SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: The National Guard (NG): A Future Homeland Security Paradigm?

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ABSTRACT

SAMS MONOGRAPH by Major Elizabeth E. Dreiling, California Army National Guard, 83 pages.

This monograph answers the question, Is the National Guard (NG) Counterdrug (CD) Support Program a suitable model to design an NG Homeland Security (HLS) force also capable of fulfilling the National Guard’s role as a first military responder and maintaining a warfighting capability as a federal ready reserve force?

In February 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century recommended that the National Guard (NG) fulfill a primary role in HLS and posture to assist first responders and provide state governors with immediate command and control capability tied to a National Crisis Action Center. Following the Hart-Rudman study, Department of Defense (DOD) agreed HLS was the NG’s responsibility, however an NG HLS program was not yet initiated or funded.

The horrific September 11, 2001 attacks accentuated the vulnerability of the United States to transnational threats. The attacks instantaneously resulted in unprecedented change in global security posture, thrust many of the national security recommendations into action, and released funding for HLS initiatives and immediate domestic security needs. Aware that the NG is accustomed to operations with state and local agencies and working as a joint first military responder under the Governor’s state response plan, the researcher sought a method to identify domestic HLS requirements that could address transnational threats such as terrorism. This led the author to the established NG CD support program for comparative analysis, a program developed to contend with the transnational threat of illicit drug trafficking.

To answer the question, the researcher conducts through a historical overview of the NG, two DTLOMS analyses, and a comparative analysis to determine parallels and shortfalls between the NG CD program and the requirements for an NG HLS force. The overview describes the founding of the militia, the dual role of the NG, and how the NG has played a major part in military operations both at home and abroad. In state status, as first military responders to domestic emergencies and disasters, NG members also conduct hundreds of actual domestic support missions each year. Analysis of the NG CD program confirmed that Title 32 NG CD members conduct CD operations as well as maintain a first military responder and federal ready reserve “warfighter” capabilities.

Review of domestic military HLS requirements, revealed that each of the ongoing missions necessary for HLS already exist in Joint, Army, and National Guard doctrine. Analysis of the NGs involvement in domestic HLS compared to alternative forces validated initial Hart-Rudman recommendations for the NG to fulfill a primary role in HLS. The nation benefits from the NG’s unique decentralized, responsive, adaptable, cost-effective, well-established, and fully integrated interagency capability. This allows the Active Component to rapidly project military power while avoiding legal, constitutional, and economic implications. The comparative analysis also identified NG CD program parallel and complementary capabilities to HLS requirements.

The research concludes that the NG CD program provides a suitable template to build an NG HLS force that can also fulfill a first military responder and warfighting capability. Since the two transnational threats, drugs and terrorism, so closely parallel each other, it is not necessary to build a massive new force structure from scratch. Instead, adding a limited number of ancillary missions and consolidating the NG CD program and other NG domestic support capabilities for an all-encompassing NG HLS force provides a responsive and cost-effective HLS solution. This monograph also includes recommendations to improve both Army and joint doctrine in order to minimize confusion over agency core competencies, roles, and responsibilities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank those people who made the completion of this research possible. In particular, I offer my sincere appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel Jerry D. Scott, who gave his valuable time in reading the many drafts and offering incisive guidance during the preparation and writing of this monograph. I am also grateful to the leadership and staff at the School of Advanced Military Studies and California National Guard for providing this opportunity, encouragement, and assistance.

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A special thanks to my mother, Carol Dreiling and friend Kenton Kidd, who endured my countless hours of conversation relating to this research and offered unswerving support.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR  After Action Review  
AC  Active Component  
ACC  Air Combat Command  
ACOM  Atlantic Command  
AD  Active Duty  
ADSW  Additional Duty Special Work  
ADT  Active Duty for Training  
AEF  American Expeditionary Force  
AFB  Air Force Base  
AFSC  Air Force Specialty Codes  
AFTP  Additional Flight Training Period  
AG  Adjutant General  
AGR  Active Guard/Reserve  
AMC  Air Mobility Command  
ANG  Air National Guard  
ANGI  Air National Guard Instruction  
AR  Army Regulation  
ARNG  Army National Guard  
AT  Annual Training  
BLM  Bureau of Land Management  
BUR  Bottom Up Review  
C2  Command and Control  
C4I  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence  
CA  Civil Affairs  
CAMP  Campaign Against Marijuana Production  
CAT  Crisis Action Team  
CBO  Community Based Organization  
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives  
CBRNE-CM  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives – Consequence Management  
CBT  Combating Terrorism  
CD  Counterdrug  
CDC  Counterdrug Coordinator  
CDF  California Department of Forestry  
CD RAID  Counterdrug Reconnaissance and Interdiction Aircraft  
CG  Commanding General  
CINC  Commander-in-Chief  
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
CM  Consequence Management  
CMIS  Counterdrug Management Information System  
CMO  Civil-Military Operations  
CMOC  Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center  
CNN  Cable News Network  
CP  Counter Proliferation  
CREST  Community Response Emergency Simulation Training  
CS  Civil Support
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<td>LA</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<td>LAV</td>
<td>Light Armored Vehicle</td>
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<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agency</td>
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<td>LP/OP</td>
<td>Listening Post/Observation Post</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Assistance to Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
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<td>OES</td>
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<td>OH</td>
<td>Observation Helicopter</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>Operation Order</td>
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<td>ONDCP</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PM</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Preparing for and Managing the Consequences of Terrorism</td>
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<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of Embarkation</td>
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<td>POMSO</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
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<td>RC</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
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<td>Security Assistance Training Field Activity</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
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<td>Special Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
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<td>Table of Distribution and Allowances</td>
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<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
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<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<td>UH</td>
<td>Utility Helicopter</td>
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<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>USPFO</td>
<td>United States Property and Fiscal Officer</td>
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<td>UTA</td>
<td>Unit Training Assembly</td>
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GLOSSARY

Active Duty (AD). Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the Reserve Components serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty [Joint Pub 1-02, 3]. Full time duty in the active military service of the United States (10 USC Sec 101 (d) (1). Active duty is always performed in a Title 10 (Federal) status. Active duty includes active duty for training (ADT) and active duty other than for training (ADOT) [NGR 500-2, 58].

Active Duty for Training (ADT). A tour of active duty which is used for training members of the Reserve Components to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency and such other times as the national security requires. The member is under orders that provide for return to non-active status when the period of active duty for training is completed. This includes annual training, special tours of active duty for training, school tours, and the initial duty for training performed by nonprior service enlistees [Joint Pub 1-02, 4].

Additional Duty Special Work (ADSW). A tour of active duty for reserve personnel authorized from military and reserve personnel appropriations for work on active or reserve component programs. This includes annual screening, training camp operations, training ship operations, and unit conversion to new weapon systems when such duties are essential. Active duty for special work may also be authorized to support study groups, training sites and exercises, short-term projects, and doing administrative or support functions. By policy, active duty for special work tours are normally limited to 179 days or less in one fiscal year. Tours exceeding 180 days are accountable against active duty end strength [Joint Pub 1-02, 3-4]. Duty status of guardsmen in addition to normal drill and annual training to perform additional or special work for the state or unit [Bloomquist, 13].

Air Surveillance. The systematic observation of airspace by electronic, visual or other means, primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of aircraft and missiles, friendly and enemy, in the airspace under observation [Joint Pub 1-02, 22].

Annual Training (AT). The minimal period of training reserve members must perform each year to satisfy the training requirements associated with their Reserve Component assignment [Joint Pub 1-02, 30].

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces [Joint Pub 1-02, 32]. Preventive measures accomplished through diplomatic and strategic policy planning [Vetter, 245].

Antiterrorism Awareness. Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorism [Joint Pub 1-02, 32].

Capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) [Joint Pub 1-02, 60]

Civil Authorities. Elected and appointed public officials and employees of Federal, state, and local governments [NGR 500-2, 58].
Civil Defense. All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a) minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack on the United States; b) deal with the immediate emergency conditions that would be created by any such attack; and c) effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack [Joint Pub 1-02, 69].

Civil Defense Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection and evaluation of information concerning all aspects of the situation in the United States and its territories that are potential or actual targets of any enemy attack including, in the preattack phase, the emergency measures taken and estimates of the civilian populations’ preparedness. In the event of an actual attack, the information will include a description of conditions in the affected area with emphasis on the extent of damage, fallout levels, and casualty and resource estimates. The product is required by civil and military authorities for use in the formulation of decisions, the conduct of operations, and the continuation of the planning processes [Joint Pub 1-02, 69].

Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces [Joint Pub 1-02, 70].

Combating terrorism (CBT). Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum [Joint Pub 1-02, 79].

Community. People with common interests living in a particular area, the area itself or a group linked by a common history and/or social, economic or political interests [NGR 500-2, 58].

Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Civilian agencies, coalitions, committees, councils, task forces, and similar groups who support drug abuse education, awareness, and prevention [NGR 500-2, 58].

Counterdrug (CD). Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs [Joint Pub 1-02, 102].

Counterdrug Nonoperational Support. Support provided to law enforcement agencies/host nations which includes loan or lease of equipment without operators, use of facilities (such as buildings, training areas and ranges), training conducted in formal schools, transfer of excess equipment, or other support provided by the services from forces not assigned or made available to the combatant commanders [Joint Pub 1-02, 102].

Counterdrug Operational Support. Support to host nations and Drug Law Enforcement Agencies involving military personnel and their associated equipment, provided by the theater combatant commanders from forces assigned to them or made available to them by the
services for this purpose. Operational support does not include support in the form of equipment alone, nor the conduct of joint law enforcement investigations with cooperating civilian law enforcement agencies [Joint Pub 1-02, 102].

**Counterdrug Operations.** Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking [Joint Pub 1-02, 102].

**Counterdrug Support Program.** Support provided to federal, state or local LEAs, civil authorities or Community Based Organizations to assist with drug interdiction and demand reduction activities under authority of Title 32 USC Section 112, in support of the National Drug Control Strategy [NGR 500-2, 58].

**Counterterrorism.** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism [Joint Pub 1-02, 105]. Measures emphasizing the tactical force option, for prevention, preemption, or retaliation against terrorist acts [Vetter, 247].

**Detection and Monitoring (D&M).** In accordance with 10 USC 124, the operation of detection and monitoring equipment to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the US as it approaches for the purpose of identifying and communicating with that vessel or aircraft and directing it to go to a location designated by civilian officials if it is unauthorized. In those cases in which a vessel or an aircraft is detected outside of the land area of the US, DOD personnel may begin or continue pursuit of that vessel or aircraft over the land area of the US. Detection and monitoring can also include ground monitoring of the border [10 USC 124 and Joint Pub 3-07.4, B-1].

**Doctrine.** Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application [Joint Pub 1-02, 135].

**Doctrine Development.** The process that develops and documents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for military operations in publications such as field manuals [How the Army Runs, 2-2].

**Domestic Support Operations (DSO).** Those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies [Joint Pub 1-02, 136 and FM 3-0, 10-1].

**Drug Interdiction.** The interception of illegal drugs smuggled by air, sea, or land [Joint Pub 1-02, 138].

**Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD).** Training or other duty, other than inactive duty performed by a member of the Army National Guard of the United States Training or the Air National Guard of the United States in the member's status as a member of the National Guard of a State or territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia under section 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505, of Title 32 for which the member is entitled to pay from the United States or for which the member has waived pay from the Untied States. Generally, counterdrug duty is performed in FTNGD status, although it may be performed in State Active Duty (SAD) status [NGR 500-2, 58-59].
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Geographic areas designated by the Director of the ONDCP in certain localities in the US as having the most serious drug trafficking problems and the most pressing need for more Federal assistance and to which federal resources are allocated to link local, state, and federal drug enforcement efforts [Joint Pub 3-07.4, III-26].

Inactive Duty (IAD). Training or duty performed by members of the Air National Guard in Title 32 (State status) under Title 32 USC sections 502(a)(1) or 502(f) and 37 USC section 1002. Air National Guard equivalent to Army National Guard Inactive Duty Training (IDT) [NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 50].

Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Training or duty performed by members of the Army National Guard in Title 32 (State status) under Title 32 USC sections 502(a)(1) or 502(f) and 37 USC section 1002. Army National Guard equivalent to Air National Guard Inactive Duty (IAD) [NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 59, 50].

Interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective [Joint Pub 1-02, 217].

Interceptor. A manned aircraft utilized for identification and/or engagement of airborne objects [Joint Pub 1-02, 217].

Law Enforcement Agency (LEA). Non-DOD government agency chartered and empowered to enforce laws in the following jurisdictions: the United States, a state (or political subdivision) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or to enforce U.S. laws within the borders of a host nation [Joint Pub 1-02, 247]. An organization, coordinating council or a task force comprised of several LEAs, empowered by Federal, state or local law to investigate, enforce or prosecute criminal laws regarding illegal drugs and controlled substances [NGR 500-2, 59].

Leader Development. The process that produces programs for the training and the professional and personal development of competent and committed leaders for the Army [How the Army Runs, 2-2].

Materiel Development. The process that conceives, develops, and executes solutions to materiel requirements [How the Army Runs, 2-3].

Military technician (MIL TECH). A Federal civilian employee providing full-time support to a National Guard, Reserve, or Active Component organization for administration, training, and maintenance of the Selected Reserve [JP 1-02, 277].

Organizational Development. The process that translates organizational requirements into organizational models and force structure [How the Army Runs, 2-2].

Posse Comitatus Act. Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code, Section 1385). This precludes the U.S. military from having police authority inside the United States [Joint Pub 1-02, 338].
**Proactive Measures.** In antiterrorism, measures taken in the preventive stage of antiterrorism designed to harden targets and detect actions before they occur [Joint Pub 1-02, 346].

**Seizures.** In counterdrug operations, includes drugs and conveyances seized by law enforcement authorities and drug related assets (monetary instruments, etc.) confiscated based on evidence that they have been derived from or used in illegal narcotics activities [Joint Pub 1-02, 388].

**Soldier Development.** The process of processes that concern the determination, addition, deletion, or modification of the Army occupational specialties. These range from the development of proposals affecting the force and/or grade structure of existing occupational specialties to the creation of entirely new occupational specialties to accomplish assigned missions [How the Army Runs, 2-3].

**State Active Duty (SAD).** Duty performed by a member of the National Guard of a State or territory, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia in the member’s status as a member of the State organized militia pursuant to State law and not pursuant to Title 10 or Title 32 [NGR 500-2, 59].

**State Plans.** Plan submitted annually by the states for National Guard Counterdrug Support Program activities under authority of Title 32 USC Section 112 [NGR 500-2].

**Suspect.** In counterdrug operations, a track of interest where correlating information actually ties the track of interest to alleged illegal drug operations [Joint Pub 1-02, 421].

**Terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological [Joint Pub 1-02, 435].

**Terrorist.** An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result [Joint Pub 1-02, 435].

**Terrorist groups.** Any element, regardless of size or espoused cause, that commits acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of its political, religious, or ideological objectives [Joint Pub 1-02, 435].

**Title 32.** Status is under the governor’s control, which is not subject to the *Posse Comitatus Act* (Title 18 U.S.C. § 1385) and allows the guardsmen to assist in law enforcement activities [Bloomquist, 13].

**Training Development.** The process that produces programs, methods, publications, and devices to support individual and unit training [How the Army Runs, 2-2].
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Americans are asking, “How will we fight and win this war?” We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network. Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success.  

President George W. Bush

Background of the Problem

The growing threat of a mass casualty transnational terrorist attack occurring on American soil, changed from a future notion to reality on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. People around the world watched Cable News Network (CNN) in astonishment and horror as terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using airliners as weapons of mass destruction. The horrific, well-coordinated attack intruded upon the American way of life and affected the hearts, minds, and souls of individuals that value human life all around the world.

Sadly, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent anthrax onslaught that prompted unprecedented change in national and even global security posture, was not our nation’s first wake-up call. In the past decade alone, the United States (U.S.) has fallen prey to numerous terrorist attacks. Some incidents abroad include: American missionaries taken hostage by terrorists in Kuna, Columbia (1993); bombing of a U.S. runway training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (1995); bombing of a U.S. military complex “Khobar Towers” in Saudi Arabia (1996); U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Ex Salaam, Tanzania (1998); and attack on the USS Cole (2000). Moreover, the U.S. confronted terrorist events on U.S. soil, such as the World Trade Center

The message is clear; terrorism targeted at the U.S. is not new and the U.S. and her allies will continue to face threats from terrorist groups inclined to create mass casualty effects like those so deeply etched in our minds on September 11, 2001. What has changed is our understanding of how terrorists will export or embrace the use of unimaginable suicidal weapons of mass destruction on American soil and the unquestionable realization that we as a nation must address these types of terrorist attacks while concurrently protecting the very liberties that makes us Americans.

Quite obviously, action for resolve can no longer simmer on the back burner. Regrettably, 9/11 triggered the immediacy and enormity of the terrorist threat. Nonetheless, as distressing as it sounds, the grievous events of 9/11 generated a newfound national awareness of the terrorist threat and even energized previous skeptics as to the true extent of the problem. Now, out of sheer necessity, this nation and the civilized world cannot discount transnational terrorism and must invest in preventing it. For Americans, our very survival as a free and prosperous nation is at stake.

After the 9/11 attacks, rather than succumb to terrorists’ additional threats to use acts of greater violence, President George W. Bush with the strong support of Congress, declared a “War against Terrorism.” As we all know, initial U.S. response to the War on Terrorism was powerful and resulted in military operations in Afghanistan, reserve call-up, and increased airport and seaport security.

Events in the past decade illustrate how radically the world has changed since the cold war ended. Though it appears the nation was still in somewhat of a reactive posture in regards to

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terrorism on U.S. soil, the U.S. Federal Government began addressing transnational threats such as drug trafficking and terrorism in the National Security Strategy (NSS). Fortunately, pre-existing national awareness of the ever-complex, post-cold war operating environment prompted substantial study into the subject of Homeland Defense (more recently Homeland Security), policy changes, and interagency training programs within the framework of State and Federal Response Plans. These plans enhanced many federal, state, and local preparedness and response capabilities to manmade and natural disasters and emergencies.

Fortunately, consequence and crisis management or preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities have received attention in the recent past. Otherwise, the situation in each of the domestic incidents above could arguably have resulted in many more casualties. The challenge ahead is to improve current response capabilities while vigorously addressing the means to prevent future incidents from occurring on U.S. soil. Newly generated national awareness due to the terrorist threat may now support government directed initiatives and the funding alignment necessary to address security shortfalls. Though not economically feasible to eliminate every possible threat to the U.S., it is crucial to design an effective and cost efficient means to protect our homeland. To expedite resolve, many of the recent national security studies might now receive appropriate attention, support, and aid in quickly deciphering gaps in current strategy and policy.

One expansive study on national security is the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, or Hart-Rudman Commission. The Commission members conducted the study in three phases over a two-year period. Phase I looked at how the world would likely evolve over the next 25 years. Phase II developed a National Security Strategy on how to address the new world. Phase III considered reform of government structure and the processes necessary to enable the National Security Strategy developed in Phase II. This resulted in the February 15, 2001 publishing of Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.
Phase III also identified the need for a single controlling authority at the national level to coordinate prevention and response efforts to domestic terrorism, which we now know as Director of Homeland Security (HLS). Additionally, the final phase recommended that the National Guard (NG) fulfill a primary role in HLS and posture to assist first responders and provide state governors with immediate command and control capability tied to a National Crisis Action Center.²

Furthermore, current Joint and Army doctrine recognizes the NG as a forward deployed, first responder force.³ Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.1 designated the NG as the primary Department of Defense (DOD) agency for disaster relief, and the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) characterized the NG as the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquility.⁴ Additionally, the National Defense Panel (NDP) and Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended assignment of consequence management responsibilities to NG units.⁵ As a result, based on these NG conditions and responsibilities and the new contemporary operating environment, the challenge ahead is to determine the capabilities the National Guard must possess to fulfill its role in HLS, while maintaining its federal ready reserve warfighting capability.

Key Terms and Definitions

The concept and use of Homeland Security as an operational term is new. Likewise, terms recently associated with HLS in many cases are new and not officially approved or

⁴ Department of Defense, Bottom Up Review (BUR), 1993, 91.
published in DOD publications. Therefore, for the purpose of this monograph, key terms below reflect either proposed DOD HLS and related definitions or existing DOD terms linked to previous concepts of Homeland Defense. The definitions should aid in clarifying the context of HLS terms in this monograph. However, the proposed DOD definition for HLS is not the important aspect of this research. Comparison of existing capabilities within the NG Counterdrug (CD) support program to those identified as necessary for securing the homeland are the critical focus. Finally, the glossary contains additional DOD and civil source definitions and terms associated with homeland security, the NG, and the NG CD support program.

Civil Support (CS). Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and authorized law enforcement activities.  

Consequence Management (CM). Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation or terrorism. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required.

Crisis Management. Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency.

Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizational, Material, and Soldier (DTLOMS). A process of determining Army requirements and translating them into programs and structure, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. The DTLOMS process consists of the six sub-processes specified in the acronym, which together operate as part of force development leading to the approval and

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6 J-7 Information Paper, “Proposed Definitions of Homeland Security and Related Issues.” (Fort Monroe, VA, 31 October 2001), 2. The information paper with proposed HLS, HLD, and CS terms, definitions, and supporting rationale, was submitted after staffing as an attachment to a Joint Staff Action Processing Form addressed from J-7 JDB through DOD/Joint approval channels on JS Form 136 on 20 November 2001.


8 JP 1-02, 107.

resourcing of Army organizations. Each sub-process is separately defined in the glossary. In this study, the use of DTLOMS will provide a template to attempt to determine if requirements in each domain currently exist and where possible to identify shortfalls.

**Homeland Defense (HLD).** The protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.\(^{10}\)

**Homeland Security (HLS).** The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, defense against, and response to aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support.\(^{11}\)

**Methodology and Significance of Research**

The author will use research from both primary and secondary unclassified sources to determine whether the present NG CD support program provides a suitable model for designing an HLS force while maintaining a warfighting capability. Primary sources will include national security policies and strategies, congressional reports, published plans, findings and recommendations, historical military data and reports, and directives. Secondary sources will include newspaper articles, periodicals, literature about homeland security, military publications, scholarly journals, and past research monographs.

This monograph intends to show that forward deployed NG military resources provide tremendous capability to federal, state, and local agencies, significant contributions to the “War on Drugs,” and that Full-time National Guard Duty Counterdrug (FTNGDCD) personnel maintain or exceed warfighting capability relative to other federal reserve warfighters. Additionally, it intends to illustrate how the NG is accustomed to working jointly as part of the Governor’s state response plan. The NG by nature has already established trust and long-term cooperative interagency relationships with state and local agencies. Finally, the monograph seeks to determine if the NG CD support program contributes to the readiness of NG soldiers and has similar, if not matching,

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\(^{10}\) J-7 Information Paper, 2.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 1.
capabilities as those needed to fulfill a new mission in homeland security as suggested by the NSS, capability studies, and the Roadmap to Success.

