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Swedish Students at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1960 – 1999
An Analysis of the Exchange Program at Quantico between the US Marine Corps and the Swedish Navy/Coastal Artillery.

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Executive Summary


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Hans M. Granlund, Swedish Amphibious Corps

Thesis: Sweden sent its students to the Command and Staff Colleges in order to gain valuable insight and knowledge, broaden the theoretical span of a selected few officers, and make contacts (networking). In doing this, the country used the school as a high level education for specially selected officers.

Discussions: Since 1960, Sweden has sent officers to the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia, at an average of one student every three or four years. It is, and has always been, important for Sweden in developing its military doctrines and officers’ professional education to compare its system with United States. As a small and nonalignment country, updates on international tactics, techniques and procedures, while maintaining a broad network of personal contacts, has been viewed as essential to maintaining valid and feasible national doctrines. The paper is written from a “Stockholm” perspective, but arguably most of the conclusions that are valid for the Swedish officers are also valid for the other international graduates - and probably to some extent, to their contemporary American comrades. As of 2001-02, fourteen Swedish students have attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (the author included). This paper deals with the thirteen students who attended between 1960 and 1999.

Conclusions: All the Swedish officers concerned where successful where compared with their peers, both before and after the year at Command and Staff College. This indicates that they where considered exemplary professional officers and therefore sent to the school. If this was the case, why were they sent to a foreign school when they already where fully educated in their own PME system? One primary reason answer this question: for each officer to have an opportunity to widen and deepening his knowledge base. It was seen in Sweden as a professional challenge. Thus, they broadened their professional skills to a level that only studies over a long time permit. In addition, they where given the opportunity to develop a network of international contacts which proved valuable to them and for Sweden in their post-graduation years.

Swedish students spent almost a year, if not more, with the Marine Corps. The two elements, Command and Staff College and their postgraduate follow-on-training, form the collective experience of all the students. The curriculum of the school produces the background to the learning experience. Also major Swedish and US current events and their follow-on-training influenced each officer’s perspective on the United States, US military forces, Quantico, and their military education.
The education at the Command and Staff College gave the students a wider knowledgebase within their profession. It has also given Sweden valuable insights into how a superpower thinks, acts, and reacts. The college also gave the Swedish Coastal Artillery a doctrinal update on how a large Marine Corps conducts amphibious operations. This was of value to the Coastal Artillery during the Cold War years and is most significant today in the transformation of this former branch into Sweden’s Amphibious Corps.
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Preface

It is, and has always been, important for Sweden in developing its military doctrines and officers’ professional education to compare its system with United States. As a small and nonalignment country, updates on international tactics, techniques and procedures, while also maintaining a broad network of personal contacts, has been viewed as essential to maintaining valid and feasible national doctrines. All this is a part of Sweden’s policy to be neutral in a major conflict, while also participating in peace support operations. Also, if necessary, Sweden must be able to function in an alliance in a conflict if neutrality is no longer an option.

There has not been any previous account of Sweden’s participation in the Marine Corps professional education program since it started in 1960. This paper will do so, surveying its background, the students who where sent to Quantico, what they learned and influenced them, and their use of the education received in their later careers. It is written from a “Stockholm” perspective, but arguably most of the conclusions that are valid for the Swedish officers are also valid for the other international graduates and, possibly, to their contemporary American comrades. It has been difficult in such a limited paper to also include a “Quantico” perspective on the contribution to the school of the Swedish officers in particular and the international community as a whole. The Swedish officer at any given time was just one international out of 16 to 25 in a course of 150 to 200 students. What has been done is to describe some of the conclusions drawn by the Command and Staff College about the international program and applicable to the Swedish students and this paper.

The paper covers 1960 through 1999, when the last Swedish student graduated from Command and Staff College.\footnote{The first Swedish student did not go to Command and Staff College. Instead he went to the Junior Course now called the Amphibious Warfare School. The second officer went to Senior Course, in 1964 renamed the Command} Information about the experiences and value for the Swedish
students at the Command and Staff College has primarily been obtained through interviewing the officers, generally via correspondence. The careers of the students are discussed at some length, and an appendix provides information on their background as well as their later assignments. The latter is a valuable criterion of their success and shows where in the respective careers they attended Command and Staff College.

Since 1960, Sweden’s Navy/Coastal Artillery has sent officers to the Marine Corps schools at Quantico. This has been a part of its professional development as a service and, equally important, to foster good US-Swedish relations in form of personal networking and mutual sharing, learning, and understanding from different experiences and outlooks on various issues.\(^2\) The Swedish part of the exchange with Quantico has so far comprised 14 officers, the current student included. This paper will deal with the thirteen officers that participated between 1960 and 1999. The program continues today and even survived the stress placed upon it by the two respective nations divergent views about the Vietnam War as students where sent during the years of that conflict. As bonds between the Swedish Navy/Amphibious Corps and the U.S. Marine Corps grow stronger as the years pass after the end of the Cold War and into the 21st century, the opportunity for Sweden to play a more active part in international security arrangements will give the newly formed Amphibious Corps a potentially larger role.

As of 2001-02, fourteen Swedish students attended at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (the author included).\(^3\) Excepting the writer, eleven of the thirteen officers answered written questions sent to them on their experience of Quantico. As a complement to

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1. Students at the Command and Staff College. For the clarity of this paper, they collectively will be referred to as having attended the “Command and Staff College”. Brigadier General (Ret.) Jan Beckman letter to the author dated 17 October 2001. Hereafter cited as: Beckman letter of 17 October 2001. Comments by Dr Donald F. Bittner, 5 February 2002.
2. Since 1 October 2000, the Coastal Artillery branch has been re-designated the Amphibious Corps within the Swedish Navy. The Swedish Amphibious Corps is tasked with operations in the littoral spectrum. Today the Corps trains, and in wartime will field, a Marine Brigade for use in archipelagoes and along coasts. Its task will be to seize, control, and defend a coastal area, islands, or port/harbor facilities. The transformation will be completed in 2010.
3. See appendix A.
this, some of their after course reports where used. Also, some of their works, and other
documentations and papers at Command and Staff College and later published articles by them,
have been used. In all cases, their dates for promotions and postings are taken from their official
service records. In addition, some contemporary material from the Marine Corps Research
Center archives is used to give a picture of the course and contemporary influences during their
years at Command and Staff College, in Quantico, Virginia.

All of the Swedish students did a follow-on-tour called “post Command and Staff College
training” with the Marine Corps after graduation. This tour varied in length between a couple of
weeks and several months. It included educational visits, and in some cases even training with
various units and commands. This experience from these follow-on-training assignments is also
included in the paper since it was an inseparable part of their experience within the Marine Corps
professional military education system.

Since I started research on this paper, one of the Swedish graduates, Brigadier General
(Ret.) Thorbjörn Ottoson, died. He died on 27 November 2001, just days after his reply, dated 15
November, to the letter from the author. General Ottoson was born in 1924. He was one of the
colourful officers of his generation. I am grateful to him and all the other officers that have
preceded me at this School, both for their help with this paper but mostly for the high reputation
of Swedish officers they left behind here at Quantico.
1 Background

Sweden historically has always had good relations with United States. Since World War II, there have been continuous exchanges between the two countries. These varied from intelligence sharing, technical developments, cross training and port visits, to officers’ education. The latter has mostly consisted of Swedish officers going to United States to learn something that Sweden alone could, or would, not provide. Most likely, another reason that few American officers goes to Sweden is that Stockholm is not a formal ally; furthermore, the language barrier must be viewed as considerable for a Professional Military Education course at a Swedish military school as there are few fluent Swedish speaking in the US forces.

Since 1943 there has been a foreign military officer presence at the Marine Corps schools at Quantico. In a 1981 historical overview of this program, the goals of the foreign military training are stated. Two basic assumptions are also described and might be used as “implied tasks”; firstly, most of the international officers that come to Quantico are “high flyers.” This is statistically proved correct and makes this program a good investment in future good relations between USA and these countries. Secondly, though, there is a hesitation that the international officers might not conform to, or truly understand, American “spirit, substance and essence”. I would say that both these assumptions are valid in the case of the Swedish students.

The first initiative for a Swedish student in the program came from Colonel Anthony Caputo, USMC, who in the late 1950s, early 1960s served as assistant Naval Attaché in Stockholm. He was familiar with similar ones and had come from the schools at Quantico where he had been an instructor. He suggested to the Inspector for the Swedish Coastal Artillery, Major

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4 Major Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, *Historical Overview, Command and Staff College Foreign Military officers Program, 1943 to Present.* (Quantico, VA: Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, United States Marine Corps. 1 July 1981), 4-6. Hereafter cited as: Bittner, USMC Historical Overview CSC, 1943 to Present.

5 Bittner, USMC Historical Overview CSC, 1943 to Present, 5.
General Henrik Lange, that a similar one be established between the US Marine Corps and the Coastal Artillery, with the stated purpose of studying amphibious warfare. After confirming this with the Ministry of Defense and the Naval Staff, General Lange asked that such a program be started. Colonel Caputo accordingly wrote a letter to the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, and a formal invitation for Sweden to send a student to Quantico was received. This invitation was for a Swedish officer to attend the Junior School and General Lange personally handpicked the first student.  

An interview with the former student indicated that the formal invitation came very close to the actual start of the course, the reason for this being on the Swedish side of the system. 

Swedish students are today sent to the Command and Staff College via formal invitations from the United States Marine Corps to the Swedish Armed Forces (and within these the Navy/Coastal Artillery). Since 1988, this has been regulated in a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) between Sweden and United States, with the goal clearly expressed:

*Is established to experiment with the mutual exchange of military personnel and to promote on active relationship between the two Services by which the experience, professional knowledge and doctrine of the services are shared to the maximum extent permissible under existing policies of the United States and Sweden.*

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6 This was at a time when the Coastal Artillery was going through some major changes concerning the development of a marine assault infantry along the lines of the UK Royal Marines Commando units. There were also adjustments in the tactics, techniques, and equipment to deal with the threat of a nuclear battlefield. The idea was presented to Major General Rudolf K. Kolmodin and Major General Henrik Lange, at that time the two senior Coastal Artillery officers. They, alongside with officers such as Bo Westin, Per Carlsson, Erik Lyth, and Roland Bjule, approved of the idea. Colonel USMC (Ret.) Anthony Caputo letter to author dated 9 January 2002.


The MoA does not state how often, when, or where the Swedish Navy/Coastal Artillery is supposed to send an officer.\(^9\) However, since 1960 Sweden has sent officers to the Command and Staff Colleges at Quantico at an average of one student every third year with, an interval between 1983 and 1989 when no officer from Sweden was at the College.\(^10\) Furthermore, there have been other Swedish Navy and Coastal Artillery officers who attended other US Navy and Army schools outside the parameters of this MoA, but they are not discussed in this paper.\(^11\)

\(^9\) Some countries such as United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Norway appear to have “permanent” places in each course; however, each is officially invited to send an officer for each particular course. The invitational process for Sweden between 1978 and present is discussed in Appendix B.

\(^10\) The latest US Marine officer sent to Sweden was Major Brett Bourne USMC, then a Captain, who was in Sweden during 1997 and was attached to various units as well as attending the commando course and airborne course (sv: Kustjägar utbildning and airborne ranger course A0231).

2 The Swedish (educational) system

Sweden is nonaligned in peacetime and plans to be neutral in wartime if not attacked. As a sovereign state, the country prides itself in being self-sustaining materiel and educational vise. This has meant that a complete national educational and training program for officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldier/sailors alike has been developed and maintained, linked to a national defense doctrine with domestic equipment and materiel to support it. Nevertheless, neutral countries like Sweden need good international connections and unofficial links in order to assist in developing its doctrines and acquiring influence on a professional level. With respect to amphibious operations, it was essential to learn about the offensive aspects in such so as to be able to develop and maintain a naval anti-invasion doctrine in the Baltic Sea area against a feared potential Warsaw Pact assault.

The Swedish professional military educational program has slowly evolved in several steps since 1960. The field grade officers, majors and lieutenants-colonels, educational program have not significantly changed between 1960’s and 1990’s apart from their tactical content and changing doctrine (the major change of the program occurred in mid-90’s). It is therefore relatively correct to assume that the experiences of the Swedish officers in early 1960’s through to the 1990’s can be compared; they where all products of basically the same educational system and the Cold War era.

Only one significant global change affected the education during the period 1989-1990. This was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. With this, the Swedish national security environment dramatically changed and Sweden could now adopt a more active participation in the new and evolving security establishment of Europe. This development dramatically changed the doctrine and force structure of the Swedish armed forces in general, and the Coastal Artillery in particular.
During the Cold War and the dramatically altered the Swedish security environment of the 1990’s, the Swedish graduates of US Marine Corps Command and Staff College have all been posted to important and influential positions. These were both joint and single service, and planning and operational appointments. Of the thirteen graduates, six are still active, and three are generals and the fourth has been selected for promotion in 2002.

