Exit Strategy Options: Why the Use of Regional Forces is Important and How the CINC Can Prepare for Their Use.

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Exit strategies have historically been difficult to plan for because they very rarely have been established or gamed prior to the onset of a particular conflict. In the post Cold War era, with the U.S. serving as a de-facto policeman for the world, it has become politically important to find a way to include the use of regional allied forces in the execution military operations. There needs to be a change of doctrine that includes the use of these forces for exit strategy option planning. This research paper offers four recommendations for the inclusion of regional forces and improvement of exit strategy option planning.

1. Identify possible regional partners or security organizations capable or willing to lead peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operations.
2. Tailor theater military to military exercises, sales, and training with foreign forces to improve their ability to meet the demands posed by leading or participating in a regional stabilization effort.
3. Build OPLANS and CONPLANS that include exit strategy options tailored by the TEPs.
4. Incorporate exit strategy option planning into Joint publications IOT change the current culture and doctrine that sees it as a follow-on to war termination.

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Title:

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Abstract:

Exit strategies have historically been difficult to plan for because they very rarely have been established or gamed prior to the onset of a particular conflict. In the post Cold War era, with the U.S. serving as a de-facto policeman for the world, it has become politically important to find a way to include the use of regional allied forces in the execution of military operations. There needs to be a change in doctrine that includes the use of these forces for exit strategy option planning.

This research paper offers four recommendations for the inclusion of regional forces and improvement of exit strategy option planning.

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Thesis: Regional coalitions or alliances, if properly tailored by a Theater Strategy, can provide the CINCs with acceptable exit strategy options for contingency operations.

In the history of war, exit strategies are a relatively new and novel concept. In the past, wars routinely revolved around the acquisition of land or the destruction of a competitor’s means to compete economically and militarily. A superior power routinely defeated the enemy force and annexed their territory (the United States defeats Mexico and acquires the American Southwest)\(^1\) or destroyed their economic capability (Rome defeats Carthage and salts the surrounding farmland).\(^2\) It may be said that exit strategies are especially foreign to the United States because the American way of war prior to World War II was to go in, fight, win, and go home. Following WWII the U.S. found itself occupying two former Axis countries (Germany and Japan), the leading economic power in the world, and one of two superpowers vying for global supremacy in a Cold War that was to last 45 years. These requirements necessitated that the U.S. maintain a permanent forward presence to deter the Soviet Union via alliances and a policy of containment. The plans and strategies developed for use against the Soviet Union and their allies were successful, but they did not in any way prepare U.S. political and military leaders for the thought processes required for the development of doctrine and planning to govern exit strategies in a post Cold War environment. Today the U.S. military finds itself, like it or not, as a policeman for the world. This new reality finds U.S. military forces operating in ways previously unimagined, and operating under a new set of rules that don’t include the old Soviet Union. “Smaller-scale contingency operations
encompassing the full range of military operations, including peacekeeping, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, counter drug operations, providing humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operations are now major missions that need to be planned for.” The failure of both political and military leaders to realize that the post Cold War environment called for a more regional focus to project power has led to numerous less than optimal military operations with poorly conceived and implemented exit strategies. The lessons learned from these operations have slowly found their way into the Presidents National Security Strategy⁴ and hence the National Military Strategy.⁵ The resultant Joint Strategic Planning System requires the geographic CINCs to prepare and forward comprehensive Theater Strategies that should address these failures. Embedded in this deliberate planning process and the respective Theater Engagement Plans are the seeds of change that may lead to the requirement for the use of regional forces to support exit strategy option planning.

