UNITED STATES MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT WITH THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY OF CHINA

by

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June 2002

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# United States Military-to-military Contact with the People’s Liberation Army of China

**Abstract**

This thesis will assess whether or not military-to-military contacts between the United States military and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will be advantageous to American interests. The main reason not to increase military-to-military contact is that we may go to war with China in the future. Taiwan, China’s perceived bid for regional hegemony, and its aggressive missile programs stand as reasons not to increase military-to-military contact programs. On the other hand, engagement proponents would argue that access to counterparts in foreign militaries might help avert these very crises that may lead to war. In addition, case studies of Indonesia and El Salvador show that the long-held traditions of strong military influence over civil administration and oppression towards their own populace are on the decline. To a significant degree, this can be attributed to the participation of these nation’s security forces in American military-to-military engagement programs. Through aggressive military engagement programs, the United States has gained significant access to top military and civilian leaders in foreign nations. On some occasions, this has resulted in influencing these individuals and has led to positive and significant changes in patterns of behavior of the host nation’s security forces.

**Subject Terms**

- People’s Liberation Army, PLA
- China
- Military to military
- Military-to-Military
- Military Engagement
- Military Exchanges
- Military Relations
- Peacetime Engagement
- International Military Education and Training, IMET
- Indonesia
- El Salvador
- US-Sino Military Relations
- Theater Engagement Plan, Frogman

**Distribution/Availability Statement**

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UNITED STATES MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT WITH CHINA’S PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States has sought advantage and leverage through various engagement strategies with China. Politically and economically, Sino-U.S. relations have increased since normalization of relations in 1979. Partly as a result of this increased interaction, through foreign direct investment and joint ventures in China, China has gradually emphasized free market values. Increasing military-to-military contact between the U.S. military and the PLA may have a similar liberalizing effect. Despite a significant upward trend in political and economic activity between China and the United States, military engagement has not been used to a significant extent. The United States military has been crucial in America’s engagement and enlargement strategy.

The case study of the U.S. military engagement programs with Indonesia shows that that country’s long tradition of military influence over civil administration and oppression of its populace are on the decline. To some degree, this can be attributed to international pressure and conditions placed on both financial and military aid. In addition, the access and influence established through Indonesian’s participation in American military-to-military contact programs have contributed to this change in behavior.

Similarly, the case study of U.S. military engagement programs with El Salvador illustrates that military-to-military training programs between the United States and El Salvador significantly influenced El Salvador’s positive changes in civil-military relations and adherence to international standards of human rights. The long held tradition of strong military influence over civil administration and oppression towards its populace are on the decline in El Salvador. To a significant degree, as in Indonesia, this can also be attributed to the participation of these nation’s security forces in American military-to-military engagement programs.

China’s military relationship with the United States can be traced back to Defense Secretary Harold Brown’s visit to Beijing in January of 1980. Since then, the military relationship between the two countries has followed a cyclic pattern of abrupt postponements and gradual renewals. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995
and 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1998, and the emergency landing and subsequent detainment of the crew of a U.S. Navy surveillance plane in Hainan in 2001 have punctuated this cyclic nature of U.S. and China military relations.

China’s military tradition has some parallels with the military of Indonesia and El Salvador. However, in other respects China has had an ambiguous pattern of civil-military relations, given that the PLA is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party. In the past two decades, however, the PLA has undergone a program of military modernization. This has included professionalization of the PLA officer corps. Meanwhile, some elements of China’s national power are changing. China’s economic brand of communism has increasingly embraced characteristics of a free market.

Through aggressive military engagement programs, the United States has gained significant access to top military and civilian leaders in foreign nations. On some occasions, this has resulted in influencing these individuals and has led to significant changes in patterns of behavior of the host nation’s security forces that are in the interest of the United States.

Increasing military-to-military contact programs between the United States and China will, at a minimum, establish access to military counterparts in each of the two nations. This contact may help avert crisis through facilitating military communication channels. It may also provide U.S. officers a greater understanding of a heretofore non-transparent PLA.
I. INTRODUCTION

In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the Army to examine various ways to reestablish the army-to-army contact that existed between the United States Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) prior to the 1990s.

Following the brutal crackdown on protestors at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the United States curtailed military-to-military contact between the two nations. Prior to this, the United States and China had gradually increased their military-to-military contact since the early 1980s. High-level visits by both American and Chinese military officials, weapons sales, and technology transfers had reached a peak between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the late 1980s. This thesis addresses the costs and benefits of increasing military-to-military contact between the U.S. military and the PLA. Specifically it asks:

1. Should the United States increase its military-to-military contact with the Chinese?

2. What have been the historical results of America’s military engagement program with other nations’ militaries?

3. Can we expect similar results if we increase military-to-military contact with China?

The debate regarding military engagement with China is subordinate to the larger American debate concerning China policy. Some assert that conflict with China is inevitable. Their focus is to call attention to a “China threat,” restore formal military ties with Taiwan, and restrict economic ties with Beijing. As evidence of a growing “China threat” they cite the Cox report, the Chinese “takeover” of the Panama Canal, and China’s dramatic increase in military spending. From their perspective, little benefit can be gained from increasing military-to-military contact. Such activities are a carrot that should only be offered if the China threat dissipates and China improves its human rights record.
There are two paradigms with which to view military-to-military contact. One view can be labeled the “carrot” paradigm. With this mindset, U.S. security assistance is viewed as a carrot to be gained if the foreign nation behaves in accordance with American values. The “Leahy Law” is clear example. It was passed as a part of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208). In short, it restricts the use of funds provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights. If the Department of State has determined that such units are guilty of human rights violations, then funds can be made available only if that foreign government takes effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to justice. The other paradigm is the “engagement” paradigm. Under this paradigm, contact with foreign security forces is seen as more influential in promoting U.S. desired behavior than withholding it.

In contrast to those opposed to military exchanges, others believe in “constructive engagement.” They support policies to encourage further Taipei-Beijing dialogue and to strengthen their relations while ensuring that Taiwan is not attacked by the PRC. Also, they supported China’s World Trade Organization membership. From their perspective, military engagement offers benefits to the United States. Among these are access to the inner workings of the PLA and possible U.S. influence over PLA behavior. This debate in some respects reflects popular politics more than scholarly literature.

The scholarly literature regarding the PLA is rather limited, and so, academic study regarding military-to-military contact between the U.S. military and the PLA is also limited. PLA expert David Shambaugh (1999, p. 9) attributes this to the fact that there are few incentives for a China scholar to take up the PLA as a subject area of primary research. He notes that there are no university jobs in comparative politics, international relations, or security studies that are specifically designated for a PLA specialist; there are few knowledgeable professors to train such students; there exists extremely limited fieldwork opportunities in China; and few academic journals welcome article submissions in this field. Larry Wortzel, China scholar and former assistant army attaché to China, writes that engagement allows broad access
to U.S. military capabilities and that military contact should be kept in the perspective of China as America’s foremost threat (1999). On the other hand, Kenneth Allen, PLA scholar and former assistant air attaché to China, supports engagement policies, and he has published the most detailed account of China’s foreign military relations to date. This report is thoroughly referenced throughout this thesis. Allen’s conclusion is that the United States should reengage the PLA to increase the transparency of that organization.\(^1\)

Officially, the U.S. Congress has imposed significant restrictions regarding contacts with China’s military. The FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill, Public law 106-65, stipulates that the Secretary of Defense must:

- Provide a summary of topics discussed with the PLA since January 1993.
- Assess the benefits the U.S. military and the PLA expect to gain from any future exchanges.
- Submit an annual report analyzing China’s current and future military strength.

Finally, the Secretary may not authorize any military contact with the PLA that would create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure to specified advanced U.S. military capabilities. These include sharing information regarding:

- Force projection operations
- Nuclear operations
- Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations
- Advanced logistical operations
- Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction
- Surveillance and reconnaissance operations

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\(^1\) For a detailed analysis of the history of China’s foreign military relations and future implications see Kenneth Allen’s China’s Foreign Military Relations (1999). Stimson Center: Washington D.C.
Joint war fighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare

Military space operations

Arms sales or military-related technology transfers

Access to a Department of Defense laboratory

This thesis will use case study methodology in assessing the results of military engagement. Indonesia and El Salvador are chosen because they are representative of American military-to-military engagement programs. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (Ret) Henry Shelton (1999, December), breaks down peacetime military engagement into three components:

1. Overseas Presence—This refers to American troops forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific. This presence is intended to deter potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions by demonstrating the determination to defend American interests, allies, partners, and friends. Forward units also allow rapid American response to crises.

2. Exercises—Conducted with allies and friends, these operations improve the combat readiness of the units involved and demonstrate the ability to form and operate effectively as a coalition. Annually, the United States conducts nearly 200 exercises with allied and friendly militaries.

3. Military-to-military contact—This refers to regular and periodic visits between senior leaders, visits by lower ranking officers at the working level, educational exchanges, and International Military Education and Training programs (IMET). General (Ret) Shelton notes that military contacts with countries that are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes help build constructive security relationships, and these contacts can also promote additional avenues of communication that can pay dividends when a crisis occurs.
The component of military engagement that is pertinent to Indonesia, El Salvador, and China is the military-to-military contact component. Indonesia and El Salvador do not have American military combat forces stationed on their soil, nor has either country had significant joint exercises with the United States. The history of military-to-military contact between the United States and Indonesia and between the United States and El Salvador are representative of other U.S. programs in regard to time, money, and commitment. American military-to-military engagement programs have historically been conditioned by the larger context of the Cold War. Any country that was anti-communist after WWII could rely on U.S. military support through provision of arms and military training. As Indonesia emerged from WWII as staunchly anti-communist, the United States provided support to the government of Indonesia to ensure that this anti-communist regime remained in power. The United States provided training and equipment to the Indonesian military. Former Defense Minister Juwono Sudharsono stated that “70 percent of the Indonesian military’s equipment had originally come from the U.S…” (Perlez, 2002, April 25). Similar to Indonesia, but decades later, the stability of El Salvador was threatened by a communist insurgency. Communist success in Cuba and Nicaragua prompted the United States to increase military assistance to El Salvador. In the name of fighting communism, the United States supported governments as dictatorial as President Suharto’s Indonesia and as oppressive as President’s Duarte’s El Salvador. The Cold War saw a spread of communism that threatened U.S. interests. Combating communist insurgencies as far away from the United States as Indonesia and as close to American borders as Central America trumped all other interests. The case studies here will show that the long-held traditions of strong military influence over civil administration and oppression towards their own populace are on the decline in Indonesia and El Salvador. To a significant degree, this can be attributed to the participation of these nation’s security forces in American military-to-military engagement programs.

