The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES IN AFRICA —
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JASON C. SEAL
United States Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2002

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
This SRP will review current efforts under way which are designed to respond to Peace Operations on the African continent. In a broad context, it will look at African, European, and American responses to peacekeeping and crisis intervention, while in a narrower vein, it will review the African Crisis Response Initiative and current African Peacekeeping initiatives. The overall intent is to analyze current initiatives - not only in regard to bilateral relationships, but also within a regional and sub-regional context. It will conclude by offering discrete and focused recommendations for future operations in Africa.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................III

PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES IN AFRICA – A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS .........................................................1

BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS .....................................................................1

A. AFRICAN UNION (AU) ..............................................................................................................................3

B. AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL RESPONSES .................................................................................................5

CHAPTER II WESTERN RESPONSE .............................................................................................................11

A. FRANCE .................................................................................................................................................12

B. UNITED KINGDOM ..................................................................................................................................12

C. EUROPEAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES ASSESSED ...........................................................................14

CHAPTER III US RESPONSE .......................................................................................................................14

A. AN OVERVIEW OF ACRY .........................................................................................................................16

B. ACRI ASSESSED .....................................................................................................................................17

CHAPTER IV SUMMARY OF WESTERN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES .........................................................19

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................20

ENDNOTES ...................................................................................................................................................23

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................25
BACKGROUND

During the decade of the 1990s an African consensus began to emerge which postulated that countries south of the Sahara needed to take responsibility for Peace Operations within their own region. A long-held faith in the United Nations (UN) eroded sharply after the failures in Somalia and Rwanda as well as its demonstrated inability to respond effectively in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This disillusionment has also been directed at the African Union (AU) – formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – in light of its historical opposition to intervention within the sovereign affairs of African states and its perennial inability to organize and react to emerging crises.

Based on this gradual, yet fundamental, shift in African views concerning Peace Operations, an emerging model has appeared. This new model acknowledged the reality of an African country taking the lead in an intervention (normally a regional hegemon) and then creating a coalition of other willing neighbors to complete and "legitimize" the operation. International legitimacy would be sought "ex post facto", as many African states are increasingly unwilling to wait for a less than timely response from the AU or UN. The recent interventions in Lesotho (with a South African lead), Liberia and Sierra Leone (both operations predominantly led by the Nigerians) follow this general model. This "African solutions to African problems" model is significant in several ways for it establishes some basic (and troubling) assumptions, and highlights pro-active measures taken by sub-regional actors, while also describing significant limitations for future African interventions in peace operations.

This paper will evaluate the "African solutions for African problems" model, summarize basic assumptions and critical shortfalls of this new paradigm, review current African and Western peacekeeping initiatives, and investigate the potential for Africans to intervene in future Peace Operations. It will conclude by arguing that any "Africanization" of peace operations forces will face critical shortfalls in sustainability and mobility, and as such, will be dependent on Western augmentation for the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER I AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS

Traditionally, Africans have had tremendous faith in the United Nations. This faith was grounded primarily in the fact that the General Assembly of the UN was viewed as one of the few institutions in which countries south of the Sahara had power and influence; membership in the General Assembly was seen as one of the most important icons of African sovereignty. To
dismiss the role of the UN was to lessen – at least implicitly – the international salience of the guarantor of African sovereignty. However, the dramatic failures of Somalia and Rwanda corroded the long standing faith in the United Nations and initiated the current prevailing view that reliance on the international community is highly problematic.

For many African countries the fundamental lesson learned from Somalia and Rwanda was that non-state actors (the warlords in and around Mogadishu and the Hutu militia within Rwanda) were able to thwart international intervention. This type of intra-state conflict, so prevalent on the continent, has proven exceptionally difficult for the international community to manage and ultimately was the cause for failure. Traditional UN peacekeeping missions were not designed for such conflicts, and as such, were ultimately shown to be unworkable in these new “civil wars” in Africa. Based on the lessons learned from UN involvement in Somalia as well as it’s inaction in Rwanda, the realization that indigenous forces would need to be configured for future contingencies began to take hold within African states. The African Union summed up the new paradigm when it noted that “regional organizations should realize that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems, especially those related to issues of peace, security and stability. This is necessary as Africans external partners are increasingly less enthusiastic about sharing its problems.”

As a general rule, the vast majority of African countries possess inadequate military capabilities to mount substantial operations beyond their own borders, while marginal economic resources further restrict their ability to conduct long term sustainment for effective military operations. Though there are a number of African states that have considerable UN peacekeeping experience (Senegal, Kenya, Botswana, Zimbabwe), these countries have only been able to carry out their responsibilities due to combat support capabilities and financial aid of Western countries and the UN. Due to these limitations, the unfortunate reality is that logistical and financial constraints preclude most African states from individually participating in peace operations without sustainment, strategic lift, or financing from an external source.

In light of these limitations, African states are attempting to become more self-sufficient in responding to various crises by developing collective responses within the regional and sub-regional context, vice unilateral “ad hoc” responses from individual states. In order to do this, political and economic organizations on the African continent are expanding their original mandates so that they now include military capabilities. This reform at the political level is seen as the important first step in addressing African self-sufficiency in peacekeeping operations. Once the AU and sub-regional organizations have sufficiently adjusted their charters to the new
realities of African peacekeeping forces for African conflicts, further specific reforms within the military and financial fields can then take place.

