The Army National Guard: Force Multiplier or Irrelevant Force?

A Monograph

by

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Abstract


During the Cold War, the National Guard served the nation as an insurance policy designed for mass mobilization in the event of a major war or national emergency. The nation could maintain a small but well-trained standing army and a large pool of less-than-fully-trained personnel in the event of war. From its origins, Americans have joined the National Guard with the understanding that they were volunteering to serve part-time in a force that would prepare them to fight the nation’s next big war or to meet national or state emergencies. This led to the development of a predictable training pattern of one weekend a month and two weeks of active training a year.

After 1989, the United States Army has seen a paradigm shift in the way the nation utilizes the Army National Guard to confront the challenges to our national security interests. The Army National Guard performs global peacetime operational missions and the Army relies on the National Guard more and more to meet its military commitments.

The challenge facing the National Guard is that it cannot be all things to all people. With the limited number of training days available, the National Guard cannot be a full spectrum force and support a dual state mission and expect to be fully prepared at all times. The roles and missions for the National Guard must be firmly defined in order to allow Guard units to focus their training efforts to achieve the levels of proficiency necessary to meet the expectations of the nation and foster an atmosphere of trust and confidence with the active component. The fact of the matter is the demands of the strategic environment and current realities demonstrate the need for fundamental change. This means making smarter use of the National Guard and adapting them to new requirements, assigning missions that use their strengths and providing funding consistent with expected missions.

It is clear that the National Guard is transforming itself and has integrated into the Army better than it has ever been before, but it is equally clear that more needs to happen. Army leaders are unified in their support for the transformation and integration of the National Guard, but these issues are complex and any distracters will result in a slower realization of achieving stated goals.

If the Army is to effectively use the reserve component in the future force, some difficult trade-offs are required with regard to the current composition of combat and support forces and traditional roles and missions. When coupled with the increased responsibility of the National Guard in peacekeeping and homeland defense operations and the Army’s desire to reduce deployment burdens on the active component, the Army needs to realistically examine whether National Guard force structure, equipment and training priorities match up with its current and future roles.

Now, it is evident that if the Guard expects to contribute to The Army in this era of increased operations with reduced forces, it must accept restructuring as part of the costs of remaining relevant and a contributor to our nation’s defense. If the Guard is willing to accept restructuring, The Army must ensure that the advantages gained by the process outweigh any repercussions or loss of Guard capabilities.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

During the Cold War, the National Guard served the nation as an insurance policy designed for mass mobilization in the event of a major war or national emergency. The nation could maintain a small but well trained standing army while maintaining a pool of less-than-fully-trained personnel in the event of war.

The end of the Cold War has dramatically altered the threat facing the United States and its allies, and that has significant implications for how the Army structures its forces. As the Army continues to shrink, the importance of the National Guard will continue to grow, however, if the National Guard does not fit smoothly into the structure of The Army, and if it is not as ready as it needs to be, is the National Guard a military liability.

To fulfill its multiple roles, the Army’s force structure and design must provide the capabilities necessary to operate across a broad spectrum of conflict in peacetime, crisis and war throughout the full spectrum of military operations. The Army will have to generate these capabilities despite reductions in force structure beyond the cuts that have occurred in recent years. Increased operational pace, reduced force structure and constrained budgets will require a revision of current force structure and innovative ways of utilizing the National Guard to keep from stretching the active component too thin and degrading the effectiveness to fight and win our nation’s wars. In essence, the Army will have to establish priorities on how it apportions capabilities into the future. Forces must be optimized for Shaping, Preparing or Responding roles as outlined in the National Security Strategy and the increased capability of the National Guard, the total force policy and decreasing budgets demand that Army leaders make better use of the National Guard.

Total Force Policy states that missions should be assigned to whichever component can
achieve them the most economically. The intent is to make better use of the National Guard by shifting some of the functions performed solely by the Active Component to the National Guard. With this in mind, it is crucial that the Active Component and National Guard leaders are realistic about what missions the National Guard can achieve. Fiscal constraints in the defense budget require our leaders to maximize the contribution from all sources of military manpower across the full range of their military capabilities by evaluating which component is best suited for particular roles and what risk can prudently be assumed in relying more on the National Guard. By drawing on the demonstrated strengths of the Active Component, US Army Reserve and the National Guard, the Army can attain the objective of becoming a total force. Integration and restructuring decisions, however, will involve trade-offs and the abandonment of traditional roles or missions for each component, but they will be in the best interests of the Army in the long term. Clearly, the military will continue to have an Active Component and a Reserve Component, the question to be resolved is how much of each and what roles and missions should they assume? These decisions will be driven in part by expectations about the speed with which the National Guard can be mobilized and prepared for employment. Active component forces should be used for overseas forward deployment and other duty requiring immediate response capability, missions that require intensive training, highly technical or military-unique skills and where there is a need to deploy quickly with little warning. The National Guard should receive missions where the active component is not required, when personnel can be available to meet deployment timelines and when there is time to prepare. All recent deployments of note have included USAR and National Guard personnel. Delegating missions to the National Guard will relieve the Active Component of some of their peacetime commitments and allow them to concentrate on higher priority tasks. “Core competencies—not force structure—will be the currency each component must possess if it is to own a place in the Army After Next of 2025.”

Today, the National Guard is fully engaged in Joint Operational Support, Nation Building, Military to Military contact with emerging Democracies as well as domestic support operations and community assistance missions. The challenge for the National Guard is to fit seamlessly within The Army while remaining prepared to fulfill its state missions. State Governors rely on the capabilities and training of Army National Guard units. The effective response of the National Guard during domestic crises and community support missions provide resources and capabilities to local community infrastructure and law enforcement agencies. Concurrently, the missions of the National Guard have undergone exponential change and expansion to meet the diverse security needs of the nation. The challenge for the National Guard is that it cannot be all things to all people. With the limited number of training days available, the National Guard cannot be a full spectrum force and support their dual mission on behalf of their state and expect to be fully prepared at all times. The roles and missions for the National Guard must be firmly defined in order to allow National Guard units to focus their training efforts to achieve the levels of proficiency necessary to meet the expectations of the nation and foster an atmosphere of trust with the active component that the National Guard is capable of achieving their assigned missions.

As the nation grew, the utilization and character of the National Guard changed. It remains accepted in our culture that the average citizen is available to defend both the nation at times of war and their community during times of emergency. National Guard soldiers contribute to society as both soldiers and citizens and they provide the linkage between national policy and the population, building mutual understanding on national defense and civil issues. National Guard soldiers ensure the legitimacy of the military for as a democratic nation, it is “imperative that there is a consistency between national policy and the will of the people.” ² An underlying principle of the National Guard is to provide a national defense force made up of the general

population. By providing missions for the National Guard, the President demonstrates a greater commitment to the cause and ensures the involvement of a large sector of the population thus harnessing the national will of the people in support of national policy.

Any effort to transform the National Guard must create a radically different force that will support the Army in the challenges facing the nation in the future. Simply put, transformation in the National Guard must encompass force structure, deployability, training, its role in The Army and the necessary support to initiate the transformation. The National Guard has relevance for the future but important questions remain. What should the National Guard look like? What missions can the National Guard execute? How quickly can the National Guard mobilize and deploy? The fact of the matter is the demands of the strategic environment and current realities demonstrate the need for fundamental change.
CHAPTER TWO

Transformation and Integration Programs

The National Guard has been involved in an almost continuous transformation process since 1989 as the Army downsized and sought new ways to use both the active and reserve components effectively. In 1989, the Guard had approximately 457,000 personnel. By 1996 that number came down to 373,000 personnel and by 1999, Guard strength was down to 367,000 personnel. Although the Guard continues to reduce in size, there are still concerns that Guard combat strength exceeds projected requirements and DOD’s Commission on Roles and Missions concluded that units with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas. The change in force structure is taking place in a climate of more diverse missions and an increase in the frequency of deployments. This transformation process has had an impact on the National Guard and its role in the National Security Strategy. This chapter will outline the complexity of transforming the National Guard, what initiatives have taken place and what challenges remain.

The CAPSTONE program was the primary National Guard transformation program initiated in 1973. It aligned National Guard units to a wartime theatre of operations and chain of command. All National Guard units had equal priority for resources since each unit had an equal likelihood of mobilization for service depending on the contingency. For the first time, National Guard units were integrated into war plans and coordinated routinely with their wartime active component headquarters for training and force modernization. The contingency pool concept replaced the CAPSTONE program. The contingency pool concept determined the allocation of resources to National Guard units based on their priority for deployment to support a contingency. Units that would deploy first receive a higher priority for resources. The remaining National Guard units would be resourced under a lower priority and would be resourced if the
situation warranted that they be called to duty.

The security strategy announced in August 1990 emphasized the need for forces that could respond quickly to major regional contingencies. The Gulf War experience led the Army to rely less on the Guard for early deployment missions and because the Guard needs time to prepare for deployment, the Army assigned the Guard later deploying missions in the future force. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), there are opportunities to expand the reserves’ role but they will hinge on restructuring decisions. The GAO recommended the break up of one or more of the Guard Divisions that would allow the Army to use its component parts to round out active divisions. Battalion and Company sized round-out units could be prepared to deploy more quickly than the current Brigade sized round-out units and therefore assigned earlier combat roles. Converting some guard combat units to support units would provide a means of bolstering the Army’s support forces.

In 1990, Congress mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act that the Department of Defense conduct a comprehensive study of its Total Force Policy and active and reserve force mix and structure. With the changes in the security environment and the Army planning to field a much smaller force, there was concern that the Army was not assigning a large enough role to the National Guard. “Congress maintained that changes in the global security environment and the acknowledged lower cost of maintaining reserve forces compared to active forces should be reflected in the Army’s plans through a greater reliance on the Reserves.” ³ The December 1990 Total Force Policy Study recommended round-out at battalion or lower levels to enhance the Total Force Policy and foster greater integration of the active and reserve components. The study further recommended that the Army could increase its reliance on the reserve component by creating units that contained a mix of active and reserve personnel. The study recognized that broadening the use of the reserve component would require difficult concessions for the Army in

terms of restructuring. “To preserve meaningful combat roles, consideration must be given to rounding-out at lower organizational levels that would permit the reserve component to play a more decisive combat role by being able to deploy earlier. To preserve meaningful support roles, a larger portion of the reserve component must convert to support forces.” The Gulf War identified support shortfalls that could be resolved by increasing the number of support units in the reserve component thereby increasing the potential for these forces for use in other than protracted conflicts.

