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THE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN THE FUTURE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE APPROPRIATE USE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN THE FUTURE

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The Department of Defense (DoD) recently completed the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001). A major premise of the QDR is the continuing reliance on Reserve Component forces. To ensure the appropriate use of the Reserve Components, DoD plans to undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This paper will build on recent assessments of Reserve Component issues (utilization, force mix, and emerging missions) and offer insights regarding how the Army should structure and employ its reserve forces in the future. Key areas will include roles and missions within the strategic construct of Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat and the role of the RC postulated force packages within simultaneously occurring mission requirements.
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THE APPROPRIATE USE OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES IN THE FUTURE

The role of the Army’s reserve components (RC) as an element of the Nation’s military instrument of power has been the subject of considerable debate since the Nation’s inception. The importance of the RC is not the overarching issue of the debate, rather the issue is focused on what types of capabilities should reside in the RC and how it should be organized. Correspondingly, discussion focuses on how this element of military power should be used to perform roles and missions dictated by the National Military Strategy (NMS). The importance of the RC has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Increased reliance on the RC forced continual and incremental changes in related policies and programs. Today’s Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) consist of highly motivated professional forces that perform a critical role in supporting the NMS. The changes were brought about primarily as a result of the Department of Defense (DoD) Total Force Policy initiated in the 1970’s. The ensuing incremental changes in RC policies and programs have driven the organization, force mix, utilization, and resourcing of the RC for the last 31 years and their impact remains prevalent today. Based upon the impending transformation of the U.S. military, it is appropriate and timely to comprehensively examine the suitability of the roles, missions, functions, organization, and force mix of our nation’s reserve forces.

Today buzzwords like integration, utilization, and rotation policies have become commonplace as DoD, and specifically the Army, continue to wrestle with how the RC should be employed in the future operating environment. While many requirements remain constant, the twenty-first century holds even greater challenges calling for more changes. Notwithstanding, the role of the RC has changed overtime and will continue to evolve. Despite the fact that DoD and the Army have studied the issue of Army RC future roles, missions, utilization, and organization as part of several overarching defense reviews, the issue still remains embroiled in controversy. Contained in the recently completed 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, the RC roles and missions again emerged as a central issue.

“The Department of Defense has embarked on an ambitious transformation of U.S. military forces to meet future challenges...To support this strategy, DoD will continue to rely on RC forces. To ensure the appropriate use of the RC, DoD will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources...”

This paper addresses these issues and provides insights into the current RC force structure, contributions, force mix, and utilization. Moreover, key issues are identified regarding these critical areas as the Army moves to respond to the future challenges identified in the QDR
2001 report. Lastly, tenets or guidelines are offered that the Army could use as it works to properly structure and resource its components for the future operating environment.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF RESERVE COMPONENT ROLES AND MISSIONS

The Reserve Component has always, and will remain, an integral part of the United States National Military Strategy.

—GEN John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff

The current RC force structure and utilization is a result of past policies regarding the composition, roles, missions, and utilization of the RC. In 1973, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger codified Laird's Total Force concept by telling the military departments that "The Total Force is no longer a 'concept.' It is now the Total Force Policy, which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve into a homogeneous whole."3 Consequently, DoD institutionalized the policy that has so grown in acceptance that it was cited in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 92 and 93:

"It is DoD policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployment or sea duty, training requirements, and to support the rotation base, above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a cost effective basis."4

The Pentagon continually wrestles with the problem of balancing RC/AC existing force structure. In a 1998 article in The Officer addressing the concept of Total Force, Representative Steve Buyer (Republican-Indiana) identified three major studies that have been devoted to solving the concept including the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), the Bottom Up Review (BUR), and the 1997 QDR.5 As part of the 1997 QDR process, the National Defense Panel (NDP) also addressed emerging roles and missions for the RC.6 The NDP report was followed by the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05) mandated by then Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in the Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG language stated:

"By February 26, 1999, the CJCS and ASD (S&TR), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD (RA)), Dir (PA&E), the CINCs, and the Services will conduct a study of alternative concepts for employing Reserve component forces in the future. The study will: (1) review the full range of combat and support RC roles in the current operational plans and assess currently planned employment; (2) identify and assess potential RC missions in continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC's role in the
strategic reserve; (3) develop and assess alternative employment roles and force-mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits and risks for each option; and (4) assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements.  

This guidance was detailed, specific and required a comprehensive top to bottom review of key areas of AC/RC concern. Despite the intent however, RCE-05 apparently failed to fully address DoD's concerns. Hence, DoD is once again undertaking the task of reviewing RC roles and missions. Nevertheless, RCE-05 did recommend that the role of the Guard and Reserve could be increased to meet a multitude of missions.  

RCE-05 also reviewed mobilization and deployment timelines of ARNG Divisions and was responsible for the eventual apportionment of all fifteen enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) and six ARNG Divisions to CINC warplans.

