LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT:  
THE NEED FOR A MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS COMMAND

by

Eugene W. Mittuch
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: __________________________

Faculty Advisor: Lt Col John Brence

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## Personal Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Eugene W. Mittuch, USAF

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## Abstract

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## Name of Responsible Individual

CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

## Telephone

841-3556

## Office Symbol

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these new capabilities and to efficiently manage the unique logistics requirements of a rapid
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logistics command.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful political-military alliance in history. Despite the minor friction present in any relationship between sovereign nations (such as France withdrawing from the integrated military command structure in 1966), for forty years the Alliance stood steadfast against the further spread of communism in Europe. Even with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the Alliance endures. While the demise of the Soviet Union certainly changed the way NATO members looked at themselves militarily, the Alliance has shown naysayers that it has not lost its reason for existing. In fact, NATO is currently more active than ever; it has expanded its original mission of collective defense to include undertaking out-of-area peace support operations with multinational rapid reaction forces. These new missions have serious implications for logistics. NATO logistics, which traditionally have been exclusively a national responsibility, can no longer be effectively executed in this manner. Attempts to do so, such as during peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, have not shown encouraging results. During these operations ad hoc logistics command and control organizations were established, none of which achieved an acceptable level of unity of effort. This in turn, did not allow the Alliance to make the best use of its limited resources, or to maximize its logistics power. To effectively undertake out-of-area operations with multinational forces in the future, the Alliance requires improved capabilities in mobility, logistical integration and sustainability, and logistics command and control. Furthermore, to make the most effective use of these new capabilities and to efficiently manage the unique logistics requirements of a rapid reaction force operating outside Alliance territory, NATO should establish a standing multinational logistics command.

NATO’s Cold War Logistics

The armed forces of NATO’s original 16 member nations trained and exercised together for 50 years, so multinational operations are not new. However, while NATO coordinated many interoperability exercises during the Cold War, logistics support remained strictly a national
responsibility. Each nation in the Alliance armed, moved, maintained and sustained its own forces. What little logistical support was not provided for nationally was coordinated and contracted for through Host Nation Support agreements between individual nations rather than through a centralized and coordinated system or headquarters.\(^i\)

Operational logistics during the Cold War were largely focused on the security situation in Central Europe and the need to repel a massive attack through the Fulda Gap. To counter this threat NATO forces were assigned to defensive sectors in specific geographical areas. As a purely defensive alliance, NATO had the advantage of short, interior lines of communication. Logistics preparations involved extensive stockpiling of equipment and critical supplies, well rehearsed mobilization and reinforcement plans, and established support channels. These measures were designed to rapidly step up operational readiness in times of crisis to achieve maximum combat capability. At the time, national preparation and support for its own logistics made sense considering the clear-cut assignment of geographical defensive areas. Also, given the survival interests of NATO members, host nation support was virtually guaranteed, and civil emergency planning ensured that all civil resources, to include communications, transportation assets, and medical support would be available.\(^ii\)

**NATO’s New Expeditionary Mission: The Need for a Change in Logistics**

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era for NATO, leading to a radical change in the Alliance’s strategic concept. From its establishment in 1949 through the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Alliance’s mission was collective defense. This involved a coordinated defense among members designed to prevent aggression from an outside threat or to repel aggression should an attack occur. Collective defense can be summed up in Article V of NATO’s original charter as, “an armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against all.”\(^iii\)

Starting in July 1990 with the London Declaration, the Alliance moved from its historical mission of collective defense toward a role of collective security. Collective security is best represented by the United Nations; it is an arrangement in which an organization is authorized to settle disputes
among its own members. The subtle, yet important distinction between the two missions is that collective defense focuses on a direct threat to organization members, while collective security emphasizes managing risk factors which could lead to instability.\textsuperscript{iv} Under collective security, any region in NATO’s area of responsibility, which expanded in 1999 with the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the alliance, is now seen as a potential theater of operations.\textsuperscript{v} Of special significance is that for the first time the Alliance’s expanded strategic concept also includes the potential for operations outside Alliance territory. These are now commonly known as out-of-area operations. In the London Declaration, NATO also declared its willingness to accept mandates from international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union.\textsuperscript{vi} It was under these auspices that NATO acted in the Balkans.

