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THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY FOR U.S. SECURITY

BY

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ABSTRACT

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There are numerous areas of foreign policy where the interests of the United States and Turkey are close, and several that could very well roil relations. They range from Israel and the Middle East peace process through the Caucasus to Iran and the European Union to human rights and political Islam. Turkey is a good friend and ally, strategically important to the United States, and moving in the right direction domestically. The purpose of this paper is to look at different aspects of the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership and their effect on the two countries’ short-term and long-term security interests. It also examines the intensity of the factors that drive the two nations toward a strategic alliance and those that could put them on opposite sides of future issues.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. iii
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................................ ix
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY FOR U.S. SECURITY ....................................................... 1
   INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1
   BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................... 2
   AREAS OF MUTUAL INTERESTS ............................................................................................................... 4
   RUSSIA .................................................................................................................................................... 5
   CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ..................................................................................................... 6
   EUROPEAN SECURITY ............................................................................................................................. 8
   THE BALKANS ......................................................................................................................................... 9
   THE MIDDLE EAST .................................................................................................................................. 10
   Israel ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
   Syria ....................................................................................................................................................... 12
   Jordan ..................................................................................................................................................... 13
   MILITARY COOPERATION ....................................................................................................................... 14
   Freedom of Action .................................................................................................................................. 14
   Ballistic Missile Defense ......................................................................................................................... 15
   War on Terrorism .................................................................................................................................... 16
ENERGY SECURITY ................................................................. 17
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .................................................. 19
IRAQ ................................................................................. 20
IRAN ................................................................................. 20
ISLAM AND ISLAMISM ...................................................... 21
OUTLOOK ........................................................................... 22
ENDNOTES ........................................................................ 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................. 33
PREFACE

The aftermath of the Persian Gulf War against Iraq, the continuing tension in the Balkans and the worldwide war on terrorism help to give new meaning and importance to Turkey as a geographic and cultural link between East and West. The ongoing conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan underscore Turkey's continuing value as a force against neighboring Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The country's historic and religious ties to the Muslims call attention to Turkey's ability to span the gap between the predominantly Christian countries of NATO and the Muslim world. With close ethnic links to the largely Turkic peoples in the new republics of the former Soviet Union, Turkey is well suited to help counter Russian and Iranian efforts to gain greater influence and control in these areas. In an era when, in the absence of the communist threat, radical Islam looms larger in the eyes of many American policy makers as an ideological challenge to the West, Turkey's position as stable and secular counter-balance becomes vital. For all these reasons, United States security is increasingly tied to the political and economic actions of Turkey.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. TURKEY AND THE SURROUNDING AREA ......................................................... 2
FIGURE 2. OPTIONS FOR EXPORT OIL PIPELINES .................................................... 18
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY FOR U.S. SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has experienced continuous changes to the hierarchy of global power, resulting in increased regional instabilities and the emergence of new threats to global security. Asymmetric pressures, terrorism, international crime, the procurement and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), along with ethnic and religious radicalism are today’s realities. Add to this the view in many parts of the world that America has become “preemptory and domineering—[even] imperial...” as well as the phenomenon that a growing number of established nation-states are grouping themselves into larger entities to counter the dominance of the United States, and it is clear the list of potential threats against the United States will grow.¹

The result has been an ongoing transformation in the very concept of state security. By definition, national security has traditionally relied more on military power and less on diplomatic and economic strength built on partnerships.² But emerging trends, such as those cited above, defy this description. And U.S. policy makers acknowledge the changes are producing larger, complex trans-regional blocks that no longer respond in a predictable manner toward Western security needs. As a consequence, the longstanding strategies for the protection of the United States no longer fit.³ Washington will have to adjust its security approaches to match the geopolitical responsibilities and consequences of being the lone hyper-power in an instable world.

One promising concept is to utilize a “pivotal states” strategy.⁴ In addition to managing relationships with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, America would concentrate on several developing nations that can affect not only their surrounding regions but also emerging geopolitical unions, to the benefit of U.S. security interests. Pivotal states might include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey.⁵ For Turkey, its location on the Eurasian landmass—at the ethnic, religious, economic and military crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia—give it heightened importance as a U.S. strategic and security partner. This fact was emphasized when President Clinton declared,

A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey has supported U.S. efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, the NIS and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world’s most sensitive regions is critical.⁶
This paper looks at different aspects of the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership and its effect on the two countries' short-term and long-term security interests. It also examines the intensity of the factors that drive the two nations into a strategic alliance and those that could put them into opposite sides of future issues.

FIGURE 1. TURKEY AND THE SURROUNDING AREA

BACKGROUND

The direct relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire dates from the first quarter of the 19th Century when U.S. presence in the Mediterranean began to expand eastward, driven by the lure of fortune and the interest of bases in the Levant. Although constructive for its time, early political relations faltered, in large part because of popular American interest for Greek national aspirations and a reluctance to join in the struggle for Russian containment in eastern Mediterranean areas. Nonetheless, economic ties developed steadily through the turn of the century, based to a great extent on the export of American oil to the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant before 1900.

Following U.S. entry into World War I, contact with the Ottoman Empire was severed and not fully restored with the new Republic of Turkey until the late 1920s. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the modern state of Turkey from the post-World War I Ottoman Empire. In place of the Ottomans' deep Muslim traditions, Atatürk created a secular republic with close ties to the West. He brought a strong Turkish national spirit to its citizens, replacing the multinational character of the Ottoman state. To accomplish this, he adopted a stringent
secularism—Kemalism— whereby the government maintained control over religious institutions and teachings while strictly limiting public displays of devoutness. Atatürk replaced Sharia (Islamic law) with European legal codes; he abolished religious schools and courts and set up secular institutions; he substituted Latin script for Arabic script; purged the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian words; and most significantly, abolished the Islamic Caliphate. Under strict Kemalism, all citizens were expected to subordinate other identities to their Turkish one. This gave the Turkish people and their politics a deeply nationalistic, introverted tone that dominated Ankara’s foreign policy for decades.

Turkish neutrality during World War II guaranteed that bilateral ties would remain at a modest level through 1945, after which Turkey emerged as a major participant in the early years of the Cold War. Many historians will argue the Cold War and its strategy of containment had its origin in the eastern Mediterranean with the Truman Doctrine and the United States’ commitment to strengthen the “Northern Tier” of Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan as a bar to Soviet adventurism in the Middle East. It is from this perspective that American policy makers defined the initial strategic worth of Turkey—as a limited regional ally—yet never as an equal, strategic friend.