TODAY'S RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE

The current composition of the RC is a function of a complex set of political, strategic and operational influences. The Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act, sets the end strength (ES) of each of the Army components through Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. Each of the components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) receives appropriations to pay for their respective ES through the National Defense Appropriation Act. Figure 1 depicts the ES of the three components as of the end of fiscal year 2001 (FY 01). As illustrated, the

**FY 01 End Strength**

**Army Reserve (AR)**
205.3K (20%)

**Active Component (AC)**
480K (46%)

**Army National Guard (ARNG)**
(350K) 34%

Total End Strength – 1,035M

Selected Reserve (SELRES) elements of the ARNG and USAR comprise 54% of the Army's total end strength. Before proceeding it should also be noted that the RC ES totals only reflect
the SELRES of the Ready Reserve which consists of ARNG and USAR unit members, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel and USAR Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). The other categories of the Ready Reserve are the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive Army National Guard (ING). From a force management perspective, the ES totals are comprised of operating (warfighting) forces and generating (institutional) forces.

FORCE STRUCTURE ALLOWANCE

ES is the basis for Congressional appropriations but is in turn dependent upon force structure allowance (FSA). Force structure allowance is the sum of all MTOE and TDA spaces. Within the AC, the ES consists of a FSA of 417,000 soldiers in units and organizations plus 63,000 soldiers (13% of their ES) that are classified as trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS). Correspondingly, the actual “operating strength” (OS) of the Active Component reflects the actual distributable inventory to fill authorized spaces in MTOE units and TDA organizations. It usually reflects the current efficiency of the assignment, recruiting and retention systems to fill the FSA. Together the FSA plus TTHS equal the total active component ES of 480,000 soldiers. The TTHS account offers the AC a great deal of flexibility and ensures that soldiers in the TTHS account are not counted against unit readiness when computing readiness percentages for unit status reporting. It enables human resource managers some flexibility to manage the AC military manpower without adversely impacting units or organizations. Within the RC, there is no TTHS authorization to accommodate these administrative requirements. Moreover, the ARNG actually has an ES of 350,000 authorizations and a FSA of 388,000. During the early 1990’s the Guard was allowed to retain a FSA that was greater than the actual congressionally mandated ES. Today, the Guard has 388,000 authorized MTOE unit and TDA organization positions and is only authorized an ES of 350,000 personnel to fill these positions. This equates to an equivalent ES to FSA ratio of 1 to 1.1 versus the AC ES to FSA ratio of 1 to .87. As part of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007 process, the USAR established a similar ratio and has a 205,000 ES and a corresponding 225,000 FSA. Again, this reflects organizational requirements for 225,000 personnel with only 205,000 personnel to fill those positions.

There are two ways to view the rationale for the deviation of ES and FSA in the RC. First, the excess authorizations purportedly allow the RC to manage its manpower with greater flexibility. For example, the higher FSA allows the RC to assign existing personnel to a wider range of vacant positions and to higher priority units or to retain higher-grade personnel on the roles because they have documented positions within an “over structured” force. Unfortunately,
the second and third order effects of this practice may have started to show negative versus the positive impacts the RC hoped to achieve. One drawback is that the methodology may cause the "hollowing of the force." In the case of the AC, the TTHS account allows for the assignment of soldiers to an administrative status that are not counted against a unit's assigned strength and thus does not negatively impact readiness. This isn't possible in the RC, so readiness reporting includes soldiers who are in a training, holding or school status as well as those missing from the roles due to the decrement in ES from FSA. The RC system actually establishes a "negative" TTHS account. To make the 1 to 1.1 ratio, the RC has to have documented "requirements" for more force structure than resourced within its ES. This potentially leads to manning units below established authorizations. Since this has a real impact on readiness, one of the first priorities of the Army should be to examine the feasibility of establishing an RC TTHS account. The Army should also consider other alternatives to creating a TTHS account for the RC that may resolve the readiness implications while maintaining the assignment flexibility afforded in the current system.

TOTAL FORCE COMPOSITION

Figure 2 depicts the Army's breakout of the operating forces which consists of combat (CBT), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) warfighting unit authorizations as of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2001. The three pie charts clearly depict that the majority of CBT, CS, and CSS forces reside in the RC. This has historic significance and is in consonance with our Founding Fathers who believed in a small standing Army that should be supplemented

FY 01
Army Operating Forces

![Pie charts](image)

FIGURE 2. ARMY OPERATING FORCES
with citizen-soldiers in times of crisis. The CS and CSS parts of the pie chart are a reflection of both the needs of The Army and the economies and efficiencies gained by resourcing these forces within the RC. Figure 3 depicts how the Army looks when apportioned into its operating and generating force categories. The RC retains the majority of both operating and generating forces when the RC FSA is considered.

**Army Components Military Force Structure Allowance (FY 01)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generating Forces*</th>
<th>Operating Forces*</th>
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<td>229K</td>
<td>801K</td>
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**FIGURE 3. GENERATING AND OPERATING FORCES**

**RC COMPOSITION**

The Army and corresponding RC force structure is primarily shaped within the QDR and the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) processes. QDR specifies the operating units for all services. The 2001 QDR identified eight ARNG divisions, one Light Calvary Regiment and fifteen enhanced separate brigades (ESBs) as the RC portion of the Army's major operating forces. TAA supports the NMS by developing the echelons above division/echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) combat CS and CSS structure and the generating forces supporting the operating force. Over 80% of the RC FSA is invested in operating forces. The remaining FSA consist of generating forces that provide command and control and supports training and mobilization missions of the Army. The RC composition is also a function of a key agreement made by the Army Component Commanders. This agreement, known as the Reserve
Component Offsite Agreement, allowed the transition of the USAR to a force consisting primarily of CS and CSS organizations. The agreement also migrated USAR combat forces to the ARNG and resulted in the exchange of CS and CSS forces from the ARNG to the USAR. The end result of the agreement is reflected in the current operating force structure of the USAR which today consists of less than 1% of combat organizations (the only maneuver combat unit remaining in the USAR is the famed 442nd Infantry Battalion stationed in Hawaii).

