THESIS

U.S. MILITARY ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN: DETERRENT OR PROVOCATION?

by

Kevin Austin Cox, Sr.

March 2002

Thesis Advisor: H. Lyman Miller
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**Title:** U.S. Military Arms Sales to Taiwan: Deterrence or Provocation?

**Author:** Kevin Austin Cox, Sr.

**Abstract:**

A decision by leaders to initiate or join a civil war is fundamentally a political decision, as is the decision to continue fighting in one. Since the processes by which wars are generally fought are highly influenced by political choices, the United States’ decisions to sell military arms to Taiwan have been a major factor in deterring the PRC from attacking the ROC on Taiwan. Thus, the U.S. goal as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue may be furthered by significantly increasing the economic, military and political cost of reunification by any means other than a peaceful resolution.

Consequently, in the post-Cold War environment, the U.S.-ROC relationship has changed very little. In spite of the vast amount of weaponry purchased from the U.S., ROC armed forces do not possess the military hardware required to endure a long-term (more than 90 days) military engagement with the PRC without U.S. intervention. Although arms sales have increasingly been used for political purposes, as well as military ones, experience suggests that such sales are no substitute for solid diplomacy and policy-making with friends as well as foes. Finally, the United States has a strong interest in encouraging both sides to re-energize the political and diplomatic aspects of their relationship and de-emphasize the military dimension.
U.S. MILITARY ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN: DETERRENCE OR PROVOCATION?

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2002

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ABSTRACT

A decision by leaders to initiate or join a civil war is fundamentally a political decision, as is the decision to continue fighting in one. Since the processes by which wars are generally fought are highly influenced by political choices, the United States’ decisions to sell military arms to Taiwan have been a major factor in deterring the PRC from attacking the ROC on Taiwan. Thus, the U.S. goal as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue may be furthered by significantly increasing the economic, military and political cost of reunification by any means other than a peaceful resolution.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many professors, advisors and experts that have helped shaped my experiences and growth during this process. In general, I would like to say thank you. Specifically, I would like to extend a few special sentiments of thanks.

First, I would like to thank Professor H. Lyman Miller for his mentoring and assistance in the completion of this thesis. Without his vast knowledge and expertise on Chinese political, military, and foreign policy issues, I would not have been able to develop a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Second, I thank Professors Edward A. Olsen and Paul Godwin who openly engaged me and provided essential background information on the Asia-Pacific region and invaluable input on issues relating to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Third, thank you to Greta Marlatt and the staff at the Dudley Knox Library. You all are the best and hardest working group of people on this campus.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Janine and my children, Kamara, Austin and Kevin, Jr., for their patience and support during the process of completing my thesis.
I. INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze U.S. arms sales to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan as a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Thereafter, this assessment will be used to determine the degree to which arms sales deter the PRC’s resort to military force and further the U.S. goal as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) regarding peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. However, in order to fully understand the complexity of the Taiwan issue, a succinct historical overview of American perspectives of the Chinese is necessary.

Historical events such as the Opium War and the unequal treaties that resulted have helped shape American’s perspectives of the Chinese and exercised a considerable influence on U.S.-PRC post-1949 foreign relationships. American historical perspectives of the Chinese have influenced subsequent generations through shared recollections of those perspectives and beliefs about their meaning.¹

Frequently, such shared memories and beliefs assume mythic proportions: mythic not in the sense that they have no grounding in fact, but in the sense that the shared belief itself is in many ways more important than what actually happened in the past.² Collectively, these shared beliefs and memories are what have primarily formed the base of U.S.-PRC foreign policy decisions regarding the Taiwan question.

The Taiwan question is currently the most divisive issue in American-Chinese relations because it has predominantly evolved on both sides of the straits within the framework of America’s historical perspectives of China’s perceived inadequacies from the 19th century down to the present. A preponderance of the empirical evidence supports this view and suggests that
in order to adequately deal with future U.S.-PRC relations, perspectives on both sides must be intimately understood by policy makers. Author John K. Fairbank argued in his book *The United States and China* that America should accept the political realities of China without embellishment. Also, Americans should avoid subjective assessments of these realities, desist from wishful thinking, and try to acquire a clear understanding of the fundamental distinctions between American and Chinese goals. In hindsight, American historical perspectives of the Chinese have often not been derived from pragmatic relationships, but were shaped and perpetuated by embellished American political and economic activities within China. Perceptions of the Chinese were a byproduct of that process.

**A. ROOTS OF A CENTURY OF SHAME**

Overall, journalists have shaped America’s perspectives of the Chinese, but, beginning in the early 19th century, there was an explosion of American interest in East Asia that was spearheaded by Protestant missionaries and American traders.

> The Chinese Empire in the 1800s, still indulging itself in the remaining glory of the previous dynasties, was de-mystified by Westerners who came to China looking for business and religious conquests. From the Westerners’ perspective, the widespread corruption in and extortion by China’s Imperial Court, and the mandarins’ arrogance toward and contempt for foreigners gave them an excellent excuse for aggression.

Thus, the missionaries and traders largely shaped America’s early perceptions of China through their organizational affiliations and the letters and journals that they wrote which detailed their daily encounters with the Chinese. Since the missionaries and traders frequently did not know

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2. Ibid., p. 2.
the language or ethos, it was impossible for them to understand the society. Invariably, early perspectives of the Chinese were inherently predetermined and biased.

In 1807 the first Protestant missionary, Robert Morrison, arrived in Canton aboard an American vessel. Although Morrison was British, he represented American interests in China, primarily because American merchants financed his voyage and gave him a huge amount of moral and material assistance.

Ever since the young American bourgeoisie appeared in the arena of world trade, which was growing rapidly, the knowledge that Americans had of China and the Chinese had of the USA was formed largely under the influence of the adherents of the missionary movement, from the links that were established between the heirs of the Pilgrim Fathers and their pupils in China.  

Also, Morrison carried a letter of recommendation from Secretary of State James Madison to the United States consul in Guangzhou. This event established a direct link between American foreign policy and Protestant missionaries and American business in China, both of which viewed China as a treasure chest waiting to be opened in terms of souls for Christ and vast lucrative markets for American trade.

Consequently, as Western interest grew during the 1840s, the West challenged China on numerous fronts all at the same time. In addition to having superior military technology, a recurring theme in Chinese relationships, the Western impact created a historical confrontation between a traditional, agrarian society and a modernizing, urban industrial one. China’s traditional order was in a totally new realm. This was the first time that China’s foes were not isolated, but were in close communication with each other. When dealing with the West, politically isolating one state from another was not possible, which rendered China’s traditional

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5 Vorontsov, pp. 19-20.
6 Vorontsov, p. 19.
diplomatic techniques of playing one state against the other totally useless. Thus, granting a favor to one Western power resulted in the demanding of similar concessions by all.

The aftermath of the Opium War established the beginning of China’s entry into the Western international community and the dissolution of China’s system of international relationships in East Asia. On August 29, 1842, the British and Chinese signed the Treaty of Nanking, which “… heralded the downturn of China’s international status, opening the door for a series of humiliating impositions by almost all foreign powers at the time, the worst among which was the demand of extra-territoriality.” 7 Three additional unequal treaties were established and signed by Britain, France, and the United States with China between 1843-1844 that completed the settlement. Under the provision of extraterritoriality 8 and right of residence, Western influence dominated the treaty ports established by the treaties, making them centers of Western power and influence.

Although the British fought the war and incurred most of the expenses, the United States and France were granted the same privileges by the inception of the most favorite nation (MFN) concept. 9 The inception of the MFN provisions strongly shaped America’s approach toward China, establishing a basis of collective imperialism rather than a competitive one. The superior

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7 Mei-Ling T. Wang, p. 385.
8 The Sino-U.S. Treaty of Wanghsia in 1844 was modeled on the British treaty, but it was much longer. In Article 21 which states, “that Americans committing crimes in China could not be tried and punished only by the consul or other duly empowered American officials ‘according to the laws of the United States.’” See Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), p. 163. “…only extra-territorial legal jurisdiction can be seen as morally reasonable, given the assumption that Chinese and Westerners were going to have any contact with each other at all. Chinese lawsuits at this time involved the routine torture of the accused and witnesses (except for holders of state degrees), and the convention that required someone to be executed in expiation of every homicide led to the judicial murder of innocent people.” See Caroline Blunden and Mark Elvin, Cultural Atlas of China, rev. ed. (Abington, Oxfordshire England: Checkmark Books, 1998), p.148. In view of this, Chinese laws were considered to harsh or unfit for Americans. Thus, the Chinese lost the capacity to adjudicate laws against Westerners in Chinese territories.
9 Most Favorite Nation (MFN) status was originally negotiated by the British in article 8 of its their supplementary treaty in 1843. It stipulated “should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or citizens of such foreign countries, the same will be extended to and
military technology of the West forced the Chinese to adhere to Western terms for conducting trade. Consequently, the unequal treaties exacerbated the Ch’ing inadequacies as Chinese authorities lost control of commercial, social, and foreign policies, thus being forced to surrender the sovereignty over significant expanses of Chinese territory. Despite Chinese efforts to establish a viable government in the first four decades of the 20th century, China did not regain control over most of these commercial, social, and foreign policies until 1943 at the Cairo Conference.

**B. A NEW ERA (1949-1972)**

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the politically charged atmosphere of the 1950s subverted American perceptions of the Chinese. The United States had directly intervened in the Chinese civil war, and, after the onset of the Korean War, the Chinese were clearly the enemy.

Truman’s decision to intervene afresh in China’s civil war by interposing his Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Mainland on 27 June (two days after the outbreak of the Korean War) was followed by the American refusal to heed Chinese warnings over their northwest march in Korea.  

From the early 1950s until 1971, there was no direct media coverage of China, except in rare cases, and virtually no American correspondent visited China for nearly two decades. Americans relied heavily on foreign media and Hong Kong-based reporting about China. During this period, there were two prevailing images of the Chinese that filtered through the politically charged atmosphere. The first work to assess these images was by Harold Isaacs. Compiled in

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*Enjoyed by British subjects." See Blunden and Elvin, p. 163. This concept was extended to all Western nations that negotiated a treaty with the Chinese.*


1958, his book *Scratches on Our Mind* (which was re-titled and published as *Images of Asia; American Views of China and India* in 1972) was completed after the Korean War had ended. His work was founded on a historical and empirical analysis of American elite’s images of China, which was based on over 180 interviews he conducted. As a result of his research he described the perceived dichotomy of traits that Americans associated with the Chinese people during the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, words and phases such as high intelligence, persistent industry, filial piety, and peacebleness characterized the image of the Chinese. This image of the Chinese was widely associated with the vast riches and greatness of Chinese civilization. On the other hand, descriptions of the Chinese were often shrouded by words such as cruelty, barbarism, inhumanity and the facelessness of an impenetrable mass. This image was associated with the seemingly timeless atrocities that occurred in China and the expressionless faces on the newsreels that witnessed the savagery of World War II and the Chinese Civil War with very little or no expression. Consequently,

Isaacs maintained that historically, American admiration of China’s ancient greatness and related high expectations seldom matched its real experience with the Chinese, both in the United States and China. In other words, while abstractly the Chinese were regarded as a “superior people”, in reality they always appeared as an “inferior people.”

In conclusion, Isaacs noted that the American image of the Chinese revered a timeless phenomenon of unparalleled proportion while dealing with a vision of inadequacy and despair.

Next, Archibald Trojan Steele’s book, which was completed in 1966 during the Vietnam War, and was called *The American People and China*, revealed that most Americans viewed the Chinese as ideologically untouchable during the 1950s and 1960s. This negative sentiment was

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13 Ibid., p. 8.
14 Ibid., p. 8.
based on the deep ideological differences that existed between American capitalism and Chinese communism at the time. The data he used for his study were collected primarily from a nationwide survey of public opinion and a series of more than 200 interviews he conducted. The people that were polled occupied positions of responsibility and leadership throughout the United States.\textsuperscript{15} Although a number of the respondents lacked basic knowledge of China--including the fact that the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was a communist regime--they consistently viewed the PRC as a threat.

His data also confirmed American disdain for the Chinese people. In a 1966 survey conducted in the United States, four of the top five words the respondents considered as best describing the Chinese people were negative. “The Chinese people were considered ‘ignorant’, ‘warlike’, ‘sly’, and ‘treacherous’.”\textsuperscript{16} This attitude would cloud American-Chinese relationships until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when diplomatic efforts ended the period of no communication and build support for a more flexible China policy.

Beginning in early 1969, the CCP leadership began to take a moderate course in its foreign policy. The PRC was admitted to the United Nations (UN) in October 1971, removing the ROC. Ping-pong diplomacy began with an exchange of ping-pong teams that opened up contact with the United States and finally President Nixon visited China in February 1972.

How long would America’s anomalous images of China last? American perceptions of China had been oscillating between the poles of attraction and repulsion for decades before President Nixon’s historic visit to China set off an explosive period of interest in China once again.

