonesian security forces firing upon civilians in the Santa Cruz cemetery presented East Timor’s plight to the world. “In the past, there have been regular reports of mass killings in East Timor, but none shocked the world so much as the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre, captured on film by the courageous British cameraman.”108 While a significant story amongst the Western press, official media reactions in ASEAN to the situation were muted.

Sonny Inbaraj carefully and critically presented the ASEAN-wide limited coverage of East Timor in his book and other articles. He points out, even Malaysia, which had a citizen murdered working as a NGO volunteer, failed to cover his funeral in any major newspaper, prompting speculation of a widespread censorship in the name of ASEAN solidarity. Although having a record of accomplished foreign policy stands on the question of human rights abuses in South Africa and the Middle East, Malaysia failed, despite the Parliamentary opposition’s attempts, to raise the issue to its southern neighbor.109 A glaring example of the ASEAN standard of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries occurred a year later.

In September of 1992, a Malaysian TV producer allowed unedited footage of the Santa Cruz massacre to be broadcast, prompting an official Indonesian protest. Indonesian Members of Parliament claimed the airing of the documentary on Indonesian soldiers firing upon East Timorese protestors was equivalent to intervention in the

108 Ibid., 88.
109 In the 1960s Malaysia led the campaign to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth because of its apartheid policy.
country’s domestic affairs. A visit to Jakarta by the Malaysian Minister of Information, after the TV producer had been fired, was to apologize for the breach of inter-ASEAN etiquette. Unfortunately, for ASEAN’s reputation and the East Timorese, the situation that occurred in Dili would be a prelude to how the Southeast Asian states would react eight years later.

Demonstrated throughout the East Timor situation was ASEAN’s inability to manage inter-communal violence, and the events that would occur in August and September of 1999 would prove no different. The most recent crisis in East Timor was sparked by a vote for independence, occurring after international pressure upon the recently established post-Suharto government of Indonesia. As written by Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes,

> The bloodshed and turmoil in East Timor have cast in stark relief the utter inadequacy of existing Asia-Pacific security arrangements to cope with regional crises, let alone enduring challenges, and highlight vital questions concerning the relationship of international security and human rights in the post-Cold War.

As the violence in East Timor developed in the late summer of 1999, it became quickly apparent that a forceful and timely intervention to stop the killing was urgent yet not forthcoming. As the situation unfolded, some argued that the responsibility lay in the hands of the ASEAN member states, if not the organization itself, to intervene both diplomatically and with military forces if required. Walden Bello called upon ASEAN to move immediately to form the core of a UN peacekeeping mission. Bello asserted, “All commitments of armed peacekeepers to East Timor must be done under the mandate of the United Nations and ASEAN.”

INTERFET ultimately received a UN mandate. Nevertheless, ASEAN was incapable, either collectively or as individual countries, of taking part in a meaningful leadership role. As Richard Tanter argued at the onset of the crisis, the ARF “has made

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110 Inbaraj, 92.
no contribution to resolving the East Timor conflict in the past, and has little to offer now.”

Tanter’s vision proved prophetic. As the days passed the initiative to form a peacekeeping force fell by default to Australia and behind it, the United States, although both did so reluctantly. Despite Indonesia’s expressed desire for more active involvement by ASEAN states, those states proved warily fractious and contentious. Malaysia, an active participant in UN peacekeeping operations abroad and proclaimed advocate of human rights,

Reacted ambivalently as the crisis unfolded and ultimately bowed out of INTERFET’s first phase of the deployment in a pique after UN secretary general Kofi Annan offered Thailand the role of second-in-command behind Australia.

Even democratic Thailand’s involvement in INTERFET was domestically contentious. An internal debate developed that pitted their activist Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan against more traditional military and defense elites, consequently sending mixed signals on Thailand’s real support. The Philippines made a significant contribution of forces to INTERFET, but it also blurred its pro-human rights message by joining China in opposing the UN Human Rights Commission vote to conduct an international inquiry into the East Timor situation.

“In sum, ASEAN member states, individually and collectively, reacted to the crisis with contradiction and paralysis.” Obviously, the long held ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states was the catalyst for this inaction. The prospective consequences and implications for the future of the ever more interdependent ASEAN are sweeping. The requirement to deploy an international peacekeeping force, particularly when the United States and other regional powers hesitated to act, provided the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) an opportunity to establish a functioning role in resolving security dilemmas with the potential for trans-national escalation. This failure to act essentially ceded the initiative to the United States, which

114 Huntley and Hayes, 178.
115 Ibid.
ultimately conflicted with another tantamount principle of ASEAN—that of opposing
great power intervention in the region.

In short, the opportunity for the ARF to function as the fulcrum for
regional security coordination and dialogue was squandered, and it is
unlikely that the ARF or related nascent regional institutions will play any
major role in security deliberations or outcomes in the near future. With
no other meaningful autonomous security institutions on the horizon, the
path is clear for big powers to continue to contend for hegemony in the
region.116

D. ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY?

While the previous review of ASEAN/ARF’s handling of the most recent East
Timor crisis may elucidate a dim future for the resolution of internal conflict, some
positives did emerge from the situation. First, the fact that both the Philippines and
Thailand participated in INTERFET from its initiation demonstrates as least individually
some flexibility in their interpretation of non-interference in domestic affairs. Secondly,
both Indonesia’s willingness to accept international forces to quell an internal situation
and their request to ASEAN countries demonstrates a possible shift in the long held norm
of interference from a country that was a cornerstone of the doctrine. Even conservative
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir has suggested that cooperative peacekeeping could be
expanded beyond the traditional separation of combatants to “keeping sea lanes open and
air space free of piracy and hijackings…cross border fire fighting, and rescu[ing] the
innocent hostages of hijackings and piracy.”117 These remarks interestingly were from a
man who sacked his deputy prime minister for stating similar statements three years
earlier.118 Before the crisis, other countries, notably Thailand and the Philippines, floated
the idea of reducing the anachronistic policy of non-interference in response to the Asian
Financial Crisis.

116 Ibid.

117 Mahatir, quoted in Asian Airlines and Aerospace (January 2000): 15-16, cited in Sheldon Simon,

118 On July 21, 1997 Malaysia’s then Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, published an essay in
Newsweek urging ASEAN to be more proactive and recommended altering the organizations long-held
doctrine of non-interference in domestic affairs.
The first attempt to re-examine the non-intervention doctrine in relation to changes developing in the international order occurred when Anwar Ibrahim wrote an article for *Newsweek International* in July 1997 calling for a policy of “constructive intervention.” At the time, this was considered an innovative proposal, even though Anwar argued that it did not violate the principle of non-intervention. Of the five proposals in the article, one struck a chord in opposition to the principle: the proposal that aid should be provided to strengthen civil society in other countries caused suspicions of intervention in internal affairs creating a rather lukewarm response amongst ASEAN members.

In June 1998, activist Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan revived Anwar’s proposal at an address at Bangkok’s Tharmasat University. The rapid spread of economic crisis, caused by the ever increasing interdependence of the ASEAN economies, he argued, made it “time that ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention is modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications.” To make the Thai bid at modifying the principle more palatable before the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in late July 1998, the concept was renamed “flexible engagement.” This form of engagement was not a paradigm shift. The type of engagement Surin proposed was to be “in the form of peer pressure of friendly advice, when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability.” The idea was discussed at length at the AMM, but only the Philippines supported the initiative. As a compromise, ASEAN agreed to a new formula of “enhanced interaction.”

According to John Funston, the controversy that the Thai initiative provoked was probably caused more by the suggestion that the principle was being modified than the

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121 Ibid, 18.
nature of the proposed change per se. However further attempts at modifying the
principled have been stifled. ASEAN countries have however addressed the issue in less
direct ways, particularly economically, but also in regards to tentative steps to take on
human rights issues. The 2020 Vision commits ASEAN to establishing “caring
societies” in which “all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities to total human
development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural
background.” Further, the 1998 AMM welcomed the establishment of a non-
governmental Working Group on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism.

ASEAN has demonstrated a limited political means to address the principle with
varying degrees of success and to modify it to meet the current needs. Unfortunately, the
slow evolution of the process will again render ASEAN useless to meet near-term
unforeseeable situations that may arise requiring a violation of the principle.

E. MILITARY LIMITATIONS

Some of the ASEAN states may now consider greater regional peacekeeping
cooperation in light of East Timor and their uneasiness with Australia taking the lead as
the “U.S. Deputy Sheriff.” The requirement to deploy peacekeeping forces at short
notice to East Timor, and subsequently sustain them, has revealed the weaknesses in the
rapid deployment capabilities of the 10 members of ASEAN. Regrettably, “their armed
forces deficiencies leave them considerably short of an independent intervention
capacity.”