**Army National Guard Composition**

The ARNG is a force consisting primarily of CBT, CS, and CSS assets (Figure 4). The majority of its structure (91%) consists of operating forces with the remainder (9%) being generating force capabilities. As of the end of FY 01, the ARNG provides 53% of the Army's CBT organizations, 44% of the Army's CS, and 26% of the Army's CSS units for approximately 13% of the Army budget. Today's ARNG force provides the following capabilities: Separate Brigades -100%; Infantry Scout Troops – 100%; Field Artillery Battalions – 63%; as well as over 50% of Calvary Squadrons, Mechanized Infantry Battalions, Armor Battalions, Infantry Battalions, and Air Defense Artillery Battalions.

![ARMG Force Structure FY01 Diagram](image-url)

**Note:** ARNG meets this structure with an authorized manpower level of 350,000 soldiers.

**End Strength: 350K**
- MTO E: 351,736K
- Combat Units
  - Divs, Bdes, SOF: 203,484
  - EAD/EAC CS/CSS: 148,252
  - TDA: 34,151K
  - FSA: 365,887K

**ARNG Divisions**
- 29th Infantry Div (O) Virginia
- 30th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 31st Infantry Div (O) Texas
- 32nd Infantry Div (O) California
- 33rd Infantry Div (O) New York
- 34th Infantry Div (O) Kentucky
- 35th Infantry Div (O) Maine
- 36th Infantry Div (O) Missouri
- 37th Infantry Div (O) Nebraska
- 38th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 39th Infantry Div (O) New Jersey
- 40th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 41st Infantry Div (O) Ohio
- 42nd Infantry Div (O) Virginia
- 43rd Infantry Div (O) Maryland
- 44th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 45th Infantry Div (O) Arizona
- 46th Infantry Div (O) California
- 47th Infantry Div (O) Missouri
- 48th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 49th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 50th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 51st Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 52nd Infantry Div (O) New York
- 53rd Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 54th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 55th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 56th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 57th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 58th Infantry Div (O) New York
- 59th Infantry Div (O) North Carolina
- 60th Infantry Div (O) New York

**FIGURE 4 ARNG FORCE STRUCTURE**
U.S. Army Reserve Composition

The USAR is the smaller of the two Army RC forces. Its force structure has undergone a significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. USAR operating forces consist almost entirely of CS and CSS organizations located at the echelon above division/echelon above corps and theater levels. This is a direct result of the RC swap or migration agreement alluded to earlier. As of the end of FY 01, USAR operating forces provides 22% of the Army's CS and 46% of the Army's CSS capabilities for approximately 5% of the Army's budget. The other elements of the USAR force structure fall into the generating force category. These forces support the Army's training base, power projection, installations, Total Army Schools System, and Training Support missions. Today's USAR provides 100% of the Army's Training Support and Institutional Training Divisions, Chemical Brigades, Internment/Resettlement Brigades, Legal Units, and Water Supply Battalions. Additionally, over 50% of Army Civil Affairs Units, Psychological Operations Units, Medical Brigades and Groups, Chemical Battalions, hospital Units, Corps Support Groups, Petroleum Battalions, Interment/Resettlement Battalions and Transportation Terminal Battalions come from the USAR.

USAR Military Force Structure FY01

FIGURE 5 USAR FORCE STRUCTURE
THE ROAD AHEAD TO FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS

“We are the Army – totally integrated into oneness of purpose-no longer the Total Army, no longer the One Army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21st Century as The Army. We acknowledge the components and their varying organizational strengths. We will work to structure The Army accordingly.”

—General Eric K. Shinseki

The last sentence of Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Shinseki’s intent of 1999 is the focus of the following sections. Since the end of the Cold War, the RC continues to fulfill roles and missions in concert with the Total Force Policy. These missions correspond to the recognized Army Mission areas portrayed in FM 1 (The Army) and The Army Plan (TAP).

- Deploy, fight and win major theater wars.
- Promote regional stability.
- Reduce potential conflicts and threats.
- Deter aggression and coercion
- Conduct small-scale contingencies (SSCs)
- Support homeland defense
- Provide domestic support to civil authorities

It is unlikely that the missions performed by the RC will venture away from those prescribed for The Army by the NCA. In fact, DOD solidified the RC role when it used significant amounts of RC force structure to support Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Since then, the RC is no longer a force that simply augments the AC in time of major conflict and DOD has continued to evolve the Total Force Policy by introducing additional AC/RC initiatives and policies to further enhance integration. The principles of Total Force Integration efforts were introduced by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen in his 1997 seminal memorandum entitled “Integration of the Reserve and Active Components.” These included: “(1) clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders..., (2) clear and mutual understanding of the mission of each unit..., (3) commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions, [and] (4) leadership by senior commanders...to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.”