From the decline of the Soviet Union to the present, the U.S. has found itself involved in numerous foreign conflicts. These conflicts have ranged from full blown large-scale wars, as was fought in the Persian Gulf against Iraq, to humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia. In the prosecution of these conflicts, the U.S. has run the gamut of possibilities from acting unilaterally to participating as a member of a United Nations peacekeeping force. To debate how successful these operations were is the topic for another paper, but what can be said is that many of these operations concluded with U.S. political and military leaders very unsatisfied with the resultant exit strategies that were implemented.
Is this really the case? One only has to look at the Gulf War for verification. The deliberate planning process seemed to be working very well, providing the CINC with an OPLAN that could be modified to fit the situation. U.S. and coalition forces went into the conflict with a U.N. mandate, very specific goals, well-defined commanders intent, and a declared end state. The overwhelming victory achieved by coalition forces during DESERT STORM is well documented, so why is it considered a failure when discussing exit strategies? The reason is obvious, the mere existence of Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, along with the massive U.S. military footprint requirements in the area attests to its failure. It is easy to second-guess the assumptions and conclusions drawn by the Bush administration prior to ordering the termination of offensive operations, but one can assume that they did not contemplate the reality of the past ten plus years of near daily conflict. Would the President have made the decision for war termination when he did if part of the deliberate planning process required the CINC to present him with not only a checklist for factors to determine war termination, but also a plan detailing the conditions to be met to execute a viable exit strategy option? I don’t suggest that I have the exit strategy handy that would have been successful, but the campaign plan should have gone beyond war termination to include setting the stage for viable exit strategy options. The culture and doctrine employed by the people involved in the deliberate planning process must be changed to the point where considering war termination prior to preparing the AOR for the execution of viable exit strategy options would be considered as ridiculous as conducting shaping and decisive operations without including a sustainment phase.
Over the past fifteen years the U.S. military has conducted literally hundreds if not thousand of successful operations ranging from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping – peace enforcement, to the use of military force. The vast majority of these have been successful, but it is the few that didn’t go quite so smoothly that attracted the most attention. It was in these instances that shortcomings in the deliberate planning process revealed a disconnect that somehow had exit strategies postured to be follow-on events to the completion of an operation instead of integral to its completion.

Events that cause a mission to fail can be innumerable, but for the purposes of this paper I will highlight the four following factors in relation to their impact on exit strategies; an unwillingness to accept casualties, the “wait the Americans out” strategy, a failure to “choose sides”, and the use of regional forces.

First, there is a perception around the world that U.S. political leaders are unwilling to accept any casualties in the conduct of operations. This perception is based somewhat upon the track record established in Beirut, Somalia, and Kosovo. In the first two instances, no matter what the true reasons were, public and international perception was that the U.S. withdrew its forces because of casualties sustained – not upon mission completion. Rightly or wrongly, following the sustainment of casualties the President opted for the termination of operations, and the formulation of an exit strategy followed. Would things have unfolded differently if the deliberate planning process forwarded the President a plan prior to the insertion of troops that laid out various actions to be completed to prepare the AOR for the implementation of a viable exit strategy? In the instance of Kosovo, the political fear of casualties was so great that the use of
ground troops to prosecute the mission was taken off the table before hostilities even began. This could be called the political version of a preemptive exit strategy, but it isn’t a logical way to defeat or deter an opponent, as the U.S. and NATO were to discover.

The concept of inflicting casualties relates closely with the second factor of “waiting the Americans out.” There is a perception in the world that the U.S. public and its accompanying political process will not support sustained peacekeeping – peace enforcement operations. This perception traces its roots back to the Vietnam War, where the North Vietnamese employed the strategy of not so much as trying to win the conflict, but trying not to lose it. The Vietnamese rightly realized that the only way they could defeat the U.S. was to exhaust the will of the American people to continue. The lasting impression made by the Vietnam War has had a dramatic impact on how politicians in the U.S. view the commitment of military forces. One only has to look at the public debates surrounding the time limits arbitrarily applied to operations in Bosnia Herzegovina to find support for this line of thinking. If conflict exit strategies are publicly debated and mandated to end on a specific date, then there is a real possibility that the opposition may employ delaying tactics to “outlast” the U.S. force presence.

The third factor to consider is the one of choosing sides. It is difficult to implement a successful exit strategy when the underlying conflict remains unresolved. I would argue that the operations in Kosovo and Somalia were critically flawed based upon this premise. In Somalia, U.S. planners knew somewhat whom they were against, but an effective plan for long-term stability to lay the groundwork for an exit strategy option couldn’t be developed because military operations
weren’t being conducted to support any identifiable Somalian leader. In Kosovo U.S. and NATO forces find themselves in partitioned security zones, trying to separate two hostile groups whom both have increasing reasons to dislike/distrust the peacekeepers. This dislike/distrust will continue to grow until a solution for the control of the contested area is found. Unfortunately for the local populace, it is difficult to imagine finding a solution that will be equally acceptable to both sides. That means that unless the U.S. and NATO intend on becoming permanent peacekeepers, one side is going to have to be favored over the other in order to craft a viable security solution and a subsequent workable exit strategy.

