STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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DESIGNING THE JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER THROUGH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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U.S. joint doctrine continues to evolve as the Department of Defense develops definitive policy for the conduct of joint operations. The issuance of *Joint Vision 2020* soon after the inaugural *Joint Vision 2010* evidences the immense challenge in developing joint doctrine. This process is further complicated by uneven doctrinal maturity across the spectrum of U.S. joint operations, even where like functions exist. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) roles have been defined, and JFACC doctrine is indeed mature. The concept of a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) remains embryonic. The JFMCC concept requires solid definition and direction – assuming that there is a valid need for a JFMCC. Although the impetus for JFACC/JFLCC doctrine differs from JFMCC, both can serve as models for designing the JFMCC concept.

Case studies of past joint operations and campaigns can prove invaluable in validating or revising current doctrine and developing new joint doctrine. This paper draws upon the lessons of past operations, current practice and experiments, pending drafts, and joint vision to propose a role for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander. Review and analysis of selected U.S. joint operations and Allied combined operations will be used in designing proposed duties and responsibilities for the JFMCC. By examining the conduct of earlier joint and combined maritime operations, postulating if superimposing a JFMCC on these "joint operations" might have delivered significant improvement, and applying this construct to proposed joint doctrine under the tenets of *Joint Vision 2020*, the need for a JFMCC can be evaluated. If the concept is validated, a JFMCC model can be proposed.

The JFMCC is envisioned as a key joint force component commander – vital to the JFC organization, command and control structures. If the JFMCC is to become joint doctrine, it is essential that the role be both well defined and coequal with the JFACC and JFLCC. Otherwise, naval forces forming the joint maritime component may find it difficult to be seamlessly employed as a viable, integrated joint force component.

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DESIGNING THE JOINT FORCES MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER THROUGH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

> No other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. —GEN J. M. Shalikashvili, USA

Joint operations have become the norm when U.S. Armed Forces are called upon to exercise the military element of national power, whether in war or military operations other than war (MOOTW). This is partially due to recent mandates – most notably the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. It is also because "joint" makes sense, and has been proven the most effective way for the U.S. military services to operate and fight together when operations are planned and executed under a solid command and control (C^2) structure. Operating jointly can also be a force multiplier over single service operations. According to modern strategist Colin Gray, "Services perform in joint and combined contexts precisely to offset [individual service] limitations."[1] No one service holds a monopoly on providing the nation's security and applying military power in support of U.S. vital interests. Operating together as not just a composite force, but as a joint force under standard joint doctrine is arguably the most effective and efficient way to accomplish almost any potential mission. Designing force structure and force posture to fight jointly is key to developing and harnessing the synergy that joint forces bring to a crisis or a fight. Realizing this potential requires proven, practiced doctrine that includes the requisite military C^2 structures.

U.S. armed forces have not always operated as "joint forces." In the past, the Services typically functioned independently or operated together as composite forces with minimal interaction – even when operations clearly would have benefited from the employment of integrated, standardized joint procedures. A well-documented series of failed and less-than-optimal military operations, most notably in the two decades preceding Desert Storm, highlighted the long overdue need for joint doctrine. The U.S. Armed Forces needed standard operating procedures for joint operations. The Joint Publication series emerged to institutionalize joint operations procedures within the U.S. armed forces. No equivalent previously existed. Joint Publications 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*; 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; and 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, set the cornerstones for joint force organization, structure, and C^2. However, the Joint Pub series remains incomplete. U.S. joint doctrine constantly evolves as the Department of Defense develops and revises definitive policy for the conduct of the wide range of joint operations. The issuance of Joint Vision 2020 (JV-2020) soon after the inaugural Joint Vision 2010 evidences

the immense challenge in developing joint doctrine. An additional complication is that joint doctrine is not uniformly mature across the spectrum of operations, even where like functions exist (notably joint force component commanders). In some cases, key doctrine remains to be developed, proven and promulgated.

The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) concept exemplifies critical doctrine under development. A JFMCC would be tasked to support the Joint Force Commander (JFC), or Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) when appointed, as a key component commander assigned responsibility for one of three elemental areas of responsibility – sea, land or air. While the roles of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) have been defined[2], the concept of JFMCC remains embryonic. JFMCC is the sole "major" functional component commander lacking any definitive doctrine. Although the overarching impetus for assigning a JFACC or JFLCC differs from the JFMCC (i.e., the requirement to combine forces from more than one service does not occur as frequently in the maritime environment as it does in the JFACC and JFLCC AOs), JFMCC validity may accrue from a variety of other reasons. Validation of the JFMCC warrants analysis and is the focus of this paper.

According to Joint Pubs 3-0 and 5-00.2, the JFMCC is responsible for the joint force maritime component and maritime operations. When assigned, the JFMCC is vital to joint task force (JTF) organization, command and control, and mission accomplishment. If the JFMCC is indeed going to be part of future joint doctrine, it is essential that his role be well defined and his status equal to that of the JFACC and JFLCC if naval forces performing the joint maritime mission are to be seamlessly employed as a viable, integrated, joint force component. The objective of this paper is to validate, and then to propose, a model for the JFMCC. Before attempting to do so, it is necessary to review the foundations for joint forces and their ground-rules. A brief examination and discussion of the definitions and descriptions pertinent to a JTF, its components, and the component commanders is in order.

DEFINING AND ORGANIZING JOINT TASK FORCES

Without unity of effort focused on a common mission and objectives, a joint force will be little more than a composite force. Worse, it may be dysfunctional and counterproductive, less than the sum of its components.

> Joint warfare is team warfare. ...not a series of individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, ...the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in unified action.

> Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.
>
> —Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

By design, a JTF must be more than a mere conglomeration of combat and support units from two or more Services. To achieve unity of effort and other objective enablers, a JTF must follow doctrinal standards – common principles that provide organization and unity of command. Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, defines a joint task force as:

> ...a joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority. (A JTF establishing authority may be the Secretary of Defense or the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing JTF. In most situations, the JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander.) A JTF may be established on a geographic area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.[3]

Joint Vision 2020 states, "The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to the operational success of the future."[4] The flexibility to build an agile joint task force, tailored to the needs of the assigned mission, helps ensure the right force can be organized for each mission. The 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* emphasizes the need for the U.S. military to employ a "capabilities-based" approach to effectively deter and defeat contemporary or future adversaries.[5] A capabilities-based defense model focuses on how a potential adversary might fight in order to identify the U.S. capabilities required to counter the threat. By tailoring a joint force to fit the mission, the employment of JTFs supports the capabilities-based approach particularly well.

A joint task force must be flexible and responsive, providing the breadth of capabilities dictated by the mission. Joint Pub 5-00.2 further states that the "...mission assigned a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort... Execution of responsibilities *may* involve *air, land, sea, space, and special operations in any combination* [emphasis added], executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations."[6] Potential force providers to a U.S. JTF are the separate services and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). A JTF may contain Service components, functional components, and/or special purpose subordinate task forces.[7] All JTFs will include Service component commands, as joint force administrative and logistic support remain Service component responsibilities.[8] The organization of a JTF is both mission and forces dependent. A JTF's composition may be Service components only or a combination of Service components

with functional components and/or special purpose subordinate task forces.[9] Typically, joint task forces are organized with a combination of Service component commands, functional component commands, and subordinate task forces assigned operational responsibilities. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the organizational options for a JTF.



FIGURE 1. JOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS[10]

JOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION PRINCIPLES

The joint force commander (JFC) establishing a joint task force may retain command of the task force or appoint a subordinate Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF). Appointment of a CJTF is usually appropriate and advisable for a variety of sound C^2 reasons. Only in cases of theater-wide or very large operations, such as Desert Storm, would command by the JFC (the theater commander-in-chief in this case) be a predictable choice. (For ease of discussion, this

paper will address the more common situation with a CJTF.) The JFC establishing the JTF has the authority to organize the assigned forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.[11] Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides this guidance on organizing and staffing a JTF:

> JTFs may take many forms and sizes and be employed across the range of military operations in *air, land, or maritime environments.* The *specific organization* and staffing of a JTF *will vary based on* the mission assigned, *the environment within which operations must be conducted* [emphasis added], the makeup of existing and potential enemy forces, and the time available to reach the desired end state.[12]

But when is it appropriate to employ Service components only? When is it appropriate to add functional components? And which components?

Given the immaturity of joint doctrine, it is not surprising to find that references and philosophies vary on the employment of Service versus functional components in a JTF. Two versions of the same statement on JTF composition appear within Joint Pub 5-00.2:

- Functional component commands *are* appropriate when forces from two or more *Services* [emphasis added] must operate in the same dimension or medium, or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.[13]
- Functional component commands *can be* appropriate when forces from two or more *Military Departments* [emphasis added] must operate in the same dimension or medium, or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.[14]

By focusing on limited sections of joint doctrine, such as the above passages, the tendency can be to concentrate on phrases such as "two or more..." This provides ready justification for an air component commander, a land component commander, and even a special operations component commander – but not the maritime component commander (unless Coast Guard, allied or coalition forces are assigned the task force).

Other factors, however, can influence the appropriateness of establishing a JFMCC:

◊ As the italicized differences indicate, even Joint Pub 5.00 is ambiguous. The Executive Summary and Chapter III do not match. Given the flexibility and agility required in a joint operation, "*can be*" and "*are*" are both appropriate as either appears to match the intent of joint task force doctrine. "Two or more..." is not an absolute prerequisite with respect to "Services;" with "Military Departments," though, it is appropriate.

