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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES CAPTAINS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the unique opportunities afforded Special Forces Captains during the conduct of their doctrinal missions, primarily Unconventional Warfare, and specifically questions the professional development of these officers. A regimen of training which would better prepare Special Forces Captains to operate in the ambiguous world into which they are thrust, and better prepare them to influence that world for the future benefit of the United States is explored. The resultant recommendations focus upon single-tracking, Advanced Civil Schooling and the detailing of officers to other agencies of the United States government.
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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES CAPTAINS

With President George W. Bush's "War On Global Terrorism," and the means by which it appears it will be conducted, a significant question arises as to whether or not Special Forces Captains are being adequately prepared to fully achieve the potential afforded by the opportunity provided by their operational assignments. In the earliest phases of the Afghanistan campaign, detachment commanders spent a significant amount of time with warlords and opposition leaders which could have proved invaluable if properly exploited. These young Special Forces officers are by doctrine required to organize, equip, train, advise and assist a guerrilla, or irregular, force and they are in a unique position to counsel and influence the guerrilla force in the area of government and governance following the cessation of hostilities. They are also in a unique situation that provides them insights into the policies and attitudes of those same leaders – insights which could prove most beneficial to policy makers in the United States. These same guerrilla leaders, as was the case in Afghanistan, will emerge to form the political leadership of the nation as hostilities are terminated. The access afforded these young captains represents a unique opportunity to influence emerging regimes toward a free-market capitalist, democratic form of government friendly to the interests of the United States. The opportunity to influence the world view of these national leaders is among those opportunities which the U.S. cannot afford to squander in shaping the world of the future in the hopes of eliminating the conditions which lead to events such as the 11 September 2001 attack on the U.S.

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined as "a broad spectrum of military operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape." Application of this definition in a broad sense fits the action in Afghanistan quite well. Early activities were certainly low visibility in nature, and clearly involved the support and direction of indigenous forces by external sources. A good manner in which to visualize UW from the standpoint of the externally supporting military force is to imagine trying to move a magnet around on a table without touching it, but rather through the use of another magnet. One must manipulate the second magnet in such a manner as to achieve the desired end subtly, determining the polarity of each, and influencing the target magnet to move in the desired direction, to the desired position on the table. Thus, the master of UW is that individual
who is expert at the myriad tasks involved in UW, but is also capable of training the requisite
tasks to some group of people to enable them to execute the missions. Not only must this
trainer overcome the broad chasms in language and culture, but these missions must be
accomplished at great personal risk to whomever is conducting the missions. Until the
insurgency achieves the status of a belligerent in world opinion, insurgents have virtually no
hope of being afforded those rights due a prisoner of war under the provisions of the Geneva
and Hague Conventions. Admittedly, the hope is minimal at best even after the insurgency has
achieved belligerent status.

The “regular” Army traditionally has harbored misgivings concerning the practitioners of
the UW trade, which has resulted in a reluctance to employ Special Forces (SF) to the extent of
its capabilities in support of strategic and operational objectives. There has never been offered
an adequate explanation for this phenomenon, aside from normal branch rivalries, though there
are historical examples of irregular forces failing to achieve their objectives in support of regular
forces which may have been the original source of conflict. Clausewitz claims that “military
virtues are found only in regular armies.”3 These virtues are principally obedience, order, rule,
and method.4 Perhaps the feeling is that an individual who must adapt to working outside the
bounds of these “military virtues”, or those of a “regular army”, is incapable of internalizing them
as an individual soldier. However, the current method of selection and assessment into the
Special Forces branch and career management field, discussed later, ensures each individual is
fully imbued with the values of the Army first. At any rate, the goal of any member of the
profession of arms should be to do that which is best for the nation. One should not be hesitant
to employ whatever means is available to achieve that which is in the vital interests of the
nation.

The action in Afghanistan should not be viewed as a template which may be overlaid upon
each situation encountered in every campaign of the future. However, there is every indication
that this return to the use of Special Forces in a predominant role in UW will continue, and that
these opportunities will be presented in other areas. In fact, “when dealing with terrorists [or
asymmetric threats], a low-key response usually is preferable to heavy-handed action which
both dignifies the enemy by signaling a large significance to his misdeeds and risks alienating
political opinion.”5 U.S. advisers are being deployed to the Philippines, Yemen and the Former
Soviet Republic of Georgia as this is being written to further the ends of the U.S. government.

Experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s provide some idea of what is possible in the
context of development and stability.6 In a “Patience, Presence, Perseverance”-type paradigm,
daily exposure to Special Forces Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) provided a role model for
the young Salvadoran officers and soldiers. What emerged toward the end of the conflict was a relatively effective NCO corps, which, it may be debated, was the key to the successful termination of hostilities. By extension, this factor must have had a significant impact on the nation as the Salvadoran Army downsized and those individuals influenced by American NCOs returned to society with a new world view stressing individual responsibility and accountability for one’s actions.

Other, intangible factors must be taken into account as well – that of second- or third-order effects. Suppose an American Special Forces NCO teaches a young foreign conscript the Heimlich Maneuver on a deployment. The conscript returns to his village at the completion of his conscription and saves the life of a child using this technique learned from the American. History has been forever altered. Perhaps the child, or one of his progeny, grows up to become a national leader, or discovers the cure for cancer. How does one measure the value of the mission deployment or the training provided?

WHAT IS EXPECTED OF A SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY GRADE OFFICER

Officers are assessed into Special Forces at the level of junior Captain, or promotable First Lieutenant, from the general population of the Army. Basic entry-level training into the branch provides training on small unit tactics to hone the skills of combat arms officers and provides such basic skills for officers from combat support and combat service support branches. Prior to their first assignment in the branch, Special Forces officers undertake the study of a foreign language and attend a combat arms career course (infantry or armor). Further training in the maneuver of combat formations occurs in the context of his command tour, as commander of a Special Forces Operational “A” Detachment (SFODA). Here he receives on-the-job training, and is mentored by his senior NCOs and his company and battalion commanders. Special Forces officers are required to “be proficient infantry commanders in addition to being experts in Special Forces operations.”

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 points out that Special Forces operations “are focused at the operational and strategic level” and that the “continuous forward presence [of Special Forces] can assist in creating the conditions for stable development.” This clearly represents an exception to the Clausewitz maxim that “strategy is exclusively the province of generals and other senior officers.” The SF Captain may not be developing the strategy of the nation, but he clearly is executing the foreign policy of the nation, and every action he takes has strategic implications. Doctrinally, the SFODA remains the “primary operational element”, and the sole maneuver unit, within Special Forces. The SFODA is also the future combat system of
Special Forces as the Army approaches transformation. Larger SF formations, such as companies and battalions, provide command and control and support functions to the SFODA. In this context, it is the detachment commander who may be expected to be the primary contact with the indigenous force on a training or operational deployment, as opposed to a higher ranking officer. The primary Special Forces mission of unconventional warfare (UW) requires SFODAs to operate in denied areas for extended periods of time with little or no supervision or counsel from their superiors. The UW task which entails the greatest risk to the detachment, and represents the greatest level of commitment and risk acceptance by the Department of Defense, is guerrilla warfare. “Even the [British] Foreign Office ... did not fail to remember that what [the Special Operations Executive] did could affect foreign policy for many years to come,” during World War II.

A great deal of effort is expended during the basic, entry-level course training officers in the process of decision-making within the context of a very ambiguous environment. A significant part of the training is devoted to helping the officer reach a minimal level of self-realization, which also enables the evaluators to ensure that he will be capable of functioning independently. The focus of this training effort is to assist the officer learn how to think (as opposed to what to think) and on the doctrinal tasks which must be mastered. However, little, if any, instruction is provided on politics, economy, or public administration. There simply is not sufficient time to do so. Even though he will be operationally employed with his NCOs and a Warrant Officer, he alone will be responsible for the detachment and the successful completion of the mission. There exists a degree of symbiosis between the commander and his subordinates only experienced elsewhere in the Army when a conventional unit becomes isolated by enemy action in combat. The Detachment generally operates as the sole American unit in an area and, as such, provides the only cultural link the Detachment Commander will have with the nation of his origin. The Detachment focuses at the tactical end of the operation, concerned with the organization, training and employment of the indigenous force. The Detachment Commander focuses his efforts while deployed on the headquarters of the element with which he is working, to wit, the commander of the guerrilla force or the foreign military unit.