In 1992, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the Base Force, premised on a reorientation of the military strategy to regional threats and crisis intervention. In essence, the Base Force concept intended to implement a new National Security Strategy shifting the focus from preparing for a global war in Europe against the Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against uncertain adversaries. The Base Force is the minimum force capable of executing the President’s defense strategy and must be capable of engaging in a full range of conflicts, including concurrent regional conflicts that sequentially evolve. It specified a specific mix of active and reserve divisions constrained by specific limits in active and reserve end strength. This concept recommended the reduction of the eight National Guard Divisions to six with two cadre divisions structured to respond to protracted concurrent regional conflicts or a global war. The Base Force called for a total Army force of 1.1 million personnel with forty-nine percent of the force in the active component and fifty-one percent of the force in the reserve component by 1995. This concept continued the debate over the size of the reserve component and their role in the future force. This debate was clarified somewhat in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States. Of the four basic defense tenets, forward

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5 Ibid, 13.
presence, crisis response, reconstitution and strategic deterrence, the first three envisioned a role for the reserve component.

Based on this new strategy, the United States would initially respond to regional threats with active component combat and combat support units except for a limited number of reserve component support and mobility assets. Reserve Component support units would mobilize primarily for extended conflicts and reserve component combat units would mobilize to supplement active component combat units if a large or protracted deployment was necessary. The two cadre National Guard Divisions would contribute to the reconstitution element of the national security strategy. Non-Divisional support units would mobilize in configured force packages to support each deployed Corps.

In March 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) to refine the Base Force concept and assess the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, and budgets to counter regional aggression in the post cold war environment. While retaining the regional strategy orientation of the Base Force, he proposed further reductions in Army force structure. The result of the BUR was a reduction in Army force structure to eighteen divisions (ten active component and eight National Guard) and moved the Army away from the National Guard round-out and round-up brigade concept to three brigade active divisions. The Guard combat brigades would be realigned and increased to fifteen enhanced brigades to improve Guard combat readiness and would serve to offset the risk of the reduction in active divisions and augment active combat forces. The BUR designated the eight National Guard Divisions as general war forces. In essence, the BUR forced The Army to recognize that it must adapt to meet new challenges. This meant making smarter use of the reserve components and adapting them to new requirements, assigning missions that use their strengths and funding consistent with expected missions during a crisis or war. The Bottom-Up Review concluded that the reserve components’ end-strength be reduced to 575,000 personnel by 1999, with allocation to the Guard of 367,000 and allocation to the USAR of 208,000. In addition to the fifteen enhanced brigades
specified in the Bottom-Up Review, the Guard determined that it would retain eight Combat Divisions, three separate combat units, and numerous support units. The fifteen enhanced brigades would be the principal reserve component ground combat forces and an important role for these brigades is to supplement active component divisions, in the event more ground combat power is needed to deter or fight a second major regional conflict. Other roles would be to replace active forces stationed overseas or engaged in peacekeeping operations should the replaced forces be needed for a regional conflict. The enhanced brigades eliminated the previous round-out and round-up roles of the brigades and dictated that the brigades were to be organized and resourced so that they can be mobilized, trained, and deployed more quickly to fast evolving regional conflicts that were expected to occur in the future. Enhanced resourcing involved increased active Army involvement in training, higher personnel strength and a higher priority for individual training and equipment. The enhanced brigades would augment and reinforce active duty units in the event the active units could not adequately respond to two major and nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

In 1993, an offsite agreement among the active Army, the National Guard and United States Army Reserve, and the National Guard and Reserve associations, was instrumental in setting overall force structure and manpower strengths for both components. The offsite agreement dramatically restructured the Army Reserve Components to improve readiness regarding pending reductions, the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War, and to fund equipment modernization. The 1993 offsite agreement called for Army National Guard strength to drop to 367,000 and USAR strength to drop to 208,000 by fiscal year 1999. A second offsite agreement in 1997 called for Army National Guard strength to drop to 350,000 and USAR strength to drop to 205,000 by fiscal year 2000.

The offsite agreements were significant in that the Guard and Reserve have always been skeptical about plans for reducing Reserve strength. The concern rested in the opinion that reducing the reserve component strength would leave the nation with too few large ground units
and would remove citizen soldiers from the front lines and consequently from any consultation from the active Army about how to conduct a future war.

The offsite agreements also included a realignment of functions between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The National Guard agreed to inactivate one hundred and twenty eight combat support and combat service support units and transfer the personnel allocations to the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve agreed to inactivate twenty-eight combat units and its Special Forces units and transfer the personnel allocations to the National Guard. The transitions between the National Guard and Army Reserve effectively concentrated combat functions in the National Guard and combat support and combat service support in the Army Reserve.

In March 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report indicating that many Guard combat units were not needed to meet the national security strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Excess forces are assigned secondary missions such as providing wartime rotational forces, serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authorities. The GAO recommended that DOD determine the number of guard combat spaces needed, reallocate unneeded force structure to fill required but unfilled force structure and eliminate the excess. In response to the GAO, the DOD indicated that the Army National Guard Re-Design Study (ADRS) would address these issues and review ways in which force structure could shift to meet the challenges of the shortfall of combat support units and combat service support units to meet the future challenges for The Army. The conversion option selected by ADRS would result in the following force structure: Three Guard Divisions will remain in their current configuration. Three Guard Divisions will replace one maneuver brigade with an enhanced brigade. Two Guard Divisions will convert from combat divisions into combined arms divisions with one combat maneuver brigade and various support units. Two new active component/Guard Divisions, each containing an active Division Headquarters and three Guard enhanced Brigades as maneuver brigades. Two enhanced brigades remain in their current configuration. Four active component divisions, each having an integrated
enhanced brigade, and six guard combined arms brigades converted from the three separate combat units and the three divisional maneuver brigades. Additionally, the missions of 6,600 active component support spaces would migrate to the Guard. The result of this study would require the Army National Guard to effectively convert twelve combat brigades to combat support and combat service support units by fiscal year 2009 to further transform the Army National Guard to meet future National Security challenges that may face the United States. This plan will convert approximately 48,000 combat arms positions to combat support and combat service support structure to offset the current imbalance that exists in the total force between combat forces and combat support forces. Funding for this conversion has not become available, as the study required full funding of the procurement phase of the conversion before any of the redesign effort would begin. The cost estimate of the entire conversion, including procurement and implementation, is $2.6 Billion however, funding is not resolved and therefore, it is unknown when the conversion will take place. It appears that the redesign will not begin for several years and implementation will take a prolonged period, from ten to twenty-nine years.

Total Army Analysis 2003 completed in 1995 determined that an imbalance existed between the required mix of combat and support units. It forecasted a shortfall of at least 47,000 support forces while at the same time it forecasted an excess of combat forces of 145,000. Since half of the combat forces exist in the National Guard, the total army analysis indicated that the excess combat force were stationed in the National Guard and those forces had no direct role in the national military strategy and therefore should be eliminated. Although those forces may provide a strategic hedge against the emergence of an unforeseen threat, the expense of operating, supporting and equipping them may not be justifiable in times of shrinking budgets. The GAO stated that the conversion was a move in the right direction, but ADRS did not validate the need for the remaining Guard combat structure and eliminating excess forces. “As a result, the studies
leave substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid war-fighting mission.”

The Army established the Teaming concept in 1998 with the intent of enhancing the capability and readiness of Army National Guard Divisions. The teaming concept established habitual training and support relationships between Active component divisions and National Guard Divisions. Each team is composed of one Active Division and one National Guard Division. The intent of the Teaming concept is to increase the Army’s ability to respond across the full spectrum of operations by establishing operational relationships between the teamed divisions. These relationships will provide the active component divisions with a better understanding of National Guard capabilities while concurrently improving the level of training in National Guard combat units. Each team is able to use their own discretion regarding teaming activities however they include joint training at the National Training Center as well as support during deployment training and preparation. Integration occurs at the company and individual level. This integration effort is constrained geographically as only one team is located in close proximity. The remaining teams are located between 500-1500 miles apart. The 4th Infantry Division (AC), Ft. Hood, Texas is teamed with the 40th Infantry Division (CA-ARNG), Los Alamitos, California. The 10th Mountain Division (AC), Ft. Drum, New York is teamed with the 29th Infantry Division (VA-ARNG), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. The 1st Cavalry Division (AC), Ft. Hood, Texas is teamed with the 49th Armored Division (TX-ARNG), Austin, Texas. The 3rd Infantry Division (AC), Ft. Stewart, Georgia is teamed with the 28th Infantry Division (PA-ARNG), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The teaming concept has the potential for providing mutually beneficial relationships however a GAO study has determined that “most of the benefits have centered on training and pre-deployment events, rather than on actual operations.” Challenges to the teaming concept fall

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into three major categories; time, geography and equipment compatibility. Due to the time necessary for National Guard Divisions to mobilize, it will be difficult to support early deploying active component divisions on short notice. Active component divisions that deploy later in a conflict are more likely to receive more support from their National Guard partners. As indicated earlier, the geographic separation of three of the four teamed divisions affects the level of support that the Guard can provide to their active partner due to transportation challenges. The equipment and weapons used by National Guard and active component forces are often different or incompatible. This challenge can create training distracters and could delay or prevent Guard units from filling or augmenting their active duty partners. “Officials at the 40th Infantry Division (CA-ARNG) told us that none of their major equipment was compatible with that of their teaming partner, the 4th Infantry Division. They estimated that they were about ten to fifteen years behind the 4th Infantry Division in modernization.”\(^8\) Despite these challenges, the Teaming concept has merit and has had positive impacts on the readiness of the National Guard Divisions.