While African states have generally recognized the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises on the continent (and are supporting reform at the regional and sub-regional level to accomplish this task), their actual ability to undertake credible and effective peacekeeping operations still remain limited due to inadequate sustainment and projection capabilities. A good example of these fundamental challenges was the 1997/1998 UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). During this operation, France played an indispensable role by providing transport for all of the African contingents to the mission area, while also providing substantial logistical support once the force was operational. In short, while Africans provided the “boots on the ground”, France provided the critical enablers for the operation to succeed — strategic lift and follow-on sustainment.2

In summation, a new political consensus has emerged in Africa that recognizes the fact that African states need to respond to African challenges. However, this new realization understands that the vast majority of African nations does not currently have the capability to unilaterally intervene in crisis areas, and will therefore have to rely on regional or sub-regional mechanisms to respond. As such, a “pooling” of limited military resources augmented by deployment and sustainment assistance by the international community is seen as the only solution to this security dilemma.

A. AFRICAN UNION (AU)

The AU has traditionally been very cautious about intervening in humanitarian crises or peace operations within Africa due to the historical prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of AU member states. This basic principle, enshrined in its charter, has traditionally tied the hands of the AU Secretary General on many occasions when attempting to broker any type of peacekeeping mission within one of the AU member states. However, due to changing political realities within the international community, there have been attempts at reform within the AU structure which would allow a more efficient response to emerging crises. An example of this reform would be the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Conflict Management Center) within the AU Secretariats Office.3 Intended to be a rudimentary and evolving crisis management mechanism for the Secretariat, it is a good start in the process of adaptation to crisis response in Africa.

Other discrete AU initiatives intended to strengthen the organization’s ability to promote peace and security within the continent are an Early Warning System and a Crisis Management
Room - both of which fall under the “umbrella” of the Conflict Management Center. The Early Warning System was created to address the organization’s historical failure to secure reliable and timely information on conflict situations and to respond effectively on the basis of such information. In conjunction with the establishment of the Early Warning System, the AU also set up the Crisis Management Room – a 24 hour situation room where AU personnel monitor crises throughout the continent. Though commendable, both mechanisms suffer from a lack of financial support (and subsequent staffing shortfalls), and offer little to the AU in terms of substantial response capability concerning humanitarian crises. Even if these structures begin to function smoothly, they are not likely to improve the AU’s operational performance. Early decision making is a much more pressing problem for the organization to overcome than early warning, and this issue will never be truly addressed until the AU’s principle of non interference is reviewed and amended for extraordinary situations and peacekeeping interventions.

As mentioned, a tenuous financial base hampers the AU’s ability to make progress in peacekeeping capability. Only five percent of the organization’s annual budget is allocated to peace initiatives, and the failure of the majority of the members to pay their dues on time exacerbates the problem. Although the UN and other Western states have made significant donations to the AU’s conflict management machinery, these contributions have not prompted meaningful results. Additionally, the uncomfortable reality of organizational graft and corruption has prevented the AU from making full and efficient use of available funds.

The AU’s capacity to undertake credible and effective peacekeeping missions has remained limited to a few small observer missions. Other than it’s short-lived involvement in Chad during 1981, the AU has only been able to send military observers to four conflicts in the 1990s – Rwanda, Burundi, the Comoros, and the recent Ethiopian/Eritrean war. Although these missions played some important symbolic roles and provided useful confidence-building measures, they fell far short of being peacekeeping missions.

Recently, the AU has experimented with a plan to establish stand-by peacekeeping forces. This initiative, developed by the AU Chiefs of Defense Staff, recommended establishing a brigade-sized contribution for peacekeeping duties from each of the five African sub-regions. General Tonje, Chief of Kenyan General Staff, indicated such a position when he met with representatives of the US Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1999. He stated that any peacekeeping effort – either US/European or African – needed to be introduced in a sub-regional context through organizations like the East African Community (EAC) and the South African Development Community (SADC). Because peacekeeping cannot be separated from politics, General Tonje emphasized the need to train under sub-regional auspices. This fosters
improved interoperability and standardization between countries, as well as recognizing that sub-regional organizations will be decision makers on any deployment and participation within AU direction. Though understandable, the plan seems unrealistic and has yet to take form. The AU has agreed that an African peacekeeping force should consist of sub-regional brigades under AU command and control. However, given that the organization has perennially gone hat-in-hand to Western donors for basic military items such as boots, socks, and flashlights for its Observer Mission participants, it is difficult to see how it plans to field peacekeeping missions comprised of sub-regional brigades.

The AU has begun the difficult process of reforming its beauraucracy in response to peacekeeping responsibilities. Not having a standing army to respond to African challenges, the AU is dependent on consensus within the various nation states and sub-regional organizations within the continent to address conflicts and peacekeeping missions. As such, reform is needed within the beauraucracy of the AU itself so that it can better manage such operations in the future. The creation of the Conflict Management Center and Early Warning System are good examples of how the AU is attempting to restructure itself, but the fundamental challenge of how to finance this reform and to pay for future peacekeeping missions remains. With the understanding that most African countries will remain in arrears to the AU for the foreseeable future due to ongoing fiscal challenges, the US and the European Union need to explore the feasibility of providing a fiscal "stipend" to serve as a basis for ongoing reform and future missions. This money (set aside for peacekeeping issues) would "prime the pump" for ongoing reform, which would in turn support U.S. and European desires to remain detached from African peacekeeping missions.

Finally, no specific reform has been enacted to address shortcomings in strategic lift and sustainment. At the regional level, this is probably unavoidable based on the fact that the AU has no standing military structure and is dependent on individual African states and the sub-regions to respond to crises. As such, specific reform dealing with sustainment and strategic lift issues is better focused at the sub-regional level, while political reform is more appropriately addressed at the regional level.

B. AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL RESPONSES

While the AU has shown itself incapable within the current time frame of providing the leadership and resources needed for crisis response, the continent's sub-regional organizations show promise in this regard. Unencumbered by charters that restrict crisis intervention, and possessing the military means to accomplish specified goals, sub-regionals are well positioned...
to respond to evolving peace operations. Though there are several sub-regional organizations within Africa, two in particular deserve attention when one speaks of crisis intervention capability: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These organizations deserve mention based on their relatively significant military potential as well as their political standing within Africa. In particular, South Africa (within SADC) and Nigeria (within ECOWAS) possess considerable force-projection assets, and in a military and economic context, form the core of their respective sub-regional organizations.

While ECOWAS has recently been engaged in significant military operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau, SADC’s capabilities have yet to be similarly tested. This is partly due to internal disagreements over centralized control of SADC military interventions, while also reflecting a relatively more stable region than that confronting ECOWAS in West Africa. In June of 1996, SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (generally referred to as the “Organ”) reflecting sub-regional consensus on the need for stronger security coordination and the understanding that regional forces would be the force of choice for regional peace operations. However, after the establishment of the Organ, controversy and disagreement erupted over the level of centralizing power it would wield, and where it would be placed within the SADC bureaucracy. Several countries within SADC viewed the Organ as a potential source of unaccountable military power, while others saw it as an unnecessary military appendage to an economic organization. Due to this ongoing disagreement, the Organ was (and remains) still-born.\(^9\)

Economic concerns have always been SADC’s chief focus. While there was a historical shared goal of liberating southern African countries from white rule, recent political and security issues have been particularly contentious. An example of this would be the recent events surrounding the rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which have shown how deeply SADC members are divided in terms of their willingness to intervene militarily in regional conflicts. Although there have been few regional conflicts where SADC members have intervened in order to establish stability, these actions have most always been initiated by individual countries or a band of countries within the organization. Examples include interventions into Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, as well as the already mentioned intervention in the DRC. Although there was a united military and diplomatic SADC response to the crisis in Lesotho in September of 1994, its significance is rather limited due to the fact that no peace operation was undertaken, and a show of force by the South African Army along the Lesotho border proved sufficient to control the emergency. The August 1998 intervention by Angola,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe in the DRC did eventually receive retroactive endorsement by the SADC, but the late endorsement has at best been seen as a face-saving measure for Presidents Mugabe and Mandela. Finally, South Africa's September 1998 military intervention in Lesotho, in which Botswana also participated, was a "SADC force" in name only; it only received such a designation after last minute direct coordination between South African and other SADC heads of state. Again, The Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was never activated.

Notwithstanding the non-functioning of the Organ, SADC members have undertaken some important capacity-building initiatives within the peace support arena, primarily through SADC's informal security secretariat, the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC). These initiatives have included the establishment of a satellite communications linkage between the various SADC governments, the commitment to create a standby brigade for peace operations, as well as enhancing education and training within the peacekeeping venue.

Though the satellite communication "hotline" has been established within SADC, establishment of a standby brigade has proven elusive. This arrangement was supposed to be operational by the end of 1998, but due to the impasse concerning the Organ, little progress has been made. Without a mutually agreed upon umbrella organization dedicated to security and conflict resolution within SADC, little headway has been gained in pursuing laudable goals such as the standby brigade. As such, SADC continues to rely upon the ISDSC and discrete military formations provided (and controlled) by member states to respond to conflicts within the region.

Even though SADC has still to work through challenges in regards to the Organ, as well as the establishment of a standby brigade, it has shown progress in important peace operations training and other initiatives. As an example, the Defense Sub-Committee of the ISDSC has worked with the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Center (RPTC), to harmonize peacekeeping education training in the SADC sub region as a whole. With advisory and financial assistance from the United Kingdom and Denmark, the ZSC has improved its training facilities and expanded its peacekeeping course offerings. The RPTC was inaugurated in 1995, and has conducted an annual, two-week peacekeeping course for commanders (company through brigade chief of staff) designated to participate in peacekeeping operations. Lastly, the ISDSC has also initiated large scale regional peacekeeping training exercises (exercises "Blue Hungwe" in Zimbabwe, and "Blue Crane" in South Africa) in order to enhance regional liaison, cooperation, military skills and interoperability within a multinational field training environment.
SADC, like the other sub-regional organizations in Africa, has wrestled with the structural and political complexities related to peace operations within an organization whose chief focus is regional economic development - not conflict mediation. As stated, this friction has been borne out in the ongoing debate over the role of the Organ and the establishment of a standby brigade earmarked for peace operations. As with the AU, SADC has yet to fully come to terms with the structural and political necessities of regional peace support operations; however, unlike the AU, it has been able to muddle through regional contingencies by compromise, ingenuity, and will-power.

Like SADC, the impetus behind the creation of ECOWAS was the desire to develop an economic cooperation and integration scheme within West Africa - not to create a mechanism designed to maintain regional peace and security. Because of this, its recent involvement in military interventions within the West African region has been reactive in nature as it has worked through various aspects of military response when the UN and the AU were unable to intervene. Again, like the SADC, ECOWAS lacked an institutional crisis prevention and management mechanism which severely hampered its ability to mitigate regional crises in a timely and measured manner. However, the necessity of some sort of outside intervention within the regional conflicts raging in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (at a time of international and regional inaction) demanded a sub-regional response. The mantle of responsibility for crisis intervention fell on ECOWAS by default because there was no other entity prepared or willing to respond.

The historical facts surrounding the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Groups (ECOMOGs) dispatched to the three previously mentioned conflicts have been well documented and need no further elaboration within this paper. However, while all three have been categorized as peace enforcement operations and were heavily influenced by Nigeria (the sub-regional power in West Africa), they were all eventually successful in bringing the conflicts under control. The ECOMOG I mission in Liberia has been seen as more of a success story than ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone, but the “bottom line” in both missions (as well as the mission in Guinea-Bissau) is that a semblance of order was imposed on each country by ECOWAS, which in turn laid the foundation for subsequent elections in Liberia and for a UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone.

