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THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN TRANSFORMATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL OLIVER BELLAMY
United States Army Reserve

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The Role Of The Reserve Component In Transformation And Its Effect On Active Component/Reserve Component Integration

By

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Bellamy
U.S. Army Reserve

Colonel Dallas Owens, Jr.
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The Reserve Component (RC) has played an integral role in the Army's cold war strategy and can be expected to continue playing a vital role as the Army's transformation campaign moves forward. With the theme of transformation centered on the concept of a lighter and more mobile force, we will see radical departures from the old ways of doing business. This has significant implications not just for combat forces, but also for support elements, which are heavily concentrated in the RC.

In this paper I will first explore the impact of Army Transformation on the RC, examining its implications from both a combat and support perspective. I propose to begin this examination by analyzing the RC combat force, which is concentrated in the Army National Guard (ARNG), focusing on its current missions and structure. Particular attention will be given to Guard’s potential role as a Homeland Defense force and the need to adjust its structure to support this role. Then, I will examine the Army’s strategy for reducing support in the battlespace (footprint reduction), with emphasis on the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). I will determine the extent to which these efforts have moved forward and whether the USAR will have to redefine itself (given its large support structure) in a reduced support environment.

Next, I will examine transformation and current force capabilities. There is a need for the Army to maintain current force capabilities while transforming by recapitalizing existing equipment throughout the total force.

Finally, transformation holds the potential to derail current integration efforts as the Army becomes disparate in its capabilities with the entry of interim and objective units into the force. Current fielding plans reflect legacy forces being concentrated in the RC and Interim and objective forces concentrated in the AC during the mid to later stages of transformation. Here, I examine whether such a contrast in capabilities is prudent, given the Army’s reliance on the RC.
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THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN TRANSFORMATION AND ITS EFFECT ON ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION

The Reserve Component (RC) has played an integral role in the Army’s cold war strategy and is likely to continue playing a vital role as the Army’s transforms to a 21st century force. The Army of the 21st century will be more responsive, more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable and more sustainable than any of today’s forces. As the Army moves toward this new force we will see radical departures from old ways of doing business. This holds significant implications not just for combat units, but also for support elements, which are heavily concentrated in the Reserve Component.

On September 11, 2001, the nation faced the asymmetric threat defense planners and scholars had been writing and talking about over the last five years. This threat went from a matter of speculation to reality before our very eyes as we witnessed the magnitude of the carnage that such a threat is capable of producing. The U.S military, in conjunction with other federal security agencies, has the lead in defending America, and consequently the need to rapidly transform this nation’s defense force from its cold war underpinnings to a force ready to meet and decisively defeat the new threats of the 21st century is more critical than ever before.

Over the last two and one-half years, the Army has embarked on an ambitious transformation, resulting in the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and other initiatives. The transformation embraces new ways of doing business that take advantage of science and technology and other tenants in order to ultimately transform the Army into an objective force that dominates across the full spectrum of military operations.

In light of the events of September 11th, homeland security will dominate this nation’s security priorities and will consequently impact the Army’s transformation efforts. Given the National Guard’s constitutional responsibility for providing for homeland defense, which is an aspect of the larger homeland security equation, it will undoubtedly be at the forefront of any plans to accomplish this mission.

One thing is for certain; the Army cannot meet its transformation goals without the support and presence of the RC. Desert Shield/Desert Storm validated the RC’s ability to render outstanding support in the areas of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). Consequently, for the last ten years more CS and CSS force structure has been placed into the RC, allowing the Active Component (AC) to use more of its resources to meet combat requirements. This move has placed a greater reliance on the RC to conduct both conflict and peacetime operations. To an extent, it has also facilitated the promotion of Active Component/
Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration. With the three components (Active, Guard & Reserve) intertwined as such, all transformation efforts must ask the question, how does this affect the ability of the RC to render the critical support it provides to soldiers?

In this paper, I will propose what role the Reserve Component should play as the Army transforms to a 21st Century force and how transformation will impact AC/RC integration. I will first examine the RC combat forces, focusing on the Army National Guard (ARNG) and how transformation efforts might be adjusted to better support its involvement in homeland security. I will then examine the RC CS/CSS forces, with some emphasis on the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the efforts spearheaded by the logistics community to reduce the support footprint in the combat zone. Next, I will examine transformation and current force capabilities and the need to maintain these capabilities while transforming by recapitalizing existing equipment throughout the total force. Finally, I will determine how two current AC/RC integration programs will impact and perhaps facilitate efforts to maintain legacy force capabilities as the Army transforms. Here, my focus will be on the Army’s Teaming program to provide a combat perspective and the Multi-Component program to provide a CS/CSS perspective.

