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THE ARMY'S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

BY

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THE ARMY'S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

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There is role for the Army in homeland security. That role is one of support to civil authorities at local, state, and federal levels. The events of 11 September 2001 were the catalyst to start a process of developing a formal approach to securing America's homeland. Trying to define what homeland security means to each agency and governmental entity is important to determine the security tasks the Army will support in this arena. Once the definitions are in place – Army forces, which can best support homeland security, more clearly fall out. In a likely outcome, the Army National Guard will assume the greatest share of the Army's contribution to domestic security. To do so the Army National Guard must change to assume the new role in homeland security. Currently, the Army National Guard is not able to meet the traditional role of supporting the active forces, as well as, fulfill the support role to civil authorities in homeland security. In the process of transformation by reducing support to the Active force and focusing on homeland security, the Army National Guard will optimize the Army's commitment in homeland security. Any change to the National Guard will take political action, which means, in the final analysis, politics will determine a final homeland security role for the Army.
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THE ARMY'S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland security, in light of the events of 11 September 2001, has not received the attention - either critical intellectual thought or resource allocation - to prevent future asymmetrical attacks of the magnitude of what took place at the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Over the last several years a number of reports have identified critical vulnerabilities pertaining to homeland security. The federal government had allocated resources to meet the threat. But in each case these vulnerability assessments and resources failed to prevent the tragedies in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. The Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld noted in his forward to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report:

"On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious, bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They died on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as innocent victims. They died not from traditional armies, but from the brutal, faceless weapons of terror. They died as the victims of war - a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror took America by surprise."1

How American's react to this terror should define who they are as a people. Earlier generations defined themselves by their resolute actions against, for example, Hitler and Nazi Germany. It will be in the future actions of Americans, how they organize to solve the problems that terrorists pose to American homeland security, and how they confront adversity that will define these times.

The questions surrounding how the United States will organize to solve homeland defense becomes clearer each day. On October 8, former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, the new chief of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), took control of an office whose mission was to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat domestic terrorism by strengthening preparedness and security at federal, state and local levels.2 Domestic policies for homeland security are taking shape at all levels of government. Nevertheless, questions about how the federal, state, local and private institutions will organize to support homeland defense are under debate and in all likelihood will remain under debate well into the future. As these debates continue, the various levels of government are making decisions on an incremental basis - defining how the United States will act with regard to homeland security.

The Army's role in homeland security falls within the larger context of the Department of Defense's role of protecting the nation. With the declaration of Secretary of the Army Thomas White as the department's executive agent for homeland defense, the Army will work directly with Ridge to develop plans for addressing threats to America's domestic security.3 White
highlighted his tasks during a 12 October press conference, “there are 11 million first responders in this country that have the primary duty to deal with emergencies, and we are a back-up for them”. This insight underlines that the Army will largely have a support role in homeland security. The external defense of the nation remains preeminent, with support to defending the homeland an additional mission.

This paper will examine what the potential role of the Army should be in homeland security. The paper will define the current problems of homeland security and its sub-components and break out the homeland security mission areas for the Army. In so doing it will set a historical context and suggest relevance in what was already in place for homeland security prior to 11 September. The Hart-Rudman Commission Reports indicated that the strategic environment had changed sufficiently over the recent past to demand that the Federal government addresses the threat to American soil; and called for paying greater attention to homeland security. The final portion of the paper will address the potential impacts of the Hart-Rudman recommendations on the Army, the security needs following the tragedies of 11 September, and a future role for the Army in the daily business of homeland security.

At this time it appears that the Army National Guard will have a major share of the Army’s contribution in homeland security. In its present state of training readiness, the Army National Guard is unable to perform homeland security support tasks. The military combat tasks do not directly support civil assistance for homeland security. The Army National Guard should change to build organizations that support civil authorities for homeland security. A transformation of the Army National Guard including dedicating military organizations to the sole mission of supporting civil agencies in domestic security is plausible for the Army.

