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Social, Cultural and Political (SCP) factors have been inadequately attended to in Operational design and execution resulting in unwelcome outcomes. Several cases (Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon and Kosovo) illustrate SCP factor neglect in Operational design and execution. Joint Doctrine lacks sufficient guidance to incorporate SCP factors into Operational design and execution.

Neglect of SCP factors is caused by an incomplete conception of Operational Art. A revised conception of Operational Art, range of military operations, and principles of military operations are offered to raise the level of emphasis and redress doctrinal shortcomings vis-à-vis SCP factors. Finally, exemplary changes to Joint Doctrine for Intelligence and Information Operations are given to demonstrate pragmatic methods of incorporating SCP factors into Operational Design and execution.

In view of the likelihood that U.S. forces will be employed within complex social, cultural and political contexts in the near term, correcting the doctrinal shortcomings in this area is essential.

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PUTTING SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS INTO THE JOINT DOCTRINE PLAYBOOK.

by

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Lieutenant Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Social, Cultural and Political (SCP) factors have been inadequately attended to in Operational design and execution resulting in unwelcome outcomes. Several cases (Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon and Kosovo) illustrate SCP factor neglect in Operational design and execution. Joint Doctrine lacks sufficient guidance to incorporate SCP factors into Operational design and execution. Neglect of SCP factors is caused by an incomplete conception of Operational Art. A revised conception of Operational Art, range of military operations, and principles of military operations are offered to raise the level of emphasis and redress doctrinal shortcomings vis-à-vis SCP factors. Finally, exemplary changes to Joint Doctrine for Intelligence and Information Operations are given to demonstrate pragmatic methods of incorporating SCP factors into Operational Design and execution. In view of the likelihood that U.S. forces will be employed within complex social, cultural and political contexts in the near term, correcting the doctrinal shortcomings in this area is essential.

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PUTTING SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS INTO THE JOINT DOCTRINE PLAYBOOK.

Social, Cultural and Political (SCP) factors have been inadequately attended to in Operational design and execution with unwelcome outcomes the result. Several cases (Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon and Kosovo) illustrate SCP factor neglect in Operational design and execution. Joint Doctrine lacks sufficient guidance to correct the neglect of SCP factors.

Neglect of SCP factors is caused by a incomplete conception of Operational Art. A revised conception of Operational Art, range of military operations, and principles of military operations are offered to raise the level of emphasis and redress doctrinal shortcomings vis-à-vis SCP factors. Finally, exemplary changes to Joint Doctrine for Intelligence and Information Operations are given to demonstrate pragmatic methods of incorporating SCP factors into Operational Design and execution.

In view of the likelihood that U.S. forces will be employed within complex social, cultural and political contexts in the near term, correcting the doctrinal shortcomings in this area is urgent.

Putting Social, Cultural and Political factors into the Joint Doctrine Playbook

"It is not easy for a nation which has been brought up to regard Gettysburg as more decisive than Vicksburg to understand the strategy of the indirect approach." [1]

Whatever the reason for a bias toward direct approaches and consequent focus on "conventional" military foes and wishes for operations void of political restraints and constraints, the end result for operations can be perilous and the resulting doctrine is one in which consideration of Social, Cultural and Political (SCP) factors is meager. In view of the detrimental effects that the neglect of SCP factors in Operational design and execution has wrought upon military operations, a better accounting of SCP factors in the Joint Doctrine playbook is necessary.

The Vietnam conflict and U.S. military operations in Somalia loom large as examples of conflicts with unwelcome outcomes. Sound-bite criticisms of these conflicts make much of both faulty guidance and excessive interference from strategic level decision makers. This sort of Vietnam criticism relies heavily on the rationale that overbearing administrations hampered and ultimately prevented military success because of excessive, debilitating restrictions on air and ground operations. Similarly, responsibility for the Somali Blackhawk debacle and, therefore, subsequent U.S. troop departure and policy disengagement is often placed directly on then Secretary of Defense Aspin's refusal to grant additional armor forces to the cause. The neglect of Social, Cultural and Political (SCP) factors in Operational design and consequent ill-effects, however, seem to have received little attention.

