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“NEVER AGAIN”
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PREVENT GENOCIDE

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Humanitarian intervention is a broad concept that ranges from simple humanitarian assistance to the more complex peace enforcement operations. The application of military force to prevent genocide is rooted in peace enforcement operations. The question that has been continuously debated is: "Should military force be used to prevent or arrest genocide in places where the United States does not have vital strategic interests?" This paper has a twofold purpose: first, to provide an in-depth analysis of current U.S. humanitarian intervention policy for the prevention of genocide; and second, to provide a conceptual framework for delineating feasible policy and military response options. The thesis of this work is that in the case of genocide, our "broad" national interests coupled with our national values generate a synergy that demands action even in situations where the United States does not have clear "vital" interests. The policy analysis examines how preventing genocide is a moral obligation entrenched in our national values and further cemented by international agreements like The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Military response options are viewed in the context of what might have been done to prevent genocide in Rwanda.

In short, our national values, interests, and objectives coupled with our international commitments portray us as a nation with noble intentions; i.e., a nation willing to commit to do what is right to protect human rights. To live up to such high expectations, clear comprehensive policy is needed. Pledges of "never again" are hollow without planning, preparation, resources, and political commitment.
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“NEVER AGAIN”
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PREVENT GENOCIDE

The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, much like the holocaust of World War II, brought about death and suffering on a biblical scale. In only three months, between 500,000 and 800,000 (estimates vary) Tutsi & moderate-Hutus were murdered. This unmitigated act of evil will remain forever as a deep, ugly scar on the soul of humanity, the single worst humanitarian atrocity of the last decade. What is particularly searing is that it all happened while United Nations peacekeepers were being withdrawn and the rest of the world stood aside and watched. How could this have transpired? Why did we, the United States (U.S.), with or without the United Nations (UN), fail to stop it? More importantly, are we going to sit back and take no action if something like this happens again somewhere else?

The debate continues. Some argue that the genocide was a spontaneous act of violence that no one truly anticipated and that it happened so quickly that no intervention efforts could have been undertaken in time to prevent it. Others debate the national interest, maintaining the United States had no vital national interest in Africa and therefore should not have intervened. Still others simply state that we did not have the political stomach for it, given what had happened in Somalia six months earlier. Finally, there are those who contend that our lack of action was another example of a deep-seated worldwide bigotry that caused us to view the people of Africa as unimportant.

THE DEBATE

Whether or not this tragedy could have been prevented was a topic of discussion during the last presidential campaign. On 11 October 2000, at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Mr. Jim Lehrer, who served as the moderator for the second presidential debate between the Republican candidate, Governor George W. Bush, and the Democratic candidate, Vice President Al Gore, asked the candidates whether it was a mistake for the U.S. and the outside world not to intervene to prevent the death of over 600,000 people in Rwanda.

Each candidate answered the question with characteristic political rhetoric that provided superficial insights into what his policy would be if elected. Governor Bush believed the administration made the right decision not to send U.S. troops to Rwanda. He acknowledged that it was a horrible situation, but believed it was an example of a case where we needed early warning systems in place to predict the genocide. When Mr. Lehrer followed up by asking
Governor Bush what he would say to people who asked, “Why the Balkans, but not Africa?” Governor Bush said Africa was important but not a priority.¹

Vice President Gore’s answer to the same question was somewhat different. He correctly stated that we did send U.S. troops into Rwanda to help with the humanitarian relief efforts after the genocide stopped. He admitted that it was too little too late. On the other hand, he said that he did not believe we should have committed troops to try to separate the parties. He proposed the following list of criteria that should be met before we commit troops in a case like Rwanda: (1) Are there national security interests involved? (2) Can the military force make a difference? (3) Have we tried everything else? and (4) Do we have allies to help?²

Each candidate’s answer had merit but obviously lacked an earnest in-depth analysis. It is worth noting that they were trying to propose solutions for a very complex issue using sound bites. Nevertheless, the issue remains unchanged: “Should military forces be used to prevent or arrest genocide in places where the United States does not have vital strategic interests?”