◊ No matter which definition is used, however, the "...or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission" qualifier negates any unqualified requirement to have two Services or Military Departments as force providers; and

- ◊ Joint Pub 5-00.2 also states: "Service components *are appropriate* when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning and scope of operations *dictate organizational integrity* [emphasis added] of Service Components."[15]

There is no directive in Joint Pub 5-00.2 that the provision of forces by a single Service or Military Department to a given area of responsibility negates the JFC's authority to establish functional component commanders. Additionally, existing functional component doctrine does not direct specific force structure or composition for given conditions. In fact, the existence of functional components, in and of itself, does not constitute a joint force.[16]

All applicable precepts from joint doctrine must be considered in deciding the appropriateness of establishing a functional component commander such as the JFMCC. Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides guidelines concerning JTF force-structure:

- ◊ CJTFs have the authority to establish *functional component commands* to *control military operations* [emphasis added]. Mission-type orders normally are issued by the CJTF to all components – with receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the CJTF's intent and concept of operations.[17]
- ◊ Functional component commanders *have authority over forces or military capabilities* [emphasis added] made available to them.[18]
- ◊ *Functional component commands may be established across the range of military operations* [emphasis added] to perform operational missions...[19]

Thus, the decision to employ a particular component commander when forming a JTF is driven by a number of factors. Mission, forces assigned, and C^2 are prominent considerations. CJTFs have the authority to organize the JTF, determine the appropriate command relationships, and assign missions. Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides guidance to be considered when forming and organizing a JTF [bullets added]:

- ◊ CJTFs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of CJTFs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.
- ◊ The manner in which CJTFs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. *The first principle in joint force organization is that CJTFs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations.* Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations.
- ◊ Organization of joint forces also needs to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.[20]

Figure 2 provides an illustration of potential JTF components, organization and command relationships.



FIGURE 2. POSSIBLE JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATES[21]

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

The JTF commander must consider many factors when organizing a joint task force to best accomplish the assigned mission. An effective command and control

structure is critical to building an effective JTF. The CJTF's vision and concept of operations, C^2 considerations, and forces available (assigned and attached) will drive the design of the JTF. Part of that design will be a decision on which functional component commanders to employ. The objective is to organize the best possible task force, which includes sound command structure and C^2. As proven practice, the commander should carefully consider the following tenets in designing a JTF:

- ◊ *Unity of effort* is requisite to ensuring JTF effectiveness and proficiency.
- ◊ *Unity of command* is essential for joint forces to effectively mass combat power toward common objectives.
- ◊ *Centralized planning* provides critical direction and coordination to the efforts of assigned and attached forces. Clear communication of the commander's vision and intent is essential to centralized planning.
- ◊ Use of *common doctrine* enables mutual understanding and confidence both between a commander and assigned subordinates, and among subordinates. Common doctrine also enables commanders to take timely and effective action in the absence of specific instructions.
- ◊ *Decentralized execution* is essential to success of the JTF. No single commander can effectively and efficiently control the detailed actions of a large number of disparate forces. Sound JTF organization, common doctrine, and solid C^2 are required to enable effective decentralized execution.
- ◊ *Command emphasis on interoperability* is essential to enhancing joint warfighting capabilities and achieving JTF synergy.[22]

By applying these tenets in designing the organization, including the assignment of functional component commanders, the JFC/CJTF can build a JTF for success.

CJTFs establishing functional component commands have the authority to designate the commanders.[23] When considering whether to establish functional component commanders, to use only Service Component commanders, or to employ a combination, the CJTF should consider the following:

> The CJTF must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise. For example, a joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) normally has OPCON of assigned forces, and a JFACC normally is delegated tactical control (TACON) of the sorties or other military capabilities made available.[24]

Joint Pub 5-00.2 states that the Service component commander who provides the majority of

that service's forces to the JTF will normally be designated as the relevant functional component commander. The CJTF, however, will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, assigned force capabilities, and each unit's C^2 capabilities in selecting a functional component commander.[25] Selecting the best-qualified commander is paramount.

JTF Component Commander Responsibilities

By doctrine, the JTF commander assigns responsibilities and authority to a functional component commander. Establishing functional component commanders does not alter the command relationships between Service component commanders and the CJTF due to the vital services provided by Service component commanders.[26] And while Service component commanders may serve as the CJTF's "war-fighter" commanders, designation of functional component commanders enables delegation of additional duties and responsibilities that would otherwise remain with the CJTF. Joint Pub 5-00.2 tasks functional component commanders with these general duties and responsibilities:

- ◊ The commander of a functional component command is responsible for making recommendations to the CJTF on the proper employment of the military capability made available to accomplish the assigned responsibilities.
- ◊ The functional component commander normally will be a Service component commander. As a Service component commander, the functional component commander also has responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces.
- ◊ When a functional component command is composed of forces of two or more Services, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistics factors on the capability of the assigned forces and the responsibilities retained by the Services.
- ◊ When a functional component commander will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander's staff must be joint in order to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available...[27]

Additionally, whether a Service or functional component commander has operational command, the commander is responsible to:

- ◊ Coordinate with commanders of other JTF components to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized an as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.
- ◊ Plan and conduct operations in accordance with CJTF guidance and detailed plans.
- ◊ Monitor the operational situation and, as required, pass information to the CJTF.[28]

These common duties and responsibilities provide a foundation in defining the role of functional

component commanders. The duties and responsibilities unique to each functional component complete the definition of the commander's role. In hypothesizing and formulating specific duties and responsibilities, it is important to identify the contributions of each functional component to the joint force. Before examining and designing the role of the JFMCC, an overview of what naval forces and the maritime component can bring to the battlespace is in order.

ROLES OF THE U.S. NAVY AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOINT FORCE

America's place as a maritime nation predates its independence. As a maritime nation, the United States requires freedom of the seas to guarantee its strong economy, political stature, and ability to project power overseas. As events have unfolded over the course of our history, especially since the latter decades of nineteenth-century, the U.S. has come to rely upon its own mastery of the seas to ensure its national interests. Forward-deployed naval forces have proven most effective in providing and assuring this mastery and projecting all elements of national power.[29]

Over the millennia that man has depended on the seas for trade and on naval forces to achieve and guarantee its free movement, the roles of naval forces have evolved, while remaining firmly anchored to a functional core. Central to the core naval mission is assured access to the seas and freedom of movement on them, which is achieved through command of those seas that serve a state's interests. Advances in technology drive some of the evolution in naval forces and their employment. Changes in warfighting tactics and strategy also shape naval forces and their employment. In addition, the sociological, economical and political factors that determine a nation-state's persona and priorities, and in turn its goals and objectives, are significant contributing factors.

ENDURING U.S. NAVY MISSIONS

Since the 1970s, the Navy's core missions have worn various labels yet steadfastly conformed to four broad categories. While these core maritime missions will remain relevant well into the future, a continually changing global environment warrants regular review and update of supporting objectives and priorities. Although the Navy's twenty-first century core missions remain essentially unchanged, their application and execution are evolving. The U.S. Navy is shaping its force, posture and doctrine for the twenty-first century under the strategic themes and tenets of *Joint Vision 2020* and the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*. The contribution of naval-maritime operations to the security of the U.S. remains crucial. The Navy's

role in joint operations must continue to develop and mature. Table 1 provides a comparison of the Navy's enduring core missions with its broad mission priorities at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

	Enduring Core Missions[30]	21ST Century Priorities[31]
U.S. Navy Missions	Strategic deterrence	Credible deterrence
	Sea control (Maintaining freedom of the seas)	Command of the seas
	Projection of naval power ashore (Upon land forces and objectives)	Assured global access for naval, joint & allied/coalition forces
	Naval presence / U.S. sovereign power overseas – when and where required	Maintaining U.S. sovereign power forward overseas
		Enabling transformation of joint forces to achieve the rapidly deployable force structure necessary for the 21ST century

TABLE 1. CORE MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY

As expected, there is a strong correlation between the Navy's core missions and its priorities for the twenty-first century. However, it is not apparent from Table 1 how these strategic themes and broad missions contribute to joint operations. An examination of common naval action objectives – including achieving assured access and the successive transition to joint force operations – reveals that most naval activities contribute to more than one core mission and/or priority. A brief discussion of the broad missions and priorities relevant to joint operations and warfighting is warranted. While realizing *Joint Vision 2020* is a key Navy objective, providing continuity in security, defense and support of national grand strategy is paramount.

- *Sea control* — Whether called "command of the seas," or "sea control," a core Navy mission will always be to master the seas. In the joint operations realm:
  - Freedom of the seas facilitates the exercise of all elements of national power.
  - Maintaining sovereign power forward through overseas presence provides the power to shape the environment and conditions, and a capability for timely crisis response.
  - Sea control enables the Navy to provide assured access for joint forces, either by presence or through forced entry. It also enables transition to joint operations, including the projection of naval power ashore by the joint maritime component.
  - Sea control also permits reinforcement and resupply of U.S. and allied/coalition military forces engaged in joint and combine operations.

- ◊ *Projection of naval power ashore* — Approximately 75% of the world's population lives within the littoral regions with 80% of the world's national capitols also within the littorals. Consequently, the majority of crises and conflicts to which U.S. forces respond are within naval reach, making the Navy's ability to project power ashore a key joint capability.
  - o The projection of naval power upon armed forces and other objectives ashore is achieved through amphibious (expeditionary) assault, naval bombardment upon the littorals and inland, and tactical air projection.
  - o Naval power and its projection ashore are essential to assuring access for naval, joint, and allied/coalition forces to areas of crisis or conflict around the global.
  - o Naval power projection enables joint forces to flow into theater for the operational transition from forward-deployed naval forces to follow-on joint forces deployed to influence potential adversaries or to fight enemies and win.
  - o The presence of naval forces with the ability to project power provides creditability to U.S. interests, which may deter threats and/or hostile action.
- ◊ *Naval presence* — The presence of U.S. sovereign power overseas provided by forward-deployed naval forces serves to:
  - o Assure timely access by maintaining presence and routine access, or by quickly gaining access to areas otherwise denied.
  - o Deter and prevent actions contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies, and encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States and its allies.
  - o Naval presence is achieved through:
    - ▪ Routine (peacetime) rotational deployments of naval forces,
    - ▪ Permanently forward-deployed naval forces, and
    - ▪ Reactive deployments of naval forces.[32]
- ◊ *Strategic deterrence* — Many of the same actions undertaken to shape and maintain a stable political environment by deterring the threat of aggression or coercion also serve to deter conflicts and prepare potential battlespace for access by joint forces.