HISTORICAL SETTING
Preparation for the defense of one’s society lies at the heart of the political philosophy set out by Thomas Hobbes in his work *The Leviathan*. Hobbes asserts that it is banding together of individuals for mutual defense that is the essence of modern society. For Hobbes, society must combat evil that is ever present within the social structure. From the earliest days of the American colonies it was the militia that has the distinction of being the organization that provides basic protection. The colonies stood up the militia to defend themselves against local threats. Individuals could raise the collective security of the community by banding together for the mutual defense of their land, property and livelihoods. This concept was similar to those developed in most societies throughout the world and for the same reasons. Since then, the defense of the United States has matured into a system that relies on federal, state, local, and
private organizations working together for the mutual defense. Starting with the British colonies, the struggle to determine the right force and strategy to meet the problems of defense of the homeland has continued.

The National Defense Act of 1916 “provided an increase in strength for the Regular Army, enlarged and validated the role of the National Guard, authorized a reserve force and a Volunteer Army.” The legislation coincided with threats along the Mexican border occasioned by Pancho Villa’s raids. The federal government by raising the size of the Army had a growing force in place for the call-up of expeditionary forces to deploy to France for the First World War. Additionally, the Army wanted provisions for a reserve force separate from state control that would contain a pool of trained volunteers ready for immediate service. That legislation was the origin of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces that is in place today.

The Army’s large standing forces throughout the Cold War were necessary to support a national strategy directed toward deterring the Soviet Union from either a conventional or nuclear war. The collapse of the Soviet threat in the late 1980s brought about reduction in Army forces. However, the dilemma remains as to how much force is necessary to defend the nation. The U.S. military, as a whole, is transforming to meet future challenges. “As this transformation effort matures – and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force – Department of Defense will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed forces.”

In the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review’s report, the department has acknowledged that it may have to make changes in force structure and organization in preparing forces for domestic security missions. The report calls a reexamination of the roles and responsibilities of active and reserve forces to ensure these forces are properly trained, organized, manned, and equipped to defend the continental United States. Change is inevitable, but making the right changes for the right reasons by anchoring the change in the culture of the Army will be a critical component of success.

**HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINED**

While definitions of homeland security may continue to evolve, the Department of Defense (DoD) definition is used for clarity within this paper. It serves as the start point for determining the role and scope of Army support to homeland security:

**Homeland Security** – the prevention, deterrence, and preemption of, and defense against aggression targeted at United States territory, sovereignty, population, and
infrastructure as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.

**Homeland Defense** – the prevention, deterrence, and preemption of, and defense against aggression targeted at United States territory, population, and infrastructure.

**Civil Support** – Department of Defense support to civilian authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and designated law enforcement efforts.

**Emergency Preparedness** – planning activities undertaken to ensure Department of Defense processes, procedures and resources are in place to support the President and Secretary of Defense in a designated National Security Emergency.11

The DoD definition possesses three sub-areas that focus on the important aspects of the issues of security. The definition points to decisions made within DoD respective to allocation of resources to confront the challenges of domestic security. There are clearly no independent actions. Homeland security will remain under civil authority with military in support. Requirements to assist with defense of the United States, support to civil authorities in special circumstances, and a planning requirement to prepare for future national emergencies are the three areas the DoD will resource in this endeavor.

A critical part missing from the Department of Defense definition is language to address the need to protect from inside or outside the United States. Protection from inside raises questions of legal authority in view of Posse Comitatus when using federal forces. Military forces under state control are not affected by limits of posse comitatus. But the attacks of 11 September demand a reexamination of many basic laws. The protection from outside the United States is more in line with traditional military defense definitions. The military has a major role in protecting the United States outside our borders. The definition is broad enough to consider both active and passive measures to protect the United States, but clarification of the point on protecting from inside or outside the United States will give greater clarity to roles for the military.

Unfortunately, the definitions are only a start point. An analysis of homeland security requires breaking out the mission areas and associated tasks to better determine the right role for the Army. The discussion will focus on the Army; likely missions and separate tasks for Army forces.

**HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION AREAS**

Homeland security (HLS) includes three broad mission areas, homeland defense, civil support, and National Emergency Preparedness.12 These Army mission areas further break
down into distinct operations, where forces trained to provide support capabilities are required to conduct the operations. Homeland defense missions respond to acts or threats against United States sovereign territory. The threats associated with these mission areas include the following:

- Missle Attack
- Air, Land, and/or Sea Sovereignty Incursion
- An attack using Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Cyber Attack

Domestic support missions require anticipation of major disasters, acts of civil disturbance, or assistance with national-level events. The missions associated with domestic support include assistance to the following areas:

- Disasters
- Civil Disorder
- Special Events

The Army does not separate combating terrorism, the protection of critical infrastructure, and force protection from the mission areas above, but recognizes that these are inherent missions within all mission areas. This is an important distinction because it was a different version of a terror attack on 11 September. One that falls outside the homeland defense threats noted above.

National Emergency Preparedness is a potentially new mission area still under debate. In time, this area may develop from a planning effort into assigning specific tasks and forces to support the federal emergency system. Currently, much of the emergency preparedness effort is within the consequence management arena; dealing with national emergencies after the event happens.

When one compares and contrasts the first two broad areas, homeland defense aligns with providing trained and ready soldiers to deter or defend against threats, whereas civil support relates to providing Army capabilities that address a specific problem. The homeland defense side addresses specific individual technical skills or specific unit military technical skills to deter or defend against a given threat. The civil support side is more generic in nature. The capability of the existing structure requires augmentation in the capacity to support a civil structure overwhelmed by a terrorist or natural disaster. The Army, in this case, will provide excess capability to meet the needs of the existing civil structure. The Army has the forces and capability to support the two broad mission areas, but the Army must balance domestic security with the other operational demands of defending the United States and its interests.
The Quadrennial Defense Review clarifies the balance required in homeland security by placing "new emphasis on the unique operational demands associated with defense of the United States and restoring the defense of the United States as the (Defense) Department's primary mission."\(^6\) This shift in policy from an emphasis on offensive overseas capabilities to domestic defense capability confronts the Army with the need to find the best ways to fulfill these new obligations. The policy shift does not detract from the mission to have forces trained and ready to win the Nation's wars, but it does speak to the necessity for the Army to place greater emphasis on a traditional role. "The Army has a wide range of capabilities that are supportive of homeland security, but with the exception of selected specialty units, it is not sized, designed, trained, nor equipped specifically for homeland security missions."\(^7\) A discussion of the mismatch of organizational structure, personnel, training, and equipment will follow later in this paper.

**HART-RUDMAN COMMISSION**

The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, popularly known as H-R Commission, released three reports.\(^8\) The first examined the strategic environment of the upcoming quarter century. The second report looked at national strategies to address the upcoming strategic environment. The commission's final report recommended changes in America's existing security structure to deal with the challenges of the future. Overall, the reports concluded that changes in the security environment require a change in the structure and processes of U.S. national security.\(^9\) Additionally, it also posited a rise in threats with the increased likelihood of attacks on the United States resulting in thousands of casualties.\(^20\) The third report, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, recommended organizational change in five areas of the federal government:

- **ensuring** the security of the American homeland;
- **recapitalizing** America's strengths in science and education;
- **redesigning** key institutions of the Executive Branch;
- **overhauling** the United States government personnel system; and
- **reorganizing** Congress's role in national security affairs.\(^21\)

The call for domestic security was a direct request for a better utilization of the full capabilities of the U.S. homeland security community. Many parts of this community are already in place. First, the responders and regional partnerships are in place. Some of the defense structure remains as a holdover from the threats of nuclear war with the former Soviet Union. Moreover, since 11 September the nation has moved quickly in response to new
security challenges. The military components already exist and many support relationships with civil authorities in training and through actual military assistance also have developed over past decades. The maturation of the security apparatus will occur as a U.S. national security plan comes to fruition. It will necessarily evolve toward a truly national program extending well beyond the federal government. The timing of the Hart-Rudman Commission's report is hauntingly reminiscent of warnings on the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the structure failed to act on those warnings: the result, an attack on American soil that inflicted thousands of casualties. However, the United States does have a history of rapidly responding to security challenges and, undoubtedly, it will continue to change to meet the uncertain strategic environment.