NATO later officially expanded its scope of missions during a meeting of Alliance Foreign Ministers in Berlin in July 1996. The ministers called for the Alliance to develop the ability to carry out new roles and missions related to conflict prevention, crisis management, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.\textsuperscript{vii} Since the July 1996 meeting European political leaders have further defined NATO’s new roles and missions, putting their emphasis on what are now referred to as the Petersberg tasks (defined at a meeting just outside of Bonn in Petersberg, Germany). These tasks include a broad spectrum of peace support operations ranging from humanitarian relief and civilian rescue to crisis management and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{viii} NATO’s new strategic concept involves a shift from heavy forces in forward defense to that of rapid reaction light forces in expeditionary operations; this in turn requires a new approach to logistics.

To effectively command and control in this new operational environment NATO implemented the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. CJTFs were to be flexible, mobile, standing headquarters able to conduct limited contingency operations outside Alliance borders.\textsuperscript{ix} However, to more effectively use limited manpower resources, NATO is now shying away from having standing CJTFs. Instead, members envision establishing some form of nucleus element
within existing headquarters. This core element would then be augmented with added staff
modules upon mission activation. This nuclei CJTF concept may unfortunately make
multinational logistics even harder.

NATO has some experience with logistically supporting multinational rapid reaction
forces, so it understands the difficulties it faces. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land
(AMF[L]), developed in the mid-1970’s was NATO’s initial immediate reaction force. This
brigade sized force, which is still an active organization based in Heidelberg, Germany, and
assembled at the request of SACEUR, was designed to be air transportable and capable of
deploying anywhere within NATO in a short period of time. An examination of AMF(L)
logistics reveals some of the difficulties NATO faces in supporting multinational operations.

Member countries have National Support Elements (NSE) which are incorporated into a Logistics
Support Battalion headquarters. The commander of the AMF(L) assumes tactical command of all
the NSEs; however, these NSEs support only their own national forces. The Logistics Support
Battalion commander can only ask for cooperation if a need arises to redistribute assets; NSEs are
under no obligation to release assets. This arrangement leaves the logistics commander with very
little leverage and ability to balance support to meet operational requirements.

In 1992, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was established as a
multinational corps. The ARRC’s formation came about as Alliance members sought to cash in
their share of the Cold War peace dividend by reducing force size and readiness. Forces that
remained were then reorganized into versatile, highly mobile combat units available on short
notice to respond to a crisis. It was this organization that initially moved into Bosnia for
Operation Joint Endeavor, the enforcement of the Dayton peace accords. The problems associated
with supporting multinational logistics in the AMF(L), a brigade size organization, became even
more apparent within the ARRC.

Due to uncertainty among Alliance political leaders of which countries would ultimately be
involved in the operation, by consensus the United States took the lead in logistics planning for
Operation Joint Endeavor. When OPLAN 4105 was executed in December 1995 the logistics headquarters (named C-SPT) was moved to Croatia, and grew to over 400 logisticians from 14 countries. Though successful at providing logistics support to Operation Joint Endeavor, C-SPT was far from efficient, and much of its success came from the brute force associated with the sheer number of personnel assigned. Some of the lessons learned from the planning and execution of logistics under C-SPT included:

- Creating an ad hoc logistics headquarters staff such as C-SPT on a multinational level is extremely complex, especially in a crisis action planning environment. Culture, language, service/national parochialism, and political reality were all issues that had to be addressed and overcome.

- Obtaining buy-in for a centralized logistics planning staff at the highest national military level was essential to obtain quality personnel. Major General Farmen, the C-SPT Commander, spent a large amount of time early in the planning process “selling” the multinational organization to Alliance leaders.

- Logistics headquarters must be responsible solely to the theater commander in chief, rather than a coordinating agency without any central authority. Theater logistics without such full authority results in decision layering, poor prioritization, and untimely deconfliction of mission issues.