A Special Forces Captain can be expected to command an SFODA for about 24 months. During this time, he will deploy with his detachment on an overseas mission as few as two, or as many as six, times, barring the outbreak of war. These missions are of varying value in his professional development – those providing the opportunity to conduct the mission in isolation with a foreign military or para-military entity are of the greatest value in exercising and mastering his trade. If his superiors are not careful, a specific captain could spend his command tour only
conducting relatively low value missions, such as support to an embassy or security assistance office, which only minimally provides an opportunity to practice one’s language skills and practically never provides interaction with foreign military forces.

In accordance with current personnel procedures, Special Forces Captains are detailed to functional areas and nominative assignments following the completion of their company-grade command tour. It is not until an officer attends a Senior Service course that his thinking at the strategic level is developed. After all, “the higher the military rank, the greater is the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by the intellect, by insight.” However, at this point in his career the Special Forces officer has already been operating at that level for nearly 15 years. After attendance at a Senior Service course, an officer selected to command an operational unit would have in excess of 75 officers to mentor and properly prepare to maximize their potential in service to the nation, too many to be effective. Mentoring requires a full appreciation of the capabilities and limitations and the strengths and weaknesses, of a subordinate. From that point of departure, the mentor can help to direct the efforts of the subordinate to better develop himself or herself. A Special Forces officer with a wealth of experience in the infantry will require more development in the area of the political economy of the region of the world to which he is directed than perhaps an officer accessed from the military intelligence branch. The converse will also be the case.

In his treatise on war, written nearly 2600 years ago, Sun-Tzu wrote, “intelligence is of the essence in warfare – it is what the armies depend upon in their every move.” As previously pointed out, intelligence activities are a key element of SF doctrine. A few short years ago, there were many in the Army who advocated that all necessary information of one’s enemies and their intentions could be garnered through technological means, that there no longer existed the requirement for human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered by individuals. More recent events have graphically demonstrated the fallacy of that position. According to Sun-Tzu, “[intelligence] must come from people – people who know the enemy’s situation.” A willingness to live and work with people of other nationalities and cultures is a hallmark, rather than a requirement, of the Special Forces soldier. Embarking upon a process which better enables SF officers to obtain that degree of understanding of their region of orientation provides another source of those people with knowledge of the enemy’s situation over the long term.

LEARNING FROM THE PAST

Christopher Harmon suggests “that a commander might learn from at least two kinds of experience: that garnered in an earlier guerrilla war and that gained by observation of one’s
Even though he was writing in the specific context of counterinsurgency, his advice applies equally to UW in all of its permutations. In fact, as is much of the pontification and academic study of the conduct of war, the passage is sufficiently general to be applicable to all who would practice the operational art. It is instructional to embark on a review of that experience garnered earlier as it applies to the subject at hand in order to best focus one’s efforts and to avoid making the same mistakes as one’s forbearers.

Although there have been notable exceptions, the first major employment of unconventional forces in support of a recent strategic campaign was conducted by the English following their highly successful undertaking against the Italians in Ethiopia in 1940 – 1941. This mission actually began before the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed in the summer of 1940, and convinced the British that the ability to organize, train, advise and assist irregular forces in a denied area served as a quite effective economy of force operation that could be used against one’s enemies. If nothing else, resistance activities are known to have occupied significant Nazi and Japanese forces, or forced them to redeploy, when they could have been put to better use at the front fighting. There were official detractors, as can be imagined in a resource-constrained environment where materiel going to one activity may be construed as being extracted from another. Throughout the Second World War, neither the SOE nor the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS, founded in June 1942) were able to effectively organize a resistance force inside Germany or Japan – the local populace remained too loyal and the internal security measures too strong. However, organizing resistance in occupied countries proved useful in advancing the strategic goals and objectives of the Allies.

From the beginning, SOE learned that it was best able to function as an organization by operating in a manner now termed “interagency,” that is, in conjunction with several different cabinets of the British government. In that manner, equipment and messages could be shipped in diplomatic pouches to countries where the embassy continued to function. Later, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy assets were used to conduct infiltrations and exfiltrations, and to introduce supplies and equipment to the resistance. Early attempts at achieving synergy were not very successful, but as the fledgling organization matured, results improved.

A survey of the extant literature on UW operations suggests that those operations conducted by the SOE in Greece during World War II would provide the best example of UW operations which most closely approximate the asymmetric environment one could assume holds the highest level of threat for a U.S. SFODA in the future. The guerrilla bands recruited to assist the Allied effort against the Axis powers were outlaw and communist groups which existed beyond the scope of existing laws. They had been operating for years, with varying
degrees of success, in pursuance of personal objectives. The leadership of these groups competed for primacy and were wary of expending finite resources unless they were able to realize immediate, quantifiable results. Guerrilla leaders were more concerned with their relative position at the cessation of hostilities, with a view toward seizing national power through armed revolutionary means.