Through aggressive military engagement programs, the United States has gained significant access to top military and civilian leaders in foreign nations. On some occasions, this
has resulted in influencing these individuals and has led to significant changes in patterns of behavior of the host nation’s security forces.

The following chapter, Chapter II: “Costs, benefits, and challenges of engaging the PLA,” discusses the leading arguments for and against increasing military engagement with the PLA. Taiwan remains a flashpoint, and most scholars agree that the sovereignty of Taiwan is the most likely issue that may bring the United States and China into direct conflict. In addition to Taiwan, China’s possible ambitions for regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific theater remain a significant concern for the United States. Advocates of engagement argue that the benefits of access and influence gained through these activities might be significant in deterring China against aggressive action towards the United States. Chapter III chronicles Indonesia’s long tradition of authoritarian government and its notable break in tradition as military influence is on the decline in legislative bodies. In addition, this chapter addresses Indonesia’s gradual adherence to international norms of human rights policy. Chapter IV traces a long tradition of exclusive military government in El Salvador. Despite this institution, El Salvador has made great strides in pursuing international norms of human rights policy and civilian control of the government.
II. COSTS, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES OF ENGAGING THE PLA

There are many costs, benefits, and challenges to be weighed in considering whether the United States should decide to significantly increase its military-to-military contact with the PLA.

The costs lie first in the fact that we may go to war with China. Much public American sentiment reflects Representative Dana Rohrabacher’s statement, “There is no country in the world that we are more likely to be at war with 10 years from now than Communist China” (Gertz, 1999). Thus, it doesn’t seem logical that the United States should take any action that would strengthen the PLA—a future potential enemy.

On the other hand, proponents of military engagement view two benefits in engaging the PLA—access and influence. A common disclaimer that almost always accompanies scholarly literature regarding the PLA is that there is a lack of access to information. Contact between United States and PLA officers through attendance at each other’s military education institutions, for example, would increase PLA transparency. In addition to access, U.S. military engagement programs seek to influence the host nation’s military. Historically, some U.S. military engagement programs have helped significantly in decreasing long traditions of host nation military oppression. Military engagement is an effective tool of influence that stands alongside other influential tools such as economic aid. Engagement advocates submit that engagement can directly influence a foreign country not to oppose the U.S. military.

There are some unique challenges regarding the PLA that may inhibit the desired outcome of military engagement. Kenneth Allen (1999) documents China’s foreign military relations and remarks extensively on the lack of reciprocity in exchanges with the PLA. They don’t give us what we give them. Details of U.S. military capabilities and organization are easily accessible. PRC defense attaches are guided through American military bases and commands. Despite this openness, Beijing prohibits foreign defense attachés to access similar levels of information by the PLA. In addition, the PLA is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party, not of the state. This is in direct contrast to the fundamental tenet of American civil-military relations,
that of a military under civilian control. These challenges have served as a barrier to increasing engagement in the past and pose a formidable challenge to the efficacy of military engagement in the future.

A. WHY THE UNITED STATES MILITARY SHOULD NOT ENGAGE CHINA’S PLA

1. Taiwan

Future military conflict between the United States and China revolves around Taiwan. China views Taiwan as a renegade province that is part of PRC sovereign territory, whereas Taiwan refuses to be ruled by Beijing. Most importantly, China has not renounced the use of military force in regaining Taiwan. China’s white paper issued in March of 2000 threatened that it will not wait for reunification indefinitely, stating that Taiwan must publicly renounce its party’s stand on independence and explicitly reaffirm the “one China” principle (O’Hanlon, Fall 2000). In addition, Beijing reminded the international community that China reserves the right to use force against Taiwan to “safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity” (O’Hanlon). China has previously used military force in the Taiwan Strait in response to Taiwanese behavior. In response to a 1995 visit by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to his American alma mater, Cornell University, China conducted a series of military exercises and fired missiles near Taiwan. This led the U.S. to send an aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait that same December. This was the first time U.S. warships transited these waters in seventeen years. The Chinese exercises culminated in March 1996, during Taiwan’s elections, the PRC launched more missiles near Taiwan. The United States responded again, this time sending two carriers in the vicinity as a show of force. U.S. military response to PRC saber-rattling reflects U.S. law under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulates that the United States would view any conflict over Taiwan with “grave concern” (O’Hanlon, p. 52). It is these incidences that lead the United States to believe that any military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may likely involve the United States. Thus, any strengthening of PLA military capabilities by U.S. military engagement programs would be counter to U.S. national interest.
2. Regional Hegemony

In addition to Taiwan, China has asserted claims to areas in the South China Sea. In 1974, Beijing’s irredentist claims to the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea saw a small-scale PLA amphibious operation that ended with PLA forces on three of the archipelago’s islands. More recently, China, along with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan asserted claims in the Spratly Islands. In January 1988, Chinese marines started building defenses on one of the largest islands. This was the first time China settled soldiers on the islands. Later that year in March, fighting broke out between Vietnam and China, and China sank two Vietnamese ships. While they have moved to more political means of dealing with and resolving the dispute, tensions remain high in the area. Confrontation surfaced again when China contracted with an American firm to begin testing for oil sights, even though the territorial issue remains far from solved. Vice Adm. James Metzger (2000), commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, said that the U.S. government will not support any particular country’s claim to sovereignty over the islands, and that the United States is mainly concerned about maintaining navigational freedom in the area. Among the six countries that claim the Spratly Islands, the PRC has been the most aggressive. Given the aggressiveness of the Chinese military in occupying disputed islands by force, any military engagement that would increase their capability may not be in the best interest of the United States.

3. Missiles

The United States also has concerns about Beijing applying U.S. shared and stolen technology to China’s military arsenal. In 1988, President Reagan approved satellite launches on Chinese carriers. U.S. firms such as Loral Space & Communications, Ltd. and Hughes Aerospace found that costs associated with launching their products on Chinese rockets to be about 15 percent less expensive than at home (Lampton, 2001). From 1990 to 1996, 25 percent of Chinese rocket launches blew up. International insurers, who were hesitant to continue covering launches on unreliable vehicles, prompted Loral Space & Communications Ltd. and Hughes Aerospace to ascertain the cause of the mishaps. During consultations in
April-May 1996 between the U.S. companies and the Chinese, transfer of protected technology may have occurred. From 1996 to 1998 the Chinese had a perfect record in 10 launches (Lampton, 2001). Many believe that China has applied satellite launch technology gained from American aerospace companies to its strategic weapons. Furthermore, in January 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives issued the Cox committee report regarding Chinese espionage. This report asserted that China has conducted a decades-long espionage effort in various national weapons laboratories including Los Alamos in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore in California. According to the report, this effort resulted in the PRC obtaining design information concerning U.S. advanced thermonuclear weapons. These allegations have led the U.S. Congress to impose significant restrictions regarding contacts with China’s military. According to the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill, Public law 106-65 stipulates that the Secretary of Defense may not authorize any military contact with the PLA that would share information regarding nuclear operations, military space operations, military-related technology transfers, or access to Department of Defense laboratories.

4. Human Rights

In addition to defense-related issues, Washington also has significant concerns regarding China’s poor adherence to international standards of human rights. The U.S. Department of State’s “China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the Year 2001” notes "particularly serious human rights abuses persisted in Tibet and in Xinjiang.” Also, the United States views that China is increasing restrictions with regard to cultural, linguistic, and religious freedoms of Tibetans (Situation, 2001). The United States is concerned with China’s severe restrictions on the rights of citizens to the freedoms of assembly, association, expression, conscience and religion, and to due legal process and a fair trial, as well as reports of harsh sentences for some seeking to exercise their rights (Situation, 2001, April 11).

China’s human rights record has been cyclical in its influence regarding U.S. policy towards China. For example, concerns for human rights prompted President Clinton to establish seven human rights related factors as the conditions for most favored nation (MFN) status extension beyond July 1994 (Lampton, 2001, p. 41). About one year later, although
these conditions were not met, President Clinton extended MFN status to China. Potential loss of trade with China pushed President Clinton to delink human rights with the renewal of MFN status (p. 45). Commerce trumped human rights. China’s human rights record has been at the forefront of any debate that addresses increasing military, economic, or political engagement.

The costs of military engagement are high. The worst cost associated with such engagements is that we may train an army that we will fight in the future. The PLA would use military techniques learned from U.S. military educational institutions directly against American forces. In addition, U.S. military engagement may impart training to the PLA that helps it to establish regional hegemony. Short of war, do we really want to see graduates of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College ordering PLA troops to crush demonstrators in Tiananmen Square?

B. WHY THE UNITED STATES MILITARY SHOULD ENGAGE CHINA’S PLA

Access and influence stand as the primary reasons to increase military-to-military contact with the PLA.

1. Access

The institutional community of active Western PLA academicians in the United States and abroad is very small. One of the leading PLA experts, David Shambaugh (1999) writes that it is limited to a half dozen individuals. He also lists “gaining access to the data” as one of the primary problems in PLA studies (p. 15). The literature concerning the PLA is commonly sprinkled with phrases that reflect the difficulty in gaining access to information on the PLA. Caveats such as “few official PRC sources offer much detail, and nobody knows what ultimately will happen” (Jencks, 1999, p. 59) and “[although] heavily studied…civil-military relations still remains a black hole, with woefully inadequate data,” (Shambaugh, 1999, p. 18) are often in the first or concluding sentences of many works that attempt to assess the PLA.

What is it about the PLA that we want to learn that we do not already know? According to Shambaugh, “institutional mapping” of key organizations in the PLA should be a

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2 Shambaugh includes: Ellis Joffe, Yitzhak Shichor, June Dreyer, John Frankenstein, Iain Johnston, and himself in this group.
top priority (1999, p. 18). There is little understanding how the general departments, group armies, and regional commands are organized and function. Shambaugh also notes that we need to know about evolving training and tactics, how the PLA is adapting to the new doctrine of “limited war under high-tech conditions,” and China’s civil-military relations. The vacuum of information in this area forces PLA scholars to speculate beyond what hard evidence can sustain—and hard evidence can best be obtained through contact. Military-to-military contact is one of the most appropriate and effective methods to fill the voids of PLA study.

