STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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WARFIGHTING CENTER: NECESSARY TO MEET OUR NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Current National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and war plans require up to 8 National Guard enhanced Separate Brigades to be mobilized and deployed into a theater of operations within 140 days. If the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) scenario plays out the current number of post-mobilization training sites designated will not meet this strategy requirement. Thus, a review of the current and potential training sites needed to be preformed to determine the number of sites required and the best locations for these training areas. These post-mobilization training sites will be designated as Warfighting Centers. This paper will provide a short review of the evolution of the enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB), the current policy for mobilization, training and deploying of these eSB. I will also discuss the mission, description, and evaluation for selection of the Warfighting Center site and how they will be resourced with equipment, personnel, etc. Possible Courses of Action and recommendations on the Warfighting Center future will conclude this project.

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WARFIGHTING CENTERS: NECESSARY TO MEET OUR NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

"This is a far cry from the brigade's situation during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The brigade mobilized and spent three months at Fort Irwin, California, while officials debated whether we were combat ready. We said we needed 90 days to fully prepare for war. The Army kept telling us we were not ready. Much has changed. The advent of training-support brigades has helped us achieve more battle focus. Now we have the Army's brightest and best teaching, coaching and mentoring the reserve forces. It is a good relationship now as opposed to before." Colonel Tommy Stewart 48th enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) deputy commander.

To meet the RESPOND requirements of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS), the military must be able to conduct operations across the full spectrum of crisis, i.e. from humanitarian assistance to Major Theater War (MTW). With the downsizing of the active force and increased deployments and operational tempo (OPTEMPO), due to the multiple contingency operations, coupled with the Army transformation effort, i.e. developing the Interim Force by converting several heavy and light maneuver brigades to Interim Brigade Combat Teams has led to more reliance on the National Guard eSBs. Since those active forces committed in contingency operations and being transformed to IBCTs are not available for immediate deployment, the eSBs will backfill war plan Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). That being said, the eSBs are required in theater by the regional Warfighting Commander in Chief (CINC) sooner than the previous war plans directed. Therefore, does our current mobilization plan and structure allow the U.S. Army to provide trained and ready National Guard eSBs to the Warfighting CINC according to the war plans Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)?

To address this issue and to mitigate risk, the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DA, DCSOPS) has tasked Forces Command (FORSCOM) to explore the concept of developing Warfighting Centers to improve the mobilization process and decrease the number of days necessary for training prior to deployment to the theater. In addition, FORSCOM was tasked to determine the number and type (heavy/light) of Warfighting Centers necessary in order for the eSB to meet deployment windows established by the current war plans. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the value of the Warfighting Center in ensuring the National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) and the National Guard 's maneuver divisions meet their post-mobilization and deployment timelines. There will be a short review of the evolution of the National Guard eSB, the current policy for mobilization, pre/post mobilization

training model and deploying standards for the eSB, a description and evaluation of the Warfighting Centers concept, provide Courses of Action (COA), and concluding with a recommendation.

BACKGROUND

In order to determine why there is a need for Warfighting Centers we need to look at our National Security Strategy (NSS). In implementing our NSS we must enhance security at home and abroad, shape the international community, respond to threats and crises, and prepare for an uncertain future. In order to respond appropriately we must maintain the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of the enemies' objectives in two theaters, in close succession.[1] This two theater ability must also take into consideration the ability to transition to fighting major theater wars from peacetime engagements overseas as well as concurrent smaller scale contingency operations.[2] The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), dated September 30, 2001, further states that U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes.[3] To attain this two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) capability there is a critical reliance on the Combat Support/Combat Service Support from the Reserve and Combat maneuver forces from the National Guard, which contains over half of the total army combat force structure. Currently, these combat forces are formed into eight combat divisions and fifteen separate combat brigades, known as enhanced separate brigades (eSB).[4] These eSBs are apportioned for planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to the warfighting CINCs for incorporation into their war plans.

ENHANCED SEPARATE BRIGADE HISTORY

The following is a short history behind the development of the eSBs. In the early 1970s, the roundout brigade concept was introduced for several reasons. One reason was to increase the number of active duty divisions without increasing the Army's manpower strength.[5] One of the ways to increase the number of divisions within constant manpower ceilings was to structure the division with two active duty maneuver brigades and one reserve component, roundout unit, to bring the division to full strength upon mobilization.[6] Several other reasons were to save money and to improve the readiness and visibility of the reserve components. This concept was basically put to the test during Operation Desert Shield. For a variety of reasons none of the three roundout brigades, 155th eSB, roundout brigade for the 1st Cavalry Division, 256th eSB, roundout brigade for the 5th Infantry Division, and the 48th eSB, roundout for the 24th Infantry

Division, deployed with their active divisions. At the time of mobilization the 48th eSBs pre-mobilization Unit Status Report reflected C-2 and the 155th and 256th both reflected C-3, with a commanders assessment that it would take 40 days of training to be fully trained.[7] In all eSBs cases, the active Army trainers had to prepare ad hoc post-mobilization training plans calling for far more training days than envisioned by the eSB commanders.[8]

The 48th eSB deployed to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin. After completing the newly developed post mobilization training plan to standard, the 48th eSB was validated as ready for deployment, but that was not until 90 days after activation. After the intense training at the NTC, the eSB commander felt the unit strengths were small unit maneuver and tactics, troop enthusiasm and motivation. The weaknesses evolved around the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and orders processing, however, the biggest shortcoming identified throughout the entire mobilization was poor vehicle maintenance procedures.[9] This can be attributed to the reliance on maintenance and training equipment site (MATES) during weekend and annual training. The 48th eSB was not deployed to Southwest Asia; however, it was the only eSB of the three to be validated for deployment.[10]

The 155th and the 256th eSBs deployed to Fort Hood and Fort Polk respectively, their designated post-mobilization train-up site. The 155th eSB post-mobilization training was conducted at Camp Shelby, Fort Hood, Fort Carson and finally Fort Irwin. As with the 48th eSB, the unit strengths were in their individual through company weapons proficiency, motivation and enthusiasm. Their shortcomings were in the leader orders process, vehicle maintenance and logistics.[11] Neither of these eSBs were validated for deployment, however, they were projected to be validated 105 days and 135 days respectively, from the day of activation.[12]

