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ANGLICO: Birth, Life, Death, and Resurrection.

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The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a brief review of the history of the Marine Corps Tactical-Level Liaison capability and analyze the impact of the Commandant’s 1997 decision to disestablish ANGLICO. This paper reviews the history of ANGLICO, the decision to deactivate it, the current Marine Liaison Element (MLE), and the proposed "NEW" MLE. In this paper ANGLICO is used as the historical model for Marine Corps Tactical-Level Liaison. This paper compares the mission, organization, training, equipment, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of ANGLICO, the current MLE, and the proposed "NEW" MLE and focuses on which organization could provide the most effective capability to conduct tactical-level liaison between the MAGTF Commander and potential Joint/Allied/Coalition forces. The future requires that the Marine Corps be able to effectively fight and win any conflict along the full spectrum of warfare. Since future operations will most certainly involve fighting conflicts in a Joint/Allied/Coalition environment, it is vital that the MAGTF Commander has the necessary tactical-level liaison assets. As professionals it is imperative to have a fundamental knowledge of Marine Corps tactical-level liaison in order to successfully meet the challenges of the future.
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Preface

**ANGLICO: Birth, Life, Death, and Resurrection.**

**Purpose:** The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a brief review of the history of Marine Corps tactical level liaison capability and analyze the impact on the Commandant’s 1997 decision to disestablish ANGLICO. This review will include the recent progression of the Marine Corps ability to conduct tactical-level liaison.

**Approach:** In order to accomplish this, this paper will review the history of ANGLICO, the decision to deactivate it, the current Marine Liaison Element (MLE), and the proposed “New” MLE. ANGLICO will be used as the historical model for Marine Corps tactical-level liaison. The Battle of Khafji will be used as the premier example of Marine Corps tactical-level liaison in combat. This paper will compare the mission, organization, training, equipment, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of ANGLICO, the current MLE, and the proposed “New” MLE. The conclusion will focus on which organization could provide the most effective capability to conduct tactical-level liaison between the MAGTF commander and potential joint/allied/coalition forces.

**Topic limitation:** The topic will be limited to the Marine Corps’ need for tactical-level liaison. It will only briefly discuss operational level liaison.

**Importance:** The future needs for tactical-level liaison will be based on current National Military Strategy, joint and service vision statements, and joint and service publications. The future requires that the Marine Corps be able to effectively fight and win any conflict along the full spectrum of warfare. Since future operations will most certainly involve fighting conflicts in a joint/allied/coalition environment, it is vital that the MAGTF commander has the necessary tactical liaison assets. As professionals it is imperative to have a fundamental knowledge of Marine Corps tactical-level liaison in order to successfully meet the challenges of the future.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In recent years the progression of the Marine Corps tactical liaison capability has taken a long and twisted road. In 1997, the Commandant approved the recommendation of the Active Duty Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG) to eliminate the active duty Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) as a part of the ADFSRG’s effort to, “…define the most effective, capable, relevant and realistically attainable active duty force structure of the U.S. Marine Corps.”¹ This decision effectively eliminated the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander’s only dedicated tactical-level liaison unit specifically organized, trained and equipped to provide liaison between U. S. Marine Corps tactical-level units and adjacent U. S. Army and allied/coalition forces. To better understand the importance and significance of this action, the paper will present a definition of tactical-level liaison, an overview of ANGLICO, the Commandant’s decision to deactivate the active duty ANGLICOs, the current Marine Liaison Element (MLEs), and the adequacy of the proposed “new MLE.” To gain a working knowledge of liaison, “tactical-level liaison,” and the associated functions, definitions are provided in Appendix A.

Operational and Tactical Level Liaison

Liaison Officers (LNOs) and liaison teams are organized, trained, and deployed based on the requirements determined by the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. The commander establishes the necessary liaison structure to facilitate coordination of operations between joint/allied/coalition forces, governmental organizations, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), or other joint forces.² Although not defined in Joint or Service publications, operational-level liaison will
be referred to as liaison functions between joint/allied/coalition forces or organizations at the corps level and above. Operational level LNO/teams allow the commander to facilitate his command, control and coordination by improving mutual situational awareness, understanding of capabilities, limitations, and coordination of efforts at or above corps level.

**Tactical-level liaison:** For the purposes of this paper, tactical-level liaison will be referred to as liaison functions at or below the division level. Tactical-level liaison not only provides the functions of monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist, but also includes more detailed coordination such as:

- provide commander’s intent and planning expertise
- coordinate maneuver, boundary changes, linkup operations
- coordinate logistics support
- conduct/coordinate future planning
- brief commander’s plans, operations, organization, capabilities
- exchange intelligence information
- provide up-to-date information to supported command
- provide fire support planning, coordination, and control for Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and Close Air Support (CAS).
- provide joint and combined fire support connectivity
- provide the technical capability to maintain necessary connectivity with coalition partners and other services/Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).
- provide smooth integration of Marine/U.S. combat power into the overall matrix of a coalition force.
- provide integration between sensors, platforms, and controlling agencies in support of allied/coalition forces.
- provide SME expertise in Marine Corps Doctrine Tactics Techniques and Procedures (DPPT).
- provide technical and tactical expertise in fire support planning, execution, and coordination.³

**ANGLICO as the model for tactical liaison**

ANGLICO’s history and capabilities serve as a sound example of an efficient and effective unit designed to provide tactical liaison. As, “…the only purpose-structured organization within the Department of Defense (DoD) whose primary mission was the provision of control and liaison for USMC/USN Close Air Support (CAS), Naval Surface Fires Support (NSFS), and surface fire support for sister services and allied units,”⁴ ANGLICO was the “force of choice” for the MAGTF commander. With fifty years of capable service as the Marine Corps’ primary tactical-level liaison unit, ANGLICO provided a time tested and combat proven unit whose mission, organization, training, equipment, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses can be considered a historical model for development of an effective tactical liaison unit. As ANGLICO developed, it became capable of integrating into all tactical levels of a supported allied/coalition or U.S. Army unit ranging from division down to the company level. In peacetime and combat, as shown in Operation DESERT STORM, ANGLICO units provided a method of integrating into the supported command elements. This integration gave the MAGTF commander a swift means to pass intent and coordinating instructions.

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³Report of the Active Duty Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG) (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), 31 July 1997) cover sheet, The Bright working papers are a set of documents in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel R. Thomas Bright who was the last Commanding Officer (CO) of 1st ANGLICO, from 10 June 1997 to 14 May 1999. This collection contains letters, information papers, working
group reports, power point slide presentations, naval messages, e-mail and other correspondence that covers
the period from the first indications that ANGLICO was under consideration for deactivation in June 1997, to the
activation of I and II MLE in May 1999. As the last CO of ANGLICO, Lieutenant Colonel Bright was intimately
involved in the concept development of the post-ANGLICO/MLE tactical-level liaison capability. The hand written
notes and e-mail correspondence contained in his working papers were especially insightful. Additionally, the many
conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Bright concerning these working papers were extremely valuable in the
writing of this paper. Hereafter cited as the Bright Papers.

(JTF) Liaison Operations* (Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Va: Air Land Sea Application Center, August 1998), v

3 Message from the Commander Marine Forces Pacific to Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary
Force, Commanding General III Marine Expeditionary Force, subject: “Comments on draft MARFOR
concept for the MLG” 040313Z November 1997, Bright working papers.

4 Letter, from Commanding Officer (CO), 1st ANGLICO, to Commanding General (CG), I Marine Expeditionary
reductions. 15 July, 1997, Bright working papers.
Chapter 2

History of ANGLICO

ANGLICO evolved from the Assault Signal Companies (ASCOs) of WWII. The ASCOs, comprised of USMC and USN personnel were organized in an effort to support Marines during amphibious operations with air and naval gunfire liaison and shore party communications. In 1947, the Marine Corps eliminated the ASCOs. This decision redistributed the naval gunfire liaison teams into the division headquarters, and returned the communications teams back to the division communications battalions. In 1949, the Marine Corps then formed ANGLICO to support both Navy-Marine Corps and Navy-Army operations. Its initial purpose was to provide air and naval gunfire liaison in support of an U.S. Marine division, the Fleet Marine Force, and U.S. Army units. Since its inception, ANGLICO distinguished itself as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), in tactical-level planning and liaison as seen in Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada, and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

ANGLICO in Korea

During the Korean conflict, ANGLICO laid the foundations for its reputation as a flexible Mobile Training Team (MTT) of Subject Matter Experts (SME) capable of facilitating tactical-level liaison planning and execution in the conduct of joint amphibious and follow-on operations. ANGLICO received its first baptism of fire following the events of 25 June 1950. ANGLICO teams were quickly put into service in Japan by General Douglas MacArthur in an effort to hastily augment his staff with additional amphibious expertise. Early on, ANGLICO demonstrated its ability to facilitate operational planning and execution when one team quickly worked along side another amphibious training team and the staff of Rear Admiral James H.
Doyle. Together these three groups trained one regiment from each of the Eighth Army’s divisions in Japan. The ANGLICO team’s knowledge of Navy-Marine Doctrine Tactics Training and Procedures (DTTP) in amphibious operations facilitated amphibious planning that led to the loading, transporting, and offloading of the 1st Cavalry Division for its landing on 18 July at Pohang-dong.

ANGLICO teams also demonstrated their capability to conduct tactical liaison during the defense of the Pusan perimeter, the amphibious assault at Inchon, and the remainder of the Korean conflict. As part of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade, its teams arrived at Pusan on 2 August 1950. On 7 August, they began direct support to U.S. Marine and Army forces with control of CAS assets flying from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. ANGLICO battalion and regimental teams were some of the first units ashore from Major Robert L. Schreier’s 1st Signal Battalion on 16 September in support of the Inchon landing. Many ANGLICO Marines also provided fire support coordination and terminal control to U.S. Army and Allied forces such as the U.S. Army’s 3rd Division and the Royal Marine 41 Independent Commando.

**Korea to the Gulf War**

Between the Korean War and the Gulf War, ANGLICO further expanded its corporate knowledge and liaison experience base by supporting joint and combined exercises and operations. ANGLICO supplied teams and detachments to Okinawa, Lebanon, and Jordan between 1953 and 1958. In 1957, ANGLICO further strengthened its commitment to the U.S. Army when its Marines began to receive airborne training in order to provide full support to U.S. Army airborne units. In May 1965, 1st ANGLICO, Sub Unit One, deployed to Vietnam. 1st ANGLICO used Naval Gunfire and Naval Air to support the 1st Cavalry Division and Vietnamese Rangers, while 2nd ANGLICO supported the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division.
during Operation CLOVE HITCH in 1966. By 1972, the United States military presence in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) had been drastically reduced. ANGLICO was one of the few United States units left in country during the 30 March 1972, “Easter Offensive” conducted by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The ANGLICO teams, with their link to the critical “U.S. supporting arms umbrella” of Naval Gunfire (NGF) and U.S. Navy carrier air were a key element in slowing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) advance. These teams supplied the only consistent resistance as many Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units fled under the pressure of the oncoming NVA attack. Due to bad weather, the U.S. Navy destroyers positioned off the coast were the only reliable fire support during these first critical days of the battle which helped to halt the NVA advance. After the Vietnam war, ANGLICO continued to support many allied exercises and actual combat operations in Lebanon and Grenada.