Sweden has a conscript military force and has therefore a great need of a highly trained and capable professional officer corps. Furthermore, this conscript system ensures Sweden will have a numerical small force in peacetime but will expand to a large force after a mobilization in case of war. At the end of the Cold War, the peacetime strength was about 55,000 men, which could mobilize a projected force of over 850,000 in war. Today the respective figures are 35,000 and 270,000.  

This has always been a major focus of the Swedish military educational system.

After World War II, Sweden developed an officer educational system modeled on the German system in the inter-war years where every officer trained to at least one level above his current assignment. This system, of a “Führungsarmee” is still partly maintained. In the Swedish officers corps, for an example a peacetime platoon leader is a captain but his training is to the level of company commander or operations officer in a battalion. A major, in the same fashion, is assigned as company commander in a peacetime training unit but has a wartime posting as a battalion commander or on brigade staff. Most peacetime regimental commanders have double assignments as brigade commanders.  

As a part of this system, the army maintained a system of

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13 In Sweden, a regiment is not a wartime organizational unit. Instead, combined arms brigades are formed of two to four battalions from one or two regiments and complemented with specialized companies and other attachments. For example, the First Marine Brigade is composed of two Battalions from the 1st Amphibious Regiment and a third battalion from the 4th Amphibious Regiment, plus attachments and specialized companies from both regiments. Commander First Amphibious Regiment is also the Brigade Commander (at the current, Colonel Andersson, a 1996 graduate of CSC), with this command element from the two regimental staffs. However, this system is under heavy reconstruction due to changing demands within the force structure and the more demanding environment of today’s battlefield.
a General Staff Officers Corps consisting of carefully selected captains or majors to serve as staff officers in higher staffs and in other demanding tasks.\textsuperscript{14} This staff system is now modernized and adopted in all three services. It consists of about 90 to 100 officers, majors and lieutenant colonels, and is called the \textit{Commanders Training Program}. Selected into the program are no more than 10 \% of the top students from \textit{The Swedish National Defense College}. From there, they are assigned to a mix of joint and single service billet to prepare them for posting at Colonel/General officers level. Of these, at any given time about ten are from the Amphibious Corps. If the current system had been applicable during the period discussed in this paper, the assessment is that all thirteen officers was well inside such a peer group, as there service records indicate such a high level of performance given their promotion rates and billets.

The Navy and the Coastal Artillery did not adopt this formal system on their own until 1999. The need for a cadre of officers above the different branches was, and is not, crucial to that service. It was small and the promotion boards did not need a pre-selection screening and comparison with a peer group before a recommendation of a promotion to Colonel and above.

Between 1960 and 1999, the higher national officer education in Sweden consisted of \textit{The Swedish Armed Forces Staff College} for captain/major, and for lieutenant colonels selected for colonels and colonels \textit{The National Defense College}.\textsuperscript{15} During these years, \textit{The Swedish Armed Forces Staff College} had two courses that all the Swedish students had completed before coming to Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The first, called the \textit{Tactical Course}, was for captains selected for promotion to majors; and the second, called the \textit{Higher Staff Course}, was for distinguished graduates from the first. The \textit{Tactical Course} was of ten months duration, and

\textsuperscript{14} Only the best officers are selected. They stand above the different branches and form an elite staff officer corps responsible to the Chief of the Army instead of the different branch inspectors. This General Staff Corps is the nursery and trainee program for the future Army generals. Promotion above Lieutenant Colonel is rare if an officer is not a member of it.
focused on battalion/brigade level staff functions in a single service environment; for the Coastal Artillery officers, it was followed by a three months long, service-run, battalion commanders course. The *Higher Staff Course* was, and still is, the pinnacle of the Swedish professional military educational system; it focused on joint staff training and prepared its graduates for appointment to higher level staffs (i.e. joint or service staffs), Swedish regional joint commands, service staff, and Armed Forces Headquarters operational or planning staffs. The environment at the *Higher Staff Course* at any given year was similar to the contemporary Marine Corps Command and Staff College in disposition and educational methods, but not in curriculum. Sweden, at the *Higher Staff Course*, focused the education on and around the national defense doctrine, while the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College focuses on large-scale amphibious and expeditionary operations.

The highest educational level in Sweden and during the last four decades of the century was, and still is, *The National Defense College*. An institution run by the Ministry of Defense and State Department, and headed by a former ambassador or a General, its student are members of parliament, officers at colonel or above, and selected company executives and other higher-ranking civil servants. Usually a military officer would go there before, or during, his first year as commanding officer at the grade of Colonel. This top-level education focused on the Swedish concept of Total Defense, and networking within the political-military society and associated agencies and companies.

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15 The two Colleges in 1997 merged into the *Swedish National Defense College*, but none of the officers concerned in this paper were affected by that change.
3 The Students

All of the Swedish students were well educated on a national basis before being sent to Quantico. They all had distinguished careers up to that point, were all graduates from, and in most cases were distinguished graduates, from The Swedish Armed Forces Staff College, both its tactical and higher staff courses. It could be postulated that on one side they were already past the level of Command and Staff College education. So, why were they sent to Quantico so comparatively late in their careers?

There are several reasons and no distinct answer to this question. First, the impact of a foreign student at any school is always noticed. From Sweden’s perspective, they had to be exemplary officers equal to or above the standard of the U.S. and other foreign students. Their performance at the Swedish Staff College higher course helped identify this. Second, one of Sweden’s national aims was students’ acquisition of valuable contacts, to include building an international network. This was deemed invaluable for a smaller nonaligned country such as Sweden. This network should be, and has been, maintained through their careers. Some where a couple of years older than most students and of the grade of lieutenant colonel; this was deemed helpful, especially considering the US services whereby officers generally are sensitive to rank and the previous experiences of their peers and contemporary colleagues.

Captain Karl E. Lyth – 1959-60. Major (Captain?) Karl Erik Lyth was born 21 of December 1920.\textsuperscript{16} He was commissioned into the Coastal Artillery as a Second Lieutenant on 2 August 1943 and promoted to Lieutenant in August 1945, Captain in April 1952, to Major in April 1961. During his time in the Junior Course, he probably held a temporary commission as

\textsuperscript{16} Dates, postings and promotions are from the official service record. Swedish Armed Forces, Service Record of Retired Brigadier General Karl Erik Lyth, (16 November 2001). Hereafter cited as: Lyth, Service Record.
major\(^{17}\) he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in April 1963 and in April 1966 to Colonel. His last promotion to Brigadier General occurred in July 1972.

General Lyth was trained as an artillery officer and held command from platoon through brigade.\(^{18}\) He held numerous staff positions, including an early tour at the Ministry of Defense in the trainee program for the General Staff Officers Corps and was repeatedly used as an instructor in mathematics at both *The Naval Staff College* and on *The Naval Academy*.\(^{19}\) He was on loan to the Army and went through their advanced infantry officers’ course, and was further trained as a communications officer and forward observer. In addition, since 1957, he served as Adjutant to His Royal Highness Prince Bertil, Duke of Halland; this was a (and is) a lifelong honorary position held by only handful of officers at any given time.\(^{20}\)

He completed *The Naval Staff College* Tactical Course and Higher Staff Course equivalents in 1949-51 and graduated with honors.\(^{21}\) He was equaled with the Army General Staff Corps officers. He then attended the Marine Corps Junior Course in 1959-1960.\(^{22}\) After his return to Sweden, Lyth became a member of a working group studying the value of future Swedish participation in foreign military education and training, and in another Swedish project

\(^{17}\) The record from Command and Staff College shows him as Major. However, his Service Record shows his promotion date to Major as 1 April 1961 but indicates that he could have been recognized as a major from the same date as the posting to Quantico i.e. the time abroad. This was a common Swedish practice: Give an officer a temporary rank, one above the official, when going abroad. Lyth, Service Record.

\(^{18}\) In the Coastal Artillery they were two types of artillery units: the fixed anti-ship, anti-aircraft artillery, and the mobile units of the same type. The fixed units were purely artillery up to battery level, but from battalion and upwards they where combined arms battalions and designated barrage battalions (*Spärrbataljoner* in Swedish). The mobile units were organized in batteries and battalions (Avdelta/Fristående Kustartilleri batteri/bataljon in Swedish) and used as reinforcements, gap fillers, and general reserves; they where single branch through battalion level.

\(^{19}\) The College was not “joint” until 1961; till then, all three services maintained their own college but had almost identical curricula and course criteria such as grading but they emphasized different subjects. The unification was as much a force reduction and financial saving as a need for more joint education at the time. [http://www.fhs.mil.se](http://www.fhs.mil.se)

\(^{20}\) The now deceased Duke of Halland was second heir in the succession to the Swedish throne. These assignments are given as a token of appreciation to officers and they usually serve a month a year in the position. The only persons entitled to honorary adjutants are the King and Queen, and the heir, Crown prince/princess and the prince/princess Royal (son or daughter to the Crown prince/princess).

\(^{21}\) In 1949-51 they where called Staff Course, Higher Staff Course, and Artillery Course; the later indicated a third year, one of deeper technical education on the Master’s level.

studying the U.S. Marine Corps. In 1964, and again in 1972, he attended the National Defense College as a preparation for his promotions to Colonel and Brigadier General respectively.

He was not posted to Staff College as an instructor as was the general rule for officers who had received education abroad in those days. This was, and still is, the official rule of thumb concerning internationally educated officers as a mean to try to spread their knowledge to as many peers and contemporaries as possible. Rather, in October 1962 General Lyth was posted to the Defense staff, the joint Supreme Commander’s staff. This was the staff above the three service staffs, and the highest staff maintained in peacetime. There, he served in the Operations Division, Section III, force-planning branch. From there, he went to further staff and unit commands and in 1966 was promoted to Colonel and assumed command of Gotland Coastal Defense Command and the 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment, a position he held until 1971. His last assignment was as Director, Section 4, Naval Staff. He retired from this position in 1981 as a Brigadier General.

General Lyth was, and is, a typical officer of his generation. He came into the service during the World War II and along with a large number of contemporaries. Therefore, as many of his peers, he had to wait for promotions in a diminishing service that was coping with the stress of post war handling of a shrinking organization, and new and changed missions –the evolving threat from the Warsaw pact. His posting to the Ministry of Defense and rapid promotion from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel (he was Major for only two years between 1961 and 1963) shows that he possessed ample ability and exemplary performance of duty. His appointment as Adjutant to the Duke of Halland is further indication of his outstanding personal

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23 However, maintaining this system has become harder, because of Sweden’s changed role and the increased demands for Swedish officers with this kind of education, both domestic and abroad as liaison officers to NATO/PfP staffs and as Swedish participates in UN/NATO lead peace support missions.
character. General Lyth is also a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and The Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.24

**Lieutenant Colonel Jan P. O. Beckman – 1962-63.** Lieutenant Colonel Beckman was born in 1918 and commissioned into the Costal Artillery as a Second Lieutenant in September 1938. Promotion to Lieutenant followed in 1941, then to Captain in April 1946, Major in 1953, Lieutenant Colonel in 1959, Colonel in April 1963, Brigadier General in July 1974, and acting Major General during his last year of service in 1977-78.25 General Beckman was trained as an artillery officer and held commands at all levels from platoon to brigade. He, as many of his contemporaries, already as lieutenants commanded companies or batteries during World War II due to the shortage of trained regular officers. He held numerous staff positions, including an exchange tour with the Stockholm International Peace and Conflict Research Institute (SIPRI). He completed the Naval Staff College Tactical Course in 1944-1945 and Higher Staff course equivalents in 1945-1947, graduating with honors.26 He was, as General Lyth before him, equaled with the Army General Staff Corps officers and participated in part of their program. He went through the Marine Corps Senior Course in 1962-1963. General Beckman is also a graduate from Swedish National Defense College.

