MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

“Keeping the Peace?”

Can the United States military balance the need to train for war and peace?

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Since 1989 the United States has participated in eleven peace operations not including humanitarian or disaster relief actions. With the end of the Cold War came a proliferation of local wars by smaller countries. The United Nations has been under undo stress to deal both politically and militarily with these warring states. The United States has been the leader on the world stage by participating in its fair share of peace operations. Because of this unusually genre of military involvement, it has been said by American politicians, theorists, and military experts that peace operations are successfully diminishing the United States’ capability to fight nearly two simultaneous conflicts due to lack of combat readiness. However, studies and surveys conducted on returning units have shown that it is very difficult to categorize all units as being combat ineffective or less trained due to previous peace operations. In fact some studies do not show a dramatic decrease in combat readiness as once thought of peace operations. The military has made great strides over the last decade to deal with numerous varieties of warfare.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Keeping the Peace: Can the United States’ military balance the need to train for war and peace?

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Thesis: With the ever-increasing demand for the United States’ military to participate in worldwide peace operations, is the frequency of such operations degrading the combat effectiveness of our forces?

Discussion: Since 1989 the United States has participated in eleven peace operations not including humanitarian or disaster relief actions. With the end of the Cold War came a proliferation of local wars by smaller countries. Before the end of the Cold War the superpowers had exerted some control over their client states. Now, especially since 1989, a plethora of smaller independent countries seek their own space, boundaries, and a new way of life. The United Nations has therefore been under undo stress to deal both politically and militarily with these warring states. The United States has been a leader on the world stage by participating in its fair share of peace operations. Because of this unusual genre of military involvement, it has been said by American politicians, theorists, and military experts that peace operations are successfully diminishing the United States’ ability to fight nearly two simultaneous conflicts due to lack of combat readiness. However, studies and surveys conducted on returning units have shown that it is very difficult to categorize all units as being combat ineffective or less trained due to previous peace operations. In fact some studies do not show a dramatic decrease in combat readiness as once thought. The military has made great strides over the last decade to deal with numerous varieties of warfare. Personnel at the lower level units (squad-company size) tend to receive equitable skills training compared to home based training. Larger units tend to have their skills diminished depending on what type of unit is participating. Armor and infantry units tend to lose skills because many times while executing peace operations, their troops are functioning in a military police capacity vice war fighter. In contrast, support units such as military police and combat service support units receive extensive training because they are conducting actual maneuvers in support of a genuine mission. Equipment readiness is also affected by peace operations. Once again however, if a unit is training or executing real time maneuvers, equipment disrepair is expected and is worth it since the troops are experiencing a bona fide conflict.

Recommendations: First, study and abide by Presidential Decision Directive 25 dated February 22, 1996. The PDD provides guidance on when and where the United States should become involved in a peace operation. By following such guidance, the United States might be able to reduce the number of operations in which it participates. Secondly, the United States might review what it entails to initiate a Joint Task Force staff whose only job it is to prepare for and execute peace operations, thus allowing other units and staffs to train for war. Thirdly, returning units should receive an automatic C-5 combat readiness status thus ensuring priority of parts and equipment is provided to units in their quest to become combat effective again. Finally, an increase in both funding and manpower would allow a more manageable rotation of units to peace operations and give them more time to return to 100% combat effectiveness upon their return.
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Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has continued to maintain its position as a world power both economically and militarily. With the label of both world power and most powerful democracy also goes the burden of keeping peace around the globe. After the birth of the United Nations in 1945, the United States was determined to deter communist aggression throughout the world. Because of a clearly identified threat, the United States’ effort of deterrence stretched around the world from Europe to the Far East. In 1989 the Cold War came to an end and with it the end to the superpower confrontation that so often rendered the United Nations unable to act. With cooperation having replaced competition, the United States and Russia, and other Security Council members began making greater use of the United Nations to deal with wars.¹ Consequently, there was a steady rise in the number of peace operations worldwide. Of the fifty-four peace operations established by the United Nations since 1948, thirty-six (two-thirds) were begun in the 1990’s.

Since 1989 the United States has participated in eleven peace operations not including humanitarian or disaster relief actions.² There are 10,000 American peacekeepers in the Balkans alone today.³ Along with the rising number of United States military components participating in peacekeeping operations, also comes a possible decline in the combat readiness status of these units. With the ever-increasing demand for the United States’ military to participate in worldwide peace operations, is the frequency of such operations degrading the combat readiness of our forces? This paper will look into this dilemma and try to determine if it is true, and if so, why it is so, and

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what can be done to either reduce the number of peace operations or better prepare combat units to conduct both peace operations and prepare to fight and win wars. In order to assess the impact of peace operations on combat readiness, this paper will do the following: First, it will explain why peace operations are more prevalent today then in the past and why the United States has decided to participate in so many of them. Secondly, it will provide definitions for terms like peacekeeping and peace operation. Thirdly, the paper will determine the yardsticks and measurements used by civilians and the military to verify combat readiness both quantitatively and qualitatively. Next, evidence will be presented to try and determine if peace operations affect combat readiness. Finally, the paper will make recommendations to offer some resolutions to the current dilemma.

**Part I**

*Why peace operations since the end of the Cold War are so prevalent.*

With the end of the Cold War came the proliferation of local wars by smaller countries. These types of wars increased as a side effect related to decolonization. Smaller countries increasingly had to provide for themselves both economically and militarily instead of depending on the Soviet Union or the United States. The superpowers had exerted some measure of control over their client states. A good example for illustrating the role of the superpowers is the Balkans. Before the end of the Cold War, most of these countries were under the tight supervision of the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union fell, some of these countries reverted back to their original

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4 Jett, 8.
boundaries, cultures, and names. Of course new governments were established and some countries splintered from others. What once was a stable region, although communist, was now a chaotic area with a plethora of small independent countries seeking their own space, boundaries and new way of life. This struggle for independence caused old hatreds and thousand year old cultural and ethnic differences to reemerge, subsequently leading to small conflicts. Small conflicts that used to be quelled by the Soviet Union by a show of military force were now allowed to persist without limit. No longer was the Soviet Union able to suppress rebellions with tanks. These new wars were now considered conflicts of deliberation, a steady runoff of uncivil, civil wars sundering fragile, but functioning, nation-states and gnawing at the well being of stable nations.\(^5\)

This core problem is complicated by the fact that although such wars usually involve massive levels of human suffering, they rarely pose a threat to the strategic interests of the countries represented on the Security Council of the United Nations. These wars tend to take place within a nation and are therefore intrastate as opposed to interstate conflicts. They most often take place in the world’s less developed countries in which political systems are as weak as the economies. As a result, wars of this type usually pit poorly disciplined rebel forces against poorly trained armies, in which both sides are equipped extensively and often exclusively, with light weapons. Because of their nature, these wars are difficult to end.\(^6\) At the same time, because of the reach of the electronic media and the human suffering involved, they are also difficult to ignore.\(^7\) One initial response of the international community was to expand peacekeeping. In the

\(^5\) Jett, 8.
late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the number, size, scope, and cost of these efforts all increased dramatically. In the post-Cold War period, between 1988 and 1992, thirteen peace operations were begun. The number was as many as had been undertaken in the previous forty years of the United Nation’s existence! The above increase contrasts from the mid-1970’s to the mid-1980’s when only one new peace operation was initiated.

Another characteristic of these conflicts are the number of civilian victims. About fifty percent of war-related deaths from the eighteenth century to 1970 were civilian. In the 1970’s this figure rose to seventy three percent and had climbed to nearly ninety percent by 1990. According to one U.S. government study, between 1985 and 1995 these wars caused nearly forty-two million people to become refugees or displaced within their own countries. The spread of a global electronic village and the ‘CNN factor’ also brought this suffering to the attention of people throughout the world. The public response to such scenes made it harder for politicians to ignore these problems, even if their root causes and solutions were little understood.