In both cases, active duty combat forces played a significant role in helping the reserve component brigades prepare for deployment to the Persian Gulf. It is also very unlikely that there will be any active forces available for such support in the future. That being said, several initiatives came about as a result of the deployment to organize the National Guard to allow it the capability to be ready when needed. In 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy called Bold Shift. The strategy is based on improving peacetime training readiness, which will reduce post mobilization time. The strategy focuses on seven areas: the restructuring and realignment of active and reserve units, readiness assessments and exercises, unit training, soldier training, leader training, the involvement of affiliated active Army units in training, and the assignment of active Army advisers to the reserve components.[13] The Bold Shift initiative changes the focus from brigade, battalion, and company down to platoon level proficiency in individual skills, gunnery, etc.[14]

The 1993 Defense Planning Guidance and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review concluded that we could maintain a capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts and still make reductions in force structure as long as a series of critical force enhancements are implemented. One of these enhancements is the development of 15 Army National Guard eSBs.[15] The enhanced brigades are the strategic hedge against the two major regional conflict scenarios and will be used to reinforce or augment the active duty forces already deployed. However, they could be used to backfill or to support rotational mission requirements when Active duty units are committed out of theater.[16] These eSBs are organized and resourced, personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability and training, to be quickly mobilized, trained and deployed to regional conflicts within 90 days of mobilization. One of the best resources the eSBs attained was access to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). National Guard Bureau (NGB) and FORSCOM have developed a plan that every year one of the eSBs will attend each CTC, heavy units to Ft. Irwin and light to Ft. Polk. Therefore, each eSB will attend a CTC every eight years. Some additional resources gained was access to Ft. Leavenworth's Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST) followed by a Brigade Simulation Exercise every year the unit does not attend a CTC. The activation of two Integrated Divisions in 1999, has also greatly enhanced the readiness and performance of its associated eSBs by providing training readiness oversight and addition resources.

With the increased deployments and changing force structure during the transformation effort there has been a significant change to existing war plans. In fact, during the transformation process, selected eSBs are placed in the ready pool status for a 2-year period of time to fill the CINC's MTW force requirement shortfall created by active army brigades transforming.[17] Prior to transformation, eight eSBs were deploying to the second MTW within 140 days of mobilization.[18] The required number of eSB is going to increase and the deployment timeline will decrease due to the transformation process and development of Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). The former missions of the IBCT have been passed to other active units and the eSBs will be designated as backfill for those units.

One issue that has been mentioned several times prior and is one of the main bones of contention, is the length of the post mobilization training model. Various organizations, Director of Army Training, Army Inspector General, and the RAND Corporation, have predicted between 93 and 154 training days before being ready to deploy.[19] The range depends on peacetime training proficiency, single site vs. multiple site training requirements (not all mobilization sites have maneuver space to handle brigade-level exercises), etc. With the initiatives, such as Bold

Shift and increased resources to the eSBs, are there further initiatives that can be done to drive the post mobilization training time down to 90 days and below? I think there are.

WHY THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL POST MOBILIZATION TRAINING SITES

That being said, the prior FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 directed the mobilized eSBs to major post-mobilization training sites. These sites consisted of three heavy sites, Ft. Irwin, California, Ft. Hood, Texas, and Yakima, Washington. The light eSB would deploy to Ft. Polk, Louisiana.[20] A problem surfaced when the Secretary of Defense issued the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance directing that the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study be conducted. The RCE-05 study states that a principal constraint on the Army's ability to prepare and validate ARNG units for combat operations is the availability of major training sites suitable for large units such as battalion and brigade task forces, combined arms maneuver training, to include live-fire exercises. If additional sites could be established, the availability of brigade, and potentially division-sized units, could be accelerated. Accordingly, a review of additional post-mobilization training sites, beyond the four designated in outdated FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, will be conducted prior to February 2000.[21]

The current FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 dated 27 October 1999, dropped all previously designated post-mobilization training sites until completion of the study. Meanwhile, FORSCOM has been tasked by DA DCSOPS to reevaluate the number and location of these training sites. This reevaluation is due not only to the RCE-05 study, but due to the increased number of eSBs, eight eSBs in the first 140 days, deploying earlier in the TPFDD to fight the second MTW.

Since 1989, the number of Army deployments has grown over 300 percent, however, the active and reserve force structure has decreased by over 40 percent.[22] This has led to an increased reliance on the eSBs to backfill active forces that are deployed on contingency operations or identified/currently transforming into Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). This will continue throughout the Armies transformation process, i.e. 2030. For example, the first two IBCT units will not be deployable until Initial Operational Capacity (IOC) in May 2003. Current unit deployments involve the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) through at least May 2005 and include both active and reserve forces. SFOR 9 involved the 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart and the 48th eSB from the Georgia National Guard. SFOR 10 (Oct 2001 – Apr 2002) through SFOR 16 (Oct 2004 – Apr 2005) will all be National Guard Division Headquarters and SFOR 10 through SFOR 12 will also incorporate five of the 15 eSBs. KFOR 3A (Jun 2001 – Nov 2001) through KFOR 6B (Nov 2004 – May 2005) will consist primarily of active forces from III Corps, Fort Hood, the 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, V

Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, and the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, (10th Mountain Div, Fort Drum, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell).[23]

The above deployments coupled with the mandatory post-mobilization training for the eSBs requires thorough planning and resources. The pre-mobilization work up training at the NTC, mandated as part of Bold Shift, has provided excellent training experience for the eSBs. However, during post-mobilization the CINC cannot afford receiving an eSB every six weeks. As stated above, the TPFDD has eight eSBs deploying in the first 140 days. Therefore, FORSCOM has determined and submitted to DA DCSOPS six potential locations for training sites – known as Warfighting Centers.[24] Where will these Warfighting Centers be utilized during the Post-mobilization Training Model?