The U.S. Navy in the Twenty-First Century

The presence of sovereign U.S. naval power overseas with its ability to deliver global assured access remains a critical enabler for strategic, theater and operational joint power projection. Forward-deployed naval forces will continue to provide a variety of options for timely response to crises affecting U.S. national interests. Sovereign naval power forward provides

the timely, on-scene combat-power essential during the early phases of conflict to demonstrate U.S. commitment to defending its national interests. It also ensures the ability to deliver secure access for joint forces arriving in theater. As America begins the twenty-first century, the same naval forces that have traditionally sustained forward sovereign power take on a renewed role in assuring access for joint forces as they flow forward in response to conflicts. Naval forces will continue to serve as the critical enabler for joint forces by creating the conditions for entry. Additionally, naval forces that are routinely on-scene can now strike with virtually no strategic and minimal tactical warning. By tailoring U.S. Navy forces and competencies to execute these joint missions, while maintaining the key competencies of sea control and power projection, maritime elements will continue to provide a viable joint force under the tenets of joint doctrine and Joint Vision 2020.

NAVY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOINT FORCE

> The...vast network that connects information and weapons in new ways... will revolutionize the Navy's ability to project American power over land and sea, assuring access for all our forces, wherever our vital interests are threatened.
>
> —President George W. Bush, 4 March 2001

As the twenty-first century dawns, the U.S. Navy continues to enhance its joint warfighting capabilities. This focused effort is necessary if naval forces are to remain a potent contributor to the joint team. The Navy adopted its littoral-based operations focus in 1992 with the Navy–Marine Corps paper *...From the Sea,* which was further developed and articulated in the 1994 Navy–Marine Corps paper *Forward ...From the Sea.* Future naval forces will remain expeditionary and forward deployed with the capacity for sustained operations to assure timely access in an increasingly challenging environment. The littoral-based focus remains valid in the absence of a blue-water competitor, as naval forces continue to serve as critical enablers creating the conditions for timely access by follow-on joint forces. The Navy alone will not typically assure access *throughout* a conflict. Moreover, achieving the end state will usually require a synchronized team effort by the joint force. Naval forces offer the JFC with the option of lethality for effect on the seas, throughout the littorals, and inland, before, during and after the JTF arrival in theater, with the agility to continue the fight as a JTF component. Naval forces offer the CJTF many capabilities that can complement and support other forces. One unique advantage is that, "Naval forces allow a JFC [CJTF] to limit the footprint of forces ashore."[33]

Maritime Component Contributions to the Joint Force

In designing the JFMCC, it is important to understand the specific contributions of naval forces and how to best integrate them into the JTF organization. The maritime component of a JTF brings a number of capabilities to the joint force, several of which are unique to naval forces. Their contributions and potential duties make maritime forces an invaluable contributor to the joint team effort.

Maritime operations are actions conducted by armed forces on, under or over the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, through sea control or sea denial, and/or to project power ashore. Maritime operations encompass the full range of joint operations, requiring the application of naval forces, air forces, special forces, and, during amphibious operations, the delivery and support of various forces for land operations. Power projection employs maritime offensive combat power to influence activities ashore and entails operations under the sea, on the sea, over the sea and land, and ashore. Fundamental to all maritime operations is the ability to use force at sea, against the littoral, and inland.

It is important to note that the application of maritime power does not readily fall into simple categories. For example, power projection and sea control overlap, because local sea control is a minimum enabling requirement for most maritime tasks during a conflict, including power projection. In planning, however, distinction is possible between applications of maritime power *from the sea*, which are broadly power projection tasks, and those *at sea* of which sea control is the essence. Typical maritime roles, tasks, operations and mission areas of concern to the CJTF include:

- ◊ Exploit the vast maritime environment to shape the battlespace,
- ◊ Exercise sea control and sea denial throughout the battlespace,
- ◊ Influence events ashore through deployment, concentration, assault and maneuver,
- ◊ Provide the JFC/CJTF with a long-term, flexible presence and fighting capability, typically with external lines of communication (LOC),
- ◊ Influence operations ashore by:
  - o Deterrence,
  - o Providing access to the theater,
  - o Contributing to achieving battlespace dominance,
  - o Projection of power ashore, including:
    - ▪ Amphibious operations, and
    - ▪ Supporting naval fires and strike; and
  - o Providing and protecting logistic sealift,

- ◊ Operating from the littorals to:
  - o Conduct joint force projection operations,
  - o Enable or support joint operations ashore,
  - o Provide strikes directly or via the JFACC,
  - o Provide naval fires for joint fire support to:
    - ▪ Shape the battlespace, and
    - ▪ Provide interdiction; and
  - o Conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO),
- ◊ Perform joint command and control functions including:
  - o Serve as JFC/CJTF and/or provide an afloat joint force HQ, and
  - o Serve as JFACC for small or naval aviation-heavy joint operations,
- ◊ Provide intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) services,
- ◊ Conduct information operations (IO), including:
  - o Information warfare (IW),
  - o Signals exploitation warfare (SEW), and
  - o Command and Control Warfare (C^2W),
- ◊ Protect sea and air lines of communications (SLOC, ALOC),
- ◊ Perform air defense, including:
  - o Anti-air warfare (AAW),
  - o Combat air patrol (CAP)/defensive counter air (DCA),
  - o Offensive counter-air (OCA), and
  - o Theater missile defense (TMD),
- ◊ Provide sea control, sea denial and access through:
  - o Sea control warfare, consisting of:
    - ▪ Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)/Undersea warfare (USW), and
    - ▪ Surface warfare (SUW)/Anti-surface warfare (ASUW),
  - o Offensive and defensive mine warfare (MIW), and
  - o Amphibious Operations,
- ◊ Strike warfare as an element of supporting fires,
- ◊ Maritime interception operations (MIO),
- ◊ Sustain operations afloat and ashore; and
- ◊ Conduct and support special operations.[34]

Maritime combat power can be projected ashore through a variety of methods, including sea-based strike aircraft; submarine, surface and air launched cruise missiles; naval surface fire

support; amphibious forces; and Special Forces. Operations against land forces and targets are usually joint, thus requiring effective synchronization and a sound command structure. These factors, along with the myriad of tasks to be performed by assigned and attached naval forces, will figure prominently in the CJTF's decision on whether to establish a maritime component command or to employ the naval Service component(s) "as is." The breadth and magnitude of JFMCC responsibilities may also be a determining factor, as a significant portion of maritime component responsibilities theoretically remain with the CJTF if no JFMCC is assigned. Examination of potential JFMCC duties shows they can be quite extensive.

JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFMCC)

Functional component commanders are mission oriented by design. When designated, the JFMCC is the single voice regarding maritime forces and requirements, and makes recommendations to the JFC regarding prioritization and allocation of joint force assets. Designating a JFMCC provides the JTF commander with a dedicated, expert subordinate commander and staff responsible for the maritime component of the mission, from organizing and planning through execution and mission accomplishment. In addition to potential maritime missions, the CJTF should consider the following when contemplating the formation of a JFMCC-led joint force maritime component and the assignment of notional duties:

- ◊ Whether the operation will have enough maritime resources to warrant assigning a JFMCC;
- ◊ The complexity of the operation, especially with respect to synchronization, massing combat power, achieving unity of effort, and achieving unity of command;
- ◊ The requirement for maritime operations to extend inland (e.g., amphibious, strike, and/or riverine operations);
- ◊ The enemy's capability to directly and/or asymmetrically (i.e., from land, air and space) influence maritime operations;
- ◊ The requirements of other components to support maritime operations and the complexity of those requirements;
- ◊ The requirements of the maritime component to support other components and the complexity of those requirements;
- ◊ The immediacy and expected duration of the operation;
- ◊ Whether joint forces are participating in joint or multinational sea-based military operations (e.g., maritime forcible entry operation); and

- ◊ Complications and/or factors affecting C^2 and coordination, such as the assignment (or attachment) of MSC and MPS ships or non-U.S. Navy vessels.[35]

Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides additional guidance on designating the JFMCC: "The authority and command relationships of the JFMCC are established by the CJTF. Mission-type orders normally are issued by the CJTF to all components. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the CJTF's intent and concept of operations."[36] The CJTF's considerations should also include this doctrinal guidance:

- ◊ "The JFMCC has functional responsibility for planning and when directed, executing maritime operations..." and
- ◊ The JFMCC may also be designated the JFACC, either temporarily or permanently, operation-dependent.[37]

Organizing and resourcing the JFMCC Staff is another consideration. The staff should be representative of the joint force composition to ensure resident expertise in all areas of operations. This representation also facilitates doctrinal support to the other JTF components. In addition, "augmentees from the other Services comprising the joint force maritime component command add the necessary expertise to ensure the proper conduct of operations."[38]

POTENTIAL JFMCC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In designing the JFMCC, a careful comparison of the doctrinal duties of the Service component commanders and the various other functional component commanders is useful in establishing a baseline. By examining the unique capabilities and distinctive roles of the maritime component and blending them into this core, the specific duties and responsibilities of the JFMCC can be developed. Several generic doctrinal responsibilities are appropriate to all Service and functional component commanders:

- ◊ Issue planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements,
- ◊ Analyze various courses of action,
- ◊ Function as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by CJTF,
- ◊ Establish combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF planning guidance, and
- ◊ Provide the JFC with recommendations on target priorities within the target cycle.[39]

Of these potential generic responsibilities, each is either inherent to planning and executing joint operations or to developing the requisite C^2 and coordination mechanisms necessary to build a viable joint force.