The thesis of this work is that in the case of genocide, our “broad” national interests coupled with our national values generate a synergy that demands action even in situations where the United States does not have clear “vital” interests. The call for action that is created by the nexus of national interests and values cannot be realized until U.S. policy concerning genocide prevention is comprehensive and flexible enough to examine each case on its individual merits and decisive enough to establish criteria for the use of U.S. military forces.

This essay has a twofold purpose: first, to provide an in-depth analysis of current U.S. humanitarian intervention policy for the prevention of genocide; and second, to provide a conceptual framework for delineating feasible policy and military response options.

The structure of the paper begins with a distinction of terms; i.e., defining “war” and “genocide.” The next section examines our moral obligations that are entrenched in our national values. Next, the paper outlines the promises of past administrations and examines international commitments. This is followed by a review and analysis of genocide in Rwanda.

The essay closes with a comparative perspective of current policy and military options. Policy and military response options are viewed in the context of what might have been done to prevent genocide in Rwanda. Ultimately, the goal of this work is to help guide current administration policy makers to formulate useful national policy for the prevention of genocide.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

The debate in this work focuses on the peculiarities of post-Cold War cases like Somalia, East Timor, Rwanda, and Bosnia; places where U.S. vital national interests might not
necessarily be at stake. In these cases, U.S. military forces’ interventions ranged from simple humanitarian assistance to intervention to terminate hostilities or to enforce ceasefires as part of an international agreement. The term humanitarian intervention itself is a broad concept that stretches from simple humanitarian assistance to the more complex peace enforcement operations; i.e., UN Charter Chapter VII actions. The application of military force to prevent or arrest genocide is rooted in peace enforcement operations\(^3\), which are inherently risky.

However, there is one fundamental distinction between military intervention to enforce an international peace agreement and military intervention to prevent genocide. If intervention forces fail as part of a UN Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, they simply withdraw. It is seen as a failure, but the scale of loss is limited and controlled. The UN and participating nation-states suffer limited loss of political capital, but the hope for a new negotiated peace is always alive. The fighting may continue and combatants may die. Innocent people may also die, but not on a colossal scale.

When military intervention to prevent genocide is unsuccessful, the degree of loss is exceedingly high and uncontrolled. Combatants die on the same scale as seen in normal interventions, but the cost in innocent noncombatant lives is massive. International state and non-state actors lose credibility if they do nothing and allow it to happen, resulting in a long-term distrust of their political will and/or commitment by regional actors. The current administration needs a comprehensive policy for genocide prevention to avoid these pitfalls. This requires that policymakers fully understand the concept of genocide.

Genocide is something separate and distinct from war, although, the two most often occur in concert. War is a sustained struggle by armed force of a certain intensity between groups, consisting of individuals who are armed, who wear distinctive insignia and who are subjected to military discipline under responsible command.\(^4\) The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide, on the other hand, as the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."\(^5\) Genocide is deliberate and systematic destruction.

The fundamental difference between war and genocide lies in the desired outcome of each. Luttwak argues that war is unpleasant but it has the virtue of resolving political conflicts by breaking the political will of the enemy and it leads to lasting peace. That is, war brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence where all belligerents become exhausted or one side wins decisively.\(^6\) The desired outcome for genocide is different. Genocide seeks to systematically eliminate groups (e.g. ethnic, racial) through systematic
criminal acts of murder. There is no culminating point of violence where each side becomes exhausted. Genocide stops when the targeted group is annihilated.

In sum, all wars and/or military interventions are not equal. Intervention to prevent genocide is essentially a peace enforcement operation where the potential scale of loss is immense. Now let us examine the synergy fashioned by the intersection of our national values and interests.

**INTERSECTION OF NATIONAL VALUES, INTERESTS, AND OBJECTIVES**

The concept of humanitarian military intervention is rooted in our core national values including: political and economic freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.7 These core values are the guiding principle of our democracy. Our values coupled with our commitment to our perceived national interests form the essence of our national character. Our national character is our moral fiber. It drives how we respond as a nation and establishes our national legacy. Our response will not be the same in every case, but our character (moral fiber) is measured by viewing values and interests conjointly.