The implications of the commission's report on the Defense Department and the Army are considerable. There is a groundswell of support for increased security at home. The current budget reflects a focused attention on securing the nation. At the same time, there is also a call for political, economic, and military change. The third Hart-Rudman report asserts that the Army must adopt a balanced strategy – win wars, deter aggression, provide homeland security capabilities, provide humanitarian relief, and provide constabulary capabilities. The suggestion is that the Army needs to do it all. The Army can no longer focus on activities outside the United States, but rather maintain a balance of support between domestic and worldwide requirements. As seen in the Defense Secretary's Quadrennial Defense Review, there is swift support for adopting a greater role in homeland security. The Army is already modifying its defense strategy and looking to alter its organizational structure to meet the new environment.

There is little doubt that change must take place. The reaction of the military to support the war on drugs shows the ability to adapt to a changing environment and integrate new roles for the military. The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 created the counterdrug roles and missions for the DoD. The need for military involvement came at a time when law enforcement was perceived as losing the war on drugs. The Army readily accepted its new roles and missions, making an impact that continues today. The bottom line for the Army is that adapting appropriately to meet the changes in the strategic environment defines success.

ARMY TASK AREAS

A useful construct in analyzing what contributions the Army needs to make for HLS is to begin by addressing what the Army has provided to homeland security since 11 September
2001. Identifying the resultant tasks the Army performed following 11 September will be used as a start point. These resultant tasks can be compared and contrasted with a systematically developed list of homeland security tasks. This proceeding will assist in defining future roles and missions for the Army. Additionally, defining homeland security is an evolving process with changes in support roles expected over time for the Army. The critical point is to start immediately. One can chart a way ahead using a deliberate process—a process likely to achieve a solution as close to a desired endstate as possible.

The United States Army has had a visible role in supporting homeland security. Overall, the DoD provides forces from each of the military services throughout the United States to assist with support activities. Within the first month following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, more than 7,750 soldiers in eighty-seven National Guard and Reserve units reported for active duty service under President George W. Bush’s partial mobilization for Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the homeland defense and support to civil authorities in the United States. The units included military police companies to augment force protection at military installations and airports, infantry battalions and companies, military history detachments, transportation units, an ordinance company, a supply company, an air defense artillery command, military intelligence units, engineer units, a special operations command element, and others. In total, forty-eight National Guard units and thirty-nine Army Reserve units were called to federal service from twenty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. In addition, approximately 30,000 troops deployed overseas in early October for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the global war on terrorism.

Thousands of other National Guard soldiers called to state active duty supported their governors in recovery operations and domestic defense. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve were visible. New York State Governor George Pataki called out the National Guard to fulfill consequence management duties with state and local authorities. The New York Governor used National Guard forces to bolster security at the Three Mile Island Nuclear facility. The United States used National Guard forces to increase security at 422 civil airports to boost the country’s confidence in the aviation industry. Trained in Federal Aviation Administration security procedures, Army forces “monitor and reinforce airport security checkpoints, monitor alertness and performance of the civilian screeners, and assist screeners and supervisors and the airport police as required.” Additional future calls from the Bush administration to secure the Mexican border will put soldiers in a
Each of these tasks are observable deployments of American soldiers since 11 September.

Breaking the Army support tasks since 11 September into categories, the Army provided support in four areas: point or border defense, recovery, administrative, and missile defense. A fifth area, weapons of mass destruction protection is a critical capability that the Army provides, but will not be addressed here. The five support tasks serve as the 'resultant tasks' the Army performed following 11 September. These resultant tasks will be compared with a list of tasks systematically developed from a study of threats to American homeland security.

An Arroyo Center study for the United States Army evaluated the range of threats facing homeland security and the definitions of homeland security. Analysis of the problem with an emphasis on preparing the Army for homeland security was at the center of the work. The study suggests five critical Army task areas:

- Weapons of mass destruction domestic preparedness and civil support;
- Continuity of government (operations to ensure and restore civil authority);
- Border and coastal defense, including prevention of weapons of mass destruction smuggling into the United States and management of large-scale refugee flows that can create threats to national security;
- Continuity of military operations, including force protection – primarily for deploying units – protection of mission-critical facilities and systems, and protection of higher headquarters operations; and
- National missile defense.