Other data further illustrates the crescendo effect of peace operations over the years. For example in 1987, the United Nations had five peace operations under way with a combined manpower of some 10,000 soldiers and an annual budget of $233 million. By the beginning of 1995, the United Nations was conducting seventeen peace operations with over 75,000 troops at an annual cost of $3.6 billion. These facts alone show the propensity of politicians to come to the aide of countries even when they are not a threat. The numbers of troops committed continue to increase, as do the budgets because of both political and moral pressure from an outspoken public. Given the

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7 Jett, 8.
8 Jett, 9.
expansion, it is understandable that the United States continues to sign up for more missions. At this time, the United States is involved with six of the current fifteen peace operations. As a result of the above trends, the politicians are willing to send troops into peace operations at a high rate of speed without even considering the toll they take on troops and the risks they may be taking. With the end of the Cold War, the re-birth of the United Nations, and the determination of the United States to both prevent and deter threats to world peace, the United States will inevitably continue involvement with peace operations in the future.

**PART II**

**[Peace Operations Defined]**

Any discussion of peacekeeping is complicated by the fact that there is no common definition of the term; indeed, this may be one of the causes of failure in peacekeeping operations. Part of the definitional confusion grows from the fact that peace operations are United Nations led, involving both civilian and military personnel. This section will first examine the military definition, followed by the United Nations’ characterization and finally review several variations of civilian terminology. Because most peace operations involve numerous civilian authorities and military units from assorted governments throughout the world, it is obviously very difficult to develop standard definitions of peace operations.

One place to determine the military definition is to look at military doctrine. For the military definition, this paper will draw on two sources: Joint and Army publications. Since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the four services have been

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9 Jett, 10.
forced to *negotiate* between each other in training, equipment and doctrine. When performing a joint mission, (which is most typically the case today whether peace time or war time) all the services refer to the Joint Dictionary Publication 3-07 as the one source where all can find common ground denoting military definitions. According to Joint Publication 3-07, peace operations can be divided into two categories referred to as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In general peace operations are *military operations used to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement* and categorized as either peacekeeping or as peace enforcement operations. The two major subcategories of peace operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are defined as follows:

**Peace Keeping**: military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term settlement”. [JP 3-07]

**Peace Enforcement**: application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. [JP 3-07]

The Army, who participates in most of the American peace operations, has its own definition but follows the intent of the joint characterization. Since 1993, the Army has included peacekeeping operations in its FM 100-5 and other field manuals to better prepare their units for such contingencies. The Army emphasizes that peacekeeping operations should not be classified as “War” category but rather as “Operations Other

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10 Jett, 13.
Throughout this paper peace operations will be defined according to the Joint Military Publication JP 3-07.\textsuperscript{12}

The United Nations categorizes peace operations as \textit{preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building}. The United Nations’ Secretary General Boutros-Ghali defined these terms in a speech in July 1992\textsuperscript{13}. However, nowhere in the 111 articles of the Charter of the United Nations is the word peace operation used. Rather, the term has been applied by journalists, diplomats, academics, and others to a wide variety of situations.\textsuperscript{14} The Secretary General’s attempt to categorize the different missions into four groups has helped in some respect to specify what peace operations entail. Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter relate to both peacekeeping and enforcement respectively however, a clear and concise definition is not offered. This failure to define peace operations may compound the difficulty that military leaders have carrying out United Nations’ missions.

One reason that it has been difficult for the United Nations to define peace operations in terms comparable to the military terms grows from the fact that the United Nations was not intended to address the problem of civil wars or internal disorder. The United Nations was to provide general security and to protect the smaller states from

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{11} United States Army, \textit{FM 100-5 Operations} (Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1993) 2-1.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{12} Usually when the armed forces, Army, Navy Air Force and Marine Corps are involved with joint missions, they refer to joint publications as well as their own.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{13} Jett, 13.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{14} Jett, 14-15.
larger ones who might be tempted to invade. Indeed, the United Nations’ Charter explicitly prohibits intervention in members’ domestic politics. The major purpose of the organization is to protect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of its members. During the last decade, with the seemingly endless series of peace operations, the United Nations has had to resort to labeling any situation under Chapter VII as a threat to the peace. This threat need not entail a state threatening another state, as the founders of the United Nations envisaged. Although missions are usually clearly defined for the United States military by the National Command Authority, the mere fact that the United Nations is literally conducting operations that it was not even intended to do is reason to believe that communications between both the United Nations and the countries who provide forces necessarily become tangled.

Civilian terminology outside that of the United Nations confounds things even further when it comes to reaching a universal definition of peace operations. The closest definition to both the military and United Nations’ example is offered by Mr. D. Quinn, who was one of many American military experts who contributed to a collection of essays written in the wake of the Somalia experience. Quinn corresponds closely to both the American military’s and United Nations’ definition but differs slightly when he splits the categories of peacekeeping into peacekeeping and aggravated peacekeeping. Many other organizations, respected theorists, strategists, and authors have come up with

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15 **Peacekeeping**: non-combat military operations conducted by UN authorized forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement.

**Aggravated Peacekeeping**: military combat operations conducted by UN forces and designed to monitor and facilitate an existing truce agreement; initially begun as non-combat operations (exclusive of self-defense) and with the consent of all major belligerents, but which subsequently, due to any number of reasons, become combat operations where UN forces are authorized to use force not only for self-defense but also for defense of their assigned missions.
their own definition of peace operations. The fact that experts in the field can come up
with a variety of ways to define the objectives of peace operations is indicative of the
complexity of peacekeeping today and the difficulty of forming generalizations.\textsuperscript{16} Given
the difficulty that civilian experts have in reaching consensus, imagine how difficult it is
for war fighters to dissect what the civilian leadership is trying to communicate to them
when they issue an order to undertake such a mission?

Clearly the lack of a common definition can contribute to a peace operation’s
failure or perceived failure. At a minimum, conceptual confusion will complicate
communications between civilian officials and military officers as they try to prevent the
former from yielding to mission creep, the process whereby the goals of the peace
operation are constantly redefined and expanded, leaving the military faced with trying to
accomplish an ever-changing mission.\textsuperscript{17} Because of communication failure, a peace
operation may also be perceived a failure because the task or mission did not meet
conditions of a particular definition, making the mission of the United Nations and its
participants' job even more difficult. In turn, disjointed communications could impact on
combat readiness by creating lack of unity of effort and subsequent low morale among
both the troops and the officers in charge as well.

\textbf{Part III}

[\textit{Yardsticks for Measuring Combat Readiness: Empirical & Anecdotal}]

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\textbf{Peace enforcement}: military combat operations conducted by UN authorized forces in which combat
power or the threat of combat power is used to compel compliance with UN sanctions or resolutions. \textit{Jett},
14. \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Jett}, 16. \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Jett}, 16.
\end{flushleft}
Thus far definitions of peace operations have been provided from both military and civilian sources. Also noted has been the extent that peace operations have grown over the last decade. Given the growth of these operations, have they had an effect on how units prepare for fighting real wars? In order to assess the impact, determinants of how to measure combat readiness must first be established. This section will describe various measurements and yardsticks that are typically used to ascertain combat readiness and effectiveness. This section will be divided into two categories of study: (1), empirical data that determines quantitative or tangible measurements and (2), anecdotal data that deduces qualitative and more intangible measurements. Since the beginning of warfare, a leader has always wondered how his forces would hold up in the ‘fog of battle’ and usually it is not until hostilities have ended and a winner and loser have been pronounced does he ever realize the full capabilities of his unit. Because most American involvement in peace operations occurred after the last major global conflict, Desert Storm, it is difficult to measure how the military’s combat readiness has been affected. The big war came before the majority of the peace operations and this study is trying to determine what may happen in a major conflict after peace operations.