Current National Security Strategy outlines three national interest categories: vital, important, and humanitarian.8 Clearly, humanitarian military intervention policy falls under humanitarian long-term national interests (also referred to as peripheral interests). However, given the events of 11 September 2001, it may no longer be easy to simply group national interests into three discrete categories. Tom Friedman, of the New York Times, recently wrote, "The lesson of September 11th is that if we don't visit bad neighborhoods, they will surely visit us."9 Many of these bad neighborhoods are in places like Sub-Saharan Africa, yet many policy makers have often stated that is not necessary to focus resources on Sub-Saharan Africa because the U.S. has no strategic concerns in the region. This line of reasoning is flawed. Serious transnational threats emanate from Sub-Saharan Africa including state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation, international crime, environmental damage, and endemic disease – all of which may be categorized as affecting vital or important national interests.10 We can no longer afford to watch states like Somalia, Sierra Leone, or Liberia collapse and fragment into anarchy, because we would risk letting these states become the breeding ground for terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and incubators for pandemics. In this, we risk letting substantial threats to develop if the paradigm does not change.11

Our policy on intervention in the case of genocide must also take account of our three core national objectives: enhancing our security, promoting prosperity, and promoting
democracy and human rights; all related to humanitarian military intervention policies. The third objective is undoubtedly the driving force for intervening to prevent genocide. United States' efforts to promote democracy and human rights create expectations that the U.S. will stand up and protect these rights. Right or wrong, we have established ourselves has the human rights watchdog of the world, evident by the Department of State's annual publication on human rights observance around the world. If we, as a world leader, want to perch on the ridge of righteousness like a mighty lion, then we must be willing to respond to protect what we say we will protect, even if the cost is spilled blood, possibly our own.

In sum, "there are times when the nexus of our interests and values exists in a compelling combination that demand action." Our national values, interests, and objectives portray us as a nation with noble intentions; i.e., a nation willing to commit to do what is right to protect human rights. To live up to such high expectations, we need comprehensive and executable policies. Since the Holocaust, the U.S. Government and the international community have cried, "Never again." These pledges are hollow without planning, preparation, resources, and political commitment.

PAST ADMINISTRATIONS' PROMISES

Calls for U.S. involvement to protect human rights worldwide resonate from President Woodrow Wilson's ringing declaration: "All shall know that America puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity." President Wilson believed America was created "to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty." The Truman Administration joined the world in pledging "never again" after the Holocaust and, along with other member-states of the United Nations, signed The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

More recently, the Clinton Administration made two attempts (Presidential Decision Directives 25 & 56; signed May 6, 1994 & May 20, 1997, respectively) to provide coherent policy for humanitarian intervention. Every attempt has helped move each administration closer to a comprehensive policy, but more work is needed.

Now, the Bush Administration must resolve the issue of what should be done to combat genocide, especially where we have no clear vital interests at stake. The debate over our role in the prevention of genocide in Africa falls primarily into two camps, two extremes. One extreme argues that the U.S. should never get involved in a region where it does not have vital national interests, whether or not genocide is occurring. The other extreme is more idealistic.
Proponents argue that it is the United States’ moral obligation to get involved everywhere trouble brews, wherever the weak cannot defend themselves.

In his article on humanitarian intervention, retired General Haig makes some observations that will help to shape the debate. Humanitarian intervention in the Post-Cold War World is different from intervention during the Cold War. During the Cold War, there were doves and hawks. Doves advocated restrained use of military power when dealing with our enemies, preferring peaceful, less aggressive solutions. Hawks took a much tougher stand, believing the only way to deter enemies was the maintenance of a strong military and a willingness to use that force. Every intervention action was essentially viewed in the context of the Cold War. The international system controlled violence, because it was necessary to negate the great danger of the superpowers going to war. Post-Cold War interventions do not have the same risk. Today, instead of doves and hawks, according to Haig, we have cuckoos and ostriches. The cuckoos are those who believe we can intervene everywhere. The ostriches are those who believe the United States should stay aloof from humanitarian disasters in the name of national interest.\textsuperscript{16}

The policy approach of the cuckoos neglects to see the crusading arrogance inherent in the assumption that the United States has the moral outreach to correct the world’s wrongs -- a policy which will inevitably be resented and rebelled against. Equally, naïve is the policy of the ostriches. They see national interests as a cold mathematical calculation of material interests. They fail to understand that people make America. Americans have strong values linked to democracy, respect for life, rule of law, freedom of speech, etc. The combination of people, values, and national interests define our national character; i.e., a nation with the innate decency to want to do something to prevent genocide.