At the Defence Asia ’99 exhibition in Bangkok in November 1999, Suchit
Bunbongkarn, director of Thailand’s Institute of Security and International Studies,
pointed out, “ASEAN must be prepared to take more responsibility for peacekeeping
operations because in Southeast Asia the economic crisis has highlighted the issues of
human rights and human security as reflected in the case of East Timor.” However, as

122 Funston, 19.
123 The ASEAN 2020 Vision, ASEAN Informal Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 1997. Found Online at:
124 Sheldon W. Simon, “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities,” in
125 Quoted in Ian Bostock, “ASEAN Wanting on Rapid Deployment,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
November 17, 1999.
previously mentioned, two factors limit this capability. First, the principle of non-intervention, and secondly the capability to rapidly deploy ASEAN member military forces.

Although ASEAN criticized the dominant role the Australians took with U.S. assistance, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was the only regional military force capable of rapid deployment and command of such a multi-national force. “The deficiencies of the ASEAN armed forces were highlighted by the heavy reliance on ADF transport to deploy troops of the 16-nation INTERFET to Dili.”126 Forces from Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were ferried to Darwin, then boarded Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 Hercules aircraft or Royal Australian Navy (RAN) troop ships for deployment to East Timor. The Philippines and Thailand have a considerable number of amphibious transports and landing ships capable of open ocean deployment. However, availability is poor due to a shortage of spare parts, varying states of disrepair or low manning levels. Similar problems limited the number of long-range and tactical transport aircraft. Even if able to deploy, the ability to sustain them is viewed skeptically.127

In addition to the equipment deficiencies, due to the reality of security threats to the countries within ASEAN, the truth is that most of these countries have been preoccupied with internal threats. Consequently, their forces, though numerous, have been trained and configured to operate close to home and thus with supplies and support to hand.128 These priorities are reflected in the White Papers of the various nations.129 Thus, it must be concluded that ASEAN states, although increasing the procurement of modern weapons, will not have the available military capacity to deploy and sustain military forces far from their shores without significant assistance from countries capable and willing to do so.

127 Ibid.
128 Cotton, 131.
F. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE

Whether ASEAN will develop the mechanisms to resolve conflict in the future is debatable. Since clearly ASEAN was irrelevant in both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and East Timor, the outlook that ASEAN will respond positively in the near future looks bleak. ASEAN’s dilemma stems from the fact that it was intended to become a conflict resolution organization without a conflict-resolution mechanism. “Its own modus operandi precluded it from having one.”130 ASEAN, to put it bluntly, has failed in its attempt to manage both the regional economic crisis and its festering internal security problems. Its doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has only intensified these failures. ASEAN’s core states—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—retain an inflexible commitment to this doctrine despite its irrelevance in an increasingly interdependent world. As not only domestic unrest projects the possibility of regional instability, the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism Piracy and illegal narcotics demonstrate the transnational issues that will continue to demonstrate the anachronistic nature of the ASEAN way. Nonetheless, until this principle is modified, there is little hope that ASEAN or its offshoot the ARF will provide a mechanism or the capability to deploy sufficient forces to intervene in future regional crises. This will continue to be conducted by the only countries, both politically and militarily capable of exercising this.

IV. JAPAN

A. INTRODUCTION

Japan is a wealthy country; its economy is the world’s second largest, only behind the United States. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are the best funded, most technical and capable in East Asia, though constrained by their “peace” constitution. Amazingly, Japan does not participate militarily like other great economic powers; it has even resisted large-scale involvement in risk adverse peacekeeping missions. While military participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is uncontroversial for most countries, for Japan it entails a plethora of additional implications. Therefore, the intent of this chapter is to review Japan’s policy on UN peacekeeping operations and subsequently look at the possibilities for the near future. To prognosticate Japan’s future PKO contributions and evaluate whether it will perform as the willing and capable actor necessary for the third characteristic of the ETM, this chapter will present a historical background, recent changes to legislation, the evolution of public opinion, and conclude with a look at how Japan may participate in future PKOs within Southeast Asia.

The significance of Japan’s relatively recent venture into peacekeeping and concurrently its evolution as an international power requires careful evaluation. Fundamentally, we must establish a theoretical framework to determine whether the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) participation in UN peacekeeping conforms or departs from the conventions of Japanese international behavior. According to Aurelia George, “to date these conventions have adhered closely to the precepts of the Yoshida Doctrine and their derivations such as Japan’s reactive mode of international behavior, its susceptibility to external and particularly US pressure, and its basic preference for using its financial power in international affairs.” It has been ten years since Japan re-initiated the debate, subsequently passed legislation, and deployed the JSDF for PKOs. While the PKO bill may have appeared groundbreaking in 1992, we now have had a

131 The Yoshida Doctrine advocated the subordination of Japan’s international posture to the requirements of national economic growth, maintenance of a low profile in international affairs, and reliance on a moderate self-defense capability combined with the US security guarantee.

decade to review Japan’s participation in PKOs. It appears that Japan has continued to conform to its past predisposition to gradually advance towards becoming a normal country and that the 1992 PKO bill was merely a step towards that goal. As Eugene Brown explained it, Japan’s decision to participate in UN peacekeeping represents an “incremental adaptation within an agreed policy framework.”\textsuperscript{133} Consequently, Japanese participation in UN PKOs is merely a confirmation of pre-existing Japanese foreign policy norms, as are the current deployment of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships to support the American war against terrorism.

Whether Japan should participate in international collective security, broadly including PKOs, has been an issue of domestic disagreement in Japan since the UN came into existence in 1945. In 1954, when Japan re-established a military under the pretext of a “self-defense only” force, a fundamental and longstanding political dispute evolved: how and when could the SDF be deployed in regards to collective security or defense? Japan’s resistance to participate in any form of military deployment is soundly based in both constitutional restrictions and a domestic distaste for active military involvement in overseas conflicts for fear of large-scale Japanese re-militarization. However, one could also argue that although Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution does restrict the SDF from anything beyond defense of Japan, alternatively there had not been any national interest in participating in PKOs until the 1990s. Determining whether national interests, constitutional constraints, or domestic pressure weighs more heavily currently is an additional goal of this essay, since it will allow one to predict with greater success the possibility of future Japanese SDF participation in Southeast Asian PKOs and its potential to fulfill the mandate of the third characteristic of the ETM.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

“Japan’s participation in UN peace operations has long suffered from an underlying tension between the country’s general support for the United Nations and its deep-seated reluctance to use military support.”\textsuperscript{134} In 1956, the UN General Assembly, noting a proud and symbolic moment in post-war history, voted Japan into the United


Nations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) made every effort to play an active role in the international organization to demonstrate to the world that Japan was a peace-loving nation that has discarded its history of aggression. This provided an initial and lasting dilemma for Japan. Did actively participating in the UN also require Japan to contribute its SDF in support of collective security actions, namely peacekeeping?

When the United States framed the Japanese Constitution, to appease those fearful of future Japanese aggression, the 1947 document included an article that renounced war and the means to prosecute war. Article Nine of the Constitution subsequently became the shield that the Japanese could hide behind to prevent the formation and deployment of a powerful military, whether used aggressively or passively. Due to the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan, under American pressure, altered the interpretation of the Constitution and developed the SDF with the introduction of a detailed “SDF Law.” The newly formed SDF was placed under strict limits, under which it could be used and deployed. Under interpretations prevailing during that period, the SDF Law in effect, prevented Japan from being involved in any UN sponsored PKO until 1992.

Domestically, from the early 1950s until the early 1990s, there was a political division within Japanese politics about the SDF and its role. Until the 1990s, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) had “strongly favored this pacifist approach to foreign policy and were intensely critical of government proposals to modify these restrictions.” Domestic and international opposition has further supported resistance to SDF participation in any international situation. The LDP, which ruled Japan for the entire duration of Japan’s membership in the UN until 1993, yielded to this pressure in favor of economic development. Based on available information, it is problematic to validate whether domestic opposition, both political and public, or lack of national interests provided the preponderance of resistance to expanded Japanese participation in PKOs.

“As according to the government, Japan has made a UN-centered policy one of the pillars of its diplomacy and has behaved according. Japan not only pays high dues but

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135 Ibid., 8.
also makes voluntary donations, thereby contributing considerably to UN activities.”136 Japan has traditionally supported the UN and made significant contributions in both money and participation in UN councils and forums. Since becoming a UN member in 1956, Japan has regarded cooperation with the United Nations as an important pillar in its foreign policy, and it has cooperated widely in peace-oriented activities undertaken with the United Nations at the center, such as PKOs.137 In its inaugural edition, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook in 1957 posited a “UN-centered diplomacy” as one of “three pillars” of Japanese diplomacy. Having proclaimed a UN-centered diplomacy, Japan inferred it would take an active role in collective security. Consequently, on two occasions during the 1950s and 1960s, the UN requested Japanese participation in PKOs. Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya argue that the MOFA wanted to participate, but Japan’s conservative political leaders, who would later in the century favor such a role, wanted to regain economic prosperity and placed a much higher emphasis on this. By not embroiling themselves in foreign policy issues and debates and concentrating on their primary goal, Japan consistently rejected UN requests for SDF participation despite MOFA support. Furthermore, the Cold War environment did not allow Japan to pursue a “UN centered diplomacy” very much. Within a few years, the Diplomatic Bluebook ceased to use the concept of “three pillars” and pragmatically began emphasizing the bilateral relationship with the United States, rooted in the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

The initial request for Japanese participation in PKOs came in 1958, shortly after Japan had been elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. On 11 June 1958, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that called for the formation of an observation group (United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon-UNOGIL) to monitor the illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese border. As the situation deteriorated in Lebanon, Japan sought to defuse the situation by recommending that the UN increase the size of the mission in Lebanon, ultimately sparking debate within Japan concerning a possible SDF role in peacekeeping. Due to Japan’s proposition of the resolution, the Secretary-General of the UN assumed that Japan was

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willing to participate in UNOGIL and requested Japan send ten SDF officers to Lebanon. Japan denied the request because SDF missions outlined in Article Three of the SDF Law did not include UN duties. “It is certainly true that the SDF Law did not specifically include provisions for sending the SDF abroad, but neither did it forbid such a decision.”