On 21 February 1972 at 11:30 a.m., the Spirit of America rolled to a stop on the tarmac at the Capital Airport near Beijing, China. On board was the second half

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 10.
of the largest, and arguably the most important, foreign delegation ever to visit the
People’s Republic of China. The President of the United States, accompanied by
his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, his secretary of state, William
Rogers…disembarked to be greeted by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.17

A day prior, the media corps arrived. Among them were 87 distinguished television and print
journalists, including Walter Cronkite, Barbara Walters, Dan Rather, columnists William F.
Buckley and Theodore H. White. This elaborate presence began to change the face of China in
the United States. For eight days the United States delegation toured China and reported on the
new China of peaceful construction, socialist civilization, and ideals that appealed to the
egalitarian strain in American thought.18 Chinese fashions were en vogue, and a basic curiosity
about Chinese culture began to blossom. One of America’s most hated enemies was being
transformed into an ally.

While most journalists felt that the reshaping of China’s image was long overdue, for
President Nixon, who played the central role in reshaping the image of China, it was a political
necessity.19 Opening a new political relationship with the PRC after decades of mutual
estrangement in an election year was just what his re-election campaign needed.

A Gallup Poll taken a few days after his return from Beijing revealed that the
public now had a ‘far more favorable image’ of the Chinese Communists than it
had in 1966. Favorable terms like ‘hard working,’ ‘practical,’ ‘intelligent,
‘artistic,’ and progressive’ were selected over negative terms by more than 3 to 1.
American perceptions of China had once again flipflopped.20

Politically, the signing of the 1972 joint communiqué on U.S.-China relations and the
establishment of diplomatic relations on News Year’s day 1979 under President Jimmy Carter
classified the 1970s. The strategically calculated rapprochement with China by America’s

17 Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: America’s Illusions and Chinese Reality (United States of America:
18 Ibid., p. 1.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 Ibid., p. 159.
top decision-makers touched off a period characterized by political disillusionment with the conditions in the United States more than mutual understanding of China.

After the initial political and media frenzy decrescendo, confidence-building measures, such as person-to-person contact, resumed. For the Americans who visited China, guided tourism produced a remarkably uniform and positive set of impressions. Images of a nation that seemingly faced a vast set of insurmountable problems in 1949 seemed to have vanished in the wake of a magical visit by President Richard Nixon, “foreign devil.”

The nation appears to have regenerated itself and to be making economic and social progress. Moreover, the Chinese have undertaken bold experiments in a number of areas that are of direct concern to us, such as bureaucratic practice [e.g., the arrest of officials by young thugs], education [closing the universities], the pattern of urbanization [keeping the peasants out of the cities], penology [labor reeducation camps], public health [barefoot doctor]… Americans were astonished by the progress that the Chinese had seemed to make in such a short period without Western assistance. Those who visited brought back bits and pieces of China that they thought Americans could emulate and learn from, such as the new secular religion of Maoism. In hindsight, this thought is absurd, but during this pessimistic period of American history, some opinions on the Cultural Revolution saw it as a far-reaching moral crusade to change the very human Chinese personality in the direction of self-sacrifice and serving others.

What the journalists and visitors saw and depicted was a Chinese state that was outwardly underdeveloped and even backward, but not without genuine strivings for change.

C. SUMMARY

Chinese, like other people, rightly assume that if a stranger does not know the language, he or she does not know the social conventions or ethos either. Consequently, from the

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21 J. Wang, p. 10.
22 Mosher, p. 159.
23 Ibid., p. 159.
beginning, American perspectives of the Chinese have been a continuum of inaccurate
distortions of Chinese culture and values from an American perspective. As John K. Fairbank
argued in the book *The United States and China*, Americans should accept the political realities
of China without embellishment. Also, they should avoid subjectivist assessments of these
realities, desist from wishful thinking, and try to acquire a clear understanding of the
fundamental distinctions between Chinese and American societies.\textsuperscript{25} The absence of these
fundamental facts inherently perpetuated the missionaries’ and traders’ cultural biases and
predisposition, therefore questioning their grasp of China and their intentions.\textsuperscript{26}

In the wake of over a century and a half of cross-cultural communications and
miscommunications, the structural continuities in American-Chinese relationships have been
obscured. On the one hand, Americans have continually tried to exploit China’s vast resources
and influence its growth as a nation-state by imposing their cultural, economic and educational
values on it because of China’s perceived backwardness. No matter what the costs of these
perceived benevolent acts were, Americans have felt that they were necessary and that China
would eventually benefit from them by becoming a modern nation-state. On the other hand, the
Chinese have primarily rejected American advances as unbidden acts of imperialism, which have
mainly provided “spiritual pollution” for the Chinese people. The implicit message in John K.
Fairbank’s book, *The United States and China*, is that Americans must respect Chinese values
and build a constructive understanding of them instead of continually seeking to denigrate,
embellish and destroy them. Thus, the result of years of American ambivalence in American-

\textsuperscript{24} Turmoil, \url{http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/TatTcontent.html}
\textsuperscript{25} Vorontsov, p. 6.
Chinese relationships is a present day America that may possess confused and unrealistic expectations for the future of American-Chinese relationships.
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II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION

A. INTRODUCTION

After the U.S. began its rapprochement with China in 1972, the ROC’s diplomatic status was placed in limbo by the signing of the January 1, 1979 joint communiqué establishing the diplomatic relationships between the PRC and the United States of America. In that declaration, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remained a side issue, a question that would be answered later. In practice, this declaration resolved Taiwan’s status, but it left the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan open to interpretation, thereafter creating the current controversy. The PRC resolutely insists that U.S. arm sales to the ROC defy the spirit and intent of the 1972 Shanghai, 1979 and 1982 joint communiqués. The background of this controversy has long roots in U.S.-China relations.

1. Cairo Conference

As Japanese forces lost momentum during World War II in the Pacific region, the island of Taiwan gained importance. At the 1943 Cairo Conference, the big three—Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin—agreed to return Taiwan to China. Accordingly, no high-level American officials deliberated Taiwan’s independence or annexation. This decision was confirmed by the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945. After the Japanese surrendered in October 1945, the ROC proclaimed that Taiwan was reunited with the mainland and sovereign territory of China. This is important because it means that the PRC has never controlled Taiwan and its irredentist claim is based solely on China’s historical territorial claim to the island.

27 “The agreement to assign Taiwan to China, once Japan had been defeated, was made without Taiwan’s approval, an apparent violation of the Atlantic Charter which held that territorial changes should be in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.” James H. Hughes, “The Peoples Republic of China Confronts Taiwan,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 26, no. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 403.
2. Post-War China

On October 17, 1945, escorted by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, an estimated 12,000 troops of the 62nd and 70th Division Chinese Nationalist Army landed on Taiwan at the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung. A large enthusiastic crowd whose cheers would soon turn into dismay greeted the undisciplined and war battered Nationalist troops who were supposed to liberate Taiwan from the defeated Japanese. Although the inhabitants believed that the stage had been set for reunification, Taiwan was viewed by the Nationalist regime’s troops as part of the booty of war.

Meanwhile, on the mainland prior to the end of World War II, the stage was set for a monumental civil war between the Communists led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai shek. The Communists steadily expanded their guerrilla bases and territories, built larger armies, and extended their capabilities for civil rule. After a long and bitter struggle between the two, the Communists prevailed and on October 1, 1949 ushered in a new regime, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Mao Zedong, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, triumphantly announced its arrival by proclaiming that China had finally stood up. His remarks were made in reference to China’s ominous past, in which it had been systemically divided and preyed on by the Japanese and Western powers. As a result of the prolonged period of civil and international hostilities, China emerged as a weak and frail nation that felt threatened by the United States and a reemerging Japan.

3. Korean War

Consequently, the American decision to intervene in the Korean War and not to heed China’s warnings over their march into Korea led to Chinese intervention. To the Truman administration, there was a strong hint that the Soviet backed Chinese intervention was primarily designed to enhance its security against the American presence in the region. What was seen by
the United States as a move toward reuniting Korea was perceived by Mao as a threat to PRC security and the survival of its newly established revolutionary regime. Consequently, it Asianized the Korean War.  

The Korean War also served as a mechanism that instantly transformed Japan from an occupied nation to an ally in defense of the free world. The war also united the PRC with North Korea against the United States under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Author Akira Iriye argued that the outbreak of the Korean War itself might have resulted from the lack of militarization in Asia and the opportunistic attempt of the North Koreans to unify the peninsula, rather than from any concerted design of the communists to extend their power base relative to that of the West and its allied.  

However, from an American perspective, the ideological divide in the Asia-Pacific was unmistakably defined by North Korea’s action, which confirmed Taiwan’s strategic value for the United States. “In view of these circumstances Taiwan was regarded as one of the critical links in the U.S. defense line, whose loss to Communist forces would denigrate the U.S. position in Japan and the Philippines.”  

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, State Department and General MacArthur realized the strategic value and the consequences of an unfriendly communist state controlling Taiwan, U.S. policy maintained that the Taiwan issue was a low priority because of the potential need of U.S. forces elsewhere (America’s strategic emphasis was in the West).  Consequently, on

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25 Mei-Ling T. Wang, pp. 82-83.
29 “[It] effectively integrated the Asia-Pacific into the Cold War system that had first emerged in Europe. But unlike the situation in Europe where the Cold War divided the protagonists into two clearly defined camps of opposing ideological, economic and political systems separated by an ‘iron curtain’, the divisions in Asia were less clear cut and were still being contested long after they had been settled in Europe.” Michael B. Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 21.
32 “As early as November 1948, when the Truman administration reexamined America’s China policy, the JCS concluded in a memo entitled ‘Strategic Importance of Formosa’ that the prospect of a Taiwan controlled by ‘Kremlin-directed Communists’ would be ‘very seriously detrimental to our national security’ because this would
January 5, 1950, President Harry S. Truman solidified Taiwan’s status by announcing that the United States had no intention of obtaining special privileges in Taiwan or intervening in the Chinese Civil War at present or in the future. But, on June 27, 1950 President Truman in a highly politicized decision, reversed his stance on Taiwan by interposing the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland, two days after the Korean War began.

**B. COLD WAR**

1. **Arms Sales to Taiwan**
   
   As the U.S. policy of containment expanded in the 1950s, so did the scope of U.S. direct military support, hence, bringing Taiwan into its purview after the hostilities began on the Korean peninsula.  

   The threat which the Chinese Nationalist regime posed to Peking’s security interests was much magnified as the United States drew closer to Chiang and gave him increased support. Because the Chinese civil war had not run its course, the American effort to employ deterrence strategy on behalf of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan resulted in a confusion of containment with ‘liberation,’ thereby greatly exacerbating tensions and inviting dangerous crises.

   Thereafter, in 1954, the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, which remained in force until 1979. The original intent of U.S. military support was to bolster Taiwan’s combat capabilities because it was one of the key forward defense countries on the

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periphery of the communist world.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, the U.S. goal was deterring the PRC from attacking and reducing the need for U.S. intervention during a crisis in the Asia-Pacific.

Most of the weaponry that Taiwan received from 1950 to the mid-1960s was made available under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and consisted of older U.S. weapons from its World War II stockpiles. Although, the weaponry was World War II vintage, the majority of U.S. arms transfers were made free of charge, “thus, beginning the use of U.S. military transfers as a valuable tool of U.S. foreign policy in response to perceived threats to the United States, its allies and friends.”\textsuperscript{36} As a result, Taiwan’s armed forces became one the largest and best equipped forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

After 1965, the United States’ policy of military assistance through MAP shifted to Foreign Military Sales (FMS), primarily because U.S. World War II stockpiles were diminishing.\textsuperscript{37} By the mid-1960s, Taiwan’s economy had gained considerable strength, enabling the ROC to purchase a sizeable amount of military weaponry from the United States through FMS.

Keeping Taiwan on the list of countries eligible to purchase weapons from the United States under the Foreign Military Sales Act would be particularly important. International law does not require the end of agreement between governments upon severance of diplomatic relationships; neither does it require for them to remain in force.\textsuperscript{38}

In accordance with the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, U.S. relations with Taiwan were altered during the 1970s so that the U.S. could enter a coalition with the PRC to oppose the Soviet Union’s campaign for world hegemony.\textsuperscript{39} The U.S. rapprochement with the PRC ended

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{38} Clough, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{39} “This development coincided with a period of détente in Soviet-U.S. relations. Thus, China and the USSR remained in conflict with each other but were simultaneously trying to improve relations with the United States.
diplomatic recognition of and official relationships with the ROC subsequent to the signing of the 1979 joint communiqué establishing official ties to Beijing.40 But, it did not resolve the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Following normalization of diplomatic relationships between the U.S. and the PRC, on January 1, 1979 the U.S. Congress moved to ensure that the normalization of relations with the PRC did not result in the abandonment of Taiwan. What resulted was a concerted effort by the Carter White House, the Departments of State and Defense, leading members of both political parties, and expert legal scholars that contributed to the fundamental soundness of not only the wording of the legislation but also to its underlying concepts of what became the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).41 This legal document, an American law enacted by the U.S. Congress on April 10, 1979, is what enabled the United States to maintain an unofficial presence in Taiwan and the region. Its original intent was to allow Taiwan a “decent interval” before capitulating to the PRC, but it has evolved into a law that ensures direct U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait

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40 In accordance with the Joint Communiqué to establish Diplomatic Relationships between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, the U.S. government issued its official statement on December 15, 1978 that established its official position on the Taiwan issue by including the following statements. “As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China...The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continued to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” See Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock, *Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1978: An Annotated Compilation* (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1980), p. 204. Since the signing of the 1979 Joint Communiqué this has been the official position advocated by all subsequent U.S. administrations.

for a long time. Also, it is currently interpreted as the primary document that governs U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

After Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter in the 1980 U.S. presidential election, one of the most perplexing problems his administration dealt with was the arm sales to Taiwan. “This was the question that had been left unanswered by Carter and Deng Xiaoping when they had hurriedly conducted the deal for normalization of relations at the end of 1978.”