The real policy solutions could be found somewhere between the two extremes of isolation and total engagement. The American people will not support a policy that leads to intervention everywhere. Nor will they support a policy that abstains altogether. Again, we must develop policy that guides our interventions with tangible criteria, reasonable objectives, and plausible international commitments.

\textbf{INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS}

The first example of our international commitment is the United Nations Charter. When a country becomes a member of the United Nations, it agrees to accept the obligations put forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter is an international treaty that sets out basic principles of international behavior. The United Nations has four purposes, according to the
Charter: (1) to maintain international peace and security, (2) to develop friendly relations among nations, (3) to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and (4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of the nations. The United Nations is not a world government but its member nations, including the United States, are obligated by treaty to protect human rights. The Charter of the United Nations is, of course, only one international commitment that the United States has undertaken to support. There are others, one of the most important being The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948. The United States signed the Convention on November 12, 1948 and ratified it forty years later on November 23, 1988. Article one of the Convention states that genocide is a crime under international law and that the signing nations will prevent and punish it. Theoretically, if the Convention was truly applicable in U.S. Courts, Americans could become liable to “complicity” under international law as stated in Article III.

The U.S. Government ratified the Convention with “Reservations and Understandings.” Fundamentally, the U.S. reserved the right to refuse to concede authority to the International Court of Justice. This action, while arguably reasonable to protect U.S. sovereignty and citizens from unjust ruling from an external court, is considered by many nations as an abrogation of U.S. commitment to the Convention. These international concerns are valid and the U.S. is setting a double standard with its actions. On the other hand, there are cases when the Convention signatories, including the U.S., will agree that action should be taken to prevent/stop genocide. When this common ground is found, it is critical that the U.S. has executable humanitarian intervention policy that will enable U.S. forces to respond in a timely manner.

The stage is set. Let us review the bidding. Our national values, interests, and objectives combined with our international commitments portray us as a nation with noble intentions, i.e., a nation willing to commit to do what is right to protect human rights. Since the Wilson Administration, we have pledged to protect human rights. Genocide is something separate and distinct from war. It is the ultimate violation of human rights that we pledged never to allow to occur again after the holocaust. To live up to such high expectations, policy clarity is needed. Pledges of “never again” are hollow without planning, preparation, resources, and political commitment.
THE RWANDA CASE

As early as January 1994, approximately three months before the killings started in Rwanda, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), commanded by Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo A. Dallaire, reported to the United Nations Headquarters that intelligence indicated a plot to kill large numbers of Tutsi in Kigali. On April 6, 1994, violence broke out in the city of Kigali and the surrounding communities within hours of the news that President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. Many observers initially assumed the violence to be random acts by people taking advantage of a momentary lapse in law and order. General Dallaire and UNAMIR forces feared the worst and their fears soon were confirmed. As Scott Feil has documented, the events that followed occurred at a frenzied pace:

Rwandan Government Forces (including the Presidential Guard), militia, and mobs set up roadblocks. These elements, dominated by extremists from the Hutu ethnic group, targeted moderate Hutu and members of the Tutsi ethnic minority for execution. Local political leaders, police, and soldiers, with lists identifying those to be killed, went from house to house....

A battalion of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), stationed in the capital, broke out of its compound and began to skirmish with members of the Presidential Guard. Other RPF forces left assembly areas near the demilitarized zone in the north of the country and advanced on the capital, engaging Rwandan Government Forces (RGF)....

Repeated attempts by the commander of UNAMIR and the special representative of the UN to bring the parties back to the peace process met with failure. The situation spun out of control as UNAMIR was repeatedly weakened by the withdrawal of the Belgians, and then by the timid response of participating nations....

The United Nations... did not take decisive action to intervene. Individual member states in a position to act also delayed unilateral measures.