U.S. involvement in Lebanon and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo are other significant illustrative examples of military operations conducted within complex social, cultural, political contexts. Furthermore and most urgent, the attacks of 9/11, current military

operations in Afghanistan and some of the postulated subsequent military operations in the "war on terrorism" underscore the role SCP factors have on whom we find our adversary, their objectives, and how that adversary conducts operations. To be successful in making military operations achieve strategic aims, SCP factors must be integral to Operational design and execution. Current doctrine is inadequate to that task.

This paper recommends changes to Joint Doctrine that will both raise the level of emphasis on SCP factors and facilitate their incorporation into Operational design and execution. First, SCP factors will be briefly explored. Next, the historical cases mentioned above will be used to illustrate instances when neglect of SCP factors was catalyst for military failure. Specifically, facets of the Vietnam conflict and US involvement in Somalia will be explored as they pertain to Operational Design versus SCP factors; Kosovo and US involvement in Lebanon will be explored as they relate to operational functions of intelligence and information operations during execution. Finally, Joint Doctrine deficiencies that contribute to SCP factor neglect will be examined and changes offered to redress these doctrinal shortcomings. These changes will include a revised definition of Operational Art, changes to both the Principles of War and conception of Range of Military Operations, and exemplary revisions to Joint Doctrine for both Intelligence and Information Operations to illustrate the type of changes required to get SCP factors into the Joint Doctrine playbook.

SCP Factors and Military Operations

The Social, Cultural and Political factors that can affect military operations are many and all cannot be detailed here, but any accounting of SCP Factors would necessarily include: religion(s), socio-economic demographics, ethnicity(s), type and character of political/government institutions, cultural norms, cultural taboos, social stratification, character and strength of the economy, ethnic variation, language(s), etc. A key component

of SCP factor consideration would be analysis of values, interests, along with the similarities and differences within an Area of Operation's (AO) SCP fabric. Operational Design that holds these factors in the foreground would also seek out historical and sociological information to in order to shape Courses Of Action (COAs). An SCP focus would necessarily include an assessment of power and control vis-à-vis population (e.g. internal defense viability = strength and size of dissident movements versus government suppression abilities) and analysis of the SCP factors within an AO that can be exploited in order to multiply the effects of our own actions, degrade those of the adversary, or both. Similarly, unifying elements within the AO's SCP landscape would be explored and either exploited or avoided. There are obviously far too many threads to pull in order to reveal all that can comprise the SCP fabric, but ultimately, though oversimplified for the sake of brevity, understanding the SCP factors ought to result in having answers to the following:

1. What makes the other guy(s) tick? (Government, populace and military of the bad guy, coalition partners, and around the world.)

2. How will this play in Peoria(s)? (The bad guy's, our, coalition partner's and those around the world.)

Our track record for unearthing and effectively using the answers to the above questions has been mixed as several historical cases illustrate.

SCP Factors and Operational Design: Vietnam & Somalia

Vietnam and Somalia both illustrate how neglect of SCP factors in Operational design can become a catalyst for failure to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Analysis of the intricacies of the illustrative conflicts is not the focus of this paper, so neither primary research into these cases nor an attempt to modify existing analysis is offered. Sourced

criticisms of these conflicts, though perhaps arguable, nonetheless, illustrate how neglect of SCP factors in Operational design and execution can affect joint operations.