CURRENT POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING MODEL

The 1993 Bottom-up Review expressed the goal of having the eSBs ready to deploy within 90 days. The RAND training model, based on a detailed analysis of the steps necessary to prepare an eSB for combat, estimates 102 days which includes seven days for transportation.[25] This model assumes that the eSB are entering post-mobilization at the minimum training levels established by FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, 90 percent of personnel are present, qualified and stabilized by M +18 (Mobilization day +18), and equipment is fully operational by M +18.[26]

The objective of the post-mobilization training model is to formulate standards for validation of ARNG eSBs based on common deployment standards for active and National Guard brigades. This requirement is found in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) guidance, i.e. demonstrate proficiency on wartime mission essential task list (METL) and any external warfighting CINC directives and C-2 readiness level according to AR 220-1.[27] The intent of the model is to provide a tool for the planning and resourcing of post-mobilization training. It is not intended to be a prescriptive training plan, but a potential list of training events and timelines that are about right in conducting eSB post-mobilization training. It is based on a building block approach and the training can begin based on the commander assessment.[28]

The post-mobilization training model, Table 1, is divided into five categories within four stages: Initial preparation and movement to training site (Stage I), Individual, squad, platoon,

and gunnery training (Stage II), Task force organization and company training (Stage III),

eSB Training Model

Stage I Mob → Loaded	**Home Station:** Continue Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) Continue Cross Leveling of Resources Soldier/Crew/Section Training Move to Mobilization Station
Stage II Arrive → Certified	**Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station:** Complete SRP & Cross Leveling of Resources Gunnery Thru Table XII Platoon Lanes; Company Training Movement to Warfighting Center
Stage III Arrive → Verified	**Warfighting Center:** Company Lanes/Team Training Company CALFEX Bn & Bde Task Force Training/Operations
Stage IV Validated	**Deployment Preparation:** Maintenance Recovery Load Prep & Load

TABLE 1 - ESB TRAINING MODEL

Battalion task force and brigade level training (Stage III), and Maintenance, equipment services, and final preparation (Stage IV).[29]

Stage I: Initial preparation and movement to training site (Day 1 - 17)

This stage is conducted at Home Station and encompasses actions to speed transition to active duty. It includes receiving and integrating replacements in preparation for overseas movement activities, preparation of equipment and bringing it to mission capable standards, and movement of personnel and equipment to the mobilization station. At the beginning of this stage unit command transfers from the peacetime chain to the CONUSA. This stage allows 12 days for movement to the mobilization station, but in order for this stage to succeed it is essential that proper pre-mobilization equipment readiness exist.[30]

Stage II: Individual, squad, platoon, and gunnery training (Day 18 - 50)

This stage is conducted at the mobilization station with home station equipment and equipment drawn from the MATES. During this stage, individual, squad, section, and platoon

level training, and gunnery takes place for the entire brigade. Platoons conduct appropriate gunnery skill tests, i.e. individual and crew weapons qualification, common task training (CTC) etc., squad live fire, squad/platoon situation exercise (STX) lanes against OPFOR, platoon drills, offense and defense live fire exercises, Bradley/tank gunnery tables V – XII, battery/battalion evaluations, fire support training. Command and staff training for brigade and battalion/company commanders and staffs including Bn/Bde CPXs is conducted at the same time as crew through company level collective training is occurring. Training includes map exercises (MAPEXs) and seminars, Bn/Bde command post exercises with simulation support, command orders process, etc.[31] Training doesn't require re-evaluated if conducted the activity was previously evaluated by a CONUSA representative within the FC 350-1 timelines and the unit status is still a trained (T) or practice (P).

Stage III: Task Force organization and company training (Day 51 - 67) and Battalion Task Force- and Brigade level training (Day 68 - 92)

This stage is conducted at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), which is the NTC or JRTC. This stage includes organizing into Company team and Battalion Task Forces and conducting company movement, initially without OPFOR. Six different STXs lanes are conducted in 14 days, e.g. breach, assault lanes, in different types of conditions e.g. attack in an urban environment.[32]

Battalion and Brigade operations, including company team Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises (CALFEX) begins at the conclusion of the company level training portion. During this portion each Battalion Task Force will conduct two deliberate attacks, two defenses and one movement to contact. There is also time built into the model for retraining a lane or conducting additional rehearsals. The capstone event for this stage is three days of Brigade operations in order to exercise the synchronization of the entire eSB.[33]

Stage IV: Final preparations (Day 93 - 102)

This stage provides the eSB 10 days to conduct the maintenance needed after 80 days of field training, final preparation for overseas movement and loading equipment for shipment and all the administrative details that accompany deployment.[34] At this point the unit would be moved to the Power Projection Platform (PPP) and deploy to the theater of operations. This adds additional or wasted time to the deployment process.

As discussed above, Stage III training is currently being conducted at the CTCs. With the new deployment timelines for the eSBs, the requirements will quickly overwhelm the CTCs. Also, at the conclusion of Stage III, the Stage IV requirements were to move the unit from the CTC to a PPP for deployment. The proposed changes to Stages III and IV are where the

improvements to the post-mobilization model occur. The first change is to develop additional training sites or Warfighting Centers to conduct Stage III training. Secondly, is the co-locating of the PPP with the Warfighting Center. One of the easiest ways to cut down post-mobilization time is to reduce the unit movement during the train-up. Therefore, the most desired location for the Warfighting Center is the co-location of the Mobilization Station, Warfighting Center and PPP. Worst case the Warfighting Center must be co-located with the PPP.[35] This not only saves transportation time, but also alleviates excessive use of our limited strategic transportation assets, rail and air.

Looking at these proposed changes of adding the Warfighting Centers to the post-mobilization training model, what is the basic background, assumptions, mission, resources, entry and exit gates, etc., behind the Warfighting Center?

WARFIGHTING CENTER CONCEPT

Earlier in the paper I discussed some of the background leading up to the reasons why Warfighting Centers are necessary. In short, there are currently no functioning Warfighting Centers. The CTCs are not Warfighting Centers, but may be selected as a Warfighting Center. There are/were four designated post-mobilization training sites for the ARNG maneuver brigades (Ft. Polk, Ft. Irwin, Ft Hood, Yakima Training Center) designated in the old FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 and RCE-05 Study. The eSBs are required by FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, and are appropriately resourced, to be at platoon level proficiency during pre-mobilization. The number of Warfighting Centers activated for post-mobilization training will be dependent on the number of eSBs required by the warfighting CINC.[36]

There are several assumptions for the Warfighting Center sites:

- During post-mobilization use, all active duty units will be cleared from the Warfighting Center by the time the training support personnel and eSBs arrive.
- The maneuver brigades will arrive from the Mobilization Station at different proficiency levels. ESBs, by regulation, enter the Mobilization Station platoon maneuver proficient, therefore, should enter the Warfighting Center sooner and at a higher level then the National Guard Divisional Brigades.
- The site will be designed to train maneuver units at company through brigade combat teams. Again the amount of time spent at company level will vary depending on when the proficiency standard is met.
- Each Warfighting Center will be designated to support either a heavy or a light maneuver force, but not both.