American defense attachés’ contribution to the literature on the PLA display the significant value of military-to-military contact. Defense attachés around the world enjoy a unique access to the military of their host nations. China’s military is one of the least transparent forces to which American defense attachés might gain access, and American defense attaches possess an unparalleled level of access to the PLA. To date, U.S. military attaches to China have made generous contributions to the study of the PLA. Several were Foreign Area Officers in the U.S. Army or other services. Most are career professionals, who have spent their entire life in the military, and as such, they bring an expertise of weapons systems, technologies, training regimes, and operations and maintenance routines that academics are hard-pressed to understand (Shambaugh, 1999, p. 11). For example, Kenneth Allen served 21 years in the U.S. Air Force, including assignments in China as the assistant air attaché (1987-1989). He has written extensively on China’s Air Force. RADM (Ret) Eric McVaden was the U.S. defense and naval attaché at the American Embassy in Beijing. He has worked extensively with the U.S. policy and intelligence communities, and his writings appear in professional books, periodicals, academic journals, and government publications (Allen, 2001, p. ii). COL (Ret) Larry Wortzel, was the assistant army attaché and spent more than four years at the American


Embassy in Beijing. Clearly, the American defense attaché community has gained significant access to the PLA. Furthermore, these soldiers turned scholars have contributed significantly to the field of PLA analysis that would have otherwise been impossible.

Hosting PLA leaders to the United States also provides access. Although military exchanges between U.S. and PLA leaders that occur in America would not allow Americans to view PLA training or equipment, it will allow the PLA to see America’s military wares. This promotes discussion and comparison. What does the PLA want to learn about the U.S. military that it does not already know? Only the most advanced technology and deployment plans are not readily accessible either in public documents or on the Internet. The United States is an open book and uses this transparency to demonstrate U.S. military capability for the purpose of deterring would be aggressors. The General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library illustrates this point as the library touts itself as an electronic “library without walls,” and it is the repository of approved Army training and doctrine information (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm). There exists little about the U.S. military that is not on show for the world to access.

In contrast, access to information about the PLA is difficult to obtain without direct contact, and engagement advocates submit that military-to-military contact is the best way to get it. Compared to the relative ease with which China can access information and resolve questions about the U.S. military, little correspondingly that the United States wants to know about the PLA is published and accessible. Increasing face-to-face contact between American and PLA personnel may be the most effective method to answer these questions.

2. Influence

The ultimate objective of U.S. military engagement strategy is to influence the behavior of the host nation. Direct military-to-military contact involving regular and periodic visits between senior leaders, visits by lower ranking officers at the working level, educational

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exchanges, and international military education and training programs all lead to this goal. How can military-to-military contacts influence the PLA?

a. Transparency

At the conclusion of WWII, when the Japanese boarded the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay to sign the surrender document, the Japanese Foreign Minister’s Aide, Toshi Kazu (1945) remarked, “…and looking at them I wondered how Japan ever thought she could defeat all those nations.” The theory of military deterrence is based on a simple psychological truth, that fear of retaliation makes a would-be aggressor nation hesitate before attacking, and is often sufficient to deter it altogether from attacking. Clearly then, to maintain military deterrence, a nation would have to be believed to have retaliatory power so great that a potential aggressor nation would have reason to think that it could not defend itself against such retaliation. U.S. retaliation by force manifests itself in the American military. However, it is not reasonable to believe that by merely displaying American military wares, potential foes will retreat. In fact, the Soviet Union, by cloaking its conventional military capabilities, was successful in projecting the perception of a mighty army. Now we know this not to be the case. However, the American military is different from the Soviet military, and it does have an enormous military capability. Margaret Thatcher (2002) recently referred to the United States as “the only global military superpower.” The common argument against opening the U.S. military to the PLA is that they will use the information gained to defeat us. Yet, little can be learned about viewing military training, equipment, and professional military educational institutions that cannot be accessed in publicly available material. So, visiting members of the PLA will walk away from the United States with one of two impressions of the U.S. military. They will believe either that it is a shell of a military that, like its Cold War adversary, lacks substance, or that it is a force which requires serious contemplation before going up against it.

b. Human Rights

Advocates of engagement submit that, historically, U.S. military engagement programs have assisted in developing the host nation’s adherence to international standards of human rights. Human rights training by soldiers for soldiers involve practical applications of
these principles to the battlefield. For example, military trainers teach the benefits of treating prisoners of war humanely. In addition to adhering to the Geneva Convention, treating prisoners humanely provides greater incentives for other soldiers to surrender. In addition, it sets up the prisoner for “soft” interrogation, which by most studies is more successful than interrogation via “hard” techniques. The following case studies of El Salvador and Indonesia show that both countries have had a long history of military oppression towards the public. Despite these traditions, both countries have made remarkable changes. Investigative institutions have been established to find and punish military personnel accused of human rights violations. This is in direct contrast to the traditional “beyond the law” status of Indonesia’s military. In El Salvador, a 1993 UN Truth Commission reported that in 1980, 2,597 instances of “grave” human rights violations were recorded, but by 1991, only 28 were recorded. Chris Lukasevich (2002) provides convincing statistical analysis that asserts that the improvement of the human rights records of the Army of El Salvador was significantly influenced by the presence of U.S. military trainers.


c. Rising PLA Influence


The PLA’s role in shaping national strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis and intelligence to civilian leaders is particularly significant and apparently increasing... PLA influence over foreign policy is also probably on the rise, as military views are increasingly expressed and military influence exerted on specific issues...

Referring to China’s top military leaders, Allen (1999) says, “Most of these PLA officers have never traveled abroad or even traveled extensively within China” (p. 32). If Swaine is correct and the PLA’s role is increasing in shaping national strategic objectives, then engagement advocates would insist that measures to increase U.S. influence over these officers should be pursued. Activities such as educational exchanges in each country’s military educational institutions would be preferable to China’s new generations of PLA officers progressing to leadership positions in the PLA without any first hand knowledge of U.S.
intentions and capabilities. Chinese participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) may be the most appropriate program for this initiative.

The IMET program is the largest program that hosts foreign military officers to the United States to attend military education and training institutions. These schools include over 2000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations for roughly 8000 foreign students annually (Foreign, 2000).

C. CHALLENGES

Should the United States decide to significantly increase the military-to-military contact with the PLA, there exist some unique challenges to maximizing access and influence. These challenges have become apparent through the limited amount of military-to-military programs that have occurred between the PLA and the U.S. military. In addition, the PLA’s long tradition of Party rather than state command contrasts with the prevalent western concept of the military ruled by civilians.

1. Non-Reciprocity

Kenneth Allen writes that in the last twenty years, the Western view of reciprocity in military-to-military contacts has been to demand, “If we show the PLA a particular facility or weapons system in our country, then we want to see a comparable facility or weapon system in China” (2001, p. 40). For example, in 1980 former Defense Minister Geng Biao toured a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo (p. 40). Since that event, the U.S. military has requested a reciprocal visit to a Chinese ballistic missile facility without success. In response to this particular issue, Allen writes that one PLA official stated that “even Chinese military officers not assigned to missile units cannot visit missile silos in China, because unlike the United States, China has only a dozen, therefore needing to keep their locations very secret” (p. 41). The reasons for this lack of reciprocity vary. Allen points out that the PLA claims that it can only invite foreign visitors to facilities where the PLA can host them. Specifically, they state that most military bases lack sufficient dining, lodging, or meeting facilities for guests. For example, they say that many bases lack heat during the winter. Allen quotes one PLA official as saying, “Most foreigners simply cannot appreciate that many Chinese facilities are not up to
standard that would allow them to welcome guests” (p. 41). Foreign attaches in Beijing universally criticize the lack of reciprocal treatment, noting that Chinese attaches, when hosted in their home countries, receive far better treatment (p. 41).

2. Civil-Military Relations

Civilian control of the military is one of the primary emphases of American military-to-military contact programs. The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, for example, houses the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR). According to the Center’s home web page it is “dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-military relationships” (Center). The purpose of this center is to provide both American and foreign officers and civilians with an opportunity to study civil-military relations. Foreign officers attending similar American military education institutions are invited to comparable courses. This paradigm of civilian control over the military would be a challenge to sell to the Chinese. The PLA is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party, not of the state. This is in direct contrast to the fundamental tenet of American civil-military relations that of a military under civilian control. One of the leading scholars of civil-military relations, Professor Peter Feaver (1999), notes that although relations between civilian and martial spheres have preoccupied political philosophers for thousand of years, the modern intellectual history largely comes from Western scholars, the landmark study being Samuel Huntington’s (1957) The Soldier and the State. Civil-military relations is a Western term. In China, it would be more accurate to label it party-PLA relations. This relationship reflects a long tradition of politicization of the military. To understand the deep-rooted tradition of Party-PLA relations it is important to understand the history of the PLA.

a. Party-PLA Relations

The PLA began as a revolutionary army. A combination of policies amenable to China’s populace, such as land reform, and discontent with the ruling government allowed Mao Zedong to consolidate his power. The objective of the newly formed Red Army in the late 1920s was clearly to win the revolution. This objective required more than victory through armed conflict. Early in its formation, the Red Army established a political, economic, and domestic tradition that has had significant influence on its successor, the PLA, to this day.
During the Red Army’s formation in 1927, it was indistinguishable from the CCP. The leaders of the Red Army, and the leaders of the CCP were the same. Moreover, 22 years after the Red Army’s first campaign, almost fifty percent of the leaders of this battle would rise to become the senior leaders of the PLA (Dreyer, 1995, p. 155). On the planning staff of the first Red Army campaign, both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai became the chairman and premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) respectively. The leaders of the Red Army were committed to their Communist ideological beliefs. While fighting the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) troops for control of China, Mao noted that, “Many prisoners captured in past battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary outlook.” Thus, Red Army leaders emphasized the importance of political indoctrination. In his landmark book, The Chinese High Command, William Whitson notes that Mao desired a Soviet-style commissar system to ensure political loyalty in the Red Army. In these early stages, the Red Army had little option but to reside and fight from and in the countryside. It was simply the only solution to survive the Kuomintang “white terror” against the communists in the cities.