ECOMOG’s experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone prompted discussions among ECOWAS member states to develop an institutionalized mechanism for crisis prevention and management in the same vein as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security. Over the course of the last decade ECOWAS has moved forward with the creation of a permanent peace
and security mechanism – the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (better known as “the Mechanism”).\textsuperscript{12} The enactment of this new mechanism for crisis prevention has been a positive step in addressing the long-standing shortcomings concerning ECOMOG’s deployment in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Instead of relying on an ad hoc response to regional crises, ECOWAS is now attempting to institutionalize crisis response procedures. As such, the advent of “the Mechanism” represents an important turning point for ECOWAS, even though it remains to be seen if such a structural adjustment will be a success in the long run.

As with other sub-regional organizations within Africa (and the AU), a lack of adequate financial resources threatens to undermine ECOWAS plans in formulating a new structure for peacekeeping operations. While the organization’s annual budget is approximately $10 million, it is currently owed more than $40 million in arrears. As such, ECOWAS has challenges in paying its own meager staff, let alone financing new peace and security initiatives. A community wide levy was instituted during 1993 in order to help pay for the establishment of “the Mechanism”, but over eight years later it is still not enforced. Based on this, ECOWAS remains dependent on Nigerian and international largesse to support ECOMOG operations. These financial realities (and the exorbitant costs of past ECOMOG missions) cast justifiable doubt upon ECOWAS’s intention of assuming full financial responsibility for future ECOMOG peacekeeping operations, freeing itself from the dominance of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{13}

A related concern to the financial foundation of ECOMOG, is the ability of the ECOWAS leadership structure to assume the responsibilities envisaged for it in the realm of peace and security. The Secretariat’s staff remains limited due to scarce financial resources, and any expanding role in oversight and leadership responsibilities would be placed on an already overtaxed staff. The Secretariat has not been able to grow commensurately with the expanding role of ECOWAS, and as a result, the handful of personnel within it’s Legal Affairs and Information Divisions have become saddled with much of the organization’s related responsibilities concerning peace and security. Though there has been on-going restructuring designed to adapt to the increasing demands of ECOMOG duties, the financial strictures placed on the ECOWAS Secretariat’s office will undoubtedly inhibit future planning for Peacekeeping operations.

Finally, there remains the distinct possibility that institutionalizing ECOMOG through the establishment of “the Mechanism” could prove counter productive in the long run. Sub-regional members of ECOWAS might find it less attractive to contribute to an ECOMOG force if some of their autonomy were taken away, just as sub-regional members of SADC have balked at the
establishment of “the Organ” and its centralized control. A country might opt not to deploy at all if its participation in a given operation were subject to too many controls. It is conceivable that in redressing criticisms of prior ECOMOG deployments, those elements that actually made ECOMOG work will be removed.

Though there are ongoing structural adjustments within the ECOWAS Secretariat, as well as challenges with financial stability, ECOWAS has been distinguished by its willingness to assume primary responsibility for promoting peace and security within the sub-region. It has also provided a proven template for future operations in Africa. The organization has emerged as the best example of what can be done in crisis response and peacekeeping within the “African solutions for African problems” model. Additionally, ECOWAS has begun to stage multinational field training exercises, and with the help of Western militaries is focusing on peacekeeping training. Eight ECOWAS states participated in the French sponsored exercise “Guidimakha ‘98” in Senegal, while several months later, nine ECOWAS members attended exercise “Cohesion Kompienga” in Togo. Also, a number of ECOWAS states now offer peacekeeping courses at their national staff colleges and have opened participation to other countries within the sub-region. Finally, and most importantly, in the three instances of crisis response mentioned above (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau), ECOWAS has intervened with substantial military forces when no other international organization would. As former ECOMOG I Force Commander Victor Malu observed concerning Liberia, “Regional peacekeeping I think is much more effective than the United Nations peacekeeping, in terms of the casualties that have occurred within the seven years of operations here. If the United Nations had got one-tenth of that, they would have abandoned this place over how many years back.”

The sub-regional organizations have shown the greatest promise for peacekeeping missions within Africa. They are the ones closest to the areas of concern, and each has a powerful “core country” that provides basic military capabilities. However, what these organizations lack is the organizational capacity to sustain peacekeeping forces for a lengthy period of time, and the ability to project needed forces with organic strategic lift. While ECOWAS and SADC have taken the initial and fundamental steps of reform within their respective bureaucracies, further specific reforms dealing with military capabilities will be harder to realize due to financial constraints within each respective nation.

In order to address these fundamental shortfalls, the U.S. should utilize the 1996 ECOMOG assistance package as a “baseline” for future African peacekeeping ventures so as to provide future missions a better chance of success. This assistance included the provision of
contracted commercial helicopter support (International Charter Inc.), uniforms, non-lethal field equipment, and vehicles, contracted maintenance services (provided by Pacific Architects and Engineers), and strategic lift of discrete portions of ECOMOG force by the U.S. Air Force (Operation “Assured Lift” during Feb/March 1997). This type of specific and directed support was critical to the eventual success of the ECOMOG mission and provides an appropriate template for future U.S. and international support to African peacekeeping missions. This mix of private contractor and US Air Force augmentation to African sub-regional military response is probably the best solution to the quandary now facing African peacekeeping missions. It is a flexible response that has proven its worth in the ECOMOG experience in Liberia, while more importantly recognizing the realities and limitations of African sustainment and force projection capabilities.

CHAPTER II WESTERN RESPONSE

Aware of the limitations of African capabilities (and their own unwillingness to intervene militarily), several Western countries have developed peacekeeping training initiatives in Africa. Though all are aimed at enhancing "capacity building", each individual program varies in terms of financial and political commitment.