In 1998, the Army embarked on the Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign to create a more deployable force using emerging digital technology to increase its capabilities. The digital technology will allow for a reduction in the size of the heavy division and by integrating National Guard and Army Reserve personnel, the Army can reduce the number of active component personnel in the Force XXI Division. This is the most complex integration initiative because it integrates all three components throughout the organization and requires changes in equipment and force structure. The Army is using the 4th Infantry Division, Ft. Hood, Texas as a model for the potential redesign of other heavy divisions. The integration challenge in this initiative results from the fact that not many reservists live in close proximity to Fort Hood. Some National Guard soldiers have to travel almost 100 miles to get to training and soldiers do not receive reimbursement for their transportation costs. “There are no National Guard armories near the

Army’s heavy forces overseas, and less than five percent of the National Guard’s armories are located within fifty miles of the Army’s heavy active forces in the United States.\textsuperscript{9}

In 1999, the Army announced its plan to rotate active and reserve component units for service in Bosnia as part of the NATO Stabilization Force. This reflects the ongoing efforts toward full integration of the active and reserve components. The rotation plan calls for active and reserve component units to rotate to Bosnia every six to twelve months under a single integrated command structure. This plan will improve Army readiness by enhancing the association between the active and reserve components and reduces the effects of operational tempo on the active component. This program builds on the earlier relationships established through the Teaming Program and this concept will allow both active and reserve components to share responsibility for mission execution. Ultimately, this concept will improve reserve component combat readiness by providing real world training and opportunities for mentoring from the active component counterpart units. The 49\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division, TX-ARNG, commanded Stabilization Force (SFOR) rotation Seven beginning March 2000. The 29\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, VA-ARNG will command SFOR rotation Ten beginning in October 2001 and the 28\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, PA-ARNG will command SFOR rotation Twelve beginning in October 2002. As the Headquarters, they will command active army, National Guard and Army Reserve forces. In the future, additional National Guard Divisions will have the opportunity to command the integrated Task Force. This initiative appears to be the best model for transformation and integration and holds promise for the future employment of the National Guard to relieve the active component to train for higher priority missions.

There are some challenges to be resolved in the implementation of this initiative that should occur as this initiative evolves. The 49\textsuperscript{th} Armored Division had to obtain equipment to be

compatible and interoperable with active and multinational forces and had to locate personnel
with unique military occupational specialties required to accomplish the mission. Under the
constraints of tiered resourcing, future National Guard divisions will encounter similar
challenges. With the 270 day limitation under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up,
National Guard soldiers with unique specialties may not be available as needed since they will
have already performed the maximum service allowed, leaving holes in key positions in force
structure that will have to be backfilled with personnel from the active component. However,
once these issues are resolved over time, this concept will have far reaching impacts on how the
National Guard integrates with the active component.

In April 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued the Fiscal Years 2000-2005
Defense Planning Guidance that directed the Defense Department to conduct the Reserve
Component Employment 2005 Study. This study reviewed employment of the reserve
component and developed several recommendations to enhance the role of the reserve component
in the full range of military operations. The study examined how to make the reserve component
easier to access and how to better equip, train and manage it to ensure effective mission
fulfillment. The study focused on three areas: Homeland Defense, Small Scale Contingencies
and Major Theatre Wars. The study’s Missions and Capabilities panel found that the reserve
component is capable of executing the same missions as the active component, with only a few
exceptions such as extremely short-notice non-combatant evacuations and some special
operations missions. The study determined that the reserve component could make important
contributions in the areas of Homeland Defense and Small Scale Contingencies, in addition to its
traditional role of helping to fight and win our nation’s wars.

Given the increasing threats to the territory, population and infrastructure of the United States,
the reserve component should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities.
The study determined that the reserve component is well suited to homeland defense missions
because the infrastructure exists throughout the country and reserve component units are already
familiar with disaster response requirements and providing support to civil authorities.

Increasing the role of the reserve component in smaller scale contingencies where feasible will make a more effective use of their range of skills, provide some operational tempo relief for the active component and build reserve component operational skills. To provide forces for peacekeeping operations like the SFOR mission in Bosnia, the US provides sufficient personnel and equipment to station a Brigade sized force in Bosnia throughout the year. Meeting this obligation requires that at any given time during the year, one Brigade is currently serving in Bosnia, another is preparing to deploy and a third Brigade is reconstituting from the previous rotation. Manning every other rotation using reserve component personnel would require fewer active units for this mission and there are sufficient reserve component personnel to assume a six-month rotation every year. The reserve component also has a sufficient number of personnel to man a second mission like the MFO mission in the Sinai on a six-month rotational basis. The challenge in this situation is that the reserve component does not have units in several high demand areas to sustain a rotational force package without using the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up.

While substantial portions of the reserve component are already integral to the war-fighting effort, its role, particularly that of the combat units of the National Guard can be further clarified. As The Army strives to fulfill all the requirements of the US defense strategy within the context of limited available resources, optimizing the reserve component’s role in Major Theatre Warfare is essential. The study endorsed the Army’s efforts to ensure it provides sufficient resources through its budget to ensure that the enhanced brigades can deploy as required by FY2000-2005 according to the Defense Planning Guidance. Establishing habitual relationships between certain enhanced brigades and selected active Army combat divisions could prove beneficial in terms of increasing the role of the reserve component in Major Theatre Wars and in increasing the combat power of active component divisions. Once established, a habitual relationship between an enhanced Brigade and an active combat division allows the enhanced brigade to target its training
efforts on mission specific requirements and enhance its integration into its affiliated combat division. Enhanced Brigades could better focus peacetime planning and training to prepare for deployment. There are no current post-mobilization training requirements for the ARNG divisions. The Army will need to establish post-mobilization training standards and timelines for division deployments. The existing operations plans do not describe how to employ the ARNG divisions in a Major Theatre War, nor do they apportion ARNG divisions to a specific theatre. The study lacked the time and resources to perform a detailed analysis of this subject.

In October 1999, the Army created two integrated divisions formed by joining an active duty division headquarters and three existing National Guard enhanced Brigades. This initiative will assess the capability of an active duty division headquarters to improve the enhanced Brigade’s readiness and reduce post-mobilization training time through its guidance and oversight. This arrangement is designed to provide readiness and training benefits to the enhanced brigades, but the integrated division is not deployable because it lacks a division combat support and combat service support base. While on the surface this concept appears to make a huge leap in the integration of the active component and the National Guard, it appears that these elements are integrated in name only. The Division Headquarters is manned entirely by active component soldiers and the Enhanced Brigades are manned entirely by National Guard soldiers. The geography poses additional challenges as well. Neither of the Division Headquarters are located close enough to the Brigades to foster any kind of esprit-de-corps nor the ability to establish close working relationships. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) Headquarters is located in Ft. Carson, Colorado and their subordinate Brigades are located in Portland, Oregon (41st Enhanced Separate Brigade); Edmond, Oklahoma (45th Enhanced Separate Brigade); and Little Rock, Arkansas (39th Enhanced Separate Brigade). The 24th Infantry Division (Heavy) Headquarters is located in Ft. Riley, Kansas and their subordinate Brigades are located in Clinton, North Carolina (30th Enhanced Separate Brigade); Newberry, South Carolina (218th Enhanced Separate Brigade); and Macon, Georgia (48th Enhanced Separate Brigade). This geographic spread increases the time
that soldiers spend away from their homes due to increased training tempo and transportation to collective training locations. The reality remains that active component personnel work during the week and National Guard personnel work on the weekends and both need to make adjustments to support integration. Integrated training adds to a unit’s normal training requirements resulting in additional time away from home and their civilian employment. The National Guard is concerned about the possible affects on retention and this concern makes sense when one assesses the costs involved in training soldiers in today’s fast paced, technological battlefield. “The cost of replacing soldiers has doubled since 1986.”\(^{10}\)

The General Accounting Office has identified some areas of success in overall improved readiness for deployment, in training battalion and brigade staffs, in improved identification of equipment modernization and compatibility issues, and in accelerating fielding of equipment.

In 2001, the Army announced that the 56\(^{th}\) Infantry Brigade, PA-ARNG, will be the first National Guard maneuver brigade to transform from its current configuration to the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), a design that will enable the brigade to deploy faster and in a configuration ready to fight upon arrival in theatre. The Army has been planning this transformation since October 1999 and serves as a landmark to transforming the entire Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. The conversion of the initial National Guard IBCT is part of the first phase of the Army’s strategy for transforming the current force into one that is prepared to meet the national security challenges in the future. The IBCT organization will enable the brigade to conduct operations across the full spectrum and their improved strategic deployability will provide a deterrence capability that currently does not exist.

According to a study completed by the General Accounting Office in July 2000, “The Army’s

current approach of pursuing integration on an initiative-by-initiative basis, without an overarching plan to guide its efforts, may make it difficult to evaluate the merits of these initiatives.” The study indicates that the piecemeal approach to integration has resulted in unintended impacts on transportation costs and increased personnel tempo for both active component soldiers and National Guard soldiers. In addition, the National Guard units have faced significant personnel and equipment challenges as they have attempted to increase integrated training and deployment timelines while remaining at their current level of low-priority funding levels under the tiered resourcing system. “While current Army integration plans are consistent with DOD’s goal of making greater use of Guard and Reserve forces, they have not altered basic resource allocations or even identified the level of funding necessary to achieve this goal.”

Despite the concerns expressed by the General Accounting Office, it is clear that the National Guard has integrated into the Army better than it has ever been before, but it is equally clear that more needs to happen. Army leaders are unified in their support for the transformation and integration of the National Guard, but these issues are leader intensive and any distracters will result in a slower realization of achieving stated goals. As roles and missions continue to adapt to the National Security Environment, new obstacles may present themselves that can affect a successful integration and transformation process.

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12 Ibid, 18
CHAPTER THREE

Transformation and Integration Considerations

As The Army shifts the focus of military planning to include a range of missions across the full spectrum of operations, it has placed additional demands on the Army requiring the increased utilization of the National Guard. In order to meet the future national security challenges facing the country, the Army must look at its ability to meet the requirements for full spectrum operations.

Although the size of the Army has declined over the past decade, the operational tempo has increased. In this chapter, I will outline seven criteria to determine whether the Army is making the appropriate efforts to transform the National Guard to meet the requirements to execute the national security strategy.