Potential JFCC Responsibilities	JF ACC	JF LCC	JF MCC	JF SOCC	Srvc Comp
Advising on Component Force Employment					
Advise CJTF on proper employment of all forces under control of **JFACC**.	X				
Advise CJTF on proper employment of all forces under control of **JFLCC**.		X			
Advise CJTF on proper employment of all forces under control of **JFMCC**.			X		
Advise CJTF on proper employment of all **SOF & assets**.				X	
Make recommendations to CJTF on proper employment of Service component forces.					X
Concept of Operations Planning & Coordination					
Develop a joint air operations plan in support of CJTF's concept of operations.	X				
Plan, coordinate, allocate & task joint air operations in accordance with CJTF concept operations & air apportionment decisions.	X				
Plan & coordinate land operations; employ designated land forces in support of CJTF's concept of operations.		X			
Plan & coordinate maritime operations; employ designated maritime forces in support of CJTF's concept of operations.			X		
Plan & coordinate special operations; employ SOF in support of CJTF's concept of operations.				X	
Plan & coordinate operations; employ Service forces in support of CJTF's concept of operations.					X
Coordinating with other Component Commanders					
Coordinate joint air operations with other JTF component commanders & subordinate task forces to ensure the most efficient support to the CJTF.	X				
Coordinate with other JTF component commanders & subordinate task forces to ensure that the most efficient support is provided to CJTF.		X	X		
Coordinate conduct of special operations with other JTF component commanders & subordinate task forces.				X	
Coordinate with other JTF component commanders & subordinate task forces to ensure that the most efficient support is provided to CJTF.					X
Evaluating Component Operations					
Evaluate results of joint air operations.	X				
Evaluate results of [joint] land operations.		X			
Evaluate results of [joint] maritime operations.			X		
Evaluate results of special operations.				X	
Evaluate results of operations.					X
Maintaining Operational-Level Focus					
Focus on operational-level functions & their span of control.		X	X	X	
Focus on operational-level Service core capabilities.					X

TABLE 2. POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFCC) RESPONSIBILITIES SIMILAR-IN-NATURE (AS LISTED IN JOINT PUB 5-00.2)[40]

Table 2 provides a list of doctrinal responsibilities for Service and functional component commanders that are similar in nature. Although the preceding universal responsibilities appear to be limited, an examination of Table 2 reveals that many component commander specific responsibilities are quite similar; the subtle variances reflect the different roles and specialties assigned each of the components. Potential component commander responsibilities vary according to the commander's expertise, the unique nature of the component's operations, and specialization not inherent in all components. These similar responsibilities fall into the general

Potential JFCC Responsibilities	JF ACC	JF LCC	JF MCC	JF SOCC	Srvc Comp
JFACC Unique					
Recommend to CJTF apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders.	X				
Control execution of joint air operations as specified by CJTF.	X				
Perform duties of the airspace control authority &/or perform duties of the area air defense commander **when assigned by CJTF**.	X				
JFSOCC Unique					
Synchronize sustainment for SOF.				X	
Service Component Commander Unique					
Operations-Related					
Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.					X
Assume responsibility for areas of operation, if assigned (land & naval forces).					X
Providing Logistic Support					
Coordinate logistic support through Service channels for the Service component forces.					X
Inform CJTF of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability.					X
Service-related					
Retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions such as internal administration, training, logistics & Service component intelligence operations.					X
Conduct joint training.					X
Providing Forces					
Select & nominate specific units of parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces.					X
Service-unique Plans					
Provide, as requested, supporting joint operation & exercise plans.					X

TABLE 3. POSSIBLE JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFCC) RESPONSIBILITIES UNIQUE-IN-NATURE (AS LISTED IN JOINT PUB 5-00.2)[41]

categories of advising, planning, coordination, force employment, evaluation, and maintaining operational focus.

Table 3 lists component commander doctrinal responsibilities that are unique in nature and appropriate to individual components. Currently, these notional component commander responsibilities are only assigned to either the Service component commanders or one of two functional component commanders, the JFSOCC or the JFACC.[42] The absence of unique duties for the JFMCC and the JFLCC is not necessarily indicative of their roles, but more likely reflects the varied maturity of current joint doctrine – the JFLCC Handbook was only recently approved (July 2001) and the JFMCC Manual is in development. A complete list of functional component responsibilities should reflect each component's unique role and the contributions it makes to the joint team. Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be revised to include an expanded list of JFMCC and JFLCC responsibilities. In general, the Service component commander responsibilities are Service-specific functions, including logistic support and training.

PROPOSED JFMCC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

While JFMCC doctrine is yet to be promulgated, several joint doctrine and proposed doctrine resources are available to shape proposed JFMCC doctrine. These include Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*; Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*; Joint Pub 3-02, *Amphibious Ops*; Joint Pub 3-16, *Multinational Operations*; Joint Pub 3-30, *Command and Control for Air Operations*; Joint Pub 3-31, the *JFLCC Handbook*; and Joint Pub 3-13.1, *Command & Control.* Draft documents include "Study Draft 1" of NATO Allied Joint Pub (AJP) 3.1, *Allied Joint Maritime Operations,* and the "First Draft" of a proposed JFMCC Manual, currently in work at Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC).

Additionally, NWDC's Maritime Battle Center sponsors and conducts an annual *Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE)* in conjunction with the U.S. Second and Third Fleets. Other participants include U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and each of the other services. Fleet Battle Experiment India (FBE-I), conducted 18-28 June 2001, employed a JTF organization with a mix of Service and functional components. The main initiative of FBE Juliet (FBE-J), tentatively scheduled for the summer of 2002, is to "develop and evaluate a JFMCC operational command and control process that will provide a capability to prioritize multiple tasks ... and conduct the full range of Effects Based Operations (EBO) in a joint environment."[43] The U.S. Naval War College paper *Fleet Battle Experiment India* and the NWDC Draft Working Paper *Concept of Operations for Maritime Planning Process in FBE-J* both provide information useful in compiling potential JFMCC duties and responsibilities. By

reviewing these various references while keeping the roles of naval forces and the enduring missions of the U.S. Navy in mind, a list of JFMCC-specific duties and responsibilities can be postulated.

As this paper has shown, maritime forces offer significant capabilities to a joint force, many of which are unique to the maritime component. The numerous and widely varied roles of naval forces enable them to arrive rapidly on-scene, often in advance of other forces, to provide assured access for arriving joint forces and to transition into joint operations. While many of the duties and responsibilities of the JFMCC are common with or similar to those of other component commanders, many are as unique and varied as are maritime capabilities and naval force roles. A proposed list of additional JFMCC duties and responsibilities follows. Those listed in Joint Pub 5-00.2 are generally not included, as they are already doctrine; however, when a proposed expansion of duties or better definition is offered, it is included. Some of these recommendations may appear intrinsic, but are listed, as they are not found in the readily referenced joint doctrine listings.

When the JFC/CJTF designates a Naval Area of Operations (AO), the JFMCC becomes the supported commander within the AO. Per Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, "the supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of the task assigned by the JFC."[44] The overall responsibility of the JFMCC is to organize, plan, coordinate and direct the execution of maritime operations in support of the JFC/CJTF concept of operations – within the parameters of the designated command relationships and JTF C^2. The JFMCC also allocates and tasks joint maritime/naval forces based on the JFC/CJTF concept of operations and his maritime apportionment decision. Potential additional joint force duties and responsibilities of the JFMCC include (but are not limited to):

- ◊ Develop a maritime operations plan that supports the operational objectives of the JFC/CJTF, optimizes the operations of task-organized naval forces, and best supports the joint force and mission.[45]
  - o Recommend to the JFC/CJTF the apportionment of the joint maritime effort (after consultation with the other component commanders).
  - o Design naval force EBO to concentrate the effects of maritime combat power at critical times and places (i.e., decisive points) to achieve and leverage advantages over the enemy.
  - o Organize the maritime component to optimize the proven Navy practice of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) organization with its "control by negation" authority.

- ◊ Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of assigned and attached forces and capabilities to the maritime component and Naval AO based on the JFC/CJTF maritime apportionment.
- ◊ Direct the execution of the joint maritime operations as specified by the JFC/CJTF.
  - o Make timely adjustments to targeting and the tasking and employment of assigned and attached forces and capabilities.
  - o Coordinate changes with affected component commanders and the JFC/CJTF as appropriate.
- ◊ Coordinate the planning and execution of maritime operations with the other component commanders, subordinate JTFs, and supporting agencies, to ensure unity of effort.
  - o Coordinate air support of maritime/naval operations with the JFACC.
  - o Establish liaisons accordingly.
- ◊ Establish and maintain maritime superiority in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- ◊ Synchronize and integrate movement and maneuver, firepower, and interdiction in support of maritime and joint operations.
  - o As a member of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), designate target priorities, effects, and timing within the Naval AO.
  - o Nominate targets located within the Naval AO to the joint targeting process.
  - o Coordinate battle damage assessment (BDA) with the CJTF and other component commanders.
- ◊ Support the JFACC for counter-air operations, strike, theater-wide and/or JOA-wide interdiction, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and strategic attack.
  - o Ensure that available maritime air assets, both sea-based and land-based, are integrated into JFACC operations.
  - o Per Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air* Operations, make maritime "air capabilities/forces available for JFACC or JFC (under the JFC staff option) planning and tasking [as] determined by the JFC, ...based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations."[46]
    - ▪ The JFC's air apportionment decision allocates a subordinate commander's air assets between needs for component direct air capabilities/forces and joint air capabilities/forces.
- ◊ Provide naval cruise missile strikes as directed in support of the JFC concept of operations and overall mission. Work with the JFACC to de-conflict cruise missile launches and air operations.

- ◊ Provide the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC) for maritime-based air and missile defense or joint theater missile defense (JTMD), if so tasked by the JFC/CJTF.
- ◊ Support JFC/CJTF Information Operations (IO) concept of operations and execution.
  - o Develop IO requirements to support maritime operations.
  - o Synchronize maritime component IO assets as directed.[47]
- ◊ Serve as the airspace control authority for Amphibious AOs.
  - o Per Joint Pub 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*, "During maritime operations such as amphibious operations, the airspace control authority will normally designate the maritime commander as the control authority for a specific airspace control area during the conduct of the amphibious operation."[48]
- ◊ In support of battlespace shaping, engagement operations, and decisive operations, perform the following missions and actions:
  - o Conduct maritime mine detection, avoidance and countermeasures specifically required to support joint operations (i.e., not accomplished for sea control),
  - o Protect neutral merchant, fishing and private vessels transiting the JOA as directed, and
  - o Provide amphibious task force support for ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) operations.
- ◊ Be prepared to retrieve withdrawing amphibious, ground or Special forces in support of amphibious withdrawal and/or redeployment.
- ◊ Evaluate the results of maritime operations to include the effectiveness of offensive MIW, ASW/USW, ASUW/SUW, AAW, strike, SEW, MIO, and maritime logistics operations. Report to the JFC/CJTF in support of the overall combat assessment (CA) effort.
- ◊ Serve as a supporting commander for such additional operations as:
  - o Joint theater missile defense,
  - o Joint fire support,
  - o Air interdiction within the air and land AOs,
  - o Joint strike and strategic attack,
  - o Theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and
  - o Other support duties as assigned.