Within three months, UNAMIR was reduced to 450 personnel; between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were dead; 500,000 Rwandans were displaced within the country; and over two million Rwandans had fled to surrounding countries. More human tragedy was compressed into three months in Rwanda than occurred in four years in the former Yugoslavia....

Many post-Cold War conflicts are attributed to deep-rooted ethnic hatred or to the unavoidable release of tension or redress of grievances that have been held in check too long by the last vestiges of colonialism or the bipolar international structure (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo). The events in Rwanda had ethnic, historical, and broad social components, but it is
equally important to recognize the strong political component. The conspirators steered the conflict toward uncontrolled violence by tapping into long-standing, deep-rooted ethnic tension as an accelerator, all designed to achieve political goals. Their behavior; i.e., choosing to pursue political goals through genocidal violence, demonstrated malice aforethought and premeditation. The presence of the choice “to” or “not to” use genocide as a means to achieve political ends arguably implies that the outcome might have been influenced if preemptive steps had been taken to persuade the conspirators that it was in their best interest to choose “not to” commence the genocide. In short, the genocide in Rwanda was no random spontaneous act; it was deliberate and phased. To prevent future actors from choosing genocide as a way to an end, the threat of intervention must be creditable. Understanding the phases of the genocide in Rwanda offers great insight into how military intervention forces might be applied more effectively in the future.

Two primary human rights organizations, African Rights and Human Rights Watch, have compiled two different volumes on the testimony of survivors. Both produced a history of how the genocide’s leaders executed their plan. Each account outlines a chilling pattern to the progression of genocide. In his book, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, Alan Kuperman calls this alarming regularity the “mechanics of the genocide.”

There were four phases to the genocide in Rwanda. Let us call the first phase “move to incite.” During this phase, the government’s Radio Rwanda and the extremists’ Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) urged Hutus to seek vengeance against Tutsis for their murder of the president. Most of the killing did not start until the day after the crash, except in Kigali. This initial phase did not cause mass deaths because the local Hutus were neither well armed nor organized. The aim of this phase was to drive the masses (e.g., Tutsi and moderate–Hutus) out of their homes to seek safe havens.

The second phase was “move to congregate.” During this phase, more than a half-million Tutsi were forced to leave their homes because the neighbors threatened them. They sought refuge in common gathering places, e.g., churches, schools, hospitals, stadiums, etc. There was safety in numbers during this phase because the local Hutus-militias were lightly armed with knives, swords, spears, clubs, and machetes. It was easy for a large number of Tutsi throwing rocks and stones to fend off the lightly armed Hutu-militias in this phase. The congregating sites would prove less advantageous in the next phase.

“Move to isolate” was phase three. The movement in this phase was primarily the deployment of better-armed reinforcements (e.g., Hutu regular army, reservists, the Presidential Guard, or national police) into the regions where groups of Tutsi had established safe havens.
These Hutu forces were small but armed with rifles, grenades, and machine guns. Once on station, the Hutu reinforcements would determine if the area were isolated; i.e., absent of UNAMIR forces and/or foreigners. Mass killings did not occur where there were international observers.\(^{25}\) However, where there was no international presence the results were tragic.

The final phase was "move to exterminate." The goal in this phase was the political goal of genocide; i.e., the systematic elimination of a culture. Here, the Hutu reinforcements attacked the safe havens by first tossing grenades onto the Tutsi, followed by small arms fire. Those not killed would attempt to flee and were gunned down as they ran. The Hutu mobs then entered the havens and hacked to death anyone still alive. Some Tutsi still managed to escape, only to be captured and killed by the Hutu reinforcements who had setup roadblocks in phase three to ensure isolation of the region.

This four-phased pattern of violence happened repeatedly throughout the country, except where foreign observers or foreign media were present.\(^{26}\) It was a methodical plan executed with blinding speed and horrendous efficiency. Should we have tried to stop it? Could we have stopped it? Each question warrants closer examination because the answers provide insight for future policy.

**COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

Should we have intervened? The skeptics say "no." They give two primary reasons: first, we had no vital national interests in Rwanda; and second, we should not intervene prematurely to stop conflicts because the best way to achieve lasting peace is to allow violence to run its course.