To wit, this monograph will examine the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Executive Agent of a state in regards to the NG, review historical use and handling of the NG during previous changes in national security or war, recent employment of the NG both domestically and abroad, and the capabilities the NG CD support program provides to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), Community Based Organizations (CBO), and youth programs, which includes activities in supply reduction and drug demand reduction or prevention. Additionally, using doctrine, training, leadership development, organization, material, and soldiers (DTLOMS) as a model, the researcher will analyze how the NG has organized its efforts to provide full-time counterdrug support while maintaining its reserve warfighting capability.

Subsequent to the NG CD support program analysis, the monograph will examine evolving HLS policy and attempt to deduce required NG capabilities for conducting HLS. Finally, the researcher will attempt to provide suggestions for a design that can fulfill NG requirements based on apparent shortfalls or gaps in existing structure and not in conflict with other primary agencies.

The six chapters in this monograph escort the reader through the process used to solve the problem: Is the National Guard (NG) Counterdrug (CD) Support Program a suitable model to design an NG HLS force that is also capable of fulfilling the National Guard’s role as a first military responder while maintaining a warfighting capability as a federal ready reserve force?

Chapter One introduces the background, purpose, research methodology, and significance of studying domestic terrorism as a national security issue in this post-cold war era. Additionally, this chapter defines key HLS terms used throughout the monograph.

Chapter Two describes the history and dual role of the National Guard. It briefly reviews the NG’s experience in defending the homeland, warfighting role, domestic support, and its recent
increased augmentation to the active Army and Air Force. Finally, the chapter examines manning requirements for conducting prevention, preparedness, response and recovery operations in support of civil authorities.

Chapter Three reviews the background and capabilities of the NG CD Support Program. To establish a framework for later comparative analysis, the researcher analyzes the NG CD program in each domain of the DTLOMS model to determine existing capability and the program’s use of FTNGDCD personnel in both a counterdrug full-time support and warfighting role.

Chapter Four examines current aspects of HLS policy and proposed national security initiatives. Based on recent proposals, the researcher will review current NG domestic capability and use the DTLOMS model to identify each DTLOMS domain or sub-process within the existing HLS capabilities of the NG.

Chapter Five answers the principal research question based upon the evaluation criteria and research completed in chapters 2 through 4. The intent is to accomplish this by identifying any parallels drawn from NG domestic support missions. This includes counterdrug experiences within the past decade, to the most recent domestic terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Based on DTLOMS findings in chapters three and four, the chapter will identify current NG HLS capabilities and shortfalls.

Chapter Six concludes the review of factors contained in the research, provides findings, synthesizes research, and makes recommendations as to the most efficient and cost-effective military design for combating terrorism in the homeland. This chapter seeks to offer a useful concept for the NG HLS mission. It substantiates whether FTNGDCD personnel are able to conduct full-time counterdrug support missions while sustaining their wartime mission readiness. The monograph will also provide a general framework for additional, more detailed analysis of the Army’s ever-changing role in HLS.
Finally, there is no reason to suspect that the strategic operating environment will change to a point of eliminating the transnational threats of drug trafficking or terrorism in the coming years. Hence, the author believes that this study is important for the following reasons:

- The changing global operating environment requires a responsive force with HLS capability.

- As stated by Secretary of Defense, “Adopting a capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to adversaries.”

- The nation will need to maintain a cost effective, yet responsive HLS capability even if both the active and reserve forces have deployed to two overlapping major crises in different regions or multiple small-scale contingencies.

- Economy and effectiveness.
  - The force must have greater military capability at lower total personnel levels.
  - In addressing HLS, we must also deliberately consider limited resources and the impact HLS programs will have on our national treasury/economy.
  - Avoid duplication of effort.

- To address some of the following considerations in the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) dated September 30, 2001.
  - DOD must identify and examine resource implications, which links back to the concerns of economy and efficiency above.
  - DOD recognizes the importance of working through an integrated interagency process (the NG already does this routinely).
  - DOD will place new emphasis on counterterrorism training, drawing on the capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard.

- The NG must possess HLS capabilities because current military doctrine, both Joint and Army, and the Federal Response Plan, recognizes the NG in state status as a forward present force and first military responder.

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13 QDR, 70.
14 QDR, 34.
15 QDR, 19.
CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

The Congress shall have the power...

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.\textsuperscript{16}

Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16

Background of the Army National Guard

The practice of using citizens to bear arms in defense of their country has a long history. For instance, the Roman Empire “depended upon the Comitatus, a full-time, regular army backed by the limitanei of part-time soldiers living on the land along the Empire’s long frontiers and charged with defense in time of emergency.”\textsuperscript{17} Another example, guardsmen in the tenth century had the duty to defend the Saxon kings. By the twelfth century, Henry II reemphasized the universal military obligation of able-bodied men and their use only in service to the king. In the fourteenth century, England raised citizen soldiers and ratified statute restricting their use to within the citizen’s county of origin with exception only during an invasion of England.\textsuperscript{18}

John K. Mahon in his book, History of the Militia and the National Guard, suggests that the Tudor monarchs shaped the use of the citizen soldier in North America. He explained that Tudor England could not afford a professionally trained force like other forces in the European continent and therefore had to rely on the able-bodied male population for defense. Elizabeth I, in the 1570s, expanded the notion of citizen soldiery and England statutes confirmed the requirement for militias to muster for training four times a year. Furthermore, militia musters

\textsuperscript{16} National Guard Association of the United States, “1997 Legislative Priorities of the National Guard,” 1997.


\textsuperscript{18} National Guard Association of the United States, “1997 Legislative Priorities of the National Guard,” 1997.
began what became a systematic approach to training and compensating citizens as soldiers and fining those able-bodied males that failed to participate in musters.\textsuperscript{19}

As Mahon suggested, though many earlier historical examples of citizen soldiery exist, the English concept of the militia is the one recognized as following the first settlers to North America. Each of the original thirteen colonies developed militia charters with the same premise—that every white male settler had a military obligation because they were responsible for their own defense. As the colonists began to expand into Native American territory, Indians became a greater threat to the settlers than other traditional threats to independence. Indians nearly massacred the English settlers in Jamestown in 1622. As years past, the settlers realized they must coordinate support between colonies to prevent a repeat of the losses in Jamestown and ensure their survival.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1636, as tribal threats grew, Massachusetts Bay sought assistance from outside citizens. Subsequently, Plymouth joined the fight against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut.\textsuperscript{21} In the same year, the Massachusetts Bay Colony organized America’s first permanent militia regiment. The National Guard traces its roots back to this first regiment, known as the oldest component of the Armed Forces of the United States, predating the founding of the nation.\textsuperscript{22} The militia or citizen soldiers played a crucial role in protecting their fellow citizens from Indian attacks and foreign invaders and later helped to win the Revolutionary War. Leaders from Georgia specifically referred to the militia as the “backbone of defense.”\textsuperscript{23}

As numbers of militiamen grew, other colonies began to form regiments. The members of the militia, known as the “Minutemen,” were ready for duty in a minute’s notice. When immediate danger threatened an area, the senior militia officer could call out the units of the

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\textsuperscript{19} Mahon, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{20} Mahon, 4, 30/31.
\textsuperscript{21} Mahon, 31.
\end{flushleft}
standing militia. This type of mobilization was especially successful during the Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century. Militia companies called en masse prevented the landing of parties from Dutch warships that had penetrated Chesapeake Bay. In the next decade, the New York militia fended off another hostile landing. In 1706, Charleston, South Carolina companies foiled a Spanish attempt to capture their city.\(^\text{24}\)

During the eighteenth century, there were two schools of thought about the issue of a large standing regular force versus heavy reliance upon militia forces. Federalists wanted a strong central government and large standing Army with a militia firmly under control of the federal government. Advocates of state sovereignty believed in the power of the states and a small or non-existent regular army with state controlled militia. During the Revolutionary War, “economic factors and the practical impossibility of raising a large, long-term army that Washington wanted caused him [George Washington] to rely upon the militia to build up his forces for major campaigns.”\(^\text{25}\) Consequently, Commanders realized they must rely on the militia despite any of their weaknesses and learned how to use the strengths of citizen-soldier’s to help defeat the British Army.\(^\text{26}\)

After the Revolutionary War, concern over too much power in the hands of one person and debate over the military issue continued. Another factor, war debt and limited resources could not support a large standing military.\(^\text{27}\) Therefore, in 1776, the Continental Congress established a committee to work on the charter of government. Not until 1781 were the Articles of Confederation ratified, creating a decentralized government with sovereignty vested in the state

\(^\text{23}\) Mahon, 14.
\(^\text{24}\) Mahon, 32.
\(^\text{25}\) Crossland, 4/5.
\(^\text{26}\) Mahon, 47/48.
\(^\text{27}\) Crossland, 4.
and a “firm league of friendship in which the individual states pledged to defend each other.”

In 1787, the delegates ratified the Constitution, which split power into fragments to prevent overwhelming power in any person or agency essentially creating two roles for the NG.

**The National Guard’s Dual Role**

The framers of the Constitution empowered Congress as the sole authority to raise taxes to pay for the military if they chose to create one, the right to declare war, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. The militia clause of the constitution also gave states authority to appoint officers and to train the citizen soldiers according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. The President received Commander-in-Chief (CINC) authority of the militia only when called to actual federal service of the nation. “Not the President but Congress acquired authority to summon state militias into federal service, for three specific tasks only: to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasion.” Hence, the state and federal authorities in the constitution established the basis for the NG’s dual role.

The NG has maintained a dual state and federal role since its birth, though not without challenge. The two opposing positions regarding a large standing army versus a state controlled militia have persisted for centuries. Each time the nation has mobilized the NG, national leaders in the standing military have tried to provide rationale to justify an increase in the standing military and decrease or eliminate the state control aspect of the NG.

After the Korean War, representative Leroy Johnson from California accused the regulars of trying to “massacre” the reserve system. Thomas E. Curtis of Missouri said, “The Nation’s highest military leaders are sabotaging Congressional efforts to develop a working

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28 Mahon, 46.
29 Crossland, 6; and Mahon, 46 to 49.
30 Mahon, 49.
reserve program in favor of a large standing army.”  
Despite these repeated challenges to the NG’s very existence as a state controlled entity, Congress has consistently reaffirmed the dual status established by the Constitution recognizing that “the dual federal and state roles and missions of the NG make it the most cost effective portion of the defense establishment.”

Today, the NG remains a unique dual state-federal military organization with characteristics resembling the colonial militias, while concurrently fulfilling a federal requirement of maintaining a warfighting capability and augmenting the active force when called. Unlike other armed services, individuals in the NG execute two oaths, one to the United States and one to their state. The resultant is two NG missions. One, to serve as the primary combat reserve force of the Army and Air Force by providing trained, equipped and ready combat and support forces available if called by the President. The second, to fulfill a peacetime state mission, providing the governor of their assigned state or territory with trained and ready units, organic chains of command, control and communications for employment in times of emergency to ensure public safety, protect property, and maintain public order.

Since governors are the responsible officials for domestic response missions, the state and local agencies along with their state NG, provide the primary response forces for domestic emergencies. The NG remains the primary military force during these periods unless the governor requests support from the president and involvement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), as amended by Public Law 100-707,

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32 Mahon, 82, 120/121, 142 to 148, 152/153, 170, 181, 222; 1997 Legislative Priorities of the NG, 5; and Crossland, 5.
33 Mahon, 219.
34 1997 Legislative Priorities of the NG, 5/6.
35 Wright, Robert K. and Hylton-Greene, Renee, A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, (Washington, DC, National Guard Bureau, 1986); Robert D. Bloomquist, Robert D., “From Drugs to Bugs: The National Guard’s Expanding Role in the National Security Strategy” (Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 15, 2000), 5 to 6, 3; and 1997 Legislative Priorities of the NG, 6.
and retitled as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288, as amended).\(^{36}\)

Congress formalized the distinction between the NG’s dual role in 1956, which provided for differences in the employment of federal and state or territorial forces in United States Code (USC). Laws pertaining to the Federal role of the National Guard are contained in Title 10 of the Code, while laws relating to state/territorial role are contained in Title 32.\(^{37}\)

The National Guard as Warfighters

The National Guard or militia has a longstanding history of warfighting. Appendix One of this monograph provides a listing of some of the NG’s warfighting involvement from the Pequot War to Desert Storm and recent figures of NG/Active Component (AC) integration or augmentation to the AC. Some important events and legislation shaped the NG’s evolution into what is today a primary federal ready reserve warfighting force.

Early in our nation’s history, “the militia fought the British and their Indian allies from the Great Lakes to New Orleans.”\(^{38}\) Throughout the 19th century, the Regular Army (RA) remained small and the militia provided 70% of the troops that fought in the Mexican War and the majority of troops during the initial months of the Civil and Spanish-American War. By 1899, after continued reliance on the militia, Elihu Root, in his *Report of the Secretary of War*, stated, “the regular establishment of the United States would never itself be the whole machine with which wars would be fought…the Regular Army would form but a part of a great wartime body.”\(^{39}\)

In 1901, Root wrote that young men seeking volunteer commission “should be made competent to perform the duties of volunteer officers in the staff and supply departments.”\(^{40}\) Root explained, “without such a class at the outbreak of war, with a large volunteer force being called

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\(^{36}\) 1997 Legislative Priorities of the NG, 6; and FRP (for public law 93-288, as amended), 1.

\(^{37}\) NICI, CMC Guide, 4-2.

\(^{38}\) Crossland, 12.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 12.
into being, there will always be confusion, waste, delay, and suffering.”\textsuperscript{41} By 1902, Root proposed the creation of two categories of Volunteer Reserves and he emphasized the “effectiveness of militia or volunteer units depended largely upon the aid which they received from the national government.”\textsuperscript{42}

In 1903, Public Law 57-33, commonly known as the Dick Act after Major General Charles W. Dick, supported an upgrade of the NG. The legislation reaffirmed the principles of federal funding, federal inspections, and federal standards for training. Under the Dick Act, militia units that drilled at least twenty-four times a year and conducted summer encampment could receive arms, equipment, and general military stores from the federal government. Furthermore, NG officers could attend RA schools and Guardsmen would receive pay while on maneuvers. The Elihu Root plan and Dick Act of 1903 paved the way for years of continued legislation to enhance the readiness of the militia.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson mobilized 158,000 NG in response to raids by Mexican bandits and revolutionaries along the Mexican Border. The same year, ratification of the National Defense Act provided for a number of benefits for the NG. The act guaranteed the state militia’s status as the primary reserve force, required all states to rename the militia – National Guard, prescribed NG officer qualifications, allowed attendance to Army schools, and paid for drills as well as annual training. Most important was the NG’s recognition, when in federal service, as a component of the Army of the United States organized like regular army units.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 12/13.
During World War I, the NG was more than double the size of the regular force and made up 40% of the U.S. combat divisions. When the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) reached its final strength, it consisted of eight regular, eighteen NG, and seventeen draft divisions and “the NG demonstrated it could ready as fast as the regulars, and because of prewar organization, could start training six to eight weeks ahead of the divisions composed of draftees.”

In World War II, three of the first five divisions were NG units, placing the NG among the first to deploy and fight overseas. Following World War II, NG aviation units that initially formed in 1915 became the Air National Guard (ANG).

During the cold war, NG soldiers and airmen fought in Korea, reinforced North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Berlin crisis, almost 23,000 were called-up for Vietnam, and over 62,000 Army and Air Guardsmen were called upon for Desert Storm. Within the same period, the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 recognized the importance and fiscal desirability of reserve forces. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made the economic link between the need to hold down Defense costs and the cost effectiveness of the Reserve Components (RC) in August 21, 1970. Secretary Laird’s Total Force Policy established the NG and Reserve, rather than draftees, as the initial and primary source of military augmentation in any emergency requiring rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.

Following the Gulf War, the US military experienced a reduction in force and yet an increase in the number and scope of missions. The NG and Army Reserve forces have had to augment an increasing number of missions both at home and abroad to include space operations,

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44 NGB History website.
45 NGB History website; and Reserve Affairs Handbook, 44.
46 Crossland, 121/122.
47 Crossland, 214.
national missile defense, intelligence, and special operations.\textsuperscript{48} In just the past decade, the frequency of NG call-up for its federal mission has increased. No longer is the NG trained and held in reserve; the NG is more and more providing specialized service and augmenting the AC in contingency operations around the globe to include operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Kuwait, Panama, and Egypt.

Most recently, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 50,000 NG soldiers were federalized to provide security at home and combat terrorism abroad.\textsuperscript{49} In addition to these numbers, the NG continues to fulfill previous overseas commitments as well. Based on the NG’s historical involvement in warfighting for over three hundred years and the rise in NG requirements over the past decade, there is little reason to believe the NG’s pivotal role as a federal reserve of the Total Force will significantly decline.

**The NG: A Forward Deployed Force and First Responder**

Clearly, the use of the NG for state emergencies and disasters is not new. Throughout the history of the United States, the National Guard or militia has conducted what we now refer to as domestic support operations. The militia was used to protect the coasts and borders of the United States as early as the 1880s and 1890s. It conducted internal police and security work in response to labor disputes, civil uprising, and strikes, such as the employment of 4000 Guardsmen to suppress violence during the Pullman strike of 1894.\textsuperscript{50} Recognizing the long history of the NG as a first responder, John K. Mahon described the importance of the NG in domestic support operations by asserting:

\begin{quote}
Militiamen served their states far more than they ever did the United States; indeed, the states could not have carried on government without them. They were an indispensable part of ceremonies and parades; they turned out when the police could no longer keep
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{49} NGB ARNG History website.

\textsuperscript{50} Mahon, 118 to 120.
order; they manned coastal forts, for example, during the pseudo-war with France; they guarded criminals; and enforced quarantines against infectious diseases. In slave-holding areas they also functioned as patrols…One reason for such call up was the federal government simply could not carry out its Constitutional obligation at all times to protect the several states from invasion.  

As in the past, state and local officials operating under authority granted to them by state constitutions and local charters have the primary responsibility for the safety and security of their citizens. Within their respective communities, these authorities such as mayors, city managers, local police, sheriffs, fire protection officials, public health officials, educators, and judges represent the first level of support during the response to any disaster or emergency. Their responsibilities include emergency preparedness planning, prevention, response to, and recovery from natural or man-made disasters and emergencies. Examples of such disasters and emergencies include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, wild fires, chemical spills, nuclear accidents/incidents, civil disturbances, drug trafficking, and incidents of terrorism and/or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 

Because the NG is the only military force immediately available to a Governor, the NG plays a vital role and is included in this first level of prevention and preparedness planning and response when required. The NG State Area Command (STARC) in each state maintains a relationship with the community at each level of organization. The state-level emergency preparedness office and the Adjutant General’s (AG) staff work closely together as a matter of necessity. Many Adjutants General have command and control of the state’s emergency preparedness division. In the states where this is not the case, there is a natural close liaison because of the mutual support required.

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51 Ibid., 61.
Regardless of their alignment, the State Emergency Management Offices (SEMO) and National Guard units fall under the governor’s supervision. Additionally, county emergency coordinators and local NG personnel conduct interagency training and have standing operating procedures in place. Due to these established interagency relationships, the Army and Air NG, as members of their community, will unquestionably continue to serve as primary military respondents to domestic emergencies and disasters.53

“The National Guard has time and again demonstrated its capability and effectiveness in responding to state emergencies.”54 The National Guard operates daily with state and local headquarters found in communities throughout America. The NG operates over 3,100 owned and 141 leased armories in 2,700 communities in 54 states and territories. In addition, the Army National Guard federally supports the operation and maintenance of more than 19,000 training, aviation, and logistical facilities located throughout the nation. Furthermore, congressional approval of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) provides for NG responsiveness beyond state lines by allowing the use of NG assets between states. The forward presence of NG citizen soldiers is not only cost effective, but it is an essential part of DOD and a natural and vital link to the American people.55

Appendix Two provides a list of some of the NG’s recent domestic support while under state control. The figures represent mandays or personnel workdays and state call-ups above the NG’s regularly scheduled training periods or federal activation as addressed above and in Appendix One. The following chapter will look closer at the NG’s well-established domestic

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53 Bloomquist, 5 to 6; FM 100-19, 2-9 to 2-13; Reserve Affairs Handbook, 15 and 27, referring to conclusions from the Department of Defense "Bottom-Up Review" of Reserve Component Forces, Sept. 1, 1993.
54 Edward J. Philbin (ret), MG, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!” (7/23), National Guard, February 1997, 7.
support program, to assist in determining whether the NG CD Support Program is a suitable model for satisfying the NG’s HLS missions while maintaining a warfighting capability.
CHAPTER THREE

NG CD SUPPORT PROGRAM REVIEW

The National Guard Counterdrug Program is a domestic program that reaches into every community in the U.S. and its territories. National Guard soldiers and airmen live and work in the very communities they support. The Counterdrug Program has earned us an important place in assisting drug law enforcement and the community at large by furthering their efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the drug problem. Thousands of highly skilled people work daily to support local, state, and federal anti-drug organizations. In addition, we draw upon the entire National Guard equipment and facilities to add capabilities that otherwise might not be available to our customers—law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations. Finally, by providing leading-edge technology, we are able to help produce safer and more effective operations...The National Guard is proud to be a full partner with all levels of drug law enforcement and community-based organizations. We are able to transfer our military training and skills to those who need us most. We have enjoyed over 200 years of serving the nation and we will not give up the fight until our homeland is safe from the plague of drugs.  

John C. Mosbey, Colonel, Former Chief, NGB-CD

Background of the National Guard Counterdrug Program

The National Guard’s involvement in counterdrug activities traces back as far as 1977 when the Hawaii Army NG provided aerial transport to drug law enforcement agents during “Operation Green Harvest.” Over the following decade, NG support to LEAs continued to grow and NG CD operations in California, New Mexico, and Texas expanded, providing models for other state programs. By 1983, National Guard involvement in the nation’s war against illegal drugs included four states, four missions, and four loans of military equipment. By 1988, 32 states were conducting counterdrug support operations.