The American, British and French programs are the most substantial and well-developed initiatives. The US program (ACRI) provides non-lethal peacekeeping training and non-lethal equipment to select countries on a bilateral basis. France, on the other hand, conducts sub-regional peacekeeping training exercises and classroom instruction, and has pre-positioned heavy equipment in designated locations in Africa through its own peacekeeping initiative, Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP). Lastly, the UK program – administered under British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) – though more modest than the American and French programs, focuses primarily on training and education with selected African nations.

Even though the US, France, and the UK represent the lion’s share of Western peacekeeping initiatives in Africa, other Western programs merit some mention. Canada, the historic global leader in peacekeeping operations and training, provides instructors for training courses held at the Egyptian Institute of Foreign Affairs and sponsors approximately thirty African participants per year to attend peacekeeping courses offered at the Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center. Additionally, Ireland assists the Zambian Staff College in developing its peacekeeping training curriculum and provides a small cadre of military personnel in this endeavor.
A. FRANCE

RECAMP, the flagship French peacekeeping initiative, prioritizes its training regimen at the sub regional level with the goal of establishing “force modules” prepared to participate in UN and AU authorized operations. RECAMP provides significant support to multinational peacekeeping exercises hosted by different African countries with the intent of organizing multinational battalions. The first RECAMP training exercise, “Guidimakha 98”, took place in Senegal during 1998 and included eight African countries with several Western countries participating with observers. All RECAMP training exercises (such as Guidimakha) are sub-regional in nature and designed to prepare troops for a number of peacekeeping contingencies. These exercises are divided into four separate phases, to include: intelligence gathering procedures, securing key strategic points, securing a humanitarian safe zone, and protecting refugees and displaced persons. RECAMP exercises are scheduled every two years in a different francophone African country, and each exercise is preceded by a civil-military planning seminar and Command Post Exercise (CPX).

Under RECAMP, France provides substantial peacekeeping instruction and training through its regional West African peacekeeping training center in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast. France also provides financial assistance and instructors to the national military staff colleges of the Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo. During the nine month course of instruction at the staff college in Mali, RECAMP supplied instructor support to specific courses which focus on humanitarian law issues, relevant international treaties and conventions, and recent African conflicts. Additionally, an on-going exchange program with select African countries allows officers to be schooled at all levels of French military education.

The provision of peacekeeping-related equipment is also an important element of RECAMP. During the Guidimakha exercise in Senegal in 1998, France pre-positioned equipment in Dakar for use in future peacekeeping operations in West Africa. This equipment has remained under French control, is maintained by French forces, and most importantly has already been utilized in peacekeeping duties in the Central African Republic. France plans to pre-position additional equipment over the next several years in other African countries in conjunction with future RECAMP sub regional training exercises.

B. UNITED KINGDOM

Unlike RECAMP, the British focus of effort is training personnel in leadership positions, vice the French focus on developing “force modules” for future deployments. Based on the relatively small size of the UK program, the primacy of attention focuses on “training the trainer"
A central goal of the British program is the development of first rate peacekeeping training centers within the military staff colleges in Ghana, Zambia, and Uganda, with BMATTs collocated with each staff college.

Although the BMATTs are the most formalized component of the British peacekeeping program in Africa, the UK also has smaller scale training initiatives. These initiatives are centered around British Military Liaison Officers (BMLOs) and Short Term Training Teams (STTTs). STTTs have provided mine awareness training to Zimbabweans prior to their participation in the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), as well as to a Ghanaian contingent before it deployed to Liberia as part of ECOMOG during 1996. Finally, the BMLO in Addis Ababa works closely with the Ethiopian military on peacekeeping matters and advises the AU (headquartered in Addis Ababa) on similar issues. The UK effort is not only focused on bilateral training initiatives, but also on sub-regional efforts. It supports and helps to organize ongoing peacekeeping exercises in Zimbabwe (Blue Hungwe), and also provides financial support to on-going South African peacekeeping training exercises such as Blue Crane.20

The provision of peacekeeping-related instruction is a central component of BMATT. Each program is tailored to the specific needs of the host country and sub-region; however, most periods of instruction cover basic topics such as international humanitarian law and civil-military relations. In Ghana, the BMATT supports the Armed Forces Command and Staff College in its four week peacekeeping module given in the senior course. In Zimbabwe, BMATT works closely with the Staff College in its two week peacekeeping module which is open not only to Zimbabwean senior officers, but also to participants from throughout the region. The United Kingdom also conducts a number of courses outside of BMATT host countries; an example of this would be BMATT Zimbabwe which runs a company commanders course in peacekeeping in Swaziland and a disaster management course in Mauritius.21

The UK has supported several other projects designed to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities. British contributions to the UN Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa have financed peacekeeping courses in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia. Together with Nigeria, the UK co-chaired an informal working group that produced a paper entitled Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa, which was submitted to the Secretaries-General of the UN and the AU in 1995. It has been a seminal document for both organizations as they shape doctrine and responses to humanitarian crises in the continent. Additionally, in an effort to promote Anglophone/Francophone military co-operation in theater, this working group funded an English/French peacekeeping dictionary produced jointly by the Ghanaian and Senegalese armed forces.22
The provision of equipment is not a central component of the British capacity-building program in Africa, but the UK does donate peacekeeping-related material on an ad hoc basis. Due to the expense in providing hardware and equipment, the UK has made a decision that providing training and instruction would be better because of its limited military resources. Nevertheless, on several occasions, the UK has allocated financial support to purchase equipment for use in peacekeeping operations. In 1996, for example, Britain contributed more than $500,000 to purchase vehicles and spare parts for the ECOMOG mission in West Africa, and in 1999, pledged an additional $1.65 million to the UN Trust Fund for Sierra Leone, with most of the money earmarked for logistical support to ECOMOG.23

C. EUROPEAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES ASSESSED

Though these European peacekeeping initiatives are well intentioned and do provide excellent training in peacekeeping procedures, they do not establish any link between "capacity-building" and "capacity-utilization." Other than pre-positioning of equipment with the RECAMP initiative, both of the European initiatives focus on training and enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. Though adequate from a training perspective, it is inadequate from the practical perspective of focusing on the mechanics of employing and deploying a peacekeeping trained force when a crisis occurs. Each initiative can be termed as "capacity building" venture (teaching the Africans how to engage in peacekeeping), but neither get involved in "capacity utilization" (how to get the trained unit into the AOR and to sustain them once they are there). This is the greatest flaw in the initiatives, and it has yet to be fully addressed. The unspoken reality that still remains is that the West will provide "in extremis" support in critical needs areas (lift, sustainment and logistics) - as was shown in Chad with French support - but it will not formally address these issues in any training evolution.

This fundamental shortfall can primarily be addressed in the same manner as previously mentioned with US and international ECOMOG assistance package during the Liberian peacekeeping mission. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should be agreed upon by the sub-regionals and the Western powers which would then formalize support for future African troop commitment to peace operations with critical services provided by private contractors and Western strategic lift assets. This "linkage" would then address the intermediate need for training with concrete and discrete support in critical need areas.

CHAPTER III US RESPONSE

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is the United States Government's primary initiative to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and
effectively to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief contingencies on the African continent. Per the State Department, “the goal of ACRI is to enhance the capacity of our African partners to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner.”

ACRI’s program is based on common doctrine and equipment, with an emphasis on interoperable communications equipment that enables multinational units to work together more effectively. Other related initiatives by the US include peace enforcement training of select African countries (Operation Focus Relief), as well as multilateral humanitarian relief training exercises (Natural Fire/Native Fury). These initiatives, combined with ongoing International Military Educational Training (IMET) programs, support ACRI in its goal of establishing a solid foundation of African expertise in humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations.

ACRI is a scaled-down version of a more ambitious program called the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) proposed in late 1996, which sought to create an African military organization that could respond to complex emergencies with only limited outside help. The underlying construct of ACRF was straightforward: 1) establish a permanent African response force that would deal with African humanitarian crises as they appeared, and 2) troops would come from Africa, while funding would come from the US and the European Union.

Though well intentioned, ACRF was met with widespread African skepticism. It was generally seen as an attempt by the US to disengage from future involvement in African conflicts, while some surmised that any permanent transnational force with strong doctrinal links to the US and Europe would ultimately be manipulated by the Western powers in an attempt to influence African affairs. In response to this criticism, the US transformed the idea of an African intervention force into a long-term capacity building initiative.

By mid-1997, ACRF had evolved into ACRI, through which U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors provide training and limited non-lethal equipment to African militaries. The goal of ACRI is to develop an African capacity to maintain peace in a “permissive environment”, where the parties to the conflict have agreed on peacekeeping units intervening to maintain peace. To realize this goal, the intent is to create a standby pool of African peacekeeping forces which are prepared to deploy as part of a UN or regionally authorized mandate to humanitarian crises within Africa.

Designed as a bilateral U.S.-African peacekeeping training evolution (vice a multinational sub-regional approach such as RECAMP), ACRI focuses on developing basic soldiering and peacekeeping skills and providing common communications gear and general support equipment. The desired end state is to develop a set of eight to ten commonly trained, commonly equipped and interoperable African battalions (six to eight hundred soldiers each),
with four to six specialized companies for combat support/combat service support. Each
country participating must request the ACRI training, provide the requisite battalions, and meet
basic U.S. eligibility requirements (rudimentary democratic infrastructure, respect for human
rights, and not taking part in a current conflict). Initial training focuses on the battalion and
covers approximately two and a half months. This is followed by “refresher” training courses at
approximately six month intervals thereafter.26

Military trainers for the ACRI predominantly come from the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC), with augmentation by U.S. Marines. Civilian expertise comes from two
firms specializing in staff training and computer simulation assistance. Elements of the 3rd and
5th Special Forces Groups and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command have the primary lead for training in ACRI, while U.S. Marines from I Marine
Expeditionary Force provide assistance within the East African region. The civilian firms
included in the ACRI training program are Military Professional Resources International (MPRI),
and Logicon. MPRI is a firm primarily manned with retired military personnel, many of who were
senior officers in various branches of service. MPRI’s involvement centers on staff training and
leadership tasks. Logicon, on the other hand, assists in the training of host nation staffs in
computer skills and takes the lead in fashioning the computer related portions of the final
exercise packages during the training evolutions.27

A. AN OVERVIEW OF ACRI

From July 1997 to the present, ACRI has conducted battalion initial training in Senegal,
Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Ivory Coast and Kenya. Follow-on training has occurred in
all of these countries except for the Ivory Coast (due to its recent coup d’etat) and Uganda
(based on its continued military involvement in the DRC). To date, ACRI has provided training
and non-lethal equipment (including uniforms, boots, portable generators, mine detectors, night
vision devices, and water purification units) to over 8,000 peacekeepers from eight African
militaries.

During initial battalion training, U.S. military instructors lead a battalion of African soldiers
through a program of instruction on peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Six
months after initial training, U.S. instructors begin the first of a series of five “follow-on” training
events which guide the battalion, and in particular, its command and staff elements, through a
comprehensive set of field exercises, computer-assisted simulations, and classroom instruction.
These exercises are designed to prepare a battalion to be fully capable of conducting efficient
and effective peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations consistent with UN and other
international “best practices”. Follow-on training events take place every six months, in a building-block process, until the series of five events is complete. Intervals between events allow the participant country to absorb the new skills that are introduced in each training sequence and to practice the “train the trainer” skills that ACRI emphasizes. Respect for human rights is reinforced as a fundamental concept throughout the training process.

