Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership

by Jeffrey Simon

A nation’s effective integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an arduous, time-consuming, and resource-intensive task. The nine countries now aspiring to Alliance membership should heed the problems that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have encountered since accession and redouble their efforts on defense integration and civil-military reforms in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program.

During the past year, MAP has become a more versatile instrument for forging defense and civil-military reform. With further strengthening, the process will help not only to inform Alliance decisions on choosing new members at the 2002 Prague Summit but also to ease post-accession challenges for invitees.

Upon accession to the Alliance, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were disqualified from important bilateral assistance programs as NATO shifted attention to the nine MAP partners. After the next round of invitations, the United States and NATO need to keep the new allies eligible for and engaged in assistance programs after accession.

The first MAP cycle (1999–2000) put NATO and its partners on a steep learning curve as they sought to implement a new and untested Annual National Plan program. This program, a core element in membership action planning, established standards but issued no assessments. In marked contrast, augmented NATO teams dealing with all aspects of MAP rationalized the planning process and generated real assessments that partners considered fair and frank during the second MAP cycle (2000–2001). MAP partners view the third cycle (2001–2002) progress reports as playing a critical role in the next enlargement decision.

Indeed, while allied governments will rely heavily on MAP performance to begin membership negotiations, NATO should link the date of actual accession to the completion of specific (to be determined) core requirements from each of the five chapters.

The MAP process has positively influenced the growth of interministerial coordination within MAP countries and enhanced international cooperation among those countries.

MAP has become an increasingly important tool for member governments to build public support for NATO as well as parliamentary support for necessary resources. NATO-related educational programs are necessary to help MAP partners implement public information strategies to build public opinion support for the Alliance.

NATO and the European Union need to make further efforts to help MAP members delineate the relationship between the two organizations because some partners are finding it difficult to establish priorities for NATO and the European Union.

Partnership for Peace

When NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, few had any notion of how important and essential PFP would become. Many aspiring members were disappointed with PFP, perceiving it as a “policy for postponement” of NATO enlargement. In response to persistent pressures from partners to join, NATO produced a Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995 that outlined Alliance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Report Type</th>
<th>Dates Covered (from... to)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00 Oct 2001</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Title and Subtitle**
Roadmap to NATO Accession Preparing for membership

**Author(s)**

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**

**Distribution/Availability Statement**
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**Supplementary Notes**
The original document contains color images.

**Abstract**

**Subject Terms**

**Report Classification**
unclassified

**Classification of this page**
unclassified

**Classification of Abstract**
unclassified

**Limitation of Abstract**
UU

**Number of Pages**
8
In defining what the aspirants needed to accomplish on the path to membership, it was designed to incorporate lessons learned in the accession discussions with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. MAP has four essential components:

- tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that identifies key targets spanning the political/economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal dimensions (dubbed “chapters” in MAP parlance) of Alliance membership
- a feedback mechanism by which NAC members and the partner can jointly assess progress
- a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance from NATO members to the partner
- enhanced defense planning at the country level that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets.

Just as the Partnership for Peace has matured into a fundamental program not originally envisioned by its architects, the MAP process contains even greater potential. Though tailored to specific situations, MAP provides an authoritative, jointly agreed set of targets for wide-ranging political and civil-military reforms.

The Newest Members

Since their accession on March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have demonstrated how unprepared their armed forces were for functional integration into NATO, although cooperation with the Alliance within the Partnership for Peace was fruitful in terms of training and education. Participation in the Bosnia-based NATO operations helped, but the Kosovo conflict, occurring within days of accession, further challenged the new members.

Since joining NATO, all three members have engaged in strategic reviews of their armed forces; as a result Poland will reduce forces to 150,000 by 2006, Hungary to 37,500, and the Czech Republic, still engaged in review, to 38,000–40,000. All share the objective of creating more professional, mobile, and flexible armed forces but find that obstacles to political-military integration remain in civil-military relations. Also, there remains a need to increase the number of NATO-competent, English-trained civilians and military officers to staff numerous posts in the Alliance, as well as the national structures that cooperate with NATO and provide appropriate protection of classified information. For example, Hungary still has difficulty assigning officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to NATO commands and headquarters. Of the 59 positions allocated to Hungary in Southern Regional Commands—its strategic and highest priority—it has assigned only 41 persons, or 69 percent.