- All training support personnel (OPFOR, OC/T, installation, training support) will be available to begin training at M date +10.[37]

The mission of the Warfighting Center is to complete the post-mobilization training and evaluation of the ARNG maneuver brigade combat teams and Division Headquarters. It will accomplish this by conducting company team through brigade combat team live, virtual, and constructive training. The center will provide tough, realistic combined arms training and evaluations utilizing Observer Controller/Trainers (OC/Ts), an Opposing Force (OPFOR), and CALFEX to assist the commanders in training soldiers, leaders, and units.[38]

As discussed above the post-mobilization training model is divided into 4 stages. During each stage of post-mobilization there is a readiness level or gate that must be attained before moving to the next stage. The following are post-mobilization readiness definitions:

Training Assessment: Unit commander's assessment of the unit's ability to execute mission essential tasks to standard (CINC requirements and AR 220-1).

Certification: Individual through platoon level task proficiency has been demonstrated. Individual training is certified by the first O-6 in the chain of command. Collective training is certified two levels up at the Mobilization Station.

Verification: BCT proficiency has been demonstrated. ESBs training proficiency is verified by the Continental United States Army (CONUSA) Commander at the Warfighting Center.

Validation: Is the act of assuring that the unit meets established Army deployment criteria as described in Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES), AR 220-1, and supported CINC requirements. The FORSCOM Commander validates units for deployment at the PPP.[39]

As stated above there are readiness levels or gates that must be meet before moving to the next Stage of post-mobilization training. Stage 1 is the initial home station mobilization and movement to the Mobilization Station. Stage 2, conducted at the Mobilization Station, is where time and resource are allocated to the commander to complete gunnery tables and conduct platoon/company lanes. IAW FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, the eSB should arrive at the Mobilization Station trained on all platoon level tasks. The gate to depart the Mobilization Station:

- Verification of the unit status assessment:
    a. Equipment on hand S-2
    b. Personnel P-2
    c. Equipment readiness R-2

d. Verification of maneuver proficiency:
    i. Platoon level for infantry, armor and cavalry
    ii. Company/battery/detachment level for other combat arms, combat support and combat service support
e. Heavy platoons Bradley/tank Table XII qualified (min. 85%)
f. Light platoons live fire exercise (LFX) qualified
g. Command and staff proficiency at level organized
h. Routine Mobilization station activities completed

- The CONUSA representative and the unit commander conduct an assessment at the conclusion of the Mobilization Station activities to ensure that the unit has met the gate requirements. If the gate is met the CONUSA designee certifies the unit.[40]

Once certified at the Mobilization Station, the unit moves to Stage 3, at the Warfighting Center. At the Warfighting Center the unit conducts maneuver and simulation Command Post Exercises (CPXs) up to Battalion Task Force/Brigade Training/Operations. IAW AR 220-1, to achieve the training requirements, T-2, the unit must achieve a T or P in at least 80 percent of METL tasks and external CINC directives. The eSB and CONUSA commanders will verify the training readiness and unit validation for deployment will be conducted by the FORSCOM commander.[41]

From the training location the unit will move to the PPP and Stage IV. Again having the Warfighting Center co-located with the PPP is critical to saving strategic lift resources and meeting the deployment timelines of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Another way to assist in speeding up the deployment of the National Guard eSBs and divisional brigades is improving the pre-mobilization training.

NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN PRE-MOBILIZATION TRAINING

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) has been working hard in identifying the two National Guard divisions that will be providing the base generating force for the Warfighting Centers. This will provide a capability that the active component doesn't have and will provide focus for an ARNG unit. Their mission will be to provide OPFOR and OC/T support to a specified Warfighting Center; therefore, their pre-mobilization mission will be to conduct OC/T and OPFOR training.[42] It is also becoming apparent that the ARNG eSBs will conduct pre-mobilization training at several Warfighting Centers in preparation for CTCs, Rehearsal Annual Training exercises (REHAT), and Mission Readiness Exercises (MRE).[43]

The NGB has also been tasked to provide the equipment at the Warfighting Centers. The amount of equipment, types of equipment, storage, security, etc., where the equipment will come from, and who will maintain the equipment is still being worked at the bureau.

WARFIGHTING CENTER PRE-MOBILIZATION USE

The initial thought was that the Warfighting Center would only be used during post-mobilization training. FORSCOM has recognized that in order to get funding, manning and other additional resources for the Warfighting Centers, the centers must have pre-mobilization training capabilities. This is a big step in the direction of improving ARNG pre-mobilization training and preparing the Warfighting Center assets, OPFOR, OC/T, etc. for its post-mobilization mission.

One of the big advantages the OPFOR at the CTCs have is home field advantage. It is critical for the Warfighting Center OPFOR to have that same advantage in order to maximize the training value for the post-mobilization training force. The OPFOR mission must be conducted by ARNG force with a focused effort on that mission to gain that home field advantage. Every year there are two tremendous opportunities to test the Warfighting Center concept during the REHAT exercise conducted by the light and heavy eSBs.

The REHAT is an exercise that the eSBs go through the year prior to participating in the CTC rotation. It combines all facets of deploying, drawing equipment/RSOI, conducting combat operations (attack, defend and movement to contact), reconsolidation, and redeployment. This training also exercises the state staff in its deployment, post-mobilization and redeployment responsibilities. Currently, a REHAT is not mandatory, however, the two AC/RC Integrated Divisions, the 7th Integrated Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Carson and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Riley put their eSBs through the train-up. The summer of 2002, the 30th eSB, stationed in North Carolina, will deploy to Fort Riley for their REHAT. The unit will rail some of their equipment from North Carolina and will draw from the Kansas NG MATES site located at Fort Riley. This tests both their rail loading procedures and the ability to draw equipment from a site, as they will do at the CTC. The 24th Infantry Division will perform the Warfighting Center operations as well as perform the tasks in support of one of its eSBs. During this exercise Fort Riley will as test its PPP procedures by accepting a unit for train-up and deploying the unit upon completion of the exercise. Since NGB has not identified the ARNG divisions that will provide the OPFOR, an active duty unit will provide the assets. The OC/T package will come from the Training Support Brigade that supports the 30th eSB. This would

not be the case if it were post-mobilization training because all active duty forces would be deployed.