**Operation DESERT STORM**

On 2 August 1990 Saddam Hussein sent an armored and mechanized division across the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to invade the small neighboring country of Kuwait. On 6 August, President Bush order U.S. forces into Kuwait with the first ground forces being the 82nd Airborne with a detachment of Marines from 2nd ANGLICO in support. First ANGLICO soon deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of the 82nd Airborne, but were then reassigned to Arab Coalition forces. Third and Fourth ANGLICO, from the Marine reserve forces, later followed to further support the Coalition efforts. The robust tactical liaison of ANGLICO support in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was key to the coalition effort. The support of the 1st ANGLICO teams in particular was a crucial political and military factor.

For the purposes of this paper ANGLICO operations in the Battle of Khafji will represent the model for ANGLICO in a tactical liaison coalition support role. The support of
Captain James R. Braden’s ANGLICO teams attached to the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) provided a direct conduit for the impressive U.S. air power and naval gunfire supporting arms, as well as a conduit of information sharing between the Joint Forces Coalition-East (JFCE) and the U.S. Third Marine Regiment.\textsuperscript{10} This conduit provided crucial artillery, Rotary Wing (RW), and Fixed Wing (FW) CAS to JFCE forces during the battle of Khafji. The U.S. “fire support umbrella” strengthened the weaker JFCE forces in order to facilitate the prosecution of the Saudi Arabian political decision to take the lead in expelling the Iraqis from Saudi soil.\textsuperscript{11}

The ANGLICO teams also provided continuous and consistent communications between the supported Arab coalition maneuver units (Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Brigade, Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) Brigades, Qatari Brigade, Omani Battalion, United Arab Emirates Battalion, Kuwaiti Battalion), U.S. Special Forces, the JFCE, and adjacent Marine units.\textsuperscript{12}

**TASK ORGANIZATION OF JOINT FORCES COALITION EAST (JFCE) WITH ANGLICO**

![Diagram]

**Battle of Khafji**

On 27 January 1991, U.S. forces, to include the ANGLICO teams supporting the Arab coalition forces, began to track increased Iraqi activity to the north of the city of Khafji. This
activity was to be the first phase of a risky and desperate thrust to the south by the Iraqi III Corps
and elements of the IV Corps under the command of Saddam Hussein’s most able field
commander, Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud. )13 (see map 1)14

Over a five-day period, ANGLICO’s Supporting Arms Liaison Teams (SALTs) began to
observe increased enemy movement of a large armored convoy moving along the coast road.
Providing terminal control and Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA), an ANGLICO Firepower
Control Team (FCT) supported by U.S. air assets engaged and destroyed dozens of vehicles and
Iraqi artillery. As the JCFE forces began to withdraw under the Iraqi pressure, 1st ANGLICO’s
SALT 6 provided the last “eyes on” of the Iraqi thrust. Utilizing a Radar Beacon Forward Air
Controller (RABFAC), SALT 6 was able to integrate and provide terminal control of multiple
USMC and USN Tactical Air Control (Airborne) (TAC(A)) and CAS aircraft. The targeted Iraqi
armor and artillery positions massed north of the coastal road were struck with devastating
effects. Throughout the night of 29-30 January, SALT 6 integrated U.S. Air Force A-10s, and
U.S. Marine A-6s, AV-8Bs, and AH-1Ws against the attacking Iraqi forces. The SALT’s superb
coordination and terminal control of these air assets proved to be indispensable in slowing and
disorganizing the Iraqi attack.15

Information Flow

After holding out until the last possible moment, SALT 6 as the last JFCE reconnaissance
element to have “eyes on” the Iraqi advance, provided critical updated information on detailed
enemy and friendly positions as well as the previous night’s events to the SANG Brigade
Commander, Colonel Turki al-Firmi.16 After Colonel Turki finished debriefing SALT 6, he
passed this information to Saudi Headquarters. The JFCE Division Commander acted on it and
directed Colonel Turki to sweep west of the city and block any Iraqi attempt to reinforce.
Map 1
ANGLICO FCT and SALT teams were assigned to their respective Arab Units in the Saudi counter-attack into Khafji. The value of the ANGLICO support was quickly realized during this Saudi operation when SALT 5 quickly contacted the 3rd Marines’ Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) with a critical cease fire call. An uncoordinated 3rd Marines’ controlled artillery attack into the city was impacting dangerously close to the Qatari sector of the counterattack and JFCE force casualties were closely avoided by the quick, effective actions of the ANGLICO Marines. 17

CAS in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)

The ANGLICO teams proved to be key assets during the ensuing Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) battle. They provided critical CAS, naval gunfire, and Marine artillery control during the JFCE’s first MOUT combat. These personnel also provided vital communications links between the different JFCE units that had difficulties maintaining solid communications in the challenging urban terrain. These communications were vital in avoiding Arab-on-Arab fratricide during the MOUT operations. 18

Conclusion

During the battle of Khafji the ANGLICO teams played a key role in the defense and then counter-attack by JFCE forces in and around the city. The ability to reinforce a less capable coalition partner with superior supporting arms in a rapid, continuous, and overwhelming manner was key factor in facilitating the JCFE forces defeat of a numerically superior Iraqi ground force. The ANGLICO teams displayed many of the key tactical liaison functions to include:

1) Monitoring the effectiveness of the JFCE forces and provided position reports of Iraqi and JFCE forces to the adjacent Marine regiment, JFCE, and ANGLICO higher headquarters.
2) **Coordinating** the integration of U.S. air and naval gunfire into the JFCE ground operations.

3) **Advising** the JFCE forces on the proper use of CAS and supporting arms during their withdrawal and subsequent counter-attack into the city of Khafji.

4) **Assisting** the JFCE forces by coordinating and deconflicting efforts with the adjacent 3rd Marine Regiment and maintaining vital communications between the variety of JFCE Arab forces operating in close proximity during MOUT operations.

The success of ANGLICO’s “force multiplying” tactical-level liaison led to several larger strategic, operational, and tactical effects. Strategically, the victory at Khafji led to two conclusions: first, the Arabs in the coalition could and would fight aggressively against their Iraqi/Arab brothers, and second, the Iraqis would not fight aggressively if they faced stiff and well coordinated forces using combined arms.

The ability of ANGLICO to maintain continuous communications between the Coalition maneuver elements engaged in the dangerous MOUT operations inside Khafji undoubtedly helped keep casualties to a minimum. Operationally, the coalition knew that U.S. airpower could strengthen the weaker JFCE sector, and provide the JFCE the confidence that, with proper air support, they could hold their own in future combat against the Iraqis. Tactically, the JFCE headquarters and the individual JFCE units were convinced of the power of combined arms operations and were confident in the air ground task force concept. The adjacent Marine Units also were reassured that the JFCE forces could be counted upon to hold the flank against an Iraqi attack. The trust that had been built during the five-month training period between the ANGLICO teams and their JFCE units was critical to the JCFE success. The endstate of the Battle of Khafji was this: ANGLICO again proved itself as a force multiplier by
enabling the U.S. forces to extend the “fire support umbrella” over our coalition partner, thus building a stronger political and military bond with our coalition partners.

3 Montross, 13
4 Montross, 166-167
6 Marine Corps Historical Center Archives, “History of Second ANGLICO.”
7 Gerald H. Turley, Colonel, USMCR (Retired), Easter Offensive, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 65
9 Haney, 56.
12 Braden, 20
13 Braden, 12.
14 Gordon and Trainor, 268.
15 Gordon and Trainor, 270
16 Braden, 15.
17 Braden, 16.
18 Braden, 17.
19 Braden, 28.
20 Braden, 31.
20 Ibid.
Chapter 3

ANGLICO

For ANGLICO, the battle of Khafji was the pinnacle of tactical and technical acumen. It encapsulated all the attributes and capabilities that made ANGLICO a valuable tactical-level liaison tool for the MAGTF commander. The ANGLICO teams displayed flexibility in employment as planners, advisors, fire support coordinators, terminal controllers, communication facilitators, and forward reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence (RSI) gatherers for the supported JFCE units. The ability to task organize in support of varying supported units and remain logistically self-supporting via the motor transportation and supply sections made the ANGLICO teams easy for the coalition force to use. The professionalism and confidence of the ANGLICO Marines was infectious and quickly spread throughout the supported unit. 1 This flexibility, expertise, professionalism and confidence was built over years of experience and corporate knowledge developed by working with joint and foreign units. To better understand how ANGLICO reached this level of proficiency, it is necessary to examine the mission, organization, equipment, training, and capabilities that were inherent in the unit.

Mission

The primary mission of ANGLICO as stated in its last Table of Organization (T/O) was:

To support a U.S. Army or Allied division of two brigades, or elements there-of, by providing the control and liaison agencies associated with the ground elements in the control and employment of naval gunfire and naval close air support in the amphibious operations when support is provided by naval gunfire and/or naval air. This includes the provisions of support to U.S. Airborne units and parachute qualification of personnel as determined by the Fleet Marine Force Commander and approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 2
The ANGLICO support to these U.S. Army or Allied divisions allowed the MAGTF to smoothly transfer U.S. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and Close Air Support (CAS) directly to an adjacent U.S. Army or allied/coalition partner. There were a total of four ANGLICOs, two active duty, 1st and 2nd ANGLICO, and two reserve, 3rd and 4th ANGLICO. All four ANGLICOs were organized under identical T/O and Table of Equipment (T/E). First ANGLICO, based at Camp Pendleton, California, supported I Marine Expeditionary Force, (I MEF) and was deactivated on 14 May 1999. Second ANGLICO, based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, supported II MEF, and was deactivated on 28 September 1998. Third ANGLICO is currently based in Long Beach, California and 4th ANGLICO at West Palm Beach, Florida. Both 3rd and 4th ANGLICO still provide liaison support to the Marine Corps Reserve and active duty force albeit on a limited basis.

**Organization**

ANGLICO units were organized in garrison similarly to other Marine units. Although it was named a “company,” it was actually a battalion level unit. The garrison organization of each ANGLICO had a commanding officer (Lieutenant Colonel), an Executive Officer (Major, aviator), Sergeant Major, S-1, S-3, S-4, communications, supply, motor transport, paraloft sections, and three brigade platoons that provided the tactical liaison support to the supported U.S. Army or joint/allied/coalition units. Intelligence section functions were provided by the appropriate MAGTF S-2 and the supported joint/allied/coalition unit. The total T/O strength of an ANGLICO unit was 248 Marines and sailors organized into tactical liaison teams and support sections.
The tactical organization of each ANGLICO consisted of one Division Team, three Brigade Teams, six Supporting Arms Liaison Teams (SALTs), and 12 Firepower Control Teams (FCTs) for a total of 22 tactical teams consisting of 36 officers and 136 enlisted Marines. These 22 tactical teams yielded 70% (172 of 248) of the manpower for direct tactical liaison of supporting arms and communications to a supported U.S. Army or allied/coalition unit. These teams were organized to provide support to one U.S. Army or allied/coalition division size unit. Doctrinally, an ANGLICO company was designed to provide support at the division, brigade, battalion, and company level.