TRANSFORMATION & HOMELAND DEFENSE

The military, particularly the Army, will find itself in a myriad of environments, as it wages its war against terrorism. Therefore, a mobile capabilities-based force that can operate in a full array of scenarios is critical. We will now see the Army operating from built up urban terrain areas to both jungle and desert environments. All scenarios are on the table as we confront this threat. Consequently, some of these threat environments place our heavy forces at a tremendous disadvantage. We began to see signs of this shortly after the end of the cold war in places like Somalia and Bosnia. Now, with this new threat at home and abroad, we must rapidly begin the shift from an Army primarily oriented with heavy forces to one that is balanced with heavy, medium and light forces as we move to the objective force concept.

As the U.S. military wages its war on terrorism there has been a debate by senior Army leaders on how to accelerate the Army’s transformation efforts. The Interim Brigade Combat Team concept is perfectly suited for the war being waged in Afghanistan. The U.S. Marine Corps force structure uses a similar platform and has, consequently, validated the utility of a medium-weight brigade during their conduct of operations against the terrorist forces in Afghanistan. Hence, the Army leadership is considering its options on how to expeditiously integrate the IBCT concept into the current force.
At present there are six IBCTs funded and scheduled to come on line over the next five years: two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington (these are the first two brigades to convert); one brigade at Fort Wainwright, Alaska; one brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; one brigade at Fort Polk, LA; and one National Guard brigade in Pennsylvania. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is mandating that one of these brigades be stationed in Europe. However, Army officials have yet to decide whether to delay the conversion of a previously identified brigade to meet this mandate or fund and field an additional seventh Brigade.3

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD’S ROLE & CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

Even though it has not been clearly decided who will have the lead when it comes to military matters concerning homeland defense, the Army National Guard and its sister service, the Air National Guard, have the lead by default. Article I, section 8 of the constitution states that congress has the power: “To provide for calling forth of the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”4 This in essence is the basis for the creation of the National Guard and makes it perfectly suited to provide for the defense of this nation’s homeland.

For years the U.S. has relied on the presence of two great bodies of water on its east and west flanks as an assurance of its security from outside threats. Additionally, it has enjoyed an ability to provide for its security by taking the fighting to shores of others. However, the events of September 11th dispelled this sense of security and opened our eyes to the fact that the new threat is asymmetric and may come from within. Therefore, we are now forced to rethink how to ensure the security of this nation.

Many are now calling for a renewed approach to homeland security, with the military standing at the forefront in achieving it. The Army National Guard has both a constitutional and historical (it assumed a homeland defense role during WWII) justification for fulfilling this role.5

In the aftermath of the cold war, the Army National Guard has struggled with finding a new role apart from its traditional one of augmenting the AC in major overseas conflicts. Approximately one-third of the Guards 358,000 soldiers constitute eight heavy Armored divisions.6 These divisions are rapidly becoming obsolete. The chances that the AC will call upon the National Guard’s eight heavy divisions and 15 enhanced brigades in an overseas conflict are remote. During the Gulf War, U.S. forces managed to defeat the fourth largest Army in the world by the use of five heavy divisions, along with a mix of Army light, Marine, and allied forces.
The battlefield of the 21st Century is likely to be characterized by small regional conflicts requiring the deployment of rapid contingency forces. This is the reason for the need to transform in the first place. Our Army National Guard units and most of the Active Component units are simply too heavy to deploy quickly. The combat maneuver elements of the ARNG required lengthy post-mobilization training during the Gulf War and as a result did not deploy due to the brevity of the conflict. Some believe that modern maneuver warfare is too complex and too deadly for reserve combat elements, given their training time constraints. Consequently, ARNG combat elements have been relegated to a reinforcement and reconstitution (force expansion) role, allowing them the 90 (for a brigade) to 360 days (for a division) of post-mobilization training necessary to bring them on line.

Given the time it takes to bring a RC maneuver element of brigade size or higher on line, the ARNG will never achieve the short notice deployability status necessary to confront the conflicts we expect to face in the 21st century. There will continue to be a need for ARNG combat elements serving in a reinforcement and reconstitution (expansion) capacity, but not for all of its 8 divisions (88% heavy) and 15 enhanced brigades (80% heavy).

The ARNG combat elements have served in peacekeeping roles and can continue to serve in this capacity. However, there is a new mission in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist events that falls well within their purview, which is constitutionally supported, and that is Homeland Defense.

Again, civil defense is the primary job of the National Guard. Consequently, Congress and the new homeland security chief, Tom Ridge, are considering the National Guard for this nation's first line of defense in protecting the home front against attacks. Addressing a conference on the military's role in homeland defense, Mr. Ridge states that the administration would look at whether to shift some Guard units and assets to fulfill this requirement. He also states that regular military troops would be deployed to handle domestic terrorist attacks only as "the last resort". Pentagon officials are also looking at restrictions on active troop participation in domestic policing activities to facilitate their ability to augment Guard activities in this mission. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal troops (including federalized ARNG troops) from searching, seizing or arresting people in the U.S. except during clearly specified circumstances. In any event, we are likely to see a re-evaluation of the National Guard's mission in order to bring them in line with this new threat, thus, prompting a possible need for changing its organization and structure.