First, has the Army assessed National Guard force structure to ensure a proper balance between combat and combat support units and is the force structure appropriate and optimized for assigned missions? Second, has the Army addressed how quickly the Guard can deploy after mobilization? Third, are Guard units and individuals trained well enough that they can be brought up to the required state of readiness in a reasonable period-of-time after mobilization in this era of increasing technological revolution and the pace of modern maneuver warfare? Fourth, are Guard forces adequately equipped to effectively execute assigned missions? Fifth, has the Army assessed the impact of increasing deployments on soldier’s relationships with their civilian employers? Sixth, has the Army made the necessary efforts to leverage the political influence of the Guard to gain support for restructuring and missioning decisions? Seventh, is the Army utilizing the National Guard to execute missions that are essential to national security?
Force Structure

“The Army National Guard continues to structure its forces to provide for a compatible and inter-operable force that is fully capable of accomplishing state, national and international missions in war and peace.”\(^{13}\) To meet this requirement, the National Guard will need to maintain a balanced mix of combat, combat support and combat service support units that are structured to fit seamlessly with the active component. In fiscal year 2000, the National Guard force structure allowance was 388,000 personnel.\(^{14}\) The National Guard is composed of eight divisions, fifteen enhanced brigades and three strategic brigades. Guard composition is fifty-two percent combat, seventeen percent combat support, twenty-two percent combat service support and nine percent table of distribution and allowances. To accommodate all the demands on future force structure, the National Guard will require forces that are versatile, flexible and adaptable. In order to ensure that National Guard force structure is appropriate the Guard, in conjunction with the Army, must ensure the force is optimized for the missions that will be assigned to it. The Guard cannot be all things to all people and The Army must decide how to employ the Guard as part of the total force. The Guard must be flexible enough to respond to multiple missions, but must have a specific mission orientation to provide training focus. The National Guard can only meet the requirement to be prepared if units understand how they fit into the overall plan for national defense and security. The Army must establish priorities on how it apportions capabilities for the future. There must be a linkage of the possible threat to national strategy in terms of capabilities and acceptable risks. Force structure must realistically consider fiscal and legislative limitations. The reality facing the Army today is that the majority of the Army


\(^{14}\) Ibid
consists of reserve component soldiers and those soldiers are expected to provide critical
capabilities to facilitate the ability of the Army to execute missions across the full spectrum of
military operations.

When discussing force structure issues, attention usually focuses on the National Guard
combat units and the threat of two, near simultaneous, major regional conflicts. A 1996 General
Accounting Office (GAO) study determined that despite reductions the Army National Guard’s
combat units were still too large for projected war requirements. It further indicated that the
Guard’s eight divisions and three separate combat brigades were not needed to meet the current
national military strategy nor were they included in any major regional conflict planning
scenarios. These combat forces would form the strategic reserve and assigned missions if the
circumstances warrant. In testimony before the subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on
Armed Services, Richard Davis the Director of National Security Analysis, stated that “The Army
National Guard has considerable excess combat forces at the same time that the Army has a
substantial unfilled requirement for combat support units.”\(^\text{15}\) He recommended that the National
Guard’s eight combat divisions be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority
areas and after the shortfalls are resolved, any excess combat units should be eliminated from
both the active and reserve components. Mr. Davis recognized the Army’s ongoing attempt to
resolve this issue through the Army National Guard Re-Design Study and recommended that the
Secretary of the Army follow through with the conversion of combat units to combat support
units because “it would satisfy shortages in its support forces and further provide the types of
forces state governors have traditionally needed.”\(^\text{16}\) The Army needs to ensure that sufficient
numbers of support units exist and that they have the resources necessary to perform their mission
without compromising its ability to fight and win protracted conflicts. Operation Desert Storm

\(^{15}\) Davis, Richard. DOD Reserve Components: Issues Pertaining to Readiness. Washington, D.C.,
1996. Text of statement delivered to the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, p 1.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, 7.
revealed the support force shortfalls that raised the issue of the adequacy of the Army’s support forces in relation to its combat forces. “Over the course of the war, the Army exhausted its inventory of certain types of units such as water supply companies, graves registration units, pipeline and terminal operation companies, heavy truck and most medium truck companies, units handling prisoners, and virtually all postal units.”\textsuperscript{17} The Army deployed almost all of some types of support units leaving few, if any, to reinforce operations had the conflict lasted longer or if a second conflict had also developed. The use of host nation and coalition forces mitigated this condition but the Army cannot count on that level of support in preparing for future conflicts.

Currently, National Guard combat brigades do not have an immediate role in contingency operations. For the most part, they respond as late deploying or rotational reinforcements in prolonged missions or designated as forces providing the country with a strategic hedge. The effort to convert National Guard combat units to combat support units has merit and the benefits that will accrue to the states will be seen in the improved capability of military support to civilian authorities in times of crisis or natural disaster. However, “some defense experts maintain that Guard combat units are more capable than the standing armies of potential adversaries around the world. For instance, they are equipped with newer and more sophisticated weapons than may national armies. And members of the National Guard are better educated and receive more realistic training than the soldiers of many of the United States’ potential enemies.”\textsuperscript{18}

Changes in the Army’s force structure will always be constrained by end strength ceilings. If the Army had more flexibility in determining its force mix it would have opportunities to make more prudent force structure changes to better balance the force to meet future challenges. Force structuring decisions should be made based on which component is better suited for particular


missions resulting in meaningful roles being assigned to the National Guard.

The Army must also shape forces to perform operations other than war (OOTW) like humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations and smaller scale contingency operations. Discussions regarding force structure issues cannot forget to address these missions as they are becoming more representative of the types of missions that the Army will be forced to respond to and force structuring decisions must take these missions into consideration. The Bottom-Up Review concluded that in planning for these types of missions, “prudence would dictate using up to three Army divisions and a total of 50,000 combat and support personnel from all of the services.”

Although typical operations other than war missions require fewer troops than major conflicts do, they place difficult demands on the Army. Some missions can potentially last for a long time and over a period of months or years the total number of soldiers and units involved may be substantial. Peacetime operations require a different mix of skills than those required for combat emphasizing civilian control, policing and community liaison. Units that participate in peacetime operations must train several months afterward to regain their combat skills. The operations-other-than-war arena is where the Army can take advantage of the National Guard. Many of the skills critical to peacekeeping operations and smaller scale contingencies reside in the reserve component. “The Reserve component is home to ninety-seven percent of the Army’s civil affairs forces, eighty-two percent of its public affairs forces, eighty-one percent of psychological operations forces, sixty-six percent of military police, and eighty-five percent of medical brigades.”

In an April 2000 report, the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century suggested the need for the military to establish units capable of assuming humanitarian relief and constabulary duties. I would argue that those capabilities exist in the National Guard and several enhanced brigades could shift their

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training focus from a major regional contingency to operations other than war. Allowing the National Guard to assume control of these missions would relieve the drain of scarce manpower and resources in the active component to allow them to focus on their core war-fighting role. The combat power of the enhanced brigades would allow them to deter potential adversaries and would ensure that they could handle any potential escalation of violence during the conduct of the mission. These missions would also benefit the National Guard as “quantitative and anecdotal evidence suggests that when carefully managed, peacekeeping and peace enforcement deployments can actually increase morale, unit cohesion, and important aspects of war-fighting readiness.” Combat support units conduct operations almost exactly as they would for a combat operation. Soldiers routinely work with soldiers from other nations in the kind of multi-national and coalition environment that they can expect to confront in the future. Soldiers have to make real-world decisions on a daily basis that affect other people as well as themselves. These skills develop experience that will be necessary for future military leaders at all levels of command.

The pentagon noted that re-enlistment rates for units deployed on peacekeeping operations, both active and reserve component, are significantly higher than for home-based units. With the costs involved in training soldiers today, highly motivated and trained soldiers who return from these missions can infuse their training and experience throughout their units thus improving the overall quality and capability of the National Guard and enhancing the National Guard’s transformation and integration into the Army.

When evaluating the force structure of the National Guard to execute their federal mission, one cannot overlook their mission of supporting their state and territorial governors. Tasks include defense of the state from rebellion or disorder, emergency and disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and other efforts to support the community. The Guard’s state missions do not determine its size, but while the Army reviews force structure changes, they must ensure

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that the Guard is the correct size and configuration to carry out its state missions, the most common of which are emergency and disaster relief.

**Deployability**

Problems that surfaced while mobilizing and deploying the reserve component to the Gulf War led to the Army’s decision to assign the reserves fewer earlier deployment roles and currently, the Army does not plan to include National Guard combat brigades in the initial deployment of contingency forces. “From this experience, the Army’s Chief of Staff concluded that the Army had expected too much from these brigades, given the fact that reserve units train only thirty-nine days per year.”

Experiences from the Gulf War also showed that the Army had difficulty providing some types of support forces because it took time to implement the President’s reserve call-up. This led to the substitution of active component support forces for some reserve forces in the earliest deploying elements of its contingency force.

The capability of National Guard units is a central issue in designing the future force structure of the Army. Given the sometimes fast-evolving character of contingencies, key questions that The Army must address are how quickly can reserve component units be available after they are mobilized and what deployment timelines can they meet?

Mobilization and preparation for deployment is a multi-step process. First a unit mobilizes at its home station, moves to a mobilization station, prepares individuals and equipment for overseas movement, conducts collective training to reach proficiency on wartime tasks, then moves to its air or sea port of embarkation.

Determining the mobilization readiness of combat units is always challenging, whether active component or reserve component. In 1992, the RAND Corporation performed studies requested by the US Army to determine as objectively as possible how long reserve component combat and

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combat support units would take to be ready for deployment to assist in determining the ideal force mix of active component and reserve component forces. RAND determined that it would take from seventy-nine days to one hundred twenty eight days of post-mobilization training for a National Guard combat brigade to be validated for deployment while it would take eight days to sixteen days for most types of reserve component support units to be validated for deployment.