Implementation of the Total Force Integration Policy promulgated several Army AC/RC integration initiatives including three with a significant impact on roles, missions, and force mix of the RC.

- Army Division Redesign Study (ADRS). Transitions two division slice elements and twelve ARNG brigades from combat to a combat support or combat service support
role. Total number of personnel impacted is 48,000. Program completion is set for 2009. 19

- Multiple Component Units. Comprises an individual MTOE unit that consists of personnel from two or more components. Over 30 are now organized with gradual expansion through 2007 to 60+ units. 20

- AC/RC Integrated Divisions. Established two AC TDA headquarters (7th and 24th Infantry Divisions) that are responsible for training readiness oversight (TRO) for six ARNG enhanced separate brigades. Although the divisions are not deployable because they lack a CS and CSS base, the Army has identified deployability as a possible future evolution of the concept. 21

STATUTORY ROLES AND MISSIONS

Section 10102 of Title 10, United States Code and Title 32 specifies the statutory role of Guard and Reserve. Title 10 stipulates that the RC will "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when national security requires." 22 Correspondingly, Title 32 states that Guard units shall be ordered to federal active duty and retained as long as they are needed. 23 While the Reserve's role is exclusively federal, the Guard also performs an important state mission. In a 1998 article in the publication The Officer, former National Guard Bureau Chief, Lieutenant General Edward Baca clearly articulated the fundamental difference between the Army's components, "...We in the National Guard are singularly different from our active [and Reserve] counterparts in that we also have a state mission. Our people take an oath to defend the constitution of both the nation and their respective states." 24 This distinction can not be overstated because it also allows the Guard to assume roles and missions that are otherwise constrained by forces organized under Title 10. Specifically, Governors, as the Commander and Chief of state forces, can order Guard troops to perform missions supporting state requirements. This distinction was made even clearer since the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. After the attack, many Americans were startled to see rifle toting, camouflage troops patrolling airports and public buildings. 25 Unbeknown to most citizens was that these troops were not federal soldiers but state National Guard troops serving under the authorities of the respective state Governors. 26

21ST CENTURY ROLES AND MISSIONS

While it remains uncertain what the future holds, the RC can perform missions ranging from combat, peacekeeping, regional stability, exercises, forward presence, contingency
operations, and homeland security. Throughout the recent past, the RC demonstrated it can perform the full spectrum of military operational requirements when properly resourced. However, what has become increasingly evident is that the RC is extremely effective when it is able to exploit the civilian experience of its personnel. Many of the future roles should continue to leverage civilian acquired skills (police, civil engineers, medical professionals, etc) resident in the RC. A synopsis of Twenty-First Century RC roles could read as follows: Army reserve components...

- provide trained and ready forces allowing the Army to mobilize.
- expand the Army’s capabilities by providing units and individuals that augment, backfill, and generate Army forces.
- enable the Army to sustain itself over longer duration by providing forces that support and reinforce AC organizations.

These roles parallel the current missions articulated for the Army in FM 1 and The Army Plan (TAP) with a focus on the RC unique role of expanding and enabling the Army it to sustain itself during full spectrum operations. By performing these roles, the RC also allows the Army to efficiently use its limited resources by positioning various types of units in a part-time reserve status until they are needed. These roles are enduring and support the four defense policy goals articulated in the 2001 QDR Report:

- Assuring allies and friends;
- Dissuading future military competition;
- Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and
- If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

ORGANIZATION AND FORCE MIX OF THE RC

Our goal, as we move into the 21st century, must be a seamless Total Force that provides the NCA the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations...We must continue to work towards the principles of Total Force and achieve full integration of the Reserve and Active Components.

—Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

Is the RC optimally organized to perform its statutory role? The answer to that question appears to allude the DoD as evidenced by its continuing need to review the force mix, organization and use of the RC. In the past, there has also been a debate that focused on the idea that the nation could be better served by one RC. However, both the Guard and Reserve
perform important roles and missions that warrant the continuation of the two-reserve component systems.

The performance of both state and federal missions by the Guard provides essential flexibility. The Guard’s dual federal-state status has uniquely positioned it as DoD’s primary provider for Military Support to Civilian Authorities and a key force provider for emerging homeland security missions. The Reserve is a streamlined federal force that is closely integrated with the AC yet has a separate and distinct command structure. Conversely, the AC has direct control of the USAR which includes both advantages and legal limitations. Lastly, the Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and the Individual Ready Reserve force provided by the USAR are unique assets that are best managed by the Federal Reserve. These factors combine to support the continuation of two separate and distinct reserve components: the USAR and ARNG.

NEW ORGANIZATIONAL IDEAS

Within the ARNG current organizational concept, there is an emerging proposal to bring back the concept of the militia and split the ARNG into two parts. One with a federal/state mission and the other organized to support the homeland security mission. John Brinkeroff, a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) official and retired Colonel, outlined the concept in an article in The Journal of National Security. While this concept is probably politically infeasible, it does open the door for other possibilities for reorganization of the RC. For example, as the Army defines its role in homeland security, consideration should be given to missioning Guard organizations to exclusively perform various aspects of this mission. This could likely be accomplished without transferring operating forces (CS and CSS units) to the Guard or expanding the Guard’s ES.