Compelling criticism of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that explores flaws in Operational design caused by the neglect of SCP factors comes from Sir Robert Thompson.[2] He cites the decision to attempt an operational direct approach aimed at the defeat of North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong (VC) combatant forces vice an indirect one aimed at defeating the insurgency as the fatal flaw in U.S Operational design. His assertion is based upon the assessment that the methods employed to accomplish the direct approach resulted in the extensive drafting of young South Vietnamese males away from their villages, a flawed strategic hamlet program execution[3], and a massive U.S. troop build-up. Each of these worked contrary to U.S. objectives of establishing an independent, democratic state. The drafting of massive numbers of young men away from their villages and into the South Vietnamese Army fragmented local social and political structures. The strategic hamlet program was executed both without consideration of the ill-effects that dislodging the rural population from ancestral grounds would cause and without a plan that would in fact insulate the population from the insurgents. Finally, the massive build-up in U.S. troops both fostered an unwanted colonial image and usurped the responsibility and control of the fate of South Vietnam. Both of which contributed to the insurgent cause of portraying the South Vietnamese government as illegitimate. Taken as a whole, our difficulties in Operational Design in Vietnam can be viewed to a large degree as being caused by SCP factor neglect.

U.S involvement in Somalia also illustrates neglect of SCP factors in Operational design. The Courses of Action (COAs) to marginalize and later seek the arrest of Aidid and his top advisors during UNOSOM II have been widely criticized as unwise in view of the decline of combat power on the ground in Mogadishu subsequent to the shift from UNITAF,

where upwards of 20,000 U.S. Marines were in country, to UNOSOM II, where U.S. troop strength was quickly decreased to under 5,000 with most of those being logistics support forces. [4] In retrospect, in view of the warrior culture and the aims of Aidid, the movement of arms back into Mogadishu, the increase in harassment and engagement of U.N. and U.S. forces -- as evidenced by attacks on the Pakistani troops on 5 June, 1993 and periodic mortar fire into U.S and UN base camps--, and finally the Blackhawk debacle, can be seen as logical escalatory actions intended to achieve objectives. General Zinni has commented regarding lessons from Somalia,

> "[Another {lesson} is the importance of] an **understanding of the culture** that you're involved in and the environment you're involved in. I don't think we understood the Somalis, I don't think we understood the clan infrastructure and how that worked, I don't think we understood faction leaders."[5] (emphasis added)

Our inability to adequately sense and analyze the SCP factors in Somalia led to a lack of understanding of how U.S. and UN military force size, composition and actions would be interpreted and acted on by the Somali's. A more detailed understanding of SCP factors in Somalia might have driven operational level decision makers to either choose alternative COAs or make operational level changes in intelligence, protection or other areas to compensate for the consequences of embarking on the mission to capture Aidid.

Both of these cases, Somalia and Vietnam, illustrate the unwelcome consequences that the neglect of SCP factors in Operational design can cause. Neglect of SCP factors during the execution phase of operations can be similarly costly as the following two cases illustrate.

Lebanon and Kosovo: SCP factors and execution

Lebanon and Kosovo demonstrate other important SCP issues for operational commanders and staffs to consider. In Lebanon, neglect of SCP factors within operational intelligence and tactical fires during execution proved costly. Our Human Intelligence

(HUMINT) in the form of patrols in the U.S. sector of the Multi-National Force (MNF) area waned while tactical fires from U.S. Naval units and from Marines at the Beirut International Airport (BIA) led to U.S. forces being viewed as partisan.[6] Consequently, our troops were without an organic intelligence gathering mechanism to sense the threat to our forces and were not able to counter the image of partisanship, deter aggression through force or interdict terrorist acts through intelligence enabled actions. Clearly other issues surround the events leading up to the terrorist bombing of the barracks, but the lack of intelligence collection and ill-advised tactical fires nonetheless betray a neglect of SCP factors. Additionally, the rules of engagement and force protection differences between the embassy detachment and marines at the airport also indicate, among other things, a lack of awareness of SCP factors and their effects on military operations.[7]

In Kosovo, neglect of SCP factors in the Information Operations arena was evident. Information Operations (IO) cell organization, headquarters location and execution were less than optimal. The actions taken to manage perception within the Kosovo AO and in the public affairs arena both have been criticized for their shortcomings.[8] The result of the inadequacies in these two areas was an inability to shape the image of the conflict decisively in our favor. It remains troublesome that the most media savvy country was unable to shape the image of Allied Force decisively in our favor against a less entertainment and media sophisticated society. Additionally, the fact that the IO Cell was separated from the JFC HQ and lacked unity of both command and effort no doubt limited IO capability and effectiveness, but more importantly is that SCP factor neglect is causal for both what was done poorly and the lack of emphasis on this facet of Operational Art during Allied Force.[9]

The cases offered illustrate how neglect of SCP factors in Operational design or execution can cause unplanned effects that become detrimental to mission accomplishment.