The Division Team was comprised of the commanding officer, the lead officer for higher level liaison with the supported division, and his staff and communications section. The Division Team also included a division air officer (the Executive Officer) and a division naval gunfire officer (Navy Lieutenant Commander/Lieutenant). The team was responsible for maintaining continuous communications with the Amphibious Task Force’s (ATF) Supporting
Arms Coordination Center (SACC), the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) afloat or the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), and the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) ashore. This connectivity facilitated the smooth integration of U.S./USMC combat power into the overall matrix of supported U. S. Army/allied/coalition forces. The division team was also responsible for ensuring the subordinate Brigade, Supporting Arms Liaison Teams (SALTs), and Firepower Control Teams (FCTs) were properly employed by the supported unit.

The Brigade Team was organized to support an U. S. Army or allied maneuver brigade. It consisted of two officers, an Air Officer/Platoon Commander and NGF Liaison Officer, one corpsman, and 10 enlisted Marines trained in fire support, communications, motor transport, and radio repair. These teams were responsible for planning, requesting, and coordinating supporting arms for the supported infantry brigade and assisting the supported brigade in planning operations at least 72 hours in advance. The Brigade Team ensured the subordinate ANGLICO units, SALTs, and FCTs attached to the supported brigade, were properly employed and logistically supplied by the supported brigade. The team facilitated the flow of information vertically and horizontally throughout the U.S. Army/allied/coalition and ANGLICO chain of command.

The Supporting Arms Liaison Team (SALT) was organized to support an U.S. Army or allied/coalition maneuver battalion. The team consisted of one officer (air officer or fire support coordinator) and six enlisted Marines trained in fire support and communications. The SALT was responsible for planning, requesting, and coordinating supporting arms for the supported maneuver infantry battalion. The team assisted the supported battalion in planning operations at least 24–48 hours ahead. The SALT ensured the supported battalion properly employed its two FCTs. The team could also facilitate the flow of information vertically and horizontally
throughout the U.S. Army/allied/coalition and ANGLICO chain of command. The SALT was a critical planning facilitator in support of the battalion as the basic tactical maneuver unit.

The Firepower Control Team (FCT) was organized to support an U.S. Army or allied/coalition maneuver company. It consisted of one officer (team leader/universal spotter) and five enlisted Marines trained in fire support control and communications. The FCT was responsible for planning, requesting, coordinating and controlling supporting arms for the supported maneuver Infantry Company. The team was also responsible for providing terminal control of NGF and CAS, designating laser guided munitions, and adjusting artillery and mortar fires. (See Appendix C for further details on ANGLICO tactical organization)

**Individual training**

The training of ANGLICO Marines was a continuous process of building both individual and team skills. All ANGLICOs established some type of “in-house” training program that would indoctrinate new members of the unit to the basic skills necessary to sustain them through unit and team training exercises ranging from 13 month MEU (SOC) cycle deployments to supporting U.S. Army training exercises at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. This in-house training was augmented and complimented by additional formal training schools such as U.S. Army Airborne Basic and JumpMaster, Ranger, Pathfinder, Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST) schools, and USMC Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) school.

The following training cycle is specific to 1st ANGLICO, but reflects the basic individual training cycle common to all the ANGLICOs. Each new member of 1st ANGLICO was trained at 1st ANGLICO Basic Course (ABC). ABC was a six-week basic skills course designed to teach basic skills in radio communications, terminal control, patrolling, Special Insertion and
Extraction (SPIE), rappelling and fastrope techniques. If the Marine or sailor successfully completed ABC he would then be sent to the U.S. Army’s Airborne Basic school to become a basic parachutist.

Once Marines and sailors completed the six week ABC and the U.S. Army airborne school, depending on their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), they would be either assigned to a support section or one of the 22 tactical teams (Division, Brigade, SALT or FCT). After assignment to their appropriate team or support section, Marines that displayed exceptional leadership, aptitude, and maturity were selected to attend specialized schools such as U.S. Army Jump Master, Ranger, Pathfinder, Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST), and USMC Advanced Communications and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) schools.

After completing an advanced school, these highly skilled Marines became the instructors and resident tactical and technical experts that would cross-train other ANGLICO Marines in critical enabling skills. This wealth of expertise was a key factor in ANGLICOs ability to be flexible and effective in a myriad of environments. In addition to the Marines and sailors assigned to the 22 tactical liaison teams, those in the support sections were also continuously cross-trained in basic communications and terminal control procedures for mortars, artillery, CAS, and NGF. These cross-trained ANGLICO Marines and sailors were periodically rotated through the tactical teams to train and maintain them as a pool of proficient augmentees to be used in support of peacetime operations or combat replacements.

**Team training**

Although individual training was a key factor to ANGLICO’s success, the totality of the training of tactical teams was where ANGLICO gained its synergy. Just as the Marine Corps utilizes the “Crucible” to transform young recruits into Marines, the small team training at
ANGLICO also blended the skills and teamwork of tactical team members under a constant stream of diverse and challenging field exercises. As new members were introduced to a tactical team, the training would focus on the basics of radio communication, fire support coordination, terminal control of tactical aircraft, Naval Gunfire (NFG), and artillery. All the specialized training and technical expertise was constantly tried, tested, refined, and improved by providing continuous support to a series of Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and Allied exercises. ANGLICO tactical team training was greatly enhanced by multiple three-week rotations in support of U.S. Army and allied brigades and battalions at the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and at the National Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, California.

The mission of the JRTC is:

To provide realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders and units of our nation’s joint contingency forces for success on future battlefields. Train under tough, realistic combat like conditions across a wide range of likely tactical operations and mission rehearsal exercises capable of fully integrating into higher level exercises and scenarios.\(^\text{10}\)

The JRTC is specifically designed to train brigade size units of U.S. Army Light Infantry (including airborne and airborne assault units), but also trains U.S. Air Force, Special Operations Forces (SOF), other services, and allied forces. The permanent JRTC Opposing Force (OPFOR), an U.S. Army Airborne infantry battalion (1\(^\text{st}\) of the 509\(^{\text{th}}\)), provides the challenge of a real world adversary. This two and one-half week exercise uses civilians, media, terrorism, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) gear, casualty drills, and the OPFOR battalion supported with CAS from Fixed and Rotary Wing soviet style aircraft to replicate the fog, friction, and frustration of combat. The JRTC staff evaluates the training brigade through Low Intensity, Mid Intensity, and MOUT conflict scenarios in an 18-day, three-
phase exercise. This intensely tough training facilitated the refinement of ANGLICO’s DTTPs while supporting varied units ranging from the 75th Ranger regiment and the 101st Airborne (air assault) to German infantry units. This valuable training exercise provided ANGLICO with the closest possible simulation to combat. From these intense training evolutions, ANGLICO was able to develop SOPs and a corporate knowledge of how best to support varying U.S. Army and allied units and their Doctrine Tactics Techniques and Procedures (DTTP).\textsuperscript{11}

Exercises at the NTC, Fort Irwin, California, offered a similar training scenario, but these were focused on combined arms, battalion level, high intensity conflicts in a desert environment. The OPFOR at NTC is composed of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARC), simulating an enemy Motorized Rifle Division, and is supported by a squadron of OPFOR rotary and fixed wing aircraft. The NTC training complex utilizes a computer driven, live-fire complex with sophisticated targetry, and a state-of-the-art instrumentation system that monitors training battles, and a full-time team of combat trainers who observe and control units during the training exercises.\textsuperscript{12} These exercises at the NTC allowed ANGLICO to directly train to a Southwest Asia (SWA) type Operations Plan (OPLAN) in an intense desert environment. The NTC presented many of the same fire support and communications challenges that ANGLICO DESERT STORM veterans faced. Just as the JRTC exercises built experience in light infantry, air assault, and airborne operations, the NTC exercises built experience in desert armored warfare operations.

Although viewed by the Active Duty Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG) as a drain on a Marine asset in time, equipment, and personnel, JRTC and NTC support exercises were actually a tremendous bargain for ANGLICO.\textsuperscript{13} The JRTC exercises cost the Marine Corps little due to U.S. Army funding for transportation of personnel, equipment, expendables,
and supplying motor transport assets. The training opportunities at JRTC and NTC could not be duplicated in any Marine sponsored exercise. During JRTC exercises ANGLCIO had the opportunity to work with units of different size, type, and doctrine in scenarios that closely reflected I MEF’s supported CINC environments. This allowed the tactical teams to use, refine, or modify standard Marine Corps DTTPs according to the environment and the supported unit and their mission.

**MEU Training**

ANGLICO support to the MEUs also provided a great training opportunity for the tactical teams. ANGLICO supported each MEU (except 31st MEU in Okinawa, Japan) with an ANGLICO detachment of 13 Marines (one SALT and one FCT) for a 13-month cycle. This 13-month cycle would be composed of a six-month work-up cycle, a six-month shipboard deployment with the MEU, and then a one-month on-call status after the MEU returned to the Continental United States (CONUS). During the six-month work-up the ANGLICO detachment would integrate into MEU exercises and coordinate CAS, NGF and artillery in support of the MEU scheme of maneuver. Normally, the ANGLICO detachment, due to its experience with multi-service aircraft, would be given primary control of all U.S. Navy carrier air and any supporting aircraft from the U.S. Air Force or U.S. Army. This familiarity with carrier aircraft, other multi-service aircraft, and proven communications skills made ANGLICO the force of choice when the MEU commander needed a deep terminal control asset in a multi-service theater such as South West Asia (SWA). During the six-month shipboard deployment cycle, the ANGLICO detachment continued to build on the working relationships with the MEU and exploited opportunities to support numerous allied/coalition partners in a variety of combined exercises.
These combined exercises, like the JRTC and NTC exercises, presented the ANGLICO small teams with indispensable opportunities to train against the fire support, communications, doctrine, and language challenges that would be faced in actual combat or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Such exercises ranged from the jungle warfare operations of Operation COBRA GOLD in Thailand, to combined/joint operations with U. S. and Kuwaiti forces in SWA. These combined exercises also built experiences with the differing doctrine, size, type, and capabilities of allied/coalition partners. They operations were not only key in building a liaison experience base for military operations, but also built an experience base for the differences in culture, religion, and attitude.

**Operational Level Training**

ANGLICO also participated in MEF level and operational exercises such as ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL) in Korea. These exercises helped ANGLICO tactical teams reinforce Marine Corps doctrine and build a level of understanding of how the tactical liaison capabilities of ANGLICO integrated into the operational level of war. They also helped familiarize the standard Marine Units and our coalition partners with the unique role, capabilities, and mission of ANGLICO.

These JRTC, NTC, MEU, combined, and MEF level exercises often varied in scope and nature from company to MEF size operations, while ranging from mechanized armored in 140° F desert environment to Light Infantry patrols in sub-zero temperatures. The constant support of these varied Marine, U. S. Army, and allied/coalition exercises resulted in a unit comprised of tactical teams that were continuously exposed to Marine Corps, U.S. Army, and allied/coalition Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (DTTP). This repetitious exposure helped develop
tactical Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and a corporate knowledge of tactical liaison that served ANGLICO and its customers well.