And now I come to the fourth and final factor, the factor of the use of regional forces. Foreign conquerors make poor peacekeepers. It is only natural for a defeated populace to resent or hate the very people who have killed their soldiers and deposed their leaders. When these forces arrive on scene with built in cultural and language differences, it only exacerbates the problem. To compound these existing problems, U.S. forces arrive on any scene with the local populace having a built-in bias of envy toward U.S. superpower status and economic prosperity. When these perceptions are combined with the previous three factors, one could deduce that U.S. forces are probably the worst peacekeepers imaginable to use following a U.S. led military operation. For these reasons it may be prudent for future U.S. planners to craft exit strategy options that envision the use of regional forces in post-hostilities operations. Regional forces bring a sense of consistency to a problem that isn’t present with U.S. troops. Regional forces can’t pack up and go home to a land thousands of miles away, they have to live in the same neighborhood as the troubled state. A
neighboring or regional country has legitimate reasons to seek economic and social stability within its sphere of influence. Cultural and language differences may exist, but they are mostly known qualities that have historical norms and solutions associated with them. Obviously, one would hope that these forces had not previously engaged in the conflict (this is why NATO forces are a poor peacekeeping option in Kosovo), and in fact this would be a requirement in the development of any viable exit strategy option planning.

At this point it may be a good time to restate my thesis: Regional coalitions or alliances, if properly tailored by a Theater Strategy, can provide the CINCs with acceptable exit strategy options for future contingency operations. A review of the most current National Security Strategy, and the more dated National Military Strategy would fail to produce direct tasking requiring the geographic CINC to take any action concerning the use of regional forces to plan exit strategy options. The concept of Shaping through Engagement is still relatively new, but I would say that if one looks closely at those documents the ideas presented in my thesis would become readily apparent.

“The United States need not take on sole responsibility for operations and expenditures in Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs). In fact, we have encouraged and supported friends and allies’ assumption of both participatory and leadership roles in regional conflicts.”

Does this statement not seem to infer that the U.S. wants some help in being the world’s policeman?

“Coalition efforts in SSCs raise the critical question of command and control. Under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his constitutional command authority over U.S. forces. However, there may be times in the future, just as in the past, when it is in our interest to place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of a competent allied or United Nations commander.”

It’s hard to imagine large amounts of U.S. combat forces being assigned to allied or United Nations commands, but can one imagine U.S. forces
serving in a logistics/support role for a regional partner involved in a Small-scale contingency?

“Third, while retaining unilateral capability, whenever possible we must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths. Finally, we must ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement and withdrawing military forces are clearly established.”\(^{19}\)

This seems to state the requirement for exit strategy option planning, as well as tasking the CINC’s to find a way to maximize the use of allies and coalition partners in Small-scale contingencies. With the revolution in military affairs continuing, the technological distance between the U.S. and its allies can only be expected to widen, severely limiting their ability to participate in simultaneous combat operations.

With this in mind, one option for maximizing ally or coalition participation could be in tailoring their forces to facilitate exit strategy options for U.S. forces. These regional partners could ably serve as the intermediary cohesive force to provide a stable turnover to United Nations operational leadership.

The current National Security Strategy is a product of the Clinton administration. Are there any clues to suggest that President Bush may continue to employ this same strategy? A review of the transcripts from the second Bush – Gore Presidential debate yielded the following clues.

“If we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. ...And that’s why we’ve got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom.”\(^{20}\)

These statements seem to indicate that President Bush intends to continue to use the concept of “Shaping”, but “Shaping” in a way that lowers the profile of U.S. operations to possibly include playing a secondary role to regional security organizations and allies.

Is this a realistic strategy to pursue? Would regional allies or security organizations find it in their interest to come forward and lead a security operation with the U.S. assisting them in a supporting role? The example set and leadership displayed by the Australians in
East Timor during operation “Stabilise” answers that question with a resounding yes. The U.S. ambassador to Australia summarized the point in April 2000, when Genta Hawkins Holmes pointed out:

“…the lesson of Timor is that the alliance works – and works beautifully …Demonstrating your value as an ally once more, Australia stepped forward to take the lead in organizing the force which became INTERFET. East Timor is on Australia’s doorstep, and Australia has strong emotional ties to the territory. Under such circumstances it was entirely appropriate for Australia to take the lead.”