After graduating from the Staff College, he was posted to the Bureau of Artillery in the Naval Acquisition Branch between 1947 and 1950, and he then served as an instructor of artillery at the Naval Academy till 1953. In 1952, for a couple of weeks Beckman served with

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24 Both Academies are amongst the “Royal” Academies’ in Sweden, and date back to the 18th century. The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, founded in 1796, is a forum for all dimensions of war: Land, Sea and Air, and has departments for the study of Policy, Strategy, and Technology. The Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences focuses on all naval aspects of conflict and is the oldest academy of its kind in the world, founded in 1771. Membership in either one is an honor and lifelong commitment, and is a sign of (National) appreciation of a lifetime of work or a major contribution in a specific field, in these cases most often in the military. http://cgi.kkrva.se, http://www.koms.se


26 In 1944-47 they where called Staff Course, Higher Staff and Artillery Course, the latter due to the World War II ending a compressed two year course with a deeper technical education on the Master’s level.
the British Coastal Artillery at their schools at Plymouth and Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{27} In 1953, after promotion to major, he was posted as acting Chief of Staff to the 1\textsuperscript{st} Coastal Artillery Regiment and in 1954 to the Coastal Artillery Combat School as instructor in artillery. This assignment lasted until 1957; it was a period when the Swedish Coastal Artillery experienced a major development as radar came into wide use within the different artillery units as both a surveillance and a tracking device. In 1957 he was assigned to the Naval Staff, Operations Division, where he served until 1959 when he was transferred to the Stockholm Coastal Artillery Command as Chief of Staff, a position he held until 1962 when he was sent to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

After his return to Sweden from Quantico, Beckman was promoted to Colonel and ordered to the Swedish Armed Forces Staff College as Chief of Staff and Deputy Director. At the Staff College, he became a member of a cross-service working group studying “jointness,” efficiencies, and reductions of staffs and commands within the Swedish Armed Forces. He commanded the Northern Coastal Defense Command and the 5\textsuperscript{th} Coastal Artillery Regiment between 1966 and 1974. In 1974, after his promotion to Brigadier General, he was offered a posting as a senior researcher at Stockholm International Peace and Conflict Research Institute (SIPRI); there, he participated in the publishing of the annual SIPRI Yearbook.\textsuperscript{28} The last year he also participated in a study of Command, Control, and Communication (C\textsuperscript{3}). During his years at SIPRI he also started his academic studies that resulted in a BA in Political Science in 1982.\textsuperscript{29} General Beckman’s last assignment before retirement was heading the Swedish delegation to Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), DMZ, Korea, a position he held in 1977 and

\textsuperscript{27} Beckman letter of 17 October 2001.
\textsuperscript{28} The Stockholm International Peace and Conflict Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent foundation funded by Swedish government. http://www.sipri.se
\textsuperscript{29} Beckman, TiKA, 44.
1978. General Beckman retired in October 1978. He is also a member of The Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Major Thorbjörn Ottoson – 1965-66.** Major Ottoson attended Command and Staff College in 1965-1966. After his return, he was posted to the new Coastal Ranger School as the commander until 1969. He attended National Defense College in 1968, and again in 1982. In 1969, he was assigned to the Defense staff where he served in the Operations Division. From there, in 1975, he moved on to the Coastal Artillery Combat School, and in 1976, assumed command of it. In 1980, he was posted as Commanding officer, Gothenburg Coastal Artillery Command, and led the transformation of that command into a bi-service combined Naval Command in 1983. Ottoson retired as a Brigadier General in 1984. His Service Record was not available.

**Lieutenant Colonel Arne N. Lundell - 1970-71.** Lieutenant Colonel Lundell retired as Colonel in 1985. His service record was not available. Colonel Lundell is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Lieutenant Colonel Lars G. Persson - 1973-74.** Lieutenant Colonel Persson retired as a Lieutenant General in 1997. His service record was not available. General Persson is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences

**Lieutenant Colonel Urban R. Sobéus - 1975-76.** Lieutenant Colonel Sobéus was born in 1935 and commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the reserve into the Coastal Artillery in 1958

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30 Called a school until 1989, it is the battalion where the all-volunteer forces of Coastal Rangers are trained. The Coastal Rangers are assault infantry developed, equipped, and trained for recapturing fixed artillery positions and islands of importance in the defense of coastal areas. A concept built upon experiences from World War II, analyses showed that success in an amphibious operation is very difficult if heavy coastal artillery batteries and controlled minefields are not neutralized or captured. The Rangers are expected to function despite unusually heavy casualties. Therefore, their tactics and training was, and still is, rigorous.


Lieutenant Colonel Sobéus, attended the Swedish Armed Forces Staff College, Tactical Course in 1968-1969, and was then briefly posted to Coastal Artillery Combat School and Naval Staff, Operations Division, until 1970. Between 1970-1972, he attended the Swedish Armed Forces Staff College, Higher Staff Course, and in 1975 he was again posted to the Coastal Artillery Combat School as instructor for tactics and director for the Captains level courses.

He attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 1975-1976, and was after his return posted to Swedish Armed Forces Staff College as Director, Tactical Course (Naval). In 1977, he went to the 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment and in 1978 assumed command of one of its battalions. In 1980, he served in the Defense Staff’s Operations Division, Section II. He commanded the 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiment and later Stockholm Coastal Artillery Command. He commanded these units through some of Sweden’s experience with the Soviet submarine encroachment during the 1980’s. General Sobéus also attended The National Defense College in 1981. General Sobéus retired in 1993, and during the last years of his service he was at the Chief of the Navy’s personal disposal. General Sobéus since his retirement has written four books about the Swedish Coastal Artillery’s history and remains active as an historian.

Major Björn B. Sandström - 1977-78. There is some personal information on his time at Command and Staff College, but he has not responded to the letter sent to him. After his time at Quantico, Sandström was posted to the directing staff at the Swedish Armed Forces Staff

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33 Stockholm Coastal Artillery Command is the peacetime staff tasked with wartime planning preparation and command of three wartime “call up” Brigades for the defense of Stockholm from attack from the sea and the peacetime training regiment, The 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment.
College, and taught Strategy and Operations at the Higher staff course. He retired early in 1981 as a Lieutenant Colonel and works today for Volvo Automobile Company. His service record has not been available.

**Major Bengt-Arne Johansson - 1981-82.** Major Bengt-Arne Johansson was born October 1 in 1943. He was commissioned into the Costal Artillery as a Second Lieutenant in 1969. In 1991, he was promoted to Colonel, in 1994 to Brigadier General, in 1997 to Major General, and to Lieutenant General in 2000. General Johansson is still on the active list.


General Johansson has commanded at all levels from platoon through Regiment/Brigade (the last being Commanding officer, 2nd Coastal Artillery regiment/4th Coastal Artillery Brigade in Karlskrona) and has held numerous staff positions, both joint and single service. He was on the directing staff of the *Armed Forces Staff College* in 1982-1984, a posting he received after returning from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. After that he served at the Coastal Artillery Combat Schools as head instructor for tactics and operations. His most notable postings were at the Naval staff in the Operations Division (1986-1987), on the Defense Staff’s Operations Division, as Head of Section I (Operations) (1989-1991) and, on the Naval Staff as Assistant Chief of the Navy (1994-1997).

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34 This is a common way to take advantage of a senior officer’s knowledge during the last remaining years of active service before retirement, when he no longer is promotable and already has held the highest command.
36 This is the Coastal Artillery’s service school responsible for all training and education of officers in their MOS, and their training as leaders and commanders on the levels between platoon and brigade. It is a highly prestigious billet, and the teachers and directing staff are appointed from amongst the outstanding Coastal Artillery officers. The school maintains a small number of full time teachers and instructors, but depends heavily on augmentation from the field units and commands.
Since the formation of the new Swedish Armed Forces Headquarter in 1999, when the defense staff and separate service staffs were abolished, General Johansson has served in joint postings: Assistant Director for the Operations Directorate, Assistant Director of Training and Management directorate, and is currently Director of Training and Management Directorate. General Johansson is also a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences

**Major Bo L. Wranker - 1983-84.** Major Wranker was born in 1946 and commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Coastal Artillery in 1969, the same year as General Johansson. He advanced to Lieutenant (1971), Captain (1972), Major (1980) and Lieutenant Colonel (1983). He was named Lieutenant Colonel Select in 1987, promoted to Colonel in 1993, and Brigadier General in 1997. Since 2000, he has been acting Major General on leave, serving with the United Nations. His early career was as an artillery officer, and he has commanded at all levels through battalion and two multinational task forces, and as held many staff positions. He graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College, Tactical Course and Higher Staff Course (1976-1978), the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1983-1984) and the National Defense College (1992).

After his return to Sweden from Quantico, between 1984 and 1986 he served as the Deputy J4, Southern Joint Command, and from 1986 to 1988; he was J4, Southern Joint Command. In 1988 he commanded a battalion of the 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment in Karlskrona. In 1990 he became Chief of Staff at Naval Command South, and in 1993, after his promotion to Colonel, he

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37 Swedish Armed Forces, Service Record of Major General Bo Wranker, (16 November 2001).

38 A system that Sweden had until 2001 naming the most outstanding Lieutenant Colonels as Colonel “selects”, often giving them Colonel jobs and status in everything but grade and pay. This was a way to cope with the need of officers on this level and still keep the numbers of Colonels within the political directives. This was done with, and under approval from, the political level of Ministry of Defense and Parliament. During the period from 1970’s to present, the Coastal Artillery had between 17 and 20 full Colonels and an additional ten “selects” on a short list. The system has been abolished and replaced with the Commanders Training Program described briefly in pervious chapter.
was posted as Commanding Officer, Coast Artillery Combat School. He held this position for only a year, for in late 1993 he was assigned as Director, Strategy Department in the Operations Directorate, Armed Forces HQ. This latter position was a highly influential one in which the national military long-term plans are developed. In 1995 he became Deputy Commanding Officer Naval Command South, and in 1996 went on leave from Swedish Armed Forces and was posted as United Nations Force Commander Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDP) in FYROM as Brigadier General.\textsuperscript{39} After his return in 1997 he assumed Command of Naval Command South, a position he held until the Command was disbanded. Since 2000, General Wranker has held the position of Major General and Force Commander United Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. He is also a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Lieutenant Colonel Göran L. Boijsen - 1989-90.** Lieutenant Colonel Boijsen was born in 1951 and commissioned a Lieutenant into the Coastal Artillery in 1973. Three years later he advanced to Captain, then Major (1983), and to Lieutenant Colonel (1988).\textsuperscript{40} In 1993, he was named Lieutenant Colonel Select and promoted to Colonel in 1994. Since 1999, he has served as Sweden’s Naval attaché in Washington. His early career was in artillery and he has commanded on all levels up to brigade as well as having numerous staff assignments. He went through the *Armed Forces Staff College*, Tactical Course, he attended the Higher Staff Course (1982-1984) and The Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1989-1990). Colonel Boijsen has also graduated from *The National Defense College*.

After completion of the *Armed Forces Staff Colleges* in 1984, he was posted as Operations officers (Navy) at Southern Joint Command. From there he moved on to 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment as Operations officer and in 1988 assumed command of one of the battalions of the

\textsuperscript{39} Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.
regiment. After this he went to Quantico, and upon his return in 1990 was posted to the *Armed Forces Staff Colleges* as a Faculty Advisor and Course Director (Naval) in the Higher Staff Course. In 1992, he moved to the Armed Forces Headquarters, as a member of an analysis group that prepared the drafts for the Supreme Command strategic outlook in the annual report to the Ministry of Defence and Parliament. His next assignment was as Director, Department of Strategy in the Operations Directorate, Armed Forces HQ. In 1998 he took command of the 2nd Coastal Artillery Regiment/4th Coastal Artillery Brigade in Karlskrona, a position he held until posted to Washington in 1999. Colonel Boijsen is also a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Lieutenant Colonel Göran Gunnarsson - 1991-92.** There is no personal information on his recollections of the time at Command and Staff College, nor has he responded to questions sent to him. After his time at Quantico, Gunnarsson was posted to the Armed Forces Headquarters, Plans and Policy Directorate, as a section head. In 1994, he took command of one of the battalions at the 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment. Gunnarsson was promoted to Colonel in 1996 as Commanding Officer, Naval College, but almost immediately sent to Croatia as head of a UN Observer Mission stationed out of Dubrovnik. In 1997, he was promoted Brigadier General, and posted as Chief of the Naval Staff. In 1999, he was promoted to Major General and assumed his current position, Assistant Head of Plans and Policy Directorate, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. His current posting makes him the Supreme Commander’s main planner for long term planning and responsible for the armed forces annual reports to the Ministry of

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41 First Coastal Artillery Regiment changed its name in 2000 to First *Amphibious* Regiment as a part of the transformation of the Coastal Artillery to the Amphibious Corps. At the same time, the 2nd and 3rd Coastal Artillery Regiments where disbanded as a part of the general Swedish force reduction. The 5th Coastal Artillery Regiment had already been disbanded. Today there remains The First Amphibious Regiment (Amf 1) and The Fourth Amphibious Regiment (Amf 4), the former 4th Coastal Artillery Regiment.
Defense and the Parliament. General Gunnarsson is a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Lieutenant Colonel Bengt Andersson - 1995-96.** Lieutenant Colonel Andersson was born in 1955 and commissioned as a Lieutenant into the Coastal Artillery in 1978, and advanced to Captain (1981), Major (1986), and Lieutenant Colonel (1993). In 1995, he was named Lieutenant Colonel Select and promoted to Colonel in 1998. His early career between 1979 and 1984 was spent primarily in mobile artillery and he has commanded at all levels up to brigade, as well as serving in staff positions. He went through *The Armed Forces Staff College*, Tactical Course in 1984-1985, and the Higher Staff Course (technical) in 1987-1989. He graduated from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in June 1996. Colonel Andersson is also a graduate from the *National Defense College* (2000).