Nearly a decade after the NG CD support operation in Hawaii, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, giving the Executive Branch more authority to fight the “war on drugs.” The same year, the President issued National Security Directive 221, declaring drug trafficking a

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57 John C. Mosbey, The National Guard Strategic Plan 1999-2004, Washington DC, 1999, 5, Colonel John C. Mosbey submitted the NG strategic plan when he was the National Guard Bureau Counterdrug Director.
danger to national security, which launched legislative efforts and policy changes intended to address the drug threat. After recognizing that challenges to new counterdrug legislative efforts persisted, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988, establishing the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to improve coordination, establish national policy, and unify more than 30 federal agencies.\textsuperscript{58}

In 1989, the National Defense Authorization Act assigned Department of Defense as the lead agency in detection and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Moreover, the NG role in counterdrug operations continued to expand. Congress realized the cost effectiveness of NG CD programs in providing support to law enforcement and authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide an additional $40 million above standard NG federal mission training funds to those governors who submitted an annual state drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan.\textsuperscript{59} In an effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs into and within the United States, Congress gave the National Guard the added mission of supporting Federal, state, territorial, and local LEAs in 1989. Additionally, in response to Border Ranger (California law enforcement interdiction mission) fatalities and Congressional direction, National Guard Bureau formed an interagency counterdrug training institute.\textsuperscript{60}

In 1990, with ONDCP encouragement, DOD endorsed numerous large counter-marijuana operations. One such mission was “Operation Greensweep.” Operation Greensweep was a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) operation conducted in July and August 1990 in Northern California’s Humboldt County to eradicate marijuana grown on federal land. Operation

\textsuperscript{58} JP 3-07.4, I-1.
\textsuperscript{60} National Interagency Civil-Military Institute Briefing to Director Joint and Interagency Operations/Outreach Program Army War College, February 11, 2000, 2.
Greensweep brought increased awareness and national focus to the drug trafficking threat, generating additional federal, state, and local counterdrug efforts and funding.\textsuperscript{61}

Today, the NG CD support program is an established program with Governor State Plans from all 54 states and territories, each establishing Memorandum’s of Understanding (MOU) with the agencies they support. Many of the state NG CD programs are involved in cooperative and trusted interagency agreements. One major activity that has involved the NG from multiple states is “Operation Guardian.” This program partners NG CD personnel with U.S. Customs Service agents to assist inspecting cargo and vehicles at the U.S. border points of entry. Another long-standing, interagency support agreement involves Operation Campaign Against Marijuana Production (CAMP) in which California NG CD Task Force provides helicopter support to the State Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement which aligns aerial interdiction asset requirement for the 58 counties within California. Other long-term CD support missions include: CD Public Affairs and Operations Security (OPSEC), manning Listening Post/Observation Post (LP/OP) sites, Transcription and Translation training at the Joint Language Training Center (Utah), Community Coalition and Drug Prevention, Engineer units building fencing along the U.S./Mexico Border, and marijuana eradication.

\textbf{National Guard Counterdrug Program Capabilities}

The Army National Guard (ARNG) currently provides the majority of DOD support to CD.\textsuperscript{62} While in a state status or under governor control, the NG provides a unique, responsive, and flexible capability. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the use of Title 10 military personnel to execute the civil laws of the U.S. “except in cases and under circumstances


expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.” In contrast, Posse Comitatus does not apply to NG personnel on duty under authority of Title 32. Therefore, the NG can conduct missions not normally authorized by members of DOD under Title 10. For example, Title 32 members can inspect cargo on land, at sea, or at air points of entry, provide operational or investigative case support, and participate in LEA missions requiring assistance in searching, seizing, arresting, or conducting any related law enforcement activity involving civilians.

Additionally, the state NG CD program provides another unique form of support, community-based support missions. In this mission category, FTNGDCD members coordinate and provide Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) missions to Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), federal, state, and local LEAs, and educational institutions for the purpose of educating and encouraging members of the public to resist the use of illicit drugs, alcohol, and/or tobacco.

The NG’s forward presence, cost effectiveness, and unique state status capability has necessitated the deep involvement of the NG in the nation’s strategic goal of reducing the supply and demand for illegal drugs. Robert Bloomquist, in his study on the NG’s expanding role in national security, sums up NG capability, relationships, and contributions to LEA and the state CD program as follows:

Two vital issues in the National Security Strategy demanding increased military support are the Counterdrug effort and the defense of the Homeland against asymmetrical threats of weapons of mass destruction. The military has the people, equipment, and organization to be a great benefit in dealing with these issues. The National Guard has the community support to overcome the political concerns of using the military within our borders, while

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at the same time, ensuring the American population will maintain confidence in its military.\textsuperscript{66}

Accordingly, the NG contributes to the national CD effort through the conduct of domestic CD support operations that fall within the six mission categories consisting of eighteen missions. National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-2/Air National Guard Instruction (ANGI) 10-801, \textit{National Guard Counterdrug Support}, is the NG doctrine/regulation that addresses the NG CD missions and requirements for planning, coordinating, and executing NG CD support missions. The table below provides a list of the mission categories and missions in the NG CD support program.

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<tr>
<th>Mission Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Management</td>
<td>§ Counterdrug Coordination, Liaison and Management</td>
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<td>Technical Support</td>
<td>§ Linguist Support (Translator Support)</td>
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<td>§ Investigative Case and Analyst Support</td>
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<td>§ Subsurface/Diver Support</td>
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<td>General Support</td>
<td>§ Domestic Cannabis Suppression/ Eradication</td>
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<td>§ Operations Support</td>
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<td>§ Maintenance/Logistical Support</td>
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<td></td>
<td>§ Cargo/Mail Inspection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterdrug Related Training</td>
<td>§ Training LEA/Military Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance/Observation</td>
<td>§ Surface Reconnaissance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>§ Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td>§ Community Based Drug Reduction Support</td>
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<td>§ Educational Institution Demand Reduction Support</td>
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<td>§ Informational Demand Reduction Support</td>
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<td>§ Leadership Development</td>
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<td>§ Coalition Development</td>
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\textit{Figure 1. NG CD Support Program Mission Categories/Missions}\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} Bloomquist, 1.

\textsuperscript{67} NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 8 to 10.
DTLOMS Analysis of the NG CD Support Program

The National Guard’s CD support program has grown into a well-established, cost effective program that supports the “war on drugs” via National Drug Control Strategy. Addressing the drug trafficking danger to national security, state governors' National Guards have been especially active in countering drugs at the source. The NG CD support program has demonstrated continued success in working with all levels of law enforcement and youth and/or CBOs conducting both supply and demand reduction missions identified under the plans submitted by the governors of each state or territory.  

Because the NG CD support program is recognized as an effective program and has played an active role in national counterdrug efforts for well over a decade, the researcher choose to examine existing NG CD missions and capabilities by each DTLOMS force development sub-process. This model will provide information for later analysis to determine if like capabilities or missions exist for HLS. The analysis intends to reveal how the NG has organized its efforts to provide full-time counterdrug support while maintaining its reserve warfighting capability.

The NG CD support program matrix below (figure 2) answers Yes, or a “Y” symbolization, to those missions that have existing force development sub-process capability. For example, does doctrine exist for CD Coordination, Liaison, and Management? The matrix indicates the answer is “Y” with a reference and comment. The “Yes (-)” answer indicates requirements exist in the NG CD program but do not necessarily resemble standard Air Force/Army organizational force structure or methods used to allocate resources. The DTLOMS analysis of the NG CD support program did not reveal any “No” answers to the sub-processes on the matrix, which is not surprising since the program is a well-established program.

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Finally, under the sub-processes “Training” and “Soldier” development, this chapter will examine the use of Full-time National Guard Duty Counterdrug (FTNGDCD) personnel in countering the drug threat while concurrently contributing to the NG’s reserve warfighting mission. The assessment below the matrix provides a general discussion of each developmental sub-process and associated shortfalls or limitations. Additional information and references to each answer in the matrix is located in Appendix Three.

### Figure 2. NG CD Support Program DTLOMS Matrix

#### Doctrine

Fundamental principles used by the NG to conduct NG CD support operations exist in U.S. Code and current doctrine. Section 112, Title 32, (Title 32 U.S.C. § 112) is the authority for
the CD Support Program. Joint, Army, and NG doctrine recognizes and describes the NG CD Support Program. The Army Field Manual (FM) categorizes the NG missions as subdivisions of DOD missions yet does not reference the NG Linguist, Analyst, Communications, Domestic Cannabis Suppression/Eradication Operations Support, Community-Based Demand Reduction Support, Educational Institution Demand Reduction Support, Informational Demand Reduction Support, Leadership Development, and Coalition Development missions.69

Joint and NG doctrine refer to the same NG missions. National Guard Training Circular (NGTC) 1-500 and National Interagency Civil-Military Institute’s (NICI) Guide for Law Enforcement and Military Planners, Operations Planning for Joint Counterdrug Missions, serve as regulatory and doctrinal guidance for the employment of ARNG Aviation assets in the Counterdrug support role. NG CD experiences shared through After-Action Reviews (AARs) provide feedback and insight into operational and doctrinal strengths and weaknesses. Capturing critical lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) provide a method to document, improve, and/or modify NG CD doctrine.70

Training

The NG CD Support Program is a well-established program that has coordinated and conducted joint and interagency counterdrug operations and training for over a decade. Additionally, to improve on their training success, National Guard Bureau (NGB) continues to expand low-cost distance learning capabilities to rapidly disseminate counterdrug and science-based prevention and treatment practices throughout the nation.71 The state’s Counterdrug Coordinator (CDC) ensures all assigned personnel receive applicable qualification training, testing,

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69 JP 3-07.4, III-31; FM 100-19, 7-9; and NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 5/8.
70 Ibid.
71 Counterdrug Strategy 2001, 52.
and external agency qualification, certification, and background checks in accordance with current regulations, doctrine, and interagency/civil-military memorandums of understanding.\footnote{Operations/Outreach Program Army War College, 2.}

As indicated above and in response to Congressional direction, NGB formed NICI in 1989, which provides strategic, management and operational training, and research for military and civilian leaders to enhance the effectiveness of joint, federal, state and local intergovernmental and interagency cooperation and operations. Additional schools contributing to the CD Program followed suit: the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy (RCTA) - focusing on LEA CD “Cops teaching Cops” training using NG facilities; the Multi-jurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force Training (MCTFT) - training LEAs assigned to multi-jurisdictional task forces and satellite distance learning initiatives; the Northeast Counterdrug Training Center (NCTC) - providing CD training for state, county, and municipal LEAs; the Joint Language Training Center (JLTC) – producing skilled linguists capable of side by side language transcription and translation; and the North Dakota NG Street Language Training Program.\footnote{National Guard Bureau, “Capabilities Overview: In Defense of America’s Future,” (Capabilities briefing presented to students at NICI, accessed PowerPoint presentation on 8 March 2002); Colonel Nickey Philpot, NG CD Liaison Officer to ONDCP, personal interview 4 April 2002, Fort Leavenworth.}

The training centers conduct interagency CD training year round. State CDCs, their key staff members, and personnel from NGB-CD attend the CD Managers Course at NICI. The management courses integrate leaders from other agencies and CBOs, providing yet another opportunity for development of interagency and CBO liaison, coordination, trust, and professional networking relationships. Members with well-established interagency and civil-military relationships, all working toward common national CD/DDR goals provides for multi-agency unity of effort.\footnote{NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 21/22; NICI CD Managers’ Guide, 6-1 to 6-3; and Colonel William H. Wade II, Commander, California National Guard Counterdrug Task Force, personal interview, February 21, 2002.}
Additionally, structured within budget constraints, each state/territorial NG CD training program includes the type of training needed to accomplish the objectives specified in the Governor’s State Plan. Full-time National Guard Duty Counterdrug (FTNGDCD) personnel receive Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training, Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) as well as appropriate mission-oriented training specific to the types of CD activities or specialized CD equipment.\textsuperscript{75} Specialty training may include but is not limited to training in the following areas:

- Operator/maintenance/logistical support training for LEA vehicles, non-military equipment, and/or specialized CD equipment/systems
- Subsurface inspection of commercial vessels with divers or sidescan sonar buoys
- Methods of drug eradication
- Inspections of cargo/mail including vehicles, containers, commercial cargo, aircraft, watercraft, baggage, and mail at Ports of Embarkation (POEs) and/or functional equivalents.
- Performance of area observation by land or water to detect and report illegal drug activities.
- Community activities designed to educate, train, or otherwise prevent drug abuse, including support of youth centers, drug-free events, community recreational programs, community mobilization events, tutoring, mentoring, after-school programs, drug-free activities, role modeling programs, sports-drug awareness programs, educational material distribution, and camps/retreats/seminars.\textsuperscript{76}

**Leader Development**

The NG CD Support Program develops leaders through military and civil programs. NG CD leaders hold leadership positions within their respective military organizations. Therefore, the NG CD leaders participate in the same officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) education system designed to produce competent and committed leaders as their Active Component (AC) counterparts.

If an external agency or CBO requires specialized leadership training, clearance, or certification, NG CD leaders may coordinate and attend the training for personal and professional development.

\textsuperscript{75} NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 9; NICI CD Managers’ Guide, 4-6 and 5-5; Pennsylvania NG CD Homepage, http://www.counterdrug.org/pacdo/support.htm, accessed 29 September 2001; Wade; and Kathryn E. McHenry, Lieutenant Colonel, National Guard Bureau Demand Reduction Liaison to Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), personal interview by author, 7 February 2002, Kansas City, MO.

\textsuperscript{76} NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 22 and NICI CD Managers’ Guide, 4-6.
development, if deemed necessary to accomplish the Governor’s State CD Plan. Additionally, NG CD leaders develop extensive leadership experience in planning, coordinating, and conducting interagency operations/activities with federal, state, and local elected officials, LEA and CBO leaders. 

Organizational

The NG CD Support Program has an established organizational structure that differs by state. The organization of each State NG CD Program is reflective of the Governor’s CD State Plan and based on the illicit drug threat. Both Joint and Army doctrine provide an illustration of the NG CD state structure and national coordination or policy links, recognizing the Governor as the Commander-in-Chief of Title 32 CD members. On the DTLOMS matrix, a (-) symbol was added to the “Y” simply to indicate the NG CD organization does not mirror typical Active Component unit force structure with a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The “Y(-)” does not indicate a need to revise the program; it only acknowledges the difference.

As indicated, the NG CD structure, based on a Governor’s State Plan, is not bound to a set CD MTOE/TDA, which provides greater flexibility, versatility, and responsiveness in conducting supply and demand reduction operations. Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 provides NG CD managers with the flexibility to adapt personnel training and acquire specialized CD equipment based on the drug threat and Governor’s State Plan.

The lack of a CD MTOE/TDA appears to have more benefits than limitations. The ability to rapidly procure distinct CD equipment to accomplish uncommon capabilities based on the threat and Governor’s State plan is an imperative and extremely beneficial. Conversely, the lack of MTOE/TDA revealed a challenge attributed to personnel funding. The CD budget is not

77 Ibid.
reflective of a set number of personnel, which can adversely affect the NG’s ability to fund FTNGDCD members for critical CD/DDR support if Congress approves a DOD pay and allowance increase. The FY02 appropriations was not offset for DOD pay and allowance increases, which in turn will require the NG CD support program to terminate over 1,000 guardsmen to remain within budget. Presently, the NG CD program managers cannot field all requests due to budget constraints. Further reduction in personnel would devastate a program already proven cost effective and crucial to national security.  

**Materiel**

The “Y” for all missions under “Materiel” on the DTLOMS matrix indicates Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 provides for the Program’s procurement of specialized counterdrug equipment and services for the purpose of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. Clearly, the statute provides solutions to CD materiel requirements and methods for obtaining operator training for specialized equipment when necessary. Once again, the “Y(-)” acknowledges the State NG CD Program does not have an MTOE authorizing specific types of equipment. However, lack of a CD MTOE/TDA does not appear to negatively affect the materiel aspects of the program.

As indicated under the sub-process “Organization,” the ability to rapidly procure distinct CD equipment is an imperative. Counterdrug funds are “fenced” by Congressional mandate, creating an anomaly in CD Materiel, hence another reason for the “Y(-)” in the DTLOMS matrix. NG CD managers may not reallocate NG CD equipment purchased with Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 funds to other organizations. State counterdrug and the United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) staff evaluate proposed expenditures and ensure the use of Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 funds

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78 JP 3-07.4, Section C - State and Local CD Organizations and Figure III-21; FM 100-19, Figures 7-5 and 7-7; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801; NICI CD Managers’ Guide; National Guard Bureau, Draft Information Paper, Subject: Congressional Actions Addressing Shortfalls within the National Guard Counterdrug Program (Governor’s State Plans), dated 25 January 2002, submitted to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
for counterdrug purposes only. Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 funds also provides for procuring materiel needed to conduct DDR or prevention programs.\textsuperscript{79}

The Congressional mandate allowing procurement of CD specific equipment has provided the Governor’s with invaluable CD capability within the state or for use in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) regions. One example of such a vital piece of equipment is the Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) used to assist U.S. Customs with inspection of thick steel-walled tanker trucks, vehicles, and containers, allowing identification of false walls or other secret compartments typically associated with transporting drugs, explosives, and weapons.\textsuperscript{80}

Other critical assets funded under Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 are modified CD aircraft such as the OH-58+, C-26, and C-130. The OH-58+ CD Reconnaissance And Interdiction Aircraft (CD RAID) helicopter is equipped with Thermal Imaging System (TIS), Wulfsburg Multiband Radios, Global Positioning System Navigational Equipment, and NITE-SUN search lights and is designed to assist LEA with aerial observation, command and control and marijuana eradication. The CD modified C-26 has a suite of special CD equipment and is designed to provide day and night surveillance, real-time surveillance during raids, and communications. The C-130 provides airlift of seized equipment, photo reconnaissance, and interpretation capabilities to LEA. Other aircraft available to the Governor include Air Guard C-5, C-141, and HH-60s and Army National Guard C-12, C-23, C-26, and UH-60 aircraft.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 25/26; NICI CD Managers’ Guide; Title 32 USC 112, State Adjutants General may conduct counterdrug operations with federal property issued to the Army and Air National Guard.


\textsuperscript{81} Department of Defense, “Command Brief: Service to the Nation” (JTF-6 capabilities briefing presented to students at NICI, information updated as of 20 April 2001, accessed PowerPoint presentation on 8 March 2002) and National Guard Bureau, “Capabilities Overview: In Defense of America’s Future” (Capabilities briefing presented to students at NICI, accessed PowerPoint presentation on 8 March 2002).
Soldiers

The answer “Y” under “Soldiers” on the DTLOMS matrix indicates FTNGDCD members exist and possess MOS/AFSCs and additional internal/external counterdrug specialized training, qualification, and certification necessary to fulfill CD operational requirements. The “Y(-)” not only acknowledges the NG CD support program does not have a MTOE or TDA authorizing specific MOS/AFSCs, it indicates some CD training and qualification requirements may differ from the FTNGDCD member’s acquired military skill. For example, in accordance with legal authority possessed by the LEA, FTNGDCD members may be subject to investigation by LEAs to meet agency security requirements to work in LEA offices, and/or have access to LEA information, files or databases. Additionally, the “Y(-)” represents repeated funding shortfalls in pay and allowance.

Though FTNGDCD members have gained invaluable specialized skills in conducting joint, interagency, and civil CD/DDR operations, continued shortfalls in pay and allowance have negatively affected the NG’s ability to retain FTNGDCD members necessary to “assist law enforcement in defending our country from the scourge of illegal drugs.” The NGB Proposed Information Paper states:

In 2001, Congress directed DOD to start fixing the pay and allowances problem by increasing program funding by at least $20M annually beginning with the FY02 President’s Budget (PB) submission. Despite this, DOD neither added the Congressionally-directed level of funding to the FY02 PB, nor did it correct the out-year budget shortfalls. In FY02, the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) reiterated its previous direction by stating, “The Committee recognizes the valuable contribution made by the National Guard units to the counterdrug effort and has repeatedly directed the Department of Defense to include adequate additional funding to support these efforts in future budget submissions. Since this guidance has continued to go unheeded, the Committee directs that an additional $40,000,000 within funds available in the Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, Defense appropriation shall be used only for National Guard counterdrug funding requirements.”82

82 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801; NICI CD Managers’ Guide; and NGB, Draft Info Paper. The State NG CD Program does not have a CD MTOE or TDA authorizing specific Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) for CD.
The program is budget driven. The program always has requirements above resources or funding. Therefore, though the CDC considers requests from LEAs and CBOs, mission assignment occurs based on the priorities established in the Governor’s CD State Plan. Additionally, the soldier is the core of all the DTLOMS sub-processes; none of the other DTLOMS sub-processes can operate adequately without the driver. Absence or significant reductions in funding will devastate the program.

Though funding is the main shortfall under the “Soldier” sub-process, many advantages exist in the NG CD support program. For example, as the domestic forward deployed force and as part of the Governor’s response plan, NG soldiers, including FTNGDCD members, routinely receive civil disturbance training and operate under rules of engagement (ROE) that clarify actions in dealing with civilians, police and rescue officials, making interagency CD operations an extension of the norm.

The NG CD end strength exemption provides the Army, Air Force, and NG another advantage and capability. The number of soldiers and airmen serving on FTNGDCD tours for the NG CD support program do not affect allowable end strengths of personnel supporting reserve components. Neither do they count against authorizations outlined in Title 10 U.S.C. § 12012 (Authorized Strengths: senior enlisted members on active duty or on full-time duty for administration of the reserves or the National Guard).

NG members participating in the NG CD program in FTNGDCD status still conduct MOS/AFSC training with their units during monthly Inactive Duty Training/Inactive Duty (IDT/IAD) assemblies and during Annual Training (AT). In other words, FTNGDCD members receive the same number of MOS/AFSC training days in their assigned unit, as their peers. Additionally, they pick up appropriate CD mission-oriented specialty training, providing them a

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83 Wade interview.
84 NGB, Draft Info Paper.
unique opportunity to sharpen both specialty and military transferable skills practiced daily as a FTNGDCD member.  

As Lieutenant Colonel (P) Jerry Scott noted in his research project titled, *Enhancing Department of Defense support for Counterdrug Interdiction along the Southwest Border*, CD missions are very similar to major unit deployments and require the same type of sustained, detailed planning. Furthermore, military units possess a tremendous capability with unique equipment and resources to enhance interdiction efforts. The similar planning, training, skill, and tremendous capability reinforces those transferable military or warfighting skills that NG members otherwise would have practiced only 39 days a year.

Colonel William H. Wade, the Commander of the California National Guard Counterdrug Task Force explained that it only stands to reason that FTNGDCD members have the opportunity to hone their warfighting skills. He provided four comparative examples to illustrate the difference in training opportunities. For example, pilots flying just twenty-four to thirty-six Additional Flight Training Periods (AFTPs) per year typically do not possess the same level of flight proficiency as counterdrug pilots that reinforce interagency mission planning, OPORD production, flight skills, and actual aviation missions everyday.

Another example compared proficiency of combat engineers that practice their skills only during drills, annual training, and possibly a couple of state emergencies throughout the year to CD engineers who conduct vertical and horizontal construction 365 days a year. Next, the CD Public Affairs Officer (PAO) practices “real world” military PAO skills everyday, including OPSEC, media (print, news, TV), photojournalism to capture activities of the CD members and share with LEA, and declassification of information. Finally, Colonel Wade pointed out that Intelligence

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85 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 29.
86 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 28; Colonel John Harrel, 2d Brigade Commander, 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), personal interview by author, 12 March 2002, Los Alamitos, CA; and Wade interview.
87 Scott, iii, 33,
Analysts and Linguists in support of LEA and CD TFs everyday get feedback on how successful they are to actually getting a conviction.\(^8\)

DOD does not allow the Active Component (AC) to conduct surface reconnaissance after the killing of a U.S. citizen by active duty forces participating in a drug surveillance mission on the Southwest Border. However, the Secretary of Defense allowed the NG to continue this important support to law enforcement operation, recognizing that NG soldiers are a little older and they come from the communities from which they work. Yet, as a condition of continuation, NGB ensures NICI provides clear and specific baseline guidance and conducts standardized training, reporting, and evaluation procedures for the mission.\(^9\)

Finally, from a DOD perspective, the 2001 Joint Task Force Six (JTF 6) capability brief recognizes Intelligence Analysts, Linguists, and Intelligence Architecture Assessments as the highest demand missions in the technical support category. The DOD JTF 6 CD program involves military intelligence officers and enlisted specialists working at LEA offices for up to 179 days. The JTF 6 brief notes that other DOD operations worldwide compete for the intelligence resources, thus limiting the ability for DOD to fully meet the CD intelligence demand. The benefit to having NG CD Intelligence Analysts on the other hand, is that they can support agencies for longer periods. Furthermore, the supported agency is more inclined to train those individuals that can remain longer to enhance the specialty skills acquired from the LEA.\(^10\)

\(^8\) Wade interview.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^11\) DOD Command Brief, JTF 6 presentation, updated as of April 2001, addressing the JTF-6 limitation of duty for 179-day tours. Additionally, personal interview with Major Cole, previously a Criminal Intelligence Specialist assigned to Department of Justice, indicated that it is “well known in the CD Intel community that JTF 6 short tours of duty, generally do not allow the individuals to be used with great success on large cases.” He noted that most large cases last up to 8 months or longer, to investigate, and then prepare the information for trial. Guard personnel are generally accepted as more conducive for this type of work because they can remain on tour and can actually see the results of their analysis/case work. Colonel William H. Wade, Commander, California National Guard Counterdrug
The NG CD program has contributed to the goals in the National Drug Control Strategy through both supply and demand reduction programs. All aspects of military force structure or DTLOMS sub-processes are satisfied in the NG CD Support Program. The NG CD background information, capabilities, and DTLOMS analysis above will provide a framework for later comparative analysis within this study.