Combining this list with the JFMCC responsibilities listed in Tables 2 and 3 produces an extensive, albeit not all inclusive, list of likely JFMCC duties and responsibilities. There are few

surprises in this proposed list – although some items may be open to debate. Nonetheless, this list portrays the magnitude and scope of the potential JFMCC role. However, this alone does not answer the question of, "Why a JFMCC, why not just a naval Service component commander?" Examination of a pair of well-documented cases of U.S. multi-service operations should illuminate any potential need for a JFMCC. By analyzing the C^2 structure and command relationships in each campaign, and their effect on the operation's execution and outcome, lessons can be gleaned and insights gained that are applicable to today's joint force structure and C^2. Then in turn, the proposed JFMCC model can be applied to these case studies to determine if improvements could have been realized. Thus, the need for a JFMCC in support of the JFC/CJTF can be validated or dismissed. The U.S. invasions of Leyte and Okinawa during World War II offer two appropriate case studies. In addition to fitting this approach, the maturity of U.S. and Allied joint operations achieved late in WWII makes Leyte and Okinawa appropriate case studies. In discussing the organization and C2 of these two campaigns, modern joint terms will be loosely applied where appropriate.

LEYTE CAMPAIGN CASE STUDY

On 20 October 1944, the largest World War II invasion force yet assembled in the Pacific Ocean assaulted the Philippine island of Leyte. The primary objectives were two-fold; first, to secure the next echelon of forward operating bases (FOB) in the Pacific island-hopping campaign against Japan; and second, to liberate the Philippine Islands from Japanese occupation. The two corps (plus) sized Army force assembled to conduct the amphibious assault on Leyte required a supporting naval and air armada of a size unprecedented in the Pacific. Both major theaters of the Pacific Ocean became force providers to create this large joint force. The Philippine Campaign was within the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) area of responsibility. As Supreme Commander, SWPA, GEN Douglas MacArthur was the supported JFC. ADM Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Operating Area (POA), coordinated with GEN MacArthur to create a campaign-specific task organization and command structure.

JOINT FORCES ORGANIZATION FOR LEYTE

Figure 3 provides the basic command organization for the U.S. theaters of operation for the Pacific-Far East, as it existed in 1944. There was no all-inclusive "Pacific War Theater" or a Pacific unified commander, as one exists today. The first and only common superior for GEN MacArthur and ADM Nimitz was the President of the United States. Moreover, MGen LeMay, in charge of the Pacific strategic bombing campaign, did not report to any superior in theater.



FIGURE 3. U.S. PACIFIC-FAR EAST WORLD WAR II COMMAND RELATIONS (1944)[49]

Figure 4 is an overview of the Allied organization for the Leyte Campaign. Note that a campaign-specific coordination link was established between GEN MacArthur and ADM Halsey, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet (who reported to ADM Nimitz). ADM Halsey retained 3RD Fleet's fast carriers, modern battleships, and their escorts – the "striking fleet" – and operated in support of the invasion. Halsey had transferred his amphibious fleet and their escorts to "MacArthur's Navy," VADM Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, for Leyte. Key mission responsibilities and tasking for Leyte included:

- ◊ Allied Air Forces Southwest Pacific Area (AAF SWPA) under LTG Kenney was essentially the AFFOR in standby, since Leyte was beyond the operational reach of ground-based Allied tactical air. AAF SWPAC was not a major player until sufficient local airfields were secured.
- ◊ U.S. Sixth Army, commanded by LTG Krueger, was designated the Leyte Expeditionary Force (i.e., the amphibious assault force), and became the land



FIGURE 4. U.S.-ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONS – LEYTE CAMPAIGN[50]

component once ashore. The Expeditionary Force's mission and tasking effectively made LTG Krueger the JFLCC, albeit the land component was largely single Service (Army). Nonetheless, under today's doctrine, had Krueger served as the ARFOR Commander, MacArthur would have functioned as his own JFLCC. Kruger retained operational-level Service component commander responsibilities.

◊ GEN MacArthur retained SWPA theater-wide Service component responsibilities. Allied Land Forces, commanded by GEN Sir Blamey, relieved U.S. Sixth Army of their previous responsibilities, thus serving in a supporting role.

◊ VADM Kinkaid was "dual-hatted" as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet and Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific. For the Leyte campaign, Kinkaid was also designated Commander, Central Philippine Attack Force. In addition to all naval forces conducting and directly supporting the amphibious invasion, Kinkaid's

maritime forces included the Expeditionary Force until it was established ashore (under the traditional CATF-CLF arrangement) and 7TH Fleet organic naval air forces. Given the task organization employed, there are at least two ways to view Kinkaid's position:

- If the composite joint force employed for the Leyte Campaign is considered a single JTF under the command of GEN MacArthur as JFC, VADM Kinkaid's role was not quite a JFMCC. His responsibilities were geographically limited to the AOA. This essentially made him the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) – Central Philippine Attack Force Commander. Under this interpretation, there was no "Leyte JFMCC."
- If the forces assigned the Leyte Campaign are considered to have been a multiple-JTF organization with ADM Halsey's 3RD Fleet assigned a different OA, VADM Kinkaid was effectively the JFMCC in the Leyte JOA and Halsey (3RD Fleet) was a supporting commander.

◊ ADM Halsey's Third Fleet was responsible for the maritime area beyond the AOA. In support of the Leyte campaign, 3RD Fleet was tasked to counter the Imperial Japanese Navy and provide counter air, including pre-invasion raids against Philippine and Formosan airfields. However, ADM Halsey had one standing and overriding order from Nimitz, which was unknown even to MacArthur – destroy the Japanese Fleet should the opportunity arise. This tasking was to prove pivotal to the course of events in the Leyte Campaign.

◊ No JFACC existed. Major commanders controlled their own air forces, passing tactical control, such as for close air support (CAS), as required.

Figure 5 provides an overview of the U.S. naval organization for the Leyte Campaign. A brief discussion of naval force missions, responsibilities and tasking for Leyte is in order:

◊ Immediately noticeable is that 3RD and 7TH Fleets were not under a single theater-level commander. The liaison/coordination established between ADM Halsey, Commander, 3RD Fleet, and GEN MacArthur, the "Leyte JFC," did little to temper the service parochialism embodied in the Nimitz-MacArthur relationship. Third and Seventh Fleets operated independently – Halsey essentially "courtesy copied" Kinkaid on his actions and usually without detail. While operating as a "supporting commander" is an accepted and commonly used command relationship, it should not be permitted to compromise unity of effort. Inadequate C^2, synchronization, coordination, and/or communications can undermine or even doom joint force efforts.



FIGURE 5. U.S. NAVAL FORCES COMMAND RELATIONS – LEYTE CAMPAIGN[51]

◊ ADM Kinkaid's amphibious assault force consisted of the Northern and Southern Attack Forces, responsible for landing troops and supporting them in their respective AOAs. Also reporting to Kinkaid were various supporting task forces and task groups. This was a practiced, experienced organization; 7TH Fleet had been assigned to MacArthur since the New Guinea Campaign as his Allied Naval Forces. However, while Kinkaid's older battleships and "low-mix" escort carriers were sufficient for conducting and supporting amphibious assaults, they were not suitable for major fleet engagements.

◊ ADM Halsey's 3RD Fleet was basically unchanged, save for the transfer of his amphibious forces (with escorts) to 7TH Fleet. Halsey retained most of the Pacific naval air forces within his Fast Carrier Task Force, and essentially all of the major

surface combatants appropriate to WWII-era war-at-sea. Although operating in support of the Leyte Campaign, 3RD Fleet operations continued much as before. Halsey conducted carrier strikes (against Luzon and Formosa) and sought an engagement with the Japanese Combined Fleet. The invasion of Leyte merely reduced the doubt about where the Japanese Fleet would next appear.

Figure 6 illustrates the ground assault (land component) organization for the Leyte Campaign. Sourced from a single service, the organization was standard Army doctrine at the time, except for the emergence of the Army Service Command component now that larger land forces warranted larger support echelons. However, because the battlespace was initially beyond the operational reach of Army Air Force (AAF) tactical air, Sixth Army was dependent on carrier air until it could secure its own airfields on Leyte. The Expeditionary Force was subordinate to Kinkaid (CATF) until established ashore.



FIGURE 6. U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES COMMAND RELATIONS – LEYTE CAMPAIGN[52]

THE EFFECTS OF C^2 ON THE LEYTE CAMPAIGN

> Leyte Gulf "illustrates the necessity for a single naval command in a combat area responsible for and in full control of all combat units involved. ... Division of operational control in a combat area leads at least to confusion, lack of coordination, and overloaded communications (a fault which was pronounced during the battle on the American side), and could result in disaster."
>
> —ADM William F. "Bull" Halsey

While the ways, means and ends process was satisfied, campaign execution was not as originally envisioned. Leyte was effectively secured on 25 December 1944, just over two months after the initial amphibious assault. Superficially, the Leyte Campaign was a resounding success. However, the rapid, favorable outcome was in jeopardy on more than one occasion owing largely to fractured organization and command structures. Poor coordination, poor command and control, poor synchronization, and poor communication might have led to disaster if not for the determined efforts of U.S. forces, confusion among and poor decisions by the Japanese commanders, and some "luck-of-the-draw." The absence of a JFMCC, or at least a commander with overall control of all naval forces was a major factor, as later admitted by ADM Halsey (in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*). This became most apparent when ADM Halsey abruptly ordered 3RD Fleet north to intercept ADM Osagawa's Strike Fleet in keeping with Nimitz's standing order to destroy the Japanese Fleet whenever the opportunity arose.