His postings after the Higher Staff Course contains initial tour on the Naval Staff as a Desk Officer, Research and Development, and then in 1991 as Head of the Research and Development section. In 1993, he was posted to The 1st Amphibious Regiment as a battalion second-in-command and in 1994 he assumed command of that battalion. After this tour in 1995, he went to Quantico. After his return in 1996, he served as head instructor for Tactics and Operations *Coastal Artillery Combat Schools*, and in 1997 became its Chief of Staff. In 1998, he was assigned as J3, Eastern Joint Command during which time he served as the project manager for two exercises: Nordic Peace 98 and Viking 99. These two exercises were both “in the spirit of” NATO/PfP initiative with Nordic Peace 98 a joint US/Swedish exercise, and Viking 99 a joint Swedish/Norwegian/Finnish/Danish/Baltic exercise. In 2000 he took over the 1st Amphibious Regiment/1st Marine Brigade and has led it in its transformation from a Coastal Artillery unit

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42 Swedish Armed Forces, Service Record of Colonel Bengt Andersson, (16 November 2001).
into an Amphibious Corps unit. Colonel Andersson has been named the next Assistant Inspector General of the Navy, to assume this position in 2002 and subsequently be promoted to Brigadier General.\textsuperscript{44} Colonel Andersson is also a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Naval Sciences.

**Lieutenant Colonel Johan Eneroth - 1998-99.** Lieutenant Colonel Eneroth was born in 1955 and commissioned a Lieutenant in the Coastal Artillery in 1977. Advancement to Captain occurred in 1980, then to Major (1985), Lieutenant Colonel (1994), and Lieutenant Colonel Select in 1997. He has been selected for promotion to Colonel 2002.\textsuperscript{45} He has commanded at all levels up to battalion. He is a graduate of the *Armed Forces Staff College*, Tactical Course (1983-1984), and the Higher Staff Course (1990-1992). He attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 1998-1999.

His first tour after Higher Staff Course was to the Naval Staff as a Desk Officer, Coastal Artillery Systems Branch. In 1995 he was posted to the 1st Amphibious Regiment as a battalion commander. He left the battalion in 1997 to join the staff of the Coastal Artillery Inspector where he served as Head of Force Planning. He left that posting in 1998 to go to Quantico. After his return in 1999, he served in the Plans and Policy Directorate, Armed Forces Headquarters, as Deputy Head of Division for Future Plans. His next posting will be as an action officer at the Partnership for Peace (PfP) staff at SACLANT Norfolk, Virginia, in July 2002.

\begin{footnotes}
\item 43 NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative is a training and exercise program for the European countries standing outside with the aim to increase the interoperability between these countries and current NATO members. For Sweden’s participation, see Facts and Figures 2000-2001, 51-53.
\item 44 The Inspector General of the Navy is a Navy Rear Admiral and the Assistant Inspector General of the Navy an Amphibious Corps Brigadier General. The latter is the highest-ranking officer in the service chain of command for the Amphibious Corps and serves in a role similar to the Marine Corps Commandant. Colonel Andersson was selected for promotion to Brigadier General in 2001, following the selection of the current Inspector General of the Navy Rear Admiral Eriksson and the retirement of the former Assistant Inspector Brigadier General Stellan Fagrell. Colonel Andersson will assume his new position on 1 July 2002.
\item 45 Swedish Armed Forces, Service Record of Lieutenant Colonel Johan Eneroth, (16 November 2001).
\end{footnotes}
4 The year at Quantico and Command and Staff College

The year in Quantico compromised the formal professional military education received at the school, but the students also had follow-on-training with selected units or commands of the Marine Corps. Altogether, this meant that most Swedish students spent almost a year, if not more, with the Marine Corps. These two elements of each officers program cannot be separated; together they form their collective experience. The curriculum of the school thus formed the background to the total learning experience. However, major Swedish and US current events influenced each officer’s perspective on Quantico and his education.

1959-60 Junior School – Aftermath of Korean War, the Congo, and Berlin. The first student, Captain Lyth, arrived in Quantico in July 1959. He attended the Junior Course at the Marine Corps Schools Quantico, during the academic year 1959-60. The year 1960 was from a Swedish military perspective, a hectic one and the beginning of new era. New undertakings were a large effort for a small Armed Force that still felt, in spite of the nation’s neutrality – or because of it, had to maintain high readiness against possible Warsaw Pact aggression. Sweden also had a large military role in the United Nations mission to Congo, one that lasted for years.

In 1959 the Eisenhower administration neared its end, the Cold War continued, and the US policy of containment would soon be tested. President Kennedy was elected president in 1960 and Europe hoped he and his administration could ease the tensions of the Cold War. However, events overtook these expectations. In 1960 the U2 incident occurred in May, a prelude to the crises of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, events the next Swedish student, would observe in America. The tensions in Europe and Germany reached

47 Sweden for the second time provided units to a UN mission, the first being the Mission to the Egyptian-Israel border in 1956. In the Congo, Sweden provided staff officers, two Infantry battalions and an expeditionary air unit.
their peak with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. The United States was considering a more active role in Vietnam, as a part of its active Containment Policy. This was all in the future, and 1959 could be called the last one of innocence. The Cold War would soon be closer and much colder.

Captain Lyth came to a Marine Corps with new Korean War memories and had a formidable task of giving further formal theoretical education to officers from the World War II and Korean War years. In 1959-60, the Junior Course had about 150 officers. There were a large numbers of aviators. There where 18 international officer, five Europeans, three South Americans and eight Asians and they where distributed one to each conferences group.

The course focused on large-scale amphibious assaults, and ample time was given to the integration and use of close-air-support and helicopters in support of these operations. The course culminated in a final exercise (PACKARD) at Camp Lejeune, which simulated a major amphibious assault. The tactical education focused on conducting and leading operations and tasks by mission-type-orders, this resulting from fresh “lessons learned” from mistakes in the Korean War where detailed orders had lead to operations not being fully successful or occurring according to plans. The classes were well prepared and General Lyth recollects that the atmosphere of the course was good and that few complaints were heard. This was significant, since there is always potential for grumble when theoretical education is given to large groups of officers with pervious and extensive combat experience, often on the same or higher level than in the course attended. Altogether, General Lyth gave a very good testimonial to the Junior Course.

General Lyth remembered the off duty time as very pleasant, and is still in contact with his close neighbors, amongst them Jean Hilaire, the only colored student at the course. Amongst

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48 comprised of photoreconnaissance and air-to-ground attack aircraft plus liaison airplanes. The units’ deployed on a six-month rotational basis between 1960 and 1964.

other people remembered was Colonel Chaisson, the school director, and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Sr. General Lyth and his family recollect this year at Quantico as “amongst the happy years.” He also says that the education contributed to his following career success and helped enhance his language skills.

1962-63 Senior School – The Cuban Crisis and Haiti. The second student, Lieutenant Colonel Beckman, came to Quantico in August 1962 to attend the Senior School. He returned to Sweden in July 1963 after follow-on-training with the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejune and at Vieques, Puerto Rico. At this time, the unveiling of the biggest Soviet spy in Swedish history, Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerström, shook the military. The unveiling led to major rearrangements in force deployments and wartime planning. There is, however, no reference to this incident in General Beckman’s after course report. Instead, his report focused on the events in the United States, notably the racial tensions and the riots in Mississippi and Alabama, and two crises in which the Marine Corps was involved: the Cuban Crisis in October 1962 and the non combatant evacuation (NEO) in conjunction with elections in Haiti in May 1963.

About the Cuban Crisis, his report notes that a MEF was placed on alert and sent to sea and helicopter pilots at the school were ordered back to their units. During the critical week, after President Kennedy had delivered his ultimatum and before the Soviet ships had turned around, he described the schools as being almost empty. He commented that the secrecy around the operations, to include the MEF and an additional 100,000 Marines in Florida, was good. Beckman also noted that almost immediately the Corps used it as an example of the Marine

49 Colonel Chaisson retired as Lieutenant General. Krulak senior is the father of General Charles C. Krulak who served as 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps in the 1990s.
50 During 1948-1952, Wenneström had worked as Air Attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, and 1952-1957 as Air Attaché in Washington.
Corps’ concept as the nation’s “force in readiness.” The second incident mentioned in the report focused on the evacuation of American citizens from Haiti during the 1963 elections there.

The report further describes the operations of the Marine Corps in Lebanon, Thailand, Cuba, and Haiti as successful ones. He comments these were operations where the Corps proved its concept of being an integrated air-land force in readiness to conduct operations from the sea, followed by the Army which could conduct the buildup and then follow on with larger and heavier units. It goes on and describes the doctrines that were used and the concept of the Air-Ground Task Force and the four different levels of Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Expeditionary Corps (MEC) and their four elements: Command and Control, Ground Combat, Air Combat, and logistics. His report emphasizes the importance placed on readiness, mobility, command and control, firepower and logistics support.

After this part of the report, he provided an elaborate description of the school and the course. In 1962-1963, a Director (a Colonel), with at least six years in the grade, ran the school with a newly promoted Colonel as his deputy. Under the deputy were three sections: the Secretary unit under a Major (Woman Marine); a Plans, Operations, and Review section composed of two Lieutenant Colonels, one Captain, and a couple of junior officers and staff enlisted personnel for administration of the School; and a Command, Operations, and Instructions section consisting of twelve Lieutenant Colonels responsible for the instruction. The Senior School was part of the Educational Center that provided direction and support for all the schools at Quantico and consisting of about a hundred officers. He identifies a slight problem due to the constant rotation of the instructors, who were there for two to three years. This, however, was handled by firm direction of the director and the senior instructors to whom all
classes had to be submitted written and beforehand and after a observation of a rehearsal by him (called a “murder board”), before being presented.

The class of 1962-1963 had 124 students. Most of the students had attended The Basic School and the Junior School; some, however, had battlefield commissions and had never been to a military school before. The average age was 38-40, and 78 of them were Lieutenant Colonels, 45 Majors and 1 Colonel (the Indonesian student); 30% were aviators. All U.S. services were represented: six Army, six Air Force and six Navy (including one physician and one dentist). The international students were from Argentina, Brazil, France, Indonesia, Canada, Nationalist-China, Korea, Spain, United Kingdom and Sweden.

Beckman’s observes in his report that the mix of students gave the course a stimulating environment. He noted that hope for promotion to Colonel was low; many of the American students would be retired during the course or in the next few years. He says that the school hoped for to lower the age of students so as to target junior majors for the course, this in order to give the Marine Corps a better utilization off of the educational program given to the students.

The education was built upon many books, publications, and instructions, both unclassified and classified. The students were expected to do some study on their free time, about three hours every night was calculated to be sufficient. In addition to the reading, excerpts were given beforehand to the international students. After this, the course was given applicable exercises to solve in groups of two, four or eight. Finally, the instructors’ School Solution was presented and discussed. About 25% of the curriculum consisted of practical application problems. Eight tests were given: none of these were graded rather the purpose where to measure the general level of the education. The curriculum was divided into 12 different subjects:

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The MEC was a WW II term and organization no longer part of the MAGTF concept, but was still taught in 1962.
Curriculum Senior School AY 1962-63

- Formal Tactics and organization 83
- Commanders intent and staff duty 157
- Air/ground combat, tactical principals 173
- Amphibious operations 566 (484)\(^{53}\)
- Current world events 32
- Operations against guerillas 33 (64)
- Civil-military affairs and services 82
- Research and development 45
- Written and oral communication 30
- Language (French or Spanish) 100
- Administration etc. 31 (113)
- Physical fitness 47

1,379 hours

Finally, General Beckman, described what he saw as the Marine Corps general principals of war, as taught at the school: \(^{54}\)

1. A mission is given by the National Command Authority to the Marine Corps and the appropriate commander, and forces are allocated for the mission or as the situation develops or the commander requests.

2. A number (usual three) of courses of actions are developed.

3. The question of economy of force is rarely a subject of matter.

4. The decisive factors are instead mobility, offensive, and coordinated support.\(^{55}\)

5. Projection of force, surprise, and simplicity is applied.

6. The following are paid attention to in the comparison and evaluation of the different courses of action: terrain, climate and weather, the ability to use the terrain for protection and concealment, opportunities to protect the combat area with obstacles or fire, vulnerabilities, and risk.

Beckman, Report.

\(^{53}\) For comparison, Beckman in his report presented in brackets the number of hours for the Junior School, academic year 1962-1963. Beckman, Report.

\(^{54}\) The authors own translation of a quotation from the report. Beckman, Report.
7. Envelopment is sought in the assault, if possible even vertical.

8. Reserves are for the commander to exploit success, maintain momentum, or use for security. In addition to this is the value of intelligence emphasized; this cannot be conducted to carefully.