Empirical Yardsticks:

According to a study by the Marine Corps and the United States Army, readiness can be categorized into three factors: training, equipment, and personnel. The Marine Corps has devised a formula that incorporates all of these factors to determine the combat readiness and effectiveness for a Marine Air Ground Task Force: Combat readiness/effectiveness is a:
function of personnel readiness + equipment readiness and supplies (quantity) readiness + equipment condition readiness + training readiness + command, control, communications (C3) and unit climate readiness.\textsuperscript{18}

Training and equipment readiness can usually be documented by reviewing tangible data such as after action reports from units who have recently undergone training. This training, which usually takes place at the Army’s National Training Center and the Marine Corps’ Combined Arms Training facility, has proven vital and formidable evaluations of readiness. These evaluations are sufficiently important that they can sometimes make or break a commander. If a unit performs well the commander can get promoted, while if he fails, he can get relieved. These evaluations are summarized in “after action reports” or “lessons learned” filed at the Army War College.

Personnel readiness usually follows three measures within this framework: personnel strength, the job qualification of those assigned, and the proportion of leadership positions that are filled. Counting numbers and calculating the percentages filled can easily determine these personnel measures. Usually, an 85% category gets a commander a C-1 status, which is the highest of the combat readiness categories. This C-1 rating says the commander has “prescribed levels of wartime resources (personnel) and is trained so that it is capable of performing the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked.”\textsuperscript{19}

Readiness to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is intended to reflect more or less the initial capability of units and forces; it is represented primarily through reports

\textsuperscript{18} Paul R. Stahl, \textit{In Search of Combat Readiness in the U.S. Marine Corps} (RI, Naval Post Graduate School, 1985), 41.

of resources that units currently hold—generally compared with specific requirements for resources. Although it deliberately avoids the term readiness, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is generally considered the preeminent reflection of U.S. military readiness.  

Anecdotal Yardsticks:

Studies have shown that unit cohesion, morale, esprit de corps, the “will to fight”, discipline, commitment, leadership, all have significant roles in how an army fights and if it wins. These subjective measures require sophisticated procedures surveys, knowledge of social sciences and qualitative assessments. Although these qualitative measures are far more difficult to evaluate than quantitative measures, they must still be considered as part of the equation when evaluating a unit. A British Army Lieutenant Colonel, Jeremy Phipps, conducted a study on unit cohesion and concluded “the most modern equipment in the world is useless without motivated individuals drilled into cohesive units with sound leadership at all levels.” He also concluded “strong leadership, discipline, and a high state of training will be essential in order to ensure that units stay and fight effectively against heavy opposition.” Without this heavy emphasis on training to fight, unit cohesion can slacken and then affect both morale and discipline within a unit.

Dr. Robert Hotz states that in the study of unit readiness and effectiveness, we must “focus also on the human dimension—the morale, motivation, esprit de corps, fear

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22 Phipps, 9.
and courage-of the individual soldier as a potential force multiplier in combat." He includes in his book point that “because battle outcomes, while dependent on the achievements of technical and tactical proficiency in the use of modern arms, remain dependant on the less quantifiable and more intangible human dimensions.” Xenophon in 400 B.C. used the term ‘stronger in the soul’ or spiritual strength to explain a soldier’s successful performance in combat. Napoleon wrote ‘the spirit is to the sword as three to one’.

The term ‘battlemind’ has been coined to serve as the military term to describe fortitude. “Fortitude is the strength of mind allowing one to endure pain or adversity courageously. Fortitude can also be described as inner or moral strength, will power and resolution.” The key to developing a strong sense of moral fortitude and will to fight however is to develop this powerful state of mind through training. Stephen Westbrook writes about the intangible measures that affect a soldier’s morale and will to fight:

It has been more often the cause than superior numbers, the loss of an armed force’s will to fight that has produced the total collapse of armies. That is not surprising for as John Keegan relates at the conclusion of his comparative study of men in battle is ‘essential to moral conflict. It requires if it is to take place, a mutual and sustained act of will by two contending parties and if it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse of one of them.”

Westbrook continues:

The average soldier is subjected to a wide range of demands by his political and military leaders, and a determination of the precise reason why a specific demand is accepted as legitimate or rejected as illegitimate would require analysis of the nature of the soldier’s involvement of the demand itself and of the conditions under which it is present. The leadership may fail to communicate to its soldiers a cause that associates its demands with the soldiers’ values. For a nation besieged,

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24 Ozkaptan, 236.
25 Ozkaptan, 235.
26 Ozkaptan, 235.
particularly if the attacking force requires unconditional surrender or proposes to alter substantially the national way of life, the need for formal communication of a cause might be minimal. If a nation is not being attacked however, the problem is more complex. A cause need not be internalized by a soldier and accepted as his own principal goals and aims but it must help convince him that what he is doing is right.\textsuperscript{28}

Given the need for fortitude, morale and given the nature of ambiguous peace operations in a foreign country that peacekeepers may have no loyalties towards, one can appreciate how challenging it must be to sell a peace operation to a war-minded soldier. Westbrook continues:

\begin{quote}
At the unit level the soldier is not asked to defend democracy and freedom; he is asked to execute a small part of a specific plan. These specific acts must be translated into either the values or interests of the unit or the larger society. Failure to do so may be caused by poor communication or an unwillingness of the unit’s officers to explain to the soldier how specific acts contribute to the unit’s interests or how the unit’s success will contribute to the national cause.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

One can readily see how difficult it is too maintain a soldier’s concentration even when he is trained. How much harder must it be to cultivate concentration of a young soldier when an issue is remote from his country’s interest? Finally, even the greatest military theorist known today, Carl Von Clausewitz, speaks of the intangible nature of war and the effects these have on their outcome. He calls them the moral aspects of war. Clausewitz states, “Moral elements are the most important in War.”\textsuperscript{30} Clausewitz continues: “Where…absent, it must…be replaced by…others such as the commander’s superior ability or popular enthusiasm, or…results will fall short of the efforts expended.”\textsuperscript{31} Jomini, although paying more attention to tangible elements of war, also mentioned morale as an important indicator for measuring combat effectiveness: “In a

\textsuperscript{28} Westbrook, 262.
\textsuperscript{29} Westbrook, 262.
\textsuperscript{31} Clausewitz, 189.
word by exciting their enthusiasm by every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by
honoring courage, punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice—we may expect to
maintain a high military spirit.”32 Even the old time classical theorists understood the
importance of morale, discipline, unit cohesion and other qualitative measures needed to
affect combat readiness and hopefully ensure a victory.

PART IV (a)

[Empirical Evidence]

Training, equipment and personnel are the cornerstones of combat readiness.
This section will review the three stated categories, training, equipment, and personnel,
and present data to assess the effect of peace operations. Peace operations detract from
readiness in three ways: (1) by disrupting combat training, (2) by lending undue stress
upon equipment that might be needed for combat, and by (3) by depleting the force
structure of combat units for peace operations.

Training: Maneuver units in today’s armed forces are considered critical in the
fast paced high tempo maneuver warfare the United States military is expected to fight.
A recent Training Lesson review by maneuver units returning from Bosnia in 1997
stated:

Despite the division’s training strategy of pre-deployment and deployment actions,
maneuver units still suffered degradation in METL (Mission Essential Task List)
proficiency...crew readiness suffered without live-fire opportunities while leader
readiness degraded without practice in collective combined arms tasks. Unit training
readiness in METL tasks suffered the greatest degradation for they did not have the
time or the resources to conduct much more than opportunity training, mostly on

Peace operation training now consumes a larger segment of time before a unit deploys on a peace operation. Although the unit is better prepared to conduct peace operations, the fact still remains that combat training is no longer the priority.

A study in December of 1995 indicated that most peace operations often require a task force organized around usually an infantry battalion with other detachments pulled from units such as military police, medical doctors and assistants, combat engineers and others. By pulling these troops away from their parent company, the losing company cannot train to Mission Essential Task List standards either because of a lack of personnel or equipment. Of course when personnel are attached to the Peace Operation Task Force, they to are at the whim of the commander. A military policeman may be tasked to be a driver. A medical assistant may be assigned to work in the post office. By performing skills that they are not trained for, they loose competence in their own skills.  