Thereafter, the PRC demanded a termination date on the U.S. arms to Taiwan or else it would downgrade its relationships with the United States. Ultimately, the Reagan Administration acceded, but not completely. It compromised by agreeing to the terms of the August 17, 1982 joint communiqué.

The 1982 communiqué was the most controversial agreement ever reached between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Although the Reagan administration did not promise to end all arms sales to Taiwan, it did agree to set strict limits on these sales, where none existed before.

The Reagan administration negotiated the 1982 Joint Communiqué in good faith, but practically it did not entirely adhere to it. Starting from late in the Carter Administration through the Reagan Administration, in practice, the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) regulated U.S. arm

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43 James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 120.
44 Ibid., p. 127.
sales to Taiwan. Consequently, Beijing has resolutely believed that the United States has not honored its commitment of gradually decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan as prescribed by the 1982 joint communiqué and that Washington favors Taiwan’s de facto independence.

**C. POST-COLD WAR TRENDS**

In the course of the last ten to twelve years, the U.S.-PRC relationship has been altered by two strategic events. These events are the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union. “The dramatic suppression by the Chinese military of the democratic movement in early June 1989 and then the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the foundation of U.S. Cold War policy and initiated a change in policy toward the two sides.” Consequently, these events increased the significance of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and subsequently lessened the strategic value of PRC considerations in U.S. foreign policy.

1. Tiananmen Incident

Prior to the Tiananmen incident, “President Bush [Sr.] basically followed a similar conceptual framework employed by Reagan in conducting his China policy, which required the United States to maintain official relationships with China and support unofficial, cultural and commercial exchanges with Taiwan.” But, the violent suppression of the student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 shocked Americans with the level of brutality and

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49 Mei-Ling Wang, p. 232.
brought the maturation process of ties between the United States and China to an abrupt end. From June 3-8, 1989, the Chinese Army massacred hundreds of unarmed, pro-democracy student protesters at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The perceived, birth and death of democracy in China was earmarked by this event. The only other event that received as much media coverage in Chinese history was President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972.

This horrific act caused a huge amount of shock and horror among American people as well as among the millions of people around the world that witnessed it, according to public opinion polls. As the PRC’s government worked to recover from this incomprehensible situation, an indelible impression was left on the American public that associated its actions with the communists of old. Each time CNN rebroadcast the scenes of a million or more Chinese surging through the streets of Beijing in protest of corruption, bureaucracy, and dictatorship, Americans became more enraged. American public regard for the PRC after Tiananmen Square was extremely low, according to a Gallup poll conducted six weeks after the massacre. Eighty-seven percent of those polled felt that their actions were unjustified. The communists were characterized as a repressive regime that had no regard for China’s people or the world.

What made this event so vile to the Americans was the level of brutality witnessed on the international stage. Since the protection of human rights had become a high priority to the U.S. Congress, President George H. Bush was inclined to impose sanctions against China. Despite his inclination, he failed to condemn those who were responsible for the killings, although the process of maturing ties between the United States and China came to an impasse. As China lost favor among U.S. policymakers, Taiwan gained favor among them. Thus, “the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 became an opportunity for Taiwan to push for a relaxation in U.S. arms

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sales policy to Taiwan” as a more favorable atmosphere was created in the U.S. Congress for Taiwan.

2. Collapse of the Soviet Union
Soon after the Tiananmen incident, the Soviet Union collapsed. For U.S.-PRC relationships, this was monumental because the United States and China no longer faced a common enemy, causing the United States to review the appropriateness of its earlier “China card” policy. The coalition formed by the United States and China during the 1970s and 1980s to oppose the Soviet Union’s campaign for world hegemony came to an end. Instead of this being the core issue in U.S.-PRC relations, the Taiwan issue once again became the central item of conflict.

This marked the rise of perceptions of the PRC as a regional threat to U.S. interests and led to President George H. Bush’s decision to sell Taiwan (150) F-16 A/B to Taiwan in 1992. Some critics argued his decision “would irreparably damage U.S.-PRC relations and China’s participation in world affairs.” Others argued that, “the sale would help to stabilize the regional balance because China was aggressively seeking more advanced aircraft like Su-27s from Russia.” In view of this, the administration viewed this sale as a means for the United States to maintain the cross strait balance of power, thus creating a slippery slope for the U.S. arms sales policy to Taiwan. After the Soviet Union’s downfall, the value of PRC strategic considerations in U.S. policy began to decline and were conversely offset by the increased strategic value of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

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51 Wei-Chin Lee, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 9, no. 23 (March 2000), p. 64.
52 Ibid., p. 64.
53 Ibid., p. 66.
54 Ibid., p. 65.
55 Ibid., p. 65.
While the Tiananmen incident caused immediate changes to U.S. policy with some
residual effects, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused changes in the international system. It
consequently changed the overall structure of U.S policy and will have long-term effects.\(^5\) However, the aggregate effect of these events created a dilemma for U.S. policy makers by
interrupting numerous long-held strategic continuities in U.S. foreign policy. Thereafter, the
consensus for Taiwan in U.S. policy was temporarily lost. During the 1990s, U.S policy-makers
had to decide whether to support Taiwan’s self-determination\(^7\) or support (PRC) national
sovereignty, which helped maintain world order.\(^8\) Subsequently, policy-makers chose the
former and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increasingly took on the saliency of a de facto defensive
treaty, which gave U.S. policy-makers a means of acknowledging the PRC’s claim to Taiwan
while not affirming it in U.S. foreign policy.

**D. U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY**

1. Implicit Contradictions in U.S. Policy

Within the framework of U.S. arms sales policy to Taiwan, there are implicit
contradictions embedded in the 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué and the TRA which have
allowed numerous large-scale purchases of defensive weaponry by Taiwan. Over the past 19
years under the authority of the TRA, Taiwan has received more than $20 billion worth of
defense weaponry, primarily from the United States. These include: anti-ship missiles; air

\(^5\) Qingmin and Hyer, p. 99.

\(^7\) Taiwan is one of the few countries left in today’s world that deals with the immediate threat of being taken over
by a Communist regime after transitioning from an autocratic government to a democracy. “The people of Taiwan
are ambivalent about forming a new formulation for relations with the mainland, and they are reluctant to see
Taiwan become another Hong Kong or Macao under Beijing’s control.” See Larry Wortzel and Stephen Yates, What
the Election in Taiwan Should Mean to Washington and Beijing. Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No.
November 2000]. Its self-determination is its autonomous capability of protecting its democratic liberties and rights
such as the right to free elections, a free press, a free market economy, and minimal human rights violations through
the support of U.S. sales to Taiwan.

\(^8\) Belloccchi, p. 1.
defense missiles; tanks; air-to-air missiles for the 150 F-16 fighters sold in 1992; Stinger surface-
to-air missiles; frigates; Cobra helicopters; anti-submarine torpedoes; early warning aircraft; and
a host of air defense radar and communication systems.\textsuperscript{59} In midst of the numerous sales,
Beijing has continually protested them and continually evoked the terms of 1982 joint
communiqué, specifically paragraph six which states,

\ldots the United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long-
term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed,
either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent
years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States
and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan,
leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.\textsuperscript{60}

These protests have mostly been ignored.\textsuperscript{61} Such large quantities of weaponry directly affect the
ROC’s ability to sustain combat operations, a key factor influencing the costs of an attack on
Taiwan by the PRC. Although the PRC’s order of battle (OOB) is numerically superior to
Taiwan’s and is currently estimated at a 7 to 1 ratio, ROC defense planners estimate that its
armed forces are capable of withstanding a prolonged military attack by the PRC for a maximum
of 90 days without U.S. intervention.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Joint Communiqué of the United States and the People’s Republic of China}, 17 August 1982. Available [Online].
\texttt{<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm>} [22 March 2002].
\textsuperscript{61} “U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan have to be undertaken within the statutory and institutional framework. Such arms
deals always exasperate the PRC, which cites the terms of the 1982 Sino-U.S. Communiqué. The U.S. justifies the
transfer on the Authorization of the Taiwan Relations Act. The question becomes a textbook case concerning the
competition between international law and domestic law. U.S. administrations have repeatedly claimed that the 1982
Communiqué was only a policy, not law. However the term ‘treaty’ in the U.S. Constitution refers only to those
international agreements made by the President with the consent of the Senate. Since the Senate never approved the
1982 Communiqué, the power of the Communiqué is certainly less than the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which was
duly passed by Congress. The lack of a clear legal demarcation between the 1982 Communiqué and the 1979 TRA
has advantages and disadvantages. By claiming that both are legitimate documents, the U.S. maintains a strategic
flexibility for promulgating its own security interest.” See Lee, p. 67.
2. Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act

The Executive Summary of the December 19, 2000 “Pentagon Report on the Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act” acknowledges the PRC’s claim to Taiwan, and continues by stipulating that,

The United States takes its obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously…This is not only because it is mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but also because it is in our own national interest. As long as Taiwan has a capable defense, the environment will be more conducive to peaceful dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable.\textsuperscript{62}

It also states that the aims of U.S. arms sales are “to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability, while also reinforcing regional stability.”\textsuperscript{63} In reference to these goals, ROC armed forces have been supplied with U.S. weapon systems\textsuperscript{64} to maintain a credible self-defense capable of accomplishing the following defensive goals:

1. Maintaining an effective national surveillance and warning network.

2. Maintaining sovereign control over Taiwanese territories, being able to deter, limit or contain various internal and external violations, excluding the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

3. Being able to reinforce the state of readiness in exposed areas with the appropriate military means.

4. Being able to put up the strongest possible defense against blockades and other forms of PRC military aggression.

5. Preparing adequate facilities for receiving allied military reinforcements in the case of an unprovoked military attack by the PRC.


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid. \url{http://taiwanstudies.org/view_story.php3?287}

\textsuperscript{64} A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel [requirements] and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency. \textit{Dictionary of Military Terms: U.S. Department of Defense}. p. 409.
Since 1979, the TRA has provided Taiwan a means of maintaining a self-defensive capability, although the ROC government has never officially declared its independence from the PRC. 65 Above and beyond that, the majority of the world does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state. In sum, Taiwan’s de facto independence is awkward and insecure from the perspective of international law and the international system. 66

With these factors in mind, the PRC believes that regional peace and stability will ultimately be served by ending the long-standing civil war with Taiwan through reunification with the mainland. This is based on four principles:

1. Beijing’s preference for a peaceful resolution.
2. China’s sovereign and legitimate claim to Taiwan.
3. Beijing’s readiness to use force if necessary. Thus, the rationale for using force remains firmly within Beijing’s belief system; China is a sovereign state; Taiwan is an inalienable part of China; If Taiwan declares its independence, if Taiwan is occupied by a foreign country, if it acquires nuclear weapons or continually reject negotiations to the settlement of the cross-Strait reunification over an inordinate amount of time, it is the right of the Chinese government to use any means to restore order and maintain its national integrity.
4. Chinese decision-makers’ and the public’s perception of the United States as an interloper in regards to Taiwan.

Working within this framework, the PRC believes it will be able to enhance the Asia-Pacific’s fragile security environment by solidifying its sovereign claim over Taiwan.

Although Taiwan lacks international legitimacy, the consensus among U.S. policy makers is that Taiwan’s de facto independence has been a resounding success according to the goals stipulated by paragraph 2a in the TRA. 67

...(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation

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66 Ibid. pp. 174-175.
of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{68} U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have helped preserve the substance of this relationship through providing the ROC an effective military means of accomplishing the five goals of its national defense and to develop without the constraints of a socialist system. Overall, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 have unequivocally enhanced Taiwan’s self defense capability by modernizing its armed forces’ orders of battle, military facilities, and ability to absorb new military technologies. This supports internal regime stability through promoting regional peace and stability through deterrence, regardless of the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan, a major roadblock in its path to becoming a legitimate major power in the international community.