The perception that Turkey has long been overlooked and ignored at the political level in the United States is an enduring feeling among the Turkish elite and the politically active military leaders. The 1964 “Johnson Letter” warning against a Turkish move against Cyprus, and the U.S. arms embargo of 1975-1978, imposed following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, are still vivid in Turkish minds as examples of Turkey seeking to advance its vital interests while its Western “ally” withheld decisive support. The awareness that it was a second-class partner created a Turkish paranoia that weakened its relationship with the outside world and restrained Ankara from actively supporting Washington’s policies prior to the 1990s.

The Gulf War was a turning point in Turkey’s involvement with the United States. Against the advice of most of his advisors, Turkey’s President Turgut Özal sided with America in the war, allowing the United States to fly sorties against Iraq from Turkish bases. Additionally, Özal shut down the Kirkuk-Yumurtlik pipeline as part of the effort to impose sanctions against Iraq. President Özal’s action was an important departure from Turkey’s long-established policy of avoiding deep involvement in Middle East affairs and signaled a desire to return to the world stage. In time, the success of the Gulf War allowed Özal to initiate a new program of greater activism in Turkish foreign policy that moved Turkey closer to America’s security inner circle.
It wasn’t until the mid-1990s that Turkey lifted its veil of paranoia and began to demonstrate more and more self-confidence as an international actor. By the end of the decade, Ankara’s foreign policy began to evolve in new and important ways with significant consequence to Turkey’s political orientation. Today, Turkey has emerged as a capable and active trans-regional power poised to play an important role in the U.S. relationship with Russia, the Middle East, the emerging European security architecture, and the development of new energy resources. Yet, at the same time, due to complicated internal stresses, the hesitance of Europe to offer full European Union (EU) membership, and a resurgence of nationalism, Ankara is very cautiously re-evaluating its long-standing position as a Western-oriented nation and is considering a move away from any deep U.S. friendship. As a result, Washington has a strong national interest in pairing with Ankara as a strategic partner in order to advance U.S. policies and approaches to some of the most unstable regions of the world.

AREA S OF MUTUAL INTERESTS

At the level of general regional aims, American and Turkish interests are largely similar. Ankara and Washington speak in common terms about the need for peace, stability and economic development in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Eurasia. As such, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has come to play a key role in numerous U.S. security initiatives and approaches to include: 15

- asserting a pro-western influence and non-Russian/non-Islamic lines of communication for the Turkic States of the former Soviet Union
- providing a forceful, anti-separatist advocate of Bosnia and Kosovo and participant in Balkan peacekeeping
- serving as a pace setter in Muslim world normalization with Israel
- providing a strong supporter for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
- offering an alternative to Russia and Iran as an outlet for Caspian Sea energy resources
- offering an ideological counterweight to fundamentalist Iran
- offering a unique example of democracy and secularism in the Muslim world
RUSSIA

Every serious student of history recognizes the importance of a significant role for Russia in the building of a new international order without encouraging it into its historic patterns.\(^\text{16}\)

—Henry Kissinger

America's relations with Russia have always been complex. In the nineteenth century, America regarded Russia as the picture of European autocracy; after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, it was perceived as a radical, dangerous state. Consequently, the United States did not establish formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the beginning of 1934—and did so only as a barrier to the growth of Fascism.\(^\text{17}\) By mid-century, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union gave rise to a feeling of goodwill that lasted until the end of World War II. It wasn't until Stalin's political maneuvering and the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe that American-Soviet interaction turned hostile. For the next forty years their strategic rivalry dominated a bipolar world. With the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the USSR, the relationship changed again to form a bond weakened by mutual suspicion, dominated by the United States.\(^\text{18}\)

Today, Russia continues to play a significant role in almost all U.S. decisions concerning its foreign policy. As a result, the United States maintains an active partnership with Russia, seeking to expand areas of cooperation and effectively work through differences. Washington continues to support Moscow's political and economic transformation and integration into major international organizations while limiting its ability to extend domestic influence to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.\(^\text{19}\) U.S. strategy towards Russia is best described as a combination of engagement and containment—and Turkey has much to contribute to this approach.

A key element of Ankara's emerging foreign policy is developing the economic and diplomatic opportunities inside the Newly Independent States of the Caucasus and Central Asia—contrary to Russian desires to regain influence over the Muslim areas of their former empire. This creates a clash of political agendas between Moscow and Ankara that concerns policy makers both inside and outside Turkey. Memories of the Ottoman Empire fighting thirteen wars with czarist Russia, and loosing most of them, are strong. Accordingly, Turks retain a healthy respect for Russian power and Russia's ability to bounce back after periods of weakness and looks to the U.S. for support.\(^\text{20}\) The U.S. partnership provides Turkey the buffer it needs to prevent potential Russian reactions limiting Ankara's political efforts. This in turn
lessens the ability of Moscow to dominate lines of communication to the NIS—a U.S. strategic aim.

Through Ankara's actions, Washington attains its goal of enhancing the NIS's independence from Moscow while reorienting them toward the West. Just as important, the close relationship with Turkey allows the U.S. to temper Turkish actions in the NIS to ensure Russian security concerns are considered—an important measure in preventing Moscow from returning to its historical aggressive and expansionist patterns. By moderating the Russia-Turkey relationship, Washington can also advance its interest in reducing the need for Russia and the former Soviet states to retain large quantities of conventional and strategic weapons, having a second-order effect on global counter-proliferation efforts. Finally, the Turkish relationship can help Washington contain the growth of Russian military power by deterring Ankara from developing more extensive contacts with Russia over military sales and transfer of technology.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Caspian Basin and the surrounding states of the Caucasus and Central Asia have crept from obscurity onto the U.S. foreign policy agenda. While the individual countries of the two regions may not be of vital interest to the United States, the countries that border them are. Four have nuclear weapons, one is an important NATO ally, and two are states that have posed direct challenges to U.S. security by their support for terrorist movements.21

—Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institute

Among the many effects of changes in the international situation, the ending of Soviet rule in Central Asia and the Caucasus was one that attracted most attention since it produced new regional players that had been absent from international politics since the late 19th century, or longer. Five independent, weak and isolated republics were re-established in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan and a whole new “Muslim world” opened in the Caucasus.