Although unity of command and unity of effort existed under GEN MacArthur, it did not exist along the "dotted line" between MacArthur and Halsey. Had not a confused ADM Kurita decided to break his one-sided engagement with Kinkaid's escort carrier force during the action off Samar on 25 October 1944, the success of the amphibious operations would have been seriously jeopardized. Interestingly, the Japanese Fleet made several key errors, which were also rooted in a lack of unity of command and effort. The result was a Japanese failure to synchronize the operations of their four naval task forces and naval air forces. This undoubtedly minimized the penalty for the disjointed actions of 3RD and 7TH Fleets. Halsey's pursuit of Ozawa's deception force with all of his available forces left Kinkaid's 7TH Fleet and LTG Krueger's Sixth Army exposed to a still formidable Imperial Japanese Navy surface force. The greatest naval battle ever fought was fraught with errors on both sides. The actions of individual U.S. task forces and units prevailed despite, not because, of C^2.

APPLYING JFMCC MODEL TO LEYTE

Leyte is an excellent case study for validating the JFMCC role. Even putting the personalities of Nimitz and MacArthur aside, the command organization assembled for the

Leyte Campaign was problematic. The resultant disunity of command and effort is not surprising. Organization of the maritime component was flawed. ADM Halsey's reflection that Leyte should have been conducted with a single naval commander provides the strongest possible endorsement for a JFMCC. Employed as envisioned in today's joint doctrine, a JFMCC would have prevented the nearly catastrophic chain of events.

However, merely assigning a JFMCC by superimposing one on the existing structure is neither the best option, nor even a workable one. To establish a viable command structure, the maritime component must also be organized to provide the commander effective C^2 – especially for an operation on the scale of Leyte. Given that there is no single prescribed manner to select and assign a JFMCC, or to organize the maritime component, multiple options existed:

- ◊ Assign ADM Halsey as the JFMCC. Assign all naval forces in the Central Philippines Attack Force (7TH Fleet) or serving in a supporting role (3RD Fleet assets) to the Leyte Campaign maritime component. VADM Kinkaid as Commander, Amphibious Task Forces (CATF), retains command of the Central Philippine Attack Force as originally organized, but reports to Halsey instead of GEN MacArthur. VADM Mitscher with his Fast Carrier Task Force reports to Halsey (JFMCC). This proposal places Halsey under MacArthur (JFC), eliminating the "dotted line." See Figure 7 for an illustration of this option.
- ◊ Assign VADM Kinkaid as the JFMCC with the additional required naval forces assigned. This proposal makes Kinkaid responsible for the entire Leyte maritime AO instead of only the AOA. The additional assigned naval forces are those required to effectively protect the amphibious force from attack by the Japanese Fleet, as was attempted under the Shō Plan. To achieve an acceptable risk level, a minimal force should include a carrier group, such as RADM McCain's Carrier Group (TG-38.1), which had been detached for refit and refueling, and a modern Battleship Division (BATDIV). Figure 8 illustrates this option.
  - o This is essentially the task force (TF-34) that Kinkaid thought had been formed by Halsey to remain east of the Philippines to guard the amphibious force against the Japanese Fleet approaching from the west or north.
  - o Under this option, it is advisable to appoint another senior flag officer, such as VADM Wilkinson (CTF-79), to serve as the CATF. The JFMCC of such a large operation should not be his own CATF. Creation of a separate Task Force 77, with its own commander, subordinate to the CATF should also be considered as a CATF span of control issue given the scope of the Leyte operation.



FIGURE 7. LEYTE COMMAND RELATIONS WITH ADM HALSEY AS JFMCC

- A corollary to this option (Figure 8) is to use the same structure, but assign a senior flag officer other than Halsey or Kinkaid as the JFMCC. The advantage of this variation is that Kinkaid remains "in place" as MacArthur's CATF/NAVFOR (as in Figure 7) – an established working relationship – albeit with a JFMCC added to the chain of command. This option doesn't dual-task Halsey as JFMCC and "strike fleet" commander, which may be preferable considering the magnitude of the operation.

Given the Leyte Campaign's initial reliance on naval tactical air, the JFACC would have been a naval commander. In a smaller operation, this might be a dual-hatted JFMCC, a member of his staff, or one of his subordinate air commanders. Given the size of the maritime and air components and the C^2 considerations at Leyte, another commander of equal stature was required as JFACC. VADM Mitscher (CTF-38) is a likely candidate for the JFACC, since he commanded the bulk of the tactical air assets at the onset of the Leyte Campaign. Assigning Mitscher as JFACC would have produced the inter-fleet coordination and communication



FIGURE 8. LEYTE COMMAND RELATIONS WITH ADM KINKAID AS JFMCC

otherwise absent. If Mitscher is not assigned, then another flag officer would be appropriate, either from within assigned forces or ordered in by Nimitz.

OPERATION ICEBERG–OKINAWA CAMPAIGN CASE STUDY

On 01 April 1945, just over three months after Leyte was secured, U.S. and Allied joint and combined forces invaded the Japanese island of Okinawa in the Ryukyu archipelago, approximately 320 miles southwest of Kyūshū. Operation Iceberg employed the largest World War II amphibious force ever assembled in the Pacific. With the seizure of Okinawa and other key Ryukyu islands, the Allies would be poised to conduct the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands of Kyūshū and Honshū. Largest of the Ryukyus, Okinawa would provide the U.S. with the final forward operating base (FOB) required for the defeat of Japan. Okinawa offered airfields within medium bomber range of Kyūshū and the secure naval anchorages, staging

bases, and ports of debarkation necessary for the imminent homeland invasion. Okinawa was within ADM Nimitz's POA Theater.

As the JFC, Nimitz chose to employ a JTF structure for Operation Iceberg. Initially, all forces were assigned Central Pacific Task Forces (CENPAC TF) under the command of ADM Spruance. Once established ashore under LTG Buckner, USA, the Expeditionary Troops (or Ryukyu Force) effectively became a second JTF, initially reporting to Spruance, then later to Nimitz. As organized and exercised throughout the campaign, Operation Iceberg embodied WWII joint operations at their finest. There were numerous reasons for this success, such as the extensive combat experience of the U.S. forces and their commanders. Not the least was the use of a joint organization with all assigned forces under a single commander. This epitome of "jointness" was carried ashore by the Expeditionary Troops.

The task organization and command structure were campaign-specific. U.S. Tenth Army was formed under LTG Bucker to serve as the Expeditionary Troops (TF-56) for Operation Iceberg. Tenth Army was unique as its force structure included units from all three services. The ground forces were composed of the Army XXIV Corps, the Marine III Amphibious Corps, and two additional Army Divisions. Tenth Tactical Air Force was assigned, as were Naval Forces Ryukyus and a number of other Army and Navy units. The amphibious landing force's sheer magnitude required the support of extensive naval and air armadas. The air forces employed rivaled those used for the Leyte Campaign. Composition of the maritime component differed from Leyte because of the elimination of the Japanese Fleet's offensive capability combined with the increased Kamikaze threats. Once again, the two major theaters within the Pacific became the force providers to build this large joint force. Beyond the transfer of forces and equipment to help form 10TH Army and support the Okinawa landings, GEN MacArthur, Supreme Commander, SWPA, was not a supporting commander.

Operation Iceberg presents an interesting case for validating the JFMCC role as it lacks the major mistakes of the Leyte Campaign.

JOINT FORCES ORGANIZATION FOR OKINAWA

Figure 9 presents the basic U.S. joint forces organization for the Pacific-Far East as it existed in early 1945. Theater Commander relationships remained as they were during the Leyte Campaign. Figure 9 also provides a representation of ADM Nimitz's POA forces (as was shown for GEN MacArthur's SWPA forces in Figure 4).

Figure 10 provides an overview of the Operation Iceberg Allied organization, as it existed through the amphibious phase of the Okinawa Campaign – effective until LTG Buckner was



FIGURE 9. U.S. PACIFIC-PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS COMMAND RELATIONS[53]

fully established ashore. Figure 10 also illustrates the Allied naval organization throughout the campaign. Note that ADM Spruance controlled all naval assets, including covering (supporting) forces with their carrier task forces and surface combatants, and the Joint Expeditionary (Amphibious) Force, which included the landing forces until established ashore (under the traditional CATF-CLF arrangement). VADM Turner was CATF. (Figures 4 and 5 provide comparable information for Leyte.) Amphibious landing craft and other equipment used in the Philippines were transferred to the Joint Expeditionary Force to support the Okinawa landings. Loosely applying today's joint terms where appropriate, here is a brief discussion of responsibilities and tasking for Operation Iceberg:

- ◊ ADM Spruance was dual-hatted as Commander, Fifth Fleet, and Commander, Central Pacific Task Forces, responsible for the Ryukyu Campaign. Spruance was effectively



FIGURE 10. U.S.-ALLIED CENTRAL PACIFIC TASK FORCES – RYUKYU CAMPAIGN[54]

a JFMCC throughout Operation Iceberg – he controlled all naval forces assigned to the maritime component until Fifth Fleet was detached. Given the task organization employed, Spruance's position as the de facto JFMCC can be interpreted in different ways:

- The Okinawa joint force can be considered a single JTF under the command of ADM Nimitz as JFC with subordinate JTFs assigned. Under this theoretical organization and command structure, Spruance was both Nimitz's JFMCC and the CJTF of the subordinate JTF CENPAC TF throughout the campaign. (Although, CFMCC may be more proper, given the Royal Navy forces assigned.)
- CENPAC TF can also be considered the opening-phase JTF, with a second JTF later forming under Buckner. Under this interpretation, ADM Spruance is a CJTF

and his own JFMCC. Once LTG Buckner is established ashore as CJTF Ryukyu Force, Spruance's responsibilities narrow to a supporting role. He retains responsibility for the Okinawa-Ryukyu maritime OA and for maritime support of the joint forces ashore. Thus, Spruance continues in his JFMCC role, but operates parallel to the CJTF Ryukyu Force (Buckner). Thus, two task forces operate in concert to prosecute the operation. With the British Carrier Force assigned to the maritime component, CENPAC TF functions as an Allied naval task force, making Spruance his own CFMCC.