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III. U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

A. INTRODUCTION

A decision by leaders to initiate or join a civil war is fundamentally a political decision, as is the decision to continue fighting in one. \(^{69}\) Since the processes by which civil wars are generally fought are usually influenced by political choices, the United States’ decisions to sell military arms to Taiwan have been a major factor in deterring the PRC from attacking Taiwan. Thus, the U.S. goal—as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue may be furthered by supporting a credible deterrent that will significantly increase the PRC’s cost of reunification in terms of political, economic and military factors when pursued by other means than a peaceful resolution. Post-1979 arms sales to Taiwan are at the core of this process, and they reflect the dynamic nature of the numerous competing interests and policy objectives defined in the TRA, many of which have changed since 1979 and continue to evolve. \(^{70}\) This chapter will analyze the aggregate affect of post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship.

A government’s legitimacy depends on the extent to which it can make a plausible claim to represent the will of its people. \(^{71}\) Through the implementation of the TRA, Taiwan’s fundamental interests, such as its economic, territorial, political, and social integrity, have been secured and hence have promoted the prosperity of its people since the normalization of

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\(^{69}\) D. Scott Bennett, and Allan C. Stam III, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” American Political Science Review, 90, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 239.

\(^{70}\) Following this formula of deterrence “if a military clash occurred, even a limit one, tremendous damage would done, both to Taiwan and to U.S.-China relationships. Failure to deter conflict also would be regarded in Asia as a failure of U.S. leadership.” See Richard D. Fisher, “China’s Threat to Taiwan Challenge U.S. Leadership in Asia.” Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, 139 (March 1996), p. 1. Availble [Online]. <http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/asc139.html> [20 March 2002]. Thus, the United States must maintain its outright commitment to Taiwan in order to reduce suspicions and doubts from other allies in the region about the United States’ reliability in keeping its defense commitments. See Lee, p. 70.

diplomatic relationships between the United States and China. It has also supported U.S. foreign policy goals, such as deterring aggression, promoting democracy, and ensuring U.S. economic access to important markets, commodities, and trading partners on Taiwan. Although this directly conflicts with the PRC’s current protocol policy as defined by its 2000 White Paper “The One China Policy and the Taiwan Issue,” the PRC has not recently conveyed any warnings about downgrading Sino-U.S. relations.\(^72\) Thus, the United States has been able to maintain very complex, but relatively stable relationships with the Taiwan and China, while promoting the prosperity of the American people.

For the United States, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 manifested new strategic implications, primarily because the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan had been abrogated. Thereafter, the TRA served as the basic framework for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, granting the President and the Congress a considerable amount of diplomatic latitude when dealing arms to Taiwan.

Clearly, after the Cold War, arms sales have become an important aspect of foreign trade used to improve the balance of payments and generate employment in the high tech sector. During the 1980s the United States experienced economic decline and a dramatic increase in the trade deficit. Compared to other sectors of the economy, the U.S. is by far the most competitive in the world arms market and military technology.\(^73\)

On the one hand, this diluted the actual intent and purpose of post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which was best exemplified by the President George H. Bush’s decision to sell F-16 fighter aircraft in 1992.\(^74\) But on the other hand, for Taiwan this indicated an increased level of

\(^73\) Qingmin and Hyer, p. 103.
\(^74\) Post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan created a major source of foreign exchange, which has contributed to a favorable trade balance, and boosted domestic employment. To a lesser extent they also helped “...reduce unit R&D cost, defray high learning cost associated with the initial stage of production of complex systems, and help preserve critical manufacturing capabilities and labor skills. All of these factors were expressed in various ways... by advocates of the 1992 Bush Administration decision to sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan.” See Karl W.
U.S. support for its de facto independence. Accordingly, a number of Taiwan’s procurements since 1979 have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked credible links to its real military needs. In sum, this suggests that in terms of overall dollar amounts of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 through FMS, a major portion of them has primarily been made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the U.S. domestic industry and for political gains.\textsuperscript{75}

Prior to stepping down, Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first president, resolutely stated that “only through actual power will there be survival, only with survival will there be prosperity.”\textsuperscript{76}

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\textsuperscript{76} Yi Ming. “HK Article says U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan to Create ‘Tripartite Problem.’” Hong Kong, Ching Pao, 1 April 2001, no. 285, 78-80. FBIS translation. Document ID number CPP20010410000094. In 1999, then President Lee Teng-hui first articulated Taiwan’s politically authoritative definition on special state-to-state relations, which triggered a new period of heightened tensions in the cross-strait relations prior to its 2000 presidential election. Within this politically authoritative definition there were two propositions described. First, he proposed that negotiations with the PRC should continue to move forward only after the PRC recognized Taiwan as an equal political entity. Second, he announced that Taiwan rejected the “one country, two systems” formula for reunification with the mainland. This implied that Taiwan is an independent state and designated parity and freedom as preconditions for reunification with the mainland. These statements convinced PRC leadership that the ROC’s next logical step would be an attempt at de jure independence. Consequently, prior to its election the PRC responded to his assertion by publishing the 2000 white paper entitled “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, which reinforced that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. Also it restated the PRC’s intentions to use force in order to maintain its territorial integrity. Although, President elect Chen Shui-bian inherited Lee Teng-hui’s politically authoritative legacy he has since tried to quell the controversy by declining to push for the inclusion of the so-called special state-to-state provisions in the ROC Constitution. But, there is no doubt that this formula will continue to influence the ROC’s political views about its relations with the Mainland well into the future, primarily because the ROC has not rescinded it, they have only stopped using the term. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has helped increase its level of confidence and enabled it to become more politically authoritative in face of the PRC’s self-serving preconditions for cross-strait dialogue and negotiations (the one country, two systems) and the eight-point proposition made by President Jiang Zemin on China’s reunification, thereby paralyzing cross-strait relations. See Ronald N. Montaperto, James J. Przystup and Gerald W. Faber, “‘One China’ and Relations Across the Taiwan
For Taiwan, its armed forces are a symbol of its national power controlled by political leaders for national purposes. According to its 2000 defense policy:

Because of the growing military threat from the PRC, our nation must, for the sake of survival and development as well as the safeguarding of its constitutional democracy and its people’s life and property, continue to maintain sufficient defense capabilities. It is necessary… Hence the defense preparations and defense readiness of the ROC are purely for self-defense and peacekeeping.  

Therefore, in order for the Taiwan’s armed forces to move beyond a mere national symbol and to be a viable defense force, its armed forces’ structure must be well-equipped with adequate technologies, sufficient numbers of combat systems, well-trained, and adequately sustained for combat action. Post-1979 U.S. arms sales have provided Taiwan with adequate military equipment, technological assistance and an informal or “tactical” alliance, which augments the island’s defenses.

According to the DOD “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authority Act,”

China’s main national policy priority remains economic reform and development within an environment that is both peaceful and stable. To that end, Beijing has avoided activities that might threaten its economic growth and its access to foreign markets, investment, and technology. In initiating a military conflict with Taiwan, Beijing would run the risk of jeopardizing both its continued economic development and its political standing, especially among those regional states with which it has unresolved territorial disputes.
Fundamentally, this places U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the core of the PRC’s drive to sustain economic prosperity because the Taiwan issue has the potential of embroiling the entire region into a conflict, thus, affecting the PRC’s political calculus. In this regard, Japan—China’s largest trading partner—will potentially support the U.S. position if Taiwan is attacked by China. This is implied in the guidelines of the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century,” which call for cooperation to meet “…situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.”

While Taiwan is not specifically mentioned, there are strong reasons to believe that it will be included, in accordance with Japan’s 2001 White Paper. Although some of Taiwan’s procurements since 1979 lacked credible links to its real military needs, their aggregate value is indisputable because they have principally formed a credible deterrent to the PRC’s aggression by specifically increasing its overall strategic advantages and decreasing its strategic vulnerabilities.

In assessing the value of post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship, three areas will be addressed. They include the preservation of Taiwan’s democratic ways, Taiwan’s self-defense capability, and the cross-strait balance of military power. An analysis of these areas will provide a precise measurement of the effects that post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have had in the complex cross-strait relationship.

\[81\] “Deterrence at levels below the strategic differ strikingly from the strategic case in that it is primarily a question of influencing the opponent’s political calculus of the acceptable cost and risks of his potential initiative rather than simply threatening overwhelming military cost. The operational criteria for selection among means are dominated not by technical or tactical but by diplomatic and political factors.” See George and Smoke, p. 5.


relationship. A discussion will follow in chapter five on the significance of the U.S. role in this relationship and whether U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increase the likelihood of a PRC attack.

**B. PRESERVATION OF TAIWAN’S DEMOCRATIC WAYS**

American historical perspectives of China’s perceived inadequacies have transcended the Cold War and boiled over into the United States’ current foreign policy decisions through the implementation of the TRA, a de facto security treaty.\(^8^5\) For all intents and purposes from Taiwan’s perspective, U.S. arms sales after 1979 primarily supported its self-determination and allowed Taiwan to maintain its claim to sovereignty by deterring PRC aggression. U.S. arms sales also lent tacit support to the Taiwan authorities’ ambitious foreign policy goal of one day defeating the PLA and reuniting China under its leadership. This ambitious goal was advocated by the Taiwan authorities officially until the end of the Cold War, but in 1991, after martial law was lifted, its connotations diminished and different means of unification which were less attached to the “one country, two system” approach were openly discussed and explored in Taiwan.\(^8^6\) Thus, the end of martial law on Taiwan lifted government controls over the populace.

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\(^8^4\) The susceptibility of vital elements of national power to being seriously decreased or adversely changed by the application of actions within the capability of another nation to impose. Strategic vulnerabilities may pertain to political, geographic, economic, scientific, sociological, or military factors. Ibid., p. 362.

\(^8^5\) “There are two primary political patterns in the world today.” One is the pattern loosely termed democracy or more abstractly termed liberal-democracy, a form of government found in chiefly in the West. The other is communism, a pattern this is much more homogeneous than liberal-democracy, now found primarily in east and northeast Asia (China and North Korea) since the end of the Cold War. “Both creeds claim to satisfy man’s deepest needs…” See Denis W. Brogan and Douglas V. Verney, *Political Patterns in Today’s World* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1963), p. 1. For the United States its foreign policies decisions are still fundamentally based on the deep ideologically divide between American capitalism and Chinese communism that developed during the 1950s and 1960s.

\(^8^6\) By February 1991, Taiwan’s National Unification Council had adopted a new approach to unification, which was outlined in the document entitled the Guidelines for National Unification. This document’s means of reunification was fundamentally different than the PRC’s. Instead of the “one country, two systems” scheduled approach with final unification occurring after Macao’s return in 1999, their approach was less rigid and based on mutual respect and reciprocity. It required a more equitable distribution of power and was more aptly described as the “one China, two areas, two political entities,” ‘peaceful and democratic unification of China,’ and ‘a three-phase, no time frame approach to unification.” See Mei-Ling Wang, p. 317. The first phase of reunification would begin with exchanges and reciprocity, followed by increased mutual trust and cooperation in the second phase, ending with consultation and unification in the third phase. This abstract approach on behalf of the unification of China brought no conciliatory measures from Beijing, although peace was maintained until 1995. “The prospect for Cross-Strait
and ushered in a period of radical political reconstruction of the Nationalist state, culminating in 1996 with Taiwan’s first direct presidential election.\textsuperscript{87}

Although the Taiwan authorities link Taiwan’s ability to procure more advanced weaponry from the United States to the level of confidence that the people of Taiwan have in democracy, they fully understand arms procurement is not the only way to defend its national security. They believe that “true and permanent peace can be achieved only through constructive dialogue and normalization of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”\textsuperscript{88} But, in the wake of the PRC’s devastating experience with socialism and the successful implementation of democracy in Taiwan, the great divide between them has continued to widen.\textsuperscript{89} In view of this, Taiwan is impelled to purchase defensive weapons to meet its basic security needs and protect its people from military threat in the face of the PRC’s threat to of force against Taiwan, its intensified deployment of Taiwan-targeting missiles, and its reluctance to resume cross-strait dialogue.\textsuperscript{90}

relations certainly looked promising in the first half of 1995, when leaders from the two sides issued their blueprints for the improvement of relations. PRC President Jiang Zemin made his eight-point proposal on January 30, 1995, urging that a Cross-Strait summit be held on Chinese soil and suggesting that ‘talks be initiated and an agreement be reached on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits under the principle of one China. ROC President Lee Teng-hui responded on April 8, 1995 by issuing a six-point proposal to ‘pave the way for peace talks on ending the state of hostility.’ President Lee Teng-hui also urged Beijing to recognize that ‘both sides should be assured of the ability to joint international organizations on an equal footing’ and said that leaders of both sides may ‘meet on international occasions.’ See Cheng-Yi Lin, “Confidence-Building Measures in the Taiwan Strait,” \textit{American Foreign Policy Interests}, 23, no. 2 (2001), p. 88. This optimistic period ended after President Lee Teng-hui’s historic visit to Cornell University in June of 1995 that helped precipitate the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. As indicated by the denouement of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the Taiwan issue has the potential to gravely alter East Asia’s security balance and regional stability in which the U.S. has a major interest.