Despite its proclaimed “UN centered diplomacy” in 1958 and its avowed interest in international UN-centered collective security, domestic support both within the populace and the government was not yet prepared to support sending the SDF participation in UN operations. In the 1960s, Japan would be queried again with much the same results.

The newly independent Congo requested UN troops in July 1960 after Belgium unilaterally sent forces into its former colony to restore order. The UN mission in the Congo would eventually become the largest PKO undertaken to that time. There was no formal request for Japanese participation in the operation, but there were rumors that the UN was inquiring into whether Japan would be willing to send troops. Unlike the mission in Lebanon, the situation in the Congo required UN peacekeepers to quell violence. Consequently, the UN passed Resolution 161 urging UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) to take all appropriate measures, including the use of force, which effectively prevented any SDF participation. Nonetheless, in early 1961, “the statement by Japan’s then ambassador to the United Nations aroused a controversy.” He ignited debate by questioning how Japan could have an UN-centered diplomacy and yet not contribute to peacekeeping operations. He argued, “Because the United Nations will be responsible for the future world order, a UN police force ought to be considered. It would not be reasonable for Japan to remain unalterably opposed to sending troops abroad.”

138 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 10.
139 Japan’s Constitutional prohibits collective security, however in general Japanese foreign policy has historically favored the “idealistic” UN approach to security.
This view which became known as the “Matsudaira statement,” was attacked in the Diet on the grounds it was proposing the dispatch of troops when law prohibited it. An editorial in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* “linked pressure for SDF participation in UN peacekeeping with a broader LDP effort to revise Article Nine,”143 which initiated the longstanding debate that any increase in the roles and missions of the SDF would inherently lead to remilitarization. Thus, by the 1960s legally and politically Japan was not yet prepared to fully participate as an UN member.

To contribute more forthrightly in the UN, Japan would need to revise the legal framework, either through altering the SDF Law or the Constitution, to participate in any PKO. Seeking the path to least resistance, the initial attempt, the UN Resolutions Cooperation Bill, was initiated by the MOFA in 1966. The bill, which would have changed the SDF Law, was surrounded with controversy, stalled and was never brought before the Diet. This initial attempt was consequently quickly rescinded, discarded, and would not be reappear as an issue for an additional three decades.144 Heinreich, Shibata, and Soeya argue that the governing LDP was far more concerned with continuing with rebuilding and integrating the Japanese economy into the global economy and avoiding misinterpretation both at home and abroad of their intentions.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan was economically prosperous. Concurrently, it appeared that the United States had decreased its commitment to East Asia by its removal of all troops from Vietnam and some from Korea under President Nixon, with threats of further reductions under President Carter. These two factors established an argument both domestically and abroad for greater Japanese participation in shouldering more security responsibility. In response, the Nomura Research Institute in 1977 prepared a study on the future of Japanese security policies, under a commission from the Japanese government and with the participation of senior Japanese officials. One of its recommendations was that Japan should consider sending its troops abroad for the first time since WWII in the context of UN peacekeeping operations.145 In 1980, a

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143 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 12.
144 Leitenberg, 9; and Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 15.
panel composed of mid-level MOFA bureaucrats circulated a report declaring, “with respect to UN peacekeeping operations, a positive discussion should take place on the contribution of personnel in addition to financial cooperation. The dispatch of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations is considered for our country, which desires to exist as a peaceful state.”146 Although SDF personnel were not specifically mentioned, it is readily apparent that their participation would be required. Nonetheless, in 1980 the official government position of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki’s cabinet and again by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983 was to continue to hold the issue at arms length by reiterating the longstanding official view, namely that there would be no SDF participation in UN operations if the use of armed force was to be contemplated.147

The 1980s did begin to see changes in Japan’s security outlook. Although not directly applicable to peacekeeping, changes in policy would ultimately have links to expanded SDF participation in Japanese security. An example of this change occurred in 1981, when the government established a sea-lane defense perimeter 1,000 miles out from the Japanese coastline. Further expansion of SDF roles under Nakasone, allowed his successor Noboru Takeshita to take concrete steps to expand Japan’s involvement in international affairs, while simultaneously UN participation in PKOs was about to greatly increase. In parallel with these initiatives was the closure of the Cold War, which would reinvigorate the role the United Nations would play in conflict resolution.148 Without the restrictions incurred under the East-West conflict, the UN was now able and expected to play a larger role in conflict management, particularly as the number of missions that would arise increased vastly.

When Noburu Takeshita became prime minister in November 1987, he proposed shortly after being posted to the job an “International Cooperation Initiative” in 1988. The proposal, referred to “three pillars of international cooperation,” consisting of 1) cooperation for peace, 2) promotion of international cultural exchange, and 3) increase in

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147 Leitenberg, 10, and Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 17.
148 Since the end of the Cold War, the world has seen an expansion of peacekeeping missions by tenfold, taxing both the UN financial assets but also the military forces that traditionally participated.
Within this policy, Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya identify five areas in which Japan could place a larger international role:

- Active pursuit of diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening political dialogue and international cooperation
- Stepped-up contributions for UN-sponsored activities to prevent the outbreak of conflict
- Active involvement in international efforts to resolve disputes peacefully
- Strengthened assistance to refugees through both bilateral and multilateral efforts; and vigorous contributions-in terms of money and personnel-to international cooperative efforts aimed at reconstruction once a conflict is peacefully resolved.

In 1988, Japan sent one civilian to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan and another civilian to the UN monitoring operations on the Iran-Iraq truce. In the following years, Japan assigned thirty-one civilian observers to the election monitoring team in Namibia and six civilian observers to join in monitoring the Nicaraguan elections. “Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, no serious debates had taken place as to the possibility, let alone the desirability, of sending SDF on UN missions.” However, thoughts of further SDF involvement began to appear, as indicative of a statement to the Diet in November 1989 by Juro Matsumoto, the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. The Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) quoted him saying he was “considering authorizing the use of troops for anti-terrorist operations, protecting Japanese nationals overseas and in international peacekeeping activities.” Prime Minister Toshiko Kaifu had made a similar speech to the Diet in October 1989 hinting at similar interests, which FEER commented was the “standard Japanese approach towards implementing a sensitive policy.”

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150 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 18.
151 Tanaka, 92.
153 Ibid.
Thus, by 1990 Japan had “got its foot in the door,” but convincing the public and the opposition that the SDF should be included for Japan to realistically participate as a peacekeeper. While viewing the involvement of government personnel as acceptable, the opposition parties continued to view participation of the SDF in UN peacekeeping “as part of a Machiavellian strategy by conservatives to expand Japan’s military role abroad.” Yozo Yokota concurs with this assessment proclaiming:

The government’s stated policy of making a tangible contribution to security-related areas (in other words, providing personnel as well as funds to PKO activities) is not motivated by Japan’s so-called UN-centered diplomacy; it is just a pretext for the government’s attempt to make the overseas dispatch of units of the Self-Defense Forces a fait accompli.

Public support in the late 1980s remained ambivalent as well. An opinion poll taken by the Prime Minister’s Office in early 1989 concluded that forty-seven percent of respondents were opposed to sending the SDF abroad to participate in UN PKOs, while only twenty-two percent were in favor. Yet, the survey indicated that seventy-two percent were prepared to send the SDF abroad for the purpose of disaster rescue operations. A culmination of international events, the 1991 Gulf War and the break-up of the USSR, would become the turning point.