A study completed in 1999 indicated that when units were away at a peace operation training suffered, compared to units that stayed at their home base. The chart below provides data compiled when Army War College Officers were queried whether or not they thought they lost valuable training opportunities compared to when they were at their base (see figure #1). The data indicates that most thought training while on a peace operation had fallen drastically over the last three years. Of those involved in peace operations during 1997, only 23% said that they received better training on the peace operation than while at home, whereas 65% said they received anywhere from less training to non-existent. The data for 1999 improves for training while on peace

operation to 36%, an improvement of 13%. Fifty-four percent said they received anywhere from less to non-existent. Although a drop of 11% from 1997, this is still a significant amount of officers who think they are not getting the training necessary to fight the next war. The 13% improvement in training, however, from 1997 to 1999 may indicate that the military is recognizing that there is a problem and are taking corrective action.

**METL Training During the Peace Process**

![Chart showing METL training during the peace process from 1997 to 1999.]

(Figure 1: Data from "Peace Operations and Their Impact on Combat Readiness" [Nizolak, pg. 15])

In one interview, a Marine colonel, who was questioned about combat readiness observed: “With respect to training, a unit is only as good as its weakest link. If your individual Marines don’t have the confidence in their ability to fight, based upon their individual combat skills, then leadership will not be able to overcome this deficiency.”

Besides declining training opportunities while deployed to a peace operation lies another problem. If a unit prepares for a peace operation before it deploys, it must train

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35 Stahl, 63.
for that contingency. The chart below depicts the required time necessary to prepare, deploy, conduct deployment and return for an average infantry battalion:

**Table 1: Infantry Battalion Deployment Training Cycle**

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<tr>
<th>Peace Operations (Pre-deployment training)</th>
<th>Deploy</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Leave</th>
<th>Combined Arms Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Feb-Mar-Apr-May</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Jul-Aug-Sep-Oct-Nov-Dec</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb-Mar-Apr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

{Table # 1: Data from “Army Forces for Operations Other Than War” [Sortor, pg.36]}

For a six-month peace operation, a unit must take approximately 13 months, double the actual deployment time, to prepare, deploy, execute, return, recover, and begin training again for wartime situations.

It is difficult to document how units returning from peace operations perform at the Army’s Combat Training Centers. Because units only rotate on average once every two years through these training centers and because the personnel turnover rate is so great, it is difficult to retrieve conclusive empirical data from the exact same unit who has just returned from a peace operation. Because the unit loses most of its trained soldiers

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36 The United States Army’s Combat Training Center (CTC) Program creates the most realistic environment possible, short or war, for tactical units to train during peacetime on the tasks they will execute during wartime. In simple terms, the CTCs are designed to enable units to “fight the battle before the battle”, to ensure their readiness to do so, should the need arise. The CTC Program consists of the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at the Hohenfels Maneuver Area, Germany; and the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Since their genesis in the early 1980’s, the most distinguishing characteristic of the CTCs has been their ability to realistically simulate combat. This has enabled a generation of soldiers and leaders to learn from their experiences while operating within a peacetime crucible of war. As such, the CTCs have played a major role in the success that Army forces experienced in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia and in other crisis around the world. As the strategic environment is evolving, the CTCs are evolving as well. Their ultimate purpose is to ensure that Army forces are prepared to execute National Military Strategy. The initiatives undertaken in recent years at each CTC-to develop new scenarios, including peace operations, and to increase training realism and complexity-will ensure they remain trained and ready to do so.
and leadership, it would not be accurate to make a determined calculation on a unit only similar in name and not in personnel. This difficulty in retrieving data is compounded by the fact that Combat Training Centers do not readily publish results from these evaluations. The unit’s debrief is between Observer/Controllers at the Combat Training Centers and the evaluated unit’s leadership. According to the Combat Training Centers’ leadership, this informal evaluation allows units to train and learn from mistakes as opposed to receiving a grade or report card for all to see. Therefore unit commanders need not be intimidated by the evaluators for fear that their score will be published for the entire Army to review. The commander can come to one of the Combat Training Centers to train and learn with only those pressures associated with ordinary Army leadership and responsibility.

With that said, interviews were conducted with the leadership of two of the Army’s Combat Training Centers, National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Although concrete empirical data could not be gathered, the leadership of these Combat Training Centers was asked if any trends, whether good or bad, were associated with units returning from peace operations. 37 Lieutenant Colonel William F. Brown, United States Army, Chief of Staff for Training and Evaluation at Fort Polk’s Joint Readiness and

37 Telephonic interviews were conducted by the author with some of the senior leadership of two of the three Combat Training Centers located in the United States: National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, California and Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Louisiana. The author spoke with Lieutenant Colonel William F. Brown, United States Army, Chief of Staff, Joint Readiness Training Center, Lieutenant Joseph K. Wallace, United States Army, G-3/Operations Officer, National Training Center, and Lieutenant Daniel Zajac, United States Army, Senior Armor Advisor/Trainer, National Training Center. All were both members of peace operations and had at least over 18 months of experience at their present billet. LTC Wallace had been at the NTC for over six continuous years save a one-year tour overseas. The interviews took place on March 15, 2002 and covered a variety of issues, namely the effects of peace operations on training. All three officers were
Training Center, commented that trends show that units who go through Fort Polk within two years after a peace operation have suffered such a great personnel turnover that most units “almost 100% of them have a long way to go to reach their expected combat efficiency and effectiveness.” Interestingly enough however, Brown states that any unit deployed, even on a combat mission, returning to Fort Polk within two years of their return would probably suffer the same turnover and subsequently have a long way to go to catch up with their combat proficiency. Certain Mission Essential Task List skills would still be lacking whether the unit returned from combat or a peace operation because of personnel turnover. The head of the Armor Observers and Controllers at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Zajac, United States Army, confirmed Brown’s testimonial. He observed through his eighteen months on the job, that it does not matter where units are returning from, by the time they are evaluated a few years later, they are only the same unit in name. In fact Lieutenant Colonel Zajac remembers one unit returning from Kosovo where the unit conducted real life mine sweeping operations on a daily basis. Upon their return to the United States and subsequent return to the National Training Center almost two years later, the same unit had lost almost all of their mine sweeping skills.

These statements by the leaders at the evaluation centers for the United States Army bring up interesting points. Perhaps personnel turnover is the hidden problem with units maintaining combat efficiency rather than participation in peacekeeping missions. If so, the question may be: should a unit be stabilized for longer periods of time versus detaching members, especially officers and junior enlisted non-commissioned officers,
after only a three year tour? This problem, which has nothing to do with peace operations, deserves further research.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Wallace, United States Army, Executive Officer, G-3 Operations, National Training Center said the only trend he really saw while at Fort Irwin for the last six years was that the junior officers and non-commissioned officers, who were not receiving their specialty training while on peace operations and upon their return from peace operations, were being sent to staff positions where they were expected to be experts in their related field. Wallace states that if an armor lieutenant, fresh out of his specialty school, goes to a peace operation and performs military police duties, he has lost his most influential years of on-hands training. He subsequently gets moved on to another position upon his return and a few years later when he returns to command an armor company, finds himself not as highly trained or proficient as his peers who did not deploy to a peace operation. This puts the young officer not only at a disadvantage for promotion among his peers but puts the unit at risk if they are called upon to go to combat.

All three officers who were interviewed said that they could not see a direct corollary with how a unit performed at their perspective Combat Training Center and whether or not they returned from a peace operation. Each officer said the units they observed either performed well or not so well based on many intangibles as eagerness to learn, ability to react to changing situations, and the effectiveness of their new leadership. Whether they came back from a peace operation or not did not appear to matter. What did matter was how much time the unit prepared before coming to the Combat Training Center. Lieutenant Colonel Zajac concluded that the Army is getting better with not only
how they deploy combat units to peace operations but also how they redeploy back to their parent units in Europe or the United States. Lieutenant Colonel Zajac stated that his unit, upon completing its deployment to Bosnia in 1998, did not directly return to its home base in Germany but spent a month in Hungary re-training to meet its combat efficiency skills lost while on the peace operation. This statement confirms two points: (1), combat units that execute peace operations do lose some of their combat efficiency, especially if they go six months without training to a certain Mission Essential Task List standard and (2), the Army has become much more cognizant of the fact that units do lose combat proficiency and recognize the importance of re-training before redeployment to their home base. Zajac continued that if units are allowed to return home with no proficiency training whatsoever, because of the time allocated for a soldier’s leave and then subsequent personnel turnover, a brand new unit is created that lacks basic combat skills.