◊ In addition to serving as a CJTF and the JFMCC/CFMCC, ADM Spruance was also commander of the Covering Forces and Special Groups – essentially Fifth Fleet's battle forces, comprised of the Fast Carrier Attack Force along with the newer U.S. battleships and various other surface combatants. Many of these forces bore the brunt of the Kamikaze attacks, especially the picket destroyers and destroyer escorts.

◊ As Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force (CTF-51), ADM Turner was the CATF. Task Force 51 had a large number of joint forces assigned: the Northern and Southern Attack Forces (CTF-53 and CTF-55); the Gunfire and Covering Force; the Demonstration Group (with 2ND Marine Division detaching after conducting two amphibious feints); the Amphibious Support Force; the Western Islands Attack Group (with most of 77TH Division later joining Buckner on Okinawa), and Buckner's Floating Reserve. The two-corps sized landing forces that were embarked in TF-53 and TF-55 became the core of LTG Buckner's Expeditionary Troops.

◊ The Service component commands effectively resided within ADM Nimitz's POA command, although differing from today's joint doctrine. LTG Richardson, Commander, US Army Forces POA, was the ARFOR. LTG Richardson and MGen Hale, Commander, Strategic Air Forces POA, essentially shared AFFOR duties since AAF tactical and strategic air were under separate commands. Nimitz was his own NAVFOR with the various Navy commanders under him assigned a specific area of responsibility by type of forces assigned and/or geographic area of responsibility.

- Many of the POA Service component forces were marshaled in support of Operation Iceberg, serving in a supporting role appropriate to their mission, force structure, and geographic area of responsibility.

◊ The joint forces assigned Operation Iceberg were practiced and experienced. They were responsible for a series of highly successful POA island-hopping operations that

had steadily advanced north through the central Pacific toward Japan, starting with Guadalcanal in 1942, and most recently securing Iwo Jima on 26 March 1945.

◊ MGen LeMay's XX Army Air Force provided crucial support to Operation Iceberg by conducting strategic bombing strikes on the Kyūshū airfields, where many of the Japanese Kamikaze and conventional air sorties originated. Prioritization of XX AAF missions was a source of concern for Nimitz and Spruance, however, as LeMay strongly favored the firebombing of Japanese cities over offensive counter air missions in support of the Okinawa Campaign.

Figure 11 illustrates the Expeditionary Troops organization for the Ryukyu Campaign. Unlike Leyte, this organization was not a single service or functional component ground assault force (i.e., ARFOR land component). LTG Buckner's Ryukyu Force was sourced from all services. Buckner controlled his own functional air component, Tenth Tactical Air Force (TAF)



FIGURE 11. U.S. EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS – RYUKYU CAMPAIGN[55]

Ryukyus, composed of Army (AAF) and Marine Corps tactical air, and various other joint forces, including some Navy units. Buckner served as his own JFLCC. MGen Mulcahy, USMC, served as Buckner's JFACC. Mulcahy commanded all tactical air ashore, Army and Marine, and was responsible for the coordination and incorporation of all tactical air supporting the ground forces, including carrier air flying CAS.

Although the Expeditionary Troops force was initially part of Spruance's CENPAC TF, the Ryukyu Forces effectively became a separate JTF once fully established ashore. Until then, Buckner reported first to Turner (CATF), then to Spruance; afterwards, he reported directly to ADM Nimitz. When ADM Spruance's Fifth Fleet detached from the Ryukyu Campaign, LTG Buckner was to assume responsibility for the Okinawa maritime area to 25 miles offshore, controlling a small naval force, with RADM Cobb as his JFMCC. (Upon Buckner's death, however, LTG Geiger, USMC, Commander of Marine III Amphibious Corps, assumed command of 10TH Army.)

THE EFFECTS OF C^2 ON THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

While Okinawa offered many difficulties and surprises for U.S. and Allied forces, most were courtesy of the Japanese and Mother Nature. Okinawa was effectively secured 21 June 1945, less than three months after the initial amphibious assault. Unlike Leyte, there was no fractured organization or command structure. In fact, as the pinnacle of U.S. joint operations during WWII, Okinawa was an impressive exhibition of operational art. Lessons learned from past campaigns were expertly applied, achieving synchronization and the effective massing of combat power. Despite effective operational deception, well-designed defenses, and a valiant effort by Japanese forces, the U.S. ability to mass combat effectively power steadily attrited and eventually overwhelmed the Japanese defenders. Unity of command and the use of standardized joint procedures throughout the campaign ensured unity of effort.

Mother Nature's primary contributions to U.S.-Allied difficulties were the monsoon season that started in late May and the terrain of Okinawa, on which the Japanese defenders capitalized. The Japanese contributed asymmetrical threats, such as Kamikaze attacks, and operational deception, which was largely achieved by not following the Japanese doctrine to which the U.S. had become accustomed. This change in tactics started with GEN Ushijima's decision not to defend the beaches in depth and continued throughout the battle with such tactics as the clandestine retreat from the Shuri line.

Part of the reason that the U.S. was able to secure Okinawa within three months, despite a determined defense by an enemy prepared to fight to his death, was the level to which

joint cooperation was raised during Operation Iceberg. Despite extensive damage suffered to ships and massive casualties suffered by sailors, Spruance's maritime component remained on station throughout the campaign to protect amphibious/logistic shipping and the joint forces ashore. On Okinawa, LTG Buckner ensured that the troops on the frontlines received the support they needed. Artillery and CAS were assigned to units and targets according to priority. This included allocating artillery to the units with the greatest requirement, even if that meant Marine artillery supported Army infantry. As previously discussed, tactical air ashore was also fully integrated, with the "JFACC" responsible for controlling all CAS missions, including sorties provided by the fleet. Unity of command in Operation Iceberg paid big dividends.

APPLYING JFMCC MODEL TO OPERATION ICEBERG

The level of success enjoyed under the organization and command structure employed during Operation Iceberg, makes it a more positive case study for the JFMCC model. Okinawa offers an excellent opportunity to validate the JFMCC role from a different perspective. While Operation Iceberg was highly successful and lacked the C^2 flaws of Leyte, the operation enjoyed many advantages that cannot be expected in today's environment. The "opportunity" to conduct a future operation of comparable complexity with a joint force and commanders seasoned by three years of continuous battle is extremely unlikely – even a six-month Desert Storm-style build-up is a "luxury" that may not available in the future. As Operation Enduring Freedom has demonstrated, commanders must be able to rapidly build and employ viable JTFs suited to the mission. Proven joint doctrine is required to consistently deliver the intended results.

The Iceberg maritime component was organized and employed in a manner *similar* to what could be expected under present joint doctrine. However, the Iceberg force organization and C^2 were not as envisioned by current joint doctrine. This is readily apparent in discussing assignment of the JFMCC responsibilities within the joint force organization. Employing proven joint doctrine, including a validated JFMCC model, should enable the JFC/CJTF to rapidly assemble a JTF best structured for the assigned mission – one that can deliver the required results with reasonable assurance and minimal risk. Inherent to a successful JTF are component commanders with clearly established positions and well-defined roles. Here are some Operation Iceberg options employing a more "standard" JTF and JFMCC:

- ADM Nimitz retains command of the Ryukyu Task Force as JFC. ADM Spruance is his JFMCC. Once established ashore, LTG Buckner is the JFLCC, reporting directly to ADM Nimitz. MGen Mulcahy is the JFACC, reporting directly to Nimitz. Due to C^2

considerations, Mulcahy would initially operate afloat until facilities are available ashore. Alternatively, the JFACC could initially be a Navy commander afloat, such as VADM Mitscher, Commander, Fast Carrier Attack Force (CTF-58), and then pass ashore to Mulcahy, much like a CATF to CLF handoff. The disadvantage of this option is that the CINC/JFC is also the JTF commander. Figure 12 illustrates this option.



FIGURE 12. RYUKYU COMMAND RELATIONS WITH ADM SPRUANCE AS JFMCC

◊ Another option is to appoint ADM Spruance as the CJTF "Ryukyu Assault Force". A different Navy commander is appointed as the JFMCC, either from assigned maritime forces or by assigning another senior flag officer to the organization. Buckner is JFLCC. JFACC is as discussed above (unless Mitscher is appointed JFMCC, then another commander may be appointed JFACC). Although this is the largest POA

operation, it frees Nimitz to retain his theater-strategic focus and plan for the invasion of Japan. Figure 13 illustrates this option. (Alternatively, another senior flag officer could be appointed as the CJTF with Spruance as his JFMCC.)



FIGURE 13. RYUKYU COMMAND RELATIONS WITH ADM SPRUANCE AS CJTF

Under each option, Ryukyu CJTF would eventually pass to the JFLCC (the primary commander ashore), as was executed under the original plan.

Applying either of these proposed models to Operation Iceberg reduces ambiguity in the command relationships by providing an organization and C^2 structure with "cleaner lines" for command, control and coordination. While Okinawa does not provide an example of a joint operation that demands a JFMCC to achieve unity of command and effort, it does provide an outstanding example (by proxy) of what a JFMCC can do for a JTF. Both case studies provide valuable lessons on which to draw for design of the JFMCC.

However, a contemporary JFMCC model is required. The environment in which current and future operations will be executed demands a modern, standardized organization and C^2 to ensure unity of command, synchronization, and unity of effort. The modern JFMCC role must be well defined to be valid.