And though speculative reasoning might wish to undo the results of one or all of the cases, more importantly and the position of this paper is that the complex SCP environments within which our forces have been, and likely will be, employed necessitate doctrine that immerses Operational design and execution in SCP factors.

Current Joint Doctrine. Where's the SCP??

> "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." [10]

Unfortunately, current Joint Doctrine scarcely contends with SCP factors. Joint Pub 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations) meagerly addresses SCP factors. As they relate to achieving an end state it does state,

> "What military (or related **political** or **social**) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)" [11]{emphasis added}

More expansive commentary on SCP factors, however, is notably absent from sections on facets of operational art and key planning considerations. In chapter 5 of JP 3-0 (Military Operations Other Than War), where one would hope to find dense commentary on SCP issues, useful commentary or guidance on attending to SCP factors is also scanty. Confusingly, MOOTW is described by what it is not,

> **"**MOOTW encompasses a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes <u>other than the large-scale combat operations</u> usually associated with wa**r"[12]** (emphasis added)

rather than defining MOOTW in a manner that conveys the SCP imperatives associated with operations at the lower intensity end of the spectrum. In Joint Pub 3-07 (Joint Doctrine for MOOTW) SCP factors are emphasized in only a marginally more detailed fashion. Although primacy of political objective is stated clearly, there is a notable lack of authoritative guidance

for considering SCP factors. Instead it focuses on what the commander must do to prevent another Somalia through preparedness in the use of force.

> "**Of particular importance in the planning process is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats**. Commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate." [13]JP 3-07 pg ix (Emphasis not added)

Admittedly, there is a bit more accounting of SCP factors in MOOTW doctrine, but it too is inadequate. Further, this dichotomous view of military operations with war on one side of a line and MOOTW on the other, each having their own distinct and separate doctrine, combined with the subordinate place MOOTW is held within the dominant military culture serves to also subordinate SCP concerns.

As would be expected, the dichotomous view of war and short shrift given SCP factors continues in Joint Pub 2-0 (Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations) and in Joint Pub 3-13 (Joint Doctrine for Information Operations), both critical doctrinal publications if SCP factors are to be entered into the Operational Art playbook. This neglect of SCP factors is not coincidental. Rather, it is a product of doctrine and its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings. The first step in changing the playbook and moving SCP concerns from the periphery to an integral position within Operational design and execution is analysis and revision of Operational Art.

Defining Operational Art

> "The joint operational art encompasses the translation of strategy into operational design for the joint employment of forces. . ."[14](JP 1-0, V-1)

> ". . . operational art today can be defined as a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting,, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives. . ." (Vego. Operational Warfare, 2)

The quotes above are noteworthy. The first is as close as the Joint Doctrine gets to defining Operational Art. The second states with what operational art is concerned. Neither defines Operational Art. Perhaps the lack of an adequate definition is not so surprising since the answer to whether war is art or even artistic in any way is paradoxical and, therefore, confounding. It is paradoxical because war, an act resulting in destruction, carnage and human suffering, is seemingly irreconcilable with a conception of war as either artistic or creative. Resolving this paradox is necessary to arrive at a definition of Operational Art that is philosophically sound and will force SCP factors into the foreground of Operational design and execution.

What is the Art of War? Resolving Paradox.

> "**Paradox is a symptom of misconception**, and coherent, systematic conception, i.e. the process of making sense out of experience, is philosophy. **Therefore a paradoxical idea is not one to be discarded, but to be resolved**." (Emphasis added)[15]

To resolve the paradox, working conceptions of both what is operational and art are required as a point from which to depart. The ones below serve that purpose.