These task areas encompass the types of tasks the Army would likely fulfill in homeland security. The RAND study task areas are similar to the homeland security mission areas defined earlier in this paper, but there are some differences. The RAND study points to five homeland security tasks for the Army: domestic preparedness, continuity of government, border and coastline defense, continuity of military operations, and missile defense. The first three task areas are supporting tasks to civil authorities, meaning that requesting agencies can receive military assistance in these task areas. The last two task areas are military responsibilities for protection of personnel and infrastructure that is part of military and specialized military capability for missile defense of the United States. The differences include a greater specificity for the homeland security mission areas emphasizing, for example, cyber, missile, or weapons of mass destruction attack. Regardless, the distinctions are slight, but important in capturing the
entire security issue. Let us now compare and contrast the actual Army tasks being performed with the theoretical task areas from the RAND study.

A review of the task lists in table 1 shows many similarities to the actual and theoretical tasks Army soldiers perform in homeland security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Tasks</th>
<th>Theoretical Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Point/border defense</td>
<td>Domestic preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Continuity of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Border and coastal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile defense</td>
<td>Continuity of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD protection</td>
<td>Missile defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1

The current tasks the Army provides in support of homeland security are included in the theoretical list with the exception of continuity of government. If the challenge was a tremendous build-up of refugees in Mexico or Canada along the U.S. border that would outstrip a local civil capability or threat of a credible Naval force in the Pacific, then the Army could perform continuity of government or coastal defense tasks. The theoretical list is broad enough to support federal, state and local leaders and agencies with the types military capability leaders and agencies would need to train first responders and to support consequence management.

This review demonstrates that the Army is fulfilling the tasks required in homeland security. From disaster relief to civil disorder, the Army has met the traditional roles of assisting in the security of the United States. The Army has soldiers to perform an endless variety of tasks that could support homeland security, but the question remains as to whether the Army should drastically transform to meet the growing need for homeland defense forces. Another option is for civil or even paramilitary organizations to fulfill the security responsibility.

Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, sent a letter to Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta on 23 January 2002 requesting relief of the National Guard security duties within sixty to ninety days. The approximately 6000 soldiers patrolling more than 400 airports would be replaced by Transportation Security Administration enforcement officers in a transition plan. The transportation administration will ultimately hire 25,000 to 30,000 people to ensure safety in airports and other transportation infrastructures, while the guard "needs to get back to back to its core mission." For the transportation administration, a large civil workforce will fill the security role. Other agencies facing similar problems may come to the same solution or use various different approaches. To rapidly secure America's airports, the Army was brought in. With a new transportation structure in place and a security situation stabilized, the Army goes back to preparing for its wartime missions.
ARMY ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

This paper has come full circle back to asking the question as to the role of the Army in homeland security. There is little doubt the Army has made a significant impact in securing America since its inception. Army roles, prescribed in law, evolve over time. The current wave of popular support in our country and trend in Defense Department correspondence will lead to legislation that will outline roles for the Army in homeland security. The key will be achieving the right roles with the right levels of involvement for the Army. It is unwise to change the entire structure of the Army in reaction to the events of 11 September, but we can use the momentum for change in a positive manner to transform the Army to better meet the challenges ahead.

Using the homeland security mission areas and the task lists, it is possible to discern several general observations that would be of assistance in determining roles for the Army. First, there is a need for specialists in the homeland defense. These specialists fall into many groups. Intelligence analysts; police forces; nuclear, biological, and chemical specialists; and engineers, for example, have utility both in the Army and in a support for homeland security capacity. There is a need to designate specific Army specialties and corresponding detachments or units to perform homeland security tasks. Other capability, for example, national missile defense specialists perform a homeland defense function, but the capability falls primarily within the Department of Defense. These specialists will support homeland security from within the military as the Department of Defense has the lead agency responsibility.

Second, there is a generic requirement to provide military support to civil authorities for homeland security. America's first responders have the primary responsibility for homeland security, but a surge capability to meet both homeland defense requirements and domestic support requirements are needed from the Army. In this case, generic military manpower is needed to meet mass response necessities.

Third, there is a need for a single authority providing military support to homeland security. The command and control issues are critical to meeting the needs of civil authorities and accomplishing military missions. In an attempt to reduce friction caused by competing requirements, establishing a single authority within the military for homeland security is a must.