**Equipment**: Secondary to training, when it comes to combat readiness, is ensuring that units have the proper equipment with which to train and subsequently fight. The Joint Chiefs of Staff use data such as SORTS or Status of Resources and Training Systems to evaluate combat readiness. The Status of Resources and Training Systems gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff a snapshot of which units are equipped and ready to go to war if necessary. Because of the possibility of having to return from a peace operation and then deploy to a major regional conflict, many studies by the RAND Corporation were conducted to evaluate the amount of time necessary to recover equipment to full time C-1 capability once the unit has returned. Whether departing for, or returning from a deployment, a unit must inventory and prepare its equipment. If deploying, the unit
would prepare the equipment for shipment; if returning, it would unload and prepare the equipment for storage or use in training. The time required to complete this cycle will vary widely depending upon the type of unit, nature and duration of the operation, and degree of similarity between the tasks performed during the operation and the tasks normally performed by the unit in a major regional conflict.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) found large variations in time between certain units when it came to equipment readiness and maintenance. Equipment maintenance took between one and six months after equipment reached home station. Transportation of equipment home also took from one to six months. Some shipments took as long as eight to eighteen months due to extreme delays or outright loss. In addition, a unit’s equipment is sometimes left in the theatre, so it must wait for the replacements from new purchase or from depot stocks. Replacements may take considerable time.

General Henry Shelton, former Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, also identified these equipment-related issues among the readiness impacts of participation in peace operations. In 1995 Shelton cited an example from the experiences of the 86th Combat Support Hospital: “After leaving its equipment in Somalia, this unit had only recovered 85% eighteen months later.”

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38 Ronald E. Sortor, Army Forces for Operations Other Than War (Santa Monica: RAND Publications, 1997), 35.
39 The size of the unit and the location of the peace operation will make the duration of returning units to ready status different than others. For example, an infantry battalion would have less equipment than a combat service support unit. Therefore, it would probably take a longer time for the CSS unit to be able to redeploy in a major regional conflict. Additionally, as will be seen later on, most combat service support units are conducting real-life missions because the nature of their specialty: support. Therefore, that unit’s equipment will be used more frequently thus needing more time to repair.
40 Sortor, 38.
41 Sorter, 38.
environment and because of austere conditions in theatre, equipment required extensive
maintenance after its return to home station. Such factors can help cause particular units
to take from as little as six months to as long as year and a half to reach full combat-ready
status after returning from a peace operation. These time estimates and experiences are
all based on a peacetime business-as-usual situation. Clearly, given priority and a sense
of urgency, units could regain at least partial readiness status and be prepared for
deployment to a combat theatre much more quickly. 42

An example of what would take place if a unit returning from a peace operation
was called into action as a player for a major regional conflict (MRC); the accelerated
recovery for the unit would follow along the lines of table #2 below.

Table 2: Accelerated Recovery for MRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit relieved from PO</th>
<th>Redeployment</th>
<th>Combat Arms</th>
<th>Combat Support Units</th>
<th>Combat Service Support Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Body</td>
<td>1 Month</td>
<td>2 Months</td>
<td>3 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>returns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table #2: Data from Army Forces for Operating Other Than War” [Sortor, pg. 39]]

42 Sortor, 38.
Even with this seemingly hurried pace, there is no time for leave, personnel restructuring or extensive maintenance for equipment. Equipment may not be brought to full mission-capable status, while only the essential tasks are performed to bring deadline equipment to operation. If, however, a unit such as an engineer battalion or a motor transport company were using its equipment due to training that resembles what they usually do, the degradation of equipment would be worth it because the unit is receiving valuable training. If a unit is using equipment for reasons other than training for combat, then a point of contention lies in the fact that these units would not only not be able to retrain to their combat Mission Essential Task List but their equipment would not be ready to deploy to a major regional conflict as well.

**Personnel:** The Bottom Up Review of 1993 stated that personnel needed to be reduced following the collapse of the Soviet Union. With that review came a reduction of US Army troops from 770,000 in 1989 to 495,000 in 1997. With the cuts in the Army and other services one would assume that operations would decrease as well. Instead, after the end of Desert Storm, from 1993 until 1999 the United Nations had authorized 14 different peace operations. Although the United States was not the largest contributor of forces during this time, it still deployed units while struggling with other global responsibilities and the need to be prepared to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously.

As of September 2001 however, the primary responsibility for the United States is to protect its own territory first and handle one major regional conflict simultaneously.
according to the Quadrennial Defense Review.⁴³ Ambiguous as it may seem, in the words of now retired Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton: “The United States has plenty of strategies, just not enough forces.”⁴⁴ Most peace operations require non-combat arms units such as combat service support units, health units, military police units and others compared to the heavy emphasis on combat arms troops in war. However, the large headquarters, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) staffs, and Joint Task Forces that plan most of the peace operations are made up of war fighters such as infantrymen and artillerymen. Not only is there not much expertise in the planning headquarters on how to manage and deploy these combat service support forces they are also trying to train to fight their Commander-in-Chief’s next real-time war.

While the combat service support units are picked apart and either attached or assigned to peace operation Joint Task Forces, they leave behind skeleton units that are needed to support the logistic and support capabilities of the infantry units to maintain their operational training tempo. The U.S. government’s General Accounting Office reported in August 1996 that of the thirty-one Army and five Air Force units they reviewed that had participated in the Bosnia operation, five Army units (14%) and one Air Force unit (20%) reported personnel readiness reductions. Moreover, the Army units had deployed elements or key personnel to Bosnia in such a way as to lower resources available to the parent (reporting) units. The five units that reported reductions were all support units: civil affairs, signal, psychological operations, and two transportation

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⁴³ The QDR is written nearly every four years by the JCS to the NCA in order to offer the opportunity to articulate a defense strategy for protecting and advancing U.S. national interests and to develop a sound programmatic and budgetary blueprint to realize that strategy.
units. Additionally, when units are picked apart they are reconstituted with other units that have never worked together. This extemporized arrangement normally happens even when a Joint Task Force for war is formed, however, most operations are carried out by the union of much larger forces not the smaller piecemeal skill oriented units formulated for peace operations.

Some experts suggest the United States Department of Defense should pull more troops from the reserves. With the activation of reserves during Desert Storm being the only case of a national call-up since Vietnam, reserves are not prepared for such an eventuality. To the extent that peace operation deployments are perceived as frequent events that impose financial burdens on reserve personnel, reserve retention and recruiting may suffer—particularly in specialties that require a high degree of training or experience.

Some experts recommend asking for volunteers from the reserve force. The postal company that deployed to Somalia in 1992 and the infantry battalion that went to multinational force and observers duty in Egypt in 1994 are two notable examples. Relying on volunteers whether more or less formally can be problematic for a number of reasons. First, volunteers often fail to match the force composition requirements of the contingency. In some specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, linguist, and medicine, it has been difficult to get volunteers with the correct mix of skills and experience. Second, even if the appropriate skills are provided, it can be difficult to generate a sufficient number of volunteers, especially for military operations other than war. Because Rwanda followed closely on the heels of Somalia and the amount of

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45 Jennifer Taw, David Persslin, and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations’ Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness (Santa Monica: RAND Publications, 1998), 16.
disease and risk of exposure to AIDS was high, the United States military had difficulty getting reservists to volunteer. Whereas the Army received 1,000 phone calls from potential volunteers for a popular mission, for Rwanda the Army Personnel Center received less than a hundred.47

The question then becomes, does the United States build its force structure around the need for more combat service support troops because of the increasing number of peace operations while maintaining the same amount of troop strength or does it increase the overall number of its armed forces? Given the fact that troop strength has been consistently reduced over the last decade, it seems doubtful that the United States Congress will agree to an increase in current strength.