From 1930 to 1934, the KMT launched five campaigns of encirclement and annihilation against the rural communist forces. These campaigns “created a distinctively Maoist revolutionary strategy that depended on close connections between the Red Army and the peasant population in the area of operations” (Dreyer, 1995, p. 159). In each of the five campaigns, the Red Army was severely outnumbered and outgunned by the KMT Army. The first campaign pitted 100,000 KMT troops against 40,000 Red Army troops (Dreyer, p. 160). The following campaigns had similar force ratios. Communist troops were encircled but not annihilated. The loyalty of the rural areas, where the campaigns were fought, provided the Communists superior intelligence that allowed communist forces to escape KMT cordons. The relative success of the Red Army in thwarting annihilation by the KMT was also influenced by circumstances beyond the combatant’s control. During the third campaign, Japan took over Manchuria. Thus, the leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek, had to deploy his best troops to the Nanking-Shanghai region against the Japanese threat. Nonetheless, the Red Army’s ability
to survive repeated attacks by the GMD Army was primarily through the support of the rural populace. This close link between the people and the Red Army would continue to be a cornerstone of PLA strategy for decades.

The Red Army went through cycles of increasing and decreasing politicization. When the CCP consolidated power in 1949 and ousted China Kai-shek’s KMT regime to Taiwan, the field armies stayed in their region to ensure communist control. The 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance laid the groundwork for a deluge of Soviet technological, political, and military influence upon the newly formed PRC. A large amount of Soviet military assistance in the forms of weapons, technology, and funding entered the PRC. Soviet influence in the organizational changes of the PLA was evidenced by the increasing role that the PLA field armies played in provincial administration. Eventually, the field armies that were highly active in China’s provincial administration from 1949 to 1953 were abolished. In 1954, with the establishment of the constitutional government, the political control apparatus transferred to civilian leadership. The subordinate army corps of the field armies returned to their barracks. They remained there until the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR). This nationwide upheaval created a political crisis of such magnitude that it required the PLA to once again become active in provincial administration.

As early as the 1950s, a number of leaders within the PLA advocated a more modernized and professional military based on the Soviet model. With extensive Soviet collaboration, the PLA introduced conscription, a system of ranks and awards for officers, a new mode of discipline, and a complete reorganization of the PLA’s command structure.

The influence of the Soviet Union on the PRC cannot be underestimated. Until the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) the nascent PRC followed a Stalinist planning model. However, by the late 1950s Soviet domestic and geopolitical changes created a rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC. At the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev delivered a secret report on Stalin’s personality cult and its consequences. He bitterly denounced the rule, policies, and personality of Stalin. This began a program of destalinization in Russia. Mao viewed destalinization as Soviet “revisionism” and as inconsistent with Chinese
revolutionary ideals. In addition, the Soviet Union’s worsening financial situation prompted the Soviet Union to demand that the PRC begin repaying Soviet financial loans. Geopolitically, the Soviet Union adapted a strategic paradigm of peaceful coexistence. This lead to a U.S.-Soviet détente that culminated in Khrushchev meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland in 1959. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union lessened, China found itself less important to the Soviets in the Soviet-U.S. balance of power. Taiwan also became a point of contention between Khrushchev and Mao. Khrushchev wanted a promise from Mao that he would not attack Taiwan (Zhisui, 1994, p. 262). Mao strongly believed Taiwan was a purely Chinese domestic affair. This came to a head when, on August 23, 1958, China began shelling the island of Quemoy, an island just off of the coast of China’s Fujian province still held by the KMT. Mao’s personal physician, Dr. Li writes that this show of military force was “Mao’s challenge to Khrushchev’s bid to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, his demonstration of China’s importance in the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States” (p. 270). In 1959, the Soviet Union cut all military aid to China. Despite severing ties with the Soviet Union, the decade of Soviet influence on the PLA was deep and lasting. The PLA had changed from a largely guerrilla force of volunteers to a conscripted army staffed by professional career officers. The break with the Soviet Union also brought changes in PLA leadership. In 1959, Minister of Defense, Marshal Peng De Huai voiced a divergent view from Mao concerning PLA management and the ongoing nationwide Great Leap Forward campaign. Thus, in September 1959, he was replaced with Marshal Lin Biao.

Marshal Lin, the Military Affairs Committee, and Mao Zedong embarked on an aggressive push to raise the PLA’s political loyalty and ideological commitment from the low level to which it had sunk by the time of the dismissal of Marshal Peng De Huai. The era of military modernization, with the help of the Soviets, allowed political education at the company level to diminish. By 1960, according to the resolution of the enlarged Military Affairs Committee, there were no party branch committees in approximately one-third of all PLA
companies (Gittings, p. 247). Party control was even less below company level, where most platoons had no party cells, and most squads had no party members (p. 247).

This politicization of the PLA was accomplished through various methods. First, the CCP concentrated Party education and membership at the company level. By April 1961, eighty per cent of the platoons had organized party cells, and over half of the squads had party members (Gittings, p. 247). The renewed effort to ensure party loyalty in the PLA was complete by February 1963 with the enforcement of a new code of Political Work Regulations. This new PLA-wide directive elevated the status of the political commissar to a level that he had not possessed since before the founding of the PRC (p. 250). The politicization of the PLA reached its zenith with the 1964 “Learn From the PLA” emulation movement. This centrally directed campaign marketed the PLA as the example that a good Chinese citizen would follow. Mao’s little red book of personal quotes became the PLA’s field manual for proper thought and behavior. Perhaps the most overt or formal aspect of the politicization of the PLA was the decision to abolish ranks and insignia, without however abolishing the functions themselves. This represented the egalitarian ideals of the CCP.

It was not until the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR) that the PLA was reluctantly and gradually reimmersed in the business of running China’s provinces (Nelson, 1981, p. 126). There were at least two important advantages for using the centrally controlled army corps during the GPCR rather than provincial forces. First, the army corps had few ties to the old Party bureaucracy in the provinces. They were, therefore, less vulnerable to the “revolutionary left” than were the regional forces. Second, the army corps was operationally controlled from Beijing. Consequently, they were not entirely subject to the orders of military districts and regions, some of which had already proven hostile to the mass movement. The success of the GPCR required that the CCP be able to establish control over all political and economic organizations, including relatively small factories and many schools. Furthermore, many cities in China bordered on anarchy, and this required a strong military presence to maintain essential services and to prevent the urban economy from grinding to a halt (Nelson, p. 126).
In 1973, Mao began to diminish the politicization of the PLA. Mao appointed Deng Xiaoping as chief of staff of the Army. One of Deng’s primary goals was to withdraw the PLA from politics and to reassert political control over it (Joffe, 1987, p. 149). It took a decade for this to materialize, and in 1983 the regime began to transfer public security functions from the PLA to the public security organs (p. 153). In April of 1983, the People’s Armed Police was formally established as an arm of the Ministry of Public Security. This move represented a major move towards the withdrawal of the PLA from non-military matters at the basic levels of society (p. 153).

From a Chinese perspective, the challenge has not been to assert civilian control over the military but to assert political control over the military. After the hesitancy of the PLA to act on party orders during the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, renewed priority has been placed on political allegiance in order to strengthen party-PLA relations. These initiatives include emphasizing traditional political themes and models in an effort to reassert the role of the political officers in the PLA party committees and work to clarify their relationship to commanders (China’s, 1990, July 3). New guidelines that included “adhering to the system of political commissars and political organizations,” insisting that “energetically strengthening party organizations at all levels” was the principle means of ensuring party command of the army (p. 9). In addition to this effort, the traditional model soldier of the 1960s, Lei Feng, was also revived. Lei Feng was a Chinese soldier who died in combat. Among his belongings was found a diary of inspirational writings depicting his loyalty to Chairman Mao and the PRC. A new edition of his diary was published five months after the Tiananmen Square incident with a forward by China’s Central Military Commission secretary general and General Political Department director (p. 10). Sinologist John Garver (1996) writes that Tiananmen had a causal effect on increasing the number of PLA member in the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party. He notes that the CC, 13 percent of whom where soldiers, further elected military men to comprise over 23 percent of this body after the Tiananmen Square incident (p. 251).
The first forty years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China saw former military officers as China’s rulers. Jiang Zemin’s position of party general secretary in June 1989 marked the first time that the PRC has been led by an individual without military background.

PLA expert You Ji (2001) notes a trend of change in China’s Party-PLA relations. Ji (2001) writes that the passing of the first- and second-generation party of military leaders has reduced the scope of the military’s intervention in domestic politics (p. 131). The period between 1991 and 2001 has not seen the PLA challenge the party’s authority. He notes that the PLA has vital interests in protecting the Party, with which it shares vital interests. Ji (p. 132) considers the PLA a highly professionalized organization that may very likely outlive the Chinese Communist Party.

The fact that the PLA and the party are inextricably linked emphasizes the value that increased access to the PLA may have. Furthermore, if the United States and China become increasingly belligerent towards each other, then it is through contact that a crisis may be peacefully resolved. Regarding the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, to which the United States sent two aircraft carrier battlegroups, Admiral Preuher, Commander in Chief of Pacific Command remarked:

> What frustrated me at the time was that we had no military relationship with China, and so that situation got very tense, very fast. Our options for resolution were limited, and military communications channels were difficult. We have built better dialogue since then. We have a positive relationship with China's senior leadership. It still needs work, but we do have a good relationship. If something like the China/Taiwan Strait situation should start rumbling again, we now have better means of resolving the situation.

Another historical example of the priority on contact in a foreseen time of crisis occurred after the Cuban missile crisis. In order to prevent ambiguous signals that may have lead to a nuclear exchange, the “Hot line” red phone was installed in the White House for instant contact with the Soviet Premier.
D. UNITED STATES MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA’S MILITARY

Military and strategic ties provided the primary raison d’être for Sino-American normalization. In the period between Nixon’s visit and the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, the U.S. and China supported each other diplomatically against the Soviet Union. In addition, Washington reportedly shared intelligence on the Soviets with Beijing from Kissinger’s first visit to China onward (Wilborn, 1994). The origin of the contemporary, official, Sino-American military relationship can be traced to Defense Secretary Harold Brown’s visit to Beijing in January of 1980. That visit came against the backdrop of the Soviets invading Afghanistan one year earlier. During his visit, Secretary Brown discussed the sale of non-lethal military equipment and the formation of a military relationship with China. It also resulted in agreement for a wider range of military-to-military activities and a U.S. commitment to sell dual-purpose technology and non-lethal equipment. Secretary Brown’s visit was followed by numerous exchanges involving a wide variety of high-ranking defense officials from both countries. In addition to these visits, bilateral functional exchanges by military and security experts and the sale by the United States of defensive military weapons, equipment, and technology to China also occurred (Get, 1996).

In 1983, Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced a new program of security cooperation between the United States and China. This program consisted of “three pillars”: high level visits, functional exchanges that allowed the PLA and the U.S. armed forces to explore common problems and interests, and the sale of U.S. defensive weapons, military equipment, and technology to China (Harding, 1992, p. 142).