The ACRI training program (both initial and follow-on training) exposes the host military to the full range of UN Chapter VI peacekeeping tasks, from convoy escort, logistics, and protection of refugees, to negotiations and command and control. The ACRI program trains African militaries how to respond (force protection) to an escalating military situation; however, ACRI does not cover the offensive combat aspects of Chapter VII peace enforcement nor does ACRI provide lethal equipment. ACRI’s program integrates non-governmental organizations and international organizations into the training and also provides an in-depth HIV/AIDS awareness module in all training events.28

ACRI’s first brigade-level training effort was conducted in Senegal in September 2000, and it’s second was completed with Kenya in May of 2001. Brigade-level training has been designed to develop command and control capacities at the sub-regional level and to enhance the ability of participants to carry out multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Brigade level training events, while focused on staff elements of a particular country, also incorporate elements from additional ACRI partners and representatives of regional or sub-regional organizations (AU, ECOWAS, SADC) that may play a central role in the multi-national coordination of a peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operation.

ACRI has already contributed to conflict resolution in Africa; several partner countries have deployed peacekeepers in international operations after ACRI tutelage. Mali and Ghana have sent forces to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force; a Ghanaian ACRI-trained brigadier is the AU representative to the Ethiopian-Eritrean Cease Fire Monitoring Group, and Benin has sent a troop contingent to Guinea-Bissau. Senegalese peacekeepers have been engaged under the UN mission in the Central African Republic; while Malawi contributed ACRI-provided equipment to humanitarian relief efforts in Mozambique and has provided observers to peacekeeping efforts in the DRC and Kosovo.29

B. ACRI ASSESSED

Though ACRI represents a significant step forward for US involvement in Africa, as well as providing a “base line” for future U.S. Peace keeping initiatives in other parts of the world, it
remains relatively limited due to its U.N. Chapter VI (peacekeeping) focus and its omission of any type of tutelage and support in strategic lift, sustainment and logistics.

As mentioned earlier, ACRI is designed only to train units for duty in a permissive environment; however, as was shown with the UNAMSIL Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, peacekeeping duties many times turn "hot" when belligerents kidnap or disrupt portions of the UN force. Because of this, the ACRI may want to incorporate some lethal training procedures within it's POI in order to provide a "bridge" for those occasions when "permissive" environments turn into "non-permissive" and hostile environments for deployed Peacekeepers. Portions of the "Focus Relief" POI recently conducted in Nigeria could be used as a template for this type of "Chapter VI and a half" training. More fundamentally (and more importantly), aspects of ACRI training which need to be addressed are the issues of deployment of ACRI-trained units, sustainment, and logistic support. These issues need to be addressed up front in order to inform all concerned about national limitations and how to prepare in spite of these obstacles. The fact that most of the countries involved with ACRI training lack the necessary organic lift requirements and sustainment capabilities associated with operations of this magnitude necessitate this exposure – if for no other reason than to ensure awareness of these critical deficiencies.

Efforts need to be focused in these areas in order to improve the integration of airlift support for ACRI training events and also for the mobilization of ACRI-trained units into a crisis area. Unfortunately, not only does the ACRI training syllabus overlook this necessary component of Battalion and Brigade level training, but U.S. Air Force doctrinal publications relating to MOOTW overlook it also. In an actual crisis, if the US Air Force is tasked with planning the support requirements in regards to ACRI peacekeeping operations, it will be performed on an ad hoc basis. This lack of a focused strategic lift portion within the ACRI period of instruction is not only a problem in establishing lift support, it also has an impact on air transport costs, scheduling, curriculum development, and also compounds the difficulty in responding to real airlift needs related to ACRI.  

Additionally, the issues of sustainment and logistics (so critical to the ECOMOG mission in Liberia and superbly addressed by contractors such as Pacific Architects and Engineers [PAE]) need to be added to the POI so that countries can better prepare for these fundamental issues and understand the intricacies of contractor support. As previously mentioned with the European peacekeeping training initiatives, some sort of MOU needs to be agreed upon between the US and its African partners in regards to US peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. This MOU can establish a "formalized" understanding that ACRI is part of an overall response to
African peacekeeping – fundamentally linked to other ongoing initiatives such as Focus Relief, Natural Fire/Native Fury, and IMET programs.

CHAPTER IV SUMMARY OF WESTERN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES

The unspoken premise underlying the Western initiatives in African peacekeeping operations is that the West is no longer willing to become directly involved in African conflicts. By providing African countries with peacekeeping-related training, instruction and equipment, Western states hope to prevent future military interventions on the continent. As already shown, RECAMP, BMATT, and ACRI focus primarily on “capacity building” as the main effort within their respective training programs. Each is flavored by discrete European or American domestic political concerns, and each is weighted in particular areas. All three programs form a portion of a tripartite African peacekeeping training agreement which was signed on May 22 1997 by the three Western powers (“P3 Agreement”).

While the British initiative aims at academic instruction and exercise management, the French initiative focuses on training multinational contingents for PKO as well as pre-positioning equipment at selected locations for future operations. The US, through ACRI, primarily focuses on bilateral training programs with selected African countries, while also providing a limited amount of non-lethal support equipment.