In 1997, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) performed a study that discussed deployment schedules for reserve component units. CBO stated that the Army might not be able to reach its timetable for assembling forces in theatre due to lift constraints. “Even if the Army can meet its timetable for delivering combat equipment to a major conflict, it is unlikely to do so for support equipment.” Based on the sealift and airlift available in 2001, CBO estimated that deploying combat and combat support troops and their equipment to Korea or the Middle East would take ninety to one hundred days. Deploying all of the necessary forces would require 110 days for Korea and 140 days for the Middle East. Lift constraints would have an even more profound affect on the deployment of forces for two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The need to finish deliveries to the first MRC would postpone completion of the buildup for the second MRC.

The delays incurred by inadequate airlift and sealift outlined by the CBO indicates that the reserve components can mobilize and prepare for deployment in time to participate in defending the nation. “Because lift would not be available sooner, CBO estimates that it would probably take at least 90 days to assemble the 90,000 reservists and their equipment in theatre.” CBO points out that during the Gulf War, support units that totaled 73,000 reservists did not assemble in theatre until about 200 days after Operation Desert Shield began.

The Army and the administration have made several changes since the Gulf War that could

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24 Ibid, 21.
accelerate the availability of reserve component combat and support forces for a major conflict. Legislation has made partial mobilization more flexible and calling up reservists to participate in smaller scale contingencies has become routine.

The Army could accelerate the deployment process if they identified units it would need to fight a conflict before it began. Activating those units immediately rather than over a period-of-time would make a significant difference in mobilization and deployment time. “If all 700 reserve units sent to the Gulf had been activated at the same time, and if enough lift had been available, virtually all of those units could have been mobilized, deployed, and transported in about seventy days rather than the 200 days actually required.”25 Given the long time needed to transport Army forces to a major regional contingency, waiting for the National Guard combat brigades might not significantly slow the arrival of the full combat force. If the Guard combat brigades were able to meet the Army’s goal of deployment within ninety days, there would not be room on the available lift assets to move all of them to the theatre. “The Army’s goal is for all the brigades to be assembled, trained, and ready to deploy within ninety days of the date they are called to active duty. However, latest arrival dates in actual war plans give some of the brigades considerably more time to be fully trained and transported to the war zones.”26

Training

Army National Guard units, combat and combat support, play an important part in any major contingency operation. The quicker they are prepared for deployment, the more force structure can be located in the reserve component. Organized and professionally conducted training is the cornerstone of readiness. The success of any unit’s post-mobilization training focuses on three important elements: missions, performance standards and peacetime training. The more complex


missions the unit must perform, the more extensive the preparation time required. The higher the performance standards required, the greater the preparation time needed, and the better the peacetime training, the shorter the preparation time prior to deployment.

Training must achieve a satisfactory level of competency before mobilization. Units and individuals must be trained well enough that they can be brought up to the required state of readiness in a reasonable period-of-time after mobilization. Combat maneuver organizations are the hardest of all Army assets to keep ready due to the collective training requirements. Achieving these skills can only happen through a vigorous repetition of collective training tasks that require significant time in order for them to become effective.

The difficulty facing the reserve component is the increasing technological revolution and pace of modern maneuver warfare that will require extensive training that will challenge the traditional allocation of thirty-nine days of training per year. How, on a part time basis, will the Guard create and maintain combat capable units in a complex environment with complex weapons systems? During these thirty-nine days, Guard units are expected to accomplish all the individual, crew and collective training tasks required by their wartime mission, including maintenance skills, State missions, integration of new soldiers, and all administrative requirements. Clearly, even the most organized and effective units cannot devote all thirty-nine days exclusively to training. It is commonplace for Guard soldiers, especially leaders, to spend much more than thirty-nine days a year to accomplishing these tasks. The two greatest challenges to Guard readiness are time available for training and their geographic distance from suitable training areas.

Most National Guard units are located significant distances from collective training areas. On average, a unit must travel forty miles to the nearest local training area, where soldiers can perform small unit training without firing live ammunition. To reach a major training area where it can conduct collective training a unit must travel 154 miles. The average unit must travel sixty-five miles to the nearest range in order to qualify with their individual and crew served weapons
systems. During an average unit’s annual training period, travel to and from the collective training site can consume up to two days. Drawing equipment and cleaning, repairing and turning it in can take up to three days. This leaves only ten days available for collective training in the best-case scenario. During weekend drills, travel to and from training areas and unit armories consumes time reducing the available time for collective training.

With only thirty-nine days available to perform collective training, planning and execution are essential to ensuring that National Guard units get the most out of their training opportunities. It can be argued that reserve component combat units can only accomplish minimal collective training tasks during a weekend drill simply because the time available “is not enough to organize a unit that has not been together for a month, issue equipment, travel to a training area, return to home station, maintain the equipment and turn in back in.” Weekend training is always a challenge and there must be some thought to changing the training methodology. “Despite the significant changes in the art of warfare, Selected Reserve training requirements remain essentially the same today as they were forty years ago.” As the Army undergoes changes in force structure, it must consider stationing and where units train in relation to their hometown armories. Changing the way Guard units train is a very complex issue with the potential for significant ramifications. Decisions will have an impact on recruiting and retention and will present challenges in the relationship Guard soldiers have with their employers and can conceivably create conflicts with family responsibilities. Any decision to adjust the historical method of weekend training and a two-week annual training period must balance with the possible repercussions that would result. It is also clear that with the emerging technological revolution and the ever-increasing complexity involved in military operations, some change must be made either in the missions assigned to the Guard, or in the allocation of training time. The

28 Ibid, p 70
29 Ibid, p 104.
costs of transformation will force some difficult decisions on Guard leadership to evaluate acceptable risk in reviewing the traditional method of Guard training and implement initiatives to determine the required training time necessary to ensure soldiers are prepared if they are to be called to duty. Operational deployments are increasing and will continue to increase. National Guard soldiers must be prepared to perform their mission if they expect to participate in the total force. Army leadership must have the confidence that Guard soldiers can deploy to dangerous areas without concerns about soldier readiness and their ability to meet the challenges that present themselves. Making a change in the time available for units to train appears to be a necessary step in ensuring the Guard can meet its obligation to the Army, and ensure soldiers can safely and competently execute their assigned missions. The Army can solve part of this equation by allocating specific missions and providing focused training guidance to allow Guard units to prioritize the range of missions that Guard units will expect to perform. This would allow units to narrow training tasks to a predictable and realistic set of skills to perform in the time available for training. National Guard units have an inherent challenge in meeting training goals due to having too much training to accomplish in the time available. In their role as state militia, the Guard must train for state missions such as providing emergency and disaster responses and supporting local community needs. At the federal level, the Guard’s role is to provide a flexible backup for active Army units fighting either of two nearly simultaneous regional wars that US military forces are required to accomplish. The Army has identified a variety of potential missions for Guard combat brigades, including offensive and defensive combat tasks, and replacing active duty units moved from peace operations to war zones. The brigades must also be prepared to fight in the deserts of southwest Asia, as well as the mountains and cold climate of Korea, the two primary theaters used for planning purposes. “According to brigade and Army war planning officials, war plans do not specify what Army unit the brigades will be assigned to, which mission(s) they will be assigned, or where they will deploy. As a result, it is difficult for the brigades to narrow their training focus to those tasks most likely to be needed, and whose standards can be met in the time
These facts have not escaped the attention of the National Guard. The Army National Guard Vision 2010 states the need to take advantage of emerging technologies to reduce the challenges of time and distance to training. “We will harness the technology of the information age to increase our readiness through innovative and creative training programs. We will leverage distributive training, distance learning, electronic classrooms, information networks, the Reserve Component Automation System, and other systems to realize greater training efficiencies.”

Distributive learning technologies will provide the Guard with an effective method of training individual soldiers while concurrently cutting down travel time and family separations. The use of simulation training sites will increase the amount of time soldiers spend on training and reduce the amount of time traveling to and from field training areas. The Guard has set a goal of establishing a distance learning facility within sixty minutes of every soldier. Simulation technology is growing rapidly and the Guard is devoting resources to exploiting this technology. The goal is to maximize training effectiveness through linking simulations and simulators to support a theatre of war with the simulations actually coaching the soldier and leader through training scenarios. “Every effort must be made to reduce soldiers’ time spent traveling to and from training areas, and conversely, increasing their time for training.”

Personal computer based individual and crew training programs will emulate weapons systems specific to the unit to which they are issued and can be available to soldiers on a daily basis, during drill weekends at the unit location, or during additional training assemblies. A networked suite of multi-echelon, multi-crew simulators, re-configurable to a wide array of weapons systems will drive battalion and brigade task force training. Units can achieve increased readiness by integrating virtual

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
training environments with live training environments to increase task repetition at multiple
echelons. “Simulations and simulators will assist commanders in developing leaders and soldiers
in individual, collective and functional tasks.”

Distance learning techniques have demonstrated potential by delivering training to a soldier’s
home to enhance individual training proficiency. Training using videotape, computer-based
training and interactive videodisk has proven to be cost effective and time saving methods to
overcome the time and distance challenges inherent in Guard training. Emerging technology will
continue to provide opportunities for training.

**Equipment**

A modern, technologically advanced force is vital to the National Guard’s ability to fulfill its
state and federal missions. Modern equipment will make Guard units interoperable with their
active duty counterparts, facilitating their deployment to support the nation. “Recognition that
Reserve forces are not merely forces in reserve should help overcome a major deficiency limiting
the utility of Reserve forces as a source of defense manpower; namely, equipment obsolescence
and shortfalls.” Forces that are not adequately equipped, nor able to be sustained in combat,
cannot be credible nor effective in executing wartime missions. Equipment not already in the
hands of trained soldiers cannot be brought to bear against an adversary.

A potentially dangerous situation exists in that Guard units typically train with older versions
of equipment handed down from active component units that are now outdated. The equipment is
frequently non-deployable due to age and non-sustainable due to replacement part shortages. It is
also operationally incompatible with the modern equipment utilized by the active component.