Referring again to the Nizolak surveys, he found that 22% of those junior enlisted (non- non-commissioned officers) and soldiers queried said they would not reenlist because of participation in past peace operations. On a positive note 50% said that peace operations had no effect on whether or not they would remain in the armed services. It does not bode well for the 28% of junior non-commissioned officers, who stated that their decision not to reenlist was because of peace operations.

This data seems to indicate that young men and women will not reenlist in the armed services if they feel they are not executing the mission for which they joined. Until proper leadership training and guidance for young enlisted soldiers improves showing them the benefits of their peace operation mission, this personnel problem will continue to hamper combat readiness.

46 Taw, Persslin, and Leed, 23.
47 Taw, Persslin, and Leed, 22.
Part IV (b)

[Anecdotal Evidence]

Part IV (b) will present anecdotal information on the effects of peace operations on combat readiness. Several surveys were conducted on officers and enlisted personnel who had recently returned from peace operations. The studies tried to determine if and to what extent peace operations had an impact on combat readiness. As with most survey data, it is based on soldiers’ subjective observation that is affected by the individual’s experience, billet specialty, and bias. Although the surveys cannot verify scientifically combat readiness, they do suggest perceptions of troops involved.

Training: In 1999 the Army War College conducted a survey that asked officers, who received the most training while on a peace operation by specialty? The results indicate that many of the support units such as combat support said they received the most training while special operation forces were split almost evenly between greater training and non-existent. The primary war fighting specialties received little:
The data indicates that the units most likely to engage in combat do not receive the necessary training required to keep their skills honed. Many infantry, armor, and artillery units are restricted to a limited number of training ranges and the practice of using combined arms. On a positive note, the units who actually do real-life execution of their billets while deployed on peace operations such as combat service support tended to have the time to train. Training during a peace operation is in fact probably better than they would get back at their home base.

One other survey was conducted concerning whether or not the individual soldier felt his skills were enhanced or depleted while on a peace operation. The survey went from individual soldier to squad to platoon, to company then battalion level. (see figure

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48 Combined arms is the practice of using many weapon systems in an orchestrated manner in order to bring to the enemy the total effects of all of the army’s combat power at one time. Infantry units are the main ground units that usually control the use of supporting arms such as air, armor (tanks) and artillery. Because most infantry units on peace operations are employed as guards and policemen, their infantry skills such as the use of combined arms, tend to degrade.

49 Most combat service support units such as engineers and motor transport units actually are gainfully employed during peace operations. Some of the main missions while employed on peace operations include transporting troops from one location to another and building bridges and other infrastructure edifices.
#3 below). The individual soldier and marine seemed to loose the least amount of skills at their level. The degradation rises proportionally with the size of the unit.\(^\text{50}\)

![Skills Degraded by Peace Operations](image)

{Figure 3: Data from “Peace Operations and Their Impact on Combat Readiness” [Nizolak, pg. 21]}

Finally, when asked if there was adequate time to recover from the training deficit, almost 50% of those responding to the survey felt that there was not adequate time for a full training recovery in order to be able to respond adequately to a war time scenario. The following chart illustrates how training recovery is the biggest casualty when returning from peace operations (see figure #4 below). Almost 50% of those queried thought that training recovery suffered the most. On a positive note, however,

\(^{50}\) Most small unit leaders are able to train their squads and platoons during down time or when not fully engaged with the peace operation. Because the METLs for a platoon are considerably less than what is required of a full battalion, smaller units tend to get more training. It obviously takes considerable more time and effort to train a six hundred-man battalion at one time than a 30-man platoon.
almost ¾ of those queried thought that there was enough recovery time for equipment and personnel. Based on this survey, the findings suggest such divided opinions that a consensus does not emerge.

The following data comes from both after action reports and lessons learned following combat training scenarios before and after returning from peace operations. Col. Rosenberger, Commander, 11th Armored Calvary Regiment whose unit plays the opposition for the evaluated units at Fort Irwin, reported to Congress “the performance and combat readiness of brigade combat teams at the National Training Center has substantially declined over the past five years.”51 Col Rosenberger attributes a

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large portion of this decline to “expanding peacekeeping operations which quickly erode warfighting knowledge, skill, and the ability creating a growing generation of young leaders who don’t know how to fight as members of a combined arms team.’

**Equipment:** The following data was obtained by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. A survey was given to Army officers and non-commissioned officers who had filled key positions during peace operations before and during 1995. Key positions were defined as Battalion Commander, Battalion Executive Officer, Command Sergeant Major, and Platoon Sergeant. The results of 94 officers and 127 non-commissioned officers were reviewed. The results revealed that equipment maintenance readiness levels were consistently rated as showing a significant drop immediately upon returning from the peace operation, followed by a steady increase in readiness over the next two months (see figure 5 below). During the interviews some soldiers, primarily non-commissioned officers and junior officers, consistently mentioned maintenance as a major problem even four to six months after return to home station. The majority of those interviewed disagreed, as does most of the empirical data assessed in part IV (a). This seeming conflict can best be explained by the increased command attention normally given to equipment upon a deployment return. Also, upon return from a peace operation or any other deployment, most units undergo detailed equipment inspections by

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52 Nizolak, 33. [This 1999 testimony contradicts the testimony earlier noted by those leaders now at the National Training Center, primarily because of the heavy personnel turnover. However, the Colonel does confirm that skills are degraded and if a unit were to have to reply to a regional conflict directly after returning from a peace operation, they would probably be lacking in skills].
direct support maintenance experts who can normally find discrepancies that are usually unseen by the average soldier. 53

Overall, the data found in this subjective study is just that: subjective. Drawing conclusions based on this study is difficult. Nevertheless, morale and esprit de corps can be affected if young enlisted soldiers feel their equipment is not combat ready and if they

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53 Center for Lessons Learned, Department of the Army, 1995.
feel they are spending too much time fixing equipment as opposed to training to their combat Mission Essential Task List.

**Personnel:** The increased frequency and variety of military interventions since the end of the Cold War have brought changes in the causes, management, and operational significance of psychological stress on soldiers. Research has found that all of the types of operations—combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and government support—conducted since 1989 have imposed stress.\(^5^4\)

Anecdotal evidence questioning the effect of peace operations on combat readiness continues to grow in the media. Stories in a *Washington Times* report stated that: “Soldiers [in Bosnia] constantly question the nature of peace operations. They feel the jobs are not skill-specific to the military.”\(^5^5\) A 1996 Parameters study conducted by research psychologists contend that a soldier’s principal source of stress during the Vietnam war was a sense of betrayal by his own leaders of values he understood to be the moral foundation of the war. Post Cold-War campaigns have not entailed prolonged combat, but they have imposed new kinds of stress, similar to those found in Vietnam. Sudden transitions from peace to war, and interventions with ambiguous objectives, can make it difficult for soldiers to develop clear attitudes about the values underlying a campaign.\(^5^6\)

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia provides an example of the problems described above. This operation led to complaints from enlisted men about:

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\(^5^5\) Nizolak, 33.

\(^5^6\) Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 80.
the lack of mission-relevant resources, specifically poor maps and other intelligence materials, inadequate information about the aspects of the mission being executed by other units, and insufficient numbers of interpreters and troops to carry out the numerous missions assigned. Lack of information about the progress of the expedition as a whole was one facet of the troops’ perception that their commanders did not trust them. An order that male and female soldiers were to sleep in separate tents was also perceived by many as lack of trust and in addition, it impugned their professionalism. They knew that soldiers of both sexes had shared tents in Desert Storm.  