Immediately, Washington acknowledged its interest in seeing the countries of these regions succeed in becoming strong, stable and independent states with free market economies and democratic institutions—which in turn produced a strong reaction from Russia. Russia’s southern tier is now its most sensitive frontier and the Caucasus and Central Asia are a number one security priority.22 Prior to September 11, some in Moscow portray the United States as purposefully weakening Russia’s strategic position in order to establish Central Asia and the Caucasus as U.S. outposts. Moscow interprets any direct U.S. involvement with the two
regions as a potential threat to the security interests of Russia and her Federation. Where American policy makers speak of intervention in a positive sense— to promote regional cooperation and stability—Russian political commentators speak of American "vmeshatel'stvo"—literally, interference or "butting in"—to constrain Russia. With America’s actions in Afghanistan, this feeling has gained considerable momentum inside the Kremlin. Consequently, with the prospects of extended U.S. military presence in Central Asia increasingly likely, Russia has revived a three-year-old proposal to tie India and China in a trilateral power axis, first suggested by Yevgeni Primakov in 1998.

Notwithstanding Russian anxieties, a number of developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia underscore the need for the United States to pay close attention to the area. Both the Caucasus and Central Asia are rapidly becoming bases for extremism and terrorism, drug and weapons trafficking, and ethnic conflicts—the potential for instability could lead to the regions’ "Afghanicization." It is therefore vital that the U.S. develop effective approaches, using Turkey’s influence, to bring stability and project a favorable impression of American actions in the region.

In the initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey sought to expand its ties to the new countries of Central Asia with the expectation it could become the unofficial leader of a Pan-Turkic community. Motivations were based on cultural and historical legacies as well as modern political and economic practicalities. In a world in which ethnic identities are seen as the foundation of modern statehood, Turkey saw itself as being in a unique and important position to directly influence the progress of the new states. Turkey even opened cultural centers and Turkic schools in most of the Central Asian states and provided training and technical assistance for thousands of Central Asian students. Ankara also expanded its television broadcasts in an effort to extend its cultural influence in Central Asia. However, because Ankara underestimated both the cost of implementing the plan, as well as the influence Russia retained over the region, its initial efforts had mixed results and follow-on efforts are losing momentum.

Though Turkish relations with Central Asia slowed, Ankara strengthened its position in the Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan both share Turkey's concerns about Russia's re-emergence as a trans-regional power. And Turkey and Georgia have cooperated to launch a joint initiative to create a South Caucasus Stability Pact designed to fund reconstruction of the region and advance the area’s integration into the European and transatlantic communities. Suffice to say, Turkey has established itself as a major actor—if not a legitimate power—in the region.
With Turkey’s active participation and pro-Western influence, U.S. support of Turkish actions will bring significant progress toward Washington’s objective of producing stable, democratic, and prosperous societies in the Caucasus and Central Asia, without direct involvement that could hurt bilateral U.S.-Russian relations.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

*European stability is vital to our own security... we seek a relationship that will benefit current, and the potential future, members of [NATO and the EU], and we intend to remain fully engaged, both politically and militarily.*

—National Security for a Global Age

The enlargement of NATO and its partners, and the growth of new Alliance missions—most of which are likely to be performed outside the traditional NATO area—have redefined the European security areas of interest. In the new European environment, the most prominent risks are on Europe’s southern periphery. In fact, contingencies on Turkey’s borders, or nearby, now represent the “bulk of the scenarios against which NATO plans.”

*Risks in Turkish relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria are part of these contingencies, as is the potential for spillover of refugees and instability in the Caucasus. Should Russia move to challenge United States and Western security interests in the future, it may do so on the European periphery—in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, or the Middle East—rather than in Eastern Europe where geopolitical changes will be difficult to overthrow.*

Therefore, it would seem current European and future EU security interests would focus in and around Turkey. Yet the opposite is true. Because Turkey is only a candidate for membership to the EU and because of the growing sensitivity by several European nations to inheriting regional instabilities imposed by Turkey having borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria, Europe has been slow to integrate Ankara in any security agreement beyond the NATO Alliance. As such, Turkey’s role in an expanded EU security space is becoming less clear. This is contrary to U.S. desires to ensure Turkey remains anchored to the West through full membership in the EU. In Washington’s view, only through full integration—resulting in a strong Western-oriented Turkey—can long term U.S. priorities involving Russia, the Middle East, the NIS, and Greek-Turkish relations (Cyprus) succeed.

Despite the move forward in Turkish-EU relations, in the eyes of many Turkish government officials, the indifferent response to Turkey’s bid for EU membership weakened Atatürk’s claim that Turkey’s future lies solely in the West. Washington believes Turkey’s security position will fade without Europe, causing Ankara to take one of two courses of action.
First, if Europe is not inclined to give Turkey, even as a EU “candidate,” more than a marginal say in its foreign and security policy, Ankara will lose leverage in its ability to maintain its approaches to Russia and the Caucasus/Central Asia regions—triggering it to retreat once again from the international political scene while reducing its ability to advance Washington’s policies. This will cause Washington to expend its own, scarce political capital to attain security aims and contribute to deeper discord between Europe and the U.S. On the other hand, the absence of a legitimate role in European security, coupled with Ankara’s new foreign policy assertiveness and nationalism, may cause Turkey to abandon the West altogether and push Ankara toward an Eastern security alliance with either Russia or Iran. Although this would not happen overnight, certainly the second and third order effects of this outcome would be troubling to future U.S. security initiatives. Either way, the United States has a strong incentive to engage and support Turkey’s full integration in a close European Community-Turkish association and EU membership.

THE BALKANS

_We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or central Europe, or any other place, if someone comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is in our power to stop it, we will stop it._

—President William J. Clinton

America’s intervention in the Balkans is notable in there is no traditional notion of national interest at stake—in the sense that the outcome can in no way directly affect the security of the U.S. Yet, America still responded in the Balkans. It did so because of “powerful domestic pressure to alleviate undeniable human suffering” and because it firmly believed continuing unrest in the Balkans might spread to Macedonia and engulf Turkey and Greece in a new phase of their old hostility. America’s continuing security strategy seeks to stabilize the region to allow economic reform, ethnic reconciliation, and democratization to take hold in order to build a whole and free Europe as envisioned by the Marshall Plan, some fifty years ago. Yet, America’s involvement is an expensive endeavor that uses enormous military, political, and economic resources.

For Turkey, the Balkans is a strategic link and a “land bridge” to Western Europe. “Two and a half million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe and more than half of Turkish foreign trade is conducted with that region.” Additionally, as part of the Ottoman legacy, many Turks have “Balkan” roots—family lineage tracing back to the region. This creates a strong Turkish interest in Balkan developments, especially in securing regional stability in order to guarantee
easy and unhindered land access to Western Europe. As a result, activism in the Balkans has been a part of Turkey’s own goal of full assimilation into Europe. Early in the conflict, Ankara played a key role in brokering an accord between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which resulted in the establishment of a Muslim-Croat Federation. This led to Turkey and Croatia developing close relations, demonstrating to the world the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a straightforward war between Christians and Muslims—and easing tensions with Greece. Ankara continues to pursue a dynamic, positive policy, normalizing relations with key neighbors such as Bulgaria, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and adopting a multi-lateral approach to regional stability (i.e., through participation in IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR; and by authorizing the use of airbases in Thrace during the latter stages of Operation Allied Force).  