**Equipment**

ANGLICO had a wealth of communications equipment, a robust motor transportation, medical, supply, logistics, armory, and paraloft sections. While all the support sections provided overall flexibility for the ANGLICO, the communications and motor transportation capability were exceptionally beneficial in the tactical environment. The communications section was capable of intermediate level 3rd echelon maintenance of all communications-electronics items. This equipment included HF, VHF, UHF, SATCOM, Digital Communications Terminals (DCT), and encryption equipment. These items included both man-portable and vehicle versions of VHF, UHF, and HF radios. This varied and numerous suite of communications equipment facilitated the rapid, clear, and secure transfer of tactical information both vertically and horizontally throughout the supported U.S. Army/allied/coalition unit and adjacent Marine Corps unit. Having this equipment organic to the ANGLICO meant that the supported unit viewed its ANGLICO detachment as a valued additional communications asset, providing enhanced communications flow on technical as well as the human level.\(^{16}\)

The motor transport section was capable of performing 1st and 2nd level maintenance on a range of assets from standard High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to 5-ton Trucks.\(^{17}\) This organic section gave ANGLICO detachments the flexibility to self-support when the supported units lacked the ability to provide adequate transportation assets. This capability also gave the ANGLICO company great flexibility in conducting “in-house” training. The Marines of the section also provided trained drivers and mechanics that were a
great asset as cross-trained communicators, terminal controllers, and assistant fire support coordinators.

**Capabilities**

The well trained ANGLICO provided the MEF or MAGTF commander with a flexible and well trained unit that could quickly and easily task organize to support an U.S. Army or allied/coalition partner with well equipped, self-sustaining, tactical teams able to provide first class communication, terminal control, and fire support coordination liaison assets from the company to division level. These 22 tactical ANGLICO teams were capable of conducting independent operations around the world. The skills and capabilities inherent in this organization included planning, scheduling, coordinating, and universal spotter terminal control of U.S./JSOC/allied air assets, naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, laser designation and marking, and AN/PPN-19 radar beacon marking. As a specialized unit capable of airborne or other special insertion methods, ANGLICO was uniquely capable of supporting Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of a MEU, MAGTF, or Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) deep strike requirements. This deep strike capability could be in support of SOF teams or as an independent Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) responsible for terminal control of deep strike aircraft, or as a limited reconnaissance and surveillance asset.

**Strengths and Weaknesses**

The primary strengths of ANGLICO were a mixture of quality Marines, robust organic support, and individual and team training in a multitude of unique and demanding exercises and operations. The Marines that came to ANGLICO were normally volunteers who were experienced and highly proficient in their MOSs. Additionally, the ability to task organize these
scalable, highly trained, flexible, self-supporting, world-wide deployable, tactical liaison teams was an incredible asset to a MAGTF commander. The weakness of ANGLICO was its lack of linguistic, cultural, and regional expertise. Without this capability, ANGLICO was forced to rely on the supported unit to supply English speaking officers. This weakness could have adversely affected ANGLICO’s ability to conduct effective liaison.

Conclusion

After 50 years of growth, refinement, and testing during innumerable exercises, deployments, and combat, ANGLICO developed into a skilled, flexible, and potent combat multiplier. As the military environment is fast becoming more joint and combined, it would seem that ANGLICO would be a key leader in the Marine Corps’ vision of the future. Ironically, despite its valuable performance as a superb unit specifically designed and utilized as a joint and allied/coalition support unit, ANGLICO was seen by the then Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak, as a unit that was no longer economical. In 1997, the Commandant’s ADFSRG viewed ANGLICO as heavy in personnel with a mission that was not needed in light of potential future technological advances.19

1 Braden, 37.
3 1 MEF Liaison Element information slides referencing Marine Corps Bulletin 5400, Author’s working papers.
4 Marine Corps Historical Center Archives, “History of Second ANGLICO.”
5 Scott Pierce, Captain, USMC, Executive Officer at 3rd ANGLICO, phone interview by author, 3 March 2001.
6 The description ANGLICO mission, organization, equipment, training, and capabilities are based on the last T/O of the active duty ANGLICOs and the training levels present from 1995 to July 1997 (CMC’s deactivation decision).
7 Zachery P. Hubbard, Major, USMC, Field Artillery,
8 Standard 1st ANGLICO information slide brief, 1996, Author’s working papers.
9 Author’s personal experience as an ANGLICO Training Platoon Officer in Charge
11 Author’s experience while assigned to 1st ANGLICO as the 13th MEU ANGLICO detachment Officer in Charge, from September 1995 to November 1996 and Brigade Platoon Commander from December 1996 to October 1997.
12 NTC official website. URL: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/forscom/ntc/, accessed 03 March 2001
Author’s experience as the 13th MEU ANGLICO detachment Officer in Charge, from September 1995 to November 1996.

Ibid.

Author’s experience while assigned to 1st ANGLICO as the 13th MEU ANGLICO detachment Officer in Charge, from September 1995 to November 1996 and Brigade Platoon Commander from December 1996 to October 1997.

Table of Manpower Requirements T/O Checklist, T/O 4854 ANGLICO, Report No. 15921C4A-1, as of: November 1997, 7. A. (1)

Table of Manpower Requirements T/O Checklist, T/O 4854 ANGLICO, Report No. 15921C4A-1, as of: November 1997, 4.A.

Bright Papers.
ANGLICO: The Birth, Life, Death …..and Resurrection?

In July 1997, ANGLICO was a target of the Active Duty Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG) as a possible unit for reduction or elimination from the active duty structure. CMC directed the ADFSRG to refine the results of the 1997 QDR in an effort to, “…define the most effective, capable, relevant, and realistically attainable active duty forces structure for the U. S. Marine Corps.”¹ In order to accomplish this mission, the Commandant of the Marine Corps set forth four objectives for the ADFRSRG to reach in an effort to increase manning at the battalion and squadron level units from 87% to 90% or above:

1) to examine how a notional reduction of 1800 Active Component and 400 civilian Marines might be made.

2) to use the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as a springboard to improving the operational readiness of our operating forces.

3) to seek savings of spaces that could be reinvested in better maintaining the current Corps or in procuring systems needed for the future and

4) to provide views on how the Marine Corps might organize for 2015.

The group formulated the CMC’s commander’s intent as, “…define the most effective, capable, relevant, and realistically attainable active duty force structure for the U.S. Marine Corps.” The method used was to “revalidate those functions we [Marine Corps] need to retain as ‘core’ and divest those functions that can be better (and possibly more economically) performed by someone else.”²

From this guidance the ADFSRG presented to the CMC a review of the force structure that met his desired endstate: a list of possible reductions for his approval to make the 1800
Marine and 400 civilian reduction and a course of action to reinvest structure space savings back into the operating forces so as to man the operating forces’s squadrons and battalions at 90% or above.

ANGLICO’s mission to provide liaison support to the U.S. Army and allied/coalition forces was presented by the ADFSRG as impractical and unnecessary under the then [1997] personnel and fiscal constraints. The ADFSRG opined that due to present and future advances in technology the U.S. Army has/will have the ability to control and coordinate Naval firepower assets. The ADFSRG proposed that the support of allied/coalition forces in the event of joint/combined operations could be provided from fire support personnel already embedded within the Marine-Air Ground Task Force’s (MAGTF) Ground Combat Element (GCE). Ironically, the ADFSRG also identified a deficiency in the MAGTF commander’s capability to facilitate command, control, and coordination with allied/coalition forces across the full spectrum of conflict, and to coordinate operations with international civilian organizations. The mission of ANGLICO was deemed too restrictive to meet all the liaison requirements that the MAGTF commander faces on the modern battlefield.

The ADFSRG proposed that the 496 structure within the active duty ANGLICO units should be reduced to 96, therefore freeing 400 personnel to be immediately returned to other operating forces. The remaining 96 structure spaces should be incorporated into a single Marine liaison organization, at I MEF, with those 96 being active duty spaces and augmented if necessary by reserve Marines. This single Marine liaison organization would provide a “reservoir of capability” for the entire Marine Corps in order to address the increasing emphasis on joint and combined operations at the MARFOR and MEF level.
On 11 August 1997, General C.C. Krulak approved the recommendation of ADFSRG to eliminate 400 of the 496 ANGLICO billets to be reinvested in the active duty force.\(^5\)

The following was also ordered:

1) Integrate the recommendation with the reserve component.

2) Phase the reduction by “building an ANGLICO-like” capability at I MEF to be used as a “reservoir of capability.”

3) Take remaining savings ASAP!, i.e. cut 250 spaces now!\(^6\)

The decision to reduce ANGLICO was based on two determining factors. One, the Marine Corps could not afford to retain a unit that was solely designed to support another service or allied/coalition force. Additionally, the need for operational level liaison was seen to be a greater one than the tactical level liaison.\(^7\)

The key elements of General Krulak’s comments would provide guidance and turmoil for the next three and one-half year as Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the operational level commanders struggled to develop a unit that would fulfill the Commandant’s decision and the liaison needs of the MEF and MAFOR commanders. The Commandant’s decision effectively shifted the focus from tactical level liaison to operational level liaison.\(^8\) This new emphasis would prove to be the start of a long tumultuous process as the mix of input from the operating forces, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and II MEF clashed with the decision of the CMC and the ADFSRG.

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\(^1\) Bright Papers.

\(^2\) Bright Papers.


\(^4\) Ibid.
5 Unclassified message from CMC, deactivation of 1st ANGLICO, Bright Papers.
7 Lieutenant Colonel Steve Baker, interview by author.
Chapter 5

The Road to the Marine Liaison Group (MLG)

This new unit, proposed by the ADFSRG, would be, “…notionally referred to as the Marine Liaison Group (MLG).”¹ The MLG had one primary intent: to eliminate the liaison deficiency at the operational level and create a liaison capability for the MAGTF commander that would be more flexible throughout the full spectrum of warfare. The MLG would be a globally sourced, single organization, organic to I MEF and in theory capable of meeting Fleet Marine Force (FMF) global coalition support requirements. The structure of the MLG was to be constructed from a portion of the deactivated ANGLICO structure and augmented from the reserve component.