General Beckman in his letter to the author names the following officers and Students as especially memorable: General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and fellow students Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Barrow and Lieutenant Colonel Simlik.\textsuperscript{56}

To summarize the impressions General Beckman’s, the value of the school from a Swedish perspective was dual: operations and tactics, but also a national military view on such different subjects as equipment, economy, security, readiness, training, and educational methods. Furthermore, he stated that his tour with SIPRI and in Korea was directly linked with his previous education and follow-on-tour with the Marine Corps. Significantly he wrote:

\begin{quote}
The value for Swedish officers, both younger and older, of a international education with a military organization within a super power cannot be overestimated; the US Marine Corps organization, tactics, and equipment comprise all elements of modern warfare and are founded on current combat experiences which characterize all parts of the education…\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

\textbf{1965-66 Command and Staff College – The Vietnam War.} The third student, Major Ottoson came to Quantico in 1965 and graduated from the Command and Staff College in 1966. President Lyndon B. Johnson faced the deepening American involvement in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{58} The Johnson administration had increased its support to the new regime in 1964, and after the Tonkin Resolution had passed through the Congress an increasingly larger and lengthier US military commitment then ensued. In 1965 the military involvement was growing and in 1966 the

\textsuperscript{55} The Swedish word for Mobility is used, but the English word Maneuver was used in the original text. Beckman, Report.

\textsuperscript{56} Barrow later became 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps.

\textsuperscript{57} Beckman, Report.

numbers of US troops in Vietnam had reached 79,000 and the Air Campaign ROLLING THUNDER had commenced. The first combat units, as early as March 1965, to be committed to Vietnam were two battalions of US Marines that had landed at Da Nang.

Major Ottoson came to Command and Staff College from a posting at the Swedish Naval Academy as an instructor of tactics. He was selected to go to Quantico as a preparation for his next assignment as Commanding Officer of the Coastal Ranger School. The education was still focused on amphibious operations, and as Ottoson says:

*...Gave a picture of global challenges [for the United States] and [had] an emphasis on problem solving using creative imagination....*[^59]

After graduation Major Ottoson did his follow-on-training with the 2d Marine Division, where he observed the recruit training at Parris Island and training of infantry, artillery, armor, and reconnaissance units. The recon training initially was refused, but eventually he was given permission to do so. As the last part of his training, he served as deputy commanding officer to a battalion of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Marines with whom he conducted a major landing on the island Vieques. Thirteen destroyers, two cruisers, two amphibious assault ships, and two carriers screened the landing; helicopters from the USS Okinawa (LPH-3) launched the assault.

**1970-71 Command and Staff College – The expansion of the Vietnam War.** The fourth student, Lieutenant Colonel Arne Lundell, arrived in Quantico in August 1970 to attend the Command and Staff College for the 1970-71 Academic Year. This was at the height of the Vietnam war, and the course was compromised of about 125 students, of which 15 were internationals from Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Greece, Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand and two each from Korea and Vietnam.[^60]

[^60]: Colonel (Ret.) Arne Lundell letter to author marked: ARNE LUNDELL CSC 70-71 dated 29 November 2001. Hereafter cited as: Lundell, letter to author of 29 November.
In 1970, the Nixon administration had expanded the war into Laos and Cambodia. Also, in spite of the active policy of Vietnamization, more US troops were sent in 1970-71 than the previous years. In June, the incursion into Cambodia was almost over but it had brought heavy criticism for the administration. Ironically, at a time when on the battlefield the war was going better than ever before, it was about to be lost on the streets and in the television sets of United States. The focus of the course was Vietnam, and tactics and staff procedures. Most of the students were veterans of the conflict, and some suffered of post-traumatic-stress; many of the graduates had assignments to return to Vietnam.  

Colonel Lundell remembers the course as highly professional and well prepared. A teacher, Dr Argus Tresidder, a former Cultural Attaché to Turkey and Sweden taught English, French, and foreign culture, is particularly remembered by Colonel Lundell as a great friend of Sweden and a supporter of him and his family, both professional and social.

The school gave Sweden, through Colonel Lundell, good insight into current US doctrine and strategic thinking. Furthermore, it provided valuable knowledge on Marine Corps staff procedures and tactics. This altogether then formed an updated and renewed picture of the then Marine Corps philosophy of war-fighting techniques. During his time at the Command and Staff College, Colonel Lundell wrote a paper titled “Ho Chi Min’s Strategy and Tactics – Winning or?” He gave a brief to for the assembled course based on this paper.

As a part of his post-College training, he along with the British officer had a month posting to Camp Pendleton, California. This included participation in amphibious training on the battalion and higher levels. Since Colonel Lundell on his return to Sweden would be posted to the Defense Staff, Operations Department, Section II (Readiness), he was offered an additional six weeks in Okinawa to study the Marine Corps ready battalion there. While there, he was

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invited for additional visits to the Singapore Navy and to the Marine Corps of Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines and Korea, although the latter was not visited. He met the various commandants and chiefs of the navy, and also briefed them on Sweden’s defense philosophy and the doctrine of non-alignment, and its Navy/Coastal Artillery organization and equipment. Inevitably Colonel Lundell developed an invaluable and broad network of personal and professional contacts for future use. Parts of these were put to valuable use during his time as Naval Attaché in Paris, between 1980 and 1985.63

1973-74 Command and Staff College – Swedish-US tensions. The fifth student, Lieutenant Colonel Persson, departed Sweden for Virginia in August 1973; he was a member of the Command and Staff College class of 1974. On 6 October 1973 Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel. The United States soon heavily supported Israel, flying in replacement equipment, which enabled the Israelis to commit their reserves and assume the offensive. On 27 October, a ceasefire was called and peace negotiations started partly due to United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The war was a moral victory to Egypt and Syria, but a clear military victory for Israel. The new element of the oil embargo also contributed to a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt wherein most territory was returned to Cairo.64

By 1973, the Nixon administration had begun the disengagement in Vietnam.65 From the outside, though, this was not so clearly seen and the 1972 LINEBACKER II bomber offensive, also known as the “Christmas bombings,” had drawn heavy protests from Sweden’s Prime

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62 This paper, however, has not been found in the archives.
Minister Olof Palme. This caused the United States to recall its Ambassador from Stockholm.\textsuperscript{66} Eventually, a peace treaty was signed in January 1973 but the war was to drag on until 1975.\textsuperscript{67}

The tension between United States and Sweden was so severe that when an invitation to Command and Staff College was extended to Sweden in 1973, the Swedish Armed Forces were forbidden by the Swedish Ministry of Defense to turn the invitation down.\textsuperscript{68} Eventually it was accepted and General Persson was given only three weeks to leave his assignment and report to Quantico. He recalled the high level of professionalism among the instructors more so than among the students. The international students also contributed to the learning atmosphere. He was impressed by the method of studying strategy and policy on a global basis, something he tried to introduce at \textit{The Armed Forces Staff Colleges} which he joined as an instructor after his return from the United States. His major takeaway from Command and Staff College was the personal network that was formed there and the connections to United States. Persson has stated that this has been of great value as an icebreaker and measure of confidence in him with his later contacts with American officers and civilian officials.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{1975-76 Command and Staff College – The aftermath of the Vietnam War.} The sixth student, Lieutenant Colonel Sobéus, came to Quantico in August 1975 for the 1975-76 Academic year. This was after the Watergate affair and President Gerald C. Ford had assumed the presidency just a year earlier. In 1975, the American engagement in Vietnam was over: all students and faculty members were veterans of the war. This was also an era when the general

\textsuperscript{66} USMC Historical Overview, CSC, 1943 to present. p.85.  
\textsuperscript{67} Microsoft Encarta.  
\textsuperscript{68} At the time the Coastal Artillery had severe shortage of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels and could only send students to foreign schools on a limited basis, leaving many offers declined through the years. General Persson suggests in his letter that US Department of Defense only forwarded the invitation because of a failure of communication between them and US State Department on current policy concerning Sweden. Persson letter of 21 October 2001.  
\textsuperscript{69} Persson letter of 21 October 2001.
outlook on current politics and social awareness in Sweden and the United States differed mostly.

Still, as in earlier years, the focus of the education was to train officers to conduct major amphibious operations. For Lieutenant Colonel Sobéus who had attended The Armed Forces Staff College in 1972, the education, seemed to be on a lower level than the Swedish equivalence, and his recollection is that the general standard of the education of the officers, both US and the internationals, was low. He did not have any problem following the course and this gave him time to observe, live, and participate in the American society.  

In perspective, General Sobéus still has warm memories of his time at Quantico, and the knowledge and his experiences from the stay. This knowledge was put to good use in his later work within the projects regarding development and deployment of the two artillery systems, ERSTA and KARIN. Both were vital projects in the modernization of the Swedish Coastal Artillery in the 1970-1980’s.

1977-78 Command and Staff College – Transition Era. The seventh student, Major Sandström, came to Quantico in August 1977 and graduated in June 1978. He attended the Command and Staff College during Academic year 1977-78. There is no personal information on his year at Quantico. However, his inquiry sheet says that the living American that he admires most was Henry Kissinger and that the living American that he admires least was Richard Nixon. He went on to the question of what USA as a concept and a reality stands for and wrote:


71 ERSTA and KARIN stand for Replacements Fixed Heavy Artillery and Coastal Artillery Mobile Defense System. There were the two projects for the developments of 12-centimeter artillery replacement systems capable of shooting and hitting a ship at a distance of 30 kilometers. ERSTA was a series of fixed system of self-sustained combined arms strong points around three guns, each strong point with 300-500 men. KARIN was a battalion-sized unit of eight 12-centimeter guns where replaced the gun systems from WW II; the system was a development from the Bofors 15-centimeter howitzer model FH77. Sobéus knowledge of amphibious operations, combined with Soviet amphibious doctrine, was valuable in the developments of tactics, techniques and procedures (TT&P) how to oppose a landing force and how to engage it with artillery in the crucial phase during the landings.
It means a Western country developed from European culture, which now is the most powerful country in the world. That means that USA has a great mission to protect the free world and show the way to peacefully develop the world to be a better world.\textsuperscript{72}

1981-82 Command and Staff College – The Reagan era, U 137, and Maneuver Warfare. The eighth student, Major Johansson, arrived in Quantico in August 1981 for the Command and Staff College class of 1982. In 1982, the US military had emerged from the Carter era and entered that of the Reagan presidency. A new sense of honor was growing in the ranks, and seen amongst the officers in uniform.\textsuperscript{73} The easing of tensions between the two superpowers that the SALT treaty had brought was overshadowed by the military fiasco at Desert One in Iran. This was still fresh in everybody’s memory, and the general threat of Iran in the Middle East cast a shadow over the course. However, the Reagan Administration’s signal to the western democracies that they were going to win the Cold War was clear. This was to be a time of one of the largest peacetime expansion of the US military forces. The first tests of Lebanon and The Grenada Operation were one year away.

Johansson says in the inquiry sheet that he wanted to learn:

\textit{A lot of AW [Amphibious Warfare]. Meet other fellows with the same profession and learn from them. Get new friends. Learn about U.S. and probably other countries culture and history. Learn how people and military personnel thinks in a superpower country.}\textsuperscript{74}

Back in Sweden, the main event was the grounding of a Soviet Whiskey class submarine, the U137 in the archipelagoes outside the major naval base of Karlskrona in October 1981. This was the most serious crisis with the Soviet Union since the 1950’s. The incident also showed the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea. It also illustrated to the military leadership that a major

\textsuperscript{72} Dr. Donald F. Bittner, Basic Information and American Civilization Commentary Sheet on Major Björn B. Sandström, August 1977.

revision in force readiness and the rules of engagements for the Swedish Armed Forces was necessary.  

Sweden was in the major news shows every night and Major Johansson on several occasions briefed the College on the current situation and the Swedish defense policy of non-alignment and neutrality.

The education at the time still had many links to the Vietnam War, and emphasized that lessons from that war were not to be repeated. One such lesson was unwillingness to take any causalities and the use of helicopter for medical evacuation. The new Army doctrine of Air-Land-Battle was introduced, as was the future Marine Corps concept of maneuver warfare, one of its strongest advocates being the future Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray. Maneuver warfare was discussed in the seminars and every aspect of it was studied. This, however, was not seen at the exercises at 29 Palms where Major Johansson did part of his postgraduate follow-on-training. There, the tactics still were of the Vietnam era: as soon as any resistance was met, units went into defense, additional fire support was called for, and under the cover of this fire a slow and cumbersome advance was made. No signs of speed and maneuver were yet to be seen in the exercises. Other Cold War remnants where comments like, “If this situation would have been five years ago the answer to this tactical problem would be to “nuke” them,” surprised Major Johansson. This was something that Sweden had several years earlier ruled out on the battlefield level, as being an impossible policy, for it would have lowered the nuclear threshold. This can be seen as an example of how views, and acknowledgments, not attainable in other ways could be viewed and picked up in day-to-day discussions in the seminar environment. It was a lesson

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74 Dr. Donald F. Bittner, Basic Information and American Civilization Commentary Sheet on Major Bengt-Arne Johansson, August 1981.

75 This led to the readiness reform named “Vision 1990” (VI 90). This emphasized force preparedness and readiness. It introduced a new training cycle for the forces, providing fully trained units on a year around basis instead of the old training cycle maximized for peacetime efficiency, which produced fully trained units twice a year. Johansson letter of 7 November 2001.
for Major Johansson that one should be suspicious of theories and comments by people not confirmed and not based on policy or doctrine.