Although suspect at first, Turkish policy towards the Balkans turned out to be almost entirely similar to U.S. strategies. Ankara favors maintaining Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity and supports increased political autonomy—but not independence—for Kosovo. Most important, to some extent, Turkey’s active participation as a Muslim state gives legitimacy and removes suspicion of Western efforts in the region by other Islamic states. Accordingly, lasting stability in the Balkans is tied closely to Turkish deference and Ankara’s willingness to work as a partner rather than as an independent Muslim entity. With Greek-Turkish relations remaining a wildcard, continued strong U.S.-Turkey relations will keep the Balkan stabilization process moving in a positive direction with minimal chance of tensions spreading farther south—reinforcing Washington’s objective of creating a stabilized region allied firmly with Europe.

THE MIDDLE EAST

*Instability in the Middle East carries profound dangers. It can threaten the security of close friends and partners such as Israel and Egypt and the GCC states. It can threaten our NATO partners in Europe. It can threaten our ability to protect vital oil supplies from the Gulf. It can bring new outbreaks of terrorism to our shores. And it can fuel a race to acquire weapons of mass destruction.*

—Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

U.S. interests are heavily engaged in the Middle East as it pursues a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace that will ensure the security and well-being of Israel, help its Arab partners provide for their own security, and maintain worldwide access to critical energy sources.” Since the end of the Gulf War, Turkey has become a more active regional actor in
the Middle East, specifically in regard to Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Iran. Arguably, the most important example of Turkey's new activism in the Middle East, and a direct link to U.S. security, has been its growing relationship with Israel.

**Israel**

Commitment to Israel has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel's creation. Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic and cultural ties as well as mutual interests. Continuing economic and security assistance to Israel acknowledges these ties and signals U.S. commitment. Turkey's search for new economic partners and desire to keep pressure on its unfriendly neighbors contributes to this approach.

Turkey and Israel signed two military cooperation agreements in February and August 1996. From its point of view, Turkey considers a relationship with Israel as a military and diplomatic imperative with three main objectives. First, it adds a new factor to the Middle East equation while increasing Turkey's leverage in its efforts to emerge as a global actor. Secondly, it allows Turkey to acquire advanced military technology from Europe and the United States—via Israel—that might otherwise be restricted because of its human rights record and policy toward Cyprus. Third, some Turks hope the cooperation will enable Ankara to export the political clout of the Israeli lobby in Washington and counter the influence of the Greek and Armenian lobbies on Capitol Hill, which has blocked economic assistance to Ankara. From Washington's perspective, the Turkish-Israeli cooperation advance U.S. security interests by serving as:

- A model of regional normalization between Israel and a Muslim-majority state
- An opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation, enhancing Israeli and Turkish security and increasing weapons interoperability for US forces at times of regional crisis
- A source of pressure on Syria's peace process policies
- A potential means for the executive branch to bypass Congress in supporting Turkey
- A potential nucleus for pulling together other pro-US states, such as Jordan, into a wider Middle Eastern regional security regime
- An enhancement of Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union that will open the prospect of new avenues of Israeli cooperation among states friendly to the United States.
The United States has every reason to encourage further development of Turkish-Israeli cooperation providing other regional interests are unaffected. As long as the Turkish-Israeli relationship promotes Washington’s goals for a Middle East peace plan on terms favorable to U.S. security objectives without provoking the Arab states into a united and effective opposition to its policies on other vital issues, the relationship will receive active U.S. support. Inevitably, Turkish-Arab friction will be a by-product of the Israeli relationship.

**Syria**

United States security objectives involving Syria center on moving Damascus to abandon its support of terrorist activities while getting it to actively participate in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Turkish and U.S. approaches to Syria are also similar, although, as with Russia, Ankara is more suspicious and has historically pressed for a harder line on Syria. U.S.-Syrian relations, severed in 1967, were resumed in June 1974, following the achievement of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Yet, Washington continues to have serious differences with Damascus. Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list’s inception in 1979 and because of its continuing support and safe-haven for terrorist organizations, Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions, and is ineligible to receive most forms of U.S. aid or to purchase U.S. military equipment. Regrettably, this approach has not produced the desired change to Syrian policies, so the United States looks to influence Turkish responses to Syrian actions as indirect leverage to advance Washington’s security agenda.

From Turkey’s view, Syrian remains a security threat that must be dealt with from a position of strength. Syria’s claim on the Turkish province of Hatay, which was ceded to Turkey by the colonial French authorities in Syria in 1919; Syrian demands for a more equitable sharing of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and especially Syrian support for the militant Kurdish Separatist group, PKK, have led to tensions in relations between Ankara and Damascus. As a response, Turkey keeps a large military force on their shared border. When combined with the Turkish-Israeli defense cooperation to present Syria a potential two-front threat to its borders, Damascus has been persuaded to modify some policies. Syria’s concern about Turkish-Israeli cooperation and Ankara’s large standing military has probably encouraged it to engage in direct peace talks with Israel. Additionally, Damascus expelled Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, in 1998, resulting in PKK attacks from Syria virtually ceasing. The Turkish pressure, and follow-on change in Syrian policies, has sent a hopeful sign to Western
policy makers that Damascus might, in the future, be willing to rethink its position on state sponsored terrorism.

It would be premature, however, to conclude the United States can rely exclusively on Turkish actions to advance its security policies involving Syria. For example, U.S. actions to get Syria to commit to Arab-Israeli peace raise a number of concerns in Ankara that could affect U.S. relations. First, Turkey does not want to be pressured to provide Syria with additional amounts of Euphrates water so that Jerusalem and Damascus can more easily solve their water disputes. Second, Turkey does not want Syrian troops currently concentrated in the Golan Heights cease-fire line to redeploy to the Turkish border. As a result, Washington will have to work very closely with Ankara to advance U.S. policies while balancing Turkish security concerns.

Jordan

Relations between the U.S. and Jordan have been close for four decades. A primary objective of U.S. policy on Jordan, particularly since the end of the Gulf War, has been Jordan’s participation in a comprehensive Middle East peace process. Additionally, U.S. policy seeks to reinforce Jordan’s commitment to peace, stability, and moderation in the region. The peace process and Jordan’s opposition to terrorism parallel and indirectly assist wider U.S. security interests for the region. In exchange, America helps Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity through economic and military assistance and close political cooperation.