Poland. Domestic political pressures in Poland following NATO accession have accelerated force reductions rather disturbingly and undermined force goal implementation. But NATO inattention also has been to blame. Whereas it criticized Polish civil-military relations before accession, NATO ignored them after accession, and relations eroded. Since joining the Alliance, the Polish defense ministry and general staff have maintained two separate lines of command; consequently, the general staff link to the political process weakened. Also, once in the Alliance, Poland found that NATO was hesitant to provide advice to allies. In the absence of such advice, the Polish armed forces 2006 plan (recently completed) was driven more by economic and political exigencies than by defense planning requirements. Despite allocating 2.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, Poland’s rapid deployment units continue to absorb the...
majority of its defense resources and starve its national forces.

Hungary. Meeting force goals and deploying and maintaining armed forces abroad presented challenges for Hungary. Initially, it had difficulty with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), and then with a Kosovo Force (KFOR) guard and security battalion of 350 personnel that it sent to Pristina in July 1999. As a consequence, Hungary began a strategic review after joining the Alliance. In the first phase, the strategic review calls for reductions in the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) to 45,000 (including 7,500 civilians) by 2003. To achieve its deployment requirements, Hungary is to increase (from 35 to 70 percent) the manning level of its combat formations with volunteer reserves rather than conscripts (in part because 9-month conscription introduced in 1997 is to be reduced to 6 months in 2002 again). In the second phase (2004–2007), HDF plans to improve training, and during the third phase (after 2007) to begin acquisition. Because it allocates only 1.6 percent of GDP for defense, the test of Hungary’s strategic review implementation will concentrate on how to reduce and restructure its “reverse pyramid” officer corps, attract and retain contract soldiers, find resources to finance the reserve volunteers, and utilize costly 6-month conscripts effectively.

Czech Republic. While spending 2.2 percent of GDP on defense, the Czech Republic shares many of Hungary’s problems. Human and resource constraints remain evident in that the Czechs have assigned only one of the five officer and two or three of the NCO slots allocated to them at Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. (The Poles maintain four officers and one NCO, while the Hungarians have two officers at Norfolk.) Because a National Security Strategy (NSS) was not in place, two major factors continue to undermine the Czech Republic capacity to meet its NATO obligations. The decision made years ago to acquire an excessive number (72) of L–159 subsonic aircraft coupled with the downsizing expenses to resettle officers have dried up defense funds, so that its NATO training requirements remain unfulfilled. To address the crisis within the defense ministry and general staff establishment, which has ballooned to 3,500 personnel with the addition of background institutions, Prime Minister Milos Zeman in May 2001 relieved Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy. He appointed Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, who immediately replaced defense ministry deputies and tasked them with developing a concept in 90 days for developing a totally professional force in 4 to 6 years.

In sum, the defense planning capabilities of new members have not improved perceptibly since accession, and in some cases have eroded.

MAP Progress Report

During the first MAP cycle, aspirants attempted openness, but they were overly ambitious. In the second cycle, while ANPs were more sober and realistic, they remained more ambitious than resources permitted. The second MAP cycle witnessed a growing community effort by aspirants to find more creative, tailored solutions to meet their individual “national” situations. Not only is this diversity seen as a positive development, compared to the “cloning” that was evident in the first cycle, but more generally the MAP process is ushering in a security environment that is much more transparent and cooperative than ever before.

Former Warsaw Pact

Despite strong support for NATO and relatively high defense expenditures (2.2 and 2.8 percent of GDP respectively), Romania and Bulgaria have many of the same problems as new NATO members in dealing with the vestiges of the Warsaw Pact culture, reducing and restructuring large and heavy armed forces, and dealing with the challenges of NATO defense planning. During 1999, the United States performed defense reform assessments for Romania and Bulgaria (the so-called Kievenaar assessments), and their 1999 Annual National Plans benefited from this experience.

Romania. A number of lessons were learned by Romania from the initial MAP cycle. First, because the Romanian late budget approval cycle was not synchronized with the NATO planning cycle, it did not have sufficient money for the first 5 months of 2000. Second, because there were numerous overlaps in the planning period, Romania adopted the NATO planning cycle in ANP 2001. Third, since the ANP 2000 objectives exceeded available resources, they had to be scaled back. Fourth, Romanian efforts to correct these problems included establishing an Interdepartmental Committee for NATO Integration at the state secretary level chaired by the foreign ministry and a defense planning council and led by the defense minister.

Romania’s main achievements during ANP 2000 include improving domestic coordination mechanisms, training 158 officers and civilians in NATO and member schools, further downsizing of 2,020 military personnel (1,256 officers, 764 NCOs and warrant officers) and 1,200 civilians, counseling and training for released personnel, and continued support to SFOR and KFOR.