A re-evaluation of the National Guard mission, particularly the Army National Guard, will prompt an evaluation of its current force structure. As indicated earlier, the Army National
Guards force structure is dominated with the heavy division/brigade design geared toward fighting tank battles in the plains of Europe and deserts of the Middle East. This force structure is less effective responding to domestic security missions. Rather than confronting an enemy in a wide-open plain area, they will more than likely find themselves in a built up urban environment where heavy track vehicles are virtually useless. However, the weapons platform for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) which is configured around a light armored wheeled vehicle (LAVIII) would be ideal for this new mission.

As a consequence of U.S. military's primacy in conventional and nuclear combat, future challengers will seek asymmetric means for waging wars. Many believe that enemies will seek to equalize the fight by employing the asymmetric strategy of fighting in urban, built up areas on U.S. soil. Therefore, the conduct of a homeland defense mission will require the employment of Military Operations On Urban Terrain (MOUT) tactics. The IBCT structure facilitates our ground forces ability to effectively employ such tactics.

Additionally, the IBCT structure enhances the ability of combat units to accomplish peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions which fall under the title of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). With the ARNG now a full participant in MOOTW, the conversion of some of its brigades to the IBCT configuration will assist them immensely in fulfilling this role. Their ability to fulfill this function provides a tremendous relief to the Active Component maneuver elements and allows them to concentrate their efforts in combat operations.

As previously cited, the Army National Guard is scheduled to convert one of its brigades to the IBCT structure within the next five years. However, for the ARNG to take on a homeland defense mission now, it will be essential that Department of the Army (DA) consider the possibility of converting more ARNG structure to either this interim configuration or other structure more suitable to assume this mission. Given the support of the Homeland Security Chief for the Guard to take on a homeland defense role and the public outcry for more security within the U.S. borders, the Bush administration might support providing additional funding to enable DA to accomplish this task.

THE NEED TO IMPROVE ARNG DOMESTIC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The absence of a clear homeland defense strategy presents challenges for DA in planning for this nation's needs in this area. Critical infrastructure protection, weapons of mass destruction/consequence management and military support to civil authorities are some areas the Army is currently planning for through its Total Army Analysis process. However, a
homeland defense mission could extend to such monumental tasks as border patrol. Therefore, until the Homeland Security office articulates its expectations of the military, and in particular the Army, in a homeland defense strategy, it will be difficult for the Army to ensure that it is making the right planning decisions to support this mission.

In any event, if the ARNG is to assume domestic security role, a conversion of a portion of its structure to additional CS/CSS assets in given state locations is also needed. There are CS/CSS requirements for military police (for site protection & ensuring order), light ground and aviation reconnaissance capabilities (to provide all levels of government an understanding of the evolving threat), medical support (for when civilian assets are destroyed or overloaded), transportation units to include truck, airlift, rotary lift and small boat (to enhance mobility), communications units to provide secure communications (for a coordinated response to the threat), combat engineering (to reopen routes, ports & airfields), logistic units (to provide emergency life support to domestic refugees), chemical, biological and nuclear reconnaissance and decontamination units (to counter weapons of mass destruction use).

According to General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on this subject, having aviation assets stationed in one state and NBC assets in another state, etc. speaks to the National Guard's lack of preparedness in assuming this mission. He further states, "Guard force structure and numbers should be determined in relation to the general populations and expected needs of the individual states". Rather than equipping states with significant numbers of armor, artillery and attack helicopters, which are not needed in a domestic situation, Guard force packages should be geared toward the more immediate needs in the CS/CSS arena and some combat assets, i.e. light Infantry, etc. functioning in a domestic security capacity.

CS/CSS TRANSFORMATION

The downsizing in the aftermath of the Cold War and the success of the RC in the CS/CSS arena during the Gulf War resulted in an expansion of its role with respect to both combat and non-combat missions. In fact, the seeds for this greater reliance were actually sewn back in 1970 by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in what was termed as his "Total Force Policy" for the armed forces. This policy was to serve as a vehicle for reducing reserve response time (by directing more resources to the RC) in backing a smaller active force resulting from the Vietnam War draw down. It was to also serve as an economy measure in anticipation of the budget increases associated with the implementation of the all-volunteer force (RC forces, when not on active duty, are less expensive to maintain than AC). Now,
ARNG and USAR forces would serve as the primary source for augmenting active forces in a national emergency, but now in its earlier stages. Therefore, the Total Force Policy brought the RC back into the spot light after its virtual absence during the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War served to vindicate this policy.18

Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved that support elements in the ARNG and USAR, deployed in a complementary role, are quite successful. Unlike the ARNG maneuver elements, Army Guard and Reserve CS/CSS units often do not require extensive post mobilizations training and, therefore, can be deployed quickly and early during a conflict. In fact, a few US Army Reserve units were activated, under very short notice, in advance of the deployment of some AC elements during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm, i.e. the 1185th Transportation Terminal Company.19 The ability of RC CS/CSS units to provide expeditious support in this manor is in part attributable to the fact that many of these soldiers are simply performing their civilian skills in uniform. As a consequence of the RC support units being far less expensive to maintain than their AC counterparts, and the capacity to match civilian skills with military specialties in such areas as engineer, military police, transportation, quartermaster and medical, etc., the Army enjoys a tremendous cost effective measure in balancing its day-to-day needs with its requirements for war and small scale contingencies. For this reason, some have gone as far as advocating making Army Reserve and ARNG CS/CSS units organic to AC combat division structure.20

At present, the Army Reserve comprises 33% of the Army’s Combat Service Support units, 23 % of its Combat Support units, and less than 1% of its Combat units. Most of these units are at echelons above division. The Army National Guard comprises 56% of the Army’s combat units, 40% of its Combat Support units, and 34% of its Combat Service Support units.21 Most of its CS and CSS assets are embedded in its combat division and enhanced brigade structure. The Army National Guard Redesign Study (ADRS) calls for the conversion of six of its combat brigades to CS/CSS units (during phases I & II) to make up for a long-standing shortfall in our legacy (traditional heavy & light division) force. This conversion is expected to be completed by FY07, therefore, representing a further increase in CS/CSS assets in the RC.22

REDUCING THE BATTLEFIELD FOOT PRINT

The Army's current logistics system lacks the flexibility, mobility, efficiency and interoperativeness necessary to meet the demands of its force in 2010 and beyond.23 In today's operations, more logistics efforts are integrated into operational requirements. In many
instances these operations are logistics operations in themselves. We can attribute this to the world being less stable than during the bi-polar cold war era and the consequent increased participation in global small-scale contingencies, ranging from humanitarian to peace enforcement operations, by our Army. Similarly, the Army can no longer rely on pre-positioned stocks and must create more flexible and agile ways of rendering support to its troops in the field.

The guiding principal behind Army Transformation is strategic responsiveness which, in essence, transcends the entire joint community. In quantifying this principal the Army has set the goal of deploying a combat brigade (without compromising its lethality and force protection) anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. However, in the Army’s present war plans, support units and sustainment stocks account for 80 to 90 percent of lift requirements. This fact, coupled with the heavy nature of the Army’s combat forces, decreases its ability to get to a hot spot rapidly and conduct sustained operations. Future adversaries are unlikely to allow the Army six months to build up its combat forces like during the Gulf War. Therefore, our ability to rapidly get as much combat force on the ground as possible, with the appropriate level of logistics to support the soldiers and combat systems, is critical. Hence the term “more teeth, less tail” is the mantra in the support community.

Lift (space and weight required on transport ships & aircraft) and footprint (presence on the ground) are the two elements the logistics community must confront aggressively in support of Army Transformation. Both elements are driven by operational demand which is broken down into two types: physical and cultural. Physical demand is what a soldier and weapons system consumes in terms of fuel, ammunition, repair parts, food and water, etc. Cultural demand is a mind set in which we all have grown up with during ‘Cold War’ Army that if some is good than more is better. Science and technology will provide a portion of the needed reduction in physical demand. However, the cultural demand may be more difficult to reduce. The cultural demand is a confidence issue. It requires convincing the commander on the ground that when he needs support, it will get it to him. Better confidence in the logistics system will facilitate reducing the large number of supplies that accumulate on the battlefield because a commander chooses to keep more items on hand than is needed. What the logistics community is seeking is a balance between the two extremes, just in time logistics versus just in case logistics.
By employing these types of ideas and principals, the Army is seeking a 50% reduction in its CS/CSS footprint. What does this mean for the ARNG & USAR? With the RC making up 63% of the Army’s CS units and 67% of its CSS units it holds some significant implications, especially for the Army Reserve with 99% of its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units falling within this arena.

There is no doubt that there will be some changes in RC CS/CSS structure which will equate to reductions once the Army is able to capture the changes it seeks in logistic practices and the enablers that support them. The question is, how drastic will these changes be?

The below table reflects a comparison of support ratios for the respective brigade support battalions in the Army of Excellence (AOE), Force XXI (FXXI) and the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) forces. To further elaborate, the Arm figure represents the number of ammo handlers required per combat vehicle, the Fix figures represents the number of maintainers required per vehicle, and etc. (see legend to the right below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AOE</th>
<th>FXXI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
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<td>1:19</td>
<td>1:28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fix</td>
<td>1:2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move</td>
<td>16:1</td>
<td>13:1</td>
<td>3:1</td>
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<td>1:22</td>
<td>1:18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustain</td>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>1:14</td>
<td>1:74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1:20</td>
<td>1:17</td>
<td>1:18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Legend

Arm: Ammo Handler per Cbt Veh
Fix: Maintainers per Vehicle
Move: HEMTT Equv per Bn
Fuel: Tankers per Vehicle
Sustain: QM per Bde Personnel
Medical: Med per Bde Personnel


While the IBCT figures reflect some reductions in the support to troop/equipment ratios, one must keep in mind that the IBCT is an interim force, designed to bridge a capability gap between heavy and light forces. Therefore, the Army must await objective force maturation before quantification of support levels can be translated to future structure changes.