Task Force confirmed this NG benefit, noting that the NG Intel analysts work closely with LEA and can track how successful they are to actually getting a conviction and based on their results can develop critical techniques and procedures that improve their skills.
CHAPTER FOUR

NG HLS CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

The National Guard must be prepared for our primary responsibility as the front-line, ready reserve defense force for America. It is the mission we have always had, and it remains our seminal responsibility.\textsuperscript{92}

Lieutenant General Russell C. Davis, Chief, National Guard Bureau

Securing the Homeland

Although presently unmatched in ability to project military power worldwide, the U.S. faces challenges to homeland security by adversaries with a wide range of capabilities. Today’s threat includes adversaries with conventional weapons as well those enemies that will avoid our powerful military and strike our national vulnerabilities through extraordinary means, such as emerging technology that can target space or information systems, and weapons of mass destruction. To wit, the attacks of September 11, 2001, portray a foe that is unable to conventionally engage U.S. military might directly and therefore will take extreme asymmetric means to attack our nation, our way of life, and our freedom. On that horrific day, we learned that terrorist groups could infiltrate our homeland individually and later, collectively conduct well-coordinated, devastating acts of terror and mass casualties.

As expressed by our President, George W. Bush, “We can never be sure that we have defeated all of our terrorist enemies, and therefore we can never again allow ourselves to become overconfident about the security of our homeland.”\textsuperscript{93} Our new understanding of how terrorists will export and embrace weapons of mass destruction reasserts an enduring national security objective for survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with its fundamental


values intact and government, business, infrastructure, commerce, and people secure.\textsuperscript{94} To accomplish this, the President has prescribed a national security calling that will involve governmental reforms, new HLS programs, and expanded efforts by state and local governments, private industry, non-governmental organizations, and citizens.\textsuperscript{95}

President Bush envisions the development of a “National Strategy for Homeland Security based on the principle of partnership with state and local governments, the private sector, and citizens.”\textsuperscript{96} Moreover, according to the White House HLS Book, the National Strategy for HLS will take full account of the existing government institutions and systems providing for homeland security, build on systems that work, improve on those that work poorly, and reflect the principle that agencies’ responsibilities and authorities will clearly and logically align with their core competencies. The 2002 HLS Budget focused on four specific policy initiatives:

- Supporting First Responders
- Defending Against Bioterrorism
- Securing America’s Borders, and
- Using 21st Century Technology to Secure the Homeland\textsuperscript{97}

Undeniably, the President’s envisioned National Strategy for HLS and calling to the American people is vast and necessary. This is a time we must pull together and join in a national effort to secure our homeland. It is not a time to stovepipe efforts, bicker over federal funding, act in isolation, waste critical resources through duplicative activities, or debate over control and responsibilities. Now more than ever, agencies and individuals must cooperate and become adept in their part of Homeland Security. In the September 30, 2001, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review Report}, the Secretary of Defense highlights the need for a collective effort affirming that the “scope of homeland security responsibilities span an array of federal, state, and local organizations,

\textsuperscript{95} Bush, HLS, 3.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 7.
it also will require enhanced interagency processes and capabilities to defend the U.S. against attacks."\textsuperscript{98}

The U.S. defense strategy aims to defend U.S. freedom and secure an international environment of peace. The new strategic framework is built on four defense policy goals: 

\textit{assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.}

The following strategic tenets link to and support these policy goals.\textsuperscript{99}

- \textit{Managing Risks} (balance tension between preparations for the future and demands of the present)
- \textit{A Capabilities-Based Approach} (anticipates capabilities an adversary may employ and how an adversary might fight, while identifying capabilities the U.S. military will need to deter and defeat such adversary)
- Defending the United States and Projecting U.S. Military Power
- Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
- Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances
- Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities; and
- \textit{Transforming Defense} (to meet emerging challenges)\textsuperscript{100}

The QDR stresses the need to bolster its ability to work with other organizations involved in HLS, place new emphasis upon counterterrorism, and draw upon the capabilities of the NG and Reserves.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, the QDR acknowledges, “protecting the American homeland from attack is the foremost responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces and a primary mission for the Reserve Components.”\textsuperscript{102} Aptly, the President’s national calling and First Responder Initiative in the HLS document and the DOD QDR reaffirms the importance of the NG’s mission in protecting the homeland and the capability and role the NG has in the Governor’s Emergency Response Plan as a military first responder.

\textsuperscript{98} QDR, v-vi.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 11-13.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 13-16.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 30.
National Guard Homeland Security Role

“Since its inception more than 360 years ago, the NG has been responsible for helping to provide HLS. The Sept. 11 attacks have heightened public awareness of this role and the NG’s involvement in HLS has continued to grow in importance.”103 Army and Air NG forces, as first military responders, have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state, territorial, and local government agencies in civil disturbances, disasters, and other state emergencies in accordance with State law. When providing support to civil authorities, NG members normally serve on State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status under the command of the State’s governor.104

In a state status or under governor control, the NG provides a unique, responsive, flexible, and cost-effective capability. Under Title 32 status, the NG can conduct missions not normally authorized by members of DOD under Title 10. As such, when federalized under Title 10, the NG member is no longer available to the governor for state emergencies or his/her ready reserve unit for federal mission training. Hence, the unique NG dual role and capability applies only when the member is in state status. If history holds true, federalizing the NG under additional Title 10 command channels slows NG responsive capability.105

Therefore, NG members, when not deployed externally for their federal mission, should maintain a dual role, providing their Governor with a military first responder capability while training under an established chain of command. After all, Air National Guard fighter interceptor units provide 24-hour support to the U.S. defense interceptor mission. Plus, it was NG front-line


citizen soldiers that were immediately available to their respective governors for the following emergencies: the World Trade Center bombing in 1993; Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995; the Atlanta Olympic games pipe bomb in 1996; the Columbine shootings in 1999; and most recently, the attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade Center, mail/cargo inspections for anthrax, and airport security.\textsuperscript{106}

As described in previous chapters, above, and the following appendixes, the NG has a long history of warfighting, defending the homeland, and providing support/assistance to civil authorities in times of crisis. In just the past decade, the NG has conducted hundreds of state missions each year, in addition to AC augmentation missions and their regular warfighting unit training. Accordingly, as a forward deployed, cost-effective, military first responder and ready reserve, the NG will continue to contribute to the national HLS effort. This force will conduct HLS missions under three mission categories: program management, homeland defense, and civil support. National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, \textit{Military Support to Civil}

\begin{tabular}{|c|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Mission Category} & \textbf{Mission} \\
\hline
Program Management & \begin{itemize}
\item Homeland Security Coordination, Liaison and Management, including consequence and crisis management
\end{itemize} \\
\hline
Homeland Defense & \begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Surface}: preparedness training/exercises, land defensive operations, force protection, reconnaissance/observation, critical infrastructure protection/security, and actions to prevent attacks/invasion
\item \textbf{Aerial/Aerospace}: air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense
\item \textbf{Information}: intelligence, technical information, and cyberspace
\end{itemize} \\
\hline
Civil Support & \begin{itemize}
\item Linguist (Translator Support)
\item Investigative Case and Analyst Support
\item Communications Support
\item Engineer Support
\item Subsurface/Diver Support
\item CBRNE/WMD
\item Combating Terrorism
\item Counterdrug
\item Civil Disturbance Intervention
\item Transportation Support
\item Maintenance/Logistical Support
\end{itemize} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Authorities: *Emergency Employment of NG and Other Resources*, addresses NG planning, coordination, and execution requirements for providing support to civil authorities. The figure above provides a list by mission category of the HLS type missions extracted from doctrine and doctrinal proposals as they apply to the NG.  

**DTLOMS Analysis of NG HLS Support Requirements**

HLS proposals to the Joint Staff suggest the military’s role in HLS would include those immediate Presidential or Congressionally authorized measures taken to prepare, prevent, deter, preempt, defend, and respond against threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, including assistance in crisis and consequence management. Furthermore, the proposals view HLS as having two sub-mission categories, Civil Support (CS) and Homeland Defense (HLD), both reflected on the NG capabilities chart above and used for analysis.

In addition to the two suggested HLS sub-mission categories, the author added a third for analysis – Program Management (PM). The reason for this additional category is three-fold. One, leaders of the armed forces have an inherent responsibility to care for the welfare of their personnel. Two, preparedness and prevention efforts will require coordination, liaison, and cooperation with state and local authorities, agencies, non-governmental/community based

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108 J7 Proposed Definitions, 1.
organizations, businesses, educational institutions, and other services. Three, interagency operations will require thorough logistical accountability of military equipment and resources that are lent to outside agencies during a crisis event.

In the DOD proposal, DOD Civil Support includes support to U.S. civil authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and authorized law enforcement activities. As a first military responder often called to duty for State missions under the Governor’s control each year, NG members possess a high degree of experience in CS.

HLD involves protecting U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure (including information/cyberspace) against external threats and aggression. This DTLOMS analysis will not address maritime protection because the NG does not have naval assets. Furthermore, the initial Presidential strategy for securing the homeland recognizes the important role of the Coast Guard in protecting the coastal waters and ports. However, regarding coastal missions, coastal states’ civil authorities coordinate with the Coast Guard for necessary missions, while ANG units conduct defense interceptor and reconnaissance missions, and some NG CD personnel can provide subsurface diver support.

The researcher chose to examine missions already referenced in DOD, Joint, Department of the Army (DA), and NG doctrine. These also include regulations and directives currently characterized as defensive operations, domestic support, and military support/assistance to civil authorities. A look at capabilities by each DTLOMS sub-process will provide useful information for later comparative analysis to the NG CD support program. The DTLOMS analysis intends to take a broad look at capabilities and reveal possible changes in how the NG can best organize for HLS while maintaining its reserve warfighting capability.

109 J-7 Proposed Definitions, 2.
110 Ibid.
The NG HLS DTLOMS matrix below (figure 4) provides a Yes answer, represented by a “Y” symbol, to those missions that presently exist under the sub-mission categories of HLD or CS. For example, under the mission category of CS: is there doctrine that refers to Communications Support as a mission? In this case, the answer is Yes. Joint, Army, and NG doctrine exists. Following the same reason, the “Y(-)” answer indicates missions exist though not specifically under an HLS sub-mission category of HLD or CS. An “N(+)” reply indicates requirements for the mission exists but a newly defined or proposed necessity or sub-capability does not exist. An “N” would indicate no mission or sub-capability exists. As it turned out, the NG HLS analysis, which used missions derived from doctrine, present capability, and proposals did not reveal any “No” answers to the mission as it relates to each DTLOMS sub-process. A general explanation of the findings pertaining to each developmental sub-process and its broad associated shortfalls or limitations follows the NG HLS matrix below. Additional information and references to each answer is in the actual matrix located in appendix four.
Figure 4. NG Homeland Security DTLOMS Matrix

**Doctrine**

Though not specifically defined under the single term of HLS, the fundamental principles for HLD and CS already exist in Joint, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Army (DA), and National Guard doctrine, directives, and regulations. Additionally, the FRP addresses DOD requirements. Still, domestically, DOD will normally only provide support when other resources are unavailable, and only if such support does not interfere with its primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies, the exception being in the area of public works and engineering.111

Overall, the Armed Forces are experts in planning, coordinating, managing, commanding, and providing liaison for military operations, personnel administration, and logistics. Of note,
present doctrine does not address HLS as a program nor does it address how domestically, the military will manage, utilize, disseminate, receive, and protect intelligence through a new robust civil-military, interagency, intergovernmental information sharing system. In particular, doctrine does address sharing external intelligence that could prove pertinent to critical HLS, such as information about terrorists groups, between DOD and the NG, state and local authorities, as a matter of peacetime routine practice. In a statement to the House Armed Service Committee, the CINC, Joint Forces Command, confirms the need to develop this capability, stating:

There has been much innovative and path breaking work since 11 September to share critical information while still safeguarding the liberties of American citizens. We have more work to do to achieve full intelligence and information fusion in order to produce accurate, actionable, predictive analysis.\textsuperscript{112}

For this reason alone, the missions HLS coordination, liaison, management and HLS information under the DTLOMS sub-process Doctrine, received an N(+) assessment.

Despite the N(+) answer and the absence of an NG HLS program written in doctrine, NG Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and CD regulations, state statute, resource guides, and handbooks address federal, state, and local interagency coordination, liaison, and management procedures. Additionally, methods for maintaining communication and sharing information exist within the state response plan and state NG CD program. Furthermore, the NG Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) equipment includes state-of-the-art gear to supplement local and state response organizations and provide communications reach back capabilities to other experts needed to help with local response.

Doctrine exists for all CS missions on the matrix, though some fall specifically under the NG CD mission. In reference to HLD, military doctrine already describes domestic Title 10 and Title 32 surface, aerial/aerospace, maritime, and information operations and mission capabilities.

\textsuperscript{111} FRP, TI-1 to TI-3; FM 100-19, 2-5.
NG forces have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to state and local
government agencies. Statute, DOD directives, the Joint CD Program, and other doctrine already
establishes and explains the means for the President, Congress, and governors (the State’s
Executive) to obtain greater domestic use of the military if necessary.

Additionally, current doctrine will need to incorporate some of the NG’s new TTPs
learned from providing domestic airport and critical infrastructure security, as they do not exist
under HLD terminology at this time. For this reason, surface and aerial/aerospace doctrine is a
Y(-). The NG has already proposed and forwarded a recommended airport security regulation
and guidelines to Fort Leonard Wood for review and follow-on approval.

Effective doctrine could focus on the positive aspects of NG core competencies,
capabilities, and benefits of remaining under state control with a coordinating rather than command
linkage to DOD. Such as: NG members in state status improve domestic responsiveness because
they have existing response plans, well-established interagency ties, and familiarity with the terrain
and communities. Additionally, reimbursement goes back to the state in need rather than to DOD.
For example, if DOD mobilizes 100 NG members under Title 10 status, DOD would receive
reimbursement from the supported agency. If the NG members were activated in state status
(Title 32), the reimbursement would go back to the affected state. The mismatch in this scenario
is that the state must absorb the added costs in equipment maintenance, additional logistics, and
administrative and soldier/family care expenses that are necessary above the mission
requirements. Left in a state status, the state would receive reimbursement to requisition parts
and conduct maintenance on the equipment in use. This can give the impression that DOD is in
for the funding and positions rather than supporting those in need. Additionally, if the state did not
continue to provide maintenance, supply, and administrative support, any NG “federal detailing”

would cost the nation more because it would require duplicate and unnecessary C2, logistics, and/or administrative requirements above those that already exist in the state. Remaining in Title 32 includes the following benefits: the member maintains communication and discipline under an established command and activation in state status does not degrade the readiness level of the ready reserve unit as the NG member can still train and fill a position in the unit.

Doctrine could better focus on the core competencies and capabilities of other federal agencies and the importance of these agencies maintaining primacy in domestic operations with DOD in a support role. Such as it supports and maintains the legitimacy of elected officials and the U.S. judicial system and it does not negatively affect economies by taking business away from civilians. It limits “bad press” when accidents involving civilians occur and avoids actual or perceived civil liberty violations that could question military professionalism or credibility. It avoids the high cost of increasing DOD structure and prevents public dependency, which would negatively affect the military’s ability to project power and fulfill its obligation to fight and win the nations’ war.

Moreover, doctrine could emphasize the positive aspects of having domestic legal limitations for use of the military rather than allowing statute to become a source of friction for eager, action oriented military leaders. Such as, statute compels civil-executive or lead authorities to make and accept responsibility and the ramifications for using military force against civilians and U.S. citizens, as these decisions can have tremendous legal and grave consequences. Provisions already allow the President options to make such a colossal command decision immediately. Example, in moments after the attack on the World Trade Center, the President was able to shut down airspace, ground all aircraft, and give executive authorization to shoot down a commercial airliner if it threatened the loss of more lives. Likewise, the President could make the decision to use ground forces to support LEAs just as rapidly in a potential life threatening national

emergency. The Los Angeles (LA) Riots provide a good example of how the military had Presidential authorization to support LEAs, but the Title 10 active duty command’s misperceptions and lengthy approval process for support limited their use, not the law.\textsuperscript{113}

Based upon DOD proposed definitions, the above-mentioned, and doctrinal references in Appendix Four, one can conclude that few HLS doctrinal shortfalls exist except for the following:
determine how the existing missions align under HLS sub-mission categories; capture new TTPs acquired since the 9/11 attacks; address evolving methodology for “cyber” assurance; and addressing the requirements, relational benefits/challenges, and legal considerations for collection, control, and interagency sharing of intelligence and technical information.

Training

The NG conducts training in each of the CS missions when such training supports their wartime Mission Essential Task List (METL) or state mission requirements. Therefore, all CS missions have a “Y” answer. NG units, just like their AC counterparts, conduct offensive, defensive, support, stability, and information operations training based on their unit wartime METL. Doctrinal defensive, support, and information operations training apply to defending the homeland. Therefore, surface and aerial/aerospace missions also get a “Y” reply because NG soldiers already train for these type missions.

Upon receipt of the newly proposed intelligence and information system capability, designed to bridge the gap between federal, state, and local authorities, the NG, like others, will require training on the operation and use of the system. Processes already exist for training soldiers on the use of new equipment. Therefore, the “Y” assessment remains the same. Finally, as indicated above, the military education system trains leaders in planning, coordinating,

\textsuperscript{113} Schnaubelt, 118 to 120.
managing, commanding, and providing liaison for military operations, personnel administration, and logistics. Consequently, the training assessment for the PM mission category is “Y” as well.

There are three important points to note in qualifying the “Y” reply concerning NG HLS training. First, the NG not only trains for its primary federal mission, but also conducts civil-military and interagency training with government officials, firefighters, medical technicians, law enforcement, educators, and community-based organizations based on individual state needs.

Some of the training that could apply to HLS includes the following:

- NG CD specialized training courses as described in the last chapter
- Transcription and translation at the Utah Joint Language Training Center
- Street language training
- Preparing for and Managing the Consequences of Terrorism
- Force Protection
- Military Support to Civil Authorities including different types of domestic emergency scenarios
- Coalition Leadership Courses
- Crisis Communications – Media Relations Courses
- Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) and Performance Measures
- Community Response Emergency Simulation Training (CREST)

Second, the NG is expanding its distributive learning capability to reach more communities. Third, the U.S. military’s exceptional training combined with the NG’s unique flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness while in Title 32 status, allowed the NG to receive interagency training from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and rapidly begin airport security operations after the 9/11 attacks.

**Leader Development**

Federally recognized NG leaders, like their AC counterpart, receive appropriate systems training for the mission/equipment they will operate and complete/attend training through the Army and Air Force School System, including the appropriate professional military education program from basic training or pre-commissioning to the most senior level schools. Additionally, NG leaders hold leadership positions within their respective federal ready reserve unit and the leaders
receive appointment, assignment, promotion, unit training, and professional development applicable to their respective service and grade.

NG leaders also have unique professional development opportunities to coordinate, communicate, and conduct domestic state and local interagency, intergovernmental, and community type training, activities, and missions throughout the year. In addition, based on state law and the Governor’s state response plan, if a need arises for a NG leader to attend specialized civil or interagency training, the Guard member can attend the training under the Governor’s control and state funds. Based upon this precedence and those explained under the training sub-process, all HLD and CS missions have a “Y” answer under leader development.

Organizational

Nationally, the domestic responsibility and organizational structure for HLD and CS missions rests primarily with agencies other than DOD. In accordance with the FRP, FEMA is the lead agency and retains authority and responsibility for consequence management within U.S. territory, including consequences from terrorist incidents involving WMD. FEMA uses FRP structures to coordinate all Federal assistance to State and local governments for consequence management. DOJ is the federal lead agency for threats or acts of terrorism within U.S. territory. The DOJ assigns lead responsibility for operational response to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Within that role, the FBI operates as the on-scene manager for the Federal Government. It is FBI policy that crisis management involve only those Federal agencies requested by the FBI to provide expert guidance and/or assistance, as described in the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, Domestic Deployment Guidelines and the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Incident Contingency Plan.114

Even though DOD is not the federal lead agency for most HLS missions, with its existing domestic structure, DOD can bring to bear much capability in the way of forces, equipment, and an expansive command and planning staff structure. The following commands are representative of this capability (for information about each command see Appendix Six):

- Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
- North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
- Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
- Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
- Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
- Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
- Space Command (SPACECOM)\(^{115}\)

Moreover, JFCOM has eleven subordinate force elements to help meet its geographic and functional responsibilities, with each of the subordinate commands having integral commands and planning staff structure. The JFCOM force element commands include: Forces Command, Atlantic Fleet, Marine Forces Atlantic, Air Combat Command, Joint Reserve Unit, Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command, U.S. Forces Azores, Iceland Defense Force, Joint Force Headquarters HLS, Joint Task Force (JTF)-6, and JTF-Civil Support. Of these, seven have capability within the U.S.\(^{116}\)

At the state level, the expandable staff and organizational structure of the NG, with its dual role capability, is time tested, responsive, and cost effective. In particular, in a state role as a first military responder, the NG’s strength is its forward or front-line presence in 3,100 readiness centers in more than 2,500 communities in all 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia. In addition, the Army National Guard federally supports the operation and maintenance of more than 19,000 training, aviation and logistical facilities located throughout the nation making it essential to


\(^{116}\) Ibid.
HLS. The Director, Army National Guard in the ARNG FY 2000 Posture Statement, describes the significance of the NG and new WMD-CST:

A central reason for the emerging Guard WMD mission lies in the unique Guard domestic support capability. With a wide variety of communications and logistics assets in all 54 states and territories, the Guard continually responds to a variety of natural and man-made disasters. At the implementation level, the Guard can provide planning and exercise coordination for disaster response training, as well as assisting in the procurement of urgently needed equipment. Additionally, in 45% of the states, the Adjutant General is also the State Emergency Management Officer, thus providing a direct link between the Guard and the state agencies it supports. Finally, when the Guard completes EIS communications integration, every Army National Guard armory and Air National Guard air base can serve as a Joint Operations Center or Disaster Field Office if necessary. The combination of Guard infrastructure and state level integration will greatly improve the nation’s ability to deal with the use of WMD and all other disasters as well.