1. High Level Visits

During the initial stages of military-to-military contact between the U.S. and China, virtually all of the top leadership of the U.S. Department of Defense and services made trips to China. Casper Weinberger, in Beijing when the program started in 1983, went again in 1986, and his successor, Frank C. Carlucci, visited in 1988 (Wilborn, 1994). The Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy also visited, and the Secretary of the Army sent a personal representative.
On the military side, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the service chiefs traveled to China between 1985 and 1989.

Among the senior U.S. and Chinese Army official who conducted high level visits in the 1980s were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General W.R. Richardson</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General W.R. Richardson</td>
<td>Commanding General, Training &amp; Doctrine Command</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General John A. Wickham</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Xu Huizi</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. High Level Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military (Army) Exchanges Source: From Get, J. What’s With the Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s PLA?

Beijing also sent many defense officials to Washington. These visits included China’s minister of defense, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, chief of the general staff, deputy chief of the general staff, PLA Air Force and Navy commanders, the Air Force political commissar, and PLA Logistics Department director (Wilborn). As far as participation is concerned, the high-level portion of the U.S.-China security cooperation must be considered a success for as long as it lasted.

2. **Functional Exchanges**

The second pillar of U.S.-China security cooperation—functional exchanges—were funded generously and given strong command support on the U.S. side (Wilborn). Functional level interaction with the Chinese included U.S. Corps of Engineer cooperative studies with PRC research institutes from 1986 to 1989; a U.S. military history delegation visit to China in 1987; and Army participation in U.S. Defense Department-hosted logistics, medical, and educational exchanges (Get, 1996). In regard to weapons sales, the Chinese expressed interest in a number of military weapons systems, including TOW anti-tank missiles, Redeye and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, artillery munitions, artillery counter-battery radar systems, and scout, transport, and attack helicopters. From these, the U.S. military initiated two projects under the
U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. One was related to the modernization of Chinese artillery ammunition, and the other was the sale of U.S. manufactured counter-battery radar systems. Both of these were suspended prior to completion due to the Tiananmen incident (Get). Finally, the U.S. Army’s top two leaders, Secretary of the Army John Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl Vuono, were scheduled to visit the PRC as the decade was coming to a close. Both visits were postponed and then cancelled. Due to American human rights concerns regarding China’s handling of its Tibetan minority, Secretary March did not travel to Beijing. General Vuono, who was scheduled to visit China in June 1989 was asked by the Chinese to postpone his trip due to Chinese concerns regarding a growing democracy demonstration at Tiananmen Square (Get).

3. **Arms Sales and Technology Transfers**

The third pillar produced more publicity than actual activity. The Reagan administration limited its offers to four groups of weapons systems that it considered defensive: anti-tank missiles, artillery and artillery defense, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare. Extensive discussions about arms sales and technology transfers did take place between the two governments and between PLA and U.S. manufacturers. From 1984 to 1989, the PRC had Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer status. When President Bush suspended all aspects of security cooperation with China in 1989, only one of the half-dozen projects was close to completion. The sale of 24 UH-60A Blackhawk helicopters, a $140 million agreement, was the only significant commercial sale completed (Wilborn).

The fall of the Berlin Wall, marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War, undermined China’s role as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union in American foreign policy. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe deemed accommodation with the PRC as no longer essential to containing Soviet expansion (Harding, 1992, p. 325). Thus, the Chinese lost the strategic cover that had, in the past, helped American Cold Warriors overlook the ills and transgressions of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes (Get, 1996, p. 4).
In the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, military-to-military contact between the United States and China was severely restricted. By the late summer of 1990, however, the United States moderated its restrictions, as the American government desired PRC cooperation in responding to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. As part of its campaign to persuade the Chinese not to veto the U.S.-authored United Nations resolution for the use of all means available (force) to deal with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration reinitiated limited official Sino-American military contact (Get, 1996, p. 4). During the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD, PRC military attaché visits to Department of Defense personnel were approved on a case-by-case basis and restricted to U.S. military personnel of the ranks of two-star general/admiral or below. Furthermore, by the end of DESERT STORM, PLA attachés in Washington were starting to gain access to higher-ranking military officials and were routinely receiving briefings on U.S. operations in the Gulf (Get). In the euphoria of the war’s successful conclusion, the United States even included the PRC as a coalition partner in the June 8, 1991 victory parade down Constitution Avenue in Washington DC. Once again, security cooperation shielded the PRC from its American critics to the extent that military-to-military contact between the two nations continued.

By the end of 1993, Washington signaled its desire to reopen the suspended high-level Sino-American military dialogue by dispatching Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman to Beijing to meet with PLA leaders. At the conclusion of his visit to Beijing, Secretary Freeman remarked, “U.S.-China military talks in Beijing concluded with an agreement to a ‘modest’ agenda of future dialogue and professional exchanges on such topics as international peacekeeping operations and conversion of defense industries to civilian use.” (Dumbaugh, 1996)

In January 1994, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, the National Defense University president, led a delegation to China in order to initiate activity upon which Secretary Freeman had agreed. This was followed by an August visit to the United States by the PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Xu Huizi. While in America, General Xu met with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry (Get, 1996). In return, Secretary Perry made his first
trip to China in the capacity as Secretary of Defense in October. Chinese-American military exchanges continued through the first half of 1995.

In May 1995, Secretary Perry asked the U.S. Army “to explore the feasibility of conducting functional exchanges with the PLA in the areas of training and military jurisprudence” (Perry, 1995). General Chi Haotian’s (vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and minister of national defense) long-postponed visit to the United States in December 1996 renewed the Sino-U.S. military relationship after the Taiwan Strait crisis. In December 1997, Admiral Joseph Prueher, U.S. Commander in the Pacific, visited China. In January of 1998, Defense Secretary William Cohen followed. Two months later, General Wang Ke, Chief of the General Logistics Department and member of the Chinese Central Military Commission, came to the United States. In May, General Michael E. Ryan, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff went to China. Two months later, Lieutenant General Qian Shugen paid a return call to Washington. On September 16, General Zhang Wanian, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, and Secretary Cohen signed a military cooperation agreement in Washington (Sa Benwang, 1998). In 1998, following the successful exchange of state visits between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton, a wide area of Sino-U.S. military exchanges and security cooperation began to reopen. This ended abruptly when the U.S. mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. However, in January of 2000, U.S. and Chinese defense leaders agreed to resume military-to-military relations. The PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Xiong Guankai met with Secretary of Defense William Cohen in Washington. Secretary Cohen stated, “I think that we are on track to getting military-to-military relations back at a normal state of affairs” (Kozaryn, 2000, February 2). Finally, in May 2002, Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. The two agreed that measures would be taken to resume and strengthen the exchanges between the two militaries. Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the United States is willing to restore military exchanges on the basis of equality and reciprocity (Vice, 2002).

Sino-American military relations are relatively young. The most consistent characteristic of Sino-American military relations is that it has been upset about every half-decade since its
inception in 1980—the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-
1996, the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and in 2001, the
U.S. Navy’s surveillance plane’s emergency landing on Hainan island. Each of these created
the cycle of setback then gradual renewal of Sino-American military relations. With this record,
long-term advantages or disadvantages are difficult to access. Scholarly literature has proven to
be the greatest benefactor thus far. One of the greatest contributors to the scholarly literature
on the PLA, Ellis Joffe (2001, p. 205), noted that an important reason for the quality of
information and analysis of the PLA is due to the “auspicious addition of retired military
attachés…” If, however, long-term military relations are in the future, as foreshadowed by
Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Hu Jintao’s recent meeting in May 2002, then the
access and influence that has accompanied engagement programs with other nations may follow.
III. INDONESIA

Indonesia shares with the PRC some important aspects. Indonesia faces similar challenges of supporting a large and ethnically diverse population spread over a large area. It is the fourth most populous nation in the world and lays claim to an area of 7.9 million square kilometers. Similar to the PLA, Indonesia’s military began as an army of national liberation, and its use of military leaders down to village level parallels the PLA’s political commissar system. Both the Indonesian military and the PLA saw early major engagements against the Japanese. The Indonesian armed forces trace their origin to the fighting units organized to fight Japanese invaders and British Indian forces (1942-1945). Then, in 1945, they fought to defend the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia from Dutch colonialists. In the early 1950s, they were employed against the Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas in West Java who fought against the nascent Republic. They also fought against provincial rebellions from 1957 to 1958. In 1965, the military fought against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), thus preventing a Communist coup. After the failure of this attempted coup by the Communists, commander of the forces and later President, General Suharto, brought the military fully into the political arena. The result of this successful armed struggle encouraged Indonesia’s commitment to the common people’s participation. Towards this end, the Indonesian military played an active role in the social and political affairs of the newly emerging state. Relying heavily on the support of the local population, the military consistently rallied popular enthusiasm around their cause. This was the basis of the military’s political roles.

The military developed a doctrine of “total people’s defense and security,” and it established a command structure of 11 territorial commands. Each territorial command is further divided into smaller commands, each headed by a colonel. Further divisions reached down to the village level with requisite military leadership. In effect, this established a military structure parallel to the civil administration. This is similar to China’s political commissar system.

The Indonesian National Military, known as TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) has historically been involved in both national defense and domestic affairs. The TNI’s principle of
Dwi Fungsi (literally “dual function”) dominated the activities of TNI for nearly five decades. This principle was first articulated in 1958 as the doctrine of the “middle way” by the army chief of staff, General Nasution, and it was formalized and refined in 1965-66. By 1982 it was finally enshrined in law. The 1982 law dictated two related functions for the armed forces. First, the armed forces had a responsibility as enforcer of national defense and national security. Second, the armed forces would act with legal authority in the country’s social and political affairs. This dual function principle obliged the military to conduct not only security and defense roles but also social and political roles. The success of the military-established political party Golkar eventually allowed the military itself to become the government. Eventually, rifts that developed between leading officers of the military and President Suharto led the country’s leader to gradually marginalize the military from its social political role. The military as an institution lost its authority, and it became a tool for the regime rather than a pioneer in the development of the nation (Wiranatakusumah, 2000). When President Suharto resigned in May 1998, a deluge of public protest against the military’s dual function role indicated that it had never been fully embraced by Indonesia’s civilian populace.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY—ANGKATAN BERSENJATA REPUBLIK (ABRI) 6

Despite the long history of politicization, Indonesia’s military has made remarkable steps towards getting the military out of politics. Under international pressure and massive student demonstrations, President Suharto resigned in May 1998. This unleashed powerful pressure for military reform that had been building for decades.