Communist-led groups had been operating underground throughout Europe for some time prior to the commencement of the Second World War, and received support from the Communist International (COMINTERN). The genesis of their odium toward Nazi Germany was the fact that the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. These organizations were comprised of individuals experienced in clandestine operations, with well-oiled machines capable of producing all manner of necessary forged documents. In many cases, the communists betrayed their rivals to the occupying Nazis and so eliminated their competition in a most economical fashion. Such was the case in France and Yugoslavia. The case of the betrayed French resistance leader Jean Moulin in 1943 has never been adequately explained. The politics of the French resistance and the fact that Moulin was known to have been working to prevent the French communists from seizing power highly suggest that he was betrayed by the French communists to the Germans to remove him from the scene.

In the specific case of Greece, communists formed the National Liberation Front (EAM) in 1941 following the Axis occupation of the country. The EAM adroitly kept their ultimate goals secret, proclaiming themselves to be solely focused on resisting Axis occupation. In late 1942, EAM formed the National Liberation Army (ELAS) which, true to the Trotsky model in Russia, assigned a political officer to the command structure of each unit. In 1942, the SOE undertook the mission of organizing the resistance in Greece to interdict lines of communication with the aim of influencing Rommel in Africa. The mission did little except to hamper Rommel's retreat, but did succeed in deceiving the Germans reference the Allied invasion of Sicily. Arriving on the scene in Greece, the British insisted that all the resistance forces organize under a single command—what current U.S. doctrine calls the Area Command. Since EAM and ELAS had been organized and operating for the longest period of time, noncommunist groups became subordinate to regional ELAS groups.

When the Italians quit the war in 1943, ELAS persuaded the British to force Italian units in Greece to break up into smaller units. ELAS then disarmed these units, gaining another source of weapons and ammunition for later use. Throughout the German occupation of Greece, ELAS often conducted operations with the aim of inciting German reprisals against the peasantry, which were of such a horrendous nature as to greatly increase the potential recruits for the
resistance cause. Prior to the abandonment of Greece by the Germans, ELAS launched an all-out attack against their greatest rival (the National Republican League – EDES). This was the actual beginning of the Greek Civil War. In fact, the only factor which allowed EDES to survive the Second World War under pressure from ELAS was the presence of British SOE officers who were assisting EDES.

This sort of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude toward insurgent groups was supported by the highest levels of the British government, even when astute field operatives were able to discern what was actually taking place. A long-term view of those areas which emerged as major problems for the western allies during the Cold War nearly coincides perfectly with those areas which were supported in their resistance to the Axis powers during World War II. (This trend continues to the present day, the most recent example being the U.S. support to the Afghan mujahadin in their resistance to the Soviet invaders in the 1980s. Failure to set the conditions for success and development in Afghanistan led to the civil war and subsequent seizure of the country by the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda terrorist group.)

Perhaps it is this very unpredictability that is the source for the distaste displayed by the "conventional" Army for unconventional warfare. An indigenous force cannot necessarily be counted upon to cross the line of departure on time, as can a conventional force. Nor can the indigenous force be expected to seize an objective by the specified hour, as can a conventional force. At times, as recently evidenced in Afghanistan, the effects achieved by an indigenous force are not exactly what the conventional force commander expected. It is difficult to synchronize an irregular force with conventional operations. At the end of the day, one may find oneself fighting against the same indigenous force that was organized, trained and equipped should the situation radically change from that anticipated at the onset.

Those junior officers infiltrated by the British to organize, equip, train, advise and assist these disparate groups into a coherent strategy were required to depend more on a set of intangible skills developed prior to the onset of hostilities rather than upon a set of tactical warfighting skills. Few of these officers had extensive active-duty military experience. Those who were not regular military officers came predominantly from the service industries prior to the war. They all had in common an education obtained through the normal English public school system preceding the war, which may be termed cosmopolitan. This education relied to a large extent upon the study of languages, cultures and regions of the world, at that time part of the empire. Most of these men desired to enter government service (civil and diplomatic) upon graduation. Travel during holiday periods was encouraged, even expected, which further enhanced the individual's base of knowledge of the world. There can be no doubt of their
success in achieving their strategic objective of resisting and disrupting the Axis forces in occupied areas. However, the second and third order effects of some of those successes have proven very expensive to resolve due to the fact that policy makers failed to realize that UW must be considered as a way to a means rather than a means to an end. UW is one facet of a strategic campaign, not the campaign itself.