When not in use for its primary federal warfighting mission, the Air Force and Army NG combat, combat support, and combat service support units provide a credible, responsive, and fiscally responsible means of providing tiered augmentation to state emergency responders. The decentralized organizational structure of the NG under a single executive authority, the Governor, provides a domestic constitutional, legal, and rapid employment capability that can conduct all three HLS mission categories identified in this research: PM, HLD, and CS as well as their associated missions.

As a matter of reference, before assessment of the three DTLOMS sub-processes Organization, Material, and Soldiers, it is important to note that no tactical military organizational structure called a “Homeland Defense Unit” exists today. However, this does not mean HLS or HLD tactical units are necessary in title simply because an HLS mission is now of much more serious concern and has funding attached to it. Far more important than a title, are the capabilities needed to counter the domestic threat of today. Additionally, there is no specific statute like the NG CD Support Program under Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 that provides authority or funding for a

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117 Legislative Priorities of NG, 5/6; Crossland, 214; 2001 Posture Statement; Philbin, 23; and Bloomquist, 1.
more proactive, full-time NG involvement in HLD type missions. The intent of these important points is to frame the assessment of an NG HLS mission, specifically recognizing the need for capability over title, funding or redistribution of funds without losing other critical capability, and statute to provide responsive authority under the responsible agent.

Under the organizational sub-process, the CS missions received a “Y” reply because the organizational structure of the NG in state status already provides statutory and constitutional authority for these type missions. The PM and HLD mission categories assessment was “N(+)” for the very reason stated above, there is no NG HLS program. Additionally, each state has different federal ready reserve units in their NG and the capabilities may not necessarily align with today’s threat. Therefore, the new HLS national strategy may require redistribution or increases in the quantity of certain types of NG units more akin to the HLD mission around the U.S. based on probability of risk or vulnerability for that area. As the federal, state, and local authorities develop organizations, offices, technology, specialized skills, new standards, security requirements, and interagency information sharing capability--the NG organizational coordination and liaison requirements will also need to adapt.

Furthermore, it is premature to completely reorganize permanent domestic military structure before identifying specific capability shortfalls at home. This includes determination of the federal, state, community, and local authorities’ shortfalls in organizational structure and/or resourcing according to new HLS standards and by each agency’s primary core competency and responsibility. Then, based on these shortfalls, budgeting will likely determine the difference between funded full-time fills by each agency and those requirements necessary in the form of volunteers, agency reserves, or NG augmentation.

Materiel

The State Area Command (STARC) directs the deployment and employment of NG units for domestic operations. The NG has authorization to use NG personnel and Federal equipment assigned to the Army and Air NG for emergency support on an incremental cost-reimbursable basis. NGB works closely with the states to coordinate resource needs/shortfalls. State NG’s can requisition unique requirements not supported by an MTOE/Common Table of Allowances (CTA) through appropriate resource channels. The state can approve funding for the NG to procure unfinanced requirements deemed necessary to prepare for state emergencies, in accordance with state policies, statute, and procedures for emergency preparedness equipment and supply acquisition. For example, if the state identifies a compatibility issue between the military and state responders’ radios, in accordance with state procedures and statute, the governor can allow commitment of state funds for the NG to procure the specialized compatible radios for use in state emergencies.

The PM and HLD mission categories under the sub-process Materiel are assessed as a “N(+)” because there is no program and the new robust HLS information sharing system envisioned is not yet in place to coordinate information or intelligence between federal, state, and local authorities. Most challenging, is meeting the national objective as specified in the President’s HLS Book, Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation, which will involve disseminating critical intelligence often held at the federal level, down through the state and to the local levels in need. This will include the NG simply because of the pre-established emergency management linkage as well as the community status at the local levels.

The new national threat will most likely require additional material, specialized equipment, and funding for specialized HLS training and manning. Yet, redistribution alone could be at the
cost of other national security capabilities. National strategy and budgeting at each level of
government will determine what changes are fiscally possible without compromising too much in
another national security area. The challenge is to avoid the temptation to over inflate areas less
crucial then the invaluable “eyes-on” capabilities within communities which physically observe,
prevent, and if necessary respond most rapidly to incidents.

When looking at all three mission categories of HLS under the sub-process of Materiel,
the quantity and distribution of existing materiel necessary to provide a state HLS response
capability will likely vary or increase above present authorizations. This includes funding for
specialized HLS material and equipment, training for unique skills, in the right number, and right
place, based on analysis of areas with a higher probability of the threat.

It is generally clear, that the military will require far less federal/active and reserve forces
performing domestic HLS duty than today, once federal employees take over the airport security
mission, critical infrastructure security requirements are met, and U.S. Customs, Border Patrol,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Coast Guard, and the first responder
community are brought up to new HLS standards and strength requirements. Therefore, it would
be premature to estimate an increase in permanent, full-time military strength, based solely on
current domestic military support to civil authorities and law enforcement estimates. The chart
below conceptually illustrates the rapid rise in resource requirements after an incident and how
over time the full-time requirements decline to a state of normalcy. The level off point (far right
of the chart) is when the incident site is recovered/restored and federal, state, and local agencies,
statutes, systems, skills, and funding are aligned at new required level to address the threat.

\[120\] Bush, 19/20.
Additional HLS initiatives throughout the states will likely include some new or previously under funded fills in specialized equipment. Under the Materiel sub-process, the CS missions received a “Y” answer except for the missions that presently appear most critical to the CS mission in support with an HLS nexus. The CS missions assessed as an “N(+)” are: linguist translator support, investigative case and analyst support, CBRNE/WMD (funding has already increased for a total of 32 WMD-CSTs), combating terrorism and medical (especially related to bioterrorism). Simply put, without an HLS program, applicable statute, and funding to requisition specialized HLS equipment and conduct preparedness training, the NG will not have statutory authority to more proactively conduct missions versus training in support of civil authorities and law enforcement.
**Soldiers**

Commanders ensure assigned personnel receive training and develop skills for their federal mission as well as adequate specialized equipment necessary for their state mission. NG soldiers like their AC counterpart, complete initial entry and pre-commissioning training and attend Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) training/courses. New soldiers will receive training on the latest military equipment during their initial training.

The PM mission is an “N(+)” because the First Responder Initiative, Citizen Corps, and information sharing requirements initially addressed in the Presidents HLS Book could lead to additional coordination and liaison requirements between the STARC and state and local authorities. The HLD missions received an “N(+)” because, as in Organizational and Materiel, the Soldiers sub-process lacks funding for more proactive NG involvement in HLD type missions. As seen above, the linguist translator support, investigative case and analyst support, CBRNE/WMD, combating terrorism, and medical CS missions received an “N(+).” Additional “N(+)” replies under CS relate to the lack of funding and authorization for manning community training and awareness activities with an HLS nexus.

The President’s HLS book proposes some initial imperatives necessary for the immediate security of the nation. The national HLS requirements to secure the homeland will require a much more detailed national capabilities assessment than is possible to cover in this general DTLOMS analysis, which really focuses on DOD and especially, NG capability. Though operating in an extremely fluid national security environment, a review of initial steps in securing the homeland, the NG role and capabilities in HLS, and the above DTLOMS analysis, will provide the researcher a basis for comparative analysis with the NG CD Support Program in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Our Nation learned a painful lesson on September 11. American soil is not immune to evil or cold-blooded enemies capable of unprecedented acts of mass murder and terror. The worst of these enemies – and target number one in our war on terrorism – is the terrorist network Al Qaeda. Yet the threat to America is not limited to Al Qaeda – or to suicide hijackings of commercial aircraft. As we learned on October 4, 2001, a Florida man named Robert Stevens became the first known victim of an unprecedented act of biological terrorism.

A new wave of terrorism, involving new weapons, looms in America’s future. It is a challenge unlike any ever faced by our Nation. But we are not daunted. We possess the resources and the determination to defeat our enemies and work to secure our homeland against the threats they pose. 121

President George W. Bush

The NG and Homeland Security

Initial proposals in the President’s HLS Book address some primary imperatives for immediate security of the nation, including support to first responders, public health, information technology, DOD HLS (outside initiatives), along with U.S. Customs, INS, and U.S. Coast Guard initiatives to secure the border. Other proposals include a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT), adding federal law enforcement agents (FBI), Citizen Corps coordinated by FEMA, critical infrastructure protection in cooperation with state and local agencies, and DOD budget dedicated to intelligence, facility physical security, combat air patrols, and specialized NG WMD-CSTs. The initial proposal shows a strong commitment to the many agencies and citizens task organized for a national campaign against terrorism. Clearly, reflecting a war not fought by military forces alone. 122

Resources exist now, but require prioritization and distribution based on those areas most critical to national security. No matter how one slices the precious resources pie, when under constant consumption, it can only go so far, especially without significantly changing the American

121 Bush HLS Book, 2.
122 Ibid., 8, 23-25.
way of life. Each agency assigned missions in the HLS campaign must be fiscally responsible; avoiding stove piped competition or duplicative efforts. This ensures each agency focuses on their core competency or area of responsibility not shared by any other. Every dollar committed to areas not necessary or less crucial now, takes a dollar away from those critically in need -- more specifically, local law enforcement agencies legally weeding out the threat at home and those armed forces fighting this war abroad. Each new permanent staff member and desk added to force structure or each unit encumbering a position typically filled by another agency at home, could very well jeopardize our fiscal ability to replace an exhausted soldier or regenerate a disintegrating unit abroad.

Development of an HLS program modeled after the NG CD Support Program provides a means to strengthen gaps in domestic security until the agency in need can adapt to new requirements. That is what a ready reserve does, augments in time of national crisis. A model resembling the NG CD program provides a cost-effective, responsive, front-line capability that supports the President’s assertion that a carefully conceived plan is required to ensure that these HLS efforts yield maximum-security benefits at the least possible financial and social cost.\(^{123}\) The previous chapters provided information on the NG’s background, dual role responsibility, and employment history at home and abroad, each necessary to frame the problem for comparative analysis. The following explains each DTLOMS sub-process and forms the basis of the conclusion.

**Doctrine**

The fundamental principles already exist for both CD and HLD operations. Doctrine refers to CD as a specific type of operation and its reference actually encompasses many of the HLD and CS type missions. While HLS is not a separate and specific mission, as stated above,

\(^{123}\) Ibid.
each type of HLD and CS mission exists in doctrine. An NG HLS program designed after the
NG CD Program will require little adjustment to doctrine. Moreover, doctrine already
differentiates domestic support operations from operations abroad. The following reiterates
pertinent points to domestic support operations or the HLS missions:

- The Constitution provides authority to Congress to declare war and raise armies
- State executives are responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. (State
  and local authorities develop response plans that address mitigation, preparedness,
  response, and recovery activities. Essentially, they know the needs within their area
  of responsibility best because they are closest to it. If elected officials do not fulfill
  their commitment to the citizens, the citizens can vote for someone else)
- FEMA is the federal government’s executive agent for implementing assistance to
  state and local governments, including preparedness activities. FEMA is the lead
  federal agency responsible for consequence management, including the effects of
  terrorism
- Under Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI has primary responsibility for collecting
  domestic intelligence and coordinating the intelligence activities of other agencies; the
  FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for crisis management, including terrorism
- The Attorney General is the head of federal agencies responsible for law
  enforcement (a crucial separation between the military and law enforcement). Law
  enforcement at each level routinely practices obtaining appropriate warrants/legal
  authorization for search, seizure, and preservation of evidence
- JFCOM is responsible for defense against land and maritime aggression targeted at
  our territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as directly
  supporting the lead federal agency in the management of the consequences of such
  aggression and other domestic civil support
- CINC, US Special Operations Command serves as the principal military planning
  agent for combating terrorism involving CBRNE during crisis response
- There are specific actions in which military personnel may not participate; the
  Constitution provides two exceptions: to protect federal property/functions and when
  necessary to protect civilian property, meaning when a disturbance, disaster or
  calamity is so severe to endanger life and property and disrupt normal government
  functions to such an extent that local authorities cannot control the situation.
- The President may order armed forces to aid state authorities confronted with
  insurrection or civil disturbance under the following circumstances: at the request of
  the state, to enforce federal authority, to protect federal property, to protect
  Constitutional rights of citizens within any state
- Before a Presidential declaration, military commanders may use short-term immediate
  response authority to assist in the rescue, evacuation, and emergency treatment of
  casualties; to restore emergency medical capabilities; and to safeguard public health
- Statutory exceptions for greater Title 10 military involvement already exist and do not
  require modification, importantly keeping the decision for domestic use of military
  under executive authority and not a military commander. Exceptions include: the
constitutional exceptions listed above, governors request, statutory exceptions that allow the military to share certain information with LEAs (*10 USC 371-380*), Presidential proclamation, and domestic disaster relief the Stafford Act, *42 USC 5121*, et seq, as amended

- The role of DOD in domestic operations is to assist/support civil authorities. (It becomes a management issue when too much “help” shows up without invitation, creating congestion that can overwhelm a disaster area and thus prevent or slow effective synchronization of more critical assets)
- Under the Governor’s control, in a nonfederal status, the NG has primary responsibility for providing first military response to state and local governments
- Commanders who perform disaster assistance missions without tasking from FEMA risk not receiving reimbursement for costs
- OPLAN GARDEN PLOT contains DOD procedures for assisting the FBI in combating terrorism
- If employed, the military’s role must transfer to civilian organizations as soon as practical
- The STARC is responsible for emergency planning and response using all NG resources within its jurisdiction, working in coordination with other state and local agencies. States may have agreements for assistance with neighboring states by means of an emergency compact[^24]

The NG CD program shares many of the same missions listed on the HLS DTLOMS matrix and already sets the precedence for NG joint/interagency information and intelligence sharing with civil authorities. An NG HLS program would require few adjustments to current doctrine. The doctrine describing NG CD provides an example of how to consolidate standard military skills, TTPs, and those capabilities authorized by statute into one document or chapter.

However, doctrine does not adequately address two important aspects of domestic operations. First, it portrays the *Posse Comitatus Act* as an enemy; making even some of the most senior military leaders address the Act as an outdated law, something too diluted to maintain, or a barrier needing elimination so the military can take greater action. This perception steps dangerously close to giving military commanders free reign across state boundaries within the U.S rather than requiring executive decision before crossing coordination lines. Pressure for greater military action within the U.S. also raises question as to the motivation behind targeting the

[^24]: JP 3-07.4, III-31; JP 3-57, I, III-31; FM 100-19, 2-5, 3-3/3-4, 5-1 to 5-9, 7-9; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 5/8; FRP, TI-1 to TI-3; H.R. 525; DODD 3025.1-M.
Constitutional separation of powers. Instead, doctrine should address the Act in a positive light. It is useful in part, to avert the Forefather’s concern that the army could force its will upon the states and become a source of tyranny. The Act is the one strategic domestic control measure separating a professional military’s fire and maneuver from those operating under the judicial system. Clearly, the Act is not void or diluted if it still creates debate and it is not too restrictive if methods are in place to allow immediate Presidential proclamation.

Second, doctrine does not define war or adequately address the political, informational, and economic implications of employing the military domestically when competing combat zones exist abroad and none exist within the nation’s boundaries. This creates confusion. For example, does a President’s public announcement of a “War on Drugs” or “War on Terrorism” give the military authority to deliberately take offensive action within the U.S. or outside of designated combat zones except in self-protection? Or, does it authorize the military to go out and “hunt for business” from other agencies possibly opening later lawsuit for taking business away from civilians.

A few other considerations include: will federal military presence usurp state executive authority or give the impression that the state and/or local elected officials are no longer capable of governing or protecting their citizens? Will federal troops demonstrate a lack of faith in law enforcement? Could continuous military presence have a negative impact on American’s freedom and spending of money? Will the military receive bad press if any actual or perceived civil rights violations occur and would this degrade the credibility or image of what must remain a professional military? Although these considerations far exceed the confines of this research, clarification of the positive aspects of state and local law enforcement task forces and their ability to capture drug leaders and terrorists within the U.S could help avoid excessive investment of the

military’s time and expenditure of funds in areas outside of DOD’s primary responsibility. To date, law enforcement and civil awareness is the most effective and proven deterrent to crime, terrorism, and prevention of future attacks. Aside from the many considerations for employing the military domestically, doctrine about the NG CD program provides a start point to build the fundamental principles for an NG HLS program with a slightly broader perspective.

Training

Doctrine and training programs exist for each of the mission areas described under the NG CD program and the new HLS concept. The positive Training assessment for each mission under both the NG CD and HLS programs on the combined comparative matrix reflects the existence of specialized training and/or Air Force and Army NG training programs (See Appendix Five). The NG CD support program provides a baseline-training program that addresses most missions under HLS. The few not covered under NG CD are the HLD security and critical infrastructure protection missions and CS missions, CBRNE/WMD, combating terrorism, civil disturbance, medical, and lodging. Each of these missions exist in other training programs and doctrine.

In addition to MOS/AFSCs and unit battle focused training, NG CD members can attend CD specialized training programs that already exist in the NG. This includes extensive interagency coordination, planning, training, and actual mission support with government officials, firefighters, medical technicians, law enforcement, educators, and community organizations based on individual state needs. Additionally, the Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer (POMSO), through the STARC, a joint headquarters, coordinates MSCA type interagency training and community services that support the governor’s state plan. The NG’s training for state missions facilitates and supports preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery activities in accordance with their respective governor’s state response plan.
As indicated, many of the NG CD specialized training courses apply to HLS as well. Expanding the scope of the NG CD program or developing a cooperative NG HLS program that incorporates the few missions not addressed, would avoid unnecessarily recreating capabilities already in existence. In addition, the NG CD, interagency, and language training institutes already provide facilities, equipment, and skilled NG members familiar with CD missions and other capabilities relevant to HLS. They include interagency antiterrorism, law enforcement, MSCA/Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS), and language training/courses ranging from the international/strategic to local/tactical level.

Other NG training courses address security threats to the U.S and its communities such as drugs, gangs, violence, terrorism, and CBRNE/WMD. The NG has conducted interagency training in these areas for nearly ten years. The NG has an acclaimed language institute that provides language training as well as side-by-side transcription for CD cases. The benefits in this program and the street language program are immeasurable. Furthermore, the NGB continues to expand its low-cost distance learning capabilities, which can rapidly disseminate counterdrug, science-based prevention and treatment practices, and new HLS training requirements throughout the nation.\textsuperscript{126}

Another measurable benefit to the NG CD program is the ability for the NG members to conduct mission training with their ready reserve unit. FTNGDCD member’s ability to participate in both CD and warfighting training benefits the member, the state, and the federal ready reserve unit. The FTNCDCD member usually maintains greater proficiency in those transferable military skills practiced on a full-time basis in the NG CD program. The state benefits by having interagency connectivity and cooperation as well as skilled NG members trained on the latest technology/equipment. The federal ready reserve unit gains the benefit of a proficient unit member familiar with interagency operations, common equipment, and weapons discipline.
Practicing rules of engagement for operations among civilians strengthens an important discipline similar to that of peacekeeping operations abroad. The alternative, federalization of a NG member would create a void in the NG unit, thus reducing unit readiness or strength.

An additional benefit in modeling HLS after NG CD is that the program reduces training requirements on the agency needing assistance. The supported agency must train new support personnel each time assigned, thus rotational assignments require more training. NG CD members can remain with the agency for tours longer than 179 days if the requirement is an established priority on the governor’s state plan. Additionally, NG employment under Title 32 avoids long approval processes and mobilization days, which in turn provides additional days to the agency in need. Whereas, Title 10 employment and rotational assignments of individuals through the agency every 179 days only increases the training requirement for the agency supported, which consumes time the agency could otherwise spend focused on their primary mission.

Extension of the authorized Title 10 time on station may reduce the agency’s training requirements but it anchors down a worldwide deployable Title 10 individual that could otherwise fill a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) allocation for contingency plans. More importantly, extended Title 10 details would remove the individual from battle-focused military training programs and command structure under a warfighting unit. For example, prolonged “Title 10 detail relationships” are not under a military commander and really only generates another law enforcement, border patrol, INS, or customs agent because the individual is no longer trained with and aligned under a military command structure. This raises the question, if the Title 10 “detail” does not provide immediate liaison to the state responsible for the surrounding areas and the position does not merit a deployable warfighting need, why not fund the position as a permanent member of the agency with the shortage? The difference in employing an NG Title 32 member is they can do both, provide state liaison/support and fill a ready reserve warfighting need.

\[126\] CD Strategy 2001, 52; and Philpot.
Today, funding for CD and state MSCA preparedness type training exists in different “pots of money” and cannot be committed for purposes along a broader HLS perspective. In other words, MSCA and CD dollars are not transferable. A cost-effective program would “fence” funds for an HLS purpose, yet consolidate common missions. It would be inefficient to mandate duplicative funding for like missions just because the “color of the money” is different. For example, mandating two programs in which one individual learns how to look for drugs, explosives, large sums of money, weapons, and indicators of drug cartels, while the other learns to look for explosives, weapons – including signs of biological threats, large sums of money, and terrorist material, is duplicative and wasteful. This is especially wasteful if one individual could broaden the scope of their vision and look for each sign rather than two individuals searching the same location twice. For this reason, any training or manning considerations should address a method to prevent duplication of missions.

**Leader Development**

Leader Development follows the same premise as the Training sub-process. NG leader development programs mirror that of their AC counterpart. However, in addition to military leader development programs, NG leaders in a state role usually receive more exposure to MSCA type missions. As illustrated in chapter two, the NG conducts hundreds of domestic MSCA missions each year, which provides NG leaders with far more opportunity to interact and conduct domestic interagency missions and community service activities than their AC peer. It is the nature of response at levels closer to the citizens.

The NG is comfortable operating in a domestic supporting role because they simply do it more often. The NG does not need to build up large command and control headquarters with UCMJ authority to respond to emergencies. The Adjutant General (TAG) is already in place as the CINC. Regardless of whether the TAG coordinates with or operates the State Office of
Emergency Services, the POMSO and NG leaders understand the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities available to the state. They maintain state contingency plans and know when requirements will exceed their capability and will request assistance when necessary to fill a gap.

As a Douglas County Emergency Manager stated, “Principle number one of emergency management is disasters are always local events.” Another point from a county perspective, “local and community emergency response is at the bottom of the totem pole when it comes to funds and resourcing, but top of the totem pole in the frequency of events.” Additionally, she explained that in a large event, the community responders know the plan, contacts, needs, and shortfalls in the community and are there long before DOD ever gets to an event and long after DOD leaves. Further emphasizing, “You very rarely will ever see me because 99% of the time we will never call you.”