Under a strongly worded U.N. mandate that authorized INTERFET to take all necessary measures in the completion of its mission, the Australian Defense Force organized a coalition that paid particular attention to ensuring participation and coordination with their ASEAN partners. Prior to this operation, ASEAN countries had long adhered to a policy of nonintervention in other member’s internal affairs. There was a real fear that:

“‘involvement in another ASEAN country’s internal problems may destroy the notion of cooperation and unity between ASEAN members.’ Consequently the deployment of the multinational force to East Timor constitutes a significant precedent and may mark a departure point for regional security relationships. The participation of ASEAN countries in the force did not cause the heavens to fall – if anything, it provided balance and enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the operation within the region.”

With all this regional assistance it is still important to note that the Australians could not have executed the mission without U.S. support.

“Although the U.S. presence was not obvious in terms of troops on the ground, it was critical to the success of the mission. There can be no doubt that the political leverage it provided (backed up by the presence of the USS Belleau Wood with its contingent of Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit) – and the substantial logistical, communications and intelligence support that the U.S. military could provide – enabled INTERFET to ‘box above its weight’.”

An examination of U.S. forces provided to the Australians for “Stabilise” confirms this premise. There is no doubt that the Australian conduct of operation “Stabilise”, while acting as the lead nation for INTERFET, was a huge success. Under their leadership the U.S. was able to address three of the four conditions that had previously led to failed intervention policies and the adoption of ad
hoc exit strategies. For this operation the Australians chose a side (the people of East Timor and the follow-on United Nations transition team), eliminated the “wait them out” strategy from the opposition via a precisely worded UN resolution in conjunction with the threat of the use of the 31st MEU’s Marines, and employed Regional forces to prosecute the mission. If the current administration’s policy concerning the ability to withstand the sustainment of casualties continues, it would appear that all four factors impacting on exit strategy development have been addressed and a blueprint for successful Small-scale contingency operations has been provided to the CINCs.

If the CINCs were to choose to act upon this blueprint they would have a powerful tool at their disposal to assist implementation, the Theater Strategy.\(^{26}\) There are many elements of a Theater Strategy, but the two critical to this discussion are the deliberate planning process and the theater engagement plan. It is through the use of these two elements that the geographic CINCs can make a dramatic improvement in regional security by mandating the development of exit strategy options.

When developing a Theater Strategy within the context of the deliberate planning process, a CINC has four types of plans to work with. These four plans (OPLAN’s, CONPLAN’s with or without TPFDD, functional plans, and supporting plans) contain many factors, but a desired end state is the most important. When contemplating the development of an end state, the wording must be such that the inclusion of exit strategy options is a requirement. For this to succeed, a change in the culture and doctrine associated with exit strategies needs to be undertaken. A review of several publications readily displays the flaw in current doctrine and subsequent planning. Considerations for exit strategy options aren’t even discussed in JFSC PUB 1’s “Tests for Course of Action”.\(^{27}\) Even the Naval War College curriculum may be found lacking. After a week studying the Commanders Estimate of the Situation, and working through an accompanying war game, exit strategy option planning wasn’t even discussed. For viable exit strategies to be developed, they must be considered from the start of an operation, not something thrown in to follow war
termination. The current Joint Pub 5-00.2 “Checklist for Termination Planning”\textsuperscript{28} doesn’t even consider exit strategies, let alone if the AOR has been shaped to the point where a viable exit strategy could be executed. The checklist does consider the achievement of the end state, but the only way that would appropriately address exit strategy options would be if that requirement were made an integral part of the end state itself.