As mentioned above, vital national interests cannot be viewed as the sole determinant behind the various expressions of U.S. national resolve. It is true we had no clear vital national interests in Rwanda in 1994. However, it is equally true that the combined effect of our national values and broader interests sometimes requires us to rise to something better than a nation that will standby silently and watch 800,000 people be massacred.

For clarity, it is worth looking at our national policies toward Israel. There is no attempt here to advocate changing U.S. policy toward Israel; however, it is at least debatable whether the survival of Israel is a vital national interest for our nation. Perhaps there are other variables, such as values or domestic agendas, which ensure Israel survives. One could certainly argue from a linkage standpoint that Israel's importance to the U.S. is derived by where and how it was created. Nonetheless, it is debatable whether the survival of Israel is vital to the survival, safety, or vitality of the U.S. The warning here is clear: if vital interests are our only yardstick for
making intervention decisions regarding genocide, we will get it wrong. There must be a more comprehensive decision making process.

Another group of skeptics, the "do nothing" group, is best represented by Edward N. Luttwak. In his article, "Give War a Chance," Luttwak argues that "although war is evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This happens when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence." Luttwak contends that too many wars become protracted because outside intervention either prevents the decisive victory or dampens the exhaustive effect of violence.27 He is correct, if we are only speaking of war. However, once again, it is critical to understand that genocide and war may occur simultaneously but they are fundamentally different in intensity and objective.

To clarify, war is a state of open and declared armed conflict between states or certain combatant groups who are of a certain size and subjected to military discipline under responsible command.28 The level of intensity is controlled. The objective of war is to break the adversary's will to fight. Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a racial, political, or cultural group. Its intensity is uncontrolled and its objective is elimination of the foe's total existence. They are different but not always easily separated.

The positivists presume we could have and should have stopped the Rwandan Genocide. They assert that the massacre could have been halted by an early decisive military intervention from outside forces; and they support two possible courses of actions: (1) The "decapitation" proposal put forth by Allison Des Forges from Human Rights Watch. And (2), the "shock troop" proposal by Major General Romeo Dallaire who was commanding the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).29

The "decapitation" plan, outlined by Allison Des Forges in a talk at the Kennedy School of Government on 14 October 1998, would have had elite troops enter Rwanda in the first days of the genocide to kill or capture the extremist leaders who were primarily responsible for mobilizing the genocide. Ideally, once the leaders were gone the genocide would stop. Dr. Taylor Seybolt, from Harvard's Belfer Center, provided the primary rebuttal for this plan. He stated that once the killing began, things became so chaotic that it would have been extremely difficult for an outside force to determine what was happening, much less clearly identify and target all the leaders.30 His assessment was accurate. The only way a decapitation course of action might have worked was if it had been introduced as a "preemptive" action. There is little likelihood that the decapitation plan would have been successful once the chaos had begun.
Major General Dallaire’s “shock troop” plan offered in a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict called for a six-phased operation using approximately 5000 combat troops with a small number of armored vehicles and associated combat support and combat service support elements. Phase one was designed to stop the killing in the capital city. Phases two, three, and four focused on stopping the killings throughout the country by essentially providing safe havens and establishing a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the primary combatants (the Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Rwanda Government Forces). In Phase V, the force would have reverted back to traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. And finally, in phase VI, the force would have passed the mission to a peacekeeping force with a more limited mandate.31

In the actual event, Dallaire first asked for reinforcement on 10 April 1994. The UN Security Council did not authorize UNAMIR II until 17 May 1994 and slow implementation prevented troops from arriving until after the genocide was over. Dallaire has continuously argued that it was a missed opportunity. An expert panel of military officials with experience in peacekeeping assembled by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in April 1998 endorsed his claims.32 However, there are those who differ.