1. Political Power—Military Influence

Traditionally, active duty military officers have held a large number of seats in all branches of the government. This included the legislature, the central bureaucracy, the executive branch, and the judiciary. The actual number of seats allotted to military personnel has varied over the years. Until 1997, ABRI was allocated 100 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) (Alagappa, 2001, p. 514). By the end of Suharto’s reign in 1998, the

6 Prior to 1999, ABRI consisted of the Indonesian military and police, now it is called the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). The TNI does not include the police.
military was allocated 75 of those 500 seats (p. 234). By early 1999, the number of military seats was reduced by half—from 75 to 38 (p. 229). Finally, military participation in Parliament is scheduled to be phased out by the year 2004 (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001, p. 60).

Although far from being removed from the culture of the military, the traditional dual function doctrine has come under significant scrutiny. In late 1998, General Wiranto announced that the dual function doctrine would be reconsidered and that the military would be operating according to a “new paradigm” (Alagappa, 2001, p. 224). Furthermore, in October 1999, a group of 17 active duty military officers released a book that advocated an end to the dual function role of the military. This book marks the first time since 1965 that active duty officers have openly opposed the dual function of the military (Roosa, 1999). Authors of the book Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, Rabasa and Chalk (2001), argue that TNI has abandoned its dual function concept (p. 59-60). To the contrary, COL (Ret) John Haseman, former Defense Attaché to Indonesia, argues that on paper and doctrinally, the dual function concept is gone, but it remains in the culture of the government and the military (personal communication, March 16, 2002). It seems that Indonesia is gradually disengaging the traditional role of the military from civil administration and politics.

This is clearer in the behavior of the political-military party Golkar. The fact that the military severed ties to the former ruling party Golkar illustrates reforms implemented by the military to remove itself from direct involvement in politics (Haseman, personnel communication, May 31, 2002). In the 1960s, the armed forces created a pseudopolitical party called Golkar (literally the “Functional Group”). The purpose of this new party was to establish political legitimacy for the military (Kristiadi, 2001, p. 99). The armed forces used this political machine as a tool since its inception. Through it, they gained political legitimacy. Establishing a military-led political party has its roots in the belief that Indonesia would be come a great country only if it were led by the armed forces. This belief is thoroughly documented in Peter Britton’s doctoral thesis regarding ancient Javanese traditions of warrior-kings. He points out that all the kings of ancient Java (Mataram) were warriors and experts in battle and warfare. Britton

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7 In August 2000, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakya, or MPR) transferred the military seats from the DPR to the MPR, effective from 2004 to 2009.
concludes that political dominance by the Indonesian armed forces is deeply influenced by Javanese culture (Kristiadi, p. 99). Supported by Indonesia's armed forces and the bureaucracy, only Golkar and two minority parties were allowed under President Suharto's 32-year rule (1966-1998). Despite this long tradition of military rule, the Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P) won Indonesia's first fully democratic election in decades held in 1999.

2. Civil Military Friction

The declining role of the military in politics can also be measured by noting which institution prevails when leading civilian officials and military clash. This clash was evident in the appointment of the most senior political and military officials. In 1988, President Suharto’s vice-presidential choice, Sudharmono, was selected against strong military opposition from the ABRI leadership (Robinson, 2001, p. 238). Again, in 1998, Suharto managed to have his vice-presidential favorite, B.J. Habibie, selected against the wishes of active and retired military officers.

With the selection of Abdurrahman Wahid as president in October 1999, the transition towards civilian rule appeared to gain further energy. Wahid immediately asserted his authority over the military by a series of bold appointments and rotations at the highest levels of the TNI (Robinson, p. 244). Breaking with a long tradition of army domination, Wahid appointed a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, as minister of defense and a Naval officer, Admiral Widodo, as TNI commander. In February 2000, Wahid suspended the former armed forces commander General Wiranto from his cabinet position. This suspension was due to a pending investigation concerning General Wiranto’s performance and responsibilities during the previous year’s violence in East Timor.

B. UNITED STATES MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE INDONESIAN MILITARY

Through various military engagement programs, the U.S. military has gained significant access to top leaders in the TNI. Through relationships developed between American and Indonesian military officers and through attendance of Indonesian officers at American
professional military education institutions, there exists evidence that links Indonesia’s military reforms with U.S. military engagement programs.

1. Access

Assistant Secretary of State for political-military affairs Eric Newsom (1998) wrote that through security assistance programs, the U.S. gains critical regional access and develops relationships absolutely essential to our national security. The personal relationships developed between American and foreign military personnel during military engagement activities can become a national asset. Relationships between soldiers, regardless of nationality, are unique from those between other professions, such as politicians or businessmen. The professional soldier shares an apolitical “expertise” with his counterpart. There exists a bond among the profession of arms that transcends national borders. During recent years when there have been strains in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia, a key group of Indonesian officers who have participated in the IMET program have worked to ensure continuation of what they considered to be vital parts of that relationship and have resisted calls to “shut off the Americans” because this would harm interests important to them and also coincidentally to the U.S. (Haseman). COL (Ret) Haseman provides a list of some of the IMET graduates who have held top leadership positions:

- General (Ret) Feisal Tanjung, as the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, was instrumental in opening Indonesia to military-to-military cooperation in the 1990s. He chaired the Military Honor Council that disciplined errant officers involved in shooting civilians in Dili, East Timor in 1991. Since then he has punished other military personnel who have abused human rights. He instituted and has supported human rights awareness training for all senior officers of the Indonesian armed forces. However, as coordinating minister of politics and security in 1999, he has been implicated by leaked Australian intelligence reports as being directly involved in the violence that swept East Timor in 1999 (MacDonald, March 14 2002).

- Lt. Gen A.M. Hendro Priyono is now the chief of the National Intelligence Body (the Indonesian equivalent of the American CIA). While serving as commander of the Army
Training and Education Command, he initiated a comprehensive human rights training program at all levels of the army from private to general.

- Lt. Gen. (Ret) Yunus Yusfiah was the armed forces Chief of Staff for Socio-Political Affairs (the third-ranking post in the armed forces), and he is one of the army's most decorated soldiers. While attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1979, he wrote a thesis titled, *The Role of the Mass Media in Developing Countries* (Indonesia). As President Habibie’s minister of information, he worked to eliminate the government department that controlled all of the media. Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, now Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz attributed Yusfiah’s liberalization of the Indonesian media in part, to his attendance at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (personal communication, February 22, 2002). The retired General’s innovative leadership and understanding of the important civil side of the Indonesian armed forces mission are widely recognized.

- Lt. Gen. (Ret) Luhut Panjaitan, as commander of the Infantry Center, drafted and disseminated rules of behavior for Indonesian soldiers confronting civil disturbances. He commanded the Army Training and Education Command, where his policies influenced the entire Indonesian Army. Later he served as Indonesian ambassador to Singapore and as President Habibie’s minister of trade and industry.

- Lt. Gen. (Ret) Prabowo Subianto, Commander of Army Special Forces, delayed military action to release hostages held by an Irianese insurgent group in early 1996s and provided time for civilian groups to attempt to negotiate their release. Only when those negotiations failed did he lead a hostage rescue mission that freed seven Western and six Indonesian hostages, to the acclaim of non-governmental organizations, church leaders and third country observers. He also initiated human rights training for his command under the sponsorship of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, he was forced to retire early from the Army after admitting involvement in the arrest and torture of pro-democracy students in 1998.
- Lt. Gen. Johnny Lumintang, as commander of the Irian Jaya Military Command, he won international and domestic plaudits for his performance as military commander in East Timor from 1992 until 1994, a period in which relations between the people and military authorities were severely strained following the killing of civilians in Dili in November 1991. As military commander in Irian Jaya, he had been in the forefront of human rights education and training for every soldier under his command. He is currently the number two man in the Department of Defense.

- The late Brig. Gen. (Ret) Agus Wirahadikusumah, deputy assistant for Armed Forces Planning, was an important and innovative proponent of non-commissioned officer training and professionalism. He was a reformer in the field of training management, a key decision-maker in materiel acquisition, and a firm supporter of close U.S.-Indonesian relations. Under President Wahid, he became the leading advocate of rapid military reforms. He died in 2001 due to heart trouble.

- Brig. Gen. Sihombing, former Chief Legal Officer for the Irian Jaya Military Command, drafted the Handbook on Basic Human Rights and Respect for Law, which is now standard issue to all army personnel in his region. The International Committee of the Red Cross has praised this manual and attested to its widespread distribution.

- The late Col. Slamet Sidabutar, as the military commander in East Timor, he initiated legal training and briefings on the need to respect human rights within days of his assumption of command. He also reinstituted training programs on international law, which have since been conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross for all subordinate commanders in East Timor. He died in 1998 in a helicopter crash in East Timor.

2. Influence

The United States has enjoyed a particularly close relationship with Indonesia’s military since the mid-1960s. During the Cold War, it was viewed as a bulwark against communist expansion in Southeast Asia as well as a guarantor of access through the world’s most strategic sea lanes. U.S. military engagement programs have gone through cycles of U.S. support and condemnation. Funding for military engagement programs were cut from 1993 to 1995 to
demonstrate American disapproval over the killing of a large number of civilians by military forces in Dili, East Timor in November 1991. After this tragic event, President Suharto appointed a national investigating team that concluded the shootings clearly constituted improper use of force and that the causes and nature of the tragedy were not as initially portrayed by the military. U.S. Army COL (Ret) John Haseman, who served as U.S. defense attaché to Indonesia during that period, writes that, “This finding of wrongdoing by the Indonesian army is unprecedented in Indonesian history.” Interestingly, the chairman of the investigating team was a judge of the Indonesian Supreme Court who earlier, as an officer in the armed forces legal system, had attended courses in the United States under military engagement programs.

Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces also appointed a “Military Honor Council” to investigate the army’s role in the tragedy. This Council was charged with assessing blame and recommending punishment for those found guilty of malfeasance. Most outsiders assumed that the Council would whitewash the army, but this was not the case. The chairman, several members of the Council and its staff were graduates of various professional military educational institutions that fall under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The IMET program provides funding for foreign military personnel and defense establishment civilian employees to attend military education courses at U.S. Department of Defense and military service schools. The colonel who served as secretary of the Council made the following comment to an American officer, “I spent a year in the United States, and I know how important this investigation is to you Americans in judging our credibility. We must do a good job” (Haseman).