A review of documents pertaining to MOOTW yields the same lack of appropriate doctrine and direction in the handling of exit strategy options. “The Principles of MOOTW”\textsuperscript{29} contain a glaring contradiction to the consideration of exit strategy options. The principle of Perseverance on its face calls for JFC’s to “Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.”\textsuperscript{30} I understand the point behind the principle of Perseverance, but, in the absence of a principle that mandates the leader to shape the AOR in order to execute a viable exit strategy option, it seems to highlight my point. Maybe the planning for exit strategies lies within the principle of the “Objective”. A search yields cautions for subtle changes in the military objective, advice for specifying measures of success, and unfortunately it includes examples that may lead to the premature abandonment of the operation (yikes, preplanning for an ad hoc exit strategy?).\textsuperscript{31}

It seems that the existence and development of exit strategy options are directly tied to their inclusion as part of the desired end state. Fortunately, this is something the CINC’s have direct control over through the deliberate planning process. Until a change in culture, doctrine, and associated joint publications with respect to the development of exit strategy options can be adopted, geographic CINC’s need to ensure that all plans developed address this inherent weakness.
My thesis calls for the use of regional forces to enable exit strategy option planning - is that realistic? Have any other nations other than Australia expressed any desire to come forward and assist the U.S. in the crafting of an exit strategy?

“With strong U.S. backing, overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey officially agreed Monday to take command of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. …For months Turkey has considered taking command of the force, but was concerned that the mission would be too costly for a nation experiencing a sharp economic crisis. …Turkey has a strong history for participating in peacekeeping missions. …Turkey regards Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence and has had ties with Afghanistan for decades.”

Regional powers and security organizations have legitimate concerns for the stability and political makeup of countries within their sphere of influence. Whether it’s Australia in East Timor or Turkey in Afghanistan, if countries find it in their best interest to respond to a crisis they will act. In fact, Canada and other NATO countries are forwarding policies stating that conflicts that aren’t even in a country’s national interest must be contained for moral reasons, as well as their negative impact upon global trade. The job of the geographic CINCs should be to ensure that countries willing to assist the U.S. in maintaining regional stability are trained and equipped to complete the task. The Theater Engagement Plan is the primary planning tool for the CINCs to use in the completion of this task.

The Theater Engagement Plan is primarily a strategic planning process intended to link CINC related regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. “Activities that the CINC can use to shape allies in his AOR are defined as including: operational activities, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and any other activity the CINC designates.” Through the use of these activities the CINCs have the ability to shape or build an environment that facilitates the participation of regional allies in small-scale
contingencies. Regional exercises could be tailored to de-emphasize combined war fighting with an increased priority placed on U.S. forces playing a supporting role to allied led stabilization or peacekeeping missions. In this way the CINC can exercise and strengthen ally command and control leadership abilities amongst potential regional coalition members. Military sales, training, and education can be geared to posture regional allies with the niche capabilities required to conduct these operations. As U.S. forces become lighter, more lethal, and fewer in number, and the technological gap between it and its allies continues to widen, the most efficient interaction between the two may be using the allies as stabilization forces. This is not unprecedented. “Some countries – the Scandinavian nations, Canada, and now New Zealand stand out – have even made involvement in peace operations the keystone of their own security doctrine.”

I would like to present two counter arguments to the use of regional forces for exit strategy planning purposes. What if no countries agree with U.S. intervention in a particular situation? What if no exit strategy options exist other than long term occupation? In both instances, if the CINC had planned otherwise doesn’t that limit U.S. policy options? No. “Where our vital interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive, and if necessary, unilateral. In situations posing a threat to important national interests, ... We act in concert with the international community whenever possible, but do not hesitate to act unilaterally when necessary.” The use of regional forces could potentially relieve the workload of U.S. military units when practical, while sharing some of the burden of policing the world. Their absence does not in any way prevent the completion of the mission. If planning reveals that intervention into a country will lead
to a long-term presence requirement, it doesn’t eliminate the option to take action; it only provides another fact for the construction of a sound policy decision.

Conclusion: In a perfect world, a CINC would be able to execute a plan in three phases. The operation would start with the introduction of overwhelming U.S. combat power, followed by a regionally led stabilization force (with U.S assistance) to shape the environment for subsequent turnover to a U.N. peacekeeping/nation building team. To some extent, this was the model used in East Timor, and by capitalizing on Turkey’s involvement; it could provide the long-term exit strategy from Afghanistan. Does this paper prove that regional coalitions or alliances, if properly tailored by a Theater Strategy, can provide the CINCs with acceptable exit strategy options for contingency operations?