Outlook. As of early 2001, the new Romanian government revised priorities include:— Creating a fair and transparent career development and promotion system. Since many foreign-trained officers, who need to be retained, have lost patience, the government wants to have a promotions board operational by June 2001. Future general officers need to achieve STANAG—English language level-3 so that they can operate in international units, since Romania must keep 180 troops trained to rotate and fill requirements.— Developing more realistic defense planning. As of March 2001, of the 84 PGs Romania initially assumed, only 9 have been fully implemented and 61 partially implemented, and 14 have been postponed until after 2004.— Restructuring armed forces as a result of disbanding a number of units. The 1999 Kievenaar defense reform assessment provided 3 troop variants—140,000, 112,000, and 85,000—for Romania’s Plan 2004. Though Romania planned a target of 112,000, its forces are now at 97,800 because its resources could not sustain the plan. Romanian wartime strength will be scaled back from 370,000 to 230,000. Its current 446 flag officer positions must be reduced to a total of 140 by 2004, at which time only 82 currently serving flag officers will remain.— Implementing Air Space Operations Control and acquiring a military digital communications system that is consistent with STANAG specifications.

Bulgaria. June 2001 elections resulted in the first Bulgarian government to serve its full 4-year mandate since the democratic transition. Bulgaria has achieved sustained economic growth over the past 3 years and maintains good bilateral relations with neighbors. Also, Bulgaria participates in several

SPECIAL REPORT

3
forms of regional cooperation: South-East European Defense Ministerial; Black Sea Naval Force Cooperation; hosting the brigade headquarters of Multinational Peace Forces South-Eastern Europe in Plovdiv; establishing a multinational Engineer Task Force; and participating in a regional information network for crisis management.

Similar to Romania’s experience with MAP, Bulgaria found that its budget cycle was not synchronized with the Alliance. It also discovered during the second cycle that plans needed to be more realistic and consistent with resource availability. As a result, Bulgaria is emphasizing practical implementation and maintaining a better dialogue with NATO. It wants to establish specific objectives with concrete timeframes and to avoid duplication with the European Union. Bulgaria learned that it needs to develop a new model of economic accountability, as well as new laws on the exchange of information and on protecting classified information and security.

Even though it has a defense budget of 2.8 percent of GDP for 2001, which is to be sustained through 2003, Bulgaria realized that a mismatch exists between the risks that it faces in the Balkans and the resources that the country can allocate to defense. It has also learned that it lacks capabilities not only for making assessments but also for prioritizing MAP activities. In May 2000, Bulgaria introduced a planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) that prepared the 2001 defense budget comprising 21 programs. These programs are to be optimized and reduced to 12 in 2002. Bulgaria has established reform priorities. The first priority is to restructure and downsize its armed forces while achieving interoperability in the key areas of air defense and air traffic management; command, control, communications, and computers; logistics (including host nation support); and education and training (including language). A second priority is to modernize and rearm, which led to the creation in April 2001 of a new Armaments Policy Directorate in the defense ministry.

Outlook. During the second ANP cycle, Bulgaria learned that its personnel management and career development program for officers and NCOs needed special attention, including using foreign-trained officers more effectively. Defense planners have proposed legislative authorization of personnel ceilings by category and eventually by rank that will provide greater parliamentary control of the armed forces. This is particularly important because the Bulgarian armed forces comprised 81,500 troops in 1999, then downsized to 71,778 in 2000, and will be further reduced to 45,000 by 2004, with an ultimate goal of creating a fully professional force by 2015. Stated simply, Bulgaria’s present officer corps (13,899) is too large, while its NCO corps is too small. To fix this reverse-pyramid problem, which was highlighted in Partnership Goal G 0028 (Review of Force Structures), the current ratio of senior/junior officers of 54/46 percent needs to change to 45/55 percent by 2004. Bulgaria also needs to reform the active forces by restructuring personnel in the rapid reaction formations and in the reserve forces, whose strengths are not sustainable in terms of training, equipment, or budget. Defense planners are attempting to identify 1,000 key positions and establish a database on personnel and career development. Their intention is to train people for those posts, but planners find it difficult to identify potential leaders 5 years in advance.