OPTIONS FOR ORGANIZING THE JOINT MARITIME FORCE

> JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command *to integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction or control over the scheme of maneuver* [emphasis added]. ...the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force composition capabilities and command and control capabilities when selecting a commander.
>
> —Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*

The JFC has a host of options for organizing his joint force. The JFC may conduct operations with Service components only, functional components (Service component-supported), subordinate JTF(s) (Service component-supported), or some combination. The JFC may assign available forces to any functional component as appropriate. As with other joint force components, several options exist for organizing the joint maritime force. The objective is to organize the assigned and attached forces in the most effective way possible, given the mission and the concept of operations. As discussed, there are generally two options available for organizing joint force components:

- ◊ Form a functional component and appoint a component commander, or
- ◊ Task the existing Service force organization and command structure with operational mission accomplishment.[56]

The commander of a joint force must carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of his options before deciding on his joint force organization. Table 4 provides a comparison of the significant advantages and disadvantages of both options, as the case studies illustrate. If a JFMCC is appointed, the appointment should be made early in the planning process – preferably as soon as the need is identified. Ideally, the decision to establish and designate a JFMCC will occur during the concept development phase of the campaign plan, permitting the JFMCC to fully participate in the joint planning process, maximizing unity of effort.[57]

OPTIONS	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Form a Functional Component	Unity of effort under Unity of command	Lead time required to establish headquarters before execution
	Joint focus to maritime operations	Challenges of integrating staffs
	Integrated staff with associated increase in situational awareness	Sourcing the staffs; increased manning and command & control requirements
	Synchronized & integrated force planning & execution - Prioritization, & therefore deconfliction, of competing force requirements	JFCC usually retains Service component responsibilities (requires split focus of the staff)
	Single voice for maritime ops (consolidated picture of maritime capabilities to the JFC, staff and boards)	
	Single battle concept & focus of effort for assigned ops - An aspect of the plan, rather than a function of coordination either horizontally or vertically - Service component may not bring same focus	
	Better resolution of different tasks & priorities assigned to multi-role platforms	
Maintain Service Force C^2	No change in force structure	JFC/CJTF must focus on prosecution of the Service operations
	JFC/CJTF directly integrates maritime control operations with other operations	Potential for JFC/CJTF to focus on tactical to operational interface *vs.* operational to theater/strategic

TABLE 4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JTF ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS [58]

CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING A MARITIME COMPONENT

When forces of two or more military departments are assigned to a single maritime force, the JFC/CJTF will usually establish a JFMCC. In exceptional cases, such as a short duration operation where staff organization, C^4 architecture, and timely responsiveness could prove problematical, another option might be chosen. When working with multiple services, the JFMCC must manage the unique practices and capabilities of each service to ensure synchronization and unity of effort toward common objectives and mission accomplishment.

When the scope of operations is considerable, the JFC must often divide attention among functionally dominated major operations and/or phases of operations – and ensure

synchronization of those operations. In such cases, it is usually beneficial to employ functionally oriented commanders who can concentrate on their areas of expertise and specific responsibilities in support of the JFC's concept of operations.[59] Additionally,

- ◊ Areas of operations that are geographically concentrated in a maritime AO may warrant the employment of a JFMCC.
- ◊ Areas of operations covering a large maritime area may require a JFMCC to control dispersed and/or large numbers of maritime forces.
- ◊ Sequencing of operations in a Naval AO may warrant the establishment of a JFMCC.
- ◊ In joint operations, maritime operations compete for joint force assets – a JFMCC gives the maritime component a strong voice.

EMPLOYING THE JFMCC

When the magnitude of an operation elevates C^2 above the tactical level and requires an operational level command to directly link maritime operations to campaign-theater or strategic objectives, a JFMCC can provide that linkage. In this situation, the JFMCC may be supervising a multi-AO operation or an array of operations. In addition, the mere size and composition of the maritime forces and capabilities available to the JFC may be sufficiently large or of such detail to warrant a JFMCC. A JFMCC is more appropriate to resolve maritime issues when task or organizational complexities limit the JFC/CJTF's effective span of control.

Joint planning and the distinctive focus it brings over service planning is another consideration in deciding whether to employ a JFMCC. A JFMCC provides focused maritime expertise to enhance the detailed planning, coordination and execution of joint operations. Also, while JFMCC planning focuses primarily on integrated employment and operations, a JFMCC can facilitate and integrate the planning of potentially dissimilar multi-Service maritime forces for deployment, transition and redeployment /reconstitution under the JFC/CJTF. Properly employed and equipped, a JFMCC should be a "staff multiplier" for the joint commander.

CONCLUSION

Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander as:

> The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force *responsible* to the establishing commander *for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.* The [JFMCC] is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing

commander. *The [JFMCC] will normally be the commander with* the preponderance of maritime forces and *the requisite command and control capabilities* [emphasis added].

This paper has examined and discussed the essence of this basic JFMCC definition and sought to expand upon it so that the JFMCC role could be validated or dismissed. The JFMCC will undoubtedly appear in future joint doctrine – the basic JFMCC concept already appears in present doctrine. The key is to ensure that a viable JFMCC model is designed and incorporated – assuming the need exists – else the JFMCC will be little more than the NAVFOR commander by another name. A major premise for employing a JFMCC, or any functional component commander, is that the result must be "joint value-added" – the JFC/CJTF appoints a JFMCC to create a better, more capable JTF organization and C^2 structure. The JFMCC and maritime component should be force multipliers that fully support the JFC/CJTF's concept of operations.

The Leyte and Okinawa case studies offer excellent examples to illustrate the potential benefits of appointing a JFMCC. Both cases demonstrate that a JFMCC-commanded maritime component can indeed strengthen the JTF and synchronize joint operations. The Battle of Leyte Gulf not only validated the need for a JFMCC, but underscored it. Okinawa proved that not only is the concept valid, but that the JFMCC can be a JTF combat and C^2 multiplier.

Acceptance of functional component commanders is growing: "Joint integration is best achieved by organizing under functional component commanders."[60] One reason is that the commanders' focus becomes joint, rather than service-oriented. Some of the critical advantages of a JFMCC are that he:

- ◊ Frees the JFC/CJTF to better focus on the overall operation and mission by assuming maritime responsibilities that would otherwise remain with the JFC/CJTF.
- ◊ Fully integrates the maritime commander into the joint team starting with the planning phase. Provides the JFMCC (and other component commanders) with joint staffing.
- ◊ Better integrates the maritime component into the joint team for better synchronization and enhanced supported-supporting command relationships.
- ◊ Typically unifies all maritime assets under one naval/maritime commander for better unity of command and effort.
- ◊ Provides an existing structure to smoothly establish a CFMCC when adding allied and/or coalition forces.

In addition, "It [is] better to have proactive jointness—the ability to achieve effective cooperation *before* the fight. [emphasis added]"[61] "Proactive jointness" is achieved though established, well-exercised joint operating procedures, which serves to maintain "joint

readiness." The JFMCC role is valid – to train, exercise and fight joint, you must structure joint. Functional component commanders offer the best option in most cases. A "JFMCC Manual" is overdue. However, proper definition of the JFMCC role is only the initial challenge. JFMCC must be exercised and proven, to become accepted and standard.

Word Count = 13,481

ENDNOTES

[1] Colin S. Gray, "The Limits of Seapower: Joint Warfare and Unity of Conflict," Joint Force Quarterly 8 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 60.

[2] JFACC and JFLCC are defined in Joint Publication 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-31, *Joint force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Handbook.*

[3] Department of Defense, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Publication 5-00.2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 13 January 1999), ix.

[4] Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000), 2.

[5] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 13-14.

[6] Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2, ix.

[7] Ibid., xii.

[8] Ibid., III-1-2.

[9] Ibid., xii.

[10] Ibid., xiii.

[11] Department of Defense, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 July 2001), V-2.

[12] Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2, I-3.

[13] Ibid., xii

[14] Ibid., pg. III-3

[15] Ibid., xii.

[16] Ibid., xii.

[17] Ibid., III-3

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., II-1.

[21] Ibid., III-2, and Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 September 2001), II-18.

[22] Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2, II-1-2.

[23] Ibid., III-3

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., III-3-4.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Department of the Navy, A 21ST Century Navy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 2001), CD-ROM.

[30] Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review (Winter 1998), 91-102.

[31] Department of the Navy, A 21ST Century Navy, CD-ROM, and Department of the Navy, Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, April 2000), 18-42.

[32] Ibid., Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," 88-102, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept – The Maritime Dimension (Norfolk, VA: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SACLANT), 4 June 2001), 4-11.

[33] Carl E. Mundy, Jr., "Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly 6 (Sprint 1994), 48.

[34] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Allied Joint Maritime Operations, Study Draft 1, Allied Joint Publication 3.1 (Norfolk, VA: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SACLANT), 2 October 2001), 2-49.

[35] Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2, III-8.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., 4-10.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Navy Warfare Development Command, Concept of Operations for Maritime Planning Process in FBE-J, Draft Working Paper, Version 1 (Newport, RI: Navy Warfare Development Command: 7 September 2001), 4.

[44] Department of Defense, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 July 2001), III-10.

[45] Navy Warfare Development Command, Concept of Operations for Maritime Planning Process in FBE-J, Draft Working Paper, Version 1, 19-25.

[46] Department of Defense, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, Joint Publication 3-56.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 14 November 1994), II-1.

[47] Navy Warfare Development Command, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Manual, Working Draft, Joint Publication 3-32 (Newport, R.I.: Naval Warfare Development Command, 11 March 2002), II-3-8.

[48] Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication 3-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 19 September 2001), xii.

[49] Cannon, M. Hamlin, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. U.S. Army in the World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1985), 25.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., 29.

[52] Ibid., 25.

[53] Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle. The U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1960), 20.

[54] Ibid., 20-22

[55] Ibid., 22-24.

[56] Navy Warfare Development Command, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Manual, Working Draft, Joint Publication 3-32, II-3-8.

[57] Ibid., I-4-7.

[58] Ibid., I-5.

[59] Ibid., I-6.

[60] Douglas E. Utley, "The Area of Operations—Fighting One Campaign." Joint Force Quarterly 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998-99), 37.

[61] Robert C. Rubel, "Principles of Jointness," Joint Force Quarterly 27 (Winter 2000-01), 46.

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