The MLG concept

In October 1997, Commander Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC) as the Marine Corps lead agent for developing an “operating force position” issued a message to Commander Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT), I MEF, and III MEF setting basic parameters for the reorganization of ANGLICO. The message emphasized a shift in thinking from the current ANGLICO structure to one that would be viewed as a Marine Corps asset. This communication required that the recipients identify liaison requirements in OPLANs, annual peacetime engagement/exercises, and other contingencies.²

COMMARFORPAC agreed with the basic concept that the warfighters were in need of a liaison organization that could facilitate operational level liaison on the modern battlefield. However, he disagreed with the concept that a single liaison organization, under Operational Control (OPCON) of I MEF, would be responsive to the diverse needs of all three MEFs and their supported CINCs.
Specifically, COMMARFORPAC concurred with the findings of the ADFSRG that the MAGTF commander has liaison requirements within the full spectrum of military, civilian, ethnic, and tribal entities encountered on the modern battlefield. The focus of the new MLG concept should be to support the MAGTF commander in the joint and combined environment. However, he immediately identified several deficiencies in the Commandant’s guidance to the ADFSRG. First, he noted that both I MEF and III MEF have year-round requirements for liaison as well as requirements for respective OPLANs for the Central Command (CENTCOM) and Korean theaters. Secondly, COMMARFORPAC opined that a single organization would not be responsive enough to meet the varying and constantly changing different needs of the combatant commanders, CG II MEF, and CG III MEF. He foresaw the MLG as a concept that might require multiple organizations in order to effectively support the diverse requirements of the various CINCs. Thirdly, he intuitively identified that the new liaison organization should be designed to be task organized for specific missions in the same manner that MAGTFs are task organized to meet specific mission requirements.³

COMMARFORPAC posited that the proposed liaison organization or MLG should be organized into Marine Liaison Elements (MLE) within each of the MEF headquarters. This would allow the MEF commander to determine the liaison requirements specific to his needs. By falling under control of each MEF commander, MLEs could use existing support structure and could draw additional mission specific assets from the MEF’s own Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Combat Service Support Element (CSSE), or Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The organization of a MLE under the command of the MEF commander would give a responsive liaison capability able to monitor each MEF’s unique operational situation and
task organize, train, and effectively carry out the MEF commander’s intent through each MEF’s particular Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). 4

COMMARFORPAC’s analysis of the initial MLG concept of employment identified several points of friction between the CMC’s concept of a, “…single liaison capability at I MEF to be used as a reservoir of capability…”5 and the needs of specific operational commanders that support the CINC’s OPLANs and theater engagement plans. The Commandant’s vision of a single, small liaison unit to service the entire Marine Corps ran opposite to the operational needs of the warfighters. The two competing concepts would center around the limitation of 96 structure spaces, and would drive the development of the Marine Corps concept of the liaison question for the next three and one-half years.

The MARFORPAC Marine Liaison Group working group convened on 27-30 October 1997 to begin development of the operational concept for the MLG. It consisted of representatives from the operating forces and the supporting establishments. The working group evaluated the problem as an amplification of the ADFSRG’s conclusion that the MARFOR and MEF commanders had insufficient capability to conduct liaison with the dramatic increasing emphasis on joint and combined operations on a complex battlefield. The deficiencies contributing to this were categorized in four basic areas and were stated as:

1) Insufficient linguistic, cultural, and regional knowledge.

2) Incompatibility with coalition C4I systems.

3) Inability of coalition forces to effectively exploit improved systems integration between sensors, platforms, logistical support centers, and command organizations in multinational operations.
4) Dissimilar doctrine, tactics, technologies, and procedures which hamper planning, coordination, and execution of coalition/international operations.\textsuperscript{6}

The working group further concluded that in order to effectively operate in the conceptual constructs of the Marine Corps “Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS),” the Corps’ operational-level commanders would need the capability to interact with all the various military, civil, ethnic, and tribal entities found on the complex battlefield of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. This MLG organization would need the necessary cultural, regional, language, and military expertise for operations requiring coordination with allied/coalition forces, international agencies, and civil/governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{7}

The initial concepts developed by the first MLG working group in October of 1997 provided the foundation for two subsequent working groups. From these series of working groups the MLG concept grew into the proposed Marine Liaison Battalion (MLB) concept. The concept had also grown in size from the single liaison unit of 96 active duty structure spaces, located at I MEF, to two liaison companies, one on each coast, with personnel strength of 167 total active and 200 reserve spaces.

However, the MLB concept was too large in personnel and the Commandant convened the MLG Concept Assessment Project on 15 June 1998. The MLG Concept Assessment Team worked under the constraints of the pre-established 96 active duty structure spaces and concluded that the best coarse of action would be to establish four MLGs that would replace the four ANGLICOs (two active/two reserve).\textsuperscript{8} In January 1999, yet another working group was established and the MLG concept was once again adjusted to two MLGs, one for I MEF and one for II MEF. From this working group the 96 active duty structure spaces would remain, but be
divided 53 and 43 between I and II MEF respectively. This new concept was named the Marine Liaison Element (MLE).

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2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.


5 Bright Papers.


7 Ibid.

8 MLG Concept Assessment Project report, ES-2, Bright Papers.
Chapter 6

Beyond ANGLICO….the MLE

The next step in the evolution of the tactical liaison story is the MLE. The MLE stood up as an, “…interim step to meet the MAGTF commanders liaison requirement.”¹ Currently the MLE is only capable of providing limited operational and tactical level liaison.

Mission

The MLE mission, pending CMC approval will be:

Provide MAGTF and Marine Component Commanders with military and foreign area expertise to facilitate command, control, communication, and coordination (C4), and fire support planning, coordination, and terminal control with allied and/or coalition forces in expeditionary operations across the spectrum of conflict.²

The MLE was developed in an effort to provide operational and tactical level liaison capability to MAGTF and Marine component commanders. The primary mission of the MLE is oriented toward liaison support of allied/coalition forces, but it will still retain the flexibility to provide support to joint forces. Utilizing assets from both active and reserve components, the MLE is capable of providing operational and tactical-level teams possessing Subject Matter Expertise (SME) in Marine Corps and other U.S. joint DTTPs with regional and cultural awareness and linguistic capabilities. Operational-level MLE teams would normally support the MEF and MEB when working with adjacent coalition partners. The tactical level liaison teams would provide planning, coordination and terminal control of air, artillery, and naval surface fires through SALTs and FCTs.³

Organization

The initial (April 99) interim T/O⁴ of the MLE was 9 officers and 44 enlisted Marines for I MEF, based at Camp Pendleton, California, and 9 officers and 34 enlisted Marines for II MEF, based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This unequal distribution of assets displays a
compromise between MARFORLANT and MARFORPAC. The Commandant’s original intent from the ADFSRG was to, “…create a single ANGLICO-type liaison element located at I MEF that would create a pool of capability for the Marine Corps.”\textsuperscript{5} However, after several working groups and messages between the two MARFORs, the final proposal was to create a liaison capability at I and II MEF that would reflect the unique requirements of the two warfighting MEFs. MLE garrison organization would consist of a Command Element, administration, operations, logistics, communications, MAGTF sections, and the MLE tactical teams.\textsuperscript{6}

**MLE**

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
    \node[draw] at (0,0) {CO, Col};
    \node[draw] at (2,0) {SgtMaj};
    \node[draw] at (1.5,-1.5) {Admin};
    \node[draw] at (2.25,-1.5) {Operations};
    \node[draw] at (3.5,-1.5) {MAGTF Sect};
    \node[draw] at (4.5,-1.5) {Logistics};
    \node[draw] at (5.5,-1.5) {Comm};
    \node[draw] at (2.5,-3) {SALT};
    \node[draw] at (2.5,-3.75) {CLT};
    \node[draw] at (3.25,-3.75) {FCT};
    \node[draw] at (2.5,-4.5) {CLT};
    \node[draw] at (3.25,-4.5) {FCT};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

The tactical teams were composed of two Coalition Liaison Teams (CLT), one SALT, and two FCTs for a total of seven tactical teams. The SALT and FCTs were composed of the same mix of MOS and rank of officers and enlisted Marines as the old ANGLICO SALTs and FCTs with the following exceptions:

1. the SALT is headed by an artillery or infantry officer vice an aviator,
2. the FCT is headed by an aviator or artillery officer vice only an artillery officer,
3. both the FCT and the SALT have one linguist assigned.

Tactically the MLE is organized to provide liaison support between MEF or MAGTF commander and an allied/coalition partner from the Corps to company level. The CLT consists of two majors, both FAOs, one designated as the OIC and the other as a MAGTF LNO, and five
enlisted Marines: two communicators, two fire support coordinators, and one linguist. The CLT was responsible for providing operational liaison for the MAGTF commander when operating with allied/coalition forces, providing subject matter expertise in MAGTF operations, and timely exchange of information.  

The SALT is organized to support an allied/coalition maneuver battalion. The team consists of two officers, an artillery/infantry Captain as the OIC, and a NGF Liaison Officer, one corpsman, one linguist, and five Marines trained in fire support coordination/control, and communications. The team is responsible for fire support coordination to an allied/coalition partner at the battalion level and facilitates the flow of information vertically and horizontally throughout the allied/coalition and ANGLICO chain of command.

The MLE FCT is organized to support an allied/coalition force at the company level. The team consists of one officer, an aviator or artillery officer, one linguist, and five enlisted Marines trained in fire support coordination/control and communications.

**Individual Training**

The training of MLE Marines reflects the needs of a liaison unit that is designed to support both operational and tactical level liaison. The three main areas of training include tactical, operational, and regional/cultural. The tactical training includes Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), Supporting Arms Coordination Course, Fire Support Coordination, Tactical Training Course, Ground Operators System Course, and Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE). The operational-level training includes USAF Special Operations courses, MAGTF Staff Training Program, Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/MEU (SOC) Staff Training, MEF/Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)/MEU exercises, and Defense Language Institute (DLI) language program training. Regional/Cultural training includes Middle East, Asian Pacific, and
Sub-Saharan orientation courses; terrorism, cross-cultural and language training; personal
defensive measures, and high-risk personal evasive driving training.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Team Training}

Team training at the MLE consists mainly of the team training listed above as well as
varied MEF/MEB/MEU level exercises and the recent deployment of a four-Marine detachment
to the 11\textsuperscript{th} MEU from I MEF’s MLE. The MLE has also sent liaison teams to operational level
exercises such as BRIGHT STAR, MEFEX, LUCKY WARRIOR, COBRA GOLD and UFL.
However, the MLE does not participate in U.S. Army support exercises at the JRTC and NTC in
the same manner of the old ANGLICO unit.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Equipment}

The MLE has limited ability to self-support and depends upon support from the MEF’s
Headquarters Group (MHG). All motor transportation vehicle and mechanic support is supplied
by the MHG. Although the MLE does not own any radios or communications vehicles, the
MEF’s communications battalion is tasked with supporting the MLE with a series of state-of-the-
art communications equipment that can be tailored to the needs of the supported unit. The MLE
can be supported with a sophisticated suite of communications equipment that includes UHF
Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) capable satellite radio (AN/PSC-5) and Personal
Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards that allow the laptops to
transmit data over Satellite Communications (SATCOM) or UHF. This enables the MLE to
transmit voice, facsimile, data, and digital imagery rapidly during contingency operations. Other
man-portable VHF, UHF, HF radios and communications vehicles can be supplied from the
communications battalion as necessary.
Capabilities