In 2000, Bulgaria accepted 82 PGs (of which 47 are MAP related) and allocated $21 million for their implementation in 2001. NATO, however, at the March–April 2001 19+1 progress report session, suggested that Bulgaria further adjust some of its plans to bring objectives and priorities in line with financial resources. The Bulgarians find the OCC useful in preparing forces for NATO non-article V (that is, out-of-area) activities and are completing PARP questionnaires for the Pool of Forces Database. They lack, however, essential NATO documents and criteria for assessment. The Bulgarians consider the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative useful to bring armed forces reform closer to membership requirements, but they desire more information to avoid wasting resources. Finally, since the second MAP cycle progress reports for Bulgaria’s defense/military reforms (so-called chapter 2) were drawn from the PARP assessment, and no PARP assessment is planned for next year, Bulgaria would like a MAP progress review on all criteria in 2002 as a basis for the enlargement decision at the Prague summit.

The Baltic States

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were members of the Warsaw Pact as Soviet republics, but not independent states. Unlike Romania and Bulgaria, the three Baltic states have had to build state institutions and defense establishments from scratch. Also, since the populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are so small—1.5, 2.6, and 3.6 million respectively—they are building combined military institutions such as the joint Baltic Battalion, Baltic Defense College, and BALTNET radar system. During 1998, the United States performed defense reform (Kievenaar) assessments for all three Baltic countries, and their 1999 ANPs reflected this experience.

Estonia. During the second cycle of MAP (2000–2001), Estonia’s Parliament (Riigikogu) approved an Emergency Preparedness Act (September 2000), a National Security Strategy (NSS) on March 6, 2001, and a National Military Strategy on February 28, 2001. Reforms in Estonia’s defense structure included the creation of the Army Staff and further implementation of PG G 0028 to optimize the Estonian Defense Force (EDF) structure. The Prime Minister chairs the governmental Commission on NATO Integration. Estonia’s PGs were also incorporated in its Annual National Plan, and all ANP goals were coordinated with the defense ministry. Defense ministry ANP goals are reviewed quarterly by the ministry’s Secretary General, and those under other ministries every 6 months, with the objective of linking goals with available resources.

In its second ANP, Estonian efforts on the political/economic front (chapter 1) included final approval of its NSS and continued participation in NATO and UN peace operations, as well as the border monitoring efforts in Georgia of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Meanwhile, its efforts to build domestic support for the Alliance saw an increase from 53 to 66 percent in favorable public opinion from 2000 to 2001. Regarding defense and military issues (chapter 2), the government approved the National Military Strategy; forming the basis for optimizing the EDF structure, reorganized the General Staff into a Joint Staff, and formed an Army Staff. In January 2001, the government established a Logistics Center and EDF Medical Center, on March 20, 2001, it decided to create the Estonian Rapid Reaction Battalions, which should be operational by 2005.

Outlook. Estonia’s priorities now include completing (by September 2001) a Review of
Lessons learned in the second legal system, which prohibits long-term training of its territorial defense forces and defense plans for four combat brigades, implemented proceeding through Parliament. It has also new Peacetime National Defense Act, which is drafted domestic legislation in the form of a on legal issues (chapter 5), the government tion will be paid to information security. Lastly, 1, 2001. During the third cycle, special atten- December 20, 2000) the Security Institution rity (chapter 4), the Riigikogu adopted (on legal issues as well as how to use MAP to national plans better with NATO interoperabil- standards within Latvia’s legal framework on physical and personnel security and recognizes the need to develop further communications security. In the legal area, the government has approved the Law on National Security, drafted laws on mobilization and military personnel, drafted regulations on armed forces procurement and logistics, and analyzed the legal aspects of NATO membership. Even so, Latvia faces major challenges in further streamlining its Partnership Goals, Individual Partner Plans, and Annual National Plans. It needs to acquire and translate more NATO documents, improve internal institutional and external Baltic states coordination, and allot more time to evaluate NATO proposals for PGs (since they had to postpone seven of them).

Latvia. Lessons learned in the second cycle ANP 2000 include how to coordinate national plans better with NATO interoperability requirements as well as how to use MAP to develop self-defense capabilities and prepare for membership. The Prime Minister heads an interagency NATO Integration Council. Latvia has become more realistic about its priorities; its ANP 2000 had 22 activity areas, including 277 activities, while its third cycle, ANP 2001, contains only 18 activity areas and 85 activities. During the second cycle, Latvia developed resource-based plans for each activity, monitored monthly by an ANP Implementation Control System that proved to be effective in that 245 activities (88 percent) were completed, 19 (7 percent) were cancelled, and 13 (5 percent) postponed.