The Persian Gulf War provided the catalyst that would ultimately lead to the introduction of a bill that would authorize SDF involvement in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Japanese government supported economic sanctions against Iraq, and provided generous financial assistance both to countries affected by the invasion and to the multinational coalition forces protecting Saudi Arabia. Under pressure from the United States to provide more than just economic assistance, Japan attempted to introduce a bill that would authorize the SDF to provide logistical support and allow participation in traditional peacekeeping missions. The first attempt, which was centered on the “United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill,”

154 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 18.
155 Ibid., 19.
156 Yokota, 82.
failed well before being introduced to the House of Representatives. During that time period, the LDP had a majority in the lower house, but the opposition parties controlled the House of Councilors and made it clear that they would not cooperate with the bill.\textsuperscript{157} This failure to provide military personnel, even minimally and not in conflict, provoked strong criticism from the United States and some European countries.\textsuperscript{158} Japan was accused of resorting to checkbook diplomacy, and at the conclusion of the war Kuwait pointedly excluded Japan from a full-page advertisement in the \textit{New York Times}, thanking those countries that provided assistance. Considering that seventy percent of Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East, and suffering intense international criticism, the government sent a flotilla of minesweepers to the gulf after the war had ended.\textsuperscript{159}

Failure of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in October of 1990 can be attributed to domestic politics, primarily because the Japanese public did not support the bill. Various public opinion polls conducted in the fall of 1990 indicated that only twenty to thirty percent of the Japanese supported the bill.\textsuperscript{160} However, by the spring of 1991 seventy-five percent of the Japanese public supported the decision to deploy the ships, an almost fifty percent difference from a mere six months previous. According to another poll conducted in July 1992, fifty-eight percent of those surveyed considered the dispatch of the SDF “problematic under the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{161} Regardless, with the momentum instigated by the Gulf War, the LDP capitalized and convened a “Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community.”

The group, chaired by LDP General-Secretary Ozawa, was subsequently referred to as the “Ozawa Commission.” Ozawa was the strongest supporter of the LDP wing that supported Japanese SDF participation in the Gulf War. Ozawa argued:

\begin{quote}
With the end of the East-West Cold War, the concept of ‘collective security’ centered on the United Nations is being utilized. ‘Collective security’ based on the UN Charter is supposed to protect the global order.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{157} Tanaka, 93.  
\textsuperscript{158} Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 19.  
\textsuperscript{159} Leitenberg, 15.  
\textsuperscript{160} Tanaka, 93.  
Its character is different from the use of the concept of ‘collective self-defense,’ that the government has considered unconstitutional. I believe the ideals of our constitution and the UN Charter are identical. In order to preserve the constitutional principles of non-use of force and renunciation of war, we need to supplement (our defense efforts) with the collective security system centered on the United Nations.\(^{162}\)

Consequently, when the Commission’s report was released on February 20, 1992, it recommended Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.\(^{163}\) However even before this, the government had introduced a bill almost a year after the ill-fated UN Peace Cooperation Bill was killed before introduction. This second attempt began where the first had ended, in the introduction of a “Peacekeeping Battalion” or “Peace Cooperation Corps” composed of civilians. The Socialist Party (JSP), which was adamantly opposed to any dispatch of SDF personnel to the Gulf War for any reasons before the summer of 1991, was not opposed to Japanese participation in peacekeeping \textit{per se}. But in the summer of 1991, after three groups of Diet members from the LDP, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Komeito, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) returned from their observation of actual UN peacekeeping operations abroad, the LDP, Komeito and the DSP shifted away from the agreement about an all-civilian peacekeeping corps to one which would require SDF participation. Thus, as of the fall of 1991, the three parties had to create the conditions in which the JSP would concede and allow the SDF to deploy for peacekeeping.

Aside from the JSP and the Communist Party, public and party opinions had shifted sharply because of the Gulf War and endorsed the Ozawa opinions, which now paralleled the LDP, Komeito, and DSP positions.\(^{164}\) Now the three parties had to develop legislation that would allow the dispatch the SDF without being condemned for violating the Constitution, and maintain a broad acceptance by all three parties. The tool was the introduction of the “Five Peacekeeping Operations Principles” which were included in the PKO bill introduced in September 1991. The principles are as follows:


\(^{163}\) Leitenberg, 16.

\(^{164}\) Ibid., 16.
• Agreement on ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties of the conflict.

• The parties of the conflict, including the territorial state(s) shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping forces and Japan’s participation in the force.

• The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party in the conflict.

• Should any of the above guidelines requirements cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.

• Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel.165

Another issue helped break the deadlock. Komeito proposed in the spring of 1992 to “freeze” the co-called “core” missions of peacekeeping forces—monitoring disarmament, patrolling ceasefires zones, inspecting the disposal of abandoned weapons—until such time as a new separate law would “unfreeze” these missions. (In reality, the bill to “unfreeze” the PKO bill was not considered until 2001 and will be discussed later). The LDP and the DSP agreed with Komeito on the “freeze.” To seal the success of the bill, despite JSP opposition, the LDP and Komeito further agreed to accept the DSP demand that all PKOs would require Diet approval.166

On 15 June 1992, the LDP and its political allies finally managed to push the legislation through the Diet after three, often stormy Diet sessions. According to Hisashi Owada, the former Japanese ambassador to the UN and top Foreign Ministry official at the time, “the establishment of the peacekeeping law in 1992 was a epoch-making event for Japan.”167 Two months after the law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Bill) went into effect thirty-six years after Japan took a seat the UN General Assembly. Shortly after initiation, Japan did dispatch troops on PKO missions, “but their numbers have been minimal and their participation has been hedged with so many conditions [established in PKO bill] that they

165 Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, 1992, 53.
166 Tanaka, 97.
have been hard to utilize.” Nonetheless, we must quickly review those missions Japan has participated in.

A conference in Paris of interested UN members had reached agreement in early 1991 on a political settlement for war-torn Cambodia, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established on 28 February 1992. In September 1992, “despite public concern at home,” the Japanese government sent to Cambodia a 600-man engineering battalion, seventy-five civilian police officers, and eight military observers. “This was the first and, to date, largest deployment of military personnel since the end of World War II.”

Japan’s new international role as a peacekeeper soon faced a domestic test shortly after deploying. In early 1993, two of the Japanese members of UNTAC, one election observer, and one civilian policeman were killed by guerillas in Cambodia, “causing serious concern and controversy in Japan.” Although the cease-fire agreement was formally observed, in reality the situation was like a civil war. It was obvious the SDF had joined UNTAC operations as a part of the regular peacekeeping forces there, versus the explanation given to the public that they were there to repair and build bridges. In the end, Japanese participation in UNTAC was a watershed event for Japan, “but it had been relatively easy to generate support and enthusiasm for the Cambodian operation because Japan had a strong interest in Southeast Asian affairs and numerous ties in the region”

UNTAC was deemed a success, particularly in regards to the concurrent mission in Somalia that ended in disaster, but Japanese participation was more symbolic than a significant contribution. UNTAC reached 22,000 international troops, making Japan’s participation less than one percent of the total force. Public support of participation was fragile, and the “Japanese public tended to justify the dispatch of SDF troops largely in terms of satisfying foreign criticism of Japan’s failure to make personnel available to

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168 Yokota, 88.
170 Heinrich, Shibata, and Soeya, 24.
171 Okubo Shiro, 100.
international peacekeeping.” 173 Japanese public discussion held that it was necessary for Japan to make a symbolic contribution to satisfy this criticism. Militarily, the SDF “operated under a bewildering set of rules of engagement.” 174 If taken literally, the SDF could not fire on the Khmer Rouge to protect a non-Japanese because it would represent an exercise of the right of collective self-defense, which the PKO bill had ruled out. Evidently and for obvious reasons the “UN officials were reportedly bitter over the special circumstances under which the Japanese peacekeepers operated.” 175 Even the Japanese head of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi compared the SDF to “maidens” because they were rather “timid and tentative.” He described the Japanese participation as “teething experiences.” 176 After the Japanese participants were killed, the Japanese media, public, and portions of the Diet demanded withdrawal from UNTAC. The LDP government prevailed through the controversy nevertheless and maintained the SDF participants in UNTAC.

In other respects Japanese participation looked dismal, as twenty Japanese policemen, nearly a third of the total fled their assignments, taking their UN vehicles back to the safety of Phnom Penh. Furthermore, four Japanese peacekeepers deserted the country and drove their UN vehicles across the border to Thailand, taking refuge in the Japanese embassy in Bangkok. 177 A senior UN official remarked, “the only time the Japanese were tested by fire, they abandoned us. We understand the special constitutional restrictions on the Japanese, but in a situation of undeniable danger, how can we repeatedly ask people of one nationality, but not another, to take risks.” 178 Nevertheless, since Cambodia, Japan has participated in nine other missions, including in Mozambique, El Salvador, and the Golan Heights in limited numbers. One notable exception was East Timor, which did not fit within the constraints of the “Five

174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
177 Kenneth B Pyle, 111.
Principles” hailing again another round of criticisms that Japan was not fulfilling its role as the second largest economic power in the world, and largest in East Asia.