Dr. Seybolt found two shortcomings with the “shock troop” scenario. First, there is the issue of timing. He argued that by the time outsiders realized genocide was occurring, not just a civil war, it would have been impossible to deploy the assets needed, quickly enough, to stop the majority of the killings. And second, he believed the proposed force was “drastically insufficient”; i.e., 5000 troops could not police nearly 10,000 square miles with over 60,000 armed killers in it.33

Alan Kuperman has disputed Dallaire’s assertions on primarily two bases. First, he stated that General Dallaire’s position leads one to believe that the intervention force would have arrived almost immediately upon being ordered to deploy. This view does not take into account realistic expectations of the time required to deploy to the theater and to stage forces for operations. To move the desired force (e.g. 101st Division’s Ready Brigade, cited as a possible force in the Carnegie Commission report), it would have taken approximately 90-100 strategic airlift sorties. The entire operation would have been further slowed down by the limited capacity of regional (Kigali and Entebbe) airports to handle such airflow. Second, Kuperman, like Seybolt, has asserted that 5,000 troops would have been insufficient to stop the genocide without considerable risk of failure.34

Both Kuperman and Seybolt are accurate to highlight timing as a critical aspect of the intervention in Rwanda. However, timing, as they use it, suggests that acts of genocide are
spontaneous and thus unpredictable, moving too quickly for external military forces to react. The genocidal violence in Rwandan was certainly not spontaneous. As early as January 11, 1994, Major General Dallaire sent a fax to the UN predicting the coming genocide and requesting permission to confiscate arms caches. The action was not authorized.

Organizations like Human Rights Watch were predicting problems in Rwanda as early as 1993. There is no doubt that timing is critical. However, the issue is more clearly addressed as a question of early warning and early intervention. What is needed is a defined U.S. commitment to prevent genocide so that humanitarian military intervention can achieve the timeliness to be successful.

Kuperman's and Seybolt's concerns about the insufficient size of the force do not give enough credit to the capacity of early preemptive action or early reactive action to freeze the genocidal process in its early stages. If the force were introduced early enough, the scope of the task at hand would have been smaller. Kuperman argues that the intervention force would have had three primary missions: stop the civil war, restore order in Kigali, and prevent killing in the countryside. However, none of these missions would have been necessary if the UN had believed early intelligence reports and authorized Dallaire to take the preventative action needed.

If preemptive action were not possible then Kuperman and Seybolt would be correct to question the size of the force needed to ensure success, because the number of missions placed on the intervention force almost always increases proportionally as the genocide progresses into its latter stages.

Nonetheless, if the intervention force were too small, expectation would have had to be reduced in scope. It would not have been feasible to ask a 5000-man force to control 10,000 squares miles and stop 60,000-armed people. But success could have been redefined, reducing expectations and asking the 5000-man force to do what they had the capability to do: i.e., secure limited safe havens for the fleeing Tutsi and seize critical points. This strategy would not have saved everyone, but any action was better than none. For those who would have lived, it mattered. This paper concludes by reflecting on lessons learned from Rwanda that might aid responsive policy formulation in the future.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED

Today's strategy constructs create a quandary for senior policymakers trying to choose policy options for preventing genocide where U.S. vital national interests are not at risk. In many cases, as in Rwanda, the events occurring appear to be of peripheral interest to the U.S.
Further, the possible loss of American lives in intervention operations should not be taken lightly. Nonetheless, there are times when we, as a nation, must find the will to defend what is right because our core values and our national character are challenged. The lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide are numerous. The focus here is limited to a few critical lessons that will be useful for U.S. policy makers.

First, there is no substitute for early preemptive action. In the first instance, diplomacy would be preferred over military action. Warnings about the impending genocidal violence in Rwanda were being broadcast as early as 1993. Better intelligence reporting is needed. The international community and U.S. policy makers must appreciate the dynamic pressures created when combatants sign peace treaties and one or multiple sides become vulnerable. The environment is ripe for mass violence to occur. Diplomacy is critical but coercive diplomacy must be tempered to avoid unintentionally triggering the massive violence.\textsuperscript{36}

These ethnically stratified conflicts have multiple combatants; e.g. even in small Burundi, there are presently 17 parties and two armed movements that need to sign the agreement. If multinational forces (MNF) are deployed into these circumstances, they must have robust capabilities in place and rules of engagement that enable them to take pre-emptive action. Defining these missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter will not enable intervention forces to address the full spectrum of possibilities. These operations should be conducted under Chapter VII.