The MLE is capable of fulfilling a wide range of tactical and operational liaison requirements, but only when it integrates assets from the active duty MEF, reserve ANGLCIO, and MEF Augmentation Command Element (MACE) components. The MLE is able to field worldwide deployable, task organized, tactical and operational teams skilled in Marine Corps, U.S. Joint DTTPs, and linguistics with a regional and cultural awareness that are capable of conducting planning, liaison, and coordination from the Corps to the company level. The MLE CLT supports the operational level liaison requirements of the MEF/MAGTF commander and the MLE SALTs and FCTs provide the tactical level liaison for the planning, scheduling, coordination, and universal spotter terminal control of air, artillery, and naval surface fires support. The MLE, however does not have the same airborne or special insertion capability of an ANGLICO.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The primary strength of the MLE is the organic ability of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and linguists embedded in the MLE structure. The language capability is a tremendous asset in many cultures. The ability to speak the language of an allied/coalition partner is not only an asset in clarifying information passed between commands, but it is also an invaluable asset in building the most important part of the liaison experience…trust. The ability to converse with an allied/coalition partner and be respectful of the regional, religious and cultural sensitivities is extremely valuable.10

The primary weakness of the MLE is the very thing that made it an acceptable replacement for the much larger ANGLICO units, its limited personnel strength and lack of supporting equipment. The small size of the MLE makes it ineffective as a “stand alone”
unit. First, the MLE is presented as a “light” organization free from the personnel heavy supporting sections of supply, motor transportation, parafoil, communications maintenance, and administration. However, the elimination of these support sections has left the MLE in the unenviable position that faced those early ASCO and (J)ASCO units. The MLE will be forced to beg, borrow, and steal from other MEF/MEU units for transportation, communications, and supply assets. This creates a huge obstacle for a liaison element that needs to be flexible, nimble, and expeditionary. Secondly, the small numbers of personnel will not be enough to support even the smallest of coalition contingencies. The standard MEU ANGLICO detachment was one SALT and one FCT - with the understanding that if a MEU was to actually fight along side a foreign ally/coalition partner then other supporting teams of SALTs and FCTs would have to be flown into theater. Using the model of the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM coalition, all the active duty and reserve ANGLICOs were used and there were still gaps in coverage to our U. S. Army brethren and allied/coalition partners.

With only a MLE T/O large enough to support two FCTs and one SALT, there will be a gap in expertise and competence as personnel transfer in and out of the unit. It takes time to train and build proficiency in not only the required skills but also develop the small team cohesion and trust that is required for proper liaison. Teams need time to work together and build trust in one another and their adjacent FCT, SALT, Brigade Team, or Division Team. A well-trained liaison team requires a corporate knowledge that must build upon the multitude of experiences that only comes with working in challenging and unique situations in many different countries and services. The MLE does not have the ability to field the numbers of teams necessary to support a MTW such as Operation DESERT STORM.
In order to support the Major Theater War (MTW) end of the conflict spectrum, the MLE must integrate active duty assets from the MEF, and reserve Liaison Officer (LNO) assets from the MEF Augmentation Command Element (MACE) (50 reservists for liaison) and the reserve ANGLICOs. The lack of organic support reduces the MLE’s flexibility in peacetime training and the ability to have dedicated equipment that can be prepared and deployed for combat.

**MEU Support**

The MLE’s support of the MEUs will further cause a need to provide MLE organic support sections. Currently the MLE is committed to providing a team from the MLE to the 11th MEU that will be capable of augmenting the 11th MEU Command Element with coalition and fire support capability. This MLE detachment consists of two officers, a Forward Air Controller (FAC) and one Infantry Officer, and three enlisted communicators with fire support training/qualifications. This team will participate in the entire MEU cycle to include the work up and deployment. Based on past experiences, a five-man detachment of the proposed MOSs will not be large enough to provide useful communications or planning capabilities to either the supported coalition unit or the MEU Command Element. It could find itself split up and acting as augments to the MEU Communications Officer, the Fire Support Coordinator, and the MEU Operations Officer.

**Conclusion**

The MLE as it currently stands is just too small in communications, support equipment, and personnel to be able to conduct the appropriate team building and fielding (22 tactical teams) to be comparable to ANGLICO. The only major advantage the MLE has over ANGLICO is its advantage in linguistic, cultural, and regional expertise. The I MEF and II MEF MLEs have
been staffed with Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) focused to support the parent organizations in their Area of Responsibilities (AORs).

1 Unclassified message, from CMC to Commander Marine Forces Pacific, Commander Marine Forces Atlantic, Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary Force, Commanding General II Marine Expeditionary Force Commanding General III Marine Expeditionary Force Subj: Deactivation of 1st ANGLICO and the activation of Liaison Element, I and II MEF, 271100Z JAN 99, Bright Papers.
3 ibid.
4 Colonel Terry Metler, USMC, Commanding Officer, I MLE, Information Paper, subject: “I MEF Liaison Element (MLE) Update”, 28 December 2000, 1, Author’s working papers.
5 Bright Papers.
6 Colonel Terry Metler, USMC, Commanding Officer, I MLE, slide brief, subject: “I MEF Liaison Element (MLE)”, 28 December 2000, 1, Author’s working papers.
7 ibid.
8 Major Travis Tebbe, former I MEF MLE Operations Officer and FAO, phone interview by author, 01 March 2001
9 Master Sergeant John Dillard, I MEF MLE Operations Chief, phone interview by author, 01 March 2001
10 Major Travis A. Tebbe, former I MEF MLE Operations Officer and FAO, phone interview by author, 01 March 2001.
12 Colonel Terry Metler, USMC, Commanding Officer, I MLE, slide brief, subject: “I MEF Liaison Element (MLE)”, 28 December 2000, Author’s working papers.
13 Author’s experience as the 13th MEU ANGLICO detachment Officer in Charge, from September 1995 to November 1996.
Chapter 7

The New MLE

Shortly after becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps in July 1999, General James L. Jones issued a directive to review Marine Corps Field Artillery. As part of the findings of this review, the Commandant made the determination that it had been, “…a mistake to get rid of our ANGLICOs,” and then announced his decision to, “… bring back ANGLICO in its original form.”¹ With this statement the search for a new version of tactical level liaison had returned to prominence. Only one year after its activation, the I MEF MLE was attempting to increase its T/O strength from 53 to 150 billets. The current T/O strength and organizational structure is admittedly inadequate to support either the operational level liaison requirements of the MEF or MEU commanders liaison needs.²

In February 2001, the latest conference on the MLE was held at Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). The major players from the MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), which included 3rd and 4th ANGLICO, met to develop a new MLE concept. The new concept is five MLEs: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd MLE will be active duty MLEs designed to support I, II, and III MEF respectively; 4th and 5th MLE would be in the MARFORRES, replacing 3rd and 4th ANGLICO. The New MLE concept would realign the current active duty and reserve tactical-liaison capability under a single tactical organizational template, with the exception of 3rd MLE. Third MLE will be smaller in size, reflecting the smaller strength of III MEF as compared to I MEF and II MEF. The addition of 3rd MLE is specifically designed to support the tactical liaison requirements of the 31st MEU based in Okinawa, Japan.³ This MLE will have the same missions and concept of employment.
as the other four MLEs, but will be supported by III MEF for supply, transportation, general engineering, health services, messing, and 2nd and 3rd level maintenance.

**Mission**

The proposed mission statement of the new MLE is:

*Provide MAGTF Commanders with military and foreign area expertise to facilitate command, control, communication, and coordination, to include fire support planning, coordination, and terminal control with allied and/or coalition forces in expeditionary operations across the spectrum of conflict.*

**Concept of Employment**

Central to the New MLE concept is the use of the reserves and “global staffing” to fill the “C Coded” billets which constitute one-third of the 1st and 2nd MLE tactical teams and two-thirds of the 3rd MLE tactical teams on an “on-call” basis. The overall tactical organizational template resembles the old ANGLICOs. These MLEs are basically organized with a Headquarters Section and three platoons, similar in size and function to the three Brigade Platoons from the old ANGLICOs. The platoons are composed of one Coalition Support Section (CLS), two SALTs, and four FCTs. The overall MLE growth is 200 total active structure spaces, bringing the total MLE billets to 296 (96 current + 200 additional). While this is a significant growth, it is still well short of the 496 structure spaces that composed 1st and 2nd ANGLICO prior to deactivation.
The task of the active duty and reserve MLEs will be to provide task-organized, trained, and equipped teams to:

1) Serve as the MAGTF Commander’s liaison to allied and/or coalition forces as subject matter experts in Marine Corps DTTP to facilitate overall interoperability for the planning and execution of military operations.

2) Provide MAGTF Commanders with regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise to facilitate planning and execution of military operations.

3) Facilitate the planning, coordination, and terminal control of air, artillery, and naval surface fires when operating with allied/coalition forces.6

The Coalition Liaison Section (CLS) differs from the CLT of the current MLE in purpose, number, rank and MOS mix. The new CLS will have 6 more Marines (13) than the old CLT (7). The CLS will be led by a Lieutenant Colonel and have two Captains (one FAO and one Fires Planner), a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO), one corpsman, and three additional fire support and communications enlisted Marines. The CLS will be responsible for providing tactical-level liaison, including fire support planning and coordination, to designated Division/Brigade level allied/coalition forces.7 This new CLS structure and purpose is almost
identical to the ANGLICO Brigade Team, with the exception of the task to support at the Division/Brigade level. However, this support at one level up reflects the way ANGLICO was employed in support of the JFCE Division during Operation DESERT STORM.8

The new MLE SALT is almost identical to the former MLE SALT with the exception of the replacement of the NGLO with a Marine artillery Captain, one additional enlisted fire support Marine, and the “one level up” support at the Brigade/Battalion level. The new SALT is responsible for fire support planning and coordination of air, artillery, and naval surface fires, and provides terminal control to designated Brigade/Battalion level allied/coalition forces.

The new MLE FCT is identical to the current MLE FCT and ANGLICO FCT in rank, number, and MOS mix. The only change is the “one level up” support at the Battalion/Company level. The FCT is responsible for fire support planning and coordination of air, artillery, and naval surface fires and provides terminal control to designated Battalion/Company level.

**Equipment**

The new MLE will have the same communications assets as the current MLE plus most of the man-portable and vehicular UHF, VHF, HF, and encryption assets inherent in ANGLICO. The major change will be that these assets will be organic, therefore making the new MLE much more self-supportable. However, the new MLE will still lack the organic motor transportation assets.

**Training**

The training for the new MLEs is yet to be determined. However, a reasonable prediction would include the current training programs of the MLEs - plus additional training that was inherent in the ANGLICO as needed to support the MAGTF commander’s tactical liaison needs. Immediate exceptions to the standard training in the old ANGLICOs will be the
airborne training and the JRTC and NTC team training. The airborne capability of the old
ANGLICOs will not return to the active duty MLEs, while the airborne capability for the reserve
MLEs is still being debated as of this writing. This airborne capability is no longer a
requirement since the mission to support U. S. Army airborne units has gone away, and this
clearly focuses the MLE’s on their core competencies.

**Strengths and Weaknesses**

The primary strengths of the new MLE will be the balance of linguistic, cultural, and
regional expertise, coupled with the fire support/terminal control skills. The increase in
personnel should allow the new MLE to adequately staff the MEUs, but may not be enough to
support any other exercise at the same time. Interchangeably with reserve structure will increase
employment in support of joint/allied/coalition forces.