I think so. For this concept to work, the CINCs must make exit strategy options an integral part of the end states used to develop plans via the deliberate planning process. By planning for the exit from the beginning (regressive planning), the CINC can forward options up the chain for how the operation needs to develop prior to the end of hostilities. This doesn’t limit the President’s options; it just makes it easier for the NCA to make informed decisions for war termination. The use of regional forces provides international legitimacy as well as political cover in the U.S. If the use of regional forces can offset the American public’s historical fear and unwillingness to: sustain casualties in a peacekeeping operation, to demand a preset operation end date, and find a way to resolve the conflict, then their use significantly enhances a CINC’s planning options. The CINC’s must use their Theater Engagement Plans to shape the security environment to encourage regional organizations and allies to participate in Small-
scale Contingencies. Through the use of training exercises, military sales, and education the CINC’s need to ensure that regional forces are able to meet and excel in the completion of these missions. If funding becomes a critical factor in whether an ally can participate in a stabilizing operation, as it was for both Australia and Turkey, then the CINC must find a way to plan for and overcome this contingency. By “Shaping” the countries in the AOR, the CINC’s will be able to best select which allies will be used for combat operations and which will serve as stabilization forces. Having a plan that includes the use of regional forces to better enact exit strategy options will ultimately lead to better employment of scarce military resources (both U.S. and ally), greater regional stability, and the timely return of U.S. personnel following the completion of an operation.

Based upon the conclusions reached in this paper, I make the following recommendations:

1. Identify possible regional partners or security organizations capable or willing to lead peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operations.

2. Tailor theater military to military exercises, sales, and training with foreign forces to improve their ability to meet the demands posed by leading or participating in a regional stabilization effort.

3. Build OPLANS and CONPLANs that include exit strategy options as tailored by the TEPs.

4. Incorporate exit strategy option planning into Joint publications IOT change the current culture and doctrine that sees it as a follow-on to war termination.
“The water downstream will not be clear if the water upstream is muddied.”

- Korean Proverb
Tests for Course of Action

**SUITABLE.** Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives and does it comply with the supported commanders guidance?

**FEASIBLE.** Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

**ACCEPTABLE.** Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position? Is the action consistent with the law of war and military/politically supportable?

**DISTINGUISHABLE.** Each COA must be significantly different from the others. Plans will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved/test publications in the Joint Publication System. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine when preparing plans facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of planned operations. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not the case. The Commander’s Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COA’s preempts the CINC’s decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander’s Estimate.

**COMPLETE.** When COAs have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer?

- **Who** (what forces) will execute it?
- **What** type of action is contemplated?
- **When** it is to begin (i.e., M, C, T, or D-Day time provided for major actions for every force in the OPLAN)?
- **Where** it will take place?
- **How** it will be accomplished? There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed.

The refined COAs are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is taken not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the “how”.
APPENDIX B

CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING

__ Has the end state been achieved?
    __ Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
    __ Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered and how do they influence termination planning?
    __ Has the commander, joint task force identified postconflict requirements?

__ Can forces be safely withdrawn from the joint operations area? What are the force security requirements?
    __ What additional support will be required for redeployment?
    __ What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of JTF forces?
    __ What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by JTF forces?

__ Has coordination for redeployment of the JTF been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
__ Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will be released?
__ Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?
    __ What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

__ Will the JTF be expected to support these types of activities?
Turkey to Take Over Afghan Mission

Monday, April 29, 2002

Associated Press

ANKARA, Turkey — With strong U.S. backing, overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey officially agreed Monday to take command of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. The change supports Washington's position that the war against terror is not between Islam and the West.

The Turkish government said it would take command of the 4,500-member, 18-nation force from Britain for six months, but gave no date. British officials said they did not believe that a handover would take place before June.

"The date of the takeover will be determined following negotiations with Afghanistan, Britain and the United Nations," Cabinet spokesman Yılmaz Karakoyunlu said.

The announcement came after Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld sent a letter to the Turkish government assuring full U.S. support if Turkey takes command of the force, private NTV television reported.

Turkey has some 270 peacekeepers in Afghanistan and is the only Muslim country that has contributed to the force, which is responsible for patrolling the capital, Kabul.

The United States had been strongly encouraging Turkey, NATO's sole Muslim member and a staunchly secular state, to head the force.