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Outdated equipment degrades training and readiness and increases maintenance time and
maintenance costs. Equipment distribution must reflect deployment schedules and missions
assigned to the Guard. “Nothing detracts more from the combat readiness and rapid deployability
of the nation’s reserve forces than equipment shortages and obsolescence.”\textsuperscript{35}

The Army must execute missions in an age of long industrial lead times. Short notice
deployment is ever present, but short notice acceleration of the industrial base is not. The
National Guard is operating in an era vastly different from the past and modern equipment must
be part of their expanded role. The surge of technological improvement is also creating an
obsolescence problem for the Guard. Equipment pushed to the Guard from the active component
is quickly becoming obsolete due to new advances in technology. “Thus, the modernization
process has moved so slowly for the Guard that obsolescence is catching up with and creeping
ahead of modernization.”\textsuperscript{36} To successfully execute critical wartime tasks, Guard units must be
properly equipped before mobilization and fully interoperable with all the equipment, systems
and procedures of the active component. The advantages are obvious: commonality facilitates
training, maximizes utilization, simplifies maintenance and ensures effective integration of the
Guard into the active component.

With the increasing role of the Guard across the full spectrum of operations, they must be as
ready in peacetime as active component units and as the Army becomes involved in more
frequent deployments to support smaller scale contingency operations, it becomes even more
reliant on the Guard to accomplish its mission. Obviously, a unit cannot train or go to war
without equipment, and it cannot fight as part of the Army without compatible, interoperable
equipment. “A reserve component field artillery battalion with no secure communications
equipment is absolutely useless as part of an active Army Corps that relies on secure

\textsuperscript{35} Philbin, Edward J., and James L. Gould. “The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration.” In The

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 54.
communications."³⁷

The Department of Defense policy that units scheduled to deploy first are equipped first is logical and makes sense, but as Desert Storm proved, this policy sometimes deviates from reality and some units scheduled to deploy first do not, while others who are not scheduled to deploy first, are in fact deployed early. This creates the situation that after mobilization the active component must ensure that the reserve component units are interoperable with their equipment. However, receiving new equipment after mobilization entails the requirement to conduct new equipment training, and in the era of technological advancement, new equipment training can take a long time, time that is not available when units are deploying into combat zones or regions where they must be immediately put to work to ensure mission success.

As the Army attempts to integrate the active and reserve component to meet the intent of the Total Force Policy, incompatible equipment creates challenges as the components train together. Where equipment differences are very large, they can delay or even prevent Guard units from filling or augmenting their active component counterparts. “Officials at the 40th Infantry Division (CA-ARNG) told us that none of their major equipment was compatible with that of their teaming partner, the 4th Infantry Division. They estimated that they were about ten to fifteen years behind the 4th Infantry Division in modernization.”³⁸ National Guard units are much better equipped today, however, substantial shortages of major items remain, adversely affecting readiness.

The Reserve component receives equipment “from other Army units through redistribution, procurement funds used to equip both active and reserve units, and separate funding provided by Congress specifically for reserve equipment.”³⁹ Army statistics show considerable progress in

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equipping the reserve component, but the statistics do not reveal the effects of continuing shortages. “Shortages of major equipment items totaling $13.7 billion remain, including some items considered essential to the reserves wartime missions.” A General Accounting Office study determined that the emphasis on the Army’s procurement program and its distribution priorities contribute to shortages in the reserve component. Support units receive comparatively less equipment than combat units receive due to the emphasis on modernizing combat equipment. The first-to-fight first-to-be-equipped distribution strategy places the reserve component on a lower level of resourcing due to later deployment dates. As a result, reserve component units often receive equipment later than active component units do, and some reserve requirements are never resolved.

The GAO also determined that the extent to which excess equipment from force reductions will help alleviate reserve component shortages is unclear since the types of shortages that the reserve component experiences may not match the items that become available. “When new equipment items are fielded, the older displaced items are redistributed first within the affected major Army command, even though a higher priority may exist elsewhere.” This policy allows commanders to resolve equipment shortages within their commands, but often results in sacrificing opportunities to fill other pressing needs across the total force.

Due to funding constraints, it may not be fiscally possible to equip all units to one hundred percent of their wartime requirements, and therefore, shortages will continue to exist. If the Army were to allocate specific wartime affiliations to the Guard, an analysis to determine which units need the priority for fill can be completed. This would ensure that specified units are able to train to a level of preparedness that allows them to execute successfully in the event of mobilization for either a wartime mission or an operations other than war mission.

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41 Ibid, 5.
Even though statistics may show that equipment authorizations for a given item are filled or even excess, some less capable items may substitute for other required items of equipment. “National Guard maintenance units were expected to maintain M1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles in the Gulf War when some had only trained on older types of equipment, such as M60 tanks and M113 personnel carriers.”

Under-equipped units face other challenges during mobilization. Units on the losing end of equipment transfers have difficulty preparing for their own deployment. If suitable equipment is not in the inventory, units will deploy meeting only the minimum standard for deployment. This creates problems in mission accomplishment for units attempting to integrate with the active component when the active units are equipped at a much higher percentage of fill. If the Guard is to effectively integrate with active component forces in future contingencies, they must gain experience during peacetime on the equipment they will use when mobilized. “Given limited resources, the costs of filling shortages must be weighed against the risks of being unable to correct the shortages upon mobilization and the impacts such shortages could have on the units’ ability to conduct their missions once deployed.”

Despite the efforts taking place to integrate the National Guard into the Army, integration will not succeed without equipment modernization and interoperability.

**Employer Support**

The change in National Guard utilization is forcing the Army and the National Guard to evaluate the impact of increasing deployments on soldier’s relationships with their civilian employers. More missions result in more training requirements and frequently, more time away from civilian employers who subordinate their own interests by willingly accepting the risk of financial hardship and organizational disruption. Employer support is critical to ensure the

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availability and readiness of the National Guard. National Guard personnel must make a full time commitment to what used to be a part time career and employers must be willing to support their employee’s service. Without an employer’s support, many guard soldiers would have to make a difficult decision whether or not to remain in the force. If the Guard loses its best soldiers because they perceive they have too many pressures in their civilian jobs resulting from their service, it will damage readiness and the ability of the National Guard to meet its obligation to the Army and the national defense. Multiple studies show that nearly a third of the soldiers who leave the National Guard point to employment conflicts as their reason for separation.

Employers do not derive any monetary benefit from supporting soldiers serving in the National Guard, and despite the benefits that military experience brings to an individual’s job, the employer must accommodate absences for training and active duty deployments. This is an especially tough predicament for small business owners. As operations tempo continues to increase, legislators must consider providing financial incentives or tax credits for employers to protect them from the turbulence caused by the loss of an employee due to the obligations inherent in military service. Unless legislators consider the sacrifices made on a daily basis by employers, the National Guard will potentially face the possibility of the reluctance of employers to hire people who serve in the National Guard.

**Legislative Support**

The responsibility for Army force structure and decisions on the roles and missions assigned to the National Guard rests with the Congress. It is up to the Army and the National Guard to present a strong rationale for decisions regarding the best methods to utilize the National Guard and seamlessly integrate it into the needs of the Army to meet the requirements of national security. The National Guard must take the forefront in restructuring and missioning decisions since it has the greatest amount of political power among all three components of the Army.
“Because of its dual-Constitutional responsibilities to serve both state and federal governments, the Guard is uniquely positioned to maximize the political powers of the respective state governors as well as its own national institutions.”\textsuperscript{44} The Guard has its own lobbying groups, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Adjutant Generals Association (AGAUS), who can access all fifty-four Adjutants General if there is an important matter that needs attention. If necessary, each Adjutant General can talk with their respective governor to organize a coordinated response, and contact lawmakers or critical decision makers very quickly. Each state’s Adjutant General sustains close ties with the state legislature and his or her influence affects the state’s political leader’s understanding about the activities and needs of the National Guard. In some districts, local National Guard units are the only exposure that congressmen have with the military.

The National Guard has traditionally used this power to protect itself from restructuring decisions, but in the current national security climate, the focus of that power must ensure the Guard fits into the national security strategy and the total force without sacrificing the core competencies of the active component and Army Reserve. Difficult decisions and sacrifices are necessary and laws may need revision. The National Guard must use its political influence to ensure lawmakers understand how “to leverage the total force’s ‘skills inventory’ for the betterment of the whole.”\textsuperscript{45}

The National Guard, as an integral part of the nation’s defense, has a distinctive ability to influence the actions of the elected representatives of government to reflect national will in the pursuit of national policy objectives. National Guard soldiers serve as the linkage between national policy and the population. These soldiers work in the local community, raise families, get involved in community affairs and have business contacts. When defense issues arise, their opinions receive special consideration due to their military knowledge and experience. “As part

\textsuperscript{44} Fautua, David T. "How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025." Parameters (Spring 1999): p 129.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, p.134.
of the local electorate, citizen-soldiers influence elections by sharing personal opinions with other voters in the community."\(^{46}\) National Guard soldiers are in the position to inform both their political leaders and their fellow citizens of the concerns common to the military and the public, and elected officials obviously take a greater interest in those issues that their constituency feels are important. “The amount of funding and personnel provided by a democratic nation depends on the perceptions and will of the public.”\(^{47}\)

As the size of the military decreases, its presence in the community decreases as well leaving many communities without any military presence. National Guard armories and training centers are becoming many communities only link to the military. “In American democracy, any mechanism which builds mutual understanding between the military and society helps ensure that military policy and military activities remain properly focused for the public good.”\(^{48}\)

**Utilization**

The National Guard performs numerous exercises, activities, and operations around the world that are essential to national security. They cover a broad range from training other nation’s militaries through the State Partnership Program, supporting theater Commanders In Chief through peacekeeping operations, stability and support operations, overseas deployment for training, and performing operations at home through counter-drug, homeland security defense and support to domestic emergencies. Clearly, while the ARNG provides the basis for rapidly expanding the Army’s available forces, they play an important role in a variety of operations.

The Army increasingly commits soldiers to missions that serve the nations interests both at home and around the world. The execution of the national military strategy has dramatically increased the operational pace of the Army even as it has reduced in size. “Over the past decade,

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the collective number of days annually that reserve forces are on active duty and contributing to ongoing military missions has increased thirteen-fold, from an average of one million duty days during the 1980s, to an average of thirteen million duty days in each of the past four years.\(^4^9\)

This reflects the reality that many critical skills reside almost entirely in the reserve component and the Army cannot sustain continued operations anywhere in the world without deploying the reserve component to accomplish these missions.