At the operational level, the education was mirroring events to come. The planning exercises in the second half of the course were around operations and scenarios that was to be true in the near future. One was an operation against a small notional nation in protection of American lives and interests – later to appear in real life in Grenada and later Panama. A second was a long-reach air strike, including mid-air refueling against a hostile leader, something that later occurred in Libya against Khadaffi. A third was a fictitious rescue operation, similar to what would come in Lebanon. The final exercise scenario was a major amphibious assault in Chabahar in the Straits of Hormuz. Soviet forces had invaded and gone through Afghanistan and were heading towards the Middle East oilfields.

General Johansson after his return to Sweden was posted to the Directing Staff at the Swedish Armed Forces Staff College. Here, he taught strategy and operations at the higher staff course and he felt his education at Quantico helped prepare him for this. He even introduced such new inventions as speed-reading that he was taught at Command and Staff College. Also, as a parallel method in writing academic papers, he introduced the English way of formal paper writing; this included thesis-sentence and formal disposition in contrast to the more cumbersome Swedish formal military way of writing a paper.

1983-84 Command and Staff College – Grenada, Beirut and Submarine intrusions.

The ninth student, Major Wranker, departed Sweden for Quantico in August 1983, a member of Command and Staff College class of 1984. He was to attend in the midst of the Reagan era and its military buildup. The Strategic Defense initiative (SDI) was also launched as a concept. In

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76 This might have been one teacher or a few students’ personal views, but it was remembered, and still is, as the interpretation of a tactical doctrine. As such it was brought back to Sweden as an unconfirmed estimation of a US tactical nuclear doctrine five years in hindsight. Johansson letter of 7 November 2001.
October 1983, the Grenada invasion occurred, one of the first major tests of the United States armed forces after the trauma of the Vietnam War. Then the Marines barracks in Beirut was attacked, leaving 241 of 300 marines killed; ultimately, this meant the end to the American military involvement in Lebanon.

In Sweden, the intrusion into Swedish waters from unidentified submarines was still a major concern. After a parliamentary investigation, a formal protest was given to Soviet Union stating that Sweden held the Soviet Union responsible for the occurrences and that any further intrusion would be met with the use of deadly force according to new national rules of engagements. This was the first time since World War II that Sweden accused another country of being an aggressor Sweden. Since 1981, Swedish Navy and Coastal Artillery had developed and produced units specializing in anti-submarine warfare in the complex shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. The Armed Forces took steps to improve the over all capacity to meet a larger threat from the Soviet Union as the Cold War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact escalated.

The educational focus at Quantico was on mastering combined arms operations within the framework of the "Marine Amphibious Force" (MAF) concept and somewhat in a joint environment. Time was also devoted to logistics.\textsuperscript{77} The raising of logistical knowledge and importance was one of the lessons from the Vietnam War in which it had taken several years to build a logistical system to support the forces; this could no longer be accepted within the MAF concept. Behind this were also experiences from World War II and Korea. The overall aim of the course was to produce good battalion commanders, and, secondly, staff officers on the MAF level.

During the year, the suicidal attack in Beirut was a major event for the Corps. This event helped form the views of the US armed forces, especially the Marine Corps, about Peace
Keeping. It also made a deep impression on Wranker in the way that lessons learned were handled and how the Marine Corps coped with the loss of its comrades. The situation conveyed an impression of a highly professional handling of the overall situation; he contrasted this against his “over-the-Atlantic perspective” on the Swedish handling of the submarine intrusions.

Another difference between Swedish and US armed forces appeared. In Sweden the fight between the services raged, but in the United States the focus was on the operational effect of the sum efforts of all the services; this deeply impressed him. The lack of major American inter-service fights in 1983 can probably be explained by the good fiscal situation as a result of the Reagan administration’s force buildup. On the other hand, did Grenada show for both Major Wranker and the American students that truly joint operations was still a theoretical concept and would still take time before full implementations occurred. This proved to Major Wranker that the Swedish concept of a Total Defense and Joint Regional Commands on the three-star level was sound and right.\textsuperscript{78} One other American attribute impressed him: the high personal readiness of the officers and their knowledge of their profession through battalion level. This was something that a conscript system such as Sweden’s always would have a hard time achieving.

In 1983, as in 1959, the vision and concept of mission-type-orders was taught. Later, General Wranker as Force Commander in Macedonia and in command of US units in 1995 still did not see this implemented. Overall, the impression was that the Marine Corps in 1983 were a highly professional force with very good training and in tune with the national strategic/operational concept. Part of this resulted from the strict rule of training and exercising


\textsuperscript{78} The Total Defense is a national defense concept developed during and after World War II optimizing Homeland defense at all levels, interconnecting civilian and military authorities, and gives the country joint civil-military regional commands in case of war. Facts and Figures 2000-2001, 16-25. It emphasizes and regulates the support-supporting relationships between military units and other governmental agencies of all the services and departments in a given area under a unified command at a military General officer/County Governor level. In 1983, Sweden was organized into five Joint Regional Commands today there is instead three Joint Military Districts.
with organization and equipment that was on hand, and not with what was expected to come in the future. This was a lesson that he took back home and sought later to implement when working on exercises.

Two international officers who especially impressed him were Tom Wanambesi from Kenya and Gabi Ashkenazy from Israel. Both were very professional officers with combat experience and a superb intellect. Today, General Ashkenazy is General Wranker’s counterpart in Northern Israel as the regional Commander.

My most important takeaway can be summed up in: what counts in the end are the sum of one’s capacities on the tactical [battlefield] level and a sound operational concept to apply them within… ...at the same time, I would say that a cooperation [including education] between an [Amphibious] Corps of our size and the Marine Corps, is today even more important... ...The purpose is clear – the risk that Sweden otherwise continues to develop it military capabilities without comparison material and with a narrow Swedish [storsvensk] view- must be balanced...[by fresh influenced].

1989-90 Command and Staff College – The end of the Cold War. The tenth student, Lieutenant Colonel Boijsen, arrived Quantico in August 1989 and departed in June 1990. In 1989, the buildup from the Reagan years was completed and the signs of the Warsaw Pact crumbling were everywhere. The tensions in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union were evident. In November, the Berlin Wall was breached, and East and West Germany began their steps towards reunification. This was a time of hope and despair for many people all over former Eastern Europe, where various countries proclaimed their independence. In some states such as Czechoslovakia the process was peaceful while in others like Lithuania the Soviet Union resisted. In Romania, the process was violent where in Bucharest President Ceausescu and his wife were executed after a summary trial. This was also a year of unrest outside Europe. In February, the last Russian soldiers left Afghanistan while in China the peaceful protest by

students was brutally crushed. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was released and the process of making the country a democratic state commenced. Not since the end of the World War II had the world so much hope in the future. No one had a presentiment that the largest armed conflict since the Vietnam War was just one year ahead, the Gulf War.

There had not been a Swedish student since Major Wranker in 1983-1984 and the interval of almost five years presented some initial challenges for Lieutenant Colonel Boijsen. During the years since the last Swedish student in 1984, the school had started in 1988 to transform the course into a more academic one. Also that year, the number of Vietnam veterans amongst the students was down to 16.

The course started on the theoretical level, studying theorists Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun-Tzu, Mao, Mahan, and Corbett and Douhet. It also used the Civil War, as background to illustrate the fundamental factors of war, Lieutenant Colonel Boijsen initially was skeptical of this and did not appreciate its value. Later, he came to understand the method and embraced it, and started a comparison with the Swedish method of that time. He found that the Swedish system’s general approach was very “Jominian”. He noted an example of the Swedish almost mathematical approach: with three battalions against an opponent who had ten, the defending force could only delay him. In a corresponding example studied at Command and Staff College, Stonewall Jackson had attacked and won with three battalions against ten, and the question was - why? The answer was clear: there was more to it than just numbers.

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82 Bittner letter of 24 October 1990.
Colonel Boijsen learned other good lessons when seen in perspective. New at the time was the concept of reducing the OODA-cycle.\textsuperscript{83} This concept and its mechanisms were studied intently. This was at the core of maneuver warfare: gaining and maintaining the initiative, or change method to regain it. This concept was new to Colonel Boijsen as the Swedish training up to that point had emphasized attrition warfare. As an example, in his training he had been taught to use his reserves where the units were being pressed and not to exploit success.\textsuperscript{84} The second lesson was the difference in methods in the decision making process within a staff. The Swedish method still placed the Chief of Staff in the center of it and more or less left it to the Commanding Officer to choose which one of the proposed courses of action to execute. This contrasted with the Commanding Officer coming up with a concept and the staff making this into a feasible plan and he conducting it. The American method permitted more intuitive decision making. This would make commanders more unpredictable in their behavior. This different focus in planning, in Sweden upon the Chief of Staff and in United States on the Commanding Officer, was new. Included within were the methods of describing sequels, branches, and decision points, making a plan a dynamic instrument from which different outcomes of the operations could be handled without changing the overall plan.

These lessons, together with the overall focus on war fighting and not so much on administration, made up the main difference between the American and the Swedish courses. As Boijsen summarized:


\textsuperscript{84} This was partly an operational necessity in a Cold War scenario where Swedish brigades planned to meet reinforced Russian mechanized divisions or corps. Fighting delaying actions was necessary until a concentration of forces could defend or offensive action was possible. However, the message was clear: units were not trained in maneuver warfare but attrition. Furthermore, in a dangerous way it set the mindset of part of the Swedish officer corps.
At that time, in Sweden we trained to administrate the war – in United States to win it. At the Armed Forces Staff College we trained Chiefs of Staff – at Command and Staff College commanders where trained.\(^85\)

This, however, was something that he admits came as a reflection well after his return to Sweden. He was posted to the Armed Forces Staff College as an instructor.\(^86\) Here he used his newly found skills to try to influence the education and training of his students. There, after a briefing and a decision by the commanding general, he was allowed to change the final exam in tactics and operations. The students were given three weeks to produce six, single-spaced, and typed pages, instead of the usual open or closed book six to eight hour test. The students appreciated this new form, but they felt that the academic pressure was even higher than in the previous arrangement.

Living in an international environment emphasized tolerance and respect for other cultures, something becoming increasingly important in a globalized world. An understanding arose that there are no right or wrong cultures, only different ones. Perhaps the international officers comprehend this more than the American students did. Another thing that he contributed to the school was the Swedish experience from the Soviet submarine intrusions, the challenge to fight a war in a Grey Area, i.e., a situation which is neither war nor peace, and the legal aspects of using deadly force are not always clear. This is most obvious today in places as Kosovo and other low intensity conflict areas were it is always addressed. This notably is a field where Sweden had ample experience.

Overall, as his earlier colleagues from Sweden, Colonel Boijsen was impressed by the dedication and loyalty to the Corps of his fellow American officers, he also noted their willingness to make sacrifices and learn with “always a book in their hands.”\(^87\)

\(^{86}\) Major General Lars G. Persson letter to Colonel David Vetter, marked: Hbr 76/90, dated 11 September 1990.
Colonel Boijsen sums up his lessons from his year as:\(^8\):

- How to be a winner on the battlefield
- The Commander is the powerhouse in the battle plan
- A battle plan must describe a dynamic scenario and clearly articulate what is to be achieved, the end states, and the different ways to get there
- In the United States, they trained to win the war– in Sweden to administrate it.
- In the United States, they trained Commanders – in Sweden, Chiefs of Staff
- It is vital to be able to express yourself in speech and writing
- Time constrained tests takes away creativity from the students
- There are no right or wrong cultures – just different ones

1991-92 Command and Staff College – Aftermath of the Gulf War. The eleventh student, Lieutenant Colonel Gunnarsson, came to Quantico in August 1991 and left the school in June 1992. He attended the Command and Staff College Academic year 1992. There is no personal information on his year at Quantico.

1995-96 Command and Staff College – After Somalia and Bosnia. The twelfth student, Lieutenant Colonel Andersson attended the Command and Staff College during the 1995-96, academic year. In 1995, the last UN forces left Somalia and the UN (humanitarian) Mission that included the 1993 debacle of a US Ranger/Delta force unit ambushed trying to capture the Somali leader Aideed ended. This military mission had started in 1992 when a US lead force headed by II MEF had landed from the sea and started a five month food famine humanitarian relief operation. Soon, though, mission creep occurred and a more ambitious plan of nation building was approved, at its height, 38,000 troops eventually, 25,000 American were committed.