The cumulative effect of deficiencies in trust, resources, and information was to create a sense of failure and disillusionment. Such sentiments did not reflect well on command in two ways: First, the soldiers had not failed. They had maintained their poise and discipline, provided a measure of order, and assured that in most of the country the mission of alleviating the famine was accomplished. Because a sense of failure can sap morale, erode cohesion, and possibly compromise the future psychological readiness of the units, it is essential that soldiers have accurate feedback on their performance. Second, failure is certainly possible, but when it occurs it should be handled constructively, as an opportunity to learn.  

In Croatia from 1992-1993, combat was not part of the intervention so the participants did not have to cope with the psychological effects of killing enemy soldiers or the death or injury of comrades. Nonetheless there was often an undercurrent of danger, and some soldiers experienced fatigue, filth, and hunger even if not on the scale encountered in combat:

57 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 83.  
58 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 84.
At the end of 1992 the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) deployed to Zagreb, Croatia, to provide medical services for the 20,000 members of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia. The 212th MASH was the core unit of a medical task force with a full range of medical capabilities. Though there was often gunfire nearby, and any unpaved ground had to be treated as infested with mines, the unit was on an airport protected by United Nations’ combat units. No members of the 212th MASH Task Force engaged in combat or became casualties.59

The mental strain encountered by many of the medical unit’s members came because leaders vetoed suggestions to offer humanitarian treatment to injured Yugoslavs or to send medical teams into the field to treat United Nation personnel. Among the attachments to 212th MASH was a mental health specialist from the United States Army Medical Research Unit-Europe. He observed no apparent symptoms of stress among the troops who deployed to Croatia. However, some soldiers had witnessed a major medical resource standing idle while sick and injured people suffered. They knew their own time and abilities were being wasted. Even in wartime, medical units are allowed, if not held accountable to offer medical assistance to the enemy if possible.60

In Haiti between 1994 and 1996 during Operation Uphold Democracy, many combat soldiers perceived the mission to be pointless because it was unrelated to their military qualifications and seemed to be excessively prolonged.

Several enlisted personnel expressed disillusionment because they did not think the activities of the Army did anything to improve the lives or prospects of the Haitians. Some leaders were unable to provide their subordinates with information that could have convinced them that their contributions were important or that their discomforts served a purpose. Some junior soldiers believed that the emphasis on force protection, which included a requirement to wear complete body armor in hot weather, was unnecessary. A relatively large number of soldiers and junior leaders complained of being micromanaged, which conveyed to them a lack of trust. A persistent theme in many soldiers’ comments was that they were treated like children.61

59 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 84.
60 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 86
61 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 87.
Some complained that senior commanders inappropriately treated the operations as a maximum effort that transcended any personal needs of their subordinates. Specifically, the soldiers were forced to deploy when they had only joined their units a few days before and had not had time to settle their families, and soldiers who had children born during the deployment were not permitted to return to be with their wives for the birth process. Most soldiers and marines understand when they joined the armed services, that they would spend time from home and would indeed miss their chances sometimes at seeing the birth of their children or celebrating in the family’s birthdays. However, the increased number of operations coupled with the inability for commanders and politicians to prioritize the importance of each mission most assuredly added stress to the junior enlisted and officer ranks.

In the October 2001 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*, a writer interviews several soldiers deployed to Bosnia in Operation Provide Promise. One lieutenant was somewhat disillusioned by his trip there:

He had been trained as an infantryman to close with the enemy and fight, and instead now finds himself doing the work of a street-corner diplomat. It was not just that he felt individually unsuited for the role; he said that the entire brigade of 3500 strong had lost its war–fighting ability and would require six months of retraining upon returning home.  

Mid-level and general officers also have felt somewhat disillusioned by the frequency and seemingly unorganized non-mission focused peace operation. A captain who was interviewed by the *Atlantic Monthly* journalist, William Langewiesche, told him “I grew up with a whole vision of Ronald Reagan, our military, the resurgence of

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62 Kirkland, Halverson, and Bliese, 87.
American power in the world. That’s kind of what drew me to the military. Then the wall came down, and its like ‘Who’s the enemy?’”  

Even the base camps themselves were very tense even though nobody was killed. A young sergeant complained to Langewiesche that:

“every time he went to the field on a patrol, there had to be an observer-controller available to report back everything he saw to the higher headquarters.” A captain tried to explain the need for the observer. He blamed it on the need for information. He was the acting ‘mayor’ of the base and he had dark circles under his eyes. He said, “Once the systems for providing information were put into place, they demanded to be fed, which in turn increased the hunger for information – a snowballing effect.” That he said was why he was about to quit the Army.

A general officer by the name of Major General Walter “Skip” Sharp, who had been sent to Bosnia for a full year rather than the usually six month deployment cycle, implied to Langewiesche that “the division as a whole was having a hard time staying on track during the Bosnia deployment. It was not only with this Bosnia mission but also with the upcoming tour in Kosovo-two assignments that between them now threatened to undermine the war readiness of the entire 3rd ID, at least by the Army’s conventional standards.” Sharp’s job was not to argue with those standards but try to meet them. Not only was it hard to train to new standards but equally difficult to try to measure them.

If the most senior of the senior ‘brass’ second guess or have second thoughts about a particular mission, then one must expect that the younger less experienced junior enlisted troops must be suffering the same emotional lows. Troops are affected not only by the continuing boredom and unfocused mission statement, but by the fact that they see their war fighting capabilities melting away as the peace operation moves on. This

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64 Langewiesche, 80.
65 Langewiesche, 71.
66 Langewiesche, 56.
process in turn, weakens the confidence or unit cohesion needed for units to thrive on in a wartime scenario.

All of the psychological studies remain anecdotal at best because the crescendo of peace operations has tripled over the last decade with few systematic studies completed for the military to adjust. However, because of the high tempo and after reviewing many of the testimonies from those that served on peace operations over the past decade, the perception does suggest that there might be a problem on the horizon when the United States eventually fights a major war. Even if the young enlisted ‘perceive’ that the military is playing peacekeeper and ‘baby sitter’ as opposed to fighting wars, reenlistments might continue to drop and the morale and cohesion that is needed to win a war will corrode, leaving the armed forces in jeopardy of either losing the next war or winning it by incurring excessive casualties.

**PART V**

[Conclusions]

Nizolak concludes in his study that “most respondents to the survey reported a degradation of combat skills at the company or higher level, a need for additional time to prepare for combat related deployments, and inadequate time allocated to restore combat training to its original level. In addition, the absence of collective Mission Essential Task List skill training for an average of five months would likely spell disaster for a unit required to deploy immediately to a major regional conflict.”67 On the other hand, observers and controllers at the Army’s Combat Training Centers such as

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67 Nizolak, 34.
Lieutenant Colonel Zajac noted that his unit, while deployed Bosnia, became very “tight–knit” and close. Although his armor unit was unable to train to its wartime Mission Essential Task List objectives, there were positive tradeoffs. The smaller unit leadership training was enhanced. Zajac did not consider his unit’s deployment a total failure when it came to training. Creative training ideas were implemented: firing ranges were constructed, leadership classes presented, and cross training carried out by different military specialty personnel.

Overall, peace operations have degraded the ability of the United States’ armed forces to remain at peak level in combat readiness. Training for war suffers along with equipment maintenance and personnel turbulence. The data also illustrates that unit morale is sometimes weakened which degrades the intangible unit cohesion factor that is ever so important in combat. This more qualitative measurement might not show up until too late, when the armed forces are already engaged in war. Lack of training that can be substantiated by empirical data can erode a soldier’s confidence in his equipment, leadership, and ‘battlemind’. Something needs to be done to either curtail the number of operations or better prepare our forces for increased operations. All of this needs to be looked into and recommendations made. The data collected leaves one to respond: “So

68 The budget for peacekeeping operations within the entire United Nations has fluctuated significantly in the 1990’s. From a $0.4 billion budget in 1991, the cost rose to an all-time high of $3.6 billion in 1993. The budget decreased in the latter part of the decade and dropped to $1.0 billion at the end of 1998. However, the cost increased to $2.5 billion in both 2000 and 2001. The United States continues to play a major role in many of the larger peace operations around the world. In Bosnia, nearly 4,000 troops are sent to Bosnia on a 6-month rotation basis. The problem that lies for the United States is not just the degrading of combat readiness but how to pay for it. Senator Strom Thurmond stated “the services are not receiving the funds they need to perform their missions, maintain appropriate quality of life for their people, and they cannot fund modernization which is crucial to future success.” The Senator continued with: “The pace America’s armed forces are now operating at exceeds that of operations at the height of the Cold War, yet they are being funded at lower levels.”
what?” or “What now?” Part VI will explore measures that can be taken to restore our forces back to high levels of moral and overall readiness.