During the second cycle (ANP 2000), work on political and economic issues (chapter 1) focused on naturalizing Latvia’s Russian minority (nearly 40 percent of the population), cooperating with Russia cross-border, and building public support for NATO (now at 57 percent). In the defense and military area (chapter 2), the Partnership Goals and Individual Partner Program activities were integrated within ANP 2000. Latvia introduced a PPBS, significantly improved the quality of life for the military, improved the personnel management and education systems, and began to develop logistics and procurement systems that should become operational by 2002.

Outlook. Latvia will achieve a new threshold of capability in 2003, when its defense budget is expected to reach 2 percent of GDP. At that time all of its forces should be able to operate with NATO on Latvian soil; its rapid reaction force will be able to participate in operations outside Latvia; and it will build specialized capabilities in peace support operations (PSOs), including military police, divers, and medical units. In the security sphere made progress in developing its command, control, and communications system, new force structure, professional military education, training and doctrine, logistics, infrastructure, airspace management, and quality of life for the military.

During the third cycle, Lithuania will focus on the personnel and career management system, personnel and physical security, constitutional and legislation requirements for NATO membership, and public support for defense. Of the 66 activities in ANP 2001, 5 have already been implemented, and progress has been registered in 43 others. So far, Lithuania has implemented nine PGs, completed the local area network for the defense staff, established the National Crisis Center, and made progress in building the defense communication network.

Outlook. Lithuania’s highest priority MAP goals emphasize the need to provide realistic and resource-based ANP tasks. The 2001 defense budget was pegged at 1.95 percent of GDP to accomplish the tasks that include the further development of the armed forces and implementation of a 3-year planning, programming, and budgeting system. The NAC progress report of March 29, 2001, has been immensely helpful in reviewing programs and modifying priorities. This report criticized Lithuania’s:

- legal system, which prohibits long-term contracts for procurements. As a consequence, the Seimas Security and Defense Committee approved an updated law that would permit 3-year contracts.
- defense plans for four combat brigades, which were too ambitious. For that reason, Lithuania now plans to have one high-readiness brigade by 2006. By 2002, it will maintain one battalion (without rotation capacity) for PSO deployment and further develop logistics capabilities for sustainability.
- training of its territorial defense forces and reserves. Lithuania is seeking advice to address this problem.

Lithuania has learned that the ANP progress report has been a useful device to help shape national plans.

In summary, all three Baltic states have found PARP helpful in their force planning, and they found the PGs especially useful in aligning scarce resources among competing priorities. In addition, they have found the trilateral Baltic cooperation both necessary and valuable because of the small size of their forces and the fact that all three essentially share the same goals. Finally, mentoring partnerships
with NATO members and partners have been extremely helpful: Sweden and Finland (which are not in MAP) for Estonia; and Poland, Denmark, and America for Lithuania.

New States

Slovakia and Slovenia, with respective populations of 5.6 and 2 million, face the challenges of constructing new defense institutions (a ministry, general staff, and armed forces), with only 1.89 and 1.45 percent of GDP allocated for defense respectively. These new states also face the challenge of building popular understanding of and support for NATO, which presently stands at about 50 percent. The United States first performed defense reform assessments for Slovakia and Slovenia during 2000; thus, their 1999 ANPs did not benefit from this influence and experience.

Slovakia. To the new state of Slovakia, MAP is more than a mere technical tool in that it has enhanced political contacts with NATO, enabled Slovakia to assess the state of its preparedness, and generated a healthy tension for Slovak parliamentarians to understand the need to provide necessary human and material resources. The April 20, 2001, NAC progress review session positively assessed that, during the second MAP cycle, Slovakia accomplished the following:

- amended its constitution to remove remaining accession impediments
- adopted a Security Strategy in May 2001
- maintained good relations with neighbors
- acceded to the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
- removed antipersonnel mines and SS–23s from its arsenal
- stabilized its macroeconomy and increased foreign investments
- established a National Security Office and drafted a new law on protecting classified information.

Outlook. The NAC review session has underscored what Slovakia needs to do during the third MAP cycle. Slovakia intends to:

- strengthen public support for NATO integration (now at 52 percent)
- adopt a formal Defense and Military Strategy
- prepare a Long Term Concept for Building Armed Forces—2010
- restructure the defense ministry for more effective defense planning, crisis, and human resources management.

This process began with the integration of the general staff with the defense ministry during January–May 2000 and accelerated in earnest when Josef Stank replaced Defense Minister Pavol Kanis in January 2001 and initiated significant changes within the ministry. Stank appointed an apolitical state secretary, Rastislav Kacer, to oversee NATO integration, and he intends to reduce the defense ministry’s seven directorates to two or three, thereby improving Slovakian defense planning capability and prospects for NATO membership.