Similarly, NG leaders have ties to the community and they know and participate in the preparedness and prevention activities that take place throughout the state. The NG leaders’ trusted interagency relationships statewide and knowledge of available resources provides the NG with critically important “Golden Hour” response capability under a single executive authority. Furthermore, the public is accustomed to seeing their own NG soldiers and airmen in their community as fellow responders. Long-term contacts within the communities provide the NG with an understanding of what areas are hot spots and need attention. The NG leaders in state status are very familiar with the terrain and the culture, so to speak. The LA Riots provide a good example of how the lack of knowledge in the local layout created added confusion during an emergency. When called to assist the Governor of California, the NG Headquarters established LEA jurisdictional coordination lines to separate forces on the ground. When the AC arrived, they drew their own boundaries, occupied areas that were not coordinated with any local or state

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authorities, arrived without sufficient rations, ground or aviation transports, and became a liability to those they were sent to assist. This lack of interagency coordination created more difficulty in LEA resource allocation, mission request and approval, and overall impression of DOD usage.\textsuperscript{128} To date, LEA-based after action reviews use the DOD (excluding the NG) employment in support of LA Riots as a case study in how not to execute joint military/LEA response efforts. Leaders on Title 10 rotational assignments simply cannot develop the same longstanding relationships NG leaders develop while under state control.

The NG CD and emergency management leaders’ exposure to the interagency environment helps them appreciate the skills and primary responsibilities of other agencies. Like flying an aircraft in close formation, the agencies develop trust and an understanding of their wingman’s capability while under extreme pressure or stress.

**Organizational**

In a state role, the NG has an established state structure with a wide variety of communications and logistics assets already established in all 54 states and territories, with the Governor as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of Title 32 members.\textsuperscript{129} The decentralized organizational structure of the NG under a single state executive authority provides a non-hierarchal, legal, and rapid employment capability that can conduct each of the missions under the NG CD program and HLS concept. Not surprisingly, the Organizational sub-process is probably the area of most contention. Because along with structure comes funding. Therefore, as struggles for funding ensue, the efforts really need to weigh what is absolutely necessary to prevent exhaustion of forces fighting the war on terrorism and multiple contingency operations

\textsuperscript{128} Christopher M. Schnaubelt, 118 to 120; Mathiasen, Melissa A, Lieutenant Colonel USAR, Former Research Analyst National Interagency Civil-Military Institute. Telephone interview by author, 25 February 2002, San Luis Obispo, CA.

\textsuperscript{129} 1997 Legislative Priorities of the National Guard, 5/6; Crossland, 214; Roger C. Schultz, Major General, Director ARNG, “ARNG Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement,”
overseas and those at home. After all, it is not additional staff that will spot the single infiltrator on
the ground, it is technology or front-line troops with eyes-on-target that will make the call.

The NG CD support program provides a responsive, cost-effective flexible framework to
build a domestic NG HLS program. Amending Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 to include a broader
perspective or new statute with similar “fenced” yet cross-level HLS funding would provide the
means for a more proactive involvement of the NG in HLD type missions and incorporate the
limited number of CS missions not presently authorized under the NG CD mandate. The
organization of each State NG CD program is reflective of the Governor’s CD State Plan, based
on the drug threat and not bound to a set federal ready reserve unit MTOE or TDA. This
structure provides greater flexibility, versatility, adaptability, and responsiveness to illicit, mobile,
and changing threats. Although the capability to conduct all HLS missions exists, this does not
mean current Total Force (federal and reserve) structure and sizing optimizes the capabilities
needed for HLS.

When the President declared a “War on Drugs” in the late 1980s to address the new
threat to national security, the NG did not restructure into “Drug Divisions” or “Drug Wings.”
Instead, the NG CD program provided the governors with the means to incorporate the many
capabilities available in the Army and Air NG into state plans. The program plugged capability
into an existing headquarters, the NG STARC, an organization that has established interagency
linkage and already understands domestic response, joint and interagency operations, and the need
for rapid decision and decentralized action versus a multi-layer bureaucratic type organization. A
NG HLS program could replicate this model and add the few needed HLS requirements without
excessive new DOD force structure that might actually restrict capability.

23; and Bloomquist, 1.
An expandable structure such as the NG CD program, consolidates efforts and “plugs-in necessary capabilities,” avoiding a massive increase in full-time force, command and control structure, and equipment because the program adjusts structure based on the “needs” of the state. For larger operations, NGB has the capability to expand by activating a Crisis Action Team (CAT), utilizing both the Army and Air NG. The State’s POMSO can request liaison teams from NGB to expedite EMAC coordination and assistance.

Rather than create a new structure from scratch, an NG HLS program need only incorporate the few missions not covered under NG CD and expand where necessary in those critical areas previously or now identified as understaffed. In reality a percentage of certain types of units or skills such as military police, intelligence analysts, linguists, doctors/nurses/medics, information operations, special forces, and aviation transport and intercept units may need “tagged as national stay-behind units” to maintain an expandable dual role response plan capability necessary to protect the homeland in the event of full-mobilization.

For example, the QDR identifies the requirement for an Army force-structure that can maintain the capability to swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts and ability to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations, today equating to ten active and eight reserve divisions. However, to maintain an HLS capability, the Army force structure would require an additional ready reserve force to maintain a domestic, expandable rapid response HLS capability even after a full RC mobilization.

In this scenario, if we assume that total force-size may need an additional “peak” capability of 50,000 members organized not in HLS divisions or air wings but small units, like companies, with skills needed for securing the homeland. At first glance, the numbers seem large. However, full-time requirements in the NG to maintain interagency coordination and preparedness may only be 5-8 % of that capacity. The importance of “plug-n-go” type units remaining in the
NG is that they can fulfill a dual purpose. Positions would plug-in as front-line units under STARCs, with pre-existing interagency contacts.

The fulltime members would establish and maintain critical linkage to the state and local agencies and communities. Part-time members could conduct interagency training on drill weekends and during annual training. They could maintain the same dual role capability at home in the event the nation fully-mobilizes the remaining ready reserve forces. These NG units with dual roles could stay in place, governors could continue to cross-coordinate support by way of EMACs and have expanding capability above fulltime requirements if all other federal ready reserve structures deploy.

In this worst-case scenario, domestic functional commands would maintain focus on their primary mission. For instance, NORAD would continue to provide air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense. Furthermore, DOD focus is intentionally external and away from domestic policing functions to avoid actual or perceived civil liberty/right to privacy violations and illegal search, seizure, and collection on citizens. Therefore, other domestic commands would need to maintain an outward and more importantly, warfighting focus to support the many engagements worldwide. They would accomplish this through continued rotational training, preparation of AC units for their next deployment, mobilization/synchronization of the RC, and expansion of the training base to integrate new conscripts if necessary. This way, when mobilizing the entire force for war, they would not need to divert attention away from warfighting requirement to policing or response plan activities that remain the responsibility of the governors and other federal agencies. The alternative may result in domestic commands overlooking the need to prepare ready reserve forces for employment behind exhausting AC forces abroad. “Too many fronts could lose the war.” Whereas the NG STARC structure stays in place and the domestic units would maintain continuity and unity of effort under a common pre-established plan that links to other agencies. If demands at home increased, NGB could call-up the CAT.
However, with all of this said; it is the belief of the author that NG units should still not pick an “HLS only” look. They should still resemble AC warfighting units, regardless of what that looks like in the future. Otherwise, the NG will lose the great strides made towards operational, equipment, education, and training parity. Further segregation of the NG would continue to leave the units under-resourced or without familiarization and training in new military technology. A mistake relived many times in the past.

**Materiel**

The Materiel sub-process ties back to the “Organizational” comparative analysis above. The NG CD program in accordance with Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 provides an example of a program that allows acquisition of specialized equipment and services to meet the requirements of the governors’ state plans. Congressionally directed or “fenced” funds managed by a federally recognized officer in the NG CD program provides an accountable, flexible, and responsive procurement process based on current threats and state needs. Furthermore, not all states have the same threat. For example, states with more densely populated areas and critical infrastructures—including information or advanced technology based systems, have different vulnerabilities than those less dense with many infiltration routes. By using the NG CD concept, the fiscal/HLS force structure is not fixed and those areas of greater risk will receive higher priority in the governor’s state plan. Some other advantages include:

- The state can rapidly procure specialized material and equipment based on state needs and not according to the federal ready reserve unit structure, such as an MTOE
- Avoids creation of massive overhead and staffing because the program plugs into an existing structure with statewide/interagency capability
- Managers may not reallocate equipment purchased with Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 funds to other organizations
- State CD and the USPFO staff evaluate proposed and ensure compliance with expenditures under Title 32 U.S.C. § 112. They establish internal budgetary controls to reconcile both ARNG and ANG financial systems and maintain proper documentation to support audit and control in accordance with Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), Public Law 97-255
The program provides the expandable means to hire NG members based on temporary state needs such as for the duration of a specific mission. For example, hiring an additional pilot for a one-day flight or engineer for a three week project. The CD Management Information System (CMIS) tracks and quantifies mission hours by category, useful for NGB consolidated budgetary reporting and compliance with the GPRA. State TAGs may conduct CD operations with federal property issued to the Army and Air NG.

New HLS initiatives will most likely require additional material, specialized equipment, and funding for specialized HLS training and manning. The congressional mandate allowing procurement of CD specific equipment provided the Governors with invaluable CD capability within the state or for use in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) regions. The same principle could apply to a domestic NG HLS program. Amendment of Title 32 U.S.C. § 112 to include additional HLS missions not covered under NG CD should maintain the same budgeting requirements. A separate NG HLS program modeled after NG CD should “fence” funds for HLS missions and require management by a federally recognized Title 32 NG officer through the state USPFO. Regardless, the provisions should incorporate a means to cross-level NG CD and NG HLS capability to avoid duplication of like missions.

**Soldiers**

The NG CD support program provides an example of a congressionally directed program that addresses the national security threat of illicit drugs while maintaining a ready reserve warfighting capability, if anything the program provides the NG with opportunities to enhance Soldiers’ proficiency. Expanding the scope and authorized quantity of certain NG individual or specialized skills for domestic HLS support does not necessarily mean there is a need for change in the federal ready reserve structure. However, a decision to change this structure to better address HLS needs would enhance NG HLS capability. The NG CD support program provides

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130 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 34.
131 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 25/26; NICI CD Managers’ Resource Guide; Title 32 USC 112.
the following Soldiers sub-process advantages, all of which a congressionally directed budget and statute could replicate for an NG HLS program:

- Personnel in the NG CD program understand that the duration and size of the program is subject to annual appropriated funding levels and their participation is not permanent. In other words, if requirements do not exist members return to their civilian jobs or part-time NG members.
- FTNGDCD members possess MOS/AFSCs and additional civilian acquired, NG internal, and/or external agency specialized training, qualification, and certification if necessary to fulfill the governor’s state plan.
- It is not necessary to hire FTNGDCD personnel based solely on their federal ready reserve MOS or AFSC. An individual may have a civilian acquired skill that benefits support requirements more than an MOS. For example, an NG military police NCO that speaks fluently in Spanish could receive specialized LEA training and fulfill a linguist requirement. Another example, an infantry operations NCO could run an intelligence analyst team, providing invaluable support to both the NG CD program and ready reserve unit.
- Congressionally-directed or “fenced” funds managed by a federally recognized Title 32 NG CD member using an NG reporting system through an NG Title 10 officer at USPFO tracks for each mission hour by category performed and accounts for proper expenditure of program appropriations.
- Mission assignment occurs based on the priorities established in the Governor’s CD State Plan.\(^{133}\)
- The domestic front-line NG CD member as part of the Governor’s state plan, routinely receives civil disturbance training and operates under rules of engagement (ROE) that clarify actions in dealing with civilians, police and rescue officials, making interagency CD operations an extension of the norm.
- The NG CD end strength exemption provides additional capability that does not affect allowable end strengths\(^{134}\).
- NG alignment with a warfighting unit provides the means for continued military training and education on the latest military systems.
- The supported agency is more inclined to train those individuals that can remain longer to enhance the specialty skills they have acquired\(^{135}\).

Bottom line, an HLS program resembling the NG CD program provides a means for specialized training determined by state requirements in state status. It does not take away from the number of RC training days authorized each year. In essence, the program takes advantage of the NG’s dual role. Increased NG involvement in domestic HLS will simply require

\(^{133}\) Wade interview.
\(^{134}\) NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 29.
amendment to or similar statute to that directing the NG CD Support Program under Title 32 U.S.C. § 112. The program manager of a new or expanded NG CD program could then hire for specialized skills based on the state’s plan. The key point here is an NG HLS program that would provide a capability-based structure through consolidation and not strictly expansion. Most importantly, using the NG domestically avoids federal military forces from usurping state executive authority and does not raise a question as to military engagement without Congressional declaration of War or a designated combat zone.

Colonel William H. Wade II; Major Reyes Cole; and NGAUS, 14 March 2002, legislative alert, stating many INS and Customs agents and Customs inspectors believe the deployment will be counterproductive if they will have to spend more time worrying about protecting Guard forces.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Come join hand in hand, brave Americans all, And rouse your bold hearts at fair Liberty’s call; No tyrannous acts shall suppress your just claim, Or stain with dishonor America’s name. In freedom we’re born and in freedom we’ll live; Our purses are ready, steady, friends steady, Not as slaves, but as free men, our money we’ll give...Then join hand in hand, brave Americans all, By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall; In so righteous a cause let us hope to succeed, for heaven approves of each generous deed.\(^\text{136}\)

The Liberty Song, John Dickinson, 1768

Outcome of the Research Findings

The grievous attacks on September 11, 2001, accentuate the vulnerability of the United States to transnational threats. Since there is no reason to suspect the strategic environment will change in the coming years, the U.S. must pursue a strategy to protect the homeland while honoring international commitments and fighting the war on terrorism abroad. Aware that the NG has a long history of protecting the homeland and operating with state and local agencies as a joint first military responder, the researcher sought a method to determine domestic HLS requirements. Consequently, this led the author to the established NG CD support program for comparative analysis, a program initiated over a decade ago to contend with another threat to national security—illicit drug trafficking.

Hence, the author’s original research question was: Is the National Guard (NG) Counterdrug (CD) Support Program a suitable model to design an NG HLS force that is also capable of fulfilling the National Guard’s role as a first military responder while maintaining a warfighting capability as a federal ready reserve force? Based on the research, legislature, and policy presented in the monograph, the answer to the question is a qualified yes; the research confirms that the NG CD support program provides a suitable template

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to build an NG HLS program that is also capable of fulfilling both a first military responder and warfighting capability.

The previous chapters in this monograph escorted the reader through a historical overview of the NG, two DTLOMS analyses, and a comparative analysis to arrive at this conclusion. This overview described the founding of the militia, the dual role of the NG, and how the NG has always played a major part in military operations both at home and abroad. Regardless of attempts to dissolve the NG or debate over its readiness, the NG has participated in every major war, giving life and blood for country and the freedoms we so cherish. Post-cold war, the NG has played an increasing role in contingency operations around the world, backfilling or augmenting the AC as commitments to small-scale contingency operations have increased. In state status, NG members have continued to serve their governor and citizens within the state as a first military responder conducting prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery training and hundreds of actual MSCA missions each year. The NG remains the only force immediately available to the governors for response to domestic emergencies and disasters, which confirms the necessity of the NG’s involvement in domestic HLS operations.

Review of the background and capabilities of the NG CD Support Program provided a look at an effective program formed in response to another national security threat that has killed tens of thousands of Americans—Illicit Drugs. A killer that is inextricably linked to money laundering, weapons, violence, addiction, organized crime, and even terrorism. A DTLOMS analysis illustrated the responsiveness and effectiveness of the NG CD program. Furthermore, it showed how Title 32 NG members conduct CD operations while maintaining readiness as a warfighter.

Before conducting the HLS DTLOMS analysis, the researcher reviewed evolving HLS policy, definitions, initial HLS national security proposals, DOD goals, current doctrine for military domestic operations, and ongoing HLS missions to identify requirements for domestic HLS
missions. The review revealed that each of the ongoing missions necessary for HLS already exist in Joint, Army, and National Guard doctrine and that HLS operations do not strictly apply to the confines of the U.S. Most importantly, to fulfill international commitments, DOD must maintain a forward presence and force projection capability to prevent the threat from reaching our homeland. Additionally, analysis of the NGs involvement in domestic HLS compared to Active Component forces validated initial Hart-Rudman recommendations for the NG to fulfill a primary role in HLS.

Furthermore, the comparative analysis in the last chapter provides the basis for answering the research question. The author presented parallel and complementary capabilities in the NG CD support program and NG domestic support missions to those needed for an NG HLS program. Appropriately, the national HLS 2003-Budget proposal focuses DOD funding on outside initiatives, combat air patrols, and installation security. The continued terrorist threat abroad and commitments to smaller-scale contingencies overseas reiterates the need for DOD to focus on an area that no other agency has capability—warfighting versus domestic policing. However, the NG will need to continue to support both their federal and state roles. By using the NG for domestic operations, the nation benefits from the NG’s unique decentralized, responsive, adaptable, cost-effective, well-established, and fully integrated interagency capability. Whereas an AC alternative weakens the ACs ability to rapidly project power and creates legal, constitutional, and economic implications.

**Final Considerations/Suggested Areas for Study**

It is clearly understood that decisions are made intuitively in time of crisis, however, as the nation moves away from the immediacy of September 11, time is available for deliberate planning and decision-making, considering long-term solutions and implications. The research brought forth many areas for consideration and study above the recommended solution offered in the last
section of this chapter. In addition to considerations raised in the comparative analysis, the author offers the following:

**Command and Control:** The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended a reduction in DOD staff/headquarters to address the new challenges of the 21st Century. Creating a new headquarters contradicts the most recent QDR Report (Transforming DOD) that recommends streamlining the overhead structure and flattening the organization to improve rapid flow of data and information. This includes a reduction in CINC/service headquarters and staff by 15 percent and elimination of redundancy. Therefore, would a new headquarters solve new security challenges or does it increase coordination requirements and further stovepipe efforts? Does additional commands with parallel functions counter streamlining efforts and create planning staffs fighting for their own recognition or relevancy? How many times have civil authorities asked for command and control assistance during an emergency? Research for this project did not reveal any local or state requests for DOD to take over elected responsibilities, incident command, or control. Instead, the requests focused on equipment and manpower, which given the mission small unit commanders can conduct such support missions. If requested by a governor, when has available DOD units ever failed to coordinate or provide domestic support to civil authorities in a national emergency? If not, is additional coordinating staff required at the strategic level? Has the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) failed to obtain authorization from the Secretary for domestic support if higher national security priority does not exist? Was there a lack of unity of effort after the 9/11 attacks or did the entire nation unify? Did Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s local and the New York State Emergency Response systems work and unify efforts? If the state and FRP works, why interfere? Would additional “helping hands” not requested by the governor cause congestion and interfere with critical life saving activities? If the President’s HLS Book indicates a need for improved interagency information sharing, would additional command structure improve intelligence sharing or create a structure that degrades information sharing through multiple agencies?

**Dependency:** Should the nation create a military structure that makes state and local authorities dependent on federal forces for internal policing and response activities so the forces cannot pull out for higher national security requirements? Doctrine and numerous lessons learned from civil-military operations note the importance of returning authority to the civilian population as quickly as possible. The population must trust their elected officials. The military must ensure they respect sovereignty and empower the state officials so the citizens continue to rely upon their elected officials. There must be a plausible and pre-determined exit strategy, as with any military campaign or operation. Lacking an exit strategy ties down forces and limits the ability to project power. It would be extremely dangerous to have state and local authorities develop a dependency on the federal military. Especially if the time comes that state and local authorities have developed plans relying on federal forces and higher national or global priorities commit the military so they are unable to fulfill state and local requirements. Additionally, the military structure costs the nation much more than private citizens, civil authorities, businesses, and volunteers. This is the U.S., not a failing nation, therefore, if DOD has a

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137 QDR, 49-53.
capability needed by LEAs or local governments to secure the homeland, why not properly equip the agency lacking the equipment or provide it through the NG?

**CD and HLS Appropriations:** Amend statute to ensure distribution of funding goes to the area in need at the state and local level. There must be checks and balances to ensure the governors use the funds for HLS and/or CD only. However, it seems a conflict of interest may exist if DOD maintains approval and distribution authority over the state executive’s plan. Is it time to seek alternative appropriations processes that prevent competition for HLS/CD needs? If DOD maintains approval authority and competition for relevancy or funding exists, will DOD maintain the funds rather than disperse them to the state or make the State Plan approval process so difficult that the state plan does not reach Congress on time. A recent example of this type of competition is in DOD’s retention of NG CD funding despite congressional mandate to distribute funds to the state.\(^{138}\)

**Forward Engagement:** NSS recognizes the military as crucial in shaping the international security environment. The United States must stay engaged throughout the globe, as a global leader in order to fight terrorism, enhance security, bolster economic prosperity, and promote democracy and human rights abroad. What are the economic, political, resource, and national security implications of over-committing the military?

**Volunteerism or What Alternative?** If the “War on Terrorism” is a protracted war, can volunteers provide sufficient strength? Shifting large numbers of RC to fill AC deficits is only a stopgap measure that will ultimately deplete the RC. At what point is recruiting more costly than the return on investment? When will stop loss no longer fill the gaps? Has full-mobilization strength during wartime ever equated to a peacetime permanent structure? If not, should DOD try to form a permanent structure based on wartime mobilization requirements? If full-mobilization does not equate to peacetime permanent strength, at what point should DOD determine wartime strength requirements and mobilize appropriate ready reserve units to prepare for war? Will this require an alternative to volunteerism?

**Maintain Credibility, Trust, and Legitimacy:** To date, domestic law enforcement and civil awareness provide an effective and proven deterrent to crime, drug use, and even acts of terrorism. The public must continue to recognize and feel comfortable with their elected officials and civil authorities handling criminal (manmade) and natural disasters and the ensuing investigative actions. This is where law has set the standard and the precedent. Understanding that special law enforcement task forces can get injunctions to tear down crack houses, search potential terrorists at borders and transportation ports, or conduct authorized raids, reinforces public trust. Will educating military leaders on the capabilities of law enforcement task forces raise their trust in other agencies’ abilities? Counter to this, could the inception of a military structure traversing over to the side of domestic security in the form of enforcement, investigation, and physical intervention cause public confusion, paranoia, and fear of an impending military state? Could this then leave the public questioning whether DOD is sufficiently fulfilling its warfighting mission? Additionally, will increased military involvement bring forth bad publicity for actual or perceived civil right’s violations? Can a professional military afford the consequences or

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\(^{138}\) Congressional Actions Addressing Shortfalls within the National Guard Counterdrug Program (Governor’s State Plans),” (Draft Information Paper submitted to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD, Arlington, VA: Office of Chief, National Guard Bureau, 25 January 2002).
disparaging image if so? If the military intervenes and takes away contracting and employment opportunities from civilians or contractors normally formed to respond to domestic emergencies, does this violate law and will it damage the military’s reputation?

**Final Recommendation**

The changing global operating environment requires a responsive force with the capability to address domestic HLS requirements. A domestic NG HLS program modeled after the NG CD support program offers the most cost-effective, yet responsive capabilities-based military structure for combating terrorism in the homeland. As in the NG CD program, FTNGD personnel could conduct full-time HLS support missions while maintaining readiness in their wartime mission, which provides tremendous value to the states and nation.