Taking advantage of science and technology, the logistics community is focusing transformation efforts on reductions in water, fuel and ammunition consumptions. It has already improved its tracking capability of supplies via its total-asset and in-transit visibility programs. Coupled with reduced shipment times, this program builds confidence in the system by giving
commanders complete asset visibility with respect to what is on hand and status of requisitions. The ability to better track the status of supplies reduces the number of supplies in the pipeline which equates to a reduced requirement for logistic units in the theater to receive, stock and distribute them. This all falls in line with Army efforts to better link the size and capacity of a logistic operation to an operational requirement.

Additionally, the Army is seeking changes in doctrine and organization to reduce lift requirements. In doing so, it is looking at such principals as performing support operations where it makes best sense for the war fight. Some CS/CSS units may not deploy beyond the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB). The Army is also looking at split-based operations, between CONUS and the theater of operation. The key point here is not where the function is performed, but what function is required.31

PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION & FOOTPRINT REDUCTION

The personnel community has embarked on a very ambitious plan in support of the Army’s initiative to reduce the CSS "Foot-Print" on the battlefield. This plan is based on a phased redesign of how the Adjutant General’s (AG) Corps renders support on the battlefield. Phase I (Initial Phase) of the plan eliminates the Personnel Groups at Corps level. Phase II (Interim Phase) involves the elimination of the Personnel Service Battalion headquarters, leaving personnel detachments in place to continue providing support on an interim basis, as the processes they perform are redesigned into a web-based, joint, multi-component, Per/Pay integrated system, ultimately eliminating the need for their existence (Objective Phase). The goal here is to allow unit access to personnel data and processes with input controls at the commander, staff and soldier levels. This innovative approach to personnel support also calls for the return of personnel clerks to the maneuver units to act as subject matter experts in support of the new system.

With the advent of the information super highway, the personnel or AG community has found itself to be suffering from: too many layers; too many outdated, unnecessary, and non-standard processes; lack of data accuracy and timeliness; too much paper; too much redundancy; little, ineffective, or unintended interface between systems.32 Therefore, in partnering with the Army’s ‘s vision for transformation, it has sought to embrace current and emerging automation technologies coupled with new business practices in rendering support to the soldiers of the 21st century.
Managing and sharing personnel information about soldiers is the personnel community's center of gravity for transformation. Some principals behind this redesign effort include providing access to all who have a need to know, and allowing data input from the first person that possesses the information or has decision authority. These principals allow for the elimination of unnecessary review or handling of actions. What this amounts to is an empowering and supporting of commanders in carrying out their duties of taking care of soldiers.3

In its quest to achieve efficiencies in business practices, the AG community is looking to simplify those areas and processes that are needlessly complex. For example, there is no ability to see and access personnel information across components because there are two distinct AC and RC personnel systems. This inability hinders the commander's capacity to access timely, accurate, and relevant personnel information. In an environment where we see more and more integrated units and operations, access across components is a must. Solutions are in the works and more are being sought in the reconciliation and integration of active and reserve personnel systems. The ultimate goal is not just the integration of active and reserve army personnel systems, but also the development of a joint system that allows personnel visibility across all components and services. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) is one of the systems being developed to meet this requirement.34

Additionally, the personnel community is advocating that tasks be civilianized and contracted where feasible. As with the logistics community, they too embrace the principal of not performing functions in the battle space that can be performed elsewhere.35 Both concepts contribute to footprint reduction in the combat zone.

The AG community anticipates that employment of new personnel systems, which emphasize soldier/unit access, and new business practices, will imply that “personnel units may no longer be efficient, affordable, or necessary”.36 Reduction to total elimination of personnel units on the battlefield has been one of the guiding principals embraced by those responsible for personnel transformation. Under this principal, processes are determining structure as opposed to structure determining processes. As a result, personnel commands and unit structure are the “sacrificial lambs”, but this is in exchange for the larger goal of providing the most timely, accurate, and relevant information in support of soldiers. Additionally, this approach supports one of the Chief of Staff’s enduring principals of more combat power and less tail.

These transformation developments prompt the question, what does this all mean for the Reserve Component? A larger percentage of personnel units reside in the RC, with the U.S. Army Reserve holding claim to the most units. One of the AG community’s key parameters for
transformation is to phase out personnel unit structure only after process redesign is achieved. However, the AC has already begun to dismantle its personnel unit structure in order to begin this transition which, again, takes place in three phases (Initial, Interim & Objective), borrowing the phased approach of overall Army transformation. It has done so with the understanding that RC personnel units would remain in tact to mitigate risk. According to the transformation timeline, legacy capabilities will remain in the force, in decreasing numbers, for the next 30 years. Consequently, current personnel doctrine, structure, and procedures must remain in tact, at a minimum, until the personnel objective force capabilities are achieved. Under this plan, the RC will not transition to any interim design, but will instead move directly to the objective personnel design shortly after the AC achieves this capability. This is anticipated on or about FY 07.