The organizations earmarked exclusively for homeland security could be organized and equipped for that function alone. This concept already exists with the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CST). Each CST has 22 full-time ARNG or Air National Guard members. The teams are part of DoD’s overall effort to support Local, State, and Federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of biological, chemical, or radiological weapons. ARNG members assigned to the units are highly trained with complementary civilian acquired skills that support the mission. The ARNG also established computer emergency response teams (CERT) in a number of states to support DoD’s Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements that are closely aligned with the HLS mission. In both examples, the organizations are uniquely organized as Table of Distribution and Allowances.
(TDA) organizations versus the much more restrictive and operationally oriented Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).

The USAR also possesses specialized units that can support HLS mission requirements. USAR Garrison Support Units (GSU) are stand-alone TDA organizations that augment and expand Army installations during mobilization and deployment. While GSUs were not specifically designed for the HLS mission, they do contain military police assets that can augment an installation's force protection assets during times of heightened threatcon levels. The USAR also recently organized Information Operations Centers (IOCs) that provide information assurance and defensive information operations support contributing to the Critical Infrastructure Protection mission.

Specifically organizing units to meet emerging HLS missions also avoids the problems associated with dual missioning MTOE units to perform both the HLS and warfighting missions. During the recent response to anthrax threats and mail attacks, the Army's two biological intrusion and detection (BIDs) (one active and one reserve) units were simultaneously requested to support force protection requirements in the U.S. and warfighting requirements overseas. This highlights the fact that dual missioning warfighting units to support both MTW and HLS missions may not be prudent. One can also question whether the organization, equipment and personnel of a BIDs unit is properly designed for operations in the homeland. This is not a recent revelation, but one that was brought to the forefront after the attack on New York and the Pentagon. While examining potential HLS roles for the RC, the RCE 05 Study concluded:

"Though there are several RC units organized for NBC warfare related tasks, all are apportioned to overseas theaters...Though they could be made available in peacetime to provide WMD consequence management support at home, they might be unavailable should a WMD attack on the United States occur during a period of overseas conflict. Making such units available for CONUS WMD consequence management support may require remissioning them from their existing MTW-related commitments. Given the significant additional requirements for certain homeland defense tasks, it may be impractical and costly to maintain skills for both warfighting and specialized homeland defense missions in a large number of RC units.\"\n
The reason the Army has specially organized WMD CST in its force structure today is due to the rationale articulated above. However, is the Army willing to expand this practice and design specially organized TDA units similar to the ARNG CSTs and USAR IOCs or will it accept risk and continue the practice of dual missioning operating forces to perform potentially conflicting mission requirements? One solution to this dilemma may be to increase the number of specifically designed TDA units that can support HLS force protection, medical, and
consequence management, critical infrastructure protection and disaster response requirements. Given the high priority of defending the homeland, this organizational structure change may be justified. However, a restructuring initiative calling for reorienting some of the RC and perhaps some AC units from warfighting missions and assigning them HLS exclusive tasks may be met with significant resistance. The organizational impact may likely preclude the simple allocation of current ARNG units to the proposed Northern Command, but rather require dramatic organizational and command changes.

ADJUSTMENTS TO FORCE MIX

The emergence of HLS as a high priority mission and the refinement of the two MTW strategy calls for a shift in the structure and force mix of the Army. The following discussion assumes the ES of the three components will actually decrease as the Army transitions to the Objective Force. Two overarching questions emerge as the Army retools its structure:

- Should the Army adjust its AC force mix and shift high OPTEMPO RC resourced units to the AC and low OPTEMPO AC forces to the RC?
- How much can the Army continue to employ the RC given that part-time soldiers with other full-time responsibilities man these forces?

Operating Forces

The practice of using the RC to meet operating force requirements will likely continue well into the future. The rationale for continuing this practice is a key ingredient of the Total Force Policy that capitalizes on the cost-effectiveness of RC forces as well as link the commitment of forces to the will of the people through the employment of community-based units.

Since the early 1970's, Total Force policy has reflected two, sometimes competing views concerning the structure and mix of active and reserve forces. DOD policy, which embodies one view, holds that cost-effectiveness considerations alone should determine component assignment. A second view argues that some reserves must participate in any conflict to ensure that a commitment of forces truly represents the political will of the American people. 31

Today's army force operating mix is a reflection of the Total Force Policy. As depicted in figure 6, the RC comprises over 50% of Army authorizations in 14 of 19 operating force categories.
Army's Operating Forces

The ratios illustrate that there is significant integration of active and reserve operating forces. This may be cost efficient, but this level of integration also causes OPTEMPO problems for both AC and RC operating forces. The second and third order effects of the current force mix is a growing proclivity and need to use RC forces to support military operations that are not MTW focused. Since 66% of CS and 72% of CSS assets are in the RC, this routine deployment of selected RC units will continue unless the operating force mix is adjusted to reflect the force structure demands of the current and future geopolitical environment. Given this, the Army should explore a number of options to ameliorate future OPTEMPO problems for "high demand/low density" (HD/LD) units. First, the Army should continue the Army Division Redesign Study (ADRS) initiative and transition all 48,000 ARNG Divisional spaces to CS and CSS organizations. While this increases the percentage of RC CS and CSS organizations, it concurrently provides more of these types of units to support MOOTW requirements. This approach may meet current requirements but may not get to the root of the problem.