> "Art is the **creation** of forms symbolic of **human feeling**."[16] (Emphasis added)

> ". . . concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting,, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives. . ."[17] (Vego. Operational Warfare, 2)

Arriving at a definition of Operational Art requires a bit more than just a mashing together of these two definitions. By using a metaphoric approach as a means of resolving the paradox, the nature of the human skill involved in the techniques of Operational Art and a revised definition of Operational Art can be formed. A commonly used metaphor for conveying the nature of Operational Art likens it to the composing and conducting of a symphony, with

composition being operational design and conducting being operational execution. In view of the concept offered below,

> "Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. **Music is the tonal analogue of emotive life**." [18]

war, if it is artistic in any way, then is also an analogue of emotive life -- a violent, coercive analogue of social-cultural-political, emotive life.   Hence, from the employment of military forces and other elements of national power (the instruments of operational art) "something emerges from the arrangement . . ., which was not there before, and this, rather than the arranged material, is the symbol of sentience." [19] From this concept a revised definition of Operational Art can be constructed.

> Operational Art: the employment of military forces, and potentially other instruments of national power, to achieve strategic objectives and **to create of a symbol of sentience that is congruent with the will, interests, values stated and implied in strategic guidance** with the objective of altering the adversary(s) feelings of necessity and capability in order that the adversary do our will.

Ramifications at the Operational Level

This line of argument is perhaps tedious and has the potential to appear tangential to the task of getting SCP factors more comprehensively considered in Joint Doctrine. It is not. Conceiving of Operational Art in this way unites both the effective objectives (destroy armies, hold or seize territory) and affective results (errors in committing forces, delay in taking action, loss of will to fight). This revised definition is the logic akin to what is referred to below,

> "The rule of law and the maintenance of the highest standards are prerequisites to the creation of the right **image**, which is vital both in [a particular conflict] and in relation to grand strategy." [20] (emphasis added and [conflict name removed] from quotation.)

as "the creation of right image." Further, this view of Operational Art affirms that Operational design and execution accounts for every manner that the military instruments, and potentially additional instruments of national power, will be played in peace through the range of military operations because it will still be the music of political intentions. In other words, all military operations are the same in that they create a symbol of sentience. Hence, because all military operations -- joint, interagency or otherwise and throughout the spectrum -- serve the same purpose of creating symbols of sentience to achieve objectives, the dichotomous view of war and MOOTW above the tactical level is necessarily obviated. Additionally, both the Range of Military Operations and Principles of War as they are conceived in Joint Doctrine require revision. The recommended adjustments to these areas in doctrine appear later in this paper.

Next, knowledge and application of SCP factors can not be relegated to the periphery of a warfighter's concerns since it is substantially because of and in relation to SCP factors that reaction to the created symbol of sentience will occur. This viewpoint demands that the destruction of or attainment of some tangible objective can never be viewed in isolation to either the manner it was achieved or how it affects the adversary's feelings of necessity and capability to continue on a given course of action. Most fundamentally, this view of Operational Art concept makes SCP factor consideration vital in Operational design and, therefore, forces the movement of SCP factors from the periphery of doctrine.

Lastly, though much of joint doctrine must be revised to attend more fully with SCP factors, that task is unattainable here. Exemplary changes to intelligence and information operations doctrine, however, are offered to illustrate concrete methods for getting SCP factors into the playbook. Revision to Joint Doctrine for Intelligence aims to cause the gathering, analysis and use of SCP factors in both Operational design and execution. Joint

Doctrine for Information Operations revisions emphasize its role in shaping the image created through military operations.

Revised Range of Military Operations.

First, the range of military operation figure below is necessarily obviated by the definition of Operational Art offered because the lines between war and MOOTW do not exist in practice and cannot exist in a framework of military operations based upon the Operational Art definition given.