Politically, one of the most significant events that would alter the potential future of the SDF’s participation in PKOs occurred when the first Socialist prime minister in fifty years now headed the Cabinet. In June 1994, Tomiichi Murayama, Chairman of the former Socialist party—renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)—became prime minister in a coalition government. For decades, the Socialists had denounced the SDF as unconstitutional, and called for ending the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. It continuously opposed any form of peacekeeping legislation and SDF participation in UN PKOs. Amazingly, within days of taking office, Prime Minister Murayama announced his government would support and maintain the US-Japan treaty and accepted the constitutionality of the SDF. At the party convention in September of that year, with just over sixty percent of the party approving, the party’s platform was reversed.179 “In other words there was no essential disagreement at all with the evolution of the previous several years, which had come to pass over the fierce opposition of the SDPJ and a final dramatic filibuster that the party had staged in June 1992 before the peacekeeping legislation came to a vote.180 This apparent shift in the SDPJ’s position would not ensure that Japanese participation in PKOs would come without domestic politics proving to be another major obstacle. As an example, in the early months of 1994 the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCHQ), the Japanese Government agency responsible for PKOs, approached the coalition government about sending the SDF to participate in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. Socialist members of the coalition raised objections over the potential dangers of having the SDF handle transportation of ammunition and armed soldiers. According to these members, this could be interpreted as a violation of the Constitution and Japanese law, which prohibited the use of force. Finally, in August of 1995, the coalition parties finally reached a compromise. To ensure the SDF would not become entangled in conflict, they were forbidden from transporting ammunition or foreign combat troops or participate in

180 Leitenberg, 34-35.
UN training exercises that used live ammunition. Again, the SDF was deployed to another PKO in which Japanese law effectively made them nearly ineffective if any type of hostility developed.

C. EAST TIMOR

A UN mission that requires a closer look is Japan’s failure to send SDF troops to East Timor as a member of INTERFET. Japan has vital strategic and economic interests in Indonesia, which leads one to expect that Japan would have been required to send more than just money. After a lengthy delay, Australia took the lead in INTERFET, with the assistance of significant U.S. logistical support, and provided some 4,500 out of an estimated 7,500 troops.\textsuperscript{181} China, a conservative participant in peacekeeping, “stole a march on Japan by promising to send civilian police.”\textsuperscript{182} International pressure again mounted that Japan must reconsider revising its PKO Bill. “Tokyo’s reluctance suggests that recent reports that Japan is now ready to reassert its diplomatic and military power in East Asia as part of its existing security alliance with the United States, especially to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat, must be viewed with skepticism.”\textsuperscript{183} The prominent French Paper \textit{Le Monde} branded Japan as a “coward” for not facing up to the crisis. Japanese newspapers have also been critical of Tokyo’s policy and called on the government to exercise more leadership in Asian affairs. “Why did Indonesia’s greatest provider of aid not use its might earlier to persuade Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force?” asked the conservative \textit{Nihon Kezai Shimbun}?\textsuperscript{184} Two years and a half years after INTERFET was dispatched, Japan finally sent a contingent of 680 SDF members to East Timor, after only sending three civilian police officers in 1999.\textsuperscript{185} However, the Japanese are only providing engineering support to build roads and bridges, not actually keeping the peace, that will be left to a South Korean infantry division assigned to that mission. While public support for PKO activities has gradually grown so


\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{184} Quoted in Hadar, 17.

\textsuperscript{185} As of November 2001, Japan was still considering sending a 600-man engineer battalion to East Timor. Studies are ongoing by both MOFA and the JSDF.
that nearly eighty percent of the population supports the SDF’s participation in PKO activities, questionable is the support of Japan assuaging the Americans, taking a larger regional role as a “deputy” regional hegemon, and fulfilling the third characteristic of the ETM by leading future PKOs.186

D. JAPAN’S SUPPORT FOR THE “WAR AGAINST TERRORISM”

Obviously Japanese participation in UN PKOs, since the introduction of the Peacekeeping Bill, is still conducted with significant caution and domestic political deliberation. Since the introduction of the bill, the public has generally supported it, but it is still reserved about the use of SDF in any operation that may involve combat. The government has echoed this position, but elements within the MOFA and the IPCHQ have continued to press for further SDF participation in UN PKOs. However, until present, the Socialists in particular have continued to subject each situation in which Japan is asked to participate with intense scrutiny to ensure the conditions (Five Principles) of the Peacekeeping Law are met.

Therefore, having managed to set a foot in the door of peacekeeping, what are the recent attempts to secure and relax the constraints that inhibit Japan’s ability to participate in a wider range of operations? As of March 2002, Japan is only providing 467 personnel, less than other Asian countries such as South Korea, and in 27th place as a contributor to UN PKOs.187 Japan is the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping in terms of money, but it has yet to participate militarily in kind.188 Since its inception, the PKO law was under scrutiny for revision to allow greater participation in international PKOs. The initial freeze that was established for three years extended for nine. Another “turning point” occurred on September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on the United States provided a new opportunity to revise the SDF Law. On October 30, Japan passed an Anti-Terrorism Law, which authorized the deployment of SDF forces to provide support for US forces engaged in Afghanistan. “The Self-Defense Forces are finally crossing the line to participate in a real war for the first time in their history, even

though their role will be limited to logistic support.”

The government-sponsored bill that enables service members to provide non-combat and humanitarian support to U.S. and multinational forces was approved in the House of Councilors on the majority strength of the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and New Conservative Party. The Democratic Party of Japan opposed the bill because it does not force the government to seek Diet approval before the SDF is dispatched. The quick legislative action reflects changes in public attitudes. A Kyodo News poll showed that fifty-seven percent of the respondents supported the antiterrorism bill and sixty-three percent approved US military action against terrorism.

On its heels was a revision of the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Bill (PKO Bill) that is to pave the way for expanded participation in UN PKOs. On 7 December 2001, the PKO law was approved by the Diet. The revised PKO law calls for an end to the self-imposed freeze on the participation of the JSDF in UN PKOs and will significantly loosen the restrictions on the use of weapons. However, authorizing to use weapons to defend foreign troops and officials remain ambiguous. “Vagueness once again is prevailing in crucial legislation, making it not any different from the PKO Law implemented in 1992,” concludes the Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun. Nonetheless, because of the limitations of both Article Nine and the vague PKO bill, Japan lacks the material to provide a significant capability.

E. MILITARY LIMITATIONS

With regard to the location of Japanese support for UN peacekeeping missions, particularly in a logistics support role, “the SDF can render little support, so far as airlift and sealift capabilities are concerned.” The largest transport aircraft that the Air SDF has is C-130 Hercules, and it only has fifteen of them. Although the C-130 is a capable aircraft, it has limited range and payload, restricting the distance and gear they could provide either the SDF or whomever they may be supporting. The best the Japanese

189 Takuya Asakura, “Public Seen In Step With Boosted SDF Role,” The Japan Times Online, November 17, 2001, found online at: http://www.japantimes.co.


192 Quoted in Berfkofsky, 2.

193 Nishihara, 168.
could do is procuring airlift capabilities that the Japanese sector does possess. According to Nishihara, even this option is hard to realize based on historical examples given in the Gulf War. During that conflict, the U.S. government asked Japan whether it could procure commercial planes to help transport American troops and equipment from the continental United States to the Middle East. “The government had to decline because the trade unions of Japan Airlines and All Nipon Airways refused to positively receive the request on the grounds of the risky nature of their assignments.” Eventually the Japanese government had to procure American commercial airplanes, which demonstrates the possibility of potentially using Ukrainian or Russian IL-76, under lease if required. Recently, Japan announced the purchase of Boeing 767s for midair refueling, which is obviously a step in the right direction and a possible indication of their willingness to procure other strategic aircraft. Of course having an air facility capable of handling and servicing large aircraft, particularly in a location where the equipment is needed, is a requirement and possibly not a luxury under a future PKO. Thus, the possibility of sealift must be entertained.

As for sealift, Japan could follow the Australian lead of leasing high-speed shipping to augment their limited diesel-powered naval ships, which can sail for a short distance. Landing ships were dispatched to Cambodia to support the Engineer Battalion of Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, but having an appropriate location in which to disembark their equipment and supplies hinders them. Consequently, the Maritime SDF further lacks the helicopter assets to facilitate a large-scale offload of material, supplies, and equipment.

F. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE

The real test is yet to come on whether Japan will participate as a “normal” country in a peacekeeping operation either in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Japan’s previous reluctance to participate in the East Timor crisis, due to constitutional, legal and public distaste for Japanese participation in PKOs, demonstrates Japan will not lead or contribute large numbers of troops in a near future operation in Southeast Asia.

194 Ibid.
196 Found online at JSDF homepage at http://www.jda.go.jp/JMSDF/basic/DEFEN_E.HTM#NAME7
Unfortunately, the recent legislation still limits Japanese from taking a leading role and provides ambiguity into the real responsibility Japan is willing to accept. Concerning the logistical support role that Japan its potentially willing to offer, the means of approving such support will still be complicated. “This will involve Japan’s constitutional debates and thus political constraints.”¹⁹⁷ The debates will follow along that issue that has prevailed in the past: What is the nature of the peacekeeping mission, and where will it occur?

Optimists point towards Japan recent participation and support for US forces operating in the War Against Terrorism, but this is primarily logistics support. The limited military equipment the JSDF operate restricts even the logistics support provided to the U.S. coalition forces. Thus, if both Japan and the United States are both only willing to provide logistics support, then the questions remains unanswered in who will provide the combat forces. However, it is also important to point out that Japan has in the past entertained the notion of the United States supporting logistically Japanese PKOs with transportation and food-supply services, particularly to remote areas.¹⁹⁸ This is a significant shift in previous Japanese policies, and must be understood as a continuing evolution in Japanese participation in PKOs.