**TRAINING**

There can be no question that well-trained leaders are a priceless future commodity. As the past Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (CINCUSSOCOM) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Henry “Hugh” Shelton, professed, “to ensure our nation’s security, we must properly groom the future leaders of our armed forces. These leaders must be proficient in many fields so that they can direct military actions that will achieve desired political ends ... our leaders must be schooled in matters both military and political .. they must also be masters of the geopolitical realm.”

In no other branch of the army are captains expected to function above the tactical level. In Special Forces, they are required to implement the foreign policy of the United States with limited diplomatic or political guidance – and failure is not an option.

Most military training falls into the realm of “Single Event Learning,” focusing on habituation. This works quite well for most tasks required of the majority of an army, where proficiency is developed through repetition. The goal is to commit the execution of tasks to long-term memory to enable the soldier to function during times of extreme stress, such as in combat, because “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” This type training is what is relied upon to ensure soldiers react correctly to ambush, indirect fire, etc., and enables him to function as a member of a team. Failure to do as one is trained in these cases usually results in defeat.

However, “the objective of individual training is to maximize the full potential of the soldier through mental, moral, and physical development.” Another learning model is that of “Experiential Learning,” which is used in most institutions of higher education. This model stresses reflective observation, abstract conceptualization and active experimentation, all of which depend upon innovation and the ability to apply complex concepts to solve problems. The characteristics of the “Experiential Learning” Model suggest that it would be beneficial to prepare Special Forces officers in this manner, where the acquisition of concepts and learning how to apply them in abstract situations better prepare him for an ambiguous environment where he has little outside himself upon which to depend. Clausewitz himself said, “the
commanding officer [must] be disciplined by reflection." Colonel John D. Waghelstein stated that it was the totality of his academic study and his assignment experience which prepared him for the role he played as the commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador at a particularly critical time during that insurgency.

"Single Event Learning" is what the SF officer uses to learn the myriad soldier tasks peculiar to his new branch. From the street craft used in clandestine and urban operations to the employment and maintenance of foreign weapons, hands-on repetition has proven the best method of instruction. However, intensive training in more abstract concepts is also required for SF Captains to best optimize their potential. Habituation is not very useful in preparing one for ambiguous environments or unique situations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army determines force development requirements through a process which analyzes doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material and the soldier (DTLOMS). The analysis of leader development results in programs designed to train and professionally develop the leadership of the Army. According to the force development model outlined in Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 71-9, the proponent office at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School must prepare the documentation for proposed soldier requirements and submit them to PERSCOM and the United States Army Special Operations Command for analysis and subsequent submission to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for final approval. "In the end, a true revolution in military affairs ... will require a complete and unbiased review of our notions of organization, training, and leader development."

The Special Forces Branch assesses 90 Captains per year group, 60 of which will be single-tracked as Special Forces officers. Of these single-tracked officers, a varying number will be required to fill positions in support of the Army which are outside of the Special Forces Branch. It is my recommendation that these single-tracked Special Forces officers not be detailed to the positions outside of Special Forces, but rather are funded to attend Advanced Civil Schooling with majors in political science, economics and public administration. "The importance of schools in the training of an army cannot be overstated." This will require an adjustment with other branches to account for the loss of Special Forces officers in the positions to which the Special Forces officers would normally have filled. Although this will not solve the immediate shortfall, it will over time provide field grade officers in all positions who will be capable of more adequately mentoring and training their subordinate Captains. The long-term
goal is to create a branch of officers within the U.S. Army which is actually prepared to operate within the environment dictated by the Special Forces career path articulated in DA Pamphlet 600-3. The desired end state is to develop officers at field grade and higher who are properly prepared to mentor their captains adequately to achieve the strategic objectives of the nation. This is an investment in the future of the Army which should pay significant dividends, with the end of furthering the vital national interests of the United States.