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

The revised depiction below suggests a range of military operations that is on a continuum similar to graphic below. [21]

Figure 1

Principles of War and MOOTW Unified

Another step in the process of moving SCP factors into the foreground within doctrine is a merging of the Principles of War and Principles of MOOTW subsequent to the invalidation of the dichotomous War versus MOOTW conception. Figures II-1 and V-1 of JP 3-0, are merged into a new Principles of Military Operations.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

OBJECTIVE
OFFENSIVE
MASS
ECONOMY OF FORCE
MANEUVER
UNITY OF COMMAND
SECURITY
SURPRISE
SIMPLICITY

Figure II-1. Principles of War

+

PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE
UNITY OF EFFORT
SECURITY
RESTRAINT
PERSEVERANCE
LEGITIMACY

Figure V-1. Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

=

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEGITIMACY
OBJECTIVE
OFFENSIVE
MASS
ECONOMY OF FORCE
MANEUVER
UNITY OF EFFORT
SECURITY
SURPRISE
PERSEVERANCE
RESTRAINT
SIMPLICITY

Figure 2

The unique aspects of varying missions along with unique SCP factors and their effect on

forces can and should be detailed in Tactics, Techniques and Procedure (TTP) doctrinal

publications, but the overarching principles of military force employment are fused.

SCP and Operational Intelligence

"Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing,
what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future." Joint Pub 2-0

If Joint Doctrine for Intelligence is to become authoritative guidance for dealing with

SCP factors, it must first contend with the near monopoly that the sensing and analyzing of an

adversary's means of war holds and gain focus upon both the means and the will of the

adversary along with what buoys the feelings of necessity and capability within the adversary.

The first step is to add SCP intelligence gathering and analysis the list of Intelligence

Purposes.[22] Letting SCP factors remain an ambiguously referred to sub-element of General

Military Intelligence doesn't cut it. The second is to change the depiction of the Dimensions of

the Battlespace (Figure 3) to include SCP factors. This may appear window dressing, but

DIMENSIONS OF THE BATTLESPACE

CULTURE

INTERESTS

ETHNICITY

SOCIAL ISSUES

POLITICS

RELIGION

ECONOMY

VALUES

how we depict things both reflects and reproduces ways of thinking and taking action.

Third and most importantly, the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) needs a separate cell whose purpose is SCP intelligence gathering, analysis and application in operational design and execution. Knowing the SCP aspects of the environment within which military forces will be employed enables Operational designers to consider and contend with both the adversary's will and means of resistance. This SCP cell should have input to and oversight of Counterintelligence/I&W, Collection Management, Targeting. [23] Additionally, an SCP Intelligence element must be capable of providing both J-3 (Operations) and J-5 (Plans) cells with SCP intelligence support and <u>criticism</u> across the spectrum of operations within the AO. The idea of criticism is vital here. SCP concerns cannot be used to paralyze actions necessary for the prosecution of tangible objectives, but SCP criticism of current and future operations will inform warfighters of possible effects of their chosen COAs that can be dealt with. Examples might include an SCP cell's contributions in targeting nearby culturally significant areas. The SCP support cell would advise of the significant SCP impact that collateral damage might have on operations and would also offer means in the public affairs or psychological operations arenas that might be useful to counter the image created by inadvertent destruction.

In sum, the goals of SCP focused intelligence are shaping courses of action development, bridling of tactical actions and providing insight into means of shaping perceptions. To support this, the J-2 organization should be modified to include a robust SCP cell to accomplish their overarching responsibilities.

SCP and Information Operations

Information Operations doctrine too requires revision if the SCP knowledge gained by the SCP cell within the JISE is to bear fruit. First the IO cell must change organizationally to

include a SCP factor concerned group. Second, the purpose of an SCP factor concerned group within the IO cell must be clearly focused on the "image" or symbol of sentience being created.

To achieve these two goals, the IO cell should be split into Effects and Affects working groups. The Effects Working Group (EWG) would focus on protection of friendly IO infrastructure and attack of the adversary's, while the Affects Working Group (AWG) would be centered on a cadre of SCP focused elements. To this Affects Working Group (AWG), the J-2 would provide SCP Intelligence support, J-3 would provide operational protect, security, fires information. The JPOTF, PAO, MILDEC and Targeting cell would also be represented. Together they would focus their efforts on both the shaping of operations and perception management.