\textsuperscript{89} PRC leaders consistently ignored the impact that imperialism has on Taiwan authorities’ thoughts about unification with the mainland and the Taiwan’s insistence of its democratization as a prerequisite to unification is irrelevant, while for the Taiwan without committed progress toward democracy and the renouncement of using violence in the process of unification, negotiations will be impossible with the PRC. See Mei-Ling Wang, p. 317.
\textsuperscript{90} Sofia Wu.
As a result, Taiwan’s political landscape has drastically changed over the past 10 to 12 years and is vastly different than it was during most of the Cold War. The democratization of its politics, which was championed by the United States, has significantly changed Taipei’s approach to unification with the mainland.

…Beijing asserts that Taiwan is part of [China] and demands that Taiwan accept the principle of “one China” as a basis for negotiations aimed at eventual reunification…For its part, Taipei rejects Beijing’s version of “one China” and demands that Beijing deal with Taiwan on an equal basis. Taipei has traditionally predicated unification on the condition that China attain levels of economic and democratic development similar to those enjoyed on Taiwan.91

In view of that, over the years the Taiwan has settled into a prosperous way of life and is willing to face total annihilation in order to maintain it. By achieving democracy in their own country, the Taiwanese are very reluctant to surrender it by recognizing Beijing’s sovereignty over it. From this perspective, U.S. foreign policy confused deterrence with liberation primarily because it championed Taiwan’s democratization, although it is officially acknowledged as a part of China.92 On the one hand, democracy has strengthened Taiwan’s internal political stability; but on the other hand, it will impede reunification. Thus, Taiwan’s means of accomplishing its five self-defense goals and its capacity to maintain a free market economy, free elections, a free press, and minimum human rights violations (at least compared to the PRC) for its 23 million people is in essence its rights to independent sovereignty and self determination.

92 According to the Joint Communiqué of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relationships Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America January 1, 1979, “the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979. The United States recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relationships with the people of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China and the United States of America reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that…The Government of the United States of America acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” See Rhode and Whitlock, p. 202.
C. SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITY

1. Taiwan’s Procurement Process

It is widely held that the Taiwan weapon procurement process is a major factor in determining Taiwan’s weapon procurements.\textsuperscript{93} However, this is accurate only to the degree to which this policy is given expression by Taiwanese authorities and appears as a formal decision in Taiwan. In reality, Taiwan’s military procurements are determined by factors in which the Taiwanese authorities has little influence. On the one hand, “developments in Taiwan’s military procurement program are driven by the military threat from China and Taiwan’s increasing political and diplomatic isolation.”\textsuperscript{94} But on the other hand, according to the TRA, “the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely on their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law.”\textsuperscript{95} In view of this, the main task of Taiwan’s military procurement process is to stay informed about these factors and their interplay and to attempt to influence the selection of specified U.S. weapon systems by the President and U.S. Congress. This abstract relationship has inextricably linked Taiwan’s survival to U.S. arms sales.

To date, it has been relatively successful because recent procurements have included F-16 fighters, Knox class frigates, and the Modified Air Defense System—a Patriot system derivative.\textsuperscript{96} Also, pending arms transfers include the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air

\textsuperscript{94} McClaran, p. 623.
\textsuperscript{95} Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, \texttt{<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/taiwact.htm>}
Missiles (AMRAAM), HARPOON anti-ship missile systems (RGM-84L), and Kidd class destroyers.

The basic concept of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to seek a deterrence balance. It is to enable Taiwan to maintain superiority in some key areas so that Communist China will have to pay a heavy price if it wants to invade Taiwan by force and will thus refrain from taking hasty action...[also it] increase[s] the complexity in assessing the feasibility of armed invasion by Communist China through increasing Taiwan’s superiority in some key fields.

“Thus, while Taiwan’s national defense strategy calls for balanced development of the three armed forces, naval and air supremacy receive first priority.” Maintaining a balance between the Taiwan’s air force and increasing the defensive capabilities of its navy are the primary goals of Taiwan’s present self-defense campaign because its army is no longer the primary defense force. The collaborative strength of the air force and navy is what forms the base of President Chen Shui-bian’s “decisive war outside the borders” philosophy. In practice, they will be used to deter any form of military aggression by the PRC across the 72-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, from contesting a blockade to defending against air attacks as they try to keep China’s military at bay.

As a result of post-1979 U.S. arms transfers, Taiwan’s armed forces have been transformed into one of the most technologically advanced forces in Asia Pacific.

Taiwan’s military modernization—its $11.2 billion defense budget is roughly the size of the defense expenditures of all ASEAN states combined—has directly

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97 “It is worth noting from the U.S. sale of AIM-120 advanced intermediate air-to-air missiles, that this is currently the world's most advanced intermediate range air-to-air missile that has been deployed in actual combat. It possesses fire-and-forget and multiple target strike capabilities. It serves as major in-service air combat equipment for the US Air Force. It is equipped with advanced Doppler radar, has a maximum range of 80 km and a flight speed close to Mach 4. This is the first time the United States will sell it to the Asian region, and [it is] also one of the advanced weapons that Taiwan’s military has struggled [to obtain] for many years.” Wang Weixing. “PRC Daily Decries US Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Beijing, Guangming Ribao, 23 March 2001. FBIS translation. Document ID: CPP20010328000073.


impacted the PRC’s modernization. With 150 F-16s and 60 Mirage fighters, Taiwan will have one of the most modern air forces in the world.\textsuperscript{101}

The procurement of the 150 F-16 fighters was an essential element in Taiwan’s overall self-defense capability, primarily because it is dependent on air power.\textsuperscript{102} Without a modern and capable air force, Taiwan’s ability to deter the PRC would be negligible.

2. Case Studies

President George H. Bush’s decision to sell the F-16 to Taiwan in 1992 fundamentally changed the composition of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, because prior to this agreement FMS had not exceeded $710 million. This was the largest arms sales agreement between the United States and Taiwan, which totaled over $6.2 billion. Also, it was a large departure from the conventional wisdom used by the Carter and Reagan administrations regarding arms sales to Taiwan. Previously the Carter administration had rejected Taiwan’s request for advanced aircraft because it believed that there was no military need for such an advanced aircraft, and it also counseled the Reagan administration to do the same.

[The]… primary consideration was whether these aircraft are required to meet likely threats in the 1980s from an equally advanced aircraft, or whether their sale would tend to stimulate the development of advanced aircraft by the PRC as a response. Since it was thought that the PRC was unlikely to have upgraded aircraft in service for 10 to 15 years, it was deemed unnecessary for Taiwan to possess advanced aircraft. Such logic indicated that Taiwan’s needs would be fulfilled only after the PRC took the first move in attempting to gain supremacy.\textsuperscript{103}

Although this decision was made in the wake of the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union, these strategic events, or the considerations that the Carter and Reagan

\textsuperscript{102} In 1992 Taiwan agreed to purchase 150 F-16A/B aircraft from the United States. This also included 40 spare engines, 900 Sidewinder missiles, 600 Sparrow missiles, and 500,000 rounds of 20-millimeter (mm) cannon shells. See Hickey, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{103} Lee, pp. 59-60.
administrations used, were not key determinants in the sale of the F-16 to Taiwan. Under extreme political pressure President George H. Bush used the PRC’s reported acquisition of 72 Su-27 fighter and 24 MiG-31 aircrafts in 1992 to justify his decision on selling Taiwan 150 F-16 A/Bs in 1992. However, most critics linked his decision to sell nearly twice as many aircraft to Taiwan with the 1992 Presidential campaign, where he lagged behind Democratic challenger Bill Clinton in the contest for Texas’ 32 electoral votes, instead of Taiwan’s practical military needs. His announcement came on September 2, 1992 in Fort Worth, Texas where General Dynamic’s headquarters was located. It was estimated that this deal would generate 11,000 jobs nationwide over six years, reaching a total of 18,000 jobs in the 1996-1997 timeframe when the aircraft would be delivered to Taiwan. No significant congressional opposition developed as the deal materialized. In a prepared statement by Dr. Natalie Goldring, the deputy director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a pro-arms control independent research group, it was stated that “President Bush’s cynical attempts to buy off Texas is just too blatant, going to the factory gates and handing out jobs is not the right way to conduct our nation’s national security policy.” Although he eventually lost the election, his overt use of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to satisfy influential advocates and beneficiaries of the United States’ domestic industry worked, but larger strategic implications for U.S. foreign policy would develop as a consequence.

Taiwan’s procurement of the F-16 categorically violated the content of the 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué on arms sales by overtly increasing the quantity and quality of U.S. arms.

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sold to Taiwan. Prior to President Bush’s decision, FMS had not exceeded $710 million and was widely regarded as being near or beneath the ceiling amount set by the United States in 1983. This indicated that the United States clearly intended to establish a long and enduring relationship with Taiwan, effectively linking the escalatory nature of the PRC’s modernization effort with the procurement of future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

a. F-16 Fighting Falcon

In 2002 Taiwan finally commissioned both wings of its F-16 fleet, bringing them into full service, and it is reported that President Chen Shui-bian vowed to maintain pace with the Chinese arms build up. He also stated that, “we have no intention to engage in an arms race… We only hope to establish strategic stability in the Taiwan Strait.”

These remarks were made in the context of the June 2000 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” published by the U.S. Department of Defense. This report stressed that,

In the long term (2010-2020), China’s quantitative edge over Taiwan’s military forces will increase…After 2005, however, if projected trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China’s favor, assuming no significant, concurrent improvement in Taiwan’s air capabilities.

In light of the report’s findings some of the weaponry that the Taiwan has already procured, such as the F-16, possess a substantial growth capability and a high degree of integration that

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106 Ibid., p. 355.
109 “According to a representative at the Lockheed Martin Corporation, growth capability is defined as the F-16s ability to integrate new avionic systems, sensors, and weapons. Growth parameters are usually defined by: weight, space, cooling, electrical power, data bus capacity, and computing capacity. Some of these capabilities (such as most new weapons) can be integrated with just a software changes to the core avionics computers, i.e., no hardware change to the aircraft itself.” Context of the statement was received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on January 31, 2002.
110 “Integrability encompasses both the amount of development and modification effort required to incorporate new systems and stores on the F-16. In this regard, it is very accommodating, particularly because it has the ability to share the development costs of these new systems and stores with other users.” Context of the statement was
must be exploited in order to help Taiwan maintain the balance of air power across the strait.

This is best exemplified through an upgrade similar to the F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade that Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s received and through another upgrade (M3) that is currently being sold to European Participating Air Forces (EPAF) that can easily be adapted for the Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s.

(1) F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU)

Originally the F-16 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) was designed strictly for NATO aircraft, but following extensive complaints lodged by Taiwan about the F-16 A/B’s inability to adequately fulfill its defensive requirements, the U.S. government sold the Taiwan an upgrade similar to the F-16 MLU. The F-16 Block 20, which Taiwan started receiving in 1997 has a standard avionics configuration that is similar to F-16 MLU. It includes a modular mission computer, color digital displays and the AN/APX-111 identification friend or foe system (IFF).

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Also, according to a representative of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, “the Block 20 has some unique capabilities for the F-16A/B, such as being able carry the AIM-7 Sparrow air-

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to-air missile and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile capability, compared to other versions of the F-16 A/B.\(^{114}\) Taiwan is the only country that received this configuration, which made the F-16 A/B Block 20 a more capable combat platform than some of the early versions F-16C/D.\(^{115}\)

By modifying the original components and airframe of Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s, its overall operational performance has been improved through increasing its reliability, supportability and maintainability. In addition the upgrade brings the cockpit up to similar standards of later models of the F-16C/D.\(^{116}\) Consequently, it has significantly enhanced Taiwan’s F-16s, capability to fire advanced weaponry and detect enemy aircraft at a greater distance. Through this upgrade its fleet of F-16’s service life and combat capability have been considerably boosted to help maintain a deterrence balance in its air force.

(2) F-16 M3 Upgrade

After Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s received the upgrade similar to the F-16 MLU, the Lockheed Martin Corporation designed and made provisions for the sales of a new modification kit that will be used in several EPAFs. “These kits will be used to upgrade F-16s previously modified with the F-16A/B Mid-Life Update (MLU), and operated by the air forces of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.”\(^{117}\) If trends continue and the balance of air power begins to shift in favor of the PRC, Taiwan will be able to purchase modifications similar to what the M3 kits offers for its fleet of F-16s. Significant changes include:

- “Link 16–secure, jam-resistant, high-volume, data communications that significantly increase pilot situation awareness.”\(^{118}\)

\(^{114}\) Context of the statement was received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on January 25, 2002.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) January 25, 2002.