Turkey has quietly strengthened ties with Jordan by establishing a military cooperation agreement with Amman similar to the one it established with Tel Aviv. In late 1996, Turkey and Jordan agreed to hold joint exercises and conducted bilateral training for their pilots in winter and desert conditions. Turkey also agreed to help Jordan strengthen its defense industries. Through cooperation with Turkey—and Turkey’s relationship with Israel--Jordan can indirectly participate in the Arab-Israeli peace process while remaining relatively low-key. This is critical in order to ease the concerns of other Arab governments who fear Jordan is being pulled into a strategic alliance with Israel and the United States. At the very least, Turkey’s relationship with Jordan has helped one more Arab nation to support Western efforts to bring stability and moderation to the Middle East.
MILITARY COOPERATION

Never lose sight of this maxim, that you should establish your cantonments at the most distant and best protected point from the enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will have time to unite your forces before he can attack you.

—The Military Maxims of Napoleon

Freedom of Action

Beyond Turkey's potential to play a positive role in regions of importance to U.S. strategy, the United States has an interest in Turkey becoming a direct contributor to U.S. freedom of action in adjacent regions. This aspect of the relationship was shaped during the Gulf War and has remained an important, though controversial, aspect of relations.

Despite concerns in Ankara that the end of the Cold War would reduce Turkey’s strategic importance, Turkey has become even more central to planning for projection of military power. The U.S. has a great desire to see Turkey as a base for air operations and logistical support of ground operations into nearby areas. “Bases such as Incirlik, in Southern Turkey, are actually closer to the northern Gulf than facilities in the Arabian Peninsula.” As United States strategy becomes more expeditionary in nature, a northern route for power projection in the Gulf will rely on Turkey, Israel and Jordan. Additionally, Turkey has a variety of bases that might be useful for contingencies in the Balkans, the Caucasus, or Central Asia. And as America’s war on terrorism expands, Ankara’s support and influence will be critical to obtain staging, C2 facilities, and over-flight rights throughout the region. In addition to utilization of Turkish bases, future operations will require Washington to look for direct military participation from friends and allies in the region as a way to share the burden of fighting a global war.

Past experience leads Washington to believe Ankara has no wish to be a power projection partner. But the rise of conventional and unconventional risks in the regions adjacent to Turkey is proving to be of a sort that Ankara cannot counter alone, even with its ongoing military modernization program. With the Balkans as a start, future trans-regional contingencies in the area could see a more active Turkish military contribution. Indications from operations in Afghanistan are proving this to be true, as Ankara offered to deploy special operations forces as part of combat operations and will lead the second iteration of post-conflict security operations. The use of Turkey’s large and staunchly pro-Western military in regional hotspots will support Washington in its attempt to bring Western values and limit Russian excursions—and requisite build-up of military forces—to Eurasian and Central Asian areas of interest to the United States.
Ballistic Missile Defense

One of the most direct and serious threats to U.S. security, and the security of its friends and allies, is the potential use or threat of use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons delivered by ballistic or cruise missiles. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, diplomacy, deterrence, and defense, including missile defense, are all part of the U.S. national security strategy to address this threat.46 The regions neighboring Turkey pose one of the greatest challenges to the global nonproliferation effort. Publicly available U.S. intelligence estimates that during the next fifteen years,..."new intercontinental ballistic missile threats will probably emerge from Iran and possibly from Iraq. In addition, Iranian and Libyan programs will have the ability to reach European and Middle East countries." 47 Assuming the trend continues, it will be a matter of time before U.S. territories are threatened--the prime reason why Washington is committed to building a ballistic missile defense system.

There is much opposition to the U.S. initiative. Russia, China and Europe have all criticized U.S. efforts, fearing such a system would promote nuclear proliferation and give cause for America to withdrawal from world affairs. Turkey is one nation that has not openly disapproved of Washington’s efforts. As noted earlier, the Turks have few friends in the world and they have not received much sympathy from many of their NATO allies over the growth of the ballistic missile threat in the Middle East. Yet, Washington recognizes the significance of Turkey’s concern over possible weapons of mass destruction in the hands of unfriendly neighbors, and has responded with military and intelligence support.48 Turkey’s vulnerability and its strategic location give Washington incentive to invite Turkey to participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program— revitalizing the effort to build international support for the project.

In the near-term, Turkey can play a critical role, not only for its own defense but also as part of a coordinated group with Europe, the United States, and friendly regional states such as Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. For its own defense and the defense of U.S. forces and friends in the area, anti-tactical missile systems could be based in Turkey or its territorial waters. As part of a missile defense architecture for Europe, early warning systems could be placed in Turkey, as well as some other Middle Eastern countries. Some of the systems for intercepting longer-range missiles launched against Western Europe could also be stationed in Turkey—an arrangement that would reinforce Turkish defense ties with both NATO and emerging EU security institutions.
War on Terrorism

The terrorist attacks that took place in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 have been a major shock to the international community. While causing unprecedented condemnation and the unwavering determination of the international community to bring those responsible to justice, these attacks showed the dimensions of terrorism and the need for international solidarity and common effort to combat it.

In the aftermath of the attacks, Turkey expressed its unequivocal solidarity with the United States and responded quickly to its call to join in the international coalition to bring to justice the organizers of the attacks. In this context, Turkey opened its airspace to U.S. military transport aircraft participating in operation “Enduring Freedom”, issued a blanket clearance for landing to and take off from a number of Turkish airfields, and offered to deploy ground forces to Afghanistan.

As a country that has suffered from terrorist violence brought by the PKK, Turkey condemned the attacks and called for intensified international cooperation for the prevention of a recurrence. Turkey was instrumental in convincing several nations to join the U.S. led coalition and was key to getting the United Nations to adopt Security Council Resolution 1373, which provides a comprehensive outline for combating terrorism on a universal scale.

Having had to cope with an internal separatist movement for more than two decades, Ankara is well equipped with domestic legal instruments required to support Washington’s global effort and propagate those efforts to other regional states aligned with Turkey. Through a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements it has already seized the assets of several suspected terrorist organizations. In exchange for its support, Ankara will expect Washington to play a larger role in backing Turkish operations against the PKK. In the past, although generally supportive of Ankara’s actions, Washington has privately criticized moves against the PKK as violating the human rights of the Kurdish ethnic minority. More important than providing military support or seizing assets, Washington will need Ankara’s influence and backing as a Muslim-majority state to convince enemies of the U.S.-led coalition not to turn the Global War on Terrorism into a perceived war of Christians against Muslims.
ENERGY SECURITY

The United States depends on oil for about 40% of its primary energy needs, and roughly half our oil needs are met with imports. And although we import less than 15% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf...for some years the United States has been undergoing a fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East oil.