Based on the intent of the personnel objective force design, RC personnel units will disappear (with the exception of replacement units which reside in the USAR only) once these capabilities are fully integrated into the force. Although this change is not immediate, the RC (particularly the USAR) must now prepare (through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process) for this transition. Given the direction in which the remaining CS/CSS community is heading, now is the time for them to begin to redefine their role in a changing force.

CURRENT FORCE CAPABILITIES, INTEGRATION & TRANSFORMATION

As the Army transforms to the objective force it cannot compromise readiness. In order to maintain readiness it must retain its current force capabilities. This means the Army must maintain multiple forces, which for now constitute its traditional legacy force units (60% heavy & 40% light in the AC) and the medium weight brigades it is currently developing. Once the initial units of the objective force are brought on line, there will be three forces. As long as the legacy force capabilities remain a part of the Army's force structure, the requirement for its associated support elements will remain. However, as the AC moves toward the objective force, it will have to divest itself of a portion of its legacy combat and support structures (which may serve as bill payers in bringing the objective force on line). Again, it will still have to retain legacy force capabilities. This means the RC may play a major role in mitigating risk by maintaining this capacity in both the ARNG (which would assume much of the combat portion) and USAR (which would assume much of the support portion). Furthermore, given the current reliance on and success of the USAR support structure, it could pick up an even larger share of the CS/CSS functions through integration into active army units down to division and brigade levels.
Legacy force capabilities will remain in the force until 2032. By 2012 the total force will be comprised of three elements; Legacy, Interim and Objective forces. RC (ARNG) Brigade Combat Teams are expected to begin converting to objective force capabilities in FY12, with one of every three brigades converting each year from the RC. One major issue the Army is beginning to confront as it plans to split its focus and dollars three ways (Legacy, Interim & Objective forces) is modernization and recapitalization of its legacy force. An area of particular concern for the RC (given its large CS/CSS force) is the recapitalization of 21 systems prioritized by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (DCSOPS). At present, funding exists for the top 16 systems. This leaves five systems with no funding through FY07. Additionally, four of the five systems are CS/CSS vehicles, with the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) being one of them. The astronomical numbers of HMMWVs in the RC compounds the magnitude of this dilemma. The point here is that the Army must move cautiously as it proceeds down the transformation road. Transformation is a partnership. All components are needed for success. Neglect in current capabilities in any given area or component will result in readiness gaps.

ARMY TEAMING

As the Army ventures down the road of transformation, it will be imperative that the three components work closely together to make this endeavor a complete success. Once the Active Army begins to level its capabilities among three forces, it will be important for the RC to be able fill in the gaps that may be generated, particularly in legacy force capabilities, as Active Army focuses its efforts on making the Objective Force an effective fighting element. Hence, during these early stages of transformation, AC/RC integration is important.

Teaming is one of the Army's integration programs that may aid in balancing transformation with deployments and other operational requirements. It basically establishes a mutual support or a follow and support relationship between an AC corps or division and ARNG division or brigade. This relationship covers a full spectrum of operations from military support to civilian authorities to high intensity combat. The program's central tenant is that each unit would take the lead in certain mission areas and if that lead unit required additional resources, it would draw from the resources of its teamed unit. For instance, while an AC division is preparing for deployment to a major conflict, a teamed ARNG division would provide assistance in that deployment, to include providing replacement packages. The teaming of the 49th Armored Division (Texas ARNG) with the 1st Calvary Division at Fort Hood is one of many
examples of the teaming of like units or capabilities. In this particular example, the close proximity of these units facilitates their ability to operate in this capacity.

Expanding this concept to allow teamed ARNG divisions or brigades to fill capability gaps that will ensue as their AC counterpart units convert to objective force capabilities, may enhance the Army's ability to meet current operational needs while transitioning. Peace keeping, peace enforcement and other Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are areas where this approach might be utilized to its fullest.

Teaming, however, works best in forces with like capabilities and missions. When an AC unit begins to shift to a new or different capability the ability of the RC unit to provide further assistance and vice versa is reduced or lost, unless the RC unit transitions along with the AC unit. This reaffirms the need for AC and RC units to transition at equal rates if programs of this nature are to remain viable in promoting a total army concept.

MULTI-COMPONENT

In part due to their timing and placement in war plans, Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units are more operationally integrated into the total Army than combat units. A second explanation might be the successful reputation RC CS/CSS units managed to carve for themselves during and after the Gulf War. This is unlike RC combat units which are still struggling to establish their credibility.