ACRI reflects an American desire to support humanitarian operations in Africa without being drawn into the action itself. In essence, it reflects the political and societal dislocation brought about by the debacle in Mogadishu in 1993. On the one hand it responds to the need of providing limited capacity-building support to African militaries, while on the other hand it keeps the US disengaged from direct military intervention in African affairs. Indeed, the impetus behind ACRF was to devise a rapid response to a very real fear that the international community might face an eruption of ethnic violence within the Great Lakes Region comparable to the great tragedy that was witnessed in Rwanda in 1994. However, the unreconciled dilemma facing the U.S. and Europe still remains: how does one “link” capacity-building initiatives with concrete capacity-utilization measures? ACRI, RECAMP, and BMATT are designed to address the former, but there is no follow-on initiatives designed to train and prepare for the latter.

The initial as well as intermediate answer probably lies with the previously suggested method of establishing a MOU between the African sub-regions and the Western powers. This MOU needs to formalize some sort of baseline for future peacekeeping missions whereby African militaries trained in internationally recognized norms of peacekeeping duties can be
supported by a mix of private contractors and western Air Force assets. Only through a formalized agreement or understanding can future African peacekeeping missions be adequately addressed.

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

The various peacekeeping training initiatives now in place within Africa are the result of a decade's worth of effort from a select group of Western and African countries. All of these initiatives recognize the need for indigenous units trained in peacekeeping skills. These Western efforts designed to help Africans augment their peacekeeping capabilities are still imperfect, as they do not address the difficult issues dealing with strategic lift and sustainment of forces for peacekeeping missions. ACRI, RECAMP, and BMATT are good “first starts”, but they need to now bridge the gap between basic tutelage in peacekeeping tasks and the more difficult aspects of employment and sustainment.

When the concept of a standing African Crisis Response Force died in the latter part of the 1990's, capacity building training programs were the only alternative offered by the Western powers. However, the critical issues of sustainment and mobility would not be directly addressed within this new paradigm of capacity building. These would be left to the Africans, with the unspoken understanding that they would somehow be addressed in the future. As such, a compromise of sorts was reached whereby the western powers would train and selectively augment African forces for peacekeeping operations, but would not become directly involved themselves. After much trial and effort, it became apparent that the sub-regional organizations were the appropriate mechanisms to respond to future peacekeeping and humanitarian crises in Africa. While the UN and the AU have both shown the lack of requisite political will and required resources to carry out these types of missions on a reliable basis, the sub-regionals have mustered the necessary resources to intervene when needed.

The next step for the U.S. and its European allies is to mold ACRI, RECAMP, and BMATT into the lessons learned from the ECOMOG mission in Liberia so that capacity building training can be combined with real world requirements of contractor support for sustainment, lift, and logistics support. Augmenting the POI of each training initiative with contractor personnel dealing with sustainment and logistics (possibly PAE personnel), would add realism and needed awareness for African staff officers as they work through all the demands of peacekeeping duties. Above and beyond specific additions to the training missions, the West needs to continue to support on-going efforts by the sub-regional organizations as they establish crisis prevention mechanisms and experiment with various programs within the peacekeeping venue.
As these organizations mature, the U.S. can expand security relationships in order to foster closer relationships in the peacekeeping arena. Additionally, when African nations do engage in multinational peacekeeping, the U.S. and the international community must provide the critically needed assets – logistics, sustainment, and sustainment lift assets.

The United States should actively support African-led and designed programs to improve regional cooperation in peacekeeping even if it has little control over them. A good example of this would be financial backing of South Africa’s premier peacekeeping exercise, Blue Crane. Also, another form of support could take the form of transporting units from one country to another in order to participate in sub-regional exercises. Not only would this support indigenous efforts at peacekeeping, it would exercise U.S. strategic mobility assets that would more than likely be involved in such a scenario.

Africa has taken the lead in beginning the long term reform needed for indigenous organizations to tackle peacekeeping missions. It recognizes limitations within its training requirements as well as its force projection and sustainment capabilities which directly impact upon actual and contemplated missions. The West has already addressed the initial challenge of adequate training – ACRI, RECAMP, and BMATT provide first class tutelage in peacekeeping techniques and procedures. The next step deals with the more difficult linkage between this capacity – building and capacity – utilization. Lessons learned from the ECOMOG experience in Liberia in 1996 need to be incorporated in all aspects of Western peacekeeping initiatives and some sort of signed understanding between the sub-regions and the Western powers needs to take place so that sustainment and force projection measures can be addressed in a structured and formalized setting. It is only through this type of linkage that Africans can prepare themselves for future peacekeeping missions.

Word count = 8,792
ENDNOTES


6 Berman and Sams, ISS Monograph Series 33, 7.

7 The ideas in this section come from several conversations between General Tonje and the author during General Tonje’s visit to 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in 1999, as well as noted reference within K Kwiatowski, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): Past, Present and Future? (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 26

8 The ideas in this paragraph are distilled from authors personal notes taken during the ACRI Brigade Level Mid Planning Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, November 2000


10 Eric Berman and Katie Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (United Nations, New York, 2000), 162

11 Ibid, 166-171

12 Ibid, 138

13 Ibid, 146

14 Ibid, 148


17 Berman and Sams, ISS Monograph Series 33, 13

21 Ibid

22 Barman and Sams, ISS Monograph Series 33, 19


27 Details on MPRI/Logicon can be gathered at their web sites: <www.mpri.com>/<www.logicon.com>.

28 The ideas in this paragraph are distilled from authors personal notes of the ACRI program and unpublished position paper from ACRI Inter Agency Working Group

29 Ibid

30 Kwiatowski, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): Past, Present and Future?, 93

31 Ibid, 5
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berman, E, and Sams, K. "Constructive Disengagement – Western efforts to develop African peacekeeping." ISS Monograph Series, no. 33 (December 1998)


"France: A New Foreign Policy," The Economist (6 September 1997)


Malan, M. "Regional Power Politics under Cover of SADC – Running Amok with a Mythical Organ." ISS Paper, no.35 (October 1998)