Specialized units in the Army benefit from homeland security support missions because of the obvious advantage to training in their main competencies. Soldiers in medical units supporting a homeland security mission have an advantage in that skills are enhanced in the mission. This is not always true, but there is a greater likelihood of a benefit for specialized units as opposed to an infantry battalion deploying to perform an airport security mission. The
infantry battalion trained to perform security tasks by the Federal Aviation Administration gains training in airport security skills, but infantry soldiers take little away from the airport experience to translate into combat mission essential tasks. Each unit welcomes the chance to support the homeland security mission, but the specialized unit, used in their military specialty, gains more from the experience with respect to enhancing military capabilities.

The trade-off for the military unit performing a security mission involving tasks outside the mission essential task list is a lower level of training proficiency. A question for leaders is, for example, what training is the unit not performing in order to conduct the given support to homeland defense. Generic unit taskings are becoming more of an issue with the Army in a period of high operational tempo. These taskings affect Army National Guard units to a higher degree due to the limited number of days available to train. There is less time available to support homeland security missions and prepare for wartime mission support. It is understood that the Army will fulfill these homeland security tasks with trained units. For Army National Guard units performing homeland security tasks, this means, in many cases, not being able to train to a level to support combat mission tasks.

A homeland security role for the Army National Guard is possible with a diminished role in supporting the traditional back-up to the Active force. Could another Army organization be utilized or created to accomplish this mission? Sure — many organizations could be leveraged to fill the homeland security role. It is the right role for Guard soldiers. The Army National Guard by assuming the priority support for homeland security frees the Active Army to focus on advancing U.S. military interests abroad.

The Hart-Rudman Commission Report, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, makes the following recommendation: “The Secretary of Defense, at the President’s direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of the National Guard, and the Guard should be reorganized, properly trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.” This is a bold recommendation, but a suggestion that has distinct advantages. The National Guard has a nationwide span of nearly 3,300 locations in 2,700 communities across the country. They are the “existing” forward-deployed military force in this country. The National Guard has an existing command structure that could be stepped up to command and control a national level organization for homeland defense. Major General (Retired) Don Edwards, a Vermont National Guard Adjutant General for sixteen years, states “the National Guard is so well suited to this mission that if it did not exist, the United States would have to create an organization like it to assume this mission.” Additionally, there is the prestige for the
National Guard in the possible creation of a four star general billet for the command. In a practical sense this idea does have some merit, but there are difficulties.

The Army National Guard is inextricably linked with the Active force, increasing its responsibilities to the federal war-fighting mission by providing 54 percent of combat units, 45 percent of combat support units, and 33 percent of combat service support units. Some like Major General Don Edwards believe that the National Guard can fulfill the homeland security mission and provide supplemental units to active component forces. This is an attractive alternative, but one that must fit in an overall Department of Defense plan. Under no circumstances should the National Guard be the lead federal agency for homeland security, but there is a role for a coordinating headquarters to assist the Office of Homeland Security. Whether or not the National Guard is placed in charge of Northern Command is not relevant. What is important is that the National Guard does have a capacity to support the mission of homeland security in the country as it has since the National Guard’s inception.

The lack of an overall national command structure of the National Guard will hurt any effort to synchronize its support. Each state has its own individual command authority with the National Guard Bureau managing the federal resources. Any centralized plan seems hopeless at the national level, but a regional planning effort, pooling resources of many states, does make sense. The capabilities state governors need from the Army could be available in regions aligned with FEMA regions for enhancing coordination. The perception of an equal dissemination of resources and an equal overall focus will assist in pacifying local, state, and federal levels in the homeland security arena.

The establishment of Northern Command, a four-star joint military headquarters responsible for coordinating military support for defense of the continental United States will provide a unity of effort and better grasp of military requirements for homeland security. This change to our national military strategy will provide a central authority to plan for and execute military support and military operations as directed by the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States. The greatest contribution of Northern Command may be the development of a theater strategy. A strategy which brings all elements of power together to address all domestic security threats.