The primary weakness of the new MLE is again its size. Although the new MLE will be
much larger than the current MLE, it will only be able to field 15 tactical teams vice the 22
tactical teams ANGLICO could field. The lack of organic support sections will reduce the
flexibility and self-supportability that the old ANGLICO enjoyed. The bottom line is that the
new MLE structure will have only 296 active duty spaces compared to ANGLICO’s original 496
spaces. This delta translates directly into a smaller tactical liaison capability. Like the current
MLE the Marine Corps will be short in appropriate tactical-level liaison in a MTW.

**Conclusion: Is the new MLE the right tool for the right job?**

The Marine Corps needs to work quickly to reconstitute the fire support expertise that
was inherent in ANGLICO. The new MLE is a positive development in meeting the MAGTF
commander’s tactical liaison needs. However, it will need to grow in size in both the tactical
teams and organic support sections in order to meet the MAGTF commander’s requirements to support the MEUs, and CINC OPLANs and engagement/exercise plans.

With the nation’s rapidly expanding lead in Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence (C4I), a necessity exists to have the ability to overlay our communications networks over our hastily formed coalition partners. The increase in complexity of United States communications and computer systems will increase the historically difficult task of sharing/exchanging information between coalition partners. If this continues, then the only solution will be to provide liaison teams that will be able to use our own communications and computer systems to exchange information between coalition partner commands.

2 Bright working papers, Information Paper, Col Metler, 28 Dec 00
3 Lieutenant Colonel Steve Baker, CE Force Structure Division, MCCDC, interview by author, 15 February 2001
4 Proposed T/O 485X, 4855X and 4855R, 06Feb01, CE, Force Structure Division, MCCDC, Quantico, VA.
5 Information Paper, Col Metler, 28 Dec 00, Author’s working papers.
6 Proposed T/O 485X and 4855X, 06Feb01, Command Element, Force Structure Division, MCCDC, Quantico, VA
7 Proposed T/O 48855A, 06 Feb 01, section 4.a (2), Command Element, Force Structure Division, MCCDC, Quantico, Va
8 Braden, 8.
Final Conclusion

Since 1949, ANGLICO had provided the Marine Corps with an effective tactical liaison capability that served the Corps, and joint/allied/coalition forces from Korea to DESERT STORM to Somalia. General Krulak’s decision to deactivate the active duty ANGLICO’s created a void in the tactical liaison capability. This void has been an unsolvable puzzle for the past three and one-half years which the Marine Corps has tried to fashion a liaison capability to satisfy both operational and tactical-level liaison needs of the MAGTF commander. Several working groups have worked valiantly in an effort to meet the Commandant’s and the operational level commander’s concepts and requirements. However, these groups labored in vain due to the CMC/ADFSRG’s restriction of 96 structure spaces.

The decision to decommission ANGLICO was not prudent for the future of the Marine Corps. The decision was made based on the immediate need to reduce active duty space structures and the perception of the ADFSRG that ANGLICO was primarily a unit only designed to support the U.S. Army. The result was the loss of a valuable tactical liaison asset that had built an incredible reputation and capability to conduct tactical liaison. This action left the MEF and MEU commanders without the proper fire support liaison capability. Recognition of this error exists in the fact that the current MLE is attempting to expand its structure to incorporate a fire support capability similar to ANGLICO in order to source the MEUs. Also, the proposal for the new MLE is almost identical to the old ANGLICO minus one Brigade Platoon and the support sections.

Whatever course the new MLE takes in its attempt to meet the Marine Corps’ requirements for liaison/coalition support the Cops must be able to provide the means to make
the air and naval surface fire support capabilities available to allies/coalition partners. With the increasing complexity of precision weapons systems and their associated communications/guidance systems, it will be necessary to provide specialized teams that will provide planning and firepower support for our potential coalition partners. The first and swiftest step taken in establishing a relationship with a coalition partner should be to ensure that awesome firepower can protect the weaker coalition partner and add to his offensive combat power. As shown in ANGLICO’s combat role in the Battle of Khafji during Operation DESERT STORM, the need to provide an overarching fire support umbrella liaison with coalition partners will have not only military implications, but also can have an impact on a coalition’s political objectives. When a weaker coalition partner will want to lead the fight for political objectives, the adjacent MAGTF commander will need the communications links with a coalition unit to ensure that fires, maneuver, and all coalition objectives are shared and understood by members of the coalition. The future will present even more challenges throughout the full spectrum of military conflicts. The need for highly trained and multi-skilled flexible and autonomous tactical liaison teams will grow as our military force becomes more and more high tech and the world in which we operate becomes more and more globilized. The proposal for the new MLE is a good start, but there is still plenty of room to grow.
APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

Advise: The LNO/liaison team is a key advisor to the supported unit’s commander and staff. As a Subject Matter Expert (SME) on the sending unit’s Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (DTTP), the LNO/team is often the critical link in the joint/allied/coalition partner’s understanding of U.S. military capabilities and employment. The LNO/team is a vital link that helps ensure a joint/allied/coalition partner plans and executes operations that will effectively and efficiently integrate with U.S. operations.

Assist: As a direct representative of the commander, the LNO/team provides a direct flow of information between commanders, yet also functions as an interpreter and filter so that information is received and understood in the proper context. Effective liaison assists both units by facilitating speed and accuracy of information sent and received.

Coordination: The LNO/liaison team helps facilitate the synchronization of all the capabilities of a joint/allied/coalition force so that a commander achieves maximum synergy from all his available assets. Coordination by LNO/Team activities helps deconflict planning and execution evolutions so that effort and assets are maximized.

Liaison: The contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. It helps reduce “the fog and friction of war” through direct communications. It is the most commonly employed technique for establishing and maintaining close and continuous physical communications between commands. Liaison is another tool that enables the
commander to transmit and receive clear and precise understanding of detailed planning, commander’s intent, and situational awareness. Effective liaison facilitates the commander’s ability to command and control all joint/allied/coalition forces and facilitates the basic principles of unity of command and unity of effort across the full range of military operations. The Four basic functions of liaison are to **monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist**, and these allow the commander to reduce the fog and friction associated with coalition warfare.

**Monitor:** By continuously monitoring, the liaison officer (LNO) or team is able to provide a continuous flow of information between the commander and the joint/allied/coalition partner. This flow of information ensures the commander’s intent, purpose, method, concept of operations, and vision of endstate can be understood and incorporated into the coalition partner’s planning and execution. Monitoring keeps the commander updated on the progress or setbacks during all phases of a coalition operation. Effective information flow allows the commander to adjust the tempo of his operation or shift assets or effort to a coalition partner in order to accomplish the coalition force mission.

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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

ABC – ANGLICO Basic Course
ACE – Air Combat Element
ADFSRG – Active Duty Force Structure Review Group
AI – Air Interdiction
ANGLICO – Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO – Area of Operation
AOR – Area of Responsibilities
ARC – Armored Cavalry Regiment
ARVN – Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASCO – Assault Signal Company
ATF – Amphibious Task Force
BDA – Bomb Damage Assessment
C4I – Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence
CAS – Close Air Support
CE – Command Element
CINC – Commander in Chief
CLT – Coalition Liaison Team
CLS – Coalition Liaison Section
CMC – Commandant of the Marine Corps
COMMARFORLANT – Commander Marine Forces Atlantic
COMMARFORPAC – Commander Marine Forces Pacific
CONUS – Continental United States

COLT – Combat Observation Lasing Team

CSSE – Combat Service Support Element

DAMA – Demand Assigned Multiple Access

DASC – Direct Air Support Center

DCT – Digital Communications Terminal

DoD – Department of Defense

DTTP – Doctrine Tactics Training and Procedures

EAC – Eastern Area Command

FAC – Forward Air Controller

FAO – Foreign Area Officers

FARP – Forward Area Rearming and Refueling Point

FCT – Firepower Control Team

FLIR – Forward Looking Infrared

FO – Forward Observer

FOB – Forward Operating Base

FROG – Free Rocket Over Ground

FSC – Fire Support Coordinator

FSCC – Fire Support Coordination Center

FSCL – Fire Support Coordination Line

FW – Fixed Wing

GCE – Ground Combat Element

HF – High Frequency
HMMWV – High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle
HQMC – Headquarters Marine Corps
HRST – Helicopter Rope Suspension Training
ICM – Improved Conventional Munitions
I MEF – I Marine Expeditionary Force
IO – International Organizations
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JFCE – Joint Forces Coalition East
JTF – Joint Task Force
JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center
KTO – Kuwaiti Theater of Operations
LAW – Light Anti-armor Weapon
LNO – Liaison Officer
MACE – MEF Augmentation Command Element
MAGTF – Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MarDivLNO – Marine Division Liaison Officer
MARFORLANT – Marine Forces Atlantic
MARFORPAC – Marine Forces Pacific
MARFORRES – Marine Forces Reserve
MCCDC – Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MEB – Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHG – MEF Headquarters Group
MILES – Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MLB – Marine Liaison Battalion
MLE – Marine Liaison Element
MLG – Marine Liaison Group
MODA – Ministry of Defense and Aviation
MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War
MOS – Military Occupational Specialty
MOUT – Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MSR – Main Supply Route
MTT – Mobile Training Team
MULE – Modulated Universal Lasing Equipment
NGF – Naval Gunfire
NGLO – Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer
NGO – Non-governmental Organizations
NSFS – Naval Surface Fire Support
NTC – National Training Center
NVA – North Vietnamese Army
OP – Observation Post
OPLAN – Operations Plan
OPFOR – Opposing Force
PCMCIA – Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
POW – Prisoner of War
PVO – Private Voluntary Organizations
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
RABFAC – Radar Beacon Forward Air Controller
RECON – Reconnaissance
RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
RVN – Republic of Vietnam
RW – Rotary Wing
SACC – Supporting Arms Coordination Center
SALT – Supporting Arms Liaison Team
SANG – Saudi Arabian National Guard
SATCOM – Satellite Communication
SF – Special Forces
SME – Subject Matter Experts
SOC – Special Operations Capable
SOF – Special Operations Forces
SRIG – Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group
SWA – Southwest Asia
TACC – Tactical Air Control Center
TACP – Tactical Air Control Party
T/E – Table of Equipment
T/O – Table of Organization
TOW – Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missile
TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UHF – Ultra High Frequency
USMC – United States Marine Corps
USN – United States Navy
VHF – Very High Frequency
# APPENDIX C
## ANGLICO Capabilities Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL UNIT</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
<th>UNIT ATTACHED</th>
<th>CAPABILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Division Team** | - Commanding Officer (LtCol)  
- Executive Officer (Major)  
- SgtMaj  
- NGLO (LT-USN)  
- Operations Section  
- Logistics Section  
- Motor Transport Section  
- Communications Section | **Division** | Liaison with:  
- U.S. Army  
- Allied/coalition |
|               |             |               | - Supported Division  
- SACC  
- DASC  
- FSCC  
- Subordinate ANGLICO teams |
| **Brigade Team** | - Air Officer (Major)  
- NGLO (LT-USN)  
- NGF Chief  
- Radio Operators (X4)  
- Fire support men (X4) | **Brigade** | Liaison with:  
- U.S. Army  
- Allied/coalition |
|               |             |               | - Supported Brigade  
- SACC  
- DASC  
- FSCC  
- Subordinate ANGLICO teams |
| **SALT** | - Team Leader (Captain)  
- FSC (Captain)  
- Radio Operator (X2)  
- Fire support men (X2)  
- Radio Technician  
- Mechanic | **Battalion** | Liaison with:  
- U.S. Army  
- Allied/coalition  
- MEU |
|               |             |               | - Supported Battalio  
- SACC  
- DASC  
- FSCC  
- Subordinate ANGLICO teams |
| **FCT** | - Team Leader (Lieutenant)  
- FSC (Sergeant)  
- Radio Operator (X2)  
- Fire support men (X2) | **Company** | Liaison with:  
- U.S. Army  
- Allied/coalition  
- MEU |
|               |             |               | - Supported Company  
- SACC  
- DASC  
- FSCC |
Bibliography

Primary Sources

Bright working papers

The Bright working papers are a set of documents in the possession of Lieutenant Colonel R. Thomas Bright who was the last Commanding Officer (CO) of 1st ANGLICO, from 10 June 1997 to 14 May 1999. This collection contains letters, information papers, working group reports, power point slide presentations, naval messages, e-mail and other correspondence that covers the period from the first indications that ANGLICO was under consideration for deactivation in June 1997, to the activation of I and II MLE in May 1999. As the last CO of ANGLICO, Lieutenant Colonel Bright was intimately involved in the concept development of the post-ANGLICO/MLE tactical-level liaison capability. The hand written notes and e-mail correspondence contained in his working papers were especially insightful. Additionally, the many conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Bright concerning these working papers were extremely valuable in the writing of this paper.