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there. The operation was to shape the American view on humanitarian operations in general, and how the rest of the world viewed US ability to sustain casualties.\(^89\)

Also in October 1995, the cease-fire was called in Bosnia and the Clinton Administration took the lead initiating peace-talks. The Dayton Peace agreement was signed on 21 November 1995 and this became the framework for the NATO lead Implementation Force (IFOR), which included 20,000 US troops.\(^90\)

Colonel Andersson found the logical buildup of the education new to him. He came from Swedish Staff College, which was still 'Jominian' in the mid-1980s; furthermore, he had not been familiar with the great theorists in the way that was provided at Command and Staff College.\(^91\) The interactive instructional method of the first semester of lectures and seminars mixed with analytical papers and discussions was also new to him. This and the use of “cases studies” as background to illustrate different topics such as leadership, logistics, and other issues concerned were stimulating and fresh. As he observed:

*The Curriculum, especially during the first semester, was very good. During my entire Swedish education had I been in contact with the military theorists approximately as much as we did during one week at Command and Staff College.*\(^92\)

On the other hand, he was surprised to find that many of the American officers did not come with what he thought was the right background and experience; he believed they lacked depth in their trade, something that was explained to him by their always being teamed with professional non-commissioned officers while in units. This, and the lack of sincere critiques he saw as weakness in the system. He was coming from a Sweden that at the time just had abolished

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the professional NCO system and therefore had implemented a rigorous system of training of the
trainers. 93

Since graduating from Quantico, he has implemented these experiences on several occasions. In his first assignment as head instructor for Tactics and Operations at the Coastal Artillery Combat Schools, he immediately tried to apply some of the methods used in his education such as historical case studies and an analytical paper instead of closed book exams. Later partly because of his time in the USMC professional military educational system, he was chosen as project manager for two Exercises: Nordic Peace 98 and Viking 99. Here he daily used his knowledge ranging from the Marine Corps Planning Process to dealing with American authorities and explaining about them to his fellow Swedish officers and civilian counterparts.

As for his most important personal experience, he describes a feeling afterwards of a deeper and wider knowledge of his profession. He referred to this as the sum of the experiences that comes with living abroad for an extensive time in a different professional environment. This, and the opportunity to meet and interact with fellow international officers and build a network of personal contacts, was the enduring legacy of the year.

1998-99 Command and Staff College – The Air war in Kosovo. The thirteenth student, Lieutenant Colonel Eneroth, arrived in Quantico in July 1998 as a member of the Command and Staff College class 1998-99. In Kosovo, the situation had grown worse and in the spring of 1999 President Bill Clinton initiated military operations against Serbia. This was the largest NATO military operation in Europe since World War II. On 3 June 1998, the war ended and a UN force

93 In 1982 the Swedish corps of professional non-commissioned was dissolved and their peacetime role as drill instructors and role models for conscripts was assumed by an increased number of junior officers assigned to each unit. Conscript NCOs, serving 14 to 17 month of conscript service, in contrast to soldiers and sailors usual seven to ten months took the wartime task of small unit leaders and staff NCOs. This lead to a dramatic change in the role and training of junior officers with an emphasis on both leaderships skills as well as abilities as trainers on the squad/section up to platoon level.
of 50,000 troops established itself in Kosovo to restore the order; this force included 7,000 US military personnel.\textsuperscript{94}

Lieutenant Colonel Eneroth’s strongest recollections from the course were the implied lessons for future war: The importance of joint and coalition war fighting, military operations other than war (MOOTW), the asymmetric battlefield, and the threat against the US with an awakening concern for homeland defense.\textsuperscript{95} He was impressed with the method of teaching the theoretical settings of warfare from a “top down” perspective, starting with the theorists and then proceeding to Warfighting at the operational level, and then to planning on the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) level. The use of historical examples and staff rides during the year further illustrated different aspects of warfare, and was part of a logical learning process through the course. This gave him a deep understanding for the underlying psychological dimension of war and the true meaning of one side “forcing its will upon somebody.” The American application of “Mission Type Orders” did not impress him as, from a Swedish/European perspective, it still had large elements of direct command in the process. However, he saw benefits in the concept, especially in a rapid moving battle.\textsuperscript{96} In seminars he compared the process and implications of this to the Soviet Submarine intrusions in Swedish waters where the authority to fire was delegated further down the chain of command than was taught at Command and Staff College.

Something else impressed him: The series of publications titled Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications, MCDP. This almost philosophical series of books sought to explain in clear language some of the more complicated parts of warfighting and the Marine Corps approach to war. This, combined with the emphasis on educating their officers to become warfighters instead

\textsuperscript{96} Wranker, Sobéus and Lyth in their letters to the author all address this issue. This is an observation that in itself is an interesting subject.
of planners and chiefs of staff as in Sweden, gave him new ideas on how to train officers to be able to give orders, even when the informational basis for the decisions is unclear and incomplete, as often is the case in combat. Also, in the planning process, the use of Decision Points and the method used in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)\textsuperscript{97} was new to him.

The American national chain of command also impressed him. This gave the United States cohesion and a clear link between the political will and the use of military force. This was illustrated in the air campaign in Kosovo and other limited actions in “peacetime.” It can also show the limitation of military power as a tool of foreign policy. The military need and demand for a clear end state was something that he saw was lacking in Swedish defense politics after the end of the Cold War.

How did he contribute? Foremost, he did so by being a representative of his country by providing a picture and a model of Swedish officers in general. He also gave the “small nations’” perspective on both current and enduring topics and issues. On the practical side, he contributed to the planning process with his Swedish - Prussian heritage, chief of staff focused - training. This he did by showing his way of “mission type orders” and means to win battles without applying overwhelming forces, and by so doing tried to show that one should not underestimate a small enemy.

Lieutenant Colonel Eneroth summed-up the experience and education as:

\textit{Being important to understand how the United States thinks and reacts… …and it can help Sweden to estimate its own, and others, courses of actions, weaknesses and strengths. Professionally, for the Amphibious Corps the knowledge acquired and correctly understood can act as a comparative “yardstick” in the future development of the new Corps and its doctrines.}\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{97} Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. MCRP 5-12. p 62.  
\textsuperscript{98} Eneroth letter of 16 October 2001.
This came into use in his last assignment at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, his participations in the ongoing staff talks between Sweden and United States, and his contributions to the working group on the new Joint National Strategic Doctrine and other NATO related issues.
5 Some patterns and trends in the program

In discussing various patterns and trends, it is hard to estimate the value of the service records alone. Sweden’s Coastal Artillery (now Amphibious Corps) was, and still is, a small service. The informal exchange between the Coastal Artillery’s commanders and their international counterparts has not been within the scope of this paper and therefore no assessment based on how the course impacted upon their careers can be done. There are no clear trends as to which military occupational specialty (MOS) or regiment produced the most successful candidates to Command and Staff College, measured in final ranks and postings. In addition, there are no notes in their Service Record about their grades from the college. The only comment is “passed” US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. This may suggest that how they succeeded in the education was not merely as important as the fact that they had attended.

It is true that all the officers concerned were very successful when compared with their peers, both before and after the year at Command and Staff College. This indicates that they where considered exemplary professional officers and therefore sent to the school. If this was the case, why were they sent to another school when they obviously already were fully educated in the Swedish PME system? One logical reason explains this: for the officer concerned and the service, they had an opportunity to widen and deepen their knowledge base and simultaneously have a payback for in the most cases almost 20 years of hard work. It was considered as both a reward and professional challenge, that for a full year they could study and reflect upon what there own national training, education and experiences had given to them. Thus, they deepened their professional skills to a level that only study over a long period of time permits. In addition, they where given the opportunity to develop a network of American and other international
officers as friends for future contacts, something that most of them mention in their letters. As General Persson says:

*I think that all the Swedish students that we send to the various schools in United States and other places, collectively, is of vital interest to Sweden’s defense. Because the US Marines often are in the global focus when military force is used, it is good that younger, aspiring officers very early get good contacts with them. This is especially important to a small, nonaligned country as Sweden... I therefore think that we should continue to invest officer in education and training in American schools, for the reason that so do many other countries. By doing this we acquire good contacts not only in United States but also in the rest of the world ...in the current transition from Coastal Artillery there are possibly even more reasons... I see as the main reason, the wider effects of deep foreign contacts at an early stage in an officer’s career.***

Here, a distinction in the networking can be made. Within the international community at Quantico, the officers made very close and often family based bonds for life. This enables the international (Swedish) officers to maintain personal relationships long after the course is finished. The value of such personal relations in later interaction, as for instance between Wranker and his Israeli classmate Ashkenazy, are very high. For networking with the American students, the personal links are probably looser – except perhaps for the American student that is the military sponsor for the student. This probably has its explanation in the differences in situations between all the internationals that are very much in the same situation, being isolated from their own culture in a foreign country and sharing new experiences, something that the Americans hardly do. However, the value of attending an esteemed American school and living in USA are in itself an entry and a testimonial of quality and shared experiences in later interactions with Americans.

Did Sweden use the Command and staff College as a “top-level” education that was only necessary for a few selected presumptive “flyers”? Perhaps not up to late 1970’s, but in the career patterns of recent graduates, one can see that based on age, and educational level, many of
the students were well past the level where most American students attend intermediate level professional military education. They were generally already Lieutenant Colonels and they all had attended Swedish Staff College, both courses, and they had in many cases already held command of battalions. This in some part contradicts what General Persson says about getting their network at an early stage. In the balance, between the actual age/experience, network building, and experiences allowed them time for reflection as well as intense study, the Coastal Artillery used the school as its “top-level” school. This also added to the prestige in Sweden of being one of the few that had graduated from it. As an example: General Beckman even made a formal appearance before the King after his return to Sweden to report on his experience of his year, the education partly being funded through a prestigious Royal foundation.  

So why have not more Swedish officers come to the school? One reason is the competitive invitational process of the Marine Corps, wherein a large number of countries are interested in the course but only 20-24 countries are actually invited to send an officer. The process is regulated by various military and policy concerns, so even if Sweden had been interested in sending more officers to the course more invitations might not have been extended. Between 1984 and 2001 Sweden has sought and accepted eight competitive invitations, declined four that where forwarded, and not competed for a place four times. The main reason is the small size of the Swedish officers corps and Coastal Artillery - and the system wherein a large conscript force is trained and maintained, and thus competed with the goal of sending officers abroad to study in various countries.

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100 The King is Sweden’s highest-ranking officer, Sovereign, and patron of the Armed Forces. Beckman, TiKA, 35.  
101 Electronic e-mail from Ms. Gina Douthit to Dr Donald F. Bittner dated 13 February 2002.
6 Conclusions

The education at the Command and Staff College has given Sweden valuable insights into how a superpower thinks, acts, and reacts. It has also given the Coastal Artillery a doctrinal update on how a large Marine Corps conducts amphibious operations. This has provided input into the development of training and equipment for the anti-invasion defense of Sweden against the former Warsaw Pact. This is partly based on the assumption that the way the United States Marine Corps did amphibious operations is probably how “everybody else” would (in Sweden’s case the Soviet Marine Infantry in the Baltic.)

On a personal level, for the officers that received the education it was an opportunity to build a personal network for future contacts. It also was an academic challenge and theoretical stimulation for each professional military, and considered a reward for long and hard service for the officer and his family. It also indicated to the officer that his path was set and that his superiors saw in him great promise for the future. Of the thirteen officers studied in this paper, two, one still active, achieved the rank of Lieutenant General; two, both still active, are Major Generals; and four (and one selected), are Brigadier Generals; two (and one selected) Colonels, and one retired early as a Lieutenant Colonel. Altogether, this must be seen as a remarkable collection of “high flyers” or “water walkers” and a good testimonial to the quality of the officers Sweden has sent to Quantico.

It was little known outside limited circles within the officers’ corps and at the Ministry of Defense that the program existed until the late 1990s. Was it a secret, and in that case to whom? Sweden, upholding a nonalignment and neutrality policy, officially was on a path of non-partiality. However, by sending officers to schools in the Western hemisphere but not to the Soviet counterparts could by some be seen as partial and as a preparation for abandoning the
neutrality. This, however, could not have been a concern to the United States and probably not even to Soviet Union who likely knew about the program. So, to whom was it to be kept secret? The reason why the program was not widely advertised and known can therefore be attributed to Swedish domestic reasons. The self-picture of the Swedish neutrality needed a low profile for military preparation in case of possible policy failure and consequently confidence building measures in the West: all sound preparations and well within the political directives to the military.

What will happen with the program in the future? The changed strategic setting for Sweden after the Cold War and the transition of the Coastal Artillery into an Amphibious Corps are factors to consider. Also, the higher tempo on the battlefield is a consideration; altogether, this makes it more important to send students to the Command and Staff College than during the height of the Cold War and the intermediate years after its end. Should Sweden continue to send officers of the same background and education? The level of the Swedish officers, just beyond most of their American counterparts, has served Sweden well. It lets the student relax in an otherwise rank-conscious environment, and their previous national education allows them to reflect and discuss subjects and current matters in a way that will further enhance their professional knowledge and skills, and consequently be the levering process of their fellow students.

It was a time, 36 years ago, but still memorable!