- Future logistics headquarters must perform centralized contracting functions and have up-front NATO common funding and a budget office to administer it. In Bosnia, a lack of common funding constrained the ability to establish common user contracts for arrangements such as port operations, food supplies, and fuel distribution. Each nation essentially contracted for its own messing, billeting, and laundry. This was both inefficient and costly as noted by a 1996 Defense News article which stated:

  Despite months of advance planning, NATO countries bungled their takeover of logistics operations in Bosnia and wasted tens of millions of dollars by paying far above market prices for such standard supplies as bottled water and barbed wire.
NATO’s lack of mobility and centralized port management and movement control resulted in delays in deployment and sustainment support.

Lastly, in Bosnia and Croatia there was no central authority for the numerous host nation support contract negotiations needed to support NATO forces.\textsuperscript{xvi}

Unfortunately, between Operation Joint Endeavor and the deployment to Kosovo in July 1999 following Operation Allied Force, NATO made relatively little progress in capitalizing on lessons learned in support of multinational logistics. In preparing for Kosovo, NATO still did not have a logistics headquarters structure. It created a new entity leading to wasted time and money. Each member nation also continued to supply logistics for its own forces; there was limited common funding and multinational support. Finally, NATO had not yet published logistics doctrine for contingency operations.\textsuperscript{xvii}

To date, national considerations by individual Alliance members have precluded the implementation of every plan to create a rational logistics structure. The result has been that the United States has shouldered the burden for planning and executing logistics operations. However, Americans may tire of managing Europe’s security architecture if the Europeans themselves appear unwilling to share the burden in planning. There is a solution to cope with the issues raised during Balkan deployments and with the complexities of multinational logistics in general. A standing multinational logistics command responsible for improving capabilities in mobility, logistical integration and sustainability, and logistical command and control is needed in order for NATO to effectively undertake out-of-area operations with multinational rapid reaction CJTF forces.

**NATO Multinational Logistics Command Analysis**

**Mobility**

Clearly NATO’s greatest challenge to deploying a CJTF headquarters led rapid reaction force out-of-area is a lack of mobility. Without the United States providing lift assets, NATO simply does not have the ability to undertake out-of-area operations. Europe recognizes this
shortfall and has committed itself to building a strategic airlift capability. The United Kingdom has already leased four Boeing C-17 aircraft and Germany is planning to acquire 73 Airbus 400M’s; however, the money for these A400M aircraft is not yet in the German defense budget.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Complicating any planned acquisition programs for mobility platforms is the reality of declining European defense budgets. As a proportion of gross domestic product all of the European nations now spend less than 2 percent on defense, and given the lack of a clear threat there is no reason to believe Europe will significantly increase defense spending in the coming years.\textsuperscript{xix}

A multinational logistics command offers a potential solution to the dilemma of a mobility shortfall coupled with declining defense spending. First, this command could manage the pooling of assets. A NATO Logistics Command could start by pooling the C-130 aircraft currently operated by 10 nations, thereby providing an immediate European fixed-wing transport capability for rapid reaction forces.\textsuperscript{xx} A pooled tactical airlift fleet managed by a centralized command would offer numerous advantages over current national ownership. NATO would have improved day-to-day aircraft availability as maintenance managers would be able to plan intermediate level servicing/repair and depot overhaul/modification across a larger fleet. Also, individual nations would see significant savings in operating costs. Maintaining a small fleet with its associated infrastructure, training, and sustainment costs is extremely expensive. Having a centralized C-130 fleet operating from a few bases (or a single base in central Europe, although in NATO that may be politically unacceptable) with logistics managed by a single headquarters would result in resource savings that could then be used to enhance other airlift capabilities. The same pooling and centralized management arrangement for tactical airlift could later be applied to the procurement and operation of a common NATO strategic airlift fleet (such as the planned German buy of the A400M). Of course, this arrangement would have some hurdles to overcome--there is a certain amount of national pride associated with owning strategic lift assets, plus an important part of sovereignty for a nation to is control its own resources. These attributes would have to be set aside for the good of the Alliance as a whole.
However, the central management of a multinational airlift fleet would not be a completely radical idea for NATO; the Alliance has been operating AWACS aircraft since the early 1980s. The Geilenkirchen, Germany based Airborne Early Warning wing has been highly successful, and after 20 years still remains NATO’s first and only fully integrated multinational operational unit. xxii A study of its organization and operations would offer valuable lessons for establishing a pooled airlift fleet.