Once the NGB does identify those forces, great training opportunities will occur for both the ARNG divisional base generating force providing the OPFOR and OC/Ts and the eSB. Future REHATs are planned at Fort Riley for Georgia's 48th eSB in FY 2004 and the South Carolina's 218th eSB in FY 2007. Both of these eSBs are part of the 24th AC/RC Integrated Infantry Division (Mechanized).

REHAT POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES

The current policy for determining the order that the eSBs will be activated and begin post-mobilization training and deployment is based on their latest CTC rotation date. An eSB comes into a so-called first up deployment window the year it is scheduled to attend the CTC and the year after returning from the CTC. This is due to the fact that the eSB leadership is locked in place two to three years prior to the CTC rotation. Therefore, normally within a year of return from the CTC the leadership begins to change at a rapid pace.

By conducing a REHAT the year prior to the CTC rotation the training sequence is somewhat shifted a year to the right in order to prepare fro the REHAT. The leadership is therefore better prepared in the MDMP/orders process and eSB soldiers are afforded two opportunities at a world class OPFOR. The overall advantage is that you increase the 2-year deployment window out to 3-years. Therefore, you have more eSBs that will enter the post-mobilization training model at a higher level of proficiency. This will decrease the mobilization times because units will meet the training gates quicker. One of the areas that keep the REHATs in question is one of funding. The funding necessary for this program as well as the Warfighting Center needs to be submitted in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 04-09.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM

The costs for the Warfighting Center will be very low. The initial guidance was no money associated with becoming a Warfighting Center. When you look at the selection criteria, inadequate installation infrastructure, lack of range areas, etc. would eliminate you from the running due to expenses. Some of the items identified to be included in the POM were items that are already in the Army system, but the installation may be way down in the fielding timeline, i.e. Digital Multipurpose Range Complex (MPRC), MOUT site. Therefore, there must be a distinction between the items already programmed for the normal/current mission of training readiness and deployability and Warfighting Center specific items.

FORSCOM is currently working the POM 04-09 issue. However, a basic need across all Warfighting Centers is a generic communications package and tracking system. Neither system requires being as robust as the CTC. DA DCSOPS has already put a so-called placeholder in the POM for the Warfighting Center.

SELECTION OF WARFIGHTING CENTER

The WFC sites were selected based on primary and secondary criteria (Tables 2 and 3, pages 22 and 23).[44]

The primary criteria were maneuver area, gunnery ranges, accessibility, and installation infrastructure. The secondary criteria were environmental compatibility, support personnel and pre-mobilization utilization. The primary criteria have a higher weighting or percentage, see tables 2 and 3, due to their importance. Each criterion is given a score, 1-10, based on the criteria availability at the installation. Each criterion is given a Green (7-10), Amber (5-6), or Red (1-4) score and status. At the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 are the overall scores an installation received. Initial selection was based on the raw score of the top 4 heavy installations and top 2 light installations.

The primary criteria are:

- Maneuver area was determined by the maneuver space needed by the largest requirement on each day based on the number of events being trained, retrained, or preparing for training. The maximum was two-battalion maneuver and two-company level combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX) being conducted simultaneously. The initial requirement for maneuver space was IAW TC 25-1 that required heavy forces to have an 8x32 km and 6x23 km sized battalion maneuver box. The light forces required a 14x19 km and 8x8 km sized battalion maneuver box. This space requirement is not available at most installations.
    - One of the recommendations from the RAND study was to reduce the two-battalion maneuver boxes to 6x13km that cannot overlap with each other, which became the Warfighting Center standard.[45]
    - There is a requirement for 10 company level boxes, i.e. the eSB has 9 maneuver companies and a Cavalry troop, averaging 4x7 km.
    - The CALFEX lanes, conducted simultaneously with the two battalion lanes, need to support offensive and defensive lanes with capable of supporting 155mm howitzer fires and aerial firing points.

- The company maneuver boxes may have some overlap with each other; however, no more then 4 lanes can overlap and stay in the amber rating.[46]

- Gunnery ranges should be available to qualify and improve gunnery skills. The gate for departing the Mobilization station is 85 percent Bradley/tank Table XII, however, personnel turnover and crew instability occurs so the Warfighting Center must continue to qualify crews. Ranges that must be available at the Warfighting Center are MPTR for Table V-X (heavy), the bradley and tank proficiency course (heavy), mortar and field artillery live fire points, aerial qualification range (AWSS), urban assault course and CA-MOUT, multi-purpose machine gun range, MK 19 range, infantry platoon battle course, and an MPRC (Table XI-XII and CALFEX).[47]
- Accessibility is critical to the Warfighting Center therefore; the installation must have sufficient transportation networks available. This is where the Power Project Platform (PPP) is a must to be considered for a Warfighting Center due to the lack of strategic lift to move units frivolously.[48] The mission of the PPP is to conduct all actions needed to bring the mobilized unit to full mission capability and deployable status. These actions include soldier readiness processing, cross leveling of personnel and equipment, ensure necessary individual and unit training is conducted, validation of the unit, and preparation for movement to the POE.[49] Working as a PPP, all Warfighting Centers installations will have additional ARNG and USAR unit processing through the installation concurrent with the eSBs. The base requirements for the installation is to be able to manage 215 rail cars per day, have access to strategic airlift within one hour of the installation, and the installations maneuver areas, ranges, and facilities must be accessible 12 months of the year (climate and transportation network).[50]
- The installation infrastructure is the most diverse criteria, however, weighted heavy for several reasons. First, there is limited money available for developing a Warfighting Center. Second, building infrastructure is costly and time consuming. Lastly, there are plenty of installations that meet all requirements without adding infrastructure.
    - There must be a medical facility large enough to service assigned and transient soldiers. This accessibility must be within one hour from the ranges and training areas.