—A National Security Strategy For a Global Age

The Persian Gulf is the critical region in meeting the world’s oil needs and without alternative sources, dependence on the Persian Gulf will continue to grow as demand for energy increases in Asia – particularly China and India. For the United States, energy consumption is expected to grow by 1.3% annually. By the year 2015, 34% of North American oil imports will come from the Gulf. With this much dependence on Gulf oil, America is searching hard to find and secure alternative sources of energy.

The end of Soviet rule opened the large oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Basin to international development. Although early expectations the region could rival the Middle East as a source of energy have been scaled down, the Caspian Basin’s proven reserves are about the same as those of the North Sea about double those of the North Sea in natural gas. To date, only 10% of the area has been fully searched for proven reserves. Possible reserves have been put at 160 billion barrels (or more) and 17.6 trillion cubic meters respectfully which, if proven, would amount to 15% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 12% of its gas reserves. Consequently, transport of Caspian oil to the West is now an important strategic interest for the United States since it will help to diversify the West’s energy sources and lessen somewhat America’s dependence on the Middle East as well as spread Washington’s influence to areas formerly under communist control. From the U.S. perspective, developing the Caspian Basin enhances the following national interests:

- Diversifies the world’s energy supplies, to include reducing the over-dependence on the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf
- Excludes Iran from any access to the economic benefits of regional development
- Strengthens the sovereign independence of Azerbaijan and the Newly Independent States
- Advances U.S. economic interests in the region

Yet, strategic rivalries stand in the way of attaining Washington’s goals. Russia and Iran want to retain their control on export routes out of the basin. Russia wants any future route to traverse territory under their control as part of its strategy to influence the former Soviet
Republics and regain global standing. Iran wants a north-south oriented pipeline to the Persian Gulf to add to its already considerable control of world oil reserves. Therefore, the method and location for transporting oil out of the Caspian Basin carries significant strategic weight. Clearly, the U.S. wants to break Russia’s monopoly on export routes while completely bypassing Iran on any route.

Essentially, there are five options for Caspian oil export and all involve the construction of overland pipelines. The first option, a northern route already on line, is favored by Russia. According to this option, Kazakhstan would expand its existing pipelines and link them to the existing Russian network while an Azerbaijan built pipeline connects to Novorossiisk, Russia. Opposition to this option surrounds the fear of allowing Russia to control all of the pipelines leaving the Basin. Azerbaijan and Georgia propose a second option that would use a western route to bring oil to the Georgian port of Soupsa where it would be shipped through the Black Sea and the Bosporus to Europe. Turkey insists the straits cannot cope with increased tanker traffic and has adamantly opposed this option as well as any other option which makes the Bosporus a key transit point.

**FIGURE 2. OPTIONS FOR EXPORT OIL PIPELINES**

As an alternative to using the Bosporus, Georgia and Greece proposed a third option to construct a cut-off pipeline running from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to Alexandroupolis on the Greek Aegean coast. With this route, tankers would load oil in Novorossiisk or Soupsa and
discharge in Burgas. Other tankers would then re-load in Alexandroupolis to carry the oil to world markets. In order to by-pass the Black Sea entirely, a fourth option offers a southern route from Baku through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Economically, this is the most viable option, since Iran already has an extensive pipeline system, and the Gulf is a good exit to Asian markets. The United States, however, has vetoed this option.

As a fifth option, the United States and Turkey propose to construct an east-west pipeline from Baku to the port of Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Excessive costs (around $2.9 billion) and security concerns—this route would pass through unstable Kurdish territory—make this option difficult to implement. Yet, this option best suits U.S. strategic goals. Washington knows this strategy will keep at least one export route outside Russia’s sphere of influence and prevents Iran from gaining any economic benefit from Azerbaijani and Kazak oil production.

Turkey is an integral part and strong supporter of the U.S. option. Prior to the Caspian Basin discoveries, Ankara was heavily dependent on Iran, Iraq and Russia for its sizeable oil and natural gas needs. In order to promote its own energy security, Turkey wants to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and has committed the monetary resources to ensure its completion. Not only will the pipeline diversify both U.S. and Turkish oil supplies in the near-term, it will also enhance Ankara’s own regional importance and leverage over the former Soviet states of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the long term, Turkey’s direct control over the main export route for Caspian oil will strengthen the U.S.-Turkey strategic alliance.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The growing strength in U.S.-Turkey relations is not without its conflicts. When examined in greater detail, there is significant divergence between Turkey and the U.S. in policy approaches to key areas. Important differences exist between Ankara and Washington on regional and religious issues in the region. For example, Ankara is more inclined toward a policy of engagement with Iraq—especially economic engagement—than the U.S. Also, Turkish and U.S. perspectives on Iran differ considerably. Whereas the U.S. has sought to isolate Iran, Turkey prefers a more open interstate relationship. Finally, internal Turkish stability and the rise of political Islam have placed an important obstacle between the two nations that could put Washington and Ankara on opposite sides of future issues. President Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric has exacerbated some of these concerns, as has the political rise of Istanbul’s Islamic mayor, Täyiip Erdoğan.
IRAQ

No problem of the past decade has created more tension in U.S.-Turkish relations than Iraq, and no problem currently carries more potential for damage to those relations. Formally, Ankara and Washington concur on the outlines of Iraq policy. Both say Baghdad should fulfill the terms of relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and both advocate maintenance of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Much in the same way they approach Russia, the United States and Turkey differ in their priorities and, in some cases, their objectives regarding Iraq.

Turkey’s three major policy goals in Iraq are prevention of the emergence of a Kurdish state—or a robustly autonomous Kurdish entity, expulsion of the PKK from northern Iraq—or better yet, reintegration of Iraqi Kurds into Iraq, and resumption of vigorous trade with Iraq, once one of Turkey’s leading export markets. The United States, by contrast, seeks Saddam Hussein’s removal, does not want the Iraqi Kurds to negotiate with Saddam, and favors Iraqi Kurdish unity—to the point it would “not oppose Kurdish autonomy within Iraq or a federated Iraq with a Kurdish component.”

From Ankara’s viewpoint, current U.S. policies are at odds with Turkish goals: U.S.-backed UN sanctions on Iraq prevent resumption of Turkish commerce with a natural trading partner. Also, in Turkey’s view, U.S.-led isolation of Iraq, implementation of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, efforts to unite northern Iraqi Kurds, and more recently, support for external Iraqi opposition groups, promote Kurdish separatism and the breakup of Iraq which would threaten Turkey’s own stability.