Brigadier General (Retired) Thorbjörn Ottoson
1924 - 2001
Student at Command and Staff College class of 66

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102 The first Swedish student to attend Frunze Academy in Moscow will graduate in 2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Research for this paper has mostly been done in the Swedish archives and by interviewing the officers concerned. Swedish Armed Forces service records are from the archives in the Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm, and can be searched by name and rank or service numbers. The Swedish principle of public access to official records makes it possibly for anyone to search in these types of files, however, the service records are not as detailed as their American equivalence, for instance will the annual fitness reports not be found there. The after course reports were found in the Swedish Military Archives (Krigsarkivet) in the section dealing with the former Naval Staff, Stockholm. This search had to be done in person and Major Dag Aasvärn and school secretary Mariléne Strömberg, both of the Amphibious Combat School, conducted the search and obtained the records. All of the officers probably submitted after course reports, but some have not been found in the archives for a variety of reasons: they can be either filed under the wrong heading or they can have been shredded, viewed as non-essential, before the Naval Staff submitted that part of their working records to the Military Archives. Submitting older material to the Military Archives is done on a yearly basis, or when a unit or command is disbanded.

All thirteen graduates officers that have from Quantico were contacted and eleven of them responded in very generous manner. Each provided me with valuable material and personal recollections of their time at Quantico and their reflections in hindsight, for some almost 40 years ago! I am truly grateful to all of them for this. The letters, which all are in Swedish, will be retained by me.

The knowledge of the Swedish military educational system and career pattern for officers is within Swedish military “public domain” However, no single document addresses this in
Swedish language, or is available in English, for clarity in this paper, this system has been explained by the author in some length but without further references.

The material from Quantico has been obtained through the Alfred M. Grey Library and Research Center, after valuable directions by Dr Donald F. Bittner, PhD, who has been a source of knowledge of the history of Swedish officers at Quantico. Amongst other material, there are the 1975 to 1983 Swedish students answers on his annual inquiry sheet given to them at the beginning of the course, with a set of questions for the international students to answer about their background, knowledge, and expectations for their year at Quantico.

For those fluent in Swedish, I recommend two books on some of the more influential high ranking officers and on the Swedish (officers) system during the 20th century: Svenska officersprofiler, edited by Gunnar Artéus; and, on the birth and early years of the Swedish Coastal Artillery Anders Fredrik Centervall, Kustartilleriets skapare, by Birger Åsard. For deeper insights into the Coastal Artillery during the 20th century, the books by Urban Sobéus and Jean-Carlos Dankwardt are recommended (they are all listed in the section on Books in this bibliography). For the history of the development of the Coastal Rangers mentioned in the paper, Suggested reading is Kustjägare 1956 – 1996, by Eric Jarnberg, and Svenska amfibieförband – lyx eller nödvändighet, by Captain (Army) Lennert Wockatz and Captain (Coastal Artillery) Bertil Stjernfelt.

All the official documents are primary sources. Also included, as primary sources, are the letters with reflections and recollections from the former students, and the letter from Col. Anthony Caputo on the beginning of the program, the documents concerning the MoA, and the contemporary description of the program and inquiries by Dr Bittner. The rest of the sources are secondary sources providing background information and historical overview. The World Wide
Web pages provided in the bibliography are all Swedish, but all of them have English language pages on the subjects concerned.

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http://www.ra.se/indexengelska.html
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK) | 2. REPORT DATE | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED |
|--------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|---|
|                                  |                | STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER         |   |

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5. FUNDING NUMBERS

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6. AUTHOR(S)

Lieutenant Colonel Hans M. Granlund, Swedish Armed Forces, Amphibious Corps

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

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9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

SAME AS #7.

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER:

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ABSTRACT

Since 1960, Sweden has sent officers to the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia. This has been important for Sweden, as a nonalignment country, in developing and maintaining its military doctrines and officers’ professional education, to compare its system with United States, in order to update tactics, techniques and procedures. Further, developing a broad network of personal contacts is also viewed as essential to maintaining valid and feasible national doctrines. This paper deals with the students who attended between 1960 and 1999.

All the Swedish officers concerned where successful when compared with their peers. This indicates that they where considered exemplary professional officers and therefore sent to the school to have an opportunity to widen and deepening their knowledge base. In addition, they where given the opportunity to develop a network of international contacts which proved valuable to them and for Sweden in their post-graduation years.

Swedish students spent almost a year, if not more, with the Marine Corps. The education at the Command and Staff College gave the students a wider knowledge base within their profession and it has also given Sweden valuable insights into how a superpower thinks, acts, and reacts.

SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH)
Coastal Artillery, Professional Military Education, Quantico, Sweden, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
APPENDIX A: SWEDISH STUDENTS TO QUANTICO 1960 – 2001, OVERVIEW

Fig 1. Major B-A Johansson at Parris Island in 1981-82

Fig 2. Major B-A Johansson at Cape Kennedy in 1981-82

Fig 3. Major Wranker at CSC in 1983-84
Fig 4. Lieutenant Colonel Urban Sobéus at Parris Island 1975.

Fig 5. Major Björn Sandström with wife in New York 1977-78.

Pictures from: Personal Collection, Dr. Donald F. Bittner, LtColonel, USMCR (Retired), Professor of History, Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Retire or current rank</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Retire or current Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>LYTH, Karl E.</td>
<td>Captain/Major</td>
<td>JrCrs¹</td>
<td>59-60</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Head, Section 4, Naval Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>BECKMAN, Jan P. O.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>SrCrs²</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.) (Acting Major General)(Ret.)</td>
<td>Head of Swedish delegation to Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), DMZ, Korea</td>
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<td>OTTOSON, Thorbjörn</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>CSC⁴</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Commanding Officer West Coast Naval Command</td>
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<td>LUNDELL, Arne N.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>70-71</td>
<td>Colonel (Ret.)</td>
<td>Naval Attaché, Paris</td>
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<td>PERSON, Lars G.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>73-74</td>
<td>Lieutenant General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Commanding General Northern Joint Command</td>
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<td>SOBÉUS, Urban R.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>75-76</td>
<td>Brigadier General (Ret.)</td>
<td>Commanding Officer Stockholm Coastal Artillery Command</td>
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<td>SANDSTRÖM, Björn B.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>77-78</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.)</td>
<td>Directing staff, Swedish Armed Forces Staff College</td>
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<td>JOHANSSON, Bengt-Arne</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>81-82</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Director of Training and Management Directorate, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters</td>
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<td>WRANKER, Bo L.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>83-84</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Force Commander United Nations Disengagement Force on the Golan Heights</td>
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<td>BOIJSEN, Göran L.</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>89-90</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Naval Attaché, Washington</td>
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<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>91-92</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Plans and Policy Directorate, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters</td>
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<td>ANDERSSON, Bengt</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>95-96</td>
<td>Colonel (Brigadier General select)</td>
<td>Commanding Officer 1st Amphibious Regiment (Selected Assistant Inspector General of the Navy)</td>
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<td>ENEROTH, Johan</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>98-99</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel select)</td>
<td>Action officer, PIP staff, NATO SACLANT</td>
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<td>GRANLUND, Hans M.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>01-02</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Student CSC AY 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Junior Course
² Senior Course
⁴ Command and Staff College
⁵ Did not respond to the letter/questions
⁶ Did not respond to the letter/questions
⁷ Current student, not included in this paper, it only discusses the students between 1960-1999.
APPENDIX B: FACTS ON THE INVITATIONAL PROCESS TO USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE BETWEEN 1978 AND PRESENT

In 1978, Sweden expressed interest in the 1979-80 course and an invitation was extended in December 1978, but declined through the USDAO with the comment "Regret the (Swedish Defense Staff) will not be able to nominate a student for College this year. If invitation is extended FY 81 class they hope to respond favorably." In 1983, the Commandant in a letter dated 10 February addressed Sweden's interest in sending a student to the FY 83, if a seat was available. The CMC letter also proposed a PME Exchange with Sweden to guarantee a seat every four years (it only addressed up to 1993).

1978 – invited and declined
1979 – see discussion
1980 – invited and declined
1981 – invited and declined
1982 – see discussion
1983 – see discussion
1984 – nothing.
1985 – Sweden was on the list. There is an annotation that the invite was declined and it was crossed out and an annotation that says "Denied by JCS". No indication of what this means.
1986 – invitation extended and declined.
1987 – on standby list, but invite not extended
1988 – extended invite and declined.
1989 – invited and accepted
1990 – nothing
1991 – invited and accepted
1992 – nothing
1993 – invited and accepted (Sweden was late in requesting it)
1994 – invited and declined
1995 – invited and accepted
1996 – nothing
1997 – on standby list, but invite not extended
1998 – invited and accepted
1999 – on standby list, but invite not extended
2000 – on standby list, but invite not extended
2001 – invited and accepted
2002 – on standby list.
(Nothing, means Sweden did not request a place and a invitation was not extended)

1 CMC to CNO MSG 141430Z of Nov 11, CMC to CNO MSG 042340Z Dec 18, and USDAO Stockholm to CGMCDEC MSG 071423Z Mar 80. Bittner Papers. Box IO/FMO, General Materials, Archives, MCRC, Quantico, VA
2 Ms. Gina Douthit e-mail to Dr Bittner dated 13 February 2002. Covers the time 1984 to 2002
APPENDIX C: TYPICAL SWEDISH COASTAL ARTILLERY OFFICERS CAREER PATTERN DURING THE 1945-90 ERA

There are no set of rules for an officer’s career pattern that has been in place for this entire period. However, there are some benchmarks, key positions, and military schools that are a vital part of a Swedish military career both then and now. This pattern is common knowledge in Sweden, but for clarity in the paper it is briefly described in this appendix.

Firstly, there are a few ways to enter the officer corps: actively seek a commission, on active duty or reserve, or, be promoted through the ranks after a conscript service or pervious enlistment as a non-commissioned officer. For the most part, the thirteen officers concerned in this paper held a direct commission. A direct commission started with a year as an “aspirant,” i.e. as a trainee sergeant. This year was spent doing military service, tailored for the needs of a future officer and leader, instead of the compulsory year as conscript. The next step was the Naval Academy where two years were spent as a cadet, with the winter semesters devoted to theoretical studies and the summers to military training. After total of three years, the aspiring officers were commissioned as Second Lieutenants, and from late 70’s directly as a Lieutenant.

A typical junior officer’s first assignment was as a platoon leader or, in wartime, as a battalion staff officer 1a (operations). The Swedish staff organization up to division followed the German system: section I (operations), section II (quartermaster), section III (personnel). (An officer “1a” was the duty officers within section I.) This was changed in mid-1990, when the US/NATO staff organizational system was adopted.

The officer would then be three to five years into his career. In peacetime, he would then serve as a battalion adjutant or company commander. The battalion adjutant is the highest-ranking staff officer within the battalion, and acts as a duty officer tasked with everything from readiness and budget, to schedule training for the battalion.
The next step in his career pattern would be a service school on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TT&Ps) within his branch, i.e. artillery, communication, small boats etc., the Amphibious Warfare school being the closest equivalent; promotion to Captain came at approximately the same time. From here he could either returne to a regiment, or serve on a higher staff. At eight or nine years into his career, he was sent for a year to The Staff College, tactical courses (US Command and Staff equivalent); during this timeframe, promotion to Major also occurred. A few would directly go on to the higher course; these were the officers judged to have the best ability for the highest levels. However, most officers did two years additional duty before the higher course, which lasted for another two years. After this course, almost everyone went to higher staffs, either a service or a joint posting.

Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel could occur twelve years after commissioning, but most officers had to wait much longer due to the rule of seniority and availability of positions in the grade. However, some were never promoted and served as many as twenty-five years as Majors before retiring at age 55. From here on, most of a Lieutenant Colonels’ time would be spent on staffs or as instructors at various schools. Some, as seen in this paper, were sent abroad for further education, but for most part their professional military education was completed, the Staff College higher course being their War College. At this point, they came to a crossroads in their careers where they were reviewed. If found suitable, promotion to Colonel ensued. This meant that they had had the following billets: platoon leader/company commander, battalion commander, staff officer/instructor on the intermediate level schools, and been on a joint staff. Some exceptions can be found, but for most part this was, and still is, the normal career pattern. No more than one or two officers were promoted to Colonel each year out of a naval academy class of approximately 15 to 30 Second Lieutenants. At this time they also attended The National Defense College. Promotion to Colonel and above was,
until 2001, cabinet approved after recommendations from the Supreme Commander and the Minister of Defense. Today, promotion to Colonel is delegated to the Supreme Commander.

As newly promoted Colonels, the officers were often posted to staffs in leading positions before assuming command of a regiment or a service school. After this, for some, there was promotion to Brigadier General and beyond. At any given time, a small service as the Coastal Artillery would typical have two to four Major/Lieutenant Generals, one of them till the late 1960s being the Inspector General of the Coastal Artillery (service commandant equivalent), and another being the Naval Chief of Staff as the Coastal Artillery is a co-equal service alongside the Navy and together forming the Naval service. The others held joint billets in various staffs and commands. The highest position a coastal artillery officer has so far attained is Lieutenant General and serving as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (being the second highest-ranking officer of the nation). The Supreme Commander and the King are the only two officers holding four-star rank in peacetime.