- The installations DS/GS maintenance facilities must be capable of supporting the Warfighting Center mission or the Mobilization Station/ Warfighting Center mission. There must be appropriate amounts and types of motor pools available to support the mission.
- Appropriate administrative services i.e. AG, finance, military police, movement control/transportation, communication and soldier readiness processing must be available to support the mission.
- There must be ample supply and storage facilities to include an installation supply activity and warehouses, enough secure storage for the maneuver eSB/divisional brigade and OPFOR.
- The installation must have ample training aids, devises, simulations, and simulators (TADSS) to support the Warfighting Center mission. This includes enough MILES, TWGSS, PGS, COFT, and FIST equipment to support the OPFOR and eSB. There must be simulation facilities capable of utilizing Brigade Battlefield Simulation (BBS) and JANUS in order for the brigade staff to conduct a simulated supported exercise at the Warfighting Center. The installation must also have enough maintenance and storage facilities for TADSS.
- There needs to be adequate garrison billeting, dining facilities, barracks, etc. to house the installation staff, OPFOR, OC/T and the Warfighting Center staff.[51]

The secondary criteria are:

- Ensure that the environmental issues, if any, do not impact training or the ability of units to train to the Army standard. There should be no restriction within the company, battalion maneuver boxes or CALFEX area or on the ranges.
- Currently, FORSCOM is working the Warfighting Center support personnel structure for the permanent training support, installation support augmentation, and the OPFOR size requirement. FORSCOM has evaluated the force structure at the two CTCs to assist in their recommendation. They also have looked at Fort Riley and Fort Carson to see how each division staff handles their active duty train-ups for NTC, i.e. OPFOR and OC/T requirements, division staff requirements to support the train-up, etc.
- The pre-mobilization utilization evaluates how much pressure is place on the installation, both environmentally and capacity, while conducting normal day-to-

day operations. They also evaluate to determine the feasibility of conducting REHAT exercise on the installation to employ the OPFOR and OC/T packages.[52]

FORSCOM has scheduled several Council of Colonels meetings to working out issues related to the personnel support structure, personnel and equipment sources, WFC cost requirements and to approve the FY 2009 implementation timeline. Meanwhile, FORSCOM has completed the installation study and has forwarded the results to the DA DCSOPS for approval.

INSTALLATION RATING HIGHLIGHTS

Of the 17 potential WFC sites six (Ft. Hood, Ft. Lewis/Yakima Training Center, Ft. Carson/Pinon Canyon, Ft. Riley, Ft. Polk, and Ft. Stewart) were selected and forwarded to DA DCSOPS for approval. Table 1 provides the actual score for each installation by criteria. Below are some of the high and low points for each installation.

Fort Hood scored high in all areas except pre-mobilization utilization. The installation scored high in maneuver area, however, it is difficult to conduct brigade operations due to the lay of the land/impact area. The pre-mobilization utilization issue places a large burden on the installation. If mobilization occurs, the installation PPP mission coupled with the Corps Headquarters/supporting units and two divisions (–) one brigade deploying out the capacity of the PPP is potentially overrun. Bottom line is the incoming eSBs may not meet their TPFDD timeline. Fort Hood was recommended by FORSCOM as a heavy Warfighting Center.

Fort Lewis/Yakima Training Center and Fort Carson/Pinon Canyon both scored extremely high in all areas. The area of concern is that these installations were coupled with their associated training site when scored. In other words the PPPs, infrastructure (billets, motor pools, maintenance facilities, etc), and Warehouses are at Fort Lewis and Fort Carson and the training areas are 150 miles, with poor rail facilities, away. Fort Lewis/Yakima Training Center was recommended by FORSCOM as a heavy Warfighting Center. Fort Carson/Pinon Canyon was recommended by FORSCOM as a light Warfighting Center.

Fort Stewart scored high in all areas except for heavy maneuver, environmental and pre-mobilization utilization. The big advantage is the installation's close proximity to a deep-water port. The terrain makes heavy operations extremely difficult especially trying to give the eSB a CTC like experience. Fort Stewart was recommended by FORSCOM as a heavy Warfighting Center.

For Polk, as a light Warfighting Center, is the light CTC for the Army and scored very high in all areas except pre-mobilization capacity. Even though they scored high, another mission

like the Warfighting Center may be too much. Currently, they are the light CTC for active and 1 light eSB per year plus conducting Mission Ready Exercises (MRE) for both SFOR and KFOR. When MREs are conducted the entire training area is utilized so the 2nd ACR is unable to train. This capacity problem further hinders the active forces in that some battalion commanders do not get a CTC rotation while in command and the entry level proficiency has decreased.[53] Fort Polk was recommended by FORSCOM as a light Warfighting Center.

Fort Riley scored very high except in maneuver area. Talking with a former ADC-M, "I have trained forces at Fort Hood, Fort Carson and Fort Lewis/Yakima and the only place I have been able to fight two Task Forces abreast is at Fort Riley."[54] Fort Riley meets all the battalion/CALFEX maneuver box requirements with minimal overlap on the 10 company maneuver boxes. Fort Riley was recommended by FORSCOM as a heavy Warfighting Center.

The remaining installations were not recommended by FORSCOM as future Warfighting Centers. There are several of these installations that do have the potential to replace the recommended installations.

Fort Irwin scored high in maneuver, however, has low scores in infrastructure (motor pools, billeting, storage, etc.), accessibility (not a PPP), and environmental areas.

Fort Bliss has great maneuver space, infrastructure and accessibility. The only low scores are in the ability to conduct simulation exercises, maneuver simulation equipment and ranges. Congressional leaders are beginning to ask questions as to why Fort Bliss is not on the list. It has the greatest potential to replace one of the heavy Warfighting Centers.

Fort Dix is another installation with great accessibility to a deep-water port. However, it has limited maneuver space for light forces, has environmental concerns and limited basic infrastructure. Office of the Chief, Reserve Affairs didn't concur with FORSCOM's recommendation that Fort Dix not be nominated for a light Warfighting Center.[55] Of all the potential light Warfighting Centers, Fort Dix does have the greatest potential to replace one of the nominated light Warfighting Centers.