Japan’s participation in peacekeeping is another step and a continued evolution of its foreign policy. It does not indicate a radical departure, and we can therefore expect that Japan will continue to expand its international role, gradually abandon its “global civilian power” status, and continue to react to U.S. pressure until the foreseeable future.

In conclusion, regardless of the minimal alteration of the PKO bill originally passed in 1992, which allows Japan to legally participate in future PKOs, and signs of Japan’s willingness to contribute on a larger scale, a significant amount of both domestic and international baggage will still preclude them from taking a significant role or the lead. Regionally, many countries are still leery of Japan previous militaristic ways and will resist any large scale Japanese PKO mission, even if sanctioned by the UN. This

¹⁹⁸ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 17, 1993 in Nashihara, 167.
pressure, which will be supported by domestic opponents to Japan’s increased role, will likely prevent Japan from procuring the appropriate assets to conduct a UN PKO without having to lease the assets. Consequently, Japan will have to continue to build confidence, particularly in East Asia through multi-lateral dialogue organizations such as the ARF and CSCAP.

To deepen understanding of PKOs and ensure more effective cooperation, Japan has also held a series of seminars, including a seminar co-hosted with Canada and Malaysia in March within the framework of ARF under the theme of ‘The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,’ where a wide-ranging exchange of views was conducted on the various issues facing today's PKOs.199

Another good example of this is Japan’s participation in the “Southeast Asian Peace Symposium,” which promotes the development of peace operations capabilities, such as promoting the interoperability between armed forces, and which emphasizes rules of engagement under international laws, treaties, and customs.200

Japan’s political limitations will restrain the Japanese from taking a leadership role in a near-future Southeast Asian peacekeeping. However, the current reevaluation of Japanese legislation demonstrates a real possibility, particularly under American pressure, to accept the role that the US government desires in the next 10-20 years. Constraining this will be Japan’s military limitations, which must concurrently evolve to meet the requirements to fulfill the needs of a coalition leader. Assuming Japan weathers its current economic problems, the Japanese have the greatest economic and military potential to accept at least a co-leadership role in any future Southeast Asia PKO and potential subsume the leadership role the United States desires under characteristic three of the ETM.

199 Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2000.
V. CHINA

A. INTRODUCTION

The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that China has a skeptical and paradoxical view of peacekeeping, which stems from China’s ambivalent view of its security. Thus, China will consequently neither take a leadership role in future PKOs in Southeast Asia nor fulfill the role the United States deems necessary under the third characteristic of the ETM. This was particularly highlighted in the 1990s as China uncomfortably looked for its proper place in the “New World Order.” With the exception of UNTAC in Cambodia, not one major peacekeeping operation has remotely threatened China’s “territorial” security. Yet, China often views UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as a violation of a country’s sovereignty, and as a result it treats them as a threat to Chinese security. The concept of national sovereignty serves to sustain domestic authority against foreign incursions. “For the Chinese leadership, defense of a ‘thick’ notion of sovereignty also serves its efforts to enhance its legitimacy, to deflect criticism of its domestic politics, and to resist outside involvement in the Taiwan issue.”201 China views UN PKOs suspiciously because Beijing does not want to establish a precedent that might erode the 19th century definition of state sovereignty or increase the likelihood of multilateral interventions in the internal affairs of states. “Specifically, China has justified its opposition in terms of sovereignty in order to safeguard Chinese sovereignty from future intervention.”202 In recent decades, China has faced growing separatist movements in Tibet, Xinxiang, and Mongolia. Further, Taiwan gradually appears to be moving closer to independence, confirmed by the results of the recent elections. These indications and the rise of “non-traditional” PKOs explain why the Chinese leadership has increasingly emphasized the importance of national sovereignty in UN speeches and voting habits. Thus, China has placed the protection of the “Westphalian” norm of state sovereignty within the bounds of its national security, which conforms to China’s traditional realpolitik view of the world.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

Yongjin Zhang argues that China has had various positions on UN peacekeeping, ranging from “unreserved condemnation to active participation.” He argues that China has changed its position from antagonism in the 1950s and 1960s to antipathy in the 1970s, and then to active participation in the 1980s and 1990s. Analytically he identifies four periods in the evolution of the Chinese policy towards peacekeeping in the last 45 years. The period of condemnation dates from 1950 to 1971, when China was excluded from the UN. The period of non-disruption lasts from 1971 to 1981. The period of cooperation spans the years 1981 to 1988. The period of participation starts in 1988 and prevails today. Samuel S. Kim narrows this definition to the years since China occupied a permanent seat on the Security Council. He defines China’s evolution in three stages: (1) principled opposition/non-participation (1971-1981), (2) support/participation (1982-1989), and (3) contingent support/minimal participation (1990-present). While both these arguments are useful, it is more fitting and parsimonious to divide Chinese views on peacekeeping into just two phases: Maoism and Dengism. The first period, Maoism, extends from 1949 until the late 1970s, while the second period, Dengism, extends from 1980 until present. Both Kim and Zhang’s third period, while different, are equally problematic. Both assume something changed in China’s approach to peacekeeping, and more broadly its approach to foreign policy. Alternatively, what this chapter intends to do is demonstrate that China evolving policy towards peacekeeping—both in participation and support—has changed only once to conform to *internal* changes within Chinese politics that emphasized economic reform and opening to the world. China adjusted its policy on PKOs in the 1980s but has always adhered to the same principle in regards to peacekeeping. China has repeatedly placed sovereignty and its correlation with security atop its list of vital national interests, and this is readily demonstrated through its translucent position in regards to peacekeeping.

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1. **Maoism**

Since 1949, but most clearly demonstrated after 1971, “Beijing was critical of the general notion of UN peacekeeping until the 1980s”\(^{205}\) and opposed the creation and continuation of all peacekeeping operations (PKOs). China demonstrated its opposition to the three PKOs that occurred during this period (1971-1981) by not participating in the Security Council votes (abstaining), not paying its annual peacekeeping dues, and not donating troops to on-going operations. By summoning arguments from the period before the PRC’s representation in the UN, Beijing justified its nonparticipation of voting in support of or engaging in peacekeeping. M. Taylor Fravel argues that China’s antipathy towards the UN and peacekeeping until 1981 was entrenched in Mao’s ideological view of “just war.” Fravel argued in an essay for *Asian Survey* that China opposed all peacekeeping operations because they represented a hegemonic intervention by the superpowers in the affairs of small states, a policy that was influenced by Maoism. Support for this ideological argument stems from China’s general disfavor and vocal disregard with the UN before becoming a member in 1971, but it ignores China’s international situation. During the 1960s, a variety of articles published China’s distaste for the international organization. The *Peking Review* published a series of articles concomitantly with Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN condemning the organization. A 10 January 1965 editorial of *Renmin Ribao* alleged that the United Nations was simply a “pliant tool of US imperialism.”\(^{206}\) An ideologically based argument discounts the significance of China’s international situation during the 1960s and its confrontation with U.S.-led UN forces in the early 1950s. Accordingly, caution must be exercised in arguing that it was simply Mao’s theory of just war that viewed peacekeeping as an act of superpower “power politics.”

We must also consider the following. First, until 1971 China was excluded from the global organization. An outsider, China and the CCP were free to criticize the organization utilizing ideological rhetoric to support its domestic legitimacy while it endured the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, after the Sino-Soviet split China was


\(^{206}\) Quoted in Zhang , 140.
internationally isolated and confronted both superpowers throughout the 1960s. Throughout the decade, China rhetorically regarded the UN under direct American control and influence, (subsequently in concert with Soviets in this regards) thus misleading scholars into believing China’s foreign policy was ideologically driven. The United States and, later, the USSR were China’s avowed enemies during this period. China sincerely believed the UN was a tool to expand and justify American and Soviet influence and interests, ultimately compromising Chinese security not an ideological conflict. This was overtly demonstrated in Korea, which provided lasting memories for Chinese leaders.

“The Chinese bore a specific deep and bitter resentment against UN peacekeeping as a result of the Korean War.”207 Under the UN auspices, the United States led a multinational force to oppose both North Korean and Chinese aggression in 1950. UN operations in Korea were peacemaking rather than peacekeeping, but to the Chinese there was no distinction between them. China was condemned and on the receiving end of the largest collective security operation mounted by the UN, providing a harsh example of superpower influence within the UN. This resentment still appears. In October 2000, President Jiang Zemin was quoted at a gathering in the Great Hall of the People. In his speech to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the dispatching of the CPV (Chinese People’s Volunteers) to Korea he stated:

The victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is a great victory of the world’s peace-loving people, a heroic feat to defend justice and fight against hegemony, a splendid epic of patriotism and revolutionary heroism, and a grand monument erected by the Chinese people in maintaining world peace and human progress.208

Evidently, the Korean War provided a lasting impression of the UN as a threat to Chinese security, and, as a result, the Chinese have always looked at the UN and peacekeeping operations warily.