• “Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System–new U.S. helmet display for improved situation awareness and employment of high-off-boresight weapons.”\textsuperscript{119}

• “Upgraded processors and displays–[with] lower cost [and] improved supportability.”\textsuperscript{120}

• “U.S. family of new ‘smart weapons’–Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Stand-Off Weapon, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser–provide all-weather, precision attack from standoff distances.”\textsuperscript{121}

• “There are also enhancements to existing systems including the multimode radar, electronic warfare management system and reconnaissance pods.”\textsuperscript{122}

• “The MLU program shares a common avionics architecture and has extensive hardware and software commonality with the U.S. Air Force’s Common Configuration Implementation Program, a major cockpit and avionics upgrade to about 650 Block 40/50 F-16C/Ds.”\textsuperscript{123}

Although some of these modifications are not currently applicable for non-NATO aircraft, they exemplify the F-16’s extraordinary growth capability and high levels of integration. As the PRC continues to buy more advanced weaponry from the Soviet Union, Taiwan will have the ability to continually upgrade its fleet of F-16s with more advanced sensors and weapons because these technological advances can be easily adapted for its aircraft. In sum, the present level of technology that Taiwan possesses will help sustain the cross-strait balance of air power with its substantial growth capability and high level of technical and tactical integration over the long run (2010–2020).\textsuperscript{124}


\textsuperscript{124} “Currently the Lockheed Martin Corporation is working on an retrofit upgrade program for Taiwan’s F-16s that include: Global Position System, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-Air Missile, and a targeting pod capability (such as LANTIRN). This will give its [Taiwan’s] F-16s the advance capabilities for precision navigation, enhanced beyond-visual range intercept …[beyond the limited range of the AIM-7 air to air missile]… autonomous day/night precision strike with laser-guided weapons and target/weapon seeker cueing. There could be additional upgrades that may be made available for Taiwan’s fleet of F-16s in the future.” Context of the statement was received via email from Michael J. Nipper (Michael.j.nipper@lmco.com) at the Lockheed Martin Corporation on January 25, 2002.
In the defense of Taiwan against China, the F-16 would be the primary weapon system used to deflect or slow down PRC air assaults. It is a compact multi-role fighter aircraft with fourth generation technology. In addition, it is considered one of the world’s best fighter aircraft and a force multiplier, an aircraft that can perform either air-to-air or air-to-surface roles according to its weapon load-out. In this context, the F-16’s versatility was demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm.

During Desert Storm, 249 x F-16s of all models, flew approximately 13,500 sorties with about 4,000 at night. The average sortie duration for F-16s was 3.24 hours... F-16s were asked to perform combat air patrol, suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air support (CAS) using LANTIRN navigational pod capability, deep air interdiction (AI), Wild Weasel escort, and forward air control (FAC) missions as well as psychological operations with pamphlet drops deep inside of Iraq. F-16 availability was very high having flown over 34% of the total USAF sorties and delivered thousands of tons of munitions. Very few sorties were lost to attrition or aborts.  

Air power took a huge step forward in terms of credibility and perceived importance after the opening days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The F-16’s high level of integration and operational readiness during Desert Storm coincides with Taiwan’s defensive needs and suggest that the potential effectiveness of its fleet of F-16s will be truly strategic during a crisis with the PRC.

For Taiwan, the F-16 would be used as a fighter-bomber primarily because it does not possess any heavy bombers. In addition, it is a proven combat platform with superior maneuverability, a long combat radius (approximately 570 miles) and capable of carrying numerous air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, including the AIM-7 SPARROW and

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HARPOON missiles.\textsuperscript{128} These capabilities significantly strengthen its air force’s defensive strategy, primarily because Taiwan has a limited amount of airspace to defend. Although the PRC posses an overwhelming advantage in terms of its overall numbers, it would be impossible for the Chinese Communists to send all their aircraft over at once; each attack would be limited to 200 aircraft at the outside, attacking in a maximum of three waves a day.\textsuperscript{129} According to military planners, this level of attack can be handled by Taiwan’s current air order of battle (AOOB). These facts make the F-16 a formidable combat platform, but it would be particularly potent in an attack by the PRC because of the small airspace over Taiwan.

b. Kidd Class Destroyer

“A fundamental stability in the military balance and a very low profile have been the key features of U.S.-Taiwan military relations during the twenty some years of the Taiwan Relations Act. Both these features are changing, however.”\textsuperscript{130} Economic imperatives and the impact that arms sales have on the arms industry are a primary concern of the Congress and the Executive branch, however the latest arms package destined for Taiwan is firmly linked to its real military needs and the Bush administration’s foreign policy initiatives. In April 2001, Washington announced the largest and most comprehensive arms package to Taipei since 1992, which included four Kidd-class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and 12 P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft. This deal, “which infuriated China, followed a two-year U.S. review of Taiwan's air force and navy.”\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{130} Bellocchi., p. 158.

The acquisition of these platforms is aimed at substantially boosting the Taiwanese Navy’s combat capability in accordance with its defense strategy and the findings of the DOD report to Congress on the military power of the PRC. After these platforms are incorporated into Taiwan’s naval forces with existing equipment like the Lafayette class frigates that it acquired from France, Taiwan will be able to deploy four attack groups with the ability to hunt, detect, track and engage aircraft, surface and sub-surface vessels.

According to Li Chieh-nien, commander of Taiwan’s navy, the significance of the Kidd-class destroyer is monumental.

In [the] future, we will form four attack groups centered on those warships of a new model and assign them such a task as ‘moving towards distant sea waters.’ If everything goes on smoothly, our navy is expected to receive all four missile destroyers; deploy the four attack groups mentioned above; and assign these groups such a task as 'moving towards distant sea waters’ over the next three to five years in order to ‘counter a threat from the mainland's superior forces in 2005.’

These ships are supposed to be delivered in 2003 and are the most powerful multi-purpose destroyers that the United States has to offer. The Kidd is characterized as,

- “A ship so quiet, and an ASW system so capable, that she operates offensively against submarines.”\(^{133}\)

- [Possessing] “the most sophisticated medium-range AAW systems in the Fleet, quick reacting and highly accurate, with the capability for today's air defense environment and the growth potential for tomorrows.”\(^{134}\)

- [Having] “an exceptionally reliable and responsive engineering plant.”\(^{135}\)

- [Having] “a deadly surface-to-surface weapons capability.”\(^{136}\)

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\(^{132}\) Xiao Yu. “Pro-Taiwan Forces in United States Again Cook Up Exercise for Arms Sales to Taiwan.” Beijing, Guangming Ribao, 2 February 2001. FBIS translated text. Document ID: CPP20010207000061. [PRC Paper on U.S. Pro-Taiwan Forces Pushing for Arms Sales to Taiwan.]


• “These characteristics make KIDD a triple-threat, one of the few truly multi-mission ships, able to operate offensively, to deal with simultaneous air, surface, and sub-surface attacks.”

The Kidd-class destroyer’s operational capabilities are complemented by an equally as impressive armament package that includes: the Standard missile\(^ {138}\) (Mk-26 launcher); Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles\(^ {139}\) (Mk-141 quad launcher), which are capable of over-the-horizon attacks on surface targets; Mk-46 torpedo\(^ {140}\) (MK-32 triple tube mount); and a five inch 54 caliber MK-45 gun. These armaments make the Kidd-class destroyer a formidable combat platform and increase the Taiwan’s ability to control its territorial waters and adds additional coverage for Taiwan’s limited amount of airspace.

In addition to its robust armament package, the Kidd-class destroyer has an automated communication system and four radars that will enhance the ship’s ability to survive in combat operations. These radars are the SPS-48 (air search), SPG-60 (gun fire control), SPS-55 (surface search) and the SPQ-9A (gun fire control). Of the four different radars that the Kidd-class possesses, the SPS-48 is the most important because it is three-dimensional and allows the ship


\(^{140}\) The MK-46 torpedo is designed to attack high performance submarines, and is presently identified as the NATO standard. The MK-46 torpedo is designed to be launched from surface combatant torpedo tubes, ASROC missiles and fixed and rotary wing aircraft. In 1989, a major upgrade program began to enhance the performance of the MK-46 Mod 5 in shallow water. Weapons incorporating these improvements are identified as Mod 5A and Mod 5A(S). The MK-46 Mod 5 torpedo is the backbone of the Navy's lightweight ASW torpedo inventory and is expected to remain in service until the year 2015. Federation of American Scientist Homepage. MK 46 Torpedo. [DDG-993 Kidd-Class]. 12 December 1998. Available [Online]. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-46.htm> [12 December 2001].
to command a wide area of ocean to defend the other ships in the attack group.\textsuperscript{141} According to Jane’s Defense Weekly,

\begin{quote}
…a Kidd-class destroyer, which is more than twice the size of the largest warship Taiwan’s navy has at the moment, is capable of directing an air defense platform, an antisubmarine platform, as well as a surface combat platform on the sea. Equipped with both the advanced Standard SM-2ER missiles and the 3D radar in their ‘combat systems,’ Kidd-class destroyers are bound to help Taiwan's navy 'make a giant stride forward’ in terms of fighting capacity and raise its fleets’ air defense capability on the sea as well.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

Procurement of the Kidd-class destroyer creates a new set of complexities for the PRC because the Kidd-class destroyer can be easily integrated into an Aegis-equipped warship’s weapons network. The Kidd-class destroyer was designed so that an Aegis-equipped warship could help control and fire its missiles.

The Kidd-class destroyer will be used as a potential transitional platform for Taiwan’s navy to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, which is equipped with Aegis radar system because,

\begin{quote}
…The United States Department of Defense Evaluation Report considers the Aegis a need for Taiwan -- the Kidd warships can act as a transitory program for training Taiwan naval personnel to receive the Aegis warships. There are even United States officials that suggest that the United States navy first purchase an additional four Aegis warships and transfer them to Taiwan for use after waiting for their completion.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{141} The Radar Set AN/SPS-48E is a long-range, three-dimensional, air-search radar system that provides contact range, bearing, and height information to be displayed on consoles/workstations. This is accomplished by using a frequency-scanning antenna which emits a range of different frequencies in the E/F band (10cm). The AN/SPS-48C Radar system is a complete system including all component elements - Transmitter, Receiver, Computer (Radar and Automatic Detection and Tracking), Frequency Synthesizer and Height Display Indicator. The AN/SPS-48E uses a combination of mechanical scanning in azimuth and electronic beam-steering in elevation to provide plan position and height information on targets. Radar videos, converted to digital format, are displayed on consoles/workstations to provide a means for the operators to perform manual radar search, detection and tracking functions. Radar triggers and antenna bearings are used to properly display radar video data on the consoles/workstations. True bearing indications are displayed on the consoles/workstations to indicate whether the track position is displayed in relationship to ownership or true north. Federation of American Scientist Homepage. \textit{AN/SPS-48C Radar. [DDG-993 Kidd-Class]. 30 June 1999. Available [Online]. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-sps-48.htm> [30 January 2002].}

\textsuperscript{142} Xiao Yu.

In response to the PRC’s perceived threat as articulated by the June 2000 report on the military power of the PRC, Taiwan plans on ultimately acquiring an Aegis-equipped warship. Although the PRC has explicitly stated that the procured an Aegis-equipped warship by Taiwan would seriously harm Sino-U.S. relationships, this clearly is the direction in which the United States and Taiwan plan to proceed.

D. DETERRING THE PRC

The deterrent power of conventional weapons is based primarily upon their ability to affect the aggressor country’s political calculus. The conventional deterrent provided by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to maintain its self-defenses is only one of the essential elements required to create a credible deterrent to PRC aggression toward Taiwan. A credible deterrent is set up through a complex relationship in which country X, which is supplying the arms, will support country Y in ways such as arms sales and the threat of immediate military assistance in a crisis that convinces country Z, who is the aggressor, not to attack country Y. This relationship is set up to affect a country’s political calculus, convincing the leadership of country Z, the aggressor, that the cost or risk will be greater than the expected benefits of its actions in terms of military, economic and political factors.

Also affecting the PRC’s political calculus is the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity.” This tactic, along with weapon sales to Taiwan, does not commit the United States to militarily assist Taiwan in a crisis with the PRC, although President George W. Bush’s statement on April 26, 2001 lent credence to full U.S. support of Taiwan in a crisis under certain circumstances. Later, President Bush and other high-ranking officials modified his statement and insisted that the United States did not intend to change its policy on Taiwan. Even though this policy has left

Taiwan with only an ambiguous deterrent, it continues to pay huge dividends in the cross-strait relationship because Beijing has to consider U.S. involvement in a crisis.

On the one hand, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have clearly increased its self-defense capability and added to the complexity of a feasible attack by the PRC.145 Conversely, they have lessened the long-term prospect of peace by adding significant impetus to a new arms race in Asia.

Many analysts and strategists consider war between China and Taiwan to be inevitable. But the possibility that China will decide to use military force to achieve reunification, whether or not Taiwan declares independence, requires a measure of examination and reflection.146

In view of this, the U.S. goals defined by the 2000 DOD “Report on Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act” have diverged, thus limiting the tangible value of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Within this divergence Taiwan still possesses a limited degree of international military and political autonomy, which is indicative of the Taiwan authorities’ survival. But, at least theoretically, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have potentially decreased its cross-strait stability. This conclusion, however, assumes that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have increased the PRC’s propensity to isolate Taiwan politically and increased the efficacy of using military force against Taiwan to achieve reunification.