Transforming the Army National Guard to support homeland security while retaining a role in supporting and supplementing the active component force is a significant challenge. In order to do both, at the level of expertise expected by the American people, the Army National Guard needs to shift effort from a primary support role for the active force to homeland security. Optimizing the Army’s commitment in homeland security is the marker to define the future Army
National Guard. Any change to the National Guard will take political action, and here the role of the state governor in picking all senior guard officers in the state should play a big part in pushing the National Guard to assuming responsibility for national security. As there is a valid requirement for military homeland security forces, balancing the politics and the security needs will add to the challenges of transforming the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard can best support homeland security in filling three critical roles: population control, physical security and logistical support. In each case, the tasks of the National Guard will be in support of civil authority request for military assistance. Other capabilities like engineering or chemical and biological protection will be shared between civil and military. States will have responsibility inside their borders with regional military capability that States are able to share. This approach provides the auxiliary manpower that civil authorities require together with specialized capability that neighboring States can share to keep the necessary capability, but reduce the overall costs. Recruitment will come from within the communities the soldiers will help to protect.

The Army National Guard, at a reduced level, will support the Active component force with combat capability. The fact that the National Guard is inextricably linked to the Active force is a positive and productive relationship. Shifting Army National Guard capability from their most recent role to a focus on homeland security will streamline the mission profile and permit the Army National Guard to train their forces to the highest levels of proficiency.

Simply saying the Army National Guard will change to assume the major portion of the Army's contribution to domestic security is much different than the Army National Guard actually changing. Change is always difficult. The political sensitivities that surround the National Guard are tremendous. It must be politically feasible to make the changes to the Army National Guard. The addition of a four-star billet, growth in size of the organization, growth in prestige for the Army National Guard, reduction in costs to maintain equipment (tanks to trucks), and training to a higher level of proficiency in tasks that are germane to security are possible issues that are politically palatable.

There are questions of how much of the National Guard will need to serve in HLS and how much National Guard structure is dedicated to back up active and reserve forces. These are valid requirements for research by the Center for Army Analysis. What is critical for this paper is the understanding that a global view needs to be maintained in terms of Army forces for HLS and warfighting abroad. The Army can support both mission sets. Changing the National Guard to support HLS with certain forces and backing up active and reserve forces with certain other forces streamlines the Guard support. This action allows active and reserve forces to
better focus on the war on terrorism abroad. In the final analysis, a political process will
determine a final homeland security role for the Army. The momentum for change is present for
the National Guard using domestic security as the driver.

CONCLUSION

The Army must fulfill its promise to support and defend American society. Since 11
September 2001, the Army's role in HLS has been evident and ever changing. In the near
future, organizations within the Department of Defense will be apportioned to a “Homeland
Commander in Chief” to plan for and execute the defense of the United States. The theater
defense strategy will have a central controlling authority and civil, as well as, military
components. Homeland security issues are being acted upon in our country in a deliberate,
calculated manner. The security community will continue to work toward an unattainable perfect
solution, but we will be successful. Today's Americans define this time as a positive one in
American history.

The Army National Guard will be most effected by the homeland security mission. Politics
aside, it is the right organization. Other Army organizations could do the mission, but as
General Edwards puts it “the National Guard is so well suited to this mission that if it did not
exist, the United States would have to create an organization like it to assume this
mission.”46

The National Guard will need to change organizations, personnel, training and equipment to fill
this new role. Simultaneously the Army, active and reserve, will change to meet this need and
transform to meet the needs of the future. The momentum is present—the Army will adapt to
our changing strategic environment.

WORD COUNT = 6296
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid.


7 Ibid., 307-8.

8 Ibid., 306.

9 Rumsfeld, 23.

10 Ibid., 19.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Rumsfeld, 17.


20 Ian Roxborough, *The Hart-Rudman Commission and Homeland Defense*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2001), V.


23 Roxborough, 20.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


34 Jane McHugh, “Guard’s airport duty may end soon,” Army Times, 4 February 2002, 10.

35 Ibid.


37 Larson and Peters, xx.

38 Hart and Rudman, 25.


42 Ibid., 3.

43 Edwards and Dunn, 6.

44 Echevarria and Tussen briefing.


46 Edwards and Dunn, 5-6.
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