Most U.S.-Turkish differences over Iraq are not easily bridged, and will continue to fester until Saddam falls. Turkey clearly prefers a political negotiation in dealing with the Iraqi leadership, but knows it is restricted in its actions by the necessity of keeping good relations with Washington because of other vital Turkish interests such as the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, continued military cooperation, and American understanding of Ankara’s heavy-handed approach toward its internal Kurdish problem. Until resolved, the situation will continue to be a source of stress in U.S.-Turkish relations.

IRAN

Much like the United States, secular Turkey sees the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran as hostile and dangerous. Also like the United States, Turkey regards the emergence of Iranian President Khatami and his reform government as a hopeful but not yet decisive development.

Washington’s concerns about Iran are well founded and focus on three areas: support for terrorism; violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; and development of weapons of
mass destruction. Secondary American interests include human rights concerns, especially as they relate to Iran's religious minorities. 55

Iran's position is also well established: its government has consistently rejected direct diplomatic contacts with Washington while sanctions remain in place and while pre-revolutionary financial claims remain outstanding. Tehran also vigorously disputes the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and a host of American policies toward the region, past and present. 56

For Turkey, Iran is an ideological rival and threat. Over the years, Turkish officials have several times accused Iran of interfering in Turkey's internal affairs, hosting and supporting the PKK, and training "fundamentalist terrorists" to carryout attacks on Turkish secularists. Unlike the United States, however, Turkey is opposed to isolating Iran. Ankara especially wants good economic relations with Iran, which was one of Turkey's leading trading partners in the 1980s. 57 Turkey was displeased by the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996, calling for sanctions on states or corporate entities that invest more than $20 million in the Iranian energy industry. 58 Indeed, Turks seethed at the perception that Turkey once again, as with Iraq, was being asked to bear the economic brunt of what they saw as mainly a U.S. foreign policy problem.

Turkish relations with Iran have witnessed ups and downs over the last decade. Turkey policy makers, especially the Turkish military, remain wary of Iran because of the fundamentalist character of the Iranian regime and its support for international terrorism—yet these same leaders realize the most effective method for halting PKK attacks originating from sanctuaries inside Iran, is to engage Tehran. Additionally, Turkey's growing energy needs and desire to reduce Iranian influence in the Muslim and Turkic states of the former Soviet Union, also give Ankara a strong incentive to maintain good economic and diplomatic ties to Tehran—even if it causes Washington to impose sanctions on Ankara for violation the ILSA. Turkish-Iranian relations will continue to advance and as they go forward, clearly affect the atmosphere for strengthening U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations in the future.

ISLAM AND ISLAMISM

Because of the sensitivities of the Turkish secular elite, no issue in U.S.-Turkish relations is more delicate than Islam. The rise to power of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi or RP) and its leader Necmettin Erbakan in June 1996 sent shockwaves through the Turkish establishment and its Western Allies. For the first time in its history, a party and a leader who had openly publicized a deviation from the established norms of Kemalism governed Turkey. Political Islam had taken over the helm of a NATO member government.
Beginning at the local levels, secular functionaries were "methodically replaced with more loyal persons" to the RP. And there began a "dramatic increase of Islamic students applying for admission to Turkish universities."59 This was seen by Turkish military leadership as a systematic attempt to Islamicatize Turkey. At the beginning of 1997, a national debate regarding the introduction of Sharia took place within the government—in clear violation of the Turkish constitution. These events were followed closely by the military, which saw the situation disturbing enough to proceed to action through the powerful National Security Council.60 The result was the issuance of an ultimatum by the Council, and backed by the military, directing the government to cease all actions and policies not accepted by current constitutional laws supporting a secular government.

Described by many observers as a military "silent coup," it succeeded in eliminating the Welfare Party. However, the closure of the welfare party did not necessarily imply the Islamist movement was defeated. In fact, a growing demand for religious freedom has given rebirth to a new generation of anti-secular Islamists who are steadily rising in business and cultural elite circles. They are successfully building support to challenge the Turkish military over the need for enforcement of strict Kemalism—which raises several difficult issues for the United States.

There is considerable debate among United States government analysts as to whether Turkey’s Islamists are moderates or radicals, democrats or closet Sharia-ites, pro-western or anti-western. The answer to these questions is critical because Washington has always encouraged freedom of religion as a basic human right, but knows it may have to suppress this value in term of Turkey’s anti-secular movement—America is concerned a strong Islamist movement, with its inevitable anti-Western themes, is contrary to U.S. interests in Turkey. In recent years one of the most frequently asked questions by western publics and policy makers is whether Turkey could experience a radical Islamic revolution and join Iran as an adversary of American values and a threat to her security. The challenge for U.S.-Turkey relations is how to integrate Islam into Turkish politics without destabilizing the state.

OUTLOOK

World events have combined to give Turkey a new prominence in international politics and a higher profile in U.S. security affairs. After paying little attention to Ankara as a strategic security partner, globalization has made Washington realize the important role Turkey can play in future Western security strategies. With Turkey’s pursuit of global influence and the growing dissatisfaction with American actions by one time partners, Washington will have little choice but to expand and strengthen its alliance with Ankara.
If Washington is to succeed in bringing Moscow out of its financial ruin while containing Russian ability to revert to a pattern of domination, it will need Turkey's direct economic assistance, regional military presence, and influence with the states adjacent to the former USSR. If Washington is to bring a pro-Western influence and a non-Russian line of communication to the Turkic and Muslim states of the former Soviet Union, it will require Turkey's ethnic and cultural ties and political support. If there is going to be a solution to the long-running Balkan conflict, Turkey will have to be a key participant in all phases of negotiations and subsequent operations. If America is to contain Iraq and Iran, it will need Turkish military bases and Ankara's political willingness to accept the economic risks of the strategy. More importantly, it will need Turkey to demonstrate to the Muslim world that Islam and democracy can co-exist to create a stable nation.

If the United States is to exploit the oil reserves of the Caspian Basin to lessen its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, it will need Ankara's strong support—as well as international funds—to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline—and its cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan to secure the route. If America is to reduce the threat from ballistic missiles and other forms of WMD, it must start with Turkey in order to build international support for Washington's Ballistic Missile Defense initiative. Finally, if America is to secure a lasting peace and bring true stability to the Middle East, it will require direct Turkish participation to bring non-U.S. leverage to other regional actors while demonstrating that a Muslim-majority country can normalize relations with Israel.