During fiscal year 2000, the Guard supported contingency operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia by deploying 2,932 soldiers in Operations JOINT FORGE (Bosnia), JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo) and DESERT SPRING (Kuwait/Saudi Arabia). The Guard deployed more than 22,000 soldiers under the Overseas Deployment for Training (ODT) program in support of theater Commanders In Chief and provided approximately 5,400 soldiers in support of stability and support missions in fiscal year 2001, an increase of 2,500 soldiers from fiscal year 2000.\(^5^0\)

In order to highlight the Guard’s contribution to the total force mission, I am reviewing its contribution under the following major categories: The State Partnership Program, CINC/Service Operational Support, Domestic Emergencies, Counter-Drug Operations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

**State Partnership Program**

Through its cooperative efforts with other nations, the Guard supports the national security strategy by fostering democracy, encouraging free market economies and promoting regional cooperation and stability. The state partners actively participate in a host of activities, including mutual training and familiarization events, internships and visits from civic leaders. These


deployments provide valuable training for the Guard, reduce Active Component Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and assist the Unified Commands in shaping the security environment.

The Army National Guard serves as a role model of a military force subject to civil authority for Central European and former Soviet Union countries.\(^\text{51}\) The Guard also provides training on military support to civil authorities in planning and responding to civil emergencies and natural disasters. Other areas of special interest for these countries are reserve forces training, mobilization to support active forces, recruiting and retention. The Guard provides seminars, contact teams, and state adjutant general/governor visits to Central European and former Soviet Union countries and hosts familiarization tours to the partner states in the continental United States. Since fiscal year 1995, Guard soldiers deployed to Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Republic of Georgia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

This program grew from the Partnership for Peace initiative to assist nations emerging from the Soviet Union in establishing a defense infrastructure and today, thirty states, one territory and the District of Columbia partner with thirty countries around the world.

**CINC/Service Operational Support**

Guard personnel support numerous missions around the world. Some of these efforts respond to the needs of theater Commanders in Chief (CINC), while others fill the needs of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-ups to support missions in Europe and Southeast Asia.

*U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)*

The Guard mobilized and deployed 1,395 soldiers to support Operation JOINT FORGE (OJF)

in Bosnia during fiscal year 2000. Units deployed supporting this mission include medical, public affairs, aviation, military police and transportation. To date, approximately 6,837 soldiers from more than 253 units, from fifty states, three territories and the District of Columbia have mobilized for active duty in support of Operation Joint ENDEAVOR/GUARD/FORGE. The 49th Armored Division (AD), Texas ARNG, provided the division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) for Task Force Eagle (Bosnia) from March to October 2000. Fiscal Year 2000 also saw the first mobilization of elements from two enhanced Separate Brigades as part of the maneuver force in Bosnia. Further ARNG Divisions will rotate to Bosnia and they are, in order: the 29th Infantry Division (ID), the 28th ID, the 35th ID, the 34th ID, the 38th ID and the 42nd ID.

In addition to deployments directed by the President, the Guard deploys soldiers and units into the European Command (EUCOM) to conduct training and provide a variety of capabilities. Support has steadily increased from 8,200 soldiers deployed in fiscal year 1997 to 13,500 in fiscal year 2000. These soldiers participated in more than twenty exercises including Operations STRONG RESOLVE, COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION, BALTIC CHALLENGE, CORNERSTONE and PEACE SHIELD as well as support to annual infantry/engineer OPFOR rotations in the Combat Maneuver Training Center-Europe. The Guard also provides Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) functions to include ground and aviation maintenance, engineer projects, military intelligence, infantry, military police, signal, medical, judge advocate general, chaplain, finance, public affairs and engineer facility support.

religious and security support for base camp operations at Camp Able Sentry in Skopje, Macedonia. Fiscal Year 2001/2002 will see the expanded deployment of Guard to include a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, Target Acquisition Battery, Rear Area Operations Center, Military Intelligence Force Protection Teams, Medical Company (Air Ambulance) and a Combat Engineer Asphalt Platoon. The mission ensures that the unrest in the Former Yugoslavia does not spill over the border to the South, into Macedonia.

**U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)**

The Guard supports CENTCOM with deployments in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) and Operation DESERT SPRING (ODS). The first six-month rotation of deployments occurred in February 1998 and continues with Guard soldiers providing an aviation task force headquarters, aviation crews, air traffic controllers, aviation maintenance and infantry company force protection assets.

Additional support to CENTCOM through the ODT program increased to nearly 400 service members in fiscal year 2000.\(^{56}\) This support consists primarily of military intelligence, equipment maintenance, military police, Special Forces and communications efforts in support of active component exercises such as INTRINSIC ACTION, LUCKY SENTINEL, NATURAL FIRE, IRON COBRA and BRIGHT STAR. In fiscal year 2001, more than 1,100 soldiers will participate in CENTCOM exercises, including CENTRASBAT.\(^ {57}\)

**U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM)**

The Guard deploys personnel to support U.S. Southern Command's regional strategy through Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETE), unit exchanges and exercises such as FUERZAS DEFENSAS, TRADEWINDS and FUERZAS ALIADAS. These training deployments focus on force protection activities, theater-wide equipment maintenance support,

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\(^ {57}\) Ibid
explosive ordnance detachment support to range clearing operations, special forces training to foreign soldiers, aviation and engineering support to conduct medical screening and immunizations of local nationals, and the repair and construction of rudimentary roadways, bridges, schools, and medical clinics.

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)

In September 2000 The Army Chief of Staff announced the alignment of Guard divisions and enhanced Separate Brigades to the Korean Major Theater War Area of Operations. Now, in the Pacific theater, training exercises necessitate Guard participation. In fiscal year 2000, more than 700 ARNG personnel participated in three major exercises in Korea, and exercises in Japan, Singapore and Thailand. Specifically, exercises FOAL EAGLE, YAMA SAKURA, COBRA GOLD and ULCHI FOCUS LENS. Linguists, engineers, aviation, maintenance, and public affairs personnel also provide support in non-exercise events.

In fiscal year 2001, the Guard will commit more than 3,000 Guard personnel to work with war-trace headquarters in these exercises to support the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) in the Pacific region. The Guard also deployed soldiers to participate in the Eighth Army Reception, Staging Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I) command post exercise.

Assistance in Domestic Emergencies

In addition to deployments in support of federal missions, the Guard fulfills a wide-ranging and highly visible domestic role. As part of its dual-mission responsibilities, the Guard routinely responds to domestic requirements within each state. These support missions reinforce their role as the military’s first response when domestic emergencies occur. The ability to rely upon the

59 Ibid
Guard for State support missions demonstrates the value of a part-time, trained, and ready community based force. Services provided in support of state requirements include security, electrical power, heat, water, transportation services, food, shelter, and search and rescue. In addition, the Guard provides emergency engineering support to victims of natural disasters, including hurricanes, floods, drought, winter storms, and tornadoes.

In fiscal year 1997, Guard soldiers in fifty-four states and territories served their communities during 308 emergency response missions, expending over 280,000 man-days. Of these 308 state mobilizations, 146 were natural disasters, thirty-five were civil emergencies, thirty-nine supported law enforcement agencies, and eighty-eight classified as miscellaneous missions. The most significant domestic activities during fiscal year 1997 involved operations supporting recovery from natural disasters. Guard soldiers provided assistance during Hurricanes Fran (North Carolina), and Hortense (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), and emergency support functions in connection with flooding in the Midwest and the Ohio River valley.

In fiscal year 1998, local governments in forty-eight states requested emergency support through their state Governments 308 times to reduce suffering and meet the critical support needs of local communities representing 374,115 soldier man-days.

In fiscal year 1999, local governments in forty-four states requested emergency support through their state governments 267 times. The Guard provided 281,276 soldier man-days in response to these missions.

In fiscal year 2000, local governments in fifty states, three territories and the District of Columbia requested emergency support through their state governments 288 times. The Guard

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provided 200,590 soldier man-days in response to these missions.\textsuperscript{63}

**Counter-Drug Operations**

The Guard assists law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. The focus of effort is to drug interdiction and demand reduction activities. The Guard provides a wide range of capabilities, including cargo inspection at ports of entry, aerial and ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, training, and construction of border roads and fences. The Guard is also providing training to law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations at the National Interagency Civil-Military Institute in California, the Multi-jurisdictional Counter-drug Task Force Training Program in Florida and the Regional Counter-drug Training Academy in Mississippi. Through these efforts, the Guard plays a supporting role in the battle to stem the flow of illegal narcotics into and across the United States.

Drug Demand Reduction activities in fiscal year 1999 provided 803,065 man-days in support of 16,744 domestic counter-drug missions.\textsuperscript{64} The Guard plans to increase emphasis on the support to reduction of drug demand in accordance with the priorities established by the National Drug Control Strategy.

In fiscal year 1998, Guard soldiers provided in excess of 552,543 soldier man-days in support of 13,212 domestic counter-drug missions in support of local law enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).\textsuperscript{65}


Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In conjunction with the emerging Homeland Security mission, one of the most critical initiatives for the ARNG involves Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) consequence management. Operating from a 1996 Congressional mandate, the Department of Defense and the Guard are working to assist local agencies nationwide with identifying requirements needed to respond effectively to potential terrorist use of WMD against the continental United States.

A central reason for the emerging Guard WMD mission lies in its domestic support capability. With a broad infrastructure of communications and logistics assets in all fifty-four states and territories, the Guard responds to a variety of natural and man-made disasters. At the implementation level, the Guard can provide planning and exercise coordination for disaster response training, as well as assisting in the procurement of urgently needed equipment. Additionally, in forty-five percent of the states, the Adjutant General is also the State Emergency Management Officer, thus providing a direct link between the Guard and the state agencies it supports.  

Finally, when the Guard completes planned communications integration, every armory can serve as a Joint Operations Center or Disaster Field Office. The combination of infrastructure and state level integration will improve the nation's ability to react to the use of WMD and all other disasters.