There is no reason the pooling of mobility assets need be limited to aircraft. A multinational logistics command could equally manage a pooled transport ship fleet. Currently, few European nations possess much in the way of military sealift capability; although, the United Kingdom is acquiring several roll-on roll-off ships. xxiii This small European military sealift fleet lends itself to pooling if for no other reason than to achieve economies of scale.

In addition to managing pooled organic mobility assets, a NATO Logistics Command would be an ideal organization for establishing and administering airlift and sealift commercial contract arrangements. Even if assets are pooled, the cost of building strategic mobility capability will strain the budgets of most European governments—even the U.S. with its annual $300B defense budget cannot afford to meet its own mobility needs with a strictly organic fleet. Contractual arrangements with commercial air and sea carriers would provide lift at great cost savings. NATO could build on existing national level strategic lift contract arrangements and establish a centralized program modeled on the United States Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement to take advantage of reliable and affordable excess lift available from countries such as Ukraine and Russia (which already contracts out the Ilyushin IL-76 through Volga-Dnepr Airlines). xxiv

Associated with mobility are other tasks that European NATO logisticians are not well schooled in due to the Alliance’s past mission of forward defense but which are essential for effective deployment as required by NATO’s new strategic concept. These tasks encompass such things as the organization and management of large scale transshipments at ports and reception of
forces and movement control, all areas the U.S. Army took the lead in managing for Balkan operations. A centralized multinational logistics command could provide planning and control over these complex functions. First, just as USTRANSCOM does through the Military Traffic Management Command, a NATO logistics command could provide oversight for prioritization and funding to improve strategic ports and cargo handling facilities. Given declining defense budgets it is unrealistic to expect individual nations to put their limited defense dollars in these unglamorous, yet vital projects. Similarly, when a deployment tasking is issued, someone must manage the flow of forces and supplies through strategic ports. It is also unrealistic to expect individual nations to effectively perform this function, especially if the nations possessing the tasked ports are not participating in the CJTF deployment. Instead, a logistics command should deploy a port management team to perform the tasks of providing command and control, oversight of asset visibility, and supervision of loading operations.

Theater reception and movement control is another area where centralized oversight is needed. As noted earlier in this paper, deployment delays in Croatian ports during Joint Endeavor highlight the importance of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). When properly executed, RSOI can eliminate some of the confusion of arriving in theater. This is especially important in NATO deployments where forces are using different languages, doctrine, techniques, etc. Movement control is an integral part of reception. In any out-of-area theater in which the CJTF deploys, available transportation networks will obviously be controlled by the host nation. These transportation networks are going to be simultaneously used by all members of the deploying force, as well as other parties such as humanitarian aid organizations and the host nation itself. Since no single agency will be in a position to prioritize the needs of other agencies and de-conflict movement access, some centralized control capability is required. A multinational movement control center assigned at the theater level is the only organization that would be capable of coordinating the arrival of forces and equipment/supplies into theater, coordinating movement with other agencies such as humanitarian organizations, and coordinating the use of
host nation assets.

**Logistics Integration and Sustainment**

Logistics integration and sustainment for deploying forces go hand in hand—they are about avoiding duplication of effort to save both fiscal and manpower resources. The U.S. military learned this lesson as it downsized and made reducing the teeth-to-tail ratio, the ratio of maneuver/combat forces to support troops, the basis of *Focused Logistics*. A multinational logistics command could help NATO achieve the same goals. Operations in Kosovo provide a snapshot of NATO logistics as it exists today—was it really necessary for each nation moving into the Balkans to have their own fuel companies, supply companies, messing, and all the other combat service support that was brought, all taking valuable space on aircraft and sealift? If NATO doesn’t find a way to have some control over integrating logistics, future CJTF operations will have an unbalanced teeth-to-tail ratio. This would come at the expense of operational capabilities which are critical in an environment where NATO is trying to get the most bang for the buck. Also, this excessive duplication of effort results in increased risk. Any extra logistical support, to include equipment, facilities, and people, must be protected, further reducing combat/security forces that could be used for the primary operation task for which the unit is deployed. Without a multinational logistics command, national stovepipes that lead to duplication of effort in sustainment functions are inevitable. Only a multinational logistics command would have the ability to manage the integration of logistics from various nations in order to reduce the CJTF logistical footprint.