In closing, Turkey is uniquely important to the United States. There is both tremendous potential and peril for U.S. interests, and by its actions, Washington can promote its interests or it can endanger them. As such, I propose five actions Washington should undertake to strengthen Turkish stability and improve U.S.-Turkish strategic security relations:

- First, bring the dictatorship in Iraq to an end. Turkey had enjoyed volumes of cross-border trade with Iraq, but this turned to a trickle when sanctions were imposed against Iraq in 1991. The decade-long economic crisis Turkey suffers due to the anti-Saddam embargo gets minimal international attention but gives further grounds for finishing today what the U.S. left earlier half done. With a co-operative regime in Baghdad, Ankara can take a big step in improving its weak economic position while eliminating one of the European Union's stated sensitivities to making Turkey a full EU member—not wanting to inherit the regional instabilities imposed by Turkey having borders with Iran and Iraq. To benefit Turkey, Ankara must be involved in all phases of the planning and execution of the "second" Iraqi campaign.
• Second, make Turkey a key stop for oil and gas from the Caspian and Central Asia. Turkey offers much-needed diversification of geopolitical risk. As discussed, the export pipelines might run in any combination of directions, but no one route is likely to furnish the West the security it requires. If Russia retains control of the only export route, Washington stakes too much on Moscow's stability and future allegiances. If Iran steps in, fundamentalist influence across a vast region will multiply. China, too, may someday tap Central Asian resources with pipelines of its own, but this presents another set of issues.

• Third, a generous—but intelligent—package of fiscal support must be directed to Turkey over the medium-term future. Turkey, in February 2001, entered its most severe fiscal crisis in a generation. Collapse of the lira triggered a catastrophic sell-off on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, and the country is still reeling in the aftermath. Turkey faces the fiscal burden of a substantial national debt, and the global economic recession intensifies the crisis. It would be very risky for the U.S. position, if the Turkish economy failed to come back to life, at the same time that Turkey was committing itself to military operations in Afghanistan. But absent a strategy for how resources should be used, money thrown at the problem likely will be wasted. A program of fiscal discipline should be made prerequisite to debt relief and further aide. However, the goal of U.S. support should allow Turkey to continue to move along the path it has set for itself in economic development. It is imperative the present fiscal crisis does not cause Turkey's economic progress to stall—carrying political ramifications with a reach far beyond the republic's borders.

• Fourth, accept political Islam as a natural phenomenon of Turkish society and Turkish political life. U.S. politicians and businessmen should develop normal contacts with representatives of political Islam by including them in seminars, symposiums, workshops, and other gatherings dealing with contemporary Turkish affairs. This will expose key Islamic delegates to the benefits and of an Islamic/democracy co-existence. These contacts must, however, be clearly distinguished from supporting Islamic ideologies.

• Fifth, promote Turkey's defense capabilities where necessary without contributing to an upgrade of its offensive capabilities—capabilities such as modernizing Turkey's main battle tank and increasing its number of attack helicopters. The regional military balance does not warrant helping Turkey upgrade military capabilities across the board. The U.S. will have to work closely with NATO and Israel on this matter.
Finally, make Turkey a full member of the EU. The European Union must do whatever it takes to show that it welcomes Turkey's participation in the European economic space. The Union made statements at Helsinki in 1999 that Turks took to mean a promise of EU membership---sooner rather than in the distant future. However, subsequent EU conduct has all but dashed hopes that Turkey will be fast-tracked into the EU. If Europeans are unwilling to bring Turkey in, then the United States should apply all appropriate pressure influence them.
ENDNOTES


3 The European Union, the Russo-Chinese "strategic partnership," Mercosur in Latin America, the Asian free trade zone, and the drive to build the authority of the United Nations Security Council are but a few examples.


5 Puckett, 391.


7 This was a continuation of the classical European balance of power strategy followed after the Treaty of Westphalia was implemented.

8 A reversal of today's reality in the supply of energy products--now oil and gas flows from the region to customers in the Far East, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

9 Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West After the Cold War (Santa Monica: Rand/Arroyo Center, 1992), 32.

10 Kemalism can be seen as the cause for Turkey's battle with the international community over its treatment of Turkey's ethnic Kurds and its Armenian minority. For a thorough discussion on Turkish-Armenian relations, see Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (London: Croom Helm, 1980). See William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000 (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000) for a discussion on the continuing Kurdish issue in and outside Turkey.

11 The term "Northern Tier" describes the northernmost Near and Middle Eastern countries on the border of—or near—the Soviet Union. For a complete discussion of the struggle for power between East and West along the Northern Tier, see Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).


13 Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 77.

14 Abramowitz, 155.


17 Ibid, 72.


22 Ibid.

23 Fuller, 60.

24 Hill.


27 Ibid.

28 The Pact would include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Russia, the EU and the United States. The Pact is designed to increase Turkey's profile in the region as well as enhance Western involvement in the area. By including other Western powers, as well as Russia, Turkey is seeking to legitimize Western involvement in the region while implicitly asking Russia to view the region as an area of international cooperation rather than as a potential Russian zone of influence.


32 For a good discussion of the history and implications of EU membership for Turkey, see Ian O. Lesser's testimony before the House International Relations Committee, European Subcommittee, 13 June 2001.

33 Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, 255.


35 Kramer, 149-154.


37 Clinton, A National Security Strategy For a Global Age, 58.

38 U.S. military sales to Turkey are tied to proportional sales to Greece via Congressional action. In order to obtain a larger share of U.S. defense equipment, Ankara is purchasing equipment from Israel after the IDF obtains a U.S. Presidential waiver to sell U.S.-origin technology. An effective method to counter the anti-Turkey lobbies in the United States.

39 Makovsky, 236.


41 Makovsky, 238-39.


43 Zalmay Khalilzad, et.al., ed., The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan (Arlington, VA: Rand Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2000), 72.

44 Ibid.
45 "News Analysis: Turkey Has Accepted a U.S. Request to Open a NATO Combined Air Operations Center Based in Eskisehir for Future U.S. Strikes," Global News Wire, 12 December 2001; available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=0ec1cccefab3b2d4f1af05a4169ce14f&_doc.htm; Internet, accessed 7 January 2002.


47 Ibid.


50 Zalmay Khalilzad, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan (Rand Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2000), 82.


53 Ibid, 145.

54 Makovsky, 231.


56 Ibid.

57 Kramer, 143.


The Turkish National Security Council includes the President, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as five high-ranking generals. The Council is a consultive body with the authority to make policy recommendations to the government. Military opinion on Council actions is important because on three occasions—in 1960, 1971, and 1980—the military intervened directly into governmental affairs to "protect" and "restore" democracy when civilian leadership seemed to be drifting from Atatürk's Kemalism.
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