As a language-dependent branch, Special Forces officers are currently required to maintain a 0+/0+ rating in a language other than English, 3/3 being considered to be fluent. Requiring Special Forces officers to maintain a 2/2 rating in a foreign language for branch qualification will provide a pool of officers capable of meeting unforeseen requirements throughout the world which may emerge in the context of asymmetric threats to the nation. It is anticipated that the languages required will be the seven core languages recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Army. Specific languages which are not part of the core set, and rare dialects, can be acquired as needed through contract language training or cultivated if already extant. Quantifiable results indicate that better long-term maintenance of language capability is achieved through the Defense Language Institute (DLI), as opposed to the current process of training at the Command Language School which is part of the U.S. Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). Training at DLI would also enable those officers with existing language skills to further cultivate and enhance those skills.

Finally, I would recommend that a number of Special Forces officers be detailed to other U.S. government agencies such as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Drug Enforcement Agency to broaden their experiential base. This will enhance their understanding of the interagency process and the joint environment in which they are required to operate. It will also increase the understanding of the members of these other government agencies of the mind-set and training of members of the U.S. military. A member of the Central Intelligence Agency who attended the Army War College remarked that “the two principal conclusions I came away with were: (a) the intelligence community does not know enough about the military and its operations, and (b) the military does not know enough about the intelligence community and its operations.”

Recent support provided to the Defense Intelligence Agency by the 7th Special Forces Group afforded a unique, symbiotic support relationship. Individuals with significant experience in Colombia were able to provide that agency a different mind-set and put raw information in context, and the experience proved to be an excellent professional development opportunity for the military service members involved.
CONCLUSION

Much has been written over the past decade about the type of future warfare for which the U.S. Army should prepare. Samuel Huntington predicts that future conflict will be dominated by that between civilizations and religious groupings. Similarly, Robert Kaplan sees anarchy emerging which will result with some nation-states becoming ungovernable, and subnational and transnational entities becoming viable threats. While a great deal of rhetoric declares that the force to which the Army is transforming will address these threats, it would actually seem that the Army "continues to follow the Jominian school of military thought, with its fixation on the enduring principles of war and continued apathy toward irregular warfare."30

According to Bill Gates, an individual knows when he has arrived in the information age when he begins to resent it if information is not immediately available on the internet. "Even as the most advanced society in the world today, the United States has not fully transitioned into the information age. Many of us are still living in the industrial age and our Army reflects this truth – we still have masses of tanks, artillery, battleships and fighter aircraft."31 And the Army continues to believe that technology and an ability to achieve a "common picture" across the battlefield – a sort of "command and control conflict" which focuses on headquarters and their communications nodes – is the key to decisive military operations in the future. The capability to master information and achieve information dominance equates to an awesome tool that cannot be overlooked. However, it will be the investment in intellectual capital – in the soldier – that will prove dominant on the battlefield of the future.

The Special Forces Captain represents a unique capability within the context of the United States Army which has been underutilized in the past due to professional jealousy and misunderstanding. In the world which is now emerging, a resource-constrained military can no longer afford to rely upon the old elements of military power, but must be prepared to exploit capabilities across the full spectrum. An investment in the professional development of a relatively small number of officers will enhance the ability of Special Forces to meet the requirements of the nation in a world that is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

It is probable that the military will confront threats from new directions not now envisioned, which will attempt to counter the military power of the U.S. through asymmetric means. Such a threat requires new, innovative approaches to the preparation of those men and women who are expected to meet and defeat these new threats in whatever milieu they present themselves. The U.S. Army is about people, not equipment. Investments in the preparation of our people can never be a waste of resources. The leader of a transformed Army must be experienced in multinational operations, tolerant of uncertainty and politically aware. That leader must also
exhibit operational agility and the understanding that deployments equal training. Special Forces Captains are already well on the way toward meeting these objectives. Enhancement of the manner in which they are professionally developed will reap benefits exponentially greater than the initial cost in providing for the nation's needs in the future.

WORD COUNT = 5670
ENDNOTES


4Ibid.


8Ibid., p. 76.

9Ibid.

10Clausewitz, p. 191.


12Ibid.


14Ibid., p. 169.


17 See Foot, p. 155, for an account of Prime Minister Winston Churchill discussing this issue with an operative of the SOE in 1943.

18 Foot, pps. 47-48.


21 Clausewitz, p. 119.


23 Clausewitz, p. 190.

24 John D. Waghelstein, interview by Charles A. Carlton, Jr., 1985, Project 85-7, transcript, Senior Officers Oral History Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.


28 Collins, p. 74.


30 Shin, p. 67.

31 Ibid., p. 64.
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