Kosovo also revealed shortcomings in coordination for host nation support, another important aspect of the sustainment effort. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia there was a land grab as participating nations raced to get the best real estate (ground, accommodations, workshops, etc.). Settlement came down to who out-bid whom. This is hardly an effective or cost efficient way to run an out-of-area operation. Also, experience from Bosnia in 1995 (as noted by the previously referenced 26 February 1996 *Defense News* article) showed that when
different nations are operating in the same area and competing for the same assets, prices go up. Having a consolidated contracting function and budget office managing the procurement of essential supplies and services would help ensure availability, fair distribution, and stable prices.

Furthermore, host nation manpower in out-of-area peace support operations in immature theaters will probably be unreliable or even unavailable, requiring deploying forces to bring much more of their own service support capability. Much of these service support functions within NATO member militaries are being increasingly outsourced to the private sector--just as the U.S. Army uses Brown & Root for messing services and general camp maintenance tasks.\textsuperscript{xxvii} This third-party logistics results in significant cost savings and is a growing business; it would only be natural that NATO rapid reaction forces would use it. Having each nation setting up its own third-party logistics would be wasteful, inefficient, and result in a massive logistics footprint. Rather, a logistics command acting as a centralized contracting agency would be the ideal clearinghouse for managing these contracts.

**Logistics Command and Control**

The last area of NATO logistics requiring attention in a multinational expeditionary environment is logistics plans and command and control. In logistics support for any military operation there is a need for requirements versus capabilities studies in order to set priorities. This process starts with good logistics plans. Logistics planning involves effective information flow between nations to provide commanders with logistics data to plan operations. It encompasses computer systems and modeling that provides information such as peacetime and combat requirements for stocks, minimum levels of sustainability for deployed forces, and optimal transportation and distribution. NATO does not currently have the centralized logistics planning that a multinational logistics command could provide.\textsuperscript{xxviii} The result is nations contributing troops to a deployment err on the safe side, plan their own solution, and accept the disadvantages associated with duplication of effort.

Since logistics is a national responsibility, joint force commanders have limited authority
over another nation’s logistics assets. This is a potential Achilles’ heel for expeditionary operations, not to mention a failure to meet Alliance member expectations to avoid over provisioning, unnecessary transportation of supplies to a crisis area, and duplication of effort. To be effective, nations must delegate national control of some resources to NATO commanders. The joint force commander is not the right person to be controlling logistics; he has too many other responsibilities managing operational issues. The right person is a commander of a NATO Multinational Logistics Command, a commander with all the inherent capabilities and responsibilities of command. In a multinational setting with such a divergence of logistics systems, only a logistics commander can ensure effective and efficient logistics operations. This commander must have control of logistics units, the ability to resolve conflicts of priorities, and the authority to direct the transfer of resources between deployed national forces as required.

**Alternative NATO Logistics Arrangements**

NATO members recognize the challenges of multinational logistics, especially in out-of-area operations, and have made some progress in addressing doctrine. For instance, all NATO nations approved MC319/1, *Principles and Policies for Logistics*, which is a formal statement that nations and commanders have a common responsibility for logistics. Since MC319/1 was published, NATO has produced a number of other basic documents on multinational logistics. However, the 1997 version of the NATO Logistics Handbook has not yet been published. The fact that no formal arrangements have been approved or implemented for multinational logistics highlights the difficulty of instituting change in a consensus run alliance of 19 nations. While a multinational logistics command would appear to offer the most efficient and effective organization, there are alternative logistics arrangements should a logistics command prove politically too difficult to establish.

First, NATO could remain with the status quo and retain purely national logistics support arrangements. This of course would make sense in situations where a single nation provides all the elements of a force. However, future out-of-area operations are not expected to be executed by a
single nation; in fact, single nation execution negates the whole purpose for forming CJTFs. Should NATO choose to retain the concept of logistics being solely a national responsibility, then the Alliance is no better off logistically than it was during the Cold War. It would still experience the same problems it had in Bosnia, that of excessive burden on an individual nation, resource waste, and manpower duplication of effort. Clearly, national logistics support is not the way to go in an expeditionary environment.