The results of the investigation condemned the actions of specific individuals, including five levels of the military chain of command above the soldiers who did the shooting (Haseman). Furthermore, the regional military commander, a two star general and famous national hero, was removed from his command even though he had nothing directly to do with the incident itself (Haseman). This concept of command responsibility is deeply ingrained in the American military system, but it has not been a tradition in most Asian armed forces (Haseman). The tragedy in Dili instilled command responsibility into the Indonesian armed forces, and it was officers who
had attended U.S. military institutions who took the initiative in this respect (Haseman). Haseman notes that the Indonesian Military Honor Council researched the U.S. army’s handling of the My Lai incident in Vietnam, where American soldiers killed a number of unarmed civilians. The principle of command responsibility has been applied a number of times since then and is becoming an integral part of Indonesian military doctrine (Haseman).

Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights has recognized the importance of IMET-trained officers (Haseman). Working with the Asia Foundation, the Commission prepared a universal human rights training program for the Indonesian Armed Forces. The Commission specifically requested a roster of officers trained under the IMET program due to their moderate outlook and better understanding of the complex human rights issues. The commander of the Indonesian Army Training and Education Command, a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, prepared and disseminated throughout the army training system a curriculum on basic human rights and a code of conduct for dealing with the civilian population. Both documents drew heavily on American concepts and procedures (Haseman).

The Indonesian leadership has also begun to commission military officers from civilian universities. This program is similar to the U.S. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and it resulted directly from visits by several senior Indonesian officers to the United States under IMET funding (Haseman). The number of Indonesian officers receiving their commissions from universities is now rising steadily. This results in more officers with broad university education.

C. CONCLUSION

Indonesian has made progress in reforming their military. Traditions of politicization, which paralleled the birth of the Indonesian military, show signs of diminishing. The significant decrease in the number of military representatives in Indonesia’s House of Representatives and increasing civilian victories in civil-military clashes underscore this break with Indonesia’s long tradition of strong military influence. In addition, command responsibility and steps towards international norms on human rights are significant emerging concepts that are turning over long-
held mores. Military engagement stands alongside other incentives, such as economic aid, as a significant tool to press forward U.S. national security interest.
IV. EL SALVADOR

Military-to-military training programs between the United States and El Salvador significantly influenced El Salvador’s positive changes in civil-military relations and adherence to international standards of human rights. From 1932 to 1979, military leaders ruled El Salvador almost exclusively. Furthermore, the Army of El Salvador was the principal organization responsible for human rights abuses during this period (Lukasevich, 2002, p. 2). Between 1979 and 1991, a civil war engulfed El Salvador. This war cost approximately 75,000 lives, displaced a million people, and caused material losses of some $1 billion. In 1991, the government of El Salvador and the guerrilla insurgents signed a peace accord that ended over a decade of civil war. In March 2002, President Bush said,

Today, El Salvador is at peace. The country has renewed its commitment to democracy and economic reform and trade. It is one of the freest and strongest and most stable countries in our hemisphere.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EL SALVADORAN MILITARY

In 1932, President Dr. Arturo Araujo was overthrown by a military coup d’etat. From that point on, military regimes controlled the country until 1979, when another coup sought to establish democracy in El Salvador. For almost fifty years prior to 1979, El Salvador was virtually permanently subjected to political unrest, and military officers officially ruled the country (Barraza, 1998). The table below chronicles El Salvador’s leaders since 1932.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Head of State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932-1934</td>
<td>General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1935</td>
<td>General Andres Ignacio Menendez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1944</td>
<td>General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1948</td>
<td>General Salvador Castaneda Castro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1950</td>
<td>Revolutionary Council of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1956</td>
<td>Lt. Col Oscar Osorio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>Colonel Jose Maria Lemus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>Government Revolutionary Junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>Civil-Military Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1962</td>
<td>Dr. Rodolfo F. Cordon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1967</td>
<td>Colonel Julio A. Rivera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1972</td>
<td>General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1977</td>
<td>Colonel Arturo Armando Molina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>General Carlos Humberto Romero</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From 1932 to 1944, the active armed forces in El Salvador numbered only around 3,000 (Barraza, p. 8). Due to a small regular army force, one in five adult males belonged to the patrullas cantonales (Barraza, p. 8). Established in the early 1900s, this army reservist organization was in all of the cities in the country (UN Truth). After thirteen years of dictatorship, the Salvadorian masses coordinated a national strike. No one worked in any public or private office, and General Martinez was thus forced to leave the country on March 2, 1944.

General Hernandez Martinez’s successor, Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas, remained in power until a new round of elections was held. Elections were carried out in 1945, and retired General Salvador Castaneda Castro won and subsequently ruled the country from 1945 to 1948 (Barraza, p. 8).

General Castaneda Castro was overthrown in 1948. Army officers and civilians installed a junta called the Revolutionary Council of Government (RCG) in his place, which “sought to legitimize its existence via new political rhetoric and new way of ruling” (Moran, 1962, p. 380-381).
Military rule was legitimized through elections. In 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Osorio, member of the Unified Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRUD), was elected president. Osorio was succeeded in 1956 by his handpicked successor, Lt. Col. José María Lemus (Osorio). U.S. training of Salvadoran security forces, as opposed to the regular army, began in 1957 when the U.S. Aid for International Development organization began providing money and personnel (Bonner, 1984, p. 54). American advisors stationed in El Salvador reorganized the police academy, wrote a textbook for the Treasury Police, and trained special riot control units in the National Police and the National Guard (Bonner). During his reign, President Lemus pardoned political prisoners and attempted to continue the progressive programs of his predecessor, President Oscar Osorio. A decline in the prices of coffee and cotton, however, brought strikes, political unrest, and violence. After an attempt was made to assassinate him, Lemus became increasingly harsh and dictatorial. He was deposed in 1960 by a leftist group and deported (Lemus).

From the early 1960s to early 1970s, with growing communist influence in Cuba and Nicaragua, the United States encouraged reform in El Salvador by creating the “Alliance for Progress,” 8 and the Central American Common market increased the influence of the middle and urban working class (Enemies). Yet, opposition groups organized and grew stronger, which drew greater policies of oppression from the government. “Death squads” began assassinating dissidents in order to curtail antigovernment sentiments. Unarmed antigovernment demonstrators were fired upon by the military on two separate occasions (Enemies). By the early 1970s, several small guerrilla groups had formed.

The 1972 elections resulted in a loss of faith of Salvadorans in the electoral process. The presidential candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte, won the elections. However, he was not from the official PCN political party. The government did not accept this defeat and, after a three-day news blackout, declared itself the winner and denied Duarte’s victory (Enemies). The

Salvadoran armed forces institutionalized themselves within the constitutional framework and used it to manipulate the democratic process (Barraza, p. 11).

In addition to the popular discontent caused by the fraudulent election, the government of General Fidel Sanchez (1967-1972) and Colonel Arturo Armando Molina (1972-1977) faced many problems. These included displacement of people from their land by the expansion of the international agricultural export market, as well as residual factors resulting from the 1969 war with Honduras. This war brought thousands of Salvadorans back from Honduras to become refugees in their own land.

After the fraudulent elections of 1972, communist organizations realized that achieving power through popular elections was impossible. The military’s control of the rural areas that was so carefully managed since the insurrection of 1932 began to break down. This was mainly due to three reasons. First, the Catholic Church played an important role in emphasizing the impoverished life and unjust conditions of the peasants. By 1960, 1.9 percent of the Salvadoran population owned 57.5 percent of the land (Barraza, p. 14). The most influential leader of the Catholic Church was Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero. Second, Salvadorians saw successful communist revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua. Lastly, the repressive regime supported the oligarchy to maintain the status quo.

The elections for congressional seats and mayorships in 1974, 1976, and 1977 were again fraudulent. Stuffed ballot boxes were transported in military vehicles and there was widespread intimidation of voters by the National Democratic Organization (ORDEN). ORDEN was a paramilitary organization created in 1964 by Col. Julio A. Rivera. Its mission was to curb the influence of communist ideology (Barraza, p. 15).

On November 11, 1989, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) launched its second final offensive. The objective of this offensive was to decapitate the elected government of El Salvador. In the early hours of the attack, the guerrillas attempted to

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9 Archbishop Romero was killed during a mass in 1980, and his death remains unpunished. Heavy accusations have been against retired Major Robert d’Abuisson.

10 The first FMLN final offensive was in 1981.
assassinate the four senior elected officials of the Cristiani government—the president, the vice president, the First Delegate, and president of the National Assembly. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson (1989) likens this to assassinating the president, vice president, speaker of the House, and president pro tem of the Senate in the United States. The FMLN also simultaneously tried to kill the high command of the Salvadoran military and seize the Ilopango Airport. The purpose of this final offensive, which involved 1,600 to 2,000 combatants, was clearly to seize power, not to strengthen their negotiating position (Aronson). The FMLN failed for two reasons. First, the Salvadoran people refused to rise up as the FMLN called upon them to do, just as they had refused in January 1981 when the FMLN launched its earlier final offensive. Second, the Salvadoran government and armed forces responded quickly and effectively when the attack was first launched. Aronson notes that this was due to both President Cristiani’s leadership, the growing professionalism of the armed forces, and the training and capability that they developed with American assistance.

With the civil war as a background, the process of establishing civilian control faced two primary challenges. First, if the civilians took leadership positions and full control of the military, then they would immediately become military targets of the guerrillas (Barraza, p. 25). Second, the military institution was unwilling to give up its authority. Therefore, until the end of the civil war in 1991, civilian control of the military was not achieved.

The signing of the peace agreement between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN was a watershed event in attaining civilian control over the military. On June 1, 1989, Alfredo Cristiani received the presidential sash from Jose Napoleon Duarte. In President Cristiani’s inaugural speech he pledged a government “based on the principles of liberty, honesty, legality, and security” (Gruson, 1989, p. 7). He promised to get the economy moving and unveiled a five-point plan for immediate talks with the FMLN. The rebels accepted the proposition. In a communiqué from the FMLN to the General Command, they issued a proposal to “initiate as soon as possible a definite process of negotiation to put an end to the war and place all their forces at the service of constructing a true economy” (Barraza, pp. 25-26).
B. UNITED STATES MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE EL SALVADORAN MILITARY

Soon after World War II, El Salvador received its first American grants under the Military Assistance Program, as well as the first U.S. military mission (Arnson, 1980, March 1). During the 1960s and the 1970s, the United States’ Military Assistance Program (MAP) provided $7.4 million to El Salvador. Compared to other Central American countries during this same period, it was a small amount. Of the Central American states, only the country of Costa Rica received less (Haggerty, p. 209).