Second, once the genocide has begun, the mission shifts from preventing actions to arresting actions and the difficulty increases proportionally. The genocide will quickly process through stages like the four examined in Rwanda: move to incite, move to consolidate, move to isolate, and move to exterminate. The later the MNF arrives, the more difficult and risky the operation. In Rwanda, it took weeks before the international community fully understood the scope of the violence being executed, even though within hours of the president’s plane being shot down, Hutu extremist leaders were on the radio calling for every Hutu to rise up and kill Tutsis – the move to incite. If this action had been seen as the first stage of the genocidal progress, which it was, the international community would have understood there was a potential for genocide one day after the president’s plane was shot down.

Third, the international community, U.S. policymakers, and military leaders must accept the premise that the prevention of genocides is a likely mission and provide resources and training to its military members. There is no attempt here to suggest that the U.S. go it alone in accomplishing these operations. Far from it, the intervention force must include other non-regional and regional actors. However, U.S. leadership and involvement adds credibility. The
degree of U.S. involvement depends on whether the mission is to prevent or to arrest genocide. If the mission is to arrest genocide, the need for creditable leadership (U.S. or western involvement) is elevated and the external force requirement increases as the genocide progresses through the stages.

History has shown, as seen in the 1990s, that the international community has sufficient will to intervene in many conflicts. What is missing is the will to devote resources needed to intervene effectively.\textsuperscript{37} If the international community truly wants to live up to the pledges of the post World War II Convention on Genocide, we must change the paradigm; i.e., forces must train for this mission and resources must be applied against it.

The final assertion of this work is that when national values and interests are viewed in concert (as stated in the National Security Strategy), there will be times when it is clear that the U.S. should intervene to prevent or arrest genocide even in situations where the U.S. does not have clear “vital” interests. However, any move to intervene should not be undertaken without a serious assessment of its unintended consequences.\textsuperscript{38} Some useful metrics for the assessment process might include: (1) Does military force have a reasonable chance to succeed? That is, the assigned missions must not exceed the capabilities of the force on the ground. (2) Will U.S. military involvement put vital U.S. national interests at risk? Introducing an intervention force in China might have greater negative implications for the world than the events occurring in the country. In this case, using another element of power might be more appropriate. (3) Does the potential or actual level of genocidal violence clearly exceed acceptable international norms? This measure guards against erroneously labeling something as genocide that might not be genocide. (4) What U.S. military capabilities are needed? The U.S. should, where possible, work to provide those military capabilities that are not available from any other actors. It is important that policy makers guard against using this metric as an excuse to do nothing. U.S. involvement provides creditability that is not easily substituted. And (5), are we, the U.S., acting as a part of a multinational force? This is particularly important in cases where there are no direct threats to vital national interests.

Clearly none of these lessons or criteria can be universally applied. Each case must be examined independently but this work has attempted to provide a conceptual framework for formulating policy for the prevention of genocide so that the promise of “never again” might be realized. \textit{The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide} was signed in 1948. The signatories of the Convention must continue to work to reach a quick consensus when and where genocide occurs. The analysis of phases of genocide seen in Rwanda can help in the process to determine what is and is not genocide. Above all, what is
needed is a world leader that compels the international community to act under the Convention -
- even at great risk. The United States, drawing upon its historical values and using its
immense power and influence, is ideally suited for this role.

WORD COUNT = 6,724
ENDNOTES


8 Ibid., 4.


10 Clinton, 9-18

11 Steven Metz, Refining American Strategy in Africa, (U.S. Army College, Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, February 2000), 2.

12 Clinton, 5-7.

13 Ibid, 5.


16 Haig, 496-497.


19 Ibid., 2.


22 Ibid, 1-3.

23 Ibid, 3.


25 Ibid, 16.

26 Ibid, 14-20.


28 DeLupis, 24.


30 Taylor Seybolt, "Could Genocide Have Been Stopped in Rwanda"


32 Kuperman, 84.

33 Taylor Seybolt, "Could Genocide Have Been Stopped in Rwanda"

34 Kuperman, 83-87.

36 Kuperman, 100-111.


38 Ibid, 117.
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