Over the past five years this integration has been increasing in scope with the advent of Multi-component (MC) units. The primary purpose of the MC unit concept is to provide AC and RC units additional resources to accomplish the mission by combining assets. A MC unit combines the personnel and/or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. Status as a MC organization does not change a unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment, force packaging, or tiered resourcing. During TAA 07, this concept was used by the Active Component to resolve an Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) shortfall in its lower priority units. This was accomplished by allowing the RC to resource given authorizations in these units, therefore, enabling them to increase the "combined" unit's ALO to sufficient levels.

The Army's goal with respect to Multi-Comp (MC) units is to make them a routine part of the Army culture. Consequently, during FY01 the Army activated an additional 20 MC units and expects to activate an additional 62 between FY02 – 07, for an eventual total of 113 units. These units constitute a variation of compositions of AC, ARNG and USAR elements. The
component that owns the authorization document determines whether the unit is recognized as an AC, ARNG or USAR unit or flag.

The 321st Material Management Center (a subordinate element of the 377th Theater Support Command (TSC)) out of Louisiana (RC Flag) and the 9th TSC in Japan (AC Flag) are classic examples of this program being put to test. The 321st MMC performs supply and management for the Third U.S. Army and in doing so has a forward element in Kuwait comprised of AC soldiers. U.S. Army Reserve soldiers support the mission from home bases in Louisiana, by deploying on three-week annual training tours to Kuwait, and by remaining prepared to deploy quickly in case of a crisis. Even though the 9th TSC is headquartered in Japan, the bulk of its unit members are reservists based at Fort Belvoir, VA. There are 40 active-duty and 15 Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) soldiers in Japan who make up the nucleus of an advance party element for mobilization. At Fort Belvoir, there are 400 Army Reserve troops.

The basic concept in the organization of a Theater Support Command is the use of modular teams, customized to missions as they arise. As evidenced in the organization of the 321st MMC and 9th TSC, this concept is in support of the split operations logistics initiative of the transformation campaign.

These programs, along with a number of other integration programs, have shown some success in breaking down structural and attitudinal barriers between Active and Reserve Components. They have allowed for improvements in the interoperability of personnel and equipment that have facilitated the promotion of a total or seamless Army. As a consequence, the Army has enjoyed unprecedented understanding and cooperation amongst the components in the sharing of personnel, equipment, time, and efforts in the conduct of operations around the globe.

RELEVANCE OF INTEGRATION AS THE OBJECTIVE FORCE BECOMES A REALITY

Success of AC/RC integration, thus far, has been with legacy force capabilities and strategy. However, transformation could impact these efforts, as the Army revisits it ways of organizing and operating on the battlefields of the 21st century. Transformation holds the potential for destabilizing current integration efforts, particularly during its latter stages when the focus shifts from legacy to objective force capabilities. Given the additional resource constraints caused by transformation, there will be unevenness in the rate of transformation between the AC and RC. This unevenness will lead to capability gaps which will threaten the ability of the components to operate together at today's level.
What uneven transformation may temporarily create is two disparate Armies. A legacy force Army concentrated in the RC and an Objective force Army concentrated in the AC. Again, RC combat forces will begin their transformation to Objective Brigade Combat Teams (OBCT) two years after the AC begins its shift in 2010 at a rate of one OBCT out of every three coming on line. By then, the AC will be 19% IBCT/OBCT and will be 47% by 2015, while the RC will be 21% IBCT/OBCT in 2015.54 Here, we begin to see a lag in capabilities being sown in the RC which will begin to hinder integration efforts.

An even larger issue arises when one asks the question what this shift will mean for integration in the CS/CSS arena, which has experienced more success at integration than its combat arms brethren. At present, the picture is not very clear. Given the Army's emphasis on footprint reduction, it is certain that change is coming in the form of CS/CSS battlefield presence. With CS/CSS heavily concentrated in the RC, the potential impact of such change will weigh far more on it than the AC. For the USAR, with 99% of its MTOE assets in this arena, it may no longer be a question of integration, but a battle for relevancy.

CONCLUSION

Transformation will be a gradual 30-year process, where during the mid to later stages we will see a mix in capabilities with respect to legacy, Interim, and objective forces. With legacy force capabilities remaining throughout this period, so will the support (tail) necessary to sustain it, but with new and improved ways of rendering support. Given current assumptions and plans with respect to this transition, the RC can expect continued heavy operational engagement. But as the transition develops and resources and the focus shift in the later stages (along with the dollars) to the objective force, there will be a development of disparate capabilities that will be component oriented (legacy RC and objective AC). The implications for such dissimilar capabilities range from a derailment of current progress in integration efforts to the issue of relevancy.