Working Group Reports

- **Active Duty Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG) July 1997**


  This report was extremely valuable for providing the background information surrounding the initial considerations for the deactivation of ANGLICO. It gave the Commandant’s basic guidance of “…defining the most effective, capable, relevant and realistically attainable active duty forces structure for the U.S. Marine Corps” in order to reinvest back personnel savings back into the operating forces. It also gave the method and endstate of the review. The most pertinent information was the hand written notes on page 24 of the document in which the Commandant concurred with the ADFSRG’s recommendation to deactivate ANGLICO. The Commandant also wrote out his own comments which included an immediate reduction of 250 of 496 ANGLICO active duty spaces, integration of the reduction with the reserve, and building a “semi-ANGLICO” capability at I MEF in to be used as a “reservoir of capability”. This document with the provides both the rational behind the Commandant’s decision and the beginning of the MLE concept development.

- **Marine Liaison Group (MLG) Concept Assessment Project Report July 1998**

  Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)

  This report was valuable for documenting the process that was used to develop the MLG concept. The MLG Concept Assessment Project Report working under the following assumptions:
• That the full scope of functions performed by ANGLICO were no longer necessary.
• There would be no more than 96 personnel available.
• That there would be only one MLG located at I MEF
• Focused at the operational level of war
• MLG language training requirements must be feasible

The project group systematically evaluated the MLG concept using the Marine Corps Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Equipment, and Support facilities (DOTES) system. The four functions of liaison (advise, assist, coordinate, and monitor) were evaluated within this process.

Section 4 of the MLG Concept Assessment Project Report lists a myriad of recommendations based on this modeling process. These recommendations were the building blocks of the MLG and later MLE concepts.

• **Unclassified Messages**
  • Commander Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC) to Commanding General (CG) I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), CG II MEF, CG III ME, subject: “Comments on draft MARFOR concept for the MLG” 040311Z November 1997.

This message outlines the basic parameters for the reorganization of ANGLICO. It emphasized a shift in thinking from the current ANGLICO structure to a structure that would be viewed as a Marine Corps asset.

COMMARFORPAC identified requirements in the following areas:
- OPLAN requirements
- Annual peacetime engagement requirements (coalition and MEU support)
- Annual peacetime exercise support
- Other contingencies

COMMARFORPAC concurred with the findings of the ADFSRG that the MAGTF requires the means to liaison across the full spectrum of conflict. However, he disagreed that the best way to meet that need was with a single liaison unit. The basic parameters of this message set the foundation of the subsequent working groups and helped shape the future of the MLE.

• CG I MEF to COMMARFORPAC, CG II MEF, CG IIIMEF. Subject: “Comments on draft MARFOR concept for the MLG” 041410Z November 1997.

This message summarized the findings of the first MLG Working Group which met on 27 October 1997. COMMARFORPAC identified the basic problem of tactical liaison as being an amplification of the ADFSRG’s conclusion that the MARFOR and MEF commanders had insufficient capability to conduct liaison with the dramatic increasing emphasis on joint and combined operations in a complex battlefield. The working group identified an overall lack of operational-level liaison capabilities available to the MARFOR/MEF commander to facilitate
command, control, and coordination with coalition forces across the spectrum of conflict to include operations with international civilian organizations. The deficiencies contributing to this were categorized in four basic areas. These areas were stated as:

1) Insufficient foreign language capability and the associate knowledge/training to exploit cultural/regional differences.
2) Incompatibility with coalition information systems which are necessary to maintain effective C4I with the MAGTF and/or MARFOR.
3) Lack of coalition forces capability to effectively exploit improved systems integration between sensors, platforms, logistical support centers, and command organizations in multinational operations.
4) Dissimilar doctrine, tactics, technologies, and procedures which hamper/degrade the seamless planning, coordination and execution of coalition operations and coordination with international organizations.

The working groups further hypothesized that in order to effectively operate in the conceptual constructs of the Marine Corps “Operational Maneuver From The Sea” (OMFTS), the Marine Corps operational level commanders would need to be armed with the capabilities necessary to interact with all the various military, civil, ethnic, and tribal entities found on the complex battlefield of the 21st century. These capabilities would need to include a liaison organization staffed and equipped and trained to function in a myriad of challenging and complex military, political, ethnic, and diplomatic environments. This MLG organization would need to have the necessary cultural, regional, language and military expertise for operations requiring coordination with allied/coalition forces, international agencies, and civil/governmental organizations. The working group did a through job of listing several detailed capabilities that would be necessary in order to provide sound operational-level liaison. However, the size and composition of the MLG concept was left open for later working groups.

- CMC to COMMARFORPAC, COMMARFORLANT, CG I MEF, CG II MEF, CG IIIMEF. Subject: “Deactivation of 1st ANGLICO and the activation of Liaison Element, I and II MEF.” 271100Z January 1999.

This message officially announced the time frame of the deactivation of 1st ANGLICO and the activation of the I and II MEF MLEs. It contains mostly administrative information on the appropriate processes necessary to complete these two tasks.

- Other Unclassified Messages
  - There is a myriad of other unclassified messages contained within the Bright working papers. These messages contain supporting information that amplify and provide insight to the MLE development and decision process.
• **Letters**

    This letter is an informative source that provides an overall assessment of the history, purpose, capabilities and relevancy of ANGLICO. It stresses ANGLICO’s “jointness” and ability to “…integrate Marine combat power smoothly into the overall matrix of other U. S. services or other nations.” This letter also emphasizes ANGLICO’s flexibility and criticality for support to current OPLANs. It is an excellent three-page letter that encapsulates the need and worth of ANGLICO in a future environment that is growing more complex and more joint/combined.

  - There are a myriad of other letters contained within the Bright working papers. These letters contain supporting information that amplify and provide insight to the MLE development and decision process.

• **Table of Organizations (T/O)**

    The Bright papers contain the last T/O (T/O 4854) for the active duty ANGLICOs as well as several proposed T/Os for the appropriate MLG/MLB/MLE concepts. The T/Os provide detailed information on ANGLICO’s mission, organization, training, equipment, and employment. These T/Os provide a rich source of information for detailed comparison of ANGLICO, the MLE, and the various other proposed concepts (MLG/MLB).

**Interviews**

  - **Lieutenant Colonel Steve J. Baker**- Lieutenant Colonel Baker was a key source of information on the entire process beginning with the ADFSRG’s recommendation to eliminate ANGLICO to the current proposal for the “New” MLE. As one of the key participants in the process at the Command Element Division of the Force Structure Division at MCCDC, Lieutenant Colonel Baker has been involved in every step of the “ANGLICO-MLE-‘New’ MLE” process, from the original ADFSRG briefing to the Commandant to the latest concept development group. His interview yielded several key insights to the General Charles C Krulak’s decision for deactivation and General James L. Jones’s decision to “bring ANGLICO back.”
Major Travis Tebbe - Major Tebbe is a former Operations Officer and FAO for I MLE. He provided key information on the equipment, training, and capabilities of the MLE. He was especially helpful in providing lessons learned from operational level exercises. He reinforced the position that speaking the language of a coalition partner yields tremendous dividends in building trust.

Captain Scott Pierce - Captain Pierce is currently the active duty Executive Officer at 3rd ANGLICO in Long Beach, California. He provided key insight from the reserve ANGLICO perspective.

Master Sergeant John Dillard - Master Sergeant Dillard is the current I MLE Operations Chief. He also served multiple tours as the 1st ANGLICO Operations Chief. His comparison of the current capabilities of I MLE to the past capabilities of ANGLICO was extremely valuable.

Author’s Experience

The author’s ANGLICO experience includes a 26-month tour with 1st ANGLICO from August 1995 to October 1997. This tour included 13 months as the 13th MEU detachment Officer in Charge, 8 months as the Tactical Brigade Platoon commander and 5 months as the Training Platoon commander. During this time the author participated in multiple combined training exercises in the western pacific and a JRTC with the U. S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division.

Websites

JRTC and NTC websites provided a wealth of information on the realistic, challenging, and unique training opportunities available at the NTC and JRTC training sites.

I and II MLE websites provided basic information on the MLE mission, equipment and capabilities.

Author’s working papers

The author’s working papers include 1st ANGLICO documents on T/O, MEU specific training, ABC course training, Letters of Instruction, and generic ANGLICO information briefing slides. These working papers also include current MLE briefing slides and information papers MLE mission, organization, equipment, training, and capabilities.

2nd ANGLICO Command Chronology. Marine Corps Historical Center, Archives Branch, "History of Second ANGLICO." This source provided information limited straightforward facts such as dates of major operations, movements etc…

This source provides basic information on the planning and conduct of liaison operations.


This Handbook provides very detailed information on liaison procedures for planning and executing joint/allied/coalition operations. This was the only military publication that this author could find which defined functions of liaison in detailed, usable terms.

Proposed T/Os 48855A, 485X, 4855X and 4855R, 06Feb01, Command Element, Force Structure Division, MCCDC, Quantico, VA.

These proposed T/Os provide detailed information on the size, structure, composition, mission, organization, training, equipment, and employment of the “New MLE” concept.

**Secondary Sources**


This MMS paper is a valuable source of information from Lieutenant Colonel Braden’s personnel experiences as an eyewitness at the Battle of Khafji in Operation DESERT STORM. The author was a 1st ANGLICO SALT leader in support of the JFCE forces that fought in and around the city. His analysis of ANGLICO’s contribution to a coalition operation is a key-supporting document to the thesis of this paper. His MMS is the best-detailed description of ANGLICO’s tactical-level liaison capabilities that this author found.