AP Hill, Gowen Field, Camp Grayling, Camp Roberts and Fort McCoy for the most part have problems with accessibility, infrastructure and billeting.[56] The cost of transforming these installations to Warfighting Center standards is not feasible. Additionally, there is no need to transform any installations since there are multiple installations that already meet the Warfighting Center standards. That being said, the following are possible courses of action for the Warfighting Center locations.

ALTERATIVES - COURSES OF ACTION

Before discussing the possible courses of action there is a need to confirm the installations involved. Going solely by the grading sheet, Fort Hood, Fort Lewis/Yakima Training Center, Fort Riley, Fort Stewart were selected as heavy centers and Fort Polk and Fort Carson/Pinon Canyon were selected as light centers. However, in my opinion Fort Hood will not be accessible to the eSB soon enough because of the large active force departing and the installation performing its PPP mission. A second installation, Fort Polk may also be overburdened. Its mission as the light CTC and home station for the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment has also picked up MREs mission for SFOR and KFOR. Picking up the Warfighting Center mission may be a bridge too far. There have also been several political rumblings about the installations not selected. Fort Bliss has surfaced as a potential heavy center replacement. In fact, the past Secretary of the Army and Congressman Reyes expressed surprise and concern that Fort Bliss had missed the cut and contacted the Chief of Staff of the Army.[57] As addressed earlier the Office of the Chief, Reserve Affairs didn't concur that Fort Dix was not nominated for a light Warfighting Center. These concerns have prompted DA DCSOPS to task FORSCOM to review and incorporate the potential changes to the defense strategy from the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and changes to the strategic environment due to the attacks of September 11th. That being said, regardless of the Warfighting Center locations the following are the possible courses of action.

There are three courses of action (COA) that can be taken.

COA 1: Go with the current mobilization plan of using four post-mobilization sites. This produces risk in achieving the guidance outlined in the NSS, National Military Strategy, and the September 30, 2001, QDR of 2 MRCs with overlapping timeframes. This COA does not support the current war plans requiring 8 eSBs in 140 days.

COA 2: Approve the six Warfighting Centers recommended by FORSCOM. This allows you to meet the requirements of the NSS, NMS, and QDR at minimal cost because the Warfighting Centers are only used during post-mobilization training. The NGB provides the increase manning of full time planning staff at each Warfighting Center, earmarks the OPFOR, equipment, and OC/Ts for use by the Warfighting Center upon mobilization.

COA 3: Approve the six Warfighting Centers recommended by FORSCOM, but have Fort Riley and Fort Carson available for pre-mobilization training to facilitate the testing of the Warfighting Center concept. Utilize these two Warfighting Centers for Rehearsal Annual Training (REHAT) the year prior to an eSB attending a CTC. For example, in June/July 02, Fort Riley will exercise the Warfighting Center concept by conducting a REHAT with the 30th eSB.

This will provide the eSB a tremendous warfighting opportunity and the state headquarters a first hand look at all the procedures required to conduct their deployment/redeployment from the NTC. This option also requires the NGB to identify the OPFOR that will come from the ARNG Divisions.[58] The OPFOR can then perfect its knowledge and fighting skills; much like the OPFOR at the CTCs. This option is more costly, however, you can test the Warfighting Center concept, identify problems that can be fixed prior to full implementation, and get a well trained eSB and OPFOR. Additionally, you can shift the SFOR and KFOR MRE mission from Fort Polk to Fort Riley and Fort Carson. This will allow Fort Polk to focus on the CTC mission.

RECOMMENDATION

In order to meet the respond requirements outlined in the NSS, NMS, and GDR dated September 30, 2001, the Warfighting Center strategy must continue to be developed, supported and fully implemented by FY 09. Use the Fort Riley FY 02 REHAT exercise to test and fine-tune the concept. Program the REHAT into the eight-year eSB training model. This will allow the eSB an opportunity to exercise the year prior to a CTC rotation at one of the Warfighting Centers. The ARNG provide the necessary equipment, OPFOR, OC/Ts and staff augmentation to stand up the first two Warfighting Centers, with Fort Riley (Heavy) and Fort Carson (Light) being completed by FY 03. Continue the implementation plan by standing up two additional Warfighting Center in FY 2005 and the remaining two in FY 2007. The first test of the Warfighting Centers should be conducted with the REHAT exercises. Additional Warfighting Center tests, involving all 4 centers, should be conducted in FY 2007 and in FY 2009 involving all six centers.

CONCLUSION

In the past, training for the National Guard Separate Brigades has not been done to the standard stated in their AR 220-1 unit status reports. This became apparent when the roundout brigades for three active divisions were mobilized for Operation Desert Storm, but never deployed due to training status. Many changes have occurred in training strategy to improve on this i.e. FORSCOM initiative Bold Shift, more resource, Training Support Brigades for each eSB, 2 AC/RC Integrated Divisions providing Training Readiness Oversight for 6 of 15 eSBs, etc.

Over the last few years the NG divisional units and eSB have become extremely critical in our National Defense, CONUS and OCONUS. Highly trained NG brigades, particularly eSBs, are currently being deployed in SFOR missions. This coupled with the backfill requirements for major wars due to active component deployments and IBCT transformations have required the eSBs to deploy at a much earlier date in the current war plans. This all leads to shortening the

post-mobilization training time and developing and properly resource Warfighting Centers in order to achieve the war plan TPFDDs.

FORSCOM has recommended six installations based on a thorough analysis of maneuver, infrastructure, accessibility, etc., to ensure that there are minimal costs in establishing these Warfighting Centers. Most of the costs will be incurred if it is used during pre-mobilization training, e.g. REHATs. I highly recommend that it be used that way in order to get highly trained OPFOR and OC/T units. This also provides focused training for the NG divisional brigades required to conduct these missions.

Bottom line: Establishing these six Warfighting Centers will provide the best return on the taxpayers' investment. The costs of developing the Warfighting Center will be minimal because the infrastructure is already in place. The training value added to the NG divisional brigades and eSBs by utilizing the Warfighting Center during weekend and annual training periods will be priceless. Not only will it enhance pre-mobilization training levels but also, will further shorten the post-mobilization training times and ensure the units meet their required war plan TPFDDs. You will also build a well-trained world class OPFOR and OC/T package that will have the home field advantage and provide the deploying units a tough NTC-like experience. Then at the conclusion of the Warfighting Center OPFOR mission, there will be a pool of extremely well trained replacements, if needed.