Second, the Army should consider exchanging low OPTEMPO AC CS and CSS units for high OPTEMPO RC units. This increases the number of HD/LD units in the AC without impacting AC combat structure. It also reduces some reliance on RC HD/LD units but does not increase the number of RC units available to meet HD/LD demands.

A third option would be to convert some AC combat structure to HD/LD CS and CSS units. There are two courses of action that could be used to accomplish this option. First, the

\[ \text{FIGURE 6. ARMY OPERATING FORCES} \]
The 1974 round out concept that called for ARNG units to "round out" a parent AC division could be revived. Instead of focusing on the brigade level, the round out concept could be oriented at the company and battalion levels. The units would become an organic part of the AC divisional structure by making them multiple component organizations resourced with a mixture of AC and RC personnel. Second, an AC division could be reorganized as a multiple component organization consisting of maneuver elements out of the AC and ARNG and CS/CSS units out of all three components. In both courses of action, the objective would be to convert AC combat authorizations to CS/CSS HD/LD authorizations and use the RC to fill the gaps of those combat formations impacted by the strategy. While some of these options presented may appear counter to the current Army politics, the purpose is to examine alternative methods of reducing OPTEMPO without increasing either AC or RC ES. The emerging reality is that the Army cannot afford to transform and increase its end strength concurrently.

**Generating Forces**

The HQDA G3 Force Management Division identifies four key functions of the Army's generating force. Figure 7 depicts these categories, key capabilities and the percentage of the AC/RC mix as of the end of FY 2001. The RC already provides a significant portion of the Army's generating force requirements and this practice should continue. Since the majority of these forces are TDA organizations, they can continue to be tailored to meet future requirements. Within the RC, the USAR should continue to provide the bulk of capabilities needed to support the generating force mission. USAR garrison support units, port/terminal units, and medical augmentation units provide the Army with a robust power projection capability that is readily available to support contingency operations. This is in concert with USAR and ARNG support to the individual and organizational training missions.

Correspondingly, USAR Regional Support Commands (RSC) and ARNG State Area Commands (STARCs) perform essential command and control activities, coordinate homeland defense (HLD), execute military support to civil authorities (MSCA), and mobilize RC forces: all key roles and missions.
Army's Generating Force

Homeland Security

The specific roles and functions of the HLS forces are still being formulated. A large portion of the Homeland Security function that includes HLD and MSCA could be considered either a part of the generating force (non-deployable) or evolve into its own category separate and distinct from the generating force. Nevertheless, all three components will likely contribute essential resources to HLS. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, over 79,000 RC soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen from all services have been activated to meet priority requirements. These requirements include missions like augmenting staffs at key Army headquarters, providing security forces at Army installations, providing security at airports and deploying overseas in support of new and ongoing operations. This wide range of use of the RC during this crisis may have an effect on the future force mix as DoD attempts to determine its role in HLS. However, it is uncertain if the number and types of Army RC units and personnel called to active duty during this period will be the types required to support future HLS requirements. RC augmentation of many of the current operations should be viewed as an interim fix until the private sector and federal/state/local government agencies permanently increase their force protection levels to meet security requirements. In this regard, the Army should proceed cautiously and not make dramatic force mix changes until clearly defined and
sustainable HLS missions and force requirements emerge. The Army may also benefit by establishing HLS as a third category (operating, generating, and HLS forces) since HLS forces do not fit exclusively in either the operating or generating force domains.

In the future, Northern Command will require a certain amount of dedicated forces to perform its HLS mission. As previously discussed, many of these units (CST Teams and IOCs) already exist and simply require mission realignment. The ARNG Division missioning effort may also require some adjustment. According to a memorandum on ARNG Division missioning prepared by the Army G3, “the eight divisions will be missioned as follows: four (4) to Major Theater Wars (MTWs), one (1) to European Command, one (1) to Southern Command, and two (2) to the Base Generating Force (BGF).” Since CONUS is now equivalent to a theater of operations, the Army may have to shift the divisions allocated to the BGF to HLS. It’s assumed that these divisions are the same ones identified in another G3 memorandum that addresses ADRS. This memorandum indicates that the two divisions involved in ADRS will ultimately form “composite command and control headquarters for the converting units undergoing conversion from CBT to CS and CSS organizations.” In addition to this C2 function, the units could also assume HLS related functions in concert with USAR RSCs that are geographically aligned to FEMA regions. Add to this the STARCs and two Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA) and the Army has more than enough management headquarters to oversee and execute any emerging HLS responsibilities. However, there may be a need to change the personnel manning of these organizations to meet this new mission requirement.