Security assistance from the United States to El Salvador between Fiscal Year 1950 and Fiscal Year 1979 totaled $16.72 million. The IMET program for El Salvador accounted for almost 35 percent of this total (El Salvador).

In 1980, civil war erupted between government troops and communist-backed guerrillas in El Salvador. The Reagan administration (1981-1989) would not follow the Carter administration’s (1977-1981) policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Reagan believed the Carter administration’s unwillingness to confront the Soviets resulted in Russian presence in Afghanistan, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Furthermore, communist insurgencies spread across Central America. One such insurgency was the FMLN movement in El Salvador. This was a Marxist-led insurgency meant to topple the government of El Salvador and return it to the people. The Reagan administration took bold steps to assist the El Salvadoran military to fight the insurgent FMLN.

Between 1980 and 1990, the United States provided over $1 billion in military assistance to El Salvador, with approximately $996 million in Foreign Military Financing funds and $24 million for the International Military Education and Training program (El Salvador).¹¹ By 1982, El Salvador had become the fourth-largest recipient of American aid in the world due

¹¹ In addition to military assistance, since 1980, the United States has provided approximately $3 billion in economic aid. (GAO/NSIAD-91-166, p. 9)
to fears about a Marxist avalanche in Central America (Bonner, 1984). In 1990, El Salvador ranked first among Latin American recipients of U.S. military aid and eighth in the world.

Congress had placed conditions on aid to El Salvador since 1981, linking it to progress in ending human rights abuses and successful prosecution of those found responsible for the murder of U.S. citizens and Salvadoran civilians. Since 1985, $5 million was withheld annually and was not released unless the government of El Salvador has “pursued all legal avenues” in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for specific murders (El Salvador, p. 9).

1. Access

From 1950 to 1979, the United States had trained 1,971 Salvadoran officers, including at least 17 in urban counterinsurgency, 14 in military intelligence, 108 in basic combat and counterinsurgency, and 124 in basic officer preparation. According to the Pentagon, one of the primary objectives of military-to-military contact was to “…facilitate our overall relations with the government of El Salvador and foster useful professional contacts with key members of the Salvadoran armed forces” (Arnson, 1977).

Throughout the critical decade from 1980 to 1990 only a very small number of military personnel were actually training the El Salvadoran army. Congress had placed a 55-man maximum on the number of trainers in El Salvador authorized to instruct Salvadoran military personnel. Excluded from the 55-man cap were members of the Military Group who managed the U.S. military assistance program from the capitol San Salvador. In total there were about 109 American uniformed personnel in El Salvador (U.S. Military, 1983). Since July of 1990, the U.S. Army 7th Special Forces Group, supplied the majority of U.S. personnel to El Salvador (El Salvador, p. 29). The addition to the 55 trainers included members of the Defense Attaché Office, Marine Corps security for the embassy, and a medical team (U.S. Military, 1983).

In addition to training El Salvadoran forces in country, battalions of soldiers were also trained by the American military in the U.S., Panama and Honduras (Lukasevich, p. 28-29). Of a force of 30,000 soldiers, 19,000 soldiers had received training provided by American military personnel (p. 29).
2. Influence

According to the U.S. General Accounting Office report titled *El Salvador: Military Assistance Has Helped Counter But Not Overcome The Insurgency*, the end objective of American involvement in El Salvador was to train and support the Salvadoran Armed Forces to a level sufficient to ensure that the Salvadorans themselves would defeat the insurgency while improving their human rights record (p. 10).

In preparation of deploying to El Salvador, American military trainers were required to receive training in human rights prior to their assignment in El Salvador. This training was intended to ensure that U.S. military trainers could demonstrate, articulate, and cultivate respect for human rights. Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command General Woerner gave “specific guidance to include human rights training” in their classes to the El Salvadoran security forces (El Salvador, p. 29). This training was in accordance with standard American training and doctrine. In the early 1980s, the term “human rights” was not in U.S. military training manuals. This training fell under the heading of the “Law of Land Warfare.” This outlined the legal conduct of war and the treatment of combatants and non-combatants. Under international law, Law of Land Warfare refers to both judicial and humanitarian laws that belligerents must obey during hostilities. Topics under this subject include review of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and International Customary Law. These directives provide the basis for human rights training in the military today.

Salvadoran military personnel were also exposed to U.S. and international standards regarding human rights through the International Military Education and Training program. Salvadoran military who attended American military education were exposed to topics such as treatment of civilians and captured combatants as prescribed by the Geneva Convention, the Law of Land Warfare, and the relationship between the military and the civilian government. In 1989 and 1990, about 400 members of the Salvadoran armed forces participated in this

During the period 1980 to 1982 an El Salvadoran Army policy existed that

…they generally did not take prisoners. The first change came as U.S. advisors pressured them to be more humane in treatment of POWs for two reasons…to ensure continued foreign aid from the U.S. and European countries…and, as far as utility, it is better to have the [prisoner] alive.

According to a U.S. military official in El Salvador, a high ranking official of the UN Human Rights Commission responsible for setting up the conditions to support the human rights accords of the peace talks was told by the FMLN that U.S. military training had markedly improved Salvadoran armed forces’ human rights performance (El Salvador, p. 29). This realization is more lucidly noted in a remark by an FMLN guerrilla commander. A senior U.S. officer relayed the following excerpt based on a conversation that took place during government of El Salvador and FMLN peace negotiations (Lukasevich, 2002, p. 38). Joaquin Villalobos, commander of the insurgent group People’s Revolutionary Army remarked:

…the most damaging thing that occurred in the war was putting American trainers in the brigades…The Army became more professional, they had fewer human rights abuses, and when they had fewer human rights abuses, the guerrillas lost a lot of their propaganda value and a lot of their recruiting capability…

Similarly, Bernard Aronson (1992), Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs writes

In the early 1980s, hundreds of Salvadoran civilians were killed monthly by all factions for political reasons. By 1990, total political killings numbered 62—less in an entire year than the weekly average a decade before.

Furthermore, a UN Truth Commission Report reveals a clear decline in human rights abuse allegations against the Army of El Salvador. The Truth Commission and its mandate came into existence as a result of the peace agreement reached between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN in 1992. In this report titled From Madness to Hope: The 12 Year
War in El Salvador, the Commission had “...the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know that truth” (1993, March). In 1980 2,597 instances of “grave” human rights violations were recorded. In 1991, only 28 were recorded. Chris Lukasevich (2002) provides convincing statistical analysis that asserts that the improvement of the human rights records of the Army of El Salvador was significantly influenced by the presence of U.S. Army Special Forces trainers. On the other hand, Bernard Aronson (1992) points out that although military aid to El Salvador received the most attention, $3 out of every $4 sent to El Salvador from the U.S. in the 1980s was economic aid. This aid supported a land reform program, and it kept the economy going during the war by repairing electric lines, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure damaged by FMLN attacks (Aronson, 1992). If we measure the degree of American influence through the amount of money spent on El Salvador, then the level of influence attributed to security assistance would account for 25 percent. However, given that 19,000 out of 30,000 El Salvadoran troops were trained by American forces, the degree of military influence would likely be significantly greater.

The Salvadoran military reflected remarkable progress in the protection of human rights. This was accomplished by U.S. military assistance programs, which contributed to Salvadoran military leaders’ emphases to provide human rights training to their soldiers and to the establishment of a military human rights office (El Salvador, p. 29).

C. CONCLUSION

Almost fifty years of military rulers underscores the dramatic change to civilian led government that El Salvador has enjoyed since 1979. In addition to this transformation, El Salvadoran security forces broke with their long tradition of violence directed toward their own civilian populace. American military training of the El Salvadoran military emphasized that even in war, not all acts of violence are tolerable. In addition, humane treatment of prisoners of war, winning the loyalty of the populace, and adherence to the Law of Land Warfare have pragmatic applications that may contribute to successful campaigns. In short, El Salvadoran security forces did not alter their behavior due to an immediate recognition of the Geneva and Hague
conventions. On the contrary, they pragmatically overturned traditional tactics of warfare for tactics that proved to be more effective. The constant presence of U.S. military trainers in country and a large effort to train El Salvadoran forces outside of the country significantly contributed to this change.
V. CONCLUSION

Long-held traditions of strong military influence over civil administration and oppression towards their own populace are on the decline in Indonesia and El Salvador. To a significant degree, this can be attributed to the participation of these nation’s security forces in American military-to-military engagement programs.

Through aggressive military engagement programs, the United States has gained significant access to top military and civilian leaders in foreign nations. On some occasions, this has resulted in influencing these individuals and has led to significant changes in patterns of behavior of the host nation’s security forces.

If the United States were to increase military-to-military contact with China’s People’s Liberation Army, the most appropriate programs would be exposing mid-level officers to professional military education institutions. These would create the informal relationships that lead to access. Attendance at American institutions is on the order of months and years. For example, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College requires attendance of ten months, and attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School is one year. Educational institutions of this nature would not expose PLA officers to sensitive U.S. warfighting capabilities. Present high-level exchanges are critical as these military officers will be in positions of command. The latest military exchange involved about two-dozen U.S generals and admirals who traveled to Beijing as part of the Capstone program for new flag officers in February 2002. These officers visited the PLA National Defense University and a PLA military base. However, there is a limitation to the advantages of visits by high-ranking officers, as these visits may be too short to establish relationships that may bear fruit for a long period of time. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell said

If you get two generals together for a visit, you gain a few years of dividends, but if you get two majors together you reap the benefits for a few decades (Kozaryn, 1995).
Of the four main U.S. Department of State funded foreign military training programs, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has proven to be very effective in exposing foreign military officers to the fundamental values of the U.S. military and U.S. civil-military relations. Through this exposure, the Department of State assists participants in the professionalization of their military. The IMET program may be the most appropriate venue towards increasing military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and China.

Sino-U.S. military relations have had a very cyclic nature since its inception in 1980. Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 and 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1989, and the emergency landing of the U.S. Navy surveillance plane on Hainan Island in 2001 have led to an abrupt end then gradual renewal of military-to-military programs. Thus, there is limited evidence of the efficacy of past military-to-military contact programs between the United States and China.

Although, access, does not always translate into the type of influence that the United States desires, it gives the United States an opportunity to expose foreign security forces to American values and beliefs. Ultimately, it is the individual who makes the decision. The case studies of Indonesia and El Salvador have shown that military-to-military contact stands alongside with other tools of influence, such as economic aid, as a potentially influential program of engagement.
LIST OF REFERENCES

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER II: THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY


CHAPTER III: INDONESIA


CHAPTER IV: EL SALVADOR


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