WORD COUNT: 8217

As of 10 Aug 00	Weight	Bliss	Bliss	Bragg	Campbell	Carson	Carson	Dix	Drum	Hood	Hood	Irwin	Irwin	Knox	Knox	Lewis/ Yakima
Maneuver Area:		H	L	L	L	H	L	L	L	H	L	H	L	H	L	H
Battalion	10.00%	10	10	9	7.5	10	10	8	8	8.5	9.5	10	10	2	2	10
Company	10.00%	10	10	6	5	10	10	8	5	9	9	10	10	6	6	10
Environmental:																
Heavy	2.50%	9				6				3		6		6		8
Light	2.50%		8	5	9		9	4	8		8		8		6	
Ranges	15.00%	7	7	8	8	9	9	3	8	9	9	4	4	9	9	8
CALFEX	15.00%	10	10	10	9	10	10	7	10	10	10	10	10	5	5	10
Pre-mobilization Utilization:																
Pre-mob Environmental	2.50%	8	8	5	8	8	8	3	9	3	3	7	7	6	9	8
Pre-mob Capacity	2.50%	10	10	6	7	10	10	7	7	4	4	1	1	4	4	10
Accessibility	20.00%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	4	4	10	10	10
Installation Infrastructure																
Garrison Facilities/Billeting	5.00%	10	10	10	10	9	9	7	7	10	10	4	4	4	4	10
Maintenance:																
DS/GS facilities	2.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
Motor Pools	2.00%	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
Calibration	0.25%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
AOAP	0.25%	10	10	10	10	10	10	3	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Supply/Storage:																
Installation Supply Activity																
Retail Supply	1.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
CIF	0.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Class III and V storage and distribution systems	1.00%	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
Contracting Section	1.25%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
Warehouses/Secured Storage	0.75%	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6	6	9
TADSS:																
Heavy (Force on Force)	2.50%	1				10				10		8		3		5
Light (Force on Force)	2.50%		4	6	5		7	6	5		8		7		5	
Simulations (CMD & Staff Trng)	2.50%	7	7	10	10	8	8	8	10	10	10	0	0	7	7	10
Installation Spt Personnel	2.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	4	9	10	10	8	8	10	10	10
	105.00%															
Total (Light)			9.23	8.75	8.53		9.60	7.00	8.28		9.28		6.52		6.77	
Total (Heavy)		9.18				9.60				9.10		6.49		6.64		9.39
Max		9.23	0.00	8.75	8.53	9.60	0.00	7.00	8.28	9.28	0.00	6.52	0.00	6.77	0.00	9.39
Average		9.20	0.00	8.75	8.53	9.60	0.00	7.00	8.28	9.19	0.00	6.50	0.00	6.70	0.00	9.36
Rank (Light)			4	7	8		1	13	10		3		16		14	
Rank (Heavy)		3				1				4		9		8		2
Rank (Max)		4		7	8	1		13	10	3		16		14		2
Rank (Average)		3		7	8	1		12	10	4		16		14		2

TABLE 2 - COMPARISON MATRIX

As of 10 Aug 00	Weight	Lewis/ Yakima	Lewis/ Yakima	Polk	Riley	Riley	Stewart	Stewart	AP Hill	Gowen	Gowen	Grayling	Roberts/ HL	Roberts/ HL	McCoy
Maneuver Area:		H	L	L	H	L	H	L	L	H	L		H	L	L
Battalion	10.00%	10	10	9	6.9	9	6	7	7	7.3	8.9	7	7	9.8	6
Company	10.00%	10	10	10	6	6	6	10	3	10	10	8	10	10	5
Environmental:															
Heavy	2.50%	8			9		3			9			1		
Light	2.50%		8	8		9		9	9		9	8		8	8
Ranges	15.00%	8	8	8	7	7	9	9	3	8	8	3	6	6	9
CALFEX	15.00%	10	10	10	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	7	7	10	6
Pre-mobilization Utilization:															
Pre-mob Environmental	2.50%	8	8	8	9	9	3	7	9	9	9	7	3	9	9
Pre-mob Capacity	2.50%	10	10	1	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Accessibility	20.00%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	5	2	7	7	5	5	8
Installation Infrastructure															
Garrison Facilities/Billeting	5.00%	10	10	9	8	8	10	10	4	5	5	7	7	7	
Maintenance:															
DS/GS facilities	2.50%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	10	10	7
Motor Pools	2.00%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	10	10	7
Calibration	0.25%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	10
AOAP	0.25%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Supply/Storage:															
Installation Supply Activity															
Retail Supply	1.50%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	7	7	7
CIF	0.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Class III and V storage and distribution systems	1.00%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	10	10	6
Contracting Section	1.25%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	7	7	7
Warehouses/Secured Storage	0.75%	9	9	6	10	10	9	9	4	7	7	4	7	7	7
TADSS:															
Heavy (Force on Force)	2.50%	5			8		8			5			5		
Light (Force on Force)	2.50%		3	9		5		5	4		5	7		3	4
Simulations (CMD & Staff Trng)	2.50%	10	10	7	8	8	10	10		7	7	7	7	7	0
Installation Spt Personnel	2.50%	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
	105.00 %														
Total (Light)			9.34	8.77		8.53		9.16	5.29		7.85			7.43	6.57
Total (Heavy)		9.39			8.39		8.49			6.69			6.43		
Max		#REF!	0.00	8.77	8.53	0.00	9.16	0.00	5.29	7.85	0.00	6.07	7.43	0.00	6.57
Average		#REF!	0.00	8.77	8.46	0.00	8.82	0.00	5.29	7.27	0.00	6.07	6.93	0.00	6.57
Rank (Light)			1	3		4		2	8		5			6	7
Rank (Heavy)		1			3		2			4			5		

TABLE 3 - COMPARISON MATRIX (CONTINUED)

ENDNOTES

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[54] Edward Dyer, former Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver at Fort Riley, interview by author, 21 May 2000, Fort Riley, KS.

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