It is clear that with the increasing role of the Guard across the full spectrum of operations, they must be as ready in peacetime as active component units. As the Army increases its deployments to support smaller scale contingency operations, it becomes even more vital for the Guard to accomplish its mission as part of The Army. It is also evident that the Guard is a willing partner in accomplishing the national security strategy. The Guard participates in shaping the international environment, is actively preparing forces for the future and is ready to respond to crises when and where our interests demand. With the increased reliance on the Guard, it will be

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66 Army National Guard. Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, Army National Guard, Arlington,
up to The Army to redefine the Guard’s role, mission and force structure to ensure it is capable of meeting future challenges.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion and Recommendations

By drawing on the core competencies of each component, the Army can attain its objective of becoming a total force. The role of the Guard is vital in new ways and therefore its force structure, training, equipment and utilization must keep pace with the emerging national security environment and improvements in the active component. “Geopolitical conditions and economic constraints no longer permit us to think of the Guard and Reserve as merely forces of last resort; we must recognize them as indispensable to our ability to defend the nation.”\textsuperscript{67} To meet this requirement, the Guard must contain a balanced mix of combat, combat support and combat service support units that are structured to fit seamlessly with the active component. The Guard requires forces that are versatile, flexible, adaptable and optimized for missions required to support the national security strategy. The Guard cannot be all things to all people and The Army must decide how to employ the Guard as part of the total force. If later, deploying Guard combat units would better serve The Army in other capacities, it must identify, redesign, reequip and remission those units to ensure they are relevant.

The Guard needs a clear direction for the future and must base its force structure on an analysis of the current threat and force requirements. The active component should respond to missions requiring forward deployed units or rapidly deploying units. “Generally, the active component brings to the table forces maintained at the highest level of readiness; therefore, they are responsive to missions that require rapidly deployable forces.”\textsuperscript{68} The Guard should respond to


\textsuperscript{68} Vinson, Mark E. “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness.” Parameters (Summer 2000): p 25.
missions that require later deploying forces such as augmentation, reinforcement or rotational forces. The Guard can fully assume stable small-scale contingency missions to permit active component units to concentrate on preparing for their wartime mission. “With the right mission focus, force structure, and readiness enablers, much more of the reserve components’ combat force structure could contribute greatly to restoring the Army’s readiness for the full range of missions.”  

In the past, the Guard would challenge force structure changes to protect its legitimacy. “The fundamental reason a military force exists is to fight. To the extent that the Army Guard loses combat force structure, it can be postulated that it may lose its military legitimacy, and become increasingly seen as an institution peripheral to the central rationale for the Army’s existence.” Now, it is evident that if the Guard expects to contribute to The Army in this era of increased operations with reduced forces, it must accept restructuring as part of the costs of remaining relevant and a contributor to our nation’s defense. If the Guard is willing to accept restructuring, The Army must ensure that the advantages gained by the process outweigh any repercussions or loss of Guard capabilities.

The Guard must take a long, hard look at the historical training model of weekend training and a two-week annual training period. With the emerging technological revolution, the frequency of small-scale contingency operations, and the complexity involved in military operations, carefully analyzed changes must occur in the allocation of training time. The Army can assist in the process by allocating specific missions and providing focused training guidance to allow Guard units to prioritize the range of missions they will expect to perform. Making a change in the time available for units to train appears to be necessary in ensuring the Guard can safely and competently execute their assigned missions. Since it is common for Guard soldiers, especially leaders, to spend more than thirty-nine days a year to ensure readiness, why not change the

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70 Goldich, Robert L. The Army Reserve Components: Strength and Force Structure Issues. Washington,
training model? Technology based training systems are a step in the right direction, but combat maneuver units need space, time and repetition to master the art of modern warfare. If the historical training model remains intact, restructuring must take advantage of units that are close in proximity to installations where maneuver training replicating the actual conditions of warfare can take place. “Without a fundamental change in the way reserve combat divisions are organized and trained, there is little hope of preparing them for deployment within required timelines.”

Recent events demonstrate the critical role the Guard plays as part of the national security strategy, however, it must balance Federal and State requirements and maintain the support of families and employers. If the Guard is to succeed in providing responsive forces to support the national security strategy, it must restructure itself and prioritize specific missions to effectively utilize its assets. “The Army should restructure its forces and reallocate its missions to more effectively and efficiently use its entire force to execute the two-MTW strategy.”

The Guard cannot be all things to all people. With the time available for training, it is not realistic to expect the Guard to train to the level of readiness to fully respond across the full spectrum of operations. I would prioritize the Guard’s mission focus as follows: Small Scale Contingencies, CINC operational support, Homeland Security to include weapons of mass destruction, counter-drug efforts and domestic emergencies and reconstitution and reinforcement of the Active Component to fight two near simultaneous Major Theatre Wars.

The Army can support this focus by assigning wartime missions to every Guard unit including a permanent assignment to a theater Commander in Chief (CINC). This would permit Guard units to focus on specific tasks based on theater requirements and ensure the training and equipping of the unit reflects the potential threat. Units could establish an awareness of the

72 Ibid, p. 25.
conditions in their potential area of operations, establish training and support relationships with their supported CINC with increased force integration and interoperability as byproducts. As Guard units nest into the ongoing operations in the area under the CINC’s control, the CINC staff would gain an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of assigned Guard forces and would learn how to properly utilize those forces. Guard units could provide necessary soldiers and units on an ongoing basis and by internally establishing rotation schedules, balance the deployment workload on each unit. It would provide continuity to operations and a better organization of resources toward its mission that would allow Guard units to manage individual and unit deployment training and facilitate equipment modernization to ensure compatibility with their supported CINC. Guard deployments could fall into routine patterns that would resolve potential employer and family conflicts and ease unit turbulence.

The Army National Guard has recommended transformation of itself through the Army National Guard Re-Design Study. While this is a practical step toward transformation and the resolution of support force structure shortages identified by the General Accounting Office, there are long timelines involved and complex budget considerations to resolve before The Army initiates the recommendations, assesses, and validates the results of this effort.

Of the eight Guard divisions that essentially mirror the structure of the active component, the force structure of five are geographically dispersed among various states and the force structure of three are geographically contained within their respective states. (See Appendix 1) The fifteen enhanced Brigades are geographically distributed throughout the United States. (See Appendix 2)

The force structure that I propose designates forces to support each of the priorities outlined previously in this chapter: Support to Small Scale Contingencies, Operational Support to Theater Commanders-in-Chief, Support to Homeland Security to include domestic emergencies and support to the active component in preparing for Major Theater Wars.

The three Guard divisions that are geographically located within their respective states would retain their current force structure and participate in the transformation to the Interim Force and
eventually, the Objective Force. They would support the mission of reinforcing the active component and train to fight Major Theatre Wars. Their assignment to a Theater Commander-in-Chief would designate where they would fight if required, but they would retain the flexibility to respond wherever needed. Their secondary mission would be to provide CINC operational support that facilitates their primary mission. I recommend augmentation of these divisions with additional force structure specifically tailored to support Homeland Security missions to offset any degradation in war-fighting capabilities due to increasing responsibility to support Homeland Security missions in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001.

Three Guard divisions with geographical dispersion among various states and the Enhanced Brigades should be re-structured with a primary focus of Small Scale Contingency Operations, or Military Operations Other than War. After cross leveling modern combat equipment among themselves, excess combat equipment should go to the divisions supporting the Major Theater War capability to ensure the most modern equipment is available for training pending conversion to the Interim Force. These units would not need any force augmentation to support Homeland Security missions, as the inherent tasks necessary to successfully execute both missions are similar. These forces would be sufficient to provide rotational forces to fully assume the ongoing missions in the Sinai, Bosnia and Kosovo, and could assume future missions as they stabilize.

One Guard division with geographical dispersion among various states should reorganize to form permanent reserve component task forces to assume control of the current operations in the Sinai, Bosnia and Kosovo. The remaining division structure should convert to support forces to further resolve the support force shortfall in The Army or augment the Homeland Security capability in the divisions designated to train toward Major Theater Wars. Additionally, those support forces could move to the active component to increase their capability to respond to emerging, short notice, small-scale contingency operations until the situation stabilizes for assumption by the Guard as required. The task forces would fall under the control of the National Guard Bureau and under the command of the gaining Theater Commander-in-Chief.
One Guard division with geographical dispersion among various states would focus their efforts to support Homeland Security, to include Weapons of Mass Destruction consequence management and counter-drug operations. This division would fall under control of the National Guard Bureau and under the command of the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), who has the command authority to coordinate and deploy military forces to fight terrorism in the USA. JFCOM is already responsible for providing support to civilian authorities responding to attacks or disasters, and for planning the land and maritime defense of the continental USA. The Guard division will give the JFCOM Commander-in-Chief additional assets to deploy military forces domestically to fight terrorism and defend the homeland, in addition to maintaining a higher level of readiness and response capability.

It is clear that the Guard is contributing to the National Security Strategy and remains involved in operations around the world. The Guard is participating in shaping the international security environment, preparing its forces for the future and responds to crises when called to serve. Integration efforts are underway to take advantage of the core competencies in all three components of The Army, and they will continue to progress as those efforts mature. Transformation entails difficult trade-offs, and in this day of reduced force structure and increasing operational tempo, it is imperative that we fight as one force and look seriously at integration, interoperability and maximizing the contributions of each partner in The Army.
# APPENDIX 1

## Geographical Location of National Guard Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Brigade Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28th Infantry Division (M)</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, 55&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 56&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (all PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Division (Light)</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; and 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; (VA), 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; (MD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>34th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; (MN), 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; (IA), 66&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (IL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>35th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>67&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (NE), 69&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (KS), 149&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (KY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>38th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>37&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (OH), 46&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (MI), 76&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (IN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>40th Infantry Division (M)</td>
<td>California</td>
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<tr>
<td>42nd Infantry Division</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; (NY), 50&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (NJ), 86&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (VT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>49th Armored Division</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;, 36&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; (all TX)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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APPENDIX 2

Geographical Location of National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Syracuse, New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Honolulu, Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Clinton, North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Portland, Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Oklahoma City, Oklahoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53rd Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Tampa, Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Infantry Brigade (Light)</td>
<td>Indianapolis, Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Seattle, Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116th Armored Brigade</td>
<td>Boise, Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th Armored Brigade</td>
<td>Tupelo, Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Newberry, South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)</td>
<td>Lafayette, Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278th Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>Knoxville, Tennessee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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