To honor international commitments, fight the war on terrorism, and secure the homeland, DOD must continue to focus on external efforts and rely on the NG and LEAs with primary internal HLS responsibility for the present domestic terrorist threat. Therefore, DOD wide, consolidate headquarters with domestic functions rather than expand, this will also facilitate streamlining the overhead structure and flattening the organization to improve rapid flow of data and information. Place any additional DOD end-strength in the units and staff that can “effect” the fight abroad. Supplement present federal ready reserve requirements, by adding or designating “Stay Behind NG Units,” not divisions but modular units or a percentage of certain units with capabilities needed for HLS. Develop an NG HLS program modeled after the NG CD support program with its unique “plug-n-go” capability-based structure rather than based on an MTOE/TDA. Add ancillary missions not addressed under the NG CD support program and consolidate capability rather than create two divergent or stove-piped initiatives. This way, regardless of how the DOD transforms, the state maintains the ability to conduct HLS in accordance with the governor’s state plan and updated threat assessment.

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139 QDR, iv.
Ensure funding is “fenced” for HLS resourcing. Do not dismantle state protective measures that work and have served this nation well. Do not repeat history by trying to place the NG firmly under the control of the federal government unless used for their federal mission. Utilize the ready reserve for their federal purpose during time of war; to augment, backfill, or integrate with the AC when fighting this nation’s wars. Avoid trying to justify a new permanent peacetime structure based on present wartime requirements. Instead, determine wartime requirements and begin to mobilize the ready reserve force in sufficient time to prepare them for the war on terrorism before it expands. Waiting too long to mobilize the ready reserve risks exhausting the peacetime standing force that is trying to execute all wartime requirements. Do not make the NG simply a roving HLS force; as this would significantly extend the time needed to train and prepare these units in time of war and destroy the years of progress made in reducing the technological gap between AC and RC. Again, the NG has long proven its capability to do both its state and federal mission.

Although confirmed, worldwide connectivity between drugs and terrorism far exceeds the limits of this research. At a glance, one cannot help but parallel the close linkage between drug trafficking and the ongoing U.S. contingency operations, including the “War on Terrorism” as depicted on the ONDCP illustration of Global Drug Production and Trafficking below.

![Figure 6. Global Drug Production & Trafficking, (ONDCP, Feb 02')](image)

Therefore, closing your eyes to one transnational threat, supports the other. Separate programs could isolate intelligence key to the other program. Domestically, adding a limited number of ancillary missions and consolidating the NG CD program and other NG domestic
support capabilities for an all-encompassing NG HLS program will provide a responsive and cost-effective HLS solution. Now is not the time to build massive new force structure from scratch or create separate structures to focus on two transnational threats that so closely parallel each other, drugs and terrorism. Instead, it is a time to pull together and make the best use of those capabilities that work and focus efforts on those areas needing improvement, such as information sharing. To thwart this persistent, cunning, and unprecedented foe, as the President relays in his HLS Book, this war is a national effort that transcends all instruments of national power.140

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140 FM 3-0, 1-4. The instruments of National Power are Diplomatic (internal/domestic is political), Informational, Military, and Economic. The national effort against terrorism will not be won by military alone.
APPENDIX ONE

NG INTEGRATION/WARFIGHTING

A summary of the militia/National Guard involvement in warfighting from the Office of the June 1996 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Handbook, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CONFLICT/WAR</th>
<th>Number of NG Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>Pequot War</td>
<td>Unknown⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>Dutch War</td>
<td>Unknown³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>Queen Anne’s War</td>
<td>Unknown⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>French and Indian War</td>
<td>Unknown⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>164,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>489,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Black Hawk War</td>
<td>10,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>The Second Seminole War</td>
<td>30,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>Mexican War</td>
<td>78,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Spanish-American War</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Philippine Insurrection</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917*</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>440,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>297,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>61,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>23,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Persian Gulf War</td>
<td>62,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Information received from an additional source, see footnote.

Figure 7. National Guard Integration/Warfighting Involvement

Since active forces ranks were reduced following the Gulf War in the early 1990s, NG and Army Reserve forces have had to support an increasing number of federal missions both at home and abroad to include space operations, national missile defense, intelligence, special operations. In just the past few years, the National Guard has become actively involved in augmenting missions or small-scale contingencies previously carried out solely by the Active forces. Following is a list of some of the federal augmentations; it does not necessarily reflect all missions.¹²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Federal Augmentation/NG Integration</th>
<th>Number of NG Members/ (Number of Workdays)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti: nation building/security missions</td>
<td>68 Special Forces soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt’s Sinai Desert: <em>Multi-national Force and Observers Mission</em></td>
<td>401 soldiers from 24 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia: <em>Operation Joint Endeavor</em></td>
<td>945 soldiers from 22 Army Guard units, and 16 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp Darby Italy, Army Reserve Package-2 Maintenance Support</td>
<td>1,260 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supported exercises in:</td>
<td>2 x Special Forces (SF) Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Theater: FOAL EAGLE, FREQUENT STORM, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, BALANCED TORCH, and COBRA GOLD</td>
<td>3,546 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supported Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed exercises such as FUERTES CAMINOS, FUERZAS UNIDAS, FUERZAS DEFENZAS, BRIGHT STAR, ATLANTIC RESOLVE, TRADEWINDS, ULCHI FOCUS LENS, KEEN EDGE, NORTHWIND, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and Combat Training Center (CTC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) and Partnership for Peace Program including instruction on military support to civil authorities in planning and responding to civil emergencies and natural disasters, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Republic of Georgia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.</td>
<td>513 officers/soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit/Co-op Exchange Program: Germany, United Kingdom, Norwegian NG, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Barbados</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CIL-HI)</td>
<td>8 SF medics to identify remains from Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve Component support to the Active Component (RC to AC) program</td>
<td>314 soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to 10th Mountain to shrink wrap a/c redeploying from Haiti</td>
<td>29 soldiers from 3 states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>988 NG members (90,171 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Command</td>
<td>8,884 NG members (179,576 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>1,662 NG members (28,638 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
<td>10,547 NG members (178,583 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
<td>1,729 NG members (12,415 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1996</strong></td>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>687 NG members (14,891 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Command</td>
<td>6,650 NG members (127,501 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>2,602 NG members (44,609 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
<td>10,262 NG members (179,934 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
<td>1,658 NG members (8,188 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) and Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD)</td>
<td>4,441 NG members (45,383 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard</strong></td>
<td>3,482 soldiers (from 97 units &amp; 42 states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe in support of: <strong>Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard</strong></td>
<td>27,600 soldiers (over 1 million days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard</strong></td>
<td>Over 2,000 NG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>Over 20,000 NG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCOM: Participated in a variety of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises including Operations STRONG RESOLVE, COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION, BALTIC CHALLENGE, CORNERSTONE and PEACESHIELD</td>
<td>9,395 NG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CENTCOM: <em>Operation Southern Watch</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHCOM: Also, participated in JCS exercises NUEVOS HORIZANTES and TRADEWINDS</td>
<td>10,513 NG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM. COBRA GOLD, YAMA SAKURA, FOAL EAGLE, RSOI, NORTH WIND, KEEN EDGE/KEEN SWORD and ULCHI FOCUSED LENS</td>
<td>Over 1,000 NG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Operation/Squadron</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>OPERATION JOINT FORGE (Bosnia - 865), OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo) and OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH (Kuwait/Saudi Arabia)</td>
<td>Skopje, Macedonia. Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Support engagement strategy through Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETE), unit exchanges and joint-combined exercises such as FUERZAS DEFENSAS, TRADEWINDS and FUERZAS ALIADAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Operation Southern Watch (OSW) And Operation Desert Spring (ODS). ODT program primarily consists of military intelligence, military police, special forces and communications efforts in support of active component exercises such as INTRINSIC ACTION, LUCKY SENTINEL, NATURAL FIRE, IRON COBRA and BRIGHT STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>FOAL EAGLE, YAMA SAKURA, COBRA GOLD and ULCHI FOCUS LENS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8. National Guard/Active Component Augmentation/Integration**

2. Ibid., 26.
12. ARNG 1997 Posture Statement; ARNG 1998 Posture Statement; ARNG 1999 Posture Statement; ARNG 2000 Posture Statement; ARNG 2001 Posture Statement; The FY95 Overseas Deployment Graph information/figures were under the Army National Guard Overseas paragraph.
## APPENDIX TWO
### NG STATE/DOMESTIC SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>NG State Duty/Domestic Support</th>
<th>Number of Mandays (soldiers/airmen)</th>
<th>Number of NG Call-ups (missions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Natural Disasters 77, Law Enforcement Support 11, Other 204.13</td>
<td>207,187</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Natural Disasters 76, Law Enforcement Support 28, Other 233.1</td>
<td>44,804</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Natural Disasters 11, Law Enforcement Support 10, Other 200.1</td>
<td>374,966</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Natural Disasters 171, Law Enforcement Support 25, Other 177.1</td>
<td>474,218</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Natural Disasters 109, Law Enforcement Support 9, Other 284.1</td>
<td>382,596</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1995
Emergency assistance included Hurricane Erin (Alabama and Florida), Hurricane Marilyn (Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands), flooding in Missouri and California. Deployment of the Air NG’s C-130 Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) to fight a wildfire in Long Island, New York. Puerto Rico NG support to Law Enforcement combating crime in metropolitan areas (139,000 mandays). GUARDCARE, providing health care screening and inoculations, servicing 65 communities in 21 states, for approximately 21,200 people. Response to the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (4,895 soldiers/airmen). GUARDCARE provided medical support to emergency medical personnel and law enforcement agencies in Alachua, Florida (24,000 mandays).14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>NG State Duty/Domestic Support</th>
<th>Number of Mandays (soldiers/airmen)</th>
<th>Number of NG Call-ups (missions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Emergency assistance included Hurricane Erin (Alabama and Florida), Hurricane Marilyn (Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands), flooding in Missouri and California. Deployment of the Air NG’s C-130 Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) to fight a wildfire in Long Island, New York. Puerto Rico NG support to Law Enforcement combating crime in metropolitan areas (139,000 mandays). GUARDCARE, providing health care screening and inoculations, servicing 65 communities in 21 states, for approximately 21,200 people. Response to the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (4,895 soldiers/airmen). GUARDCARE provided medical support to emergency medical personnel and law enforcement agencies in Alachua, Florida (24,000 mandays).14</td>
<td>209,332 (17,209)</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Various emergencies, natural disasters (Hurricanes “Fran” and “Hortense”), and 1996 Summer Olympics requirements.15</td>
<td>716,120</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Disaster relief, medical support, humanitarian assistance, counter-drug, and counter-terrorism operations16</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1998
Wide range of Counterdrug support including cargo inspection assistance at ports of entry, aerial and ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, training, construction of border roads and fences and production of over 33,000 map products. In addition, training to law enforcement agencies and community based organizations at the NICI, MCTFT Program, JLTC, NCTC, and RCTA. NG Drug Demand Reduction activities reached millions of people because of support to communities throughout the nation.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>NG State Duty/Domestic Support</th>
<th>Number of Mandays (soldiers/airmen)</th>
<th>Number of NG Call-ups (missions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Services provided by the Guard in support of state requirements included security, electrical power, heat, water, transportation services, food, and shelter. In addition, the Guard provided emergency engineering support to victims of numerous natural disasters, including floods, drought, ice storms, and tornadoes. Guard mission training involved the emerging Homeland Defense requirement, encompassing a variety of potential missions, including such far-reaching requirements as National Missile Defense (NMD) and supporting State and Federal agencies in combating terrorism on U.S. soil.18</td>
<td>374,115</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Counterdrug support including cargo inspection assistance at ports of entry, aerial and ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, construction of border roads and fences and production of map products, training to law enforcement agencies and community based organizations, and DDR activities.19</td>
<td>803,065 (16,744) missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Services provided by the NG in support of state requirements included security, electrical power, heat, water, transportation services, food and shelter, emergency engineering support to victims of numerous natural disasters, including floods, hurricanes, droughts, ice storms and tornadoes.20</td>
<td>281,276 (6000+)</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) Program to improve schools, parks and recreation facilities, build and maintain roads, and administer immunizations, physician contacts, and provide medical, dental, and optometrist care/services to under-served areas. Assist the Border Patrol with illegal immigrants.  

Figure 9. National Guard State Duty/Domestic Response

18 Ibid.
## APPENDIX THREE

### NG CD SUPPORT PROGRAM DTLOMS MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category</th>
<th>Mission Description</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Leader Development</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Materiel</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program Management</td>
<td>Counterdrug Coordination, Liaison &amp; Management</td>
<td>Y(^{22})</td>
<td>Y(^{23})</td>
<td>Y(^{24})</td>
<td>Y(^{-26})</td>
<td>Y(^{-26})</td>
<td>Y(^{-27})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support</td>
<td>Linguist (Translator) Support</td>
<td>Y(^{28})</td>
<td>Y(^{29})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigative Case &amp; Analyst Support</td>
<td>Y(^{7})</td>
<td>Y(^{8})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications Support</td>
<td>Y(^{7})</td>
<td>Y(^{30})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Support</td>
<td>Y(^{31})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsurface/Diver Support</td>
<td>Y(^{7})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support</td>
<td>Domestic Cannabis Suppression/Eradication Operations Support</td>
<td>Y(^{22})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation Support</td>
<td>Y(^{22})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance/Logistic Support</td>
<td>Y(^{12})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cargo/Mail Inspection</td>
<td>Y(^{12})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Related Training</td>
<td>Training LEA/Military Personnel</td>
<td>Y(^{12})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance / Observation</td>
<td>Surface Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Y(^{34})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial Reconnaissance</td>
<td>Y(^{13})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td>Community Based Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td>Y(^{35})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educational Institution Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td>Y(^{14})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informational Demand Reduction Support</td>
<td>Y(^{36})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership Development</td>
<td>Y(^{15})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition Development</td>
<td>Y(^{15})</td>
<td>Y(^{9})</td>
<td>Y(^{3})</td>
<td>Y(^{-4})</td>
<td>Y(^{-5})</td>
<td>Y(^{-6})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y = Yes  \(Y^{-}\) = Yes, the sub-process exists for the mission but does not necessarily resemble standard Title 10 organizational force structure or methods used to allocate resources (see comments)

\# = Reference and comment in endnote

---

sheep. Individuals that worked the border regularly knew this of Hernandez. The Marines claim he fired at them first.

... Ezequiel took along an old .22 caliber rifle. Hernandez was known to fire in the air to keep wild animals away from his... Title 10 members conducting LP/OP on the border. Additionally, there were conflicting stories about the situation.

... training, reporting, and evaluation procedures for the mission. The Ezequiel Hernandez case raised much concern over... condition of continuation, NGB ensures NICI provides clear and specific baseline guidance and conducts standardized video presentation that NG soldiers are a little older and they come from the communities from which they work. As a... continue this important support to law enforcement operation. LTG Schultz, Director Army National Guard pointed out in a... forces participating in a drug surveillance mission on the Southwest Border. The Secretary of Defense allowed the NG to... not allow the Active Component (AC) to conduct surface reconnaissance after the killing of a U.S. citizen by active duty... reserves or the National Guard). U.S.C. § 12012 (Authorized Strengths: senior enlisted members on active duty or on full-time duty for administration of the strengths of personnel supporting reserve components. Neither do they count against authorizations outlined in Title 10 (NDCS) objectives and include programs such as Adopt-A-School, in-school programs, mentoring, parenting, youth camps, About Face, and many more educational programs with LEA and CBOs. DDR programs meet National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) objectives and include programs such as Adopt-A-School, in-school programs, mentoring, parenting, youth camps, About Face, and many more educational programs with LEA and CBOs.

... tasks to NNJGDCD status will train with their units at monthly Inactive Duty Training (IDT) assemblies and AT. The program is budget driven. The program always has requirements above resources or funding. Therefore, the CDC considers requests from LEAs and CBOs, mission assignments occur based on the priorities established in the Governor’s CD State Plan. Many funding constraints, missions were not resourced and therefore referred, the California NG CD Task Force still completed the following in fiscal year 2001: executed 711 missions in support of 80 local LEAs, 19 state LEAs, and 13 federal LEAs; touched the lives of 160,861 adults and children, visited 116 schools, and held 5 leadership camps through Drug Demand Reduction programs; and CD engineers maintained 52 miles of existing road, built 2.5 miles of new road, built over 3 miles of new fence, built 9 new gates, and refurbished 9 miles of road. FTNGDCD tours for the NG CD support program do not affect allowable end strengths of personnel supporting reserve components. Neither do they count against authorizations outlined in Title 10 U.S.C. § 12012 (Authorized Strengths: senior enlisted members on active duty or on full-time duty for administration of the reserves or the National Guard).

Colonel William H. Wade, “FTNGDCD members have the opportunity to hone their warfighting skills.” DOD does not allow the Active Component (AC) to conduct surface reconnaissance after the killing of a U.S. citizen by active duty forces participating in a drug surveillance mission on the Southwest Border. The Secretary of Defense allowed the NG to continue this important support to law enforcement operation. LTG Schultz, Director Army National Guard pointed out in a video presentation that NG soldiers are a little older and they come from the communities from which they work. As a condition of continuation, NGB ensures NICI provides clear and specific baseline guidance and conducts standardized training, reporting, and evaluation procedures for the mission. The Ezequiel Hernandez case raised much concern over Title 10 members conducting LP/OP on the border. Additionally, there were conflicting stories about the situation. Hernandez was an 18-year-old high school student who was taking the family's flock of sheep out to graze. As he always did, Ezequiel took along an old .22 caliber rifle. Hernandez was known to fire in the air to keep wild animals away from his sheep. Individuals that worked the border regularly knew this of Hernandez. The Marines claim he fired at them first.
There is question as to whether he was doing what he always does and the Marines misinterpreted it. Familiarity with the terrain, the culture, and the norm for the area may have prevented the killing. Border Patrol agents and NG members come from the area they work, they know the shepherders. They are familiar with individuals from the area and recognize those that are new. The NG CD Support Program has surface reconnaissance teams. The NG CD LAV program has three operators and can carry up to eight passengers. The NG also conducts air defense, air superiority, and provides general-purpose fighters.

28 JP 3-07.4, III-31; FM 100-19, 7-6; and NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 9.
29 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 9; NICI CD Managers’ Guide, 4-6 and 5-5; Pennsylvania NG CD Homepage, http://www.counterdrug.org/pacdo/support.htm, accessed 29 September 2001; Colonel William H. Wade II; and Reyes Cole. NG CD members conducting linguist support possess pre-service bilingual skills, obtain a linguist MOS, and/or receive external agency training. Linguists’ providing side-by-side transcription and translation of audio/video tapes, seized documents and other information media enhances their proficiency. Analysts also receive training through internal military or external LEA analyst training programs. It is “well known in the CD Intel community that JTF 6 short tours of duty, generally do not allow the individuals to be used with great success on large cases.” Most large cases last up to 8 months or longer, to investigate, and then prepare the information for trial. “Guard personnel are generally accepted as more conducive for this type of work because they can remain on tour and can actually see the results of their analysis/case work.”

30 NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 22; NICI CD Managers’ Guide, 4-6; Colonel William H. Wade II; and Reyes Cole. For these missions, FTNGDCD members possess appropriate qualification in compatible MOSs/AFSCs, and receive mission-oriented training specific to the types of CD activities/specialty equipment or as necessary to familiarize them with LEA or CBO procedures and methods of operation. Specialty training may include training in the following areas: operator/maintenance/logistical support to LEA vehicles and non-military equipment; subsurface inspection of commercial vessels with divers or sidescan sonar buoys; methods of drug eradication; inspections of cargo/mail including vehicles, containers, commercial cargo, aircraft, watercraft, baggage, and mail at Ports of Embarkation (POEs) and functional equivalents; performance of area observation by land or water to detect and report illegal drug activities; and community activities designed to educate, train, or otherwise prevent drug abuse, including support of youth centers, drug-free events, community recreational programs, community mobilization events, tutoring, mentoring, after-school programs, drug-free activities, role modeling programs, sports-drug awareness programs, educational material distribution, and camps/retreats/seminars.

31 JP 3-07.4, III-31; FM 100-19, 7-9; and NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 9.
33 JP 3-07.4, III-33; FM 100-19, 7-9; and NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 9.
34 JP 3-07.4, III-33; FM 100-19, 7-9; and NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 10.
35 JP 3-07.4, III-33; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 10; and Kathryn E. McHenry, Lieutenant Colonel, National Guard Bureau Demand Reduction Liaison to Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), (Interview by author, 7 February 2002, Kansas City, MO).
36 JP 3-07.4, III-34; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 10; and Kathryn E. McHenry.
## APPENDIX FOUR

### HOMELAND SECURITY DTLOMS MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Category</th>
<th>Force Development</th>
<th>Mission Category</th>
<th>Mission Description</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Leader Development</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Materiel</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Program Mgmt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Homeland Security Coordination, Liaison &amp; Management</td>
<td>N(+)³⁷</td>
<td>Y³⁸</td>
<td>Y³⁹</td>
<td>N(+)⁴⁰</td>
<td>N(+)³¹</td>
<td>N(+)³²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>Y(-)³³</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>N(+)⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial/Aerospace</td>
<td>Y(-)³⁰</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>N(+)⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>N(+)³⁰</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>N(+)⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Linguist (Translator) Support</td>
<td>Y⁴⁴</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
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<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communications Support</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>Y⁵</td>
<td>Y⁶</td>
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<td>Engineer Support</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
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<td>Subsurface/Diver Support</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
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<td>Y³</td>
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<td>Y⁵</td>
<td>Y⁶</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CBRNE/WMD</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
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<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>N(+)⁵</td>
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<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td>Transportation Support</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
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<td>Y⁵</td>
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<td>Maintenance/Logistic Support</td>
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<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td>Y⁶</td>
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<td>Medical</td>
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<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cargo/Mail Inspection</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td>HLS Related (Interagency/Military) Training</td>
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<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>Y⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
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<td>Community Based Training</td>
<td>Y⁸</td>
<td>Y²</td>
<td>Y³</td>
<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td>N(+)⁶</td>
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<td>Y⁴</td>
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<td>Public Affairs/Information</td>
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<td>Y²</td>
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<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>Y⁵</td>
<td>N(+)⁶</td>
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<td>Leadership Development</td>
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<td>Y⁴</td>
<td>Y⁵</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Y = Yes  
Y(-) = Yes, capabilities exist though not specifically under the HLS mission category of HLD or Civil Support (see comments)  
N = No  
N(+) = Capabilities for the mission exist but a necessity or sub-capability does not exist (see note)  
¹ = Reference and comment in endnote

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The doctrinal references to the subcomponents of Homeland Security (HLS) are numerous. However, to date, there is only draft doctrine that specifically refers to HLS. However, missions under each subcomponent of HLS are currently addressed in Joint, Army, and National Guard doctrine as: military support to civil authorities, defensive operations, relief operations, support to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives-consequence management (CBRNE-CM) operations, domestic support operations, relief operations, support to civil law enforcement, interagency coordination, and military assistance to civil authorities. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) addresses other DOD requirements (which are also covered in military doctrine), or specified in Department of Defense Directives.

In each State, territory, and the District of Columbia, the NG Adjutant General (AG) or Commanding General (CG) working through the State Area Command (STARC) and the Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer (POMSO), coordinates training, exercises and the emergency response plans for State emergencies. Use of an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) between participating states permits the sharing of states’ National Guard resources. As of August 2000, 33 states and territories adopted the compact. Membership is open to any state or territory of the United States of America and the District of Columbia. Congress approved EMAC in October 1996 (PL 104-321).