Another possible method of supporting operational logistics is through a lead nation concept. Under this arrangement, one nation, the “lead nation” assumes responsibility for providing the bulk of the logistics support for a multinational force. Under the control of the lead nation, other nations then provide limited, specialist support functions as required. Supporting nations then agree on any compensation/reimbursement to the lead nation. This is essentially the arrangement U.S. forces follow in joint operations where one service is designated as the lead logistics force (usually the Army since they are the largest logistics consumer). A lead nation concept is a viable approach and has some merit for NATO, especially if the United States is involved in the operation such as during Operation Joint Endeavor. Logistics planning is relatively efficient since one nation takes the lead and responsibility for managing mobility/deployment, force reception, and common user (food, fuel, beddown, etc.) sustainment. The logistics footprint is also smaller as other task force nations are only required to provide specialized, non-common user support for their forces. The drawback to the lead nation concept comes in operations where the U.S. chooses not to be involved. Other than the U.S., there are few NATO members that could take the lead role in a large-scale out-of-area operation. Britain and Germany are probably the only nations other than the U.S. within NATO’s integrated military command (IMC) structure possessing robust enough C2 capability (France has the C2 capability but is not part of NATO’s IMC); however, neither country has enough strategic lift assets to respond rapidly.

Lastly, NATO could adopt a role specialization concept in which individual nations assume responsibility for providing certain services for the rest of the multinational force. This is a
synergistic arrangement when participating nations possess unique areas of logistics strength. For example, in a CJTF operation using role specialization, the U.S. might provide the strategic lift, while Britain deploys movement control teams and ground transportation assets. Meanwhile, Germany might agree to assume responsibility for coordinating host nation support. This logistics arrangement has the benefit of easing the burden on individual nations, and, like the lead nation concept, reduces duplication of effort resulting in a smaller logistics footprint. There are also disadvantages to role specialization. Logistics planning is harder than with a lead nation concept since there are more parties involved. There is also the risk a role specialized nation may not elect to participate in a particular operation. This would be a significant shortfall for the CJTF to overcome in a fast moving deployment to diffuse a crisis, as another nation would then have to assume responsibility for and plan the tasks of the non-participating party. Finally, role specialization may not be politically palatable within NATO. Members so far have been unwilling to give up national responsibility for logistics; it might be too much to ask for them to give up overall general logistics capability to concentrate on a particular role.

Recommendations and Conclusion

NATO has made significant progress over the past decade transforming itself from an Alliance focused strictly on forward defense against the Warsaw Pact to one willing and able to undertake out-of-area operations for peace support. As suggested over the past decade by peacekeeping deployments to various countries in the Balkans, there is every reason to believe NATO will get even busier with crisis management missions in the coming years. The Alliance has made a commitment in operational command and control as witnessed by the continuing evolution of its military command structure and the formation of Combined Joint Task Forces. Now the Alliance must establish an overarching vision for logistics support. The new operational and fiscal environment requires fully integrated logistics that is both efficient and effective and that achieves economy of effort. The best option for managing logistics within NATO’s new expeditionary environment is to create a multinational logistics command.
NATO should take the necessary steps right now to form a permanent NATO Multinational Logistics Command. Also, the Alliance must give the commander of this organization authority to redistribute national logistics assets as required to meet operational needs. Only a standing NATO Logistics Command can provide the Alliance centralized planning of logistics requirements and centralized command and control of logistics assets. The command will be able to capitalize on the latest information and technology systems both to model requirements and manage resources, thereby avoiding the waste associated with duplication of effort and the deployment of excess capability.


iv Ibid, 2.

v Ibid, 5.


vii Ibid, 11.


xix Alexander and Garden, 518.
xx Ibid, 522.


xxii Alexander and Garden, 523.


xxiv Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (Wash DC: June 2000), 24-25.


xxvi Brooks, 3.

xxvii Schmitz and Rausch, 37.


xxi Milani, 45.

xxxii Ibid, 46.