E. CROSS STRAITS MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER

Since the abrogation of the of the formal defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under the guidance of the TRA have served as a defacto

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145 This proposition assumes that Taiwan has fully assimilated most of the newly acquired weapon systems. “Assimilation refers to the process that takes place between the adoption of a weapon and its use as a fully integrated component of an existing arsenal: that is, the weapon must be absorbed into the tactics, doctrine, and organizational structure of the military establishment.” See Christopher S. Parker, “New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States,” International Security, 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 121.

146 Faber, Montaperto, and Przystup, p. 2.
defense treaty. An aggregate measure of this defacto defense treaty has often been expressed in terms of the cross strait military balance of power.

The fundamental question for assessment is whether the military balance is or is not satisfactory in relation to those U.S. goals. The overarching U.S. goal is to avoid any use or threat of force to resolve differences in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, our goals include that the PRC be persuaded against or deterred from attacking or threatening attack, that if a threat is made it is unavailing, and that if an attack is made it is unsuccessful.¹⁴⁷

In relation to these goals, Taiwan’s deterrence balance in its air force and navy must be visibly maintained by the United States in terms of arms sold to Taiwan in order to persuade or deter the PRC from threatening attack or attacking. Recently, President Chen Shui-bian stated, “the modernization of communist China’s military poses threat to our national security. Therefore, we must constantly upgrade our weapon system.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, what Taiwan perceives as a level of arms necessary for the maintenance of its basic security is viewed by the PRC as a threat to its national security, creating a security dilemma.

1. PRC Modernization
   a. Military Strategy

   It is now generally accepted that Taiwan is the major motivating force behind the modernization and restructuring of the Chinese military. Presently the PRC espouses the belief that it possesses the tactics, means and methods to successfully employ force against Taiwan designed to politically shock and to psychologically and economically distress or overwhelm Taiwan in a decisive war. The crux of this belief is founded in Mao Zedong’s revolutionary

doctrinal writings on national military strategy called people’s war. It was developed during the
Chinese Civil War (1927-1937, 1945-1949) and the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945).\textsuperscript{149}

Although, the PRC never fought such a war after 1949, this concept nevertheless, presumably guided the PRC’s preparation for a future war in the 1960s, as reflected in the economic development of the “third front.” After Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC’s military strategy started to evolve, though grudgingly at times, from a “people’s war” to a “people’s war under modern conditions” in the early 1980’s to a “local, limited war” strategy from 1985-1991. Thus in 1985, responding to its new military strategy, the PRC initiated a modernization effort with the fundamental aim of moving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) away from its traditionally large, unwieldy force structure to a smaller, more efficient one that would be primarily devoted to the PRC’s foreign policy and territorial integrity.

b. The Gulf War

By the early 1990s there was a new development that loomed large in the PRC’s evolving military strategy, and that was the 1991 Gulf War. “The devastation of Iraq’s Soviet-design equipment highlighted the lethality of high-tech weapons and their ability to bring a conflict to a rapid conclusion.”\textsuperscript{150} Consequently, the Gulf War showed the PRC, despite being stronger than most of its neighbors militarily, that its forces were ill equipped to fight such a war. The PRC’s forces lacked modern high-tech platforms and advanced weaponry that such a war would require, and its troops were insufficiently trained. Thus, the emphasis in the PRC’s evolving military strategy shifted from being able to fight a “local, limited war” to being able to fight a “local war under high-tech conditions” after 1991.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 47.
2. People’s Liberation Army’s Present Capabilities

The PLA is the largest conventional force in East Asia, and its modernization must be viewed in terms of its geopolitical ambitions.

China’s primary national goal is to become a strong, modernized, unified, and wealthy nation. It views its national standing in relation to the position of other "great powers." Beijing clearly wants to be recognized as a full-fledged great power. China considers itself a developing power whose natural resources, manpower, nuclear-capable forces, seat on the UN Security Council, and growing economy give it most of the attributes of a great power.151

In addition to its infantry, the PLA has three other service members152--the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Strategic Missile Force (SMF)-- which collectively total 2,480,000153 active duty members. Traditionally the PLAN and PLAAF assumed subordinate roles and were considered mere appendages of the PLA in the past, which was also reflected in their meager military budgets. But the PRC’s shift in military strategy from a “limited local war” to “a local war under high-tech conditions” provided the impetus for these largely relegated forces to emerge with important redefined roles in the PRC’s ambitious foreign policy and national goals.

The PLA’s large size and light infantry emphasis, which it inherited from the “people’s war” era, has hindered the PRC’s modernization effort in the post-Mao era. Nevertheless, the military reforms initiated in 1985 demarcated the PLA’s transition from an antiquated quantitative force to a qualitative force with emerging capabilities. “The major objective for China now is to build its capacity in fighting a high-tech war. China will focus on improving the quality (technological advancements) of its defense rather than maintaining numerical superiority

152 Although the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is a part of the PLA it will not be discussed in this paper because it deals with internal security matters.
in weaponry and military personnel.”¹⁵⁴ Force restructuring and reductions, new equipment acquisitions, and a growing military budget have been boosted by a strong economy. The once revolutionary PLA of old has been transformed into one of East Asia’s most powerful regional threats, with an immediate goal of gaining a decisive advantage in the cross-strait military balance of power and countering Taiwan’s perceived separatist ambition. If the current levels of modernization are maintained, the PLA could potentially emerge as a credible global threat by the middle of the 21st century.¹⁵⁵

3. Force Reductions

In transforming the PLA from a traditionally large and unwieldy force structure to a smaller, more efficient one, the PLA has undergone force reductions. Starting in 1985, the Central Military Commission (CMC) announced a reduction of one million personnel. At the time, this was a 25% reduction of the PLA’s overall force of approximately 4,000,000. Next, in 1998, another massive force cut was announced which would further reduce the PLA’s manpower level by another 500,000 before 2002.¹⁵⁶ In just over 15 years, the PLA’s forces will be reduced to approximately 2.5 million members. Chinese leaders viewed reducing the massive size of the PLA as the prime mover in the modernization effort and that more force reductions will continue to occur well into the 21st century as the PLA becomes a more modernized force. The additional savings will be re-allocated back into the PLA’s modernization process for higher quality forces and more technically advanced equipment, such as the 1992 acquisition of the Su-27.

¹⁵⁴ Mei-Ling Wang, p. 436.
¹⁵⁶ Burles and Shulsky, p. 49.
4. Military Budget

Since the end of the Cold War, most countries have tried to reduce their military budgets, but the PRC has continually increased its military budget since the early 1980s. The increases in the PLA’s military budget have been the most reliable factor in its modernization effort, because its military prowess has been boosted by the PRC’s economic growth. Leaders in Beijing have continually declared that the military’s growth is subordinate to the PRC’s economic growth and that relationship will endure. But most Western analysts believe that if the PRC’s phenomenal economic growth slows or declines, the PRC will continue to aggressively invest in the PLA’s modernization effort because percentage increases in military spending in the past several years have exceeded the growth in GDP.  

Although Beijing has begun to publish an official military budget figure in an attempt to increase transparency and build confidence, analysts generally estimate that the actual figure is between one and a half to five times higher. Also, there are analysts at the extreme end of the spectrum who estimate it could be between 10 to 20 times higher, but for all practical purposes most mainstream analysts believe it is about three times higher than the published figure. Consequently, the future of the PLA’s modernization effort is gaining prominence.  


158 It is “reported that PRC’s finance minister Xiang Huaicheng will propose a 17.6% increase in the military budget this year to pay for salary rises and prepare for high-technology warfare to the National People’s Congress on Wednesday. Xiang plans to boost PRC defense spending by 25.2 billion yuan (US$3 billion) in 2002. ‘We are appropriately increasing expenditures for national defense to raise our army’s defense and combat capabilities to safeguard our national sovereignty and territorial integrity and adapt to shifts in the global situation in light of changes in modern technology, especially high technology,’ Xiang says.” Daily Report 03/6/02. Available [Online]. <http://NAPSNet@nautilus.org> [16 March 2002].

5. PLAAF
Currently the PLAAF and PLAN are well behind the technological power curve of Japan and Taiwan, its regional neighbors. At the outset of the reform period, Deng Xiaoping identified the pressing need for air force modernization and even boldly claimed that the Air Force might be the most important element in the modernization effort.\footnote{Karmel, pp. 68-69.} Although the PLAAF’s huge inventory consists of 5,300 combat aircraft,\footnote{Karmel, pp. 68-69.} the vast majority of these aircraft are of vintage 1950s era Soviet design. Against a fourth generation U.S. fighter such as the 150 F-16s sold to Taiwan, these aircraft would have little or no chance of combat success because they lack adequate maneuverability, combat radius, radar support and air-to-air weapons. But, during the early 1990s the PRC began to purchase relatively high-tech combat platforms such as the Su-27, an equivalent of the F-16, from Russia to maintain the cross-strait military balance of power with Taiwan. Also, Beijing has made it clear that it wants to ensure its future dominance in the Taiwan Strait by importing the more advanced Su-30-MK fighter. The end result of the process of modernization is to ultimately reduce overall numbers and improve the PLAAF combat potential, which is beginning to materialize.

6. PLAN
The PLA’s vast modernization effort has improved the PLAN’s combat capabilities in limited areas. However, the PLAN is still heavily reliant on a fleet of mostly obsolete Soviet-designed platforms from the 1950s and 1960s. In trying to compensate for the lack of quality
platforms and weapons systems, the PLAN maintains some 60 destroyers and frigates, about 60
diesel and six nuclear submarines, and nearly 50 amphibious landing ships, which makes it one
of the largest navies in East Asia. Due to the lack of a sufficient number of modern surface
combatants, submarines, and a comprehensive modernization program, the PLAN will remain a
coastal defense navy (brown water navy) well into the 21st century.

Through indigenous development and foreign acquisition, the PLA is selectively
upgrading the PLAN’s weaponry and equipment in a pattern consistent with operational
demands of “local war under high tech conditions.” During the 1990s, the PLAN commissioned
two indigenously produced classes of surface combatants. The first one was the 4,500-ton Luhu
class guided missile destroyer, and the second was the 2,750-ton Jiangwei class guided missile
frigate. The Chinese are also working on a third, the Luhai class destroyer, which will weigh
over 6,000 tons and be equipped with C-802 missiles with a range of 120 km.\(^\text{162}\) The
conceptualization and arrival of these ships represent a marked improvement over previous
classes of ships developed in the 1970s and 1980s. “Nevertheless, the PLAN continues to lag
behind other regional navies, including that of Taiwan, in most technological areas, especially air
defense, C4I, and surveillance.”\(^\text{163}\)

Also, the PRC’s foreign acquisition program has further enhanced the PLAN’s arsenal by
acquiring four Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with SS-N-22 (Sunburn) missiles\(^\text{164}\) and Kilo-
class diesel submarines. The Sovremenny-class destroyers, which have been dubbed the PRC’s
carrier killer, gives the PLAN a credible surface combatant, and the Kilo-class submarines

\(^{162}\) Burles and Shulsky, p. 53.
\(^{164}\) “The Sovremenny and its SS-N-22 missile system were designed to do one thing: kill American aircraft carriers
and Aegis-class cruiser…Its two hundred-kiloton nuclear warhead has almost twenty times the explosive power of
the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima..The U.S. Navy has no defense against the missile system.” Edward
significantly improved the PLAN’s ability to conduct coastal defense and blockade operations. The new emphasis placed on the PLAN reflects changes not only in China’s military strategy, but also in its perceptions of the importance of the sea as a strategic resource and cross-strait battleground.

7. Strategic Missile Force
The SMF has always been one of the PLA’s top military budget priorities. This was demonstrated in 1985 during the initial phase of the PLA modernization effort, when the SMF was expanded while the other services were reduced by the demobilization of one million troops. Retired Admiral Eric A. McVadon notes that “the PLA excels in very few warfare areas, but one of them is its arsenal of short-medium-range ballistic missiles – primarily (but necessarily) tipped with conventional warheads.” The SMF, or Second Artillery, is a highly capable regional force that provides the PRC a credible second-strike nuclear capability and will inevitably be used to spearhead all of the PLA’s strategic military operations and above all its campaign to reunite Taiwan, as was demonstrated in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996.

Most of the SMF’s tactical and strategic missiles are not very accurate in terms of their circular error probability (CEP) when compared to U.S. missiles. The PLA is currently developing new ballistic, cruise and anti-missile systems that will replace aging systems and also increase accuracy. Foreign technology will be used when possible to create better warheads and guidance systems as Beijing’s efforts shift from creating better nuclear warheads to creating

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better conventional warheads with more accurate delivery systems. According to a 1996 report by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessments, by the year 2010 China could have as many as 2,000 conventionally armed missiles with varying ranges, some of which could reach as far as Guam.\footnote{Richard D. Fisher Jr, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization,” \textit{China’s Military Faces the Future}, ed. James Lilley and David Shambaugh (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 89.} A marked increase in range, numbers and accuracy of the SMF’s missile order of battle (MOOB) will ultimately offset some of the inadequacies of the other services in a war with Taiwan.