On account of the Army National Guard's current combat configuration and missioning, it will find itself at the center of the forces contrast issue. Additionally, with the potential for becoming the nation's homeland defense force, it will find itself struggling with competing missions, given its traditional state mission and its reinforcement/reconstitution mission in support of the AC. Homeland Defense, as a component of the larger Homeland Security issue, is a hot topic and there is an immediate need to combat those non-traditional, asymmetric threats associated with it. However, the ARNG is currently not structured to meet this threat.
If the ARNG is to assume the role of a homeland defense force, then transform a portion of its heavy division and separate brigade structure. Converting more of its brigades to the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) configuration could be a part of the solution. The Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) is based on a two Major Theater of War (MTW), CS/CSS requirements shortfall. In light of the war against terrorism and the emphasis now placed on homeland defense, it’s apparent that this shortfall will decrease in priority. Therefore, a revision ADRS to support a homeland defense capability is needed. An assessment of ADRS should show how it could support this mission and, where necessary, money earmarked for its future phases should be redirected as a means of offsetting budget increases associated with changes or adjustments to ARNG force structure. ADRS has four phases; it is currently in phases I & II. An offset is necessary, regardless of whether restructuring to an IBCT or CS/CSS force.

The central theme of CS/CSS transformation is foot-print reduction, one of the Army Chief of Staff’s guiding principals for getting more combat power on the ground. In its efforts to bring this principal to reality, the logistics community is investigating a number of approaches. However, none of these approaches are out of their initial stages. Other than fewer support personnel, it is very difficult to determine exactly how this will translate to support on the battlefield.

With 99% of USAR MTOE units falling within the CS/CSS arena, the future of support on the battlefield, as we know it, is of significant concern. Again, legacy force capabilities are expected to remain in the force for the next 30 years. Therefore, with some modifications in operational practices, requirements for USAR support elements will remain in one form or another.

Given the objective force characteristics of a lighter and more agile force, with less fuel, ammo, and spare part requirements (to name just a few reductions), support needs are certain to go down. As the AC transitions to objective force capabilities in the mid to later phase of the transformation process, we should begin to see the early stages of these reductions (if not sooner), as the AC increases its operational focus on this new force. These changes in support requirements will ultimately migrate to the division and above level which is the level for most USAR CS/CSS units.

Consequently, transformation could place the U.S. Army Reserve in one of two state of affairs: having to undergo a significant reduction in its support units due to this decrease in requirements; or relegation to supporting those few late deploying legacy force units spread among the AC and ARNG. Neither scenario is promising and could mean a battle for relevancy
for the USAR, especially once all AC and ARNG combat units transition to the objective force. Now is the time for the USAR to start rethinking its role with respect to how it can best support a transforming Army. There is no doubt that the skills that the USAR brings to the Army will continue to be needed well into the future. However, the nature of the scenarios in which it will find itself utilizing those skills will change. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other military operations other than war are examples of the changing nature of this business. Civil Affairs and Information Operations are two areas in which the USAR has established a good foothold. Given the changing nature of war in the 21st century these are two potential growth industries for the USAR.

U.S. Army Heavy Divisions are recognized as the most lethal combat land forces on the planet. Therefore, no nation is likely to confront these forces head-on. Consequently, the enemies we face during the 21st century, will more than likely be state and non-state actors who employ asymmetric tactics. The massing of large forces going head-on against one another is becoming increasingly remote. Smaller elements that can move in quickly, strike a decisive blow, move out, and require minimal support are the type that will be necessary to materialize the objective force. Therefore, one could question whether the U.S. will ever fight in large combat formations with all its complementary elements again.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order for the Department of the Defense, the Army and the Army National Guard to adequately prepare for the homeland defense mission, there must be a clear determination of what is expected of them in taking on this role. Critical infrastructure protection is an area the Army is currently planning for, but this role could possibly extend to the larger task of border patrol. This holds significant implications for end strength (having enough troops to accomplish such a monumental task) and force structure (possible need for more light to medium forces). Until a homeland defense strategy is clearly defined, the military, i.e. the Army, will not be able to make the planning decisions necessary to ensure its ability to adequately support this mission.

For the Army to achieve the significant support reductions in the battle space, it must first reduce consumption rates. To achieve this, a number of enablers must be in place. In today’s resource constrained environment, there is tendency to program changes, i.e. reductions before enablers are developed and implemented in order to quickly capture their associated savings for other programs. Therefore, the Army must caution against programming support structure reductions before the critical enablers are in place. Additionally, the USAR
(given its large support presence on the battlefield) must remain decisively engaged in transformation or run the risk of being the most negatively affected by its changes.

Transformation must take place at equal rates amongst the three components. Unevenness in the rates of transformation will breed dissimilar capabilities, negatively affecting the ability of the components to support one another and destroying progress made, thus far, in AC/RC integration and cooperation. Again, transformation is a partnership requiring the participation of all parties. To allow the AC and RC to grow apart in this fashion would be in contradiction to the Total Force policy. The Total Force Policy was developed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War where there was a need to maintain a base line capability (given a smaller standing Army) and a need to re-establish the link between the citizens and their Army.

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