The Defense Strategy (adopted by the government in May 2001) is to be presented to parliament in Bratislava in the fall, and the draft Military Strategy is to be submitted soon to the government. The 2010 Concept for Slovakia’s Armed Forces, initiated in March 2001 and based on the above strategic documents, will lead to a new structure of small mobile forces that should be presented to the Alliance in autumn 2001. Slovakia’s armed forces will be reduced from 45,000 to 32,000 by 2002. Parliament is committed to maintain a defense budget at 1.89 percent of GDP for 2002, which provides sufficient resources to complete 64 Partnership Goals.

Slovenia. In its first and second ANP cycles, Slovenia found MAP useful. Indeed, the Slovenian government now regards MAP as a strategic priority in preparing the country for membership. During the first cycle, Slovenia learned what to do and how to do it but went off track by producing an unachievable ANP 2000–2001. Slovenia also did not reassess threats and risks after significant changes had occurred in the region and failed to determine what it could afford for defense.

The elections in autumn 2000 confirmed Slovenian democratic traditions and commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovenia is pursuing a communications strategy to strengthen public support for NATO, which remains at only 53 percent. In addition, the government intends to approve a NATO classified data bill in July 2001, after which it will revise legislation to establish a National Security Authority. Although the Slovenian constitution makes no provision for sending troops abroad or receiving foreign troops on Slovenian soil, all political parties agree that it does not need to be amended. They do, however, recognize the need to modify both the Defense Act and the Military Service Act. Slovenia has learned that legal issues regarding NATO membership are more taxing and challenging than originally anticipated.

The NAC and Slovenia’s progress assessment of April 2001 was sober and useful and provides the basis for the third cycle of MAP. The report was silent on the second and third chapters of MAP (defense/military and resources) simply because Slovenia had not done much in these areas. The Slovenian Armed Forces 2010, which had been adopted by parliament in February 2000, called for defense budgets of 1.86 percent of GDP ($400 million) in 2001 and was to rise to 2 percent ($440 million) in 2002. The new government was aware before the election that the plan was unrealistic and unachievable and revised the defense budget to a realistic 1.45 percent of GDP in 2001 ($300 million), which should provide enough resources to fulfill 56 PGs. The new Slovenian government also plans to adopt the Swedish system of multiyear budgeting and planning and rewrite the Slovenian National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy.

Outlook. Though Slovenia lost a year, it has learned a great deal from 2 years of MAP. The next Annual National Plan will be realistic and resource-based, reflecting a shift from the goal of working for an invitation to building capacity that can command respect within the Alliance. Slovenia accepted NATO comments, criticisms, and recommendations in a constructive spirit, and the ANP third cycle will likely register substantial improvement in overall Alliance assessment of Slovenian armed forces programs. To do so, Slovenia has established an Interdepartmental Working Group for cooperation with NATO, which is chaired by the state secretaries of the foreign and defense ministry and includes the General Staff, supported by five other ministries and foreign advisors to develop a restructuring concept. Slovenia’s mobilization capacity will be reduced from the planned 47,000 troops in 2010 to 35,000 by 2004, and defense budget cuts have been halted. In 2001, Slovenia also intends to establish three other intergovernmental working groups for information, interoperability, and crisis management.

Based upon MAP experience and outside advice (the so-called Garrett U.S. Defense Assessment, plus input from British advisors),
Slovenia has written “Guidelines for the Operation of the Ministry of Defense Up to 2004.” This document focuses on providing adequate financial resources to the Slovenian armed forces for the purpose of implementing a personnel policy for officers, NCOs, and conscripts with proper legislation. This implementation should permit contracted reservists to participate in peace support operations and should help to restructure the reverse pyramidal structure of the Slovenian officer corps.

**Challenged States**

Albania and Macedonia, with populations of 3.6 and 2 million respectively, have experienced significant political and social challenges to their state institutions. During 2001, the United States performed defense reform (Garrett) assessments for both countries; thus, the ANPs of both countries for 1999 and 2000 did not benefit from the experience.

**Albania.** In contrast to most other MAP partners, Albania has expressed high popular support for NATO as a result of the 1999 Kosovo operation. Albanian national objectives are to build a constitutional state with democratic institutions and civilian oversight of the armed forces. Albania’s political and economic recovery (MAP chapter 1) has not been easy since the 1997 total collapse of the state. Some improvement has been registered with internal security and public order, but corruption, illicit trafficking, and organized crime remain rampant. The October 2000 local elections exemplified some political progress, as did the June 24, 2001, parliamentary elections. Some economic growth (roughly 7 percent) was registered in 2000 and 2001. Albania has signed good neighbor treaties with all neighbors, including Macedonia, and has reestablished diplomatic relations with Serbia.