**PART VI**

**Recommendations**

Part VI will conclude the paper with recommended solutions to this debate. So what if peace operations do in fact degrade combat readiness? What is the military and civilian leadership ready to do in order to improve it? Does the United States increase or decrease peace operations? Former President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 initiative established guidance for when the United States should engage in peace operations but have these guidelines really been followed? With new presidential leadership, will these guidelines be thrown out or vigorously pursued? If the fast paced tempo continues, what does the United States’ military leadership do to enhance training? How do they ensure that their units get refurbishment and are ready to fight the next war upon their immediate return from a peace operation? Finally this paper will examine the option of forming a peace operation Army, or a creating a new Joint Task Force staff whose only job is to prosecute United States’ involved peace operations.

**Recommendations**:

(1). Study and abide by President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 dated February 22, 1996. This important document lists a number of guidelines and factors that were to be taken into consideration before the United States would vote in favor of peace operation intervention and what procedures to follow in case the United
States actually commits troops. Highlights of the policy directive include:

because peace operations can promote peace and even prevent the United States from having to engage in war, the United States recognizes that peace operations provide a "force multiplier" in the United States’ effort to promote peace and stability around the world. The directive policy notes, however,

in improving the United States’ capabilities for peace operations, the United States will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving United States' objectives. If United States’ participation in a peace operation were to interfere with basic military strategy, namely fighting nearly two simultaneous conflicts, the United States would place national interest uppermost, meaning it would maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations would therefore be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of United States foreign policy.

This approach appears very reasonable and both clear and concise to both the United Nations and the countries the United States would assist. The directive goes on:

It is not United States’ policy to seek to expand either the number of United

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69 *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on reforming multilateral peace operations, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25)* was released on the Worldwide Web by the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in February 1996. The secret PDD 25 is still unavailable for public scrutiny. The directive publishes guidelines that should be adhered to in order to both reduce the cost and the number of peace operations in which the United States involves itself. The policy directive addresses six major issues of reform and improvement: (1), Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operation to support-both when the US votes in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when the US participates in such operations with US troops. (2), Reducing US costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage the US pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves. The guidelines stipulate a peacekeeping assessment reduction goal from 37.5% to 25%. (3), Defining clearly the US policy regarding the command and control of American military forces for UN peace operations. The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of US forces but may, as Commander-in-Chief, place US forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests. (4), Reforming and improving the UN’s capability to manage peace operations, which includes steps to strengthen the management of peace operations. (5), Improve the way in which the US government manages and funds peace operations. The policy directive creates a new “shared responsibility” approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not US troops are involved. (6), Create better forms of cooperation between the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the American people. *(PDD 25)*

Nations’ peace operations or United States’ involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of United States’ policy on peacekeeping.  

If both the President and Congress use this approach, the armed forces might be able to make time to both train for both war and peace operations. If the number of peace operations were reduced due to the above guidelines, the military would probably be able to react and adjust to this new genre of warfare and make lasting and important changes that would benefit United States foreign policy.

(2). Have all equipment returning from peace operations report a readiness of C-5 immediately. This will ensure these units get the priority needed to fund and prioritize their rebuilding phase. Part IV of this paper assessed data that established equipment returning from peace operations took from one to six months to recover back to combat readiness status. This lengthy delay could become pivotal if that same unit were to be called upon immediately to participate in a regional conflict. By ensuring all returning units shared combat C-5 status (the highest priority allowed) on all of their returning equipment, these units would be able to receive spare parts and replacement equipment in a much quicker time ensuring they were able to reconstitute at a far greater pace than is presently permitted. Also, because of this priority, a unit would be able to repair equipment before they actually returned to their home base, ensuring that when they did return home, the maximum amount of leave and personal recovery time could be afforded every serviceman.

(3). Increase the amount of manpower necessary to fulfill the Quadrennial Defense Review requirements. If the armed forces manning levels were formulated based on the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001), increasing the number of peace operations that linger on for years can understandably devastate the morale and training levels of present units. There simply would not be enough manpower to fulfill all the goals to be accomplished. This paper cannot justify exact manpower increases but the fact remains that if manpower levels are prescribed to fulfill certain well accepted missions, namely two nearly simultaneous conflicts and then have several on going peace operations added, the present force structures would be incapable of prosecuting all the commitments. Either reduce the number of missions required by the military or increase the manning levels to match this need.

(4). Increase the budget dramatically in order to be able to maintain the increase in both forces and equipment. If recommendation number three is taken into consideration, obviously a larger budget must be allocated to the Defense Department. However, if manning levels are not prescribed, budget increases will have to be implemented for the following reasons:

a. Budget increases would allow component commanders to pay troops more money for days that they are deployed over an extended period of time, specifically 180 days. Increased pay would tempt more troops to deploy as well as help resolve family problems that usually occur do to a serviceman’s absence. Today many troops extend on deployments to many overseas locations because of the increase in Cost of Living Allowances. Although most men and women do not join the services
because of large paychecks, this increase would offset some of the
sacrifices being made.

b. Commanders could afford to spend more money on replacement parts
for their equipment. If equipment is returned to combat readiness
status sooner, more formidable combat training could be conducted to
improve those combat skills lost while deployed on a peace
operation.

(5). Form an entirely new service, CINC, or Joint Task Force Staff whose only
duty is to fulfill the United States’ requirements with peace operations.

a. The monetary requirements to form an entirely new service will
probably not come to realization in at least two to three decades.
Fiscal restraint and balanced budgets have been the norm over
the last two decades. The amount of money it would take to
format, train, and equip an entirely new service would be
extraordinary.

b. With the creation of CINC North America only months away,
an aspired newly formed CINC Peace Operations now seems
doubtful. Not only would fiscal restraints delay creation of a
new CINC, but also, with the present mood of most Americans
seeking revenge for the horrors of September 11, 2001, public
pressure might force spending for the war against terrorism.

c. The only conceivable answer may be to form a permanent Joint
Task Force Staff, attached to a present CINC whose only job
would be to prepare and develop plans for peace operations and how to employ United States troops if possible. This idea would be costly but the money earned by not making the same mistakes over again due to an experienced staff compared to a staff formed after the fact would help defray the cost. A staff whose constant day to day task is to evaluate, plan, and execute peace operations would seem invaluable, especially if the rapid pace of United States’ involvement in peace operations continues. A Joint Task Force Staff could be assigned to the newly renamed CINC Joint Forces Command whose job it is to write, explain, and teach joint doctrine to all the services. What better way to write or invent peace operation doctrine than being attached to their CINC whose job it is is to teach doctrine? Both CINC and JTF staff would be able to communicate directly with each other, review after action reports from returning peace operation units and subsequently create peace operation doctrine.

The above recommendations provide only a short list of ideas for such a young new genre of war fighting. Because of the rapid increase in peace operations and the lack of suitable, empirical data required to make change, continued studies need to be conducted on all returning units to determine the extent of the problem. Only with further study can leadership hope to have units train better for peace operations while
they retain their skills in their war fighting capabilities. The United States has faced predicaments much worse than the one with which we are engaged. Through perseverance, the armed services will be able to overcome the high tempo of peace operation deployments while successfully executing their assigned mission.
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