The AWGs responsibilities would include criticism of current ops, plans for mitigating affects of necessary military operations that run counter the desired image of the operations, submission of candidate tactical and operational missions that contribute to the creation of the desired image, and the conduct counter IO affects operations to negate the adversary's attempts at shaping the SCP landscape contrary to our desires. Consideration and application of SCP factors by the AWG in mission selection, ROE, targeting, PSYOP and Public Affairs will greatly increase our chances of military victory and attainment of political objectives where they have failed us previously.

Conclusion

"The rule of law and the maintenance of the highest standards are pre-requisites to the creation of the right **image**. . ."[24]

"Loss of hope rather than loss of life is what decides the issues of war. But helplessness induces hopelessness"[25]

". . .everybody with some degree of authority, even if it's out of the barrel of a gun, you'd better give them a forum in which to bring their case. When they're isolated, there's no recourse other than to violence."[26]

Social, Cultural and Political factors have caused great difficulty and have resulted in unfortunate and sometimes tragic consequences during military operations, as the cases offered illustrate. Current Joint Doctrine remains inadequate to the task of attending to these SCP factors in a meaningful way. The cause of the neglect of SCP factors in doctrine is an imprecise conception of what is artistic about the employment of military forces. The conception of Operational Art as an instrument intended for both tangible and emotive effects is critical to altering the way in which SCP factors are considered within doctrine and by warfighters.

The view of military force employment, throughout the range of military operations, as always creating a symbol of sentience obviates current doctrine's dichotomous view of war and MOOTW. The range of military operations is revised to one that depicts the unified and continuum nature of military force employment. The Principles of War and MOOTW are voided and replaced by Principles of Military Operations.

Finally, Intelligence and Information Operations doctrine changes offered are exemplary of the type of changes to doctrine required to put SCP factors firmly into the Joint Doctrine playbook. Intelligence doctrinal changes have as their goal "getting the analysis right"[27] in order to conduct effective operational planning and to shape, through criticism from an SCP viewpoint, military actions to achieve unity of effect, both tangible and sentient. Information Operations doctrinal changes similarly are focused on both gaining unity of effects in operational design and shaping military operations and perceptions of the symbol created through those operations.

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[1] Thompson, Robert, "Squaring the Error." <u>Foreign Affairs</u> Vol. 46, pg 451.

[2] Ibid. pgs 442-453.

[3] Thompson, Robert,, <u>Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam</u>, chapter 11.

[4] "Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview with General Anthony Zinni." Somalia criticism and analysis was also taken from "Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were they Effective?" Colonel F.M. Lorenz, USMC; and "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned," Kenneth Ballard.

[5] "Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview with General Anthony Zinni."

[6] The DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 details chronology, intelligence support failures, Rules of Engagement mistakes and Force Protection shortcomings.

[7] Ibid.

[8] NWC PUB 02-01 – C4ISR and Information operations in Kosovo, 1999. NWC, JMO Dept. A compilation of analysis of Operation Allied Force. It details Intelligence support and Information Operations inadequacies.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War.

[11] JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. pg II-3

[12] Ibid. pg V-1

[13] Ibid.

[14] Joint Pub 1-0 (Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States) 14 November 2000, pp

[15] Langer, Susanne K. <u>Feeling & Form.</u>

[16] Ibid.

[17] Vego, Milan. <u>Operational Warfare.</u>

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Thompson, Robert, "Squaring the Error." <u>Foreign Affairs</u> Vol 46.

[21] Range of Military Operations graphic substantially taken from NWC Joint Maritime Operations graphic provided by Prof Waghelstein.

[22] Joint Pub 2-0 pagesI-3 thru 7, and Figure I-2.

[23] JP 2-0, Joint Task Force Intelligence, chapter VI deals with JISE organization.

[24] Thompson, Sir Robert. "Squaring the Error"

[25] Hart, Liddel. <u>Thoughts On War</u>

[26] PBS – FRONTLINE:Ambush in Mogadishu; Interview General Anthony Zinni

[26] Waghelstein, John. Prof.

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