Albanian authorities initially believed that MAP ANP applied only to the defense ministry, but after the first cycle realized that it had nationwide application. Hence, to deal with MAP, Albania created new structures, including a senior interministerial commission headed by the Prime Minister and an interministerial commission comprising the integration departments of the defense and foreign ministries and three General Staff structures.

**Outlook:** On military and defense issues (chapter 2), Albania plans first to transform from heavier to smaller, more efficient armed forces during 2000–2004, then to modernize them during 2005–2009. Albania’s old armed force structure comprised 5 divisions/32 brigades, with no engineers, logistic, or civil protection structures; the new structure will comprise 7 combat brigades and 3 combat support brigades. Albania’s total armed forces are to decline from 43,000 to 31,000 troops (15,000 army; 3,500 air force; 2,500 navy; 9,000 command; and 1,000 students and reservists) with a wartime strength reduction from 232,000 to 120,000. By 2004, the officer corps will decline from 6,000 to 4,000; the NCO corps will increase to 4,500 from 4,000; and the 30,000 conscripts will decline to 19,000, of which 9,500 will be volunteers. Finally, though English-language training has improved, only 13 percent of the officer corps now speaks English.

As for resources, Albania’s defense budgets in 2001 and 2002 amounted to only 1.1 percent of GDP. During the first cycle, Albania targeted 80 PGs; during the second cycle, the number of PGs was more realistically reduced to 53, which still stretched the financial capacities of a weak country. Thus, Albania will place priority on those PGs linked with NATO Minimal Military Requirements. Albania realizes that it needs NATO assistance because it lacks expertise, especially in communications and personnel management. Regarding security issues (chapter 4), Albania plans to establish under the Council of Ministers a classified information office responsible for information standards, procedures, and controls. On legal issues (chapter 5), Albania possesses no constitutional obstacles to NATO membership. Parliament approved a National Security Strategy and a Defense Policy on January 23, 2000, and later passed new laws on war powers and command authority, military hierarchy and ranks, and payment and allowances for military and civilian personnel. Albania is now developing new legal frameworks for structuring the state police, addressing organized crime and illicit trafficking, and creating a National Military Strategy.

**Macedonia.** While it sought to develop democratic institutions and equitable interethnic relations since independence in 1991, these goals have proved elusive for Macedonia, and the de facto result has been Albanian (roughly 30 percent) minority separation. As a result, Macedonia has sought significant assistance from Western institutions. On May 18, 2001, when the NAC met with Macedonia to review MAP performance, it found that the constitution and laws do not present obstacles to NATO membership. In supporting NATO operations and accepting more than 360,000 refugees during the Kosovo campaign, Macedonia acted as if it were a de facto NATO member. Macedonia demonstrated this quasi-membership by its PFP status-of-forces agreements, which permitted the stationing and transit of NATO armed forces during the campaign and the Agreement on the Status of KFOR. Unfortunately, popular support for NATO, which had been 80 percent before the Kosovo campaign, eroded to 58 percent in November 2000 and may have deteriorated further in the wake of renewed troubles in spring 2001.

**Outlook:** As a result of the first MAP cycle, Macedonia accepted the fundamental requirement to integrate its national security strategy with its force planning and defense budgeting. During the second cycle, it made important progress: In August 2000, the country approved a reorganization of its defense ministry and general staff; it also implemented initial operational capability for the Border Brigade and 1st Infantry Brigade in June and October respectively; prepared the Defense Law, which awaits Parliamentary approval, and is drafting the Military Service Law.

Escalating internal strife is clouding Macedonia’s third cycle ANP work. Nonetheless, the country’s plans for 2001–2002 remain ambitious: full operational capability of the Border Brigade and 1st Infantry Brigade during the next few months; the reorganization of the defense ministry and general staff by January and February 2002 respectively; and establishment of new commands for training, logistics, and air defense and aviation by February, March, and April 2002, respectively. Macedonia has reduced the 45 PGs originally accepted in PARP to 24 priority PGs for ANP 2001. In building light and mobile armed forces to be interoperable with NATO, Macedonia plans total...
The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members of the National Defense University as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or implied in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other governmental agency.