207 Zhang, 141.
2. Dengism

When Deng Xiaoping ascended to the leadership, he understood the importance of opening to the world economically. Pragmatically, the forthcoming Chinese leadership in the late 1970s viewed the UN as a tool to expand Chinese national economic interests, and subsequently altered Beijing’s position not only on PKOs but several other international organizations. By 1980, Deng Xiaoping firmly established his position as the leader of the CCP. The principles he established, particularly on the importance of economic reform, have been the guiding philosophy of China’s foreign policy since his rise to power. Three years after his ascent in 1978, China changed its position on the UN and adopted a supportive attitude toward the organization. In regards to peacekeeping, China began to vote in favor of various resolutions in the Security Council and pay its annual peacekeeping contribution. What prompted China to change its position towards international peacekeeping at the end of 1981? “This new policy of cooperation resulted from changes in China’s domestic politics.”209 Deng recognized that China had to economically reform and open its markets to international trade and investment. This change was certainly not isolated to peacekeeping. Beijing in the 1980s “joined practically all important IGOs in the UN system, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.”210 Even more revealing was the astonishing 14-fold growth in international non-governmental organization membership in 1977 to 1996.211 Consequently, “the Chinese attitude changed as they saw support for peacekeeping as a means of promoting China’s reputation as a responsible major power with a global vision.”212 Furthermore, China saw that promoting peacekeeping was a method of upholding its image amongst the developing world. Nevertheless, this policy adjustment carried little risk during the 1980s as no new PKOs were established until 1988.

Both Kim and Zhang argue that the Chinese position changed around 1989. They both downplay the importance of the sweeping increase in the number and types PKOs that would arise at the end of the Cold War. Fravel and other scholars define the new

209 Fravel, 2.
210 Kim, 46.
212 Roy, 147.
types of PKOs that evolved after 1989 as non-traditional. The traditional principles of peacekeeping were initially recognized through the establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which was mandated to supervise the truce following the Suez crisis in 1956. These guidelines include:

- The impartiality of the force and its commander.
- The consent of the host country or belligerent parties.
- The nonuse of force except in cases of self-defense.
- Establishment only after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement.

The traditional model of peacekeeping emphasizes consent and impartiality. Alternatively, since 1989, peacekeeping operations have departed from the traditional norms. These new non-traditional norms include:

- The absence of a political settlement.
- Without consent of all parties to the conflict.
- With the authorization to use force.
- Under national (not UN) command.

Since the 1980s, China has consistently maintained and endorsed only the traditional PKOs by stressing the importance of sovereignty, emphasizing consent and impartiality. Moreover, Chinese officials have consistently upheld Security Council approval, in which China has a significant voice due to its permanent seat. In 1984, in a seven-point statement, China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Ling Yufan laid out China’s policy on UN PKOs.

- Uphold the UN charter and strengthen the role of the UN.
- PKOs can only be conducted at the request or with the consent of the country concerned and with full respect for its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
- The party concerned should cooperate in the endeavor of PKOs and make full use of the time gained and favorable conditions created from such operations to seek political settlement of the issue in the question as early as possible.
- Each PKO must have a clearly defined mandate, and no country or party should take advantage of PKOs for its self-interests or for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
• It is within the competence of the Security Council to authorize PKOs. In the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council, general assembly, and secretary-general should assume their respective responsibilities as provided for by relevant provisions of the UN charter.

• The costs of PKOs should be borne by the member states as apportioned on the merit of each case in accordance with the principle of fair and rational sharing of expenses, or covered by voluntary contributions or financing from the countries concerned.

• For the purposes of strengthening the PKOs of the UN, it is necessary both to formulate guidelines and to take practical measures. The special committee on PKOs may proceed with its work in the above two aspects simultaneously.²¹³

Thus, in opposition to the argument that China altered its position in 1989, one must conclude that the rise of non-traditional PKOs did not force a revision of China’s longstanding cautious and skeptical approach to UN intervention but merely highlighted it. In practice, the Chinese delegation to the Security Council has always opposed the establishment or modification of peacekeeping operations that departed from the traditional model. The Chinese record of voting exemplified this by abstaining from the following operations:

• Former Yugoslavia. Although originally in favor of UNPROFOR, China opposed alterations to the mandate invoking Chapter VII, including protection of humanitarian relief, the tightening of the embargo, and the establishment no-fly zones. China abstained from resolution 770, 776, 781, 787, 816, and 820, which all involved a shift towards non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping.

• Rwanda. China opposed and abstained in voting Resolution 929, because it moved away from the traditional model of peacekeeping represented by (UNAMIR). Although China condemned the loss of life, China resisted the Security Council’s call for stronger measures.

• Haiti. China opposed to Resolution 940 because the use of force to restore President Aristide “does not conform with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter.”²¹⁴

In 1999, not only did China abstain in the voting on UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions for PKOs, as had been the pattern when it disapproved, but rejected the NATO led campaign against Serbia. From the beginning of the crisis, China’s initial

²¹³ Xinhua News Agency, October 15, 1984, via Lexis/Nexis
²¹⁴ Quoted in Fravel, 1110.
priority was to resist UN involvement in what it dubbed a domestic dispute, despite the obvious regional security and humanitarian implications. Concerned that NATO, as the situation worsened, was marginalizing the UN, China demanded that the Security Council remain involved. China vocally opposed what appeared to be NATO’s avoidance of the UN and insisted that the international organization remain the centerpiece of the solution. When the “Rambouillet” negotiations failed and NATO began its air operations on 24 March 1999, the Chinese were enraged and objected on three conditions. First, China objected to foreign involvement in domestic ethnic disputes for humanitarian reasons. Second, the UN had been bypassed when NATO unilaterally acted. Third, military force had been employed to advance these goals.

Throughout the Kosovo Crisis Xinhua, Beijing Review, China Daily, Renmin Ribao, and Liaowang commentaries and editorials went on a rampage. They decreed “US-led NATO” actions as pre-mediated, illegitimate, hegemonic, and ultimately set a dangerous precedent that had enormous implications for Chinese security. The precarious standard set by NATO in Kosovo openly demonstrated China’s exposed nerve in regards to its long held interpretation of sovereignty. The paradigm established by NATO in Kosovo demonstrated to the Chinese how easily a foreign power could justify, on simple human rights or humanitarian concerns, intervention into their domestic concerns. Furthermore, the strategic ambiguity proclaimed by the United States in regards to Taiwan represents a significant threat that not only would the United States and its allies would interfere in Taiwan, but may also assist in other separatists movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

Thus, while some authors argue that the Kosovo crisis exemplifies China’s position changed in regards to peacekeeping because of Chinese increasingly perilous security situation throughout the decade, what really changed was the type of PKOs, from

traditional to non-traditional. Kosovo was by definition a non-traditional PKO and therefore, in conformity with China’s previously established policy, was opposed vociferously. Nevertheless, if China did modify its policy, it certainly does not explain why China assigned military observers to PKOs in November of 1989 and offered its greatest contribution to date in the UN effort in Cambodia in 1992. In both instances, China’s participation demonstrates its continued desire, particularly after the 1989 “Tiananmen Square Incident,” to enhance its international reputation and desire to engage the world. This initial participation in PKOs has been followed by several subsequent operations with limited numbers. In sum, from 1989 to 2000, China has filled 532 UN peacekeeping slots with military personnel and civilian police for nine missions. However, Chinese participation in all nine missions and support for other UN PKOs has adhered to the same principles established and constantly re-addressed since 1981.

C. EAST TIMOR

“In contrast to the Kosovo case, China’s statements on East Timor were few in number, brief in length, and modest in tone.” China’s reaction to East Timor, which occurred just six months after Kosovo, is a recent indication of its continued adherence to the policy established under “Dengism.” East Timor received little media attention in China, due to its conformance with traditional norms of peacekeeping. Shen Guofeng, China’s permanent deputy representative to the UN confirmed this position in September of 1999. He is quoted in regards to East Timor as stating: “When the Security Council discussed this draft resolution, China paid close attention to two points: First, the peacekeeping action of the multinational force should be authorized by the UN, and second, when carrying out tasks, the multinational force should cooperate with Indonesia.” The international response to East Timor clearly did not challenge China’s core principles on UN, and it appears that these policies will continue to guide China’s policies into the future.

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216 Gill and Reilly, 44.
217 Ibid., 50.
China did send civilian police officers to East Timor. Although this was a positive demonstration of China’s flexibility of participating in PKOs, it certainly did not indicate willingness to lead or send large numbers of PLA troops to contribute to a Southeast Asian PKO. Even if this were acceptable, there would certainly be some grave reservations on the part of the other ASEAN nations, particularly because of their concern with China’s regional hegemonism displayed by the assertion of claims to sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels. Thus, even if China demonstrated a willingness to participate with a larger number of forces to East Timor, this would have been significantly opposed by the Southeast Asian nations. Furthermore, what must be addressed now are the limitations of the PLA to deploy and sustain themselves at a significant distance from the Chinese mainland.