**FUTURE USE OF THE RC**

Today, whenever U.S. military forces are deployed, citizen soldiers from the USAR and ARNG and can be found serving side by side with their active duty counterparts. The future use of the RC is dependent upon several important factors or tenets. These tenets can also be applied to determine the appropriate use of RC forces. The central question, however, is how much should the Army rely on the RC given its citizen soldier makeup? This issue is irrelevant when looking at utilization when a major crisis occurs such as a major theater war. There is little doubt that the RC can and should be used to the maximum extent possible to support this level of threat. On the other hand, the likelihood that a MTW will occur in the near future is less likely than the need to tap RC units and individuals to support military operations other than war (MOOTW). Ultimately, over-reliance on the RC could cause significant problems if they are constantly called upon to support peacetime operations and day to day activities more appropriately performed by their active component counterparts. To address this dilemma, this
section will look at the historical use, rotation policies, mission duration and accessibility of the RC.

RC OPTEMPO AND USE

When the Total Force Policy was developed it is doubtful that Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger envisaged the high OPTEMPO environment faced by DOD today. The level of utilization of the RC is strikingly different from the Cold War level of RC contributions. Today, the RC supports multiple operations that are tracked by DOD to account for the utilization of RC manpower. Table 1 depicts the five categories tracked by DOD. 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES</th>
<th>Response to forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, riots, bombings, etc. (federal or state funded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS</td>
<td>Support to the counter-drug effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXERCISE SUPPORT</td>
<td>All Service or CINC exercises, both within and outside the U.S. (Excludes RC unique exercises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC/SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
<td>All support provided to assist the AC with accomplishing a mission or reducing AC PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZATIONS</td>
<td>Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) or other mobilization actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1. RC MISSION CATEGORIES

These categories account for all forms of contributory support the RC provides to Army missions. DOD tracks RC contributions in terms of man-days which are simply the equivalent of a calendar day. For example, if an ARNG soldier supports a CINC-sponsored exercise during a fifteen day annual training period, the ARNG would be credited with 15 mandays in the Exercise Support category. Correspondingly, if 99 fellow soldiers also supported the exercise, the total mandays would equal 1,500 (15 mandays times 100 personnel). To gain an even better understanding of the scope of historic utilization, consider the fact that the ARNG and USAR provided approximately 15.7 million mandays in support of Army missions during 1991 which included Operation Desert Storm/Shield. 37 This is the equivalent of adding over 43,000 more AC soldiers to the AC ES for a year. Clearly, Operation Desert Storm/Shield levels of manday support are unsustainable over a longer period. It is also highly unlikely that future foes will allow the U.S. to project its force into a theater of operations and build it up over such an extended period of time. In reality, it is more likely that the NMS will continue to depend on the bulk of the AC force to meet initial force requirements with the RC force involved in projecting, augmenting and expanding those capabilities. Correspondingly, RC forces can be used as part of the rotating base as is currently the case in Bosnia and Kosovo to help relieve some AC OPTEMPO demands. In summary, the AC can conduct few future operations without tapping
the RC force structure. The issues impacting the level of utilization of RC forces pertains to mobilization policies, rotation policies, mission duration, and resourcing.

Mobilization Policies

Mobilization policies must continue to be improved as the Army transforms. AC/RC integration initiatives should result in an evolutionary development approach leading to dynamic policy improvements. While mobilization policies are a necessity, they should not be an impediment to the missioning and utilization of the RC. Current issues like mobilization insurance for deployed Guardsman and Reservist, resourcing warfighting centers for RC combat units, and continued efforts to streamline mobilization procedures promise to improve RC mobilization efficiency.

Mission Duration and Rotation Policies

RCE 05 identified mission duration and rotation policies for non-MTW missions as an area of concern. The central issue effecting the RC is that one rotation rule may not fit all types of organizations. The current standard is a 179-day employment period for both active and reserve units. However, to make this work, the actual mobilization period for RC units is approximately 230 days. The additional time includes mobilization activities, transportation, transition training, and leave. It does not include additional pre-rotation training periods to prepare leadership and deploying soldiers. These pre-rotation training periods include drill and annual training periods prior to actual mobilization. Nevertheless, the current standard adds some predictability to rotations while standardizing AC and RC tours of duty.

Another contributing factor is how often a unit can or should be mobilized in support of operations? Current policy stipulates that a mobilized unit can only be called once during a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) for a particular operation. While standardization is good, it does not consider the unique make-up of the RC and the impact longer duration mobilizations have on citizen soldiers. Given this, the RC may be better served by adding some flexibility to the mission duration. This is the same concept articulated by the RCE-05 study. Deployments of shorter duration like 90 or 120 days may help reduce potential impacts on RC readiness and OPTEMPO. On the other hand, CINCS may favor long rotation periods because of the reduced turbulence in a theater. Shortening rotation times also impacts resources because more units are deploying more often although the duration of employment is reduced. One approach to addressing this issue may be to establish rotation policies for distinct categories of organizations versus a blanket policy that covers all units. For instance, CBT units could continue to use the 179-day employment period while usually better trained and more immediately deployable RC
CS and CSS units use a 90 or 120 day employment period. Figure 8 depicts how a rotation during a one year period could look. The bottomline is that the Army should review different applications of rotation policies to determine if ideas such as those presented are executable.