Robert A. Silano
Director of Publications

William R. Bode
General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes books, monographs, and reports on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/ndupress/index.htm. NUS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

Stephen J. Flanagan
Director

James A. Scheer
Director of Research

NDU

The goal of the Military Service Law is to increase the number of professionals in the forces and to reinforce the 1st Infantry Brigade. The new Defense Law provides for participation of Macedonian forces outside Macedonia, imparts host nation support within Macedonia, and prohibits political activity within the armed forces. ANP has helped Macedonia not only to identify and prioritize key tasks but also to recognize the difficult task of balancing capabilities and resources.

Assessing MAP Impact

In retrospect, the first cycle of MAP was a learning process, as one would expect with any new program. First, the Alliance had to determine what should be incorporated into the Annual National Plans and then had to establish a process with the Political-Military Steering Committee, Senior Political Committee (Reinforced), NAC, and MAP partners. The first cycle provided no universal standard and did not result in an assessment. PARP appeared to be disconnected from the Individual Partner Programs (IPP), and PGs focused on interoperability rather than NATO membership objectives.

During the second cycle, NATO streamlined the process and provided a set of real assessments. As a consequence, there is now only one review meeting for IPP, PPARP, and ANP. The Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) no longer convenes, but only the NAC (19+1). With PGs and plans now in place, realistic measurements can be made for utilization of resources. NATO made an effort to link the overall PFP (PWP) with ANP and provided a closer linkage with the PARP survey, modeled on the Defense Planning Questionnaire. NATO teams were enlarged to cover all five MAP chapters, and these teams, in turn, improved progress reports to assist partners better. Partners then viewed NATO feedback as fair and frank. Transparency was enhanced in that some partners invited others to hear their progress review.

In its ANP assessments, NATO has sought a judicious balance between encouragement and constructive criticism. In broad terms, it has found criminality to be a problem among many MAP partners, with the corresponding need for better border control. While treatment of minorities generally has improved, problems remain in Macedonia with Albanians, in Latvia and Estonia with Russians, and in Romania generally. Public opinion support for integration remains uneven, and the Alliance needs to assist partners in developing more effective ways to inform and educate public opinion. NATO also finds it difficult to make uniform comparisons of economic indicators among MAP ANPs. While some economic improvement was registered, relative stagnation with unemployment and inflation remains. For example, Slovenia showed economic growth but experienced a decline in investments. In some cases where privatization has been significant, partners have funded their PGs from accrued funds, so their ability to sustain these resources is questionable.

In the defense and military spheres, all MAP members are hampered by limited resources and are struggling with force restructuring. Most MAP members made genuine efforts to commit human resources and improve interdepartmental coordination, but their defense efforts varied, and significant progress is still required. Though MAP partners demonstrated their crisis-management capability by participation in IFOR/SFOR, and KFOR, they still need to focus more on their involvement in the OCC, Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PFP Operations, and Defense Capabilities Initiative.

army forces of 15,000, with a wartime strength of 60,000. Macedonia also plans to increase the number of professionals in the forces and to reinforce the 1st Infantry Brigade. The new Defense Law provides for participation of Macedonian forces outside Macedonia, imparts host nation support within Macedonia, and prohibits political activity within the armed forces. ANP has helped Macedonia not only to identify and prioritize key tasks but also to recognize the difficult task of balancing capabilities and resources.

all MAP members are hampered by limited resources and are struggling with force restructuring

One area that requires across-the-board improvement is deployment of forces. While most partners have identified required resources, their ability to sustain deployments remains limited. Most have experienced rotation problems that severely tax their human and material resources. Resource constraints continued to exceed the more sober and realistic second cycle objectives of MAP members and will further influence their third cycle objectives. Not only has ANP chapter 4, on security activities, contributed to building MAP cooperative security processes, but so have experiences in the Balkans. NATO engaged for the first time militarily in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, then for the second time in KFOR in Kosovo. With respect to legal and constitutional issues, some MAP members are still encumbered by domestic constraints on deploying troops for sustained operations abroad.

The enlargement process continues to play a vital role in shaping the progressive transformation of Central and Eastern Europe military institutions. Both MAP and ANP have helped create a structure for defense reform and civil-military coordination that otherwise might not have arisen. This is exemplified by the performance of the new members who did not benefit from MAP experience. MAP also has helped aspiring Alliance members to contribute more effectively to NATO operations as well as to look hard at security challenges within their own areas. At the same time, the Alliance needs to make further adaptations to institutionalize the new dimensions of this partnership—particularly in the areas of flexibility and sustainability of armed forces, establishing new training and equipment standards, standing up Combined Joint Task Forces and deployable headquarters, developing a faster force generation process, and improving the capability of Alliance partnership institutions to engage in effective crisis prevention.