D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not lack numbers of personnel nor equipment which may be appropriate for PKOs. However, the PLA, despite attempts since 1985 have a significant inability to deploy and sustain themselves at great distances and for lengthy periods. The PLA is currently in the midst of a fundamental change under a military strategy called “high-tech national defense strategy.” This transformation is an attempt to close the technological gap and concurrently redefine the strategy and doctrine in which the PLA will fight. Central to this change is both the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF). While both these services have received increases in spending to allow the PLA to expand its capability to defend in depth, after seventeen years of attempting to modernize the Chinese have yet to procure sufficient equipment to meet the demands of this recent change in doctrine. Nevertheless, China has demonstrated some capabilities by deploying Chinese ships on overseas port visits and developed specialized units, like the Marine Corps, which may be appropriate in a future peacekeeping operation.

In 1979, the PLAN reestablished a marine unit in its South Sea Fleet after a two-decade absence. This later became the First Marine Brigade. According to Ji, “This

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formation underlined the emphasis on flashpoint conflict rather than a large-scale landing operation. This is why the training of the brigade has been heavily influenced by the US and Israeli marine programs.”

The unit has a brigade/battalion/company structure with about 5000 soldiers. Although Ji proclaims the PLAN marines are supported by both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft that provide fire support and assault support, these numbers are extremely limited. The PLAN marines have an extremely limited capability to make a large-scale vertical assault when an amphibious assault is untenable. Furthermore, without a carrier, the Chinese marines do not have aviation fire support beyond the combat radius of PLAN aircraft operating from the mainland. The PLAN marines do however possess a robust assortment of amphibious tanks (T-63) and mortars to provide organic fire support. Nonetheless, this equipment is useless if it cannot be deployed to where it is needed.

One main weak point of the marines is their limited amphibious lift capabilities. The majority of their 700 landing craft are small and incapable of open-ocean navigation. Many of [the] 55 large and medium ships are more than 40 years old, left behind by the Nationalist navy in 1949. Only since the late 1980s has China made the effort to build LSTs and LSMs with displacement of more than 2200 tonnes. But the number is so small that it is far from adequate to support sustained open-ocean operations.

While the short and long term prospects appear that the PLAN marines will be strengthened, it will not be able to conduct large-scale, distant or lengthy deployments in the near future. Consequently, without the PLAN to deploy peacekeepers overseas an evaluation of the PLAAF is required.

In parallel with the recognition of the limits of the PLAN, the PLAAF has received similar emphasis to modernize. For the purposes of this chapter, this section will evaluate China’s capability to deploy and sustain a large-scale peacekeeping force utilizing strategic airlift. With over 470,000 officers and men and about 5,000 aircraft, the PLAAF is one of the largest in the world. A subgroup of the PLAAF, departing
from the norm of most militaries, is the Chinese paratroop units. Currently the 15th Corps is the PLA’s only airborne unit at the army level. However, the elevation of the 15th Corps to the status of a strategic force is indicative of the importance of this unit and of prioritization for modernization. Currently, the 15th Corps claims to have the acquired capability of airdropping at one time with more than 10,000 soldiers with light tanks and self-propelled guns. While the 15th Corps is the most rapid response unit in the PLA, for both internal and external missions, it is severely limited by the available airlift and accompanying close air support at lengthy distances from China. To rectify this situation, China has purchased large transport planes from Russia to provide both troop movement and aerial refueling. However, according to Jane’s, as of 8 January 2002, China has yet to receive any of the four Il-76s it has purchased. Thus, while able to project a large number of both troops and equipment, the PLA is currently restricted in its capability to provide a large-scale peacekeeping force to a location in Southeast Asia.

E. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE

As of March 2002, China has 51 observers, 65 police officers, and 1 soldier participating in UN PKOs, placing it 45th in countries participating. Demonstrating some flexibility on its policy, China has recently established and expanded training programs for peacekeepers in China. However, this is recognition by the Chinese leadership that China must continually entwine itself in the international environment. Nonetheless, the limited Chinese participation is mostly symbolic and certainly does not indicate a significant shift in the two-decade old policy. This static adherence to a classical definition of sovereignty confronts the Chinese with a dilemma in today’s global economy. In fact, in the words of an authoritative Chinese analyst, “the principle of non-intervention must be further strengthened not weakened.” While Beijing maintains its absolute interpretation of sovereignty, and continues to support the preservation of the

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224 Ibid., 146.
225 Jane’s found online at www.janes.com.
UN’s state-centric structure, it diminishes China ability to integrate into the increasingly interdependent world. Ultimately, Beijing’s paradoxical views and policies on PKOs must adapt as the 21st century’s interpretation of sovereignty evolves. While political restraints, both domestically and regionally, prevent the PLA from participating in a leadership role in a regional PKO, its significant military limitations make this an absolute impossibility barring significant international support. As a result, the likelihood is infinitesimal—assuming the United States would not interfere—that China would fulfill the third characteristic of the East Timor Model (ETM) as a responsible international actor to lead a Southeast Asia PKO.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States has sought a willing actor to carry a larger share of the burden to maintain Southeast Asian security and stability—without diminishing its regional leadership role—since it subsumed the position from the British after WWII. However, as NATO, the UN, and other international organizations have demonstrated, the United States is obliged to accept a larger portion of the costs of providing the public good of international security and economic stability while simultaneously upholding national interests. Hegemonic stability theory was developed and proposed by Charles Kindleberger in a book written about the 1930s global economic crisis. He suggested that the global hegemon must bear a disproportionate cost of maintaining a stable global economy, while allowing smaller states to free ride. In Southeast Asia, where post-colonial states such as Indonesia are narrowly avoiding disintegration, the United States—the existing regional hegemon—must recognize its responsibility to carry a disproportionate share of the costs to maintain stability in a region often regarded as unimportant in Eurocentric U.S. policy circles. If the United States endeavors to utilize the East Timor Model (ETM) as a policy approach in a future peacekeeping scenario, it may well find itself marginalized by another country that accepts the leadership role to promote its own interests by challenging the current regional system. Further, the United States will fulfill the prophecy accepted by Southeast Asian states that U.S. policy is often reactive and ad hoc towards the region. Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated that there is not a willing and capable actor to fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM and therefore eager to challenge the current system. Consequently, without U.S. leadership, absent a UN force capable of quickly deploying a peacekeeping force to a rapidly deteriorating situation, or in the absence of a regional actor able to intervene, it is implausible that a crisis may be resolved without unacceptable humanitarian costs and possible escalation.

The region’s largest indigenous powers, China and Japan, as demonstrated by this thesis, are currently unwilling to hastily alter the current status quo for individual national interests. Consequently, both these countries are willing to accept the role of the United
States as the regional hegemon, as long as it supports their present interests. However, it must be assumed that if China or Japan accept a greater role by leading a legitimate PKO, they would do so only in their national interests. Consequently, these interests—even those of our ally Japan—may not converge with those of the United States. The result would likely challenge and change the system the United States has maintained since 1945.

ASEAN, and its outgrowth ARF, is an “imitation community”\(^\text{229}\) and, as demonstrated by this thesis, specifically by their handling of the East Timor crisis in 1999, is not yet prepared to move onto Stage III of the *ARF Concept Paper*—conflict resolution. A more plausible leadership scenario for ASEAN would be to direct an extraregional PKO, such as a South Asian or Northeast Asian situation. However, ASEAN, like the other countries analyzed in this thesis is not at this time militarily prepared to accept such as role. Until the members of ASEAN consolidate their states’ grasp of legitimate power and ease the burdens of internal security issues, their militaries will continue to be focused inward. Although U.S. allies, Thailand the Philippines, and Malaysia have shown promise as peacekeepers and promoters of human rights, it is obvious after INTERFET, that this would occur only under the leadership of the United States.

Australia—as ostensibly demonstrated in East Timor—presents the best hope to fulfill the third characteristic of the ETM. However, as this thesis and many scholars have articulated, INTERFET was led by Australia for domestic political reasons, and therefore Australia did not accept a *de facto* “deputy” role as assumed by some in the United States. Consequently, it is unlikely that a future PKO in Southeast Asia—one which likely requires a significantly large amount of troops, equipment and funding—would provide analogous incentives for Australia to automatically accept a comparable leadership role in future PKO. It is reasonable, however, to assume that Australia would contribute a significant portion of the forces to a future crisis. Nonetheless, it is overly idealistic and unfathomable that Australia, a country of barely 20 million inhabitants, could lead an operation in which Indonesia disintegrated.

\(^{229}\) David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith.
This thesis has demonstrated the East Timor Model (ETM) is a flawed policy approach, predominantly because the third characteristic of the model cannot be fulfilled without a change to the regional system maintained by the United States since 1945. Therefore, this thesis recommends the model be adjusted to reflect the actual regional conditions in Southeast Asia. Thus, characteristic three must be modified to reflect the United States’ aspiration to have regional actors play a larger role and contribute a larger burden of the costs to maintain the current system, while America continues to lead and fulfill the responsibility of regional hegemon. The modified model must encourage and pressure Japan, China, ASEAN, and Australia to accept proportionate costs, while the United States retains its leadership role and the primacy of its interests. When the United States no longer is willing to accept the responsibility to lead as the regional hegemon, only then may it retire as the region’s policeman.
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