Rotation Duration Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation 1</th>
<th>Combat Units</th>
<th>180 day (AC or RC)</th>
<th>180 day (AC or RC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS/CSS Units</td>
<td>90 day (RC)</td>
<td>180 day (AC)</td>
<td>90 day (RC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation 2</th>
<th>Combat Units</th>
<th>180 day (AC or RC)</th>
<th>180 day (AC or RC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS/CSS Units</td>
<td>90 day (AC/RC)</td>
<td>90 day (AC/RC)</td>
<td>90 day (AC/RC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 8 ROTATION DURATION ALTERNATIVES

Resourcing the RC

Three overarching resource issues will remain on the forefront until ultimately resolved. First is fully funding full time support (FTS) for the RC. The full integration of the RC and the continuing contributions of the RC places demands on FTS manpower that performs critical recruiting, training, and maintaining functions that directly contributes to RC readiness and preparedness. The second issue pertains to equipping, sustaining, modernizing, and recapitalizing systems of the RC which comprises the preponderance of the Legacy Force. The RC must remain compatible and interoperable with the Interim and Objective forces. This can only be achieved by applying resources to the CS and CSS force while the Army transforms. The third and final issue pertains to fully funding the ADRS and other AC/RC initiatives. These are tied to force mix initiatives. Since the cost effectiveness element of the RC can not be disputed, it also makes sense to increase RC ES to meet emerging needs of the Army. Lastly, the current tiered resourcing policy that provides more funds to units designated as early deployers vice later deploying units may need to be adjusted. The new operating environment constantly taps later deploying units to participate in ongoing missions as is the case with ARNG.
Divisions participating in SFOR and KFOR. The Army must assess future impacts of the new environment and properly resource lower tiered RC units if they intend to use them to support MOOTW requirements.

CONCLUSION.

The thirty-year-old Total Force Policy is as relevant today as it was during its inception. To support the intent of the policy, the Army will continue to rely on its reserve components. This overarching tenet must remain a key strategy as the Army transforms to the Objective Force of the future. In concert with this objective, this paper proposed some concepts that the Army could use as it works to properly structure and resource its components for the future operating environment.

- **Total Force Integration.** The Total Force policy is working and ensures public supports for military deployments while keeping the cost low by maintaining a portion of the force in the RC. Integration efforts must continue to ensure that components are seamlessly integrated.

- **FSA to ES policy.** The Army should examine its current RC FSA to ES ratio to determine if there is an alternative resourcing and manning methodology that resources the force while maintaining assignment flexibility and unit readiness.

- **Dual Missioning.** The Army should carefully assess the impact of dual missioning units to perform both a HLS and overseas CINC based requirements. In some cases, it may be advisable to establish dedicated HLS TDA units in lieu of dual missioning MTOE operating forces to perform HLS missions. Conversely, dual missioning relationships within the division structure should evolve into multiple component relationships.

- **Force Mix Adjustments.** The Army should explore a number of options to ameliorate future OPTEMPO problems for high demand low density (HD/LD) units. This includes examining the feasibility and suitability of migrating some AC combat organization authorizations to the RC and using the savings to build AC HD/LD CS/CSS organizations. This includes leveraging the multiple component resource strategy to the maximum extent possible.

- **Future use.** The RC is extremely flexible but it cannot and should not replace the AC force for routine deployments or short notice contingencies. Policy decisions regarding future use cannot forget that RC soldiers are citizens first. Correspondingly, the RC can continue to fill a multitude of roles and missions supporting the NSS if RC
unit densities permit infrequent deployments and mission requirements permit adequate resourcing and train-up periods.

- **Homeland Security.** The Army should proceed cautiously and not make dramatic force mix changes until clearly defined and sustainable HLS missions and force requirements are determined. The Army may also benefit by establishing HLS as a third category (operating, generating, and HLS forces) since HLS forces do not fit exclusively in the operating or generating force domains.

- **Rotation Rules and Mission Duration.** The Army should investigate the full range of possible rotation policies for distinct categories of organizations versus a blanket policy that covers all units. For instance, CBT units could continue to use the 179-day employment period while readily deployable RC CS and CSS units use a 90 or 120 day employment period.

- **Resourcing the RC.** Top priorities for resourcing the RC include fully funding FTS requirements, ADRS, recapitalization of the legacy force, and funding other AC/RC initiatives. If end strength increases are granted, the Army should also consider increasing the ES of the RC. Tiered resourcing policies should also be investigated to optimize economies and efficiencies within the existing operating environment.
ENDNOTES

1In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird proposed a new Total Force Concept that called for the reduction of overall strengths and capabilities of active component forces and an increased reliance on combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve.


4Ibid.


10The IRR and ING makeup the remaining two subcategories of the Ready Reserve. The IRR consists of pre-trained individual soldiers assigned to the Army Reserve that are available for mobilization. The ING provides a means for individuals unable to participate actively to continue in a military status in the ARNG.

11TTHS is an individual account that is comprised of soldiers unavailable to fill authorizations in units and organizations.

12Rumsfeld, 12.

13U.S. Army War College, 5-18.

14Reserve Forces Policy Board, 28.


16Reserve Forces Policy Board, 28.
Cragin, 33.


Cohen, 15.


Ibid.


Cragin, 28.

Cohen, 4.

National Defense Research Institute, 93.


35 Reynolds.


37 Ibid.

38 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 11.
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