The President is currently empowered to use military forces for the following purposes: To restore and maintain public order, to respond to requests for aid from state governments (10 USC 331), to protect constitutional rights under certain conditions (10 USC 333). Protect the President, major political candidates, Federal property and functions (18 USC 231 and 1361 and 50 USC 797). DODD 2000.12, tasked the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that a capability exists to collect, receive, evaluate from a Service perspective, and disseminate all relevant data on terrorist activities, trends, and indicators of imminent attack. Additionally, it prescribes that the ASD(SO/LIC) has the lead role within the Department of Defense. However, the Attorney General, through the FBI, will remain responsible for coordinating: The activities of all Federal agencies assisting in the resolution of the incident and in the administration of justice in the affected area. The DOJ is responsible for overseeing the Federal response to acts of terrorism within the United States. The US Attorney General, through an appointed Deputy Attorney General, makes major policy decisions and legal judgments related to each terrorist incident as it occurs.

Intelligence is critical to the planning and execution of aerospace defense. The NORAD/USSPACECOM CMOC is the centralized receiver of intelligence information and the single disseminator of all-source air and space intelligence for NORAD and its subordinate commands as required by the US DOD Intelligence Production Program. The dissemination of relevant intelligence among US and Canadian forces, in accordance with established policies and procedures, is crucial to effective aerospace defense missions. This integration of intelligence throughout the NORAD command structure ensures responsiveness to operational needs.

NG leaders, like their AC counterpart, will complete/attend training through the Army and Air Force School System. NG leaders hold leadership positions within their respective RC/M-Day military organizations and the leaders receive appointment, assignment, promotion, and unit training/professional development applicable to their respective
service and grade. The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) (1996) aimed to better streamline the manner of RC officer appointment, training, development, promotion, tenure, and separation.

Leaders receive appropriate professional military education, joint training, and systems training for the mission/equipment they will operate, this applies to NG members attached to or supporting the command as well. The intent of the PME system is to raise the level of proficiency among the members of the US Armed Forces, and to support the educational requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, the combatant commanders, and the other Defense agencies.

DOD 3025.1-M, xix, 7-1, 8-4, 10-5; JP 3-57, III-3/13, IV-16, B-2; JP 3-01.1, vi, II-2/4, III-4/7/11; JP 3-07.4, III-21; JP 3-08 v I, I-9, II-1/6; JP 3-08 v II, A-E-3, FM 3-0, 9-11/12/14, 10-3 to 10-8; FM 100-19, 6-8 to 6-10, 7-1 to 7-7; Stafford Act; NGR 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, 3 to 11; NICI MCA Resource Guide, 7-4, 8-1; NICI PMC Resource Guide, 6-1 to 6-3; EMAC, 12, 62; Reserve Component Programs, 16, 50 to 76; Schnaubelt, Lessons from LA Riots; NGAUS, “Guard Leaders…”; and Thomas R. Lujan; H.R. 525, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 5121.

JP 3-08 v II describes the key US Government departments and agencies and nongovernmental organizations, their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. Based on the magnitude and type of disaster and the anticipated level of resource involvement, DOD may establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) or Response Task Force (RTF) to consolidate and manage the supporting operational military activities. Task forces are temporary, multi-service organizations created to provide a consequence management response to a major natural or man-made disaster or emergency. The JTF, when requested by the governor and approved by the President can respond to major disasters such as hurricanes, floods, and acts of terrorism. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) coordinates with Joint Staff and is the responsible national-level DOD office for military support to civilian authorities (for Title 10 only). DOD has lead federal responsibility for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3, Public Works and Engineering, and has designated the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as its operating agent for ESF #3 planning, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The NG is the first line of military response during domestic emergencies. The NG is a trained and organized force that provides the governor of each state a diverse response capability including: WMD-CSTs, Engineers, Military Police, Medical, Transportation, Chemical, Logistical Sustainment, Mobilization, and Command/Control. The NG State Area Command (STARC) is a mobilization entity established in each state. It organizes the mobilization of NG units for State and Federal missions. The STARC POMSO coordinates emergency response. Depending on the scope of the emergency, NG support and organizational structure may vary. When an emergency or disaster occurs and waiting for higher instruction would preclude an effective response, NG commanders may do what is required and justified to save human life, prevent immediate suffering, or lessen major property damage or destruction. The STARC will organize and employ NG members under a command structure with adequate resources to accomplish the mission. NG leaders, working routinely and naturally with other state and local agencies/leaders, are familiar with or receive training in the Incident Command System (ICS) and understand the organizational structure used by state responders.

Furthermore, when a crisis or emergency situation of such serious nature occurs and has the potential to escalate, NGB will activate a Crisis Action Team (CAT), bringing to bear the entire capability of both the Army and Air NG. The State’s POMSO can request liaison teams from NGB to expedite EMAC coordination and assistance. Furthermore, in Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, the Army and Air NG established 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) made up of 22 highly trained Army and Air NG personnel. The WMD-CSTs are organized to assist civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequence management requirements, advising on response measures, and coordinating requests for additional support. The WMD-CSTs respond as part of the overall State emergency response for a CBRNE incident/accident, either unilaterally, or in conjunction with other organizations as part of an Emergency Management Compact. They can also deploy outside of the State to act as a reserve, replacement, or reinforcing force to conduct civil support operations in support of another State’s emergency response. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.) emphasizes the requirement for Presidential approval for employment of federal troops or agencies to supplement/assist the state in an area affected by a major disaster or emergency at the request of a governor. Section 501.a of the Act states, “All requests for declaration by the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State” and the governors request “shall be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capability of the state and affected local governments and that federal assistance is required.” The act does not encourage or provide for Title 10 military “policing” or interference with a governor’s authority when the Governor and other State and local
authorities are still able to govern and provide for the state’s security with existing response assets. The act encourages states and local governments to protect themselves.


DOD 3025.1-M and NG doctrine, resource guides, and regulations identify some of the required specialized equipment for civil support operations. The Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535) permits federal agencies to provide goods and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Stafford Act (Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.) allows reimbursement to DOD for the incremental costs of providing support, when federal assistance is requested by the Governor (state executive) and authorized by the President.

The STARC directs the deployment and employment of NG units for domestic operations. The NG has authorization to use NG personnel and Federal equipment assigned to the Army and Air NG for emergency support on an incremental cost-reimbursable basis. NGB works closely with the states to coordinate resource needs/shortfalls for Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). State NG’s can requisition unique requirements not supported by an MTOE/CTA through appropriate resource channels. The NG can process unfinanced requirements in accordance with state policies and procedures for emergency preparedness.

The President has launched a long-term program for using advanced information management technology to better protect the Nation. The President’s initial strategy for HLS recognizes the need to build a system that combines threat information and then transmits it, as needed, to all relevant law enforcement and public safety officials. The President’s budget calls for an increase of $722 million and sets in motion a program to use information technology to more effectively share information and intelligence, both horizontally (among Federal agencies and Departments) and vertically (among the Federal, State and local governments). Furthermore, Goal 2: Share homeland security information with States, localities, and relevant private sector entities emphasizes the development of new technology and information sharing systems that can bridge the communication gaps between Federal, State, and local government agencies.

Federalizing NG soldiers and airmen within their state and requiring the state to assume responsibility for all maintenance, management, and administrative functions without reimbursement to the state, while DOD accepts such reimbursement, degrades the Governor and NG’s ability to maintain both specialized state and federal equipment/materiel. Increased tempo without a corresponding increase in administrative, management, maintenance, and materiel funding for equipment used within the state will lead to the degradation of equipment assigned to NG federal reserve units.

The principal assets that exist for aerospace defense operations include systems and equipment at the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, regional air operations centers, and sector air operations centers. C4I systems such as the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) ensure interoperability with and among component forces and with US combatant commands. They give commanders the resources necessary to control forces, plan missions, and coordinate operations. NG forces OPCON to NORAD will use their assigned or specialized equipment for the specific mission assigned.

DOD 3025.1-M, 3-13 to 3-27, 5-1 to 5-3, 7-1 to 7-3; JP 3-01.1, III-12; JP 3-08 v I, I-2, II-6, III-12 to III-23; JP 3-08 v II, A-E-3; FM 100-19, 3-5; NGR 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, 3; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801; NICI MSCA Resource Guide, 6-3 to 6-10; EMAC, 19, 55 to 60; Harrel, interview; Schnaubelt, Lessons from LA Riots; NGAUS, “Guard Leaders…”; NGAUS, “Governors…”; Thomas R. Lujan; The Stafford Act; and H.R. 525.

Commanders ensure assigned personnel receive adequate training for their federal mission as well as specialized equipment necessary for their state mission. The WMD-CSTs knowledge of NBCR attacks and military capabilities helps identify the assistance required for emergencies. NG soldiers, like their AC counterpart, complete/attend Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) training/courses. NG soldiers receive appropriate state, specialized mission-oriented training as well. Federalizing soldiers and airmen within their states for a mission they can perform under Title 32 creates unit vacancies and reduces NG unit manning and readiness level.

Bush, HLS Book, 25; DOD 3025.1-M, xiii, xiv, 1-2, 3-1/6/10, 3-21/22, 5-3/4, 8-5; JP 3-01.1, iv/vi; JP 3-07.2, II-12, A-1 to A-4; JP 3-07.4, III-33; FM 3-0, 8-1 to 8-18, 10-1, 10-3 to 10-13; FM 100-19, 3-17, 4-10, 7-6 to 7-15; NGR 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, 7 to 11; NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, 10; NICI MSCA Resource Guide 2-3, 5-8; DODD 2000.12, 2-
Some of the domestic surface defense/protection measures addressed in the enclosed references include: defensive operations, force protection, surface observation and reconnaissance as related to counterdrug, support to law enforcement, Combating terrorism, threat identification, detection, area monitoring, civil disturbance operations, general support, physical security, perimeter security and critical infrastructure protection, ground control, area evacuation, domestic preparedness, response to CBRNE incidents, consequence management, support for crisis management, port security, border security, traffic control, disaster search/relief and recovery, and national security for special events. DODD emphasizes security missions as a priority over logistics.

Some of the aerial/aerospace defense/protection measures addressed in the references include aerial observation and reconnaissance as related to counterdrug, air traffic control assistance, support to law enforcement, antiterrorism/force protection, protection of critical assets, ballistic missile defense, space defense, air defense, defense interceptor mission, air sovereignty, integrated tactical warning, and attack assessment.

When Operation Plan (OPLAN) GARDEN PLOT is executed in response to civil disturbance operations, Military Intelligence (MI) activities fall under the jurisdiction of law enforcement policies and regulations. Commanders must ensure that MI support missions, other than normal liaison with LEAs for force protection, have been coordinated with and approved by appropriate authorities. When any public service is lost or withdrawn, and an immediate substantial threat to public health, safety, or welfare is evident, the NG may be called to restore and/or continue that public service. It is desirable that supervisors, managers, and key personnel of the public service be available to provide technical assistance to NG personnel. In the absence of key public service personnel, the state adjutant general will make plans and coordinate with appropriate civil authorities to perform the mission within the capabilities and limitations of the NG. The capability of the NG to assist in restoration/continuation of public services depends primarily on the degree of military or civilian skills possessed by NG personnel.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Assistance to the US Postal Service, CJCSI 3217.01A, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 October 1999). Actions in USPS assistance operations require rapid response. Subject to coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advance of the employment of forces assigned to the combatant commands, direct liaison is authorized among the Director of Military Support (DOMS), Fire Department, emergency medical services, public works department, volunteer organizations (ARC, churches, Salvation Army, Humane Society), law enforcement, health department, road and bridge department, assessor, public school administrator. Representative from every community help the Emergency Management Director (EMD). NG commanders are responsible for planning and training their forces for both missions including but not limited to: contracting for supplies and services, managing supply operations, and movements, preparing and distributing meals, purifying, storing, and removing waste, repairing vehicles and equipment, constructing life support centers, removing debris, providing power generation, providing medical services, providing communications capability.
# APPENDIX FIVE

## NG CD/HLS DTLOMS MATRIX

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<th>Force Development</th>
<th>Mission Category</th>
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<td><strong>Engineer Support</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transportation Support</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Maintenance/Logistic Support</strong></td>
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102
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<td>Y(-) = Yes, capabilities exist though not necessarily as a standard Title 10 structure or specifically under the HLS mission category of HLD or Civil Support (as per previous analysis)</td>
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<td>N = No</td>
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<td>N(+) = Capabilities for the mission exist but a necessity or sub-capability does not exist (per HLS analysis)</td>
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<td>* = Additional capabilities under HLD</td>
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<td>N/A = Not applicable to this mission</td>
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**Figure 10. NG CD/HLS DTLOMS MATRIX**
APPENDIX SIX

DOD DOMESTIC COMMAND & PLANNING STAFF

The following general descriptions come from various publications and on-line sources. The information is not all-inclusive.\textsuperscript{141}

Joint Staff

The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accomplishing his responsibilities for: the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their operation under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. The "Joint Staff" is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

Formally known as Atlantic Command (ACOM); responsible for defense against land and maritime aggression targeted at our territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as directly supporting the lead federal agency in the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic civil support. JFCOMs mission is to maximize the nation's future and present military capabilities through joint concept development and experimentation, recommending joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training and providing ready continental U.S.-based forces and capabilities to support other combatant commanders-in-chief, the Atlantic Theater and domestic requirements. Moreover, after 9/11, JFCOM now has eleven subordinate force elements to help meet its geographic and functional responsibilities, with each of the subordinate commands having their own commands and planning staff structure, specifically the following:

\begin{itemize}
  \item **Forces Command (FORSCOM):** provides combat-ready ground forces and executes no-notice contingency missions throughout the world. FORSCOM provides DOD assets to support federal, state and local law enforcement agencies for non-combatant missions such as counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
  \item **Atlantic Fleet:** U.S. Atlantic Fleet is responsible for the entire Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea and the waters around Central and South America extending in the Pacific to the Galapagos Island. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet provides fully trained, combat ready forces to support United States and NATO commanders in regions of conflict throughout the world. From the Adriatic Sea to the Arabian Gulf, Atlantic Fleet units are called upon to support U.S. theater commanders in chief and joint task force commanders for unified operations anywhere in the world. Additionally, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet provides readiness training, and logistical and administrative support for its surface ships, submarines and aviation squadrons. To maintain
\end{itemize}

readiness and maximize capabilities, U.S. Atlantic Fleet units operate and train with units of the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard and Allied Forces around the world.

- **Air Combat Command (ACC):** organizes, trains, equips and maintains combat-ready air forces for rapid deployment and employment. It also ensures strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of peacetime air sovereignty and wartime defense. ACC provides nuclear-capable forces to the U.S. Strategic Command, air defense forces to the North American Aerospace Defense Command and theater air forces to the five geographical unified commands: U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command. ACC also ensure combat air forces are prepared to implement national policy throughout the world.

- **Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (MARFORLANT):** the U.S. Marine Corps component of U.S. Joint Forces Command, responsible for command, control and coordination of all Marines’ air, ground and logistical operations. Normally these forces consist of one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings and force service support groups. Together they function as a warfighting element independently or alongside a Navy component or within a joint task force.

- **Joint Reserve Unit:** The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Reserve Unit is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, with working locations in Norfolk, Suffolk and Hampton (Hampton Roads area), all seamless with USJFCOM daily activities. U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve Components augment and extend capabilities of the command to respond to peacetime domestic emergencies and worldwide contingencies.

- **Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command (SOC-JFC):** Supports the training of joint commanders and staffs in employment considerations of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations are those operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve their objective by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or sensitive areas. The United States maintains special operations forces capable of performing these difficult, complex, and sensitive missions on short notice, in peace and war, anywhere in the world. In support of the national military strategy, special operations forces are currently organized and trained in nine principal mission areas: Counter proliferation (CP), Combating terrorism (CBT), Foreign internal defense (FID), Special reconnaissance (SR), Direct action (DA), Psychological operations (PSYOP), Civil affairs (CA), Unconventional warfare (UW), Information operations (IO).

- **U.S. Forces Azores:** Lajes Field, Portugal is a subordinate unified command of U.S. Joint Forces Command. It consists of a small joint staff, the 65th Air Base Wing, and multiple tenant organizations such as the 729th Air Mobility Squadron, the Military Traffic Management Command Azores Detachment and the base's resident officer in charge of construction. Members of U.S. Forces Azores provide base and en route support for Department of Defense, allied nation and other aircraft transiting the installation. Air Force units that make up the 65th Air Base Wing are the 65th Support Group, the 65th Logistics Group and the 65th Medical Group. In peacetime, a small joint staff composed of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel assists the U.S. Forces Azores commander, who is responsible for contingency planning. In wartime,
the U.S. Forces Azores commander assumes operational control of assigned U.S. military forces. The command mission would be to support NATO forces in the area, to assist in local defense, if requested, and to protect and evacuate U.S. citizens from the Azores, Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, or other areas of the world.

- **Iceland Defense Force (IDF)**: Keflavik, Iceland, is a subordinate unified command of U.S. Joint Forces Command and is composed of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel as well as local Icelandic civilians. The commander and his staff are responsible for actions taken in compliance with inter-governmental agreements and for conducting all joint planning matters affecting the defense of Iceland. IDF was created in 1951 when, at the request of NATO, the United States signed an agreement to provide for the defense of Iceland and the North Atlantic. Today, it provides a dynamic and challenging work environment with the overall responsibility for all military operations in Iceland resting with the IDF commander, a Navy rear admiral. The IDF commander is also Commander Fleet Air Keflavik and Commander Iceland Sector Anti-Submarine Warfare Group. Commander Fleet Air Keflavik is responsible for coordinating the maritime patrol operations of deployed P-3 Orion aircraft.

- **Joint Force Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS)**: Newly created after the 9/11 attacks. The homeland security component of JFCOM that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States, and military assistance to civil authorities and plans and integrates the full spectrum of JFCOM civil support and homeland defense support to lead federal agencies from prevention through crisis response to consequence management.

- **Joint Task Force -Civil Support (JTF-CS)**: Commanded by a NG General; previously reported directly to JFCOM, now reports to a new internally created JFHQ-HLS on all matters pertaining to military support to civil authorities responding to a WMD event in a community. Such Title 10 active duty military support would focus on consequence management in support of a lead federal agency charged with responding to the WMD event.

- **Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6)**: the JFCOM component that provides Department of Defense (Title 10) counterdrug support to federal, regional, state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the continental United States.

Additional JFCOM HLS command and specialized CBRNE structures include: Army’s Regional Task Forces East and West from First and Fifth Continental United States Armies, the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Immediate Response Force, [Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) in the National Guard], and other forces as necessary.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)**

A binational United States and Canadian organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America. Aerospace warning includes the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands. Responsible for aerospace defense consisting of three mission areas that must operate in union for maximum effectiveness: air defense, which is designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of attacking enemy aircraft or missiles;
ballistic missile defense, which defeats long-range ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles; and space defense, which consists of all defensive measures designed to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of attacking enemy vehicles while in space. Three subordinate region headquarters at Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB), Alaska, Canadian Forces Base, Winnipeg, Manitoba, and Tyndall AFB, Florida. They receive direction from the CINC and control air operations within their respective areas of responsibility. Cheyenne Mountain serves as a central collection and coordination facility for a worldwide system of sensors designed to provide the CINC and the leadership of Canada and the U.S. with an accurate picture of any aerospace threat.

**Space Command (SPACECOM)**

An integral part of the evolving, modern battlespace, providing a means to exploit and, if required, control space to assist in the successful execution of national security strategy, national military strategy, and joint force operations. Conducts joint space operations in support of the following mission areas: Space force enhancement — supporting the President and Secretary of Defense, warfighters, and others with services and products from space; Space control — ensuring friendly use of space while denying it to adversaries; and Space support — launching and operating satellites. U.S. Space Command coordinates the use of Army, Naval and Air Force space forces to defend our country from the high vantage point of space, these space forces provide the information needed by our military to out-maneuver the enemy, attack with precision and protect them from attack.

**Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC)**

The Command Center is the fusion center of all operations inside Cheyenne Mountain. In this center, the Command Director (CD) and his/her crew serve as NORAD’s and SPACECOM’s direct representative for monitoring, processing, and interpreting missile, space, or air events, which could threaten North America or have operational impacts on our forces or capabilities.

**Strategic Command (STRATCOM)**

Bringing together planning, targeting, and wartime employment of strategic nuclear forces and/or capabilities under one commander to posture strategic forces in a manner to deter a military attack on the U.S, its forces, and allies. The Triad continues to be the foundation of America’s national strategy of deterrence. The Triad consists of ballistic missile submarines, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers. Each component, or leg, of the Triad provides a different capability and strength, presenting any enemy with three unique threats to oppose.

**Special Operations Command (SOCOM)**

Forces with unique skills, weapons, and capabilities, particularly suited to domestic support missions. Many are cross-trained in various disciplines such as civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and special forces (SF). Also, conducts supporting operations which may be adjuncts to other operations for which no Service has primary responsibility, including: training of indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare missions, counterinsurgency missions, and unconventional warfare missions, to include missions to enemy-held or politically-sensitive territory. Most importantly, trained to operate effectively in remote and urban areas isolated by disaster event and has previously had the responsibility for DOD response to terrorist incidents and retaining responsibility for the MACDIS portion of any terrorist incident.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)

As the single manager of defense provides common-user transportation provides strategic transport both in peace and in war. TRANSCOM is a functional combatant command provides strategic air, land, and sea transportation, including common-user terminal services, to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national objectives. Subordinate commands include: Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

Accessions Command

The Army Accessions Command will be formally activated March 25 in a ceremony at Fort Monroe. The Army Accessions Command will recruit and train volunteers, teach them Army values and prepare them for their role in a transforming Army. This combined function will create seamless oversight from the time a volunteer first seeks information about an Army enlistment or career to the time he or she completes initial military training. The Commanding General, Army Accessions Command, is now responsible for the accession of high quality young men and women into the force to meet the accessions goals for both officer and enlisted personnel. He will manage and conduct recruiting operations, develop initial military training policy, develop direct commission and appointment policy, and oversee Initial Military Training programs. The Commanding General, Army Accessions Command, will also coordinate and integrate the efforts of other external agencies involved in the accessions process.

Director of Military Support (DOMS)

The DOMS, a general officer appointed by the Secretary of the Army (SA), is the DOD primary contact for all federal departments and agencies during periods of domestic civil emergencies or disaster response. On behalf of the DOD, the DOMS and his supporting staff, serving as a joint staff, ensure the planning, coordination, and execution of domestic support missions. DOMS has both the responsibility and the authority to task the services, defense agencies, and the CINCs to support other federal, state, or local agencies. Upon request for military assistance, DOMS tasks the appropriate CINC to appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to confirm military support requirements. The SA issues an Executive Order, coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), through the DOMS to the appropriate CINCs, services, and agencies. The Executive Order designates a supported CINC and specifies the supporting CINCs, services, and agencies as well as the command relationships. The SA is the DOD executive agent and DOMS is the SA’s action agent for domestic support. In most cases, the Army will participate in disaster assistance operations as part of a DOD effort managed by the DOMS and commanded by a supported CINC.
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