Washington sees Western-oriented Turkey as a role model for Afghanistan. Turkey's leadership of the force would also support Washington's argument that the fight in Afghanistan is a battle against terror and not a clash between Islam and the West.

In London, British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon welcomed the Turkish announcement and said a British contingent would remain with the force after Turkey took over leadership.

Britain has led the force since the Security Council established it in late December and had wanted to hand over command in April.

For months, Turkey has considered taking command of the force, but was concerned that the mission would be too costly for a nation experiencing a sharp economic crisis.

Turkey was also concerned over Afghan demands that the force should be expanded throughout the country to stop regional warlords from vying for power.

Turkey's financial concerns seem to have been met in March, when U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visited and promised that the Bush administration would ask Congress for $200 million in economic aid and $28 million in military aid for Turkey.

The Turkish announcement said that the force would continue to be responsible only for security in Kabul.

Turkey has said that it would enlarge its force to about 1,000 troops if it assumes command.

Turkey has a strong history of participating in peacekeeping missions.

A Turkish general headed the mission in Somalia, although Turkey did not have a significant number of ground troops as part of that mission.

Turkey also sent peacekeepers to mostly Muslim Kosovo and Bosnia.

Turkey regards Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence and has had ties with Afghanistan for decades.

In the 1920s, Turkish military officers were sent to Afghanistan to train the military there. Turkey has been sending medical aid to Afghanistan for years and a Turkish-supplied hospital in Kabul has stayed open throughout the rise and fall of the Islamic Taliban militia.
NOTES

1 John S. D. Eisenhower, *So Far From God: The U.S. War With Mexico 1846-1848* (New York: Random House, 1989), 363. “The boundary between the two countries would run along the Rio Grande to the southern boundary of New Mexico – close to Trist’s earlier proposal – thence west along the Gila River to the Gulf of California. From there it would run westward along a line just south of San Diego to the Pacific Ocean.”

2 Gilbert Picard, *Carthage* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing CO., 1965), 152. “The city was burnt to ashes, the ruins razed to the very foundations, the soil was scattered with salt, survivors were sold into slavery, and even the gods were taken to Rome…”


4 Ibid.


6 President George H.W. Bush, “Responding To Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf”, *National Security Directive (NSD) 54* (15 January 1991). Political and military objectives required to the cessation of hostilities: a) to effect the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; b) to restore Kuwait’s legitimate government; c) to protect the lives of American Citizens abroad; and d) to promote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

7 Ralph A. Hallenbeck, *Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982 – February 1984* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 145. “Nor was there much possibility that Congress would sustain even a low level of U.S. military intervention over the long haul, especially if that intervention produced more than a trickle of U.S. casualties.”

8 Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking for the New Century* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 23. Since countries contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations on a purely voluntary basis, they are at liberty to withdraw their troops at will and can decide to do so for various political reasons. This happened in Somalia, where the United States decided to withdraw its troops following an incident in which several U.S. servicemen were killed.


12 Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 176. “In contrast, those committed to building a lasting peace in Bosnia viewed deadlines as both artificial and detrimental to meeting key objectives. Deadlines, Holbrooke maintained, ”left the impression that the Serbs might be able to outwait the enforcing powers, thus encouraging delaying tactics. By laying out self-imposed time limits the United States only weakened itself.”


Ibid.


23 Alan Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor (Duntroon ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 304, November 2000), 47.

24 Ibid., 76.


27 Ibid., 4-42. Included as Appendix A.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., II-1.


33 Berel Rodal, The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective: Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), 25. “Even where Canada’s interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern communications technologies make us real-time witness to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world.”

34 Ibid., 25. “There is, however, a central thread which runs through the policies and statements of Canadian and other NATO governments over the last few years, and which is colouring the development of military doctrine, organization and practice. This thread involved the view that conflicts will erupt which will need to be contained; that some conflicts present a moral challenge that can’t be ignored; and that in an interconnected world, conflicts have the potential to affect others, or to spread. …because it is in their national and collective interests to trade freely with the world.”

35 CJCSM 3113.01, Theater Engagement Planning, 01 February 1998, A-10.

36 Alan Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor (Duntroon ACT, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 304, November 2000), 55.