\textbf{E. CONCLUSION}

According to the June 2000 “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”, currently the cross strait balance of military power is satisfactory in view of U.S. goals. It continues by suggesting that Taiwan does not face an imminent threat of war because the expected economic, social and political cost/risk of attacking Taiwan outweighs the expected benefits for the party who initiates the war. This was demonstrated in the PRC’s 1979 war with Vietnam, in which the degree of resistance was underestimated and was never fully contained by the PRC.\footnote{Mei-Ling Wang, p. 435.} From this vantage point, post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have created a sufficient cross-strait military balance of power and are a politically stabilizing factor in the cross-strait relationship.

However, post-1979 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are the primary means of persuading or deterring the PRC from attacking Taiwan, and the PRC’s modernization effort is what continually alters the cross strait balance of military power. Thus,

\begin{quote}
Deterrence is a policy which, if it succeeds, can only frustrate an opponent who aspires to changing the international status quo in his favor. The consequence of continued frustration, however, are not easily predicted and are not necessarily benign...One possibility is that continued frustration under conditions that are imperfectly understood may indeed lead an opponent to abandon the objectives or
\end{quote}
modify the means of pursuing them that have contributed to conflict or tension...Another possibility, of course, is that deterrence gives the opposing parties time to work out an accommodation of their conflicting interests, thereby reducing tensions and the potential for overt conflicts in their relationship.\textsuperscript{169}

As this reciprocating relationship continues to escalate without resolution, the PRC’s claim to Taiwan as its sovereign territory and its “sovereign right” of the use of force have became more stridently articulated. Consequently, from this view U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have appreciably decreased Taiwan’s political stability because they both have abandoned the political and diplomatic aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and emphasized the military dimension.

Also, in any relationship, time is a valuable commodity and this is especially true in the cross-strait relationship, since this present relationship has endured for over twenty years. As the number of years continues to increase, so has the level of hostility and militarization, thus increasing the PRC’s frustration.

The most reliable benefit successful deterrence can offer is more time—time in which some of the conflict generating or conflict-exacerbating elements in a historical situation can abate, so that deterrence will no longer be necessary or, at any rate, so critical for the maintenance of peace.\textsuperscript{170}

This phenomenon has not occurred and deterrence is increasingly needed to maintain peace in the cross-strait relationship. This reciprocal relationship has increased conflict generating and exacerbating elements in the cross-strait relationship. The overarching U.S. goal is to avoid any uses or threat of force to resolve differences in the Taiwan Strait, but U.S. arms sales have increased the PRC’s level of frustration through a security dilemma that has significantly contributed to an increased probability of conflict and tension over time.

Consequently, in the post-Cold War environment, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has changed very little. In spite of the vast amount of weaponry purchased from the U.S., Taiwan’s

\textsuperscript{169} George and Smoke, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 5.
armed forces do not possess the military hardware required to endure a long-term (more than 90 days) military engagement with the PRC without U.S. intervention. Although arms sales have increasingly been used for political purposes, experience suggests that such sales are no substitute for solid diplomacy and policy-making with friends, as well as foes. In light of this, the United States has a strong interest in encouraging both sides to re-energize the political and diplomatic aspects of their relationship and de-emphasize the military dimension, ultimately to decrease the likelihood of an attack.
IV. Beijing’s Approach to U.S. Arms to Taiwan

A. INTRODUCTION

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are currently the most controversial issue in PRC-American relations. They crept to the forefront of Chinese-American relations as the PRC’s goal of reunification with Taiwan gained more prominence in the 1970s and early 1980s. Subsequent to the U.S. establishment of diplomatic relationships with the PRC on January 1, 1979, which allowed the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to be answered at a later date, PRC diplomacy has failed to reach a definitive resolution with Washington pertaining to arms sales to Taiwan.

Despite its diplomatic failures, the PRC remains committed to the peaceful reunification of Taiwan under the concept of “one country two systems” formula and insists that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are one of the remaining hurdles. According to its 2000 White Paper, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” the PRC declared that:

No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.  

Beijing sees U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a flagrant violation of these principles, but the PRC does not currently exhibit any signs of downgrading or ending diplomatic relations with the United States.

In practice, the 1979 Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) regulates U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, an American legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1979. But, from the PRC vantage point, the 1982 joint communiqué, an international agreement negotiated by the Reagan Administration, stipulates an eventual end to all U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. “In the Chinese

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political context, international law is believed to have precedence over a country’s domestic law.” Beijing firmly believes that the U.S. has not honored its commitment of gradually decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, as prescribed by the 1982 joint communiqué, and suspects Washington of being committed to its defacto independence.

B. FACTORS SHAPING BEIJING’S APPROACH

Given Beijing’s failed diplomatic efforts, symbolized by the ineffective 1982 joint communiqué, Beijing has resorted to a foreign policy approach that is intended to persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or to neutralize their aggregate effect. This approach is multifaceted and complex, and it directly reflects the numerous interests that Beijing has in Taiwan. Although there are numerous factors that have shaped Beijing’s foreign policy approach toward U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, the historical context of this issue, Beijing’s territorial claims, and its security interest have the most influence on its foreign policy approach.

1. Historical Context

“In few countries does history play a greater role than in China.” Beijing views U.S. arm sales to Taiwan as one of the last obstacles that must be cleared before the inevitable reunification—a sacred goal left over from an unfinished civil war—will occur. In view of this, U.S. arm sales raise questions about Beijing’s political legitimacy with respects to Taiwan and acts as a galvanizing force that unifies the Chinese people’s sentiment with the government against the United States. Consequently, this issue has become extremely sensitive, to the degree that it is considered an inevitable, sacred national goal that will complete China’s national “liberation.” In this context, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan demand the attention of PRC policy-

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172 McClaran, p. 627.
173 Garver, p. 2.
makers at the highest level. They believe that “[t]he U.S. does not want to see a strong and unified China.”\textsuperscript{174} Furthermore, Washington “considers Taiwan as not only ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier’ in containing China, but also a card in protecting its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.”\textsuperscript{175} Thus, from a domestic standpoint, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan are seen exclusively as a countervailing force that has prevented China from reaching its true strength through national unification.

2. Territorial Claim

In Beijing’s view, the PRC’s sovereign territorial claim has been indefinitely delayed by U.S. arm sales to Taiwan because these arm sales embolden Taiwan’s independence movement. Beijing believes that Taiwan uses the relative nature and disposition of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan as a gauge of how much the U.S. supports its separatist activities, which has totaled over 20 billion dollars in the past 19 years. No matter how this issue is viewed, 20 billion dollars worth of military equipment signals an exceptionally high degree of support for Taiwan’s separatist activities. Without the stoppage of U.S. military arm sales to Taiwan, it is unlikely that the ROC will cease its separatist activities and resolutely opt for reunification with the mainland.

3. Security

Also, Beijing has a considerable security interest in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan because the procurement of these defensive weapons has significantly increased Taiwan’s defensive capability. Over the past 19 years under the authority of the TRA, Taiwan has received more than $20 billion worth of defense weaponry, primarily from the United States. As discussed in previous chapter, U.S. arms transfers have helped transform Taiwan’s armed forces into one of

\textsuperscript{174} Xi Yang. “Harm of US Arms Sales to Taiwan in Four Aspects.” Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 7 November 2000. FBIS – translated text. Document ID: CPP20001107000059. [PRC Hong Kong Paper Says U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan May Cause War.]

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., Xi Yang.
the most technologically advanced forces in the Asia-Pacific and a credible deterrent to the mainland’s use of military force.

In addition, U.S. arm sales to Taiwan act as a de facto defense treaty under the guise of the TRA. According to section 3 (b) of the TRA,

The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

Beijing’s strategic calculation for reunifying Taiwan, thus consolidating its territorial claim, has been indefinitely delayed by this de facto relationship as the U.S. conducts annual reviews of Taiwan’s defensive needs. In view of this relationship, Beijing interprets U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as an effort to deviate from the stipulations in the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relationships between the PRC and the United States regarding terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.

The collective weight of these three factors helps define Beijing’s approach and current level of diplomatic intensity toward U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. However, the most influential factor is Beijing’s security concern, followed by its territorial claim, and lastly by the historical context of this issue. Beijing’s security concern is the most important simply because it is tangible. U.S. arm sales have modernized Taiwan’s military forces and helped them evolve into a credible deterrent to mainland aggression. As Taiwan’s military has modernized, China has embarked on a modernization effort of its own designed to neutralize the affects of Taiwan’s weapon procurements. Without U.S. arm sales to Taiwan the “Taiwan question” would no longer have the strategic credibility that it currently possesses. Although Taiwan’s military
would still be capable of fighting the PLA, the open-ended support from the United States would be null and void, leaving it to fend for itself.

C. INSTRUMENTS AND CHANNELS

To respond to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the early to mid-1980s, Beijing has used a broad range of instruments and channels to address this issue. These instruments and channels include, but are not limited to, increasing pressure on the ROC on Taiwan, public criticism of U.S. policy, official protests to Washington, military modernization (engaging in indigenous military research and development), and acquiring arms from abroad. This comprehensive approach has not been effective in dissuading the U.S. from selling arms to Taiwan.

1. Propaganda Campaign

Since the enactment of the TRA and the failed diplomatic efforts to enforce the 1982 joint communiqué, Beijing has waged a propaganda campaign that explicitly criticizes U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. These propaganda attacks were significantly enhanced in 1992 after the sale of 150 F-16 aircrafts to Taiwan. Hence, the rhetoric of this campaign describes recent U.S. arm sales to Taiwan as overtly violating the agreed terms of the 1982 joint communiqué and extending its hegemonic threat to China’s sovereignty. As a result, the PLA has actively advocated intensifying these propaganda attacks and taking a harder line toward the U.S. as a defense against these hegemonic incursions.\(^{176}\)

2. International Recognition

Also, as a means of dealing with U.S. arms sales, Beijing has adamantly proclaimed PRC legitimacy as the sole government of China of which Taiwan is a part.

\(^{176}\) McClaran, p. 630.
[For] Beijing, preventing the de jure separation of Taiwan from the mainland is inextricably linked to regime legitimacy and, therefore, survival. It is an issue over which Beijing might very well engage in combat, even if it stood to lose, and in its 1998 white paper *China’s National Defense*, Beijing declared that selling weapons to Taipei ‘threatens China’s security.’\(^{177}\)

Thus, Beijing insists that the reunification of Taiwan is an internal matter that does not warrant any foreign interference. At the heart of this statement are the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in other's internal affairs. From Beijing’s perspective, the continuation of U.S. arms sales flagrantly violates international principles and norms that all sovereign nations rightfully possess. After the French sold Taiwan 60 Mirage aircraft in early 1990s, this approach has bolstered the international support for Beijing’s cause and helped dissuade all countries except the United States from selling arms to Taiwan.\(^{178}\) In sum, Beijing expects that recognition of these international principles will pressure the United States review its arms sales to Taiwan and facilitate there stoppage, thus, increasing the pressure on Taiwan to capitulate.

3. Military Modernization (Indigenous Military Research and Development (R&D))

In response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, the PLA has vigorously engaged in a widespread process of military modernization to improve its overall combat potential. This has been the Chinese’s high command’s main preoccupation. Since, 1985 the number of active duty troops have declined, the number of combat aircraft and warships have remained relatively the same, but fire power, accuracy, missiles and the ability to respond more efficiently and effectively to crisis in the Taiwan Strait have been improved, thus improving survivability as well. Although the military modernization is an ongoing process, significant weakness and lack of resources will continue to limit the PLA’s ability to realize the full combat potential of its new indigenous and


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foreign acquisitions for some years to come. But, in terms of its military strength compared to Taiwan, this program has given the PRC a significant advantage in missile technology.

4. Foreign Acquisitions

Additionally, as a part of the PLA modernization effort, Beijing began a foreign acquisitions program, which primarily sought to acquire tactical platforms instead of strategic defense systems to maintain the cross-strait power balance. This fact stands out when a number of the PRC highly publicized weapon deals with the Russia are looked at. These included the purchase in 1992 of the SA-10 anti-air missiles (S-300) system, the PLAAF’s purchase in 1992 of the 26 SU-27 (Flanker) air-superiority fighter with production licenses, and the PLAN’s purchase in 1992 of in four Kilo class submarines and the purchase in 1996 of two Sovremenny class destroyers with Moskit surface-to-surface missiles.\textsuperscript{179} So far, there is no clear evidence that the PRC has acquired a significant power-projection capability (i.e. aircraft carrier, long-range bomber or large-scale amphibious forces), although there can be little doubt that recent acquisitions are increasing the range, accuracy and lethality of the PRC’s combat platforms compared to Taiwan. Its indigenous and foreign acquisition programs have been relatively effective in creating pockets of excellence and neutralizing the aggregate effects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

D. PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS

Beijing’s policy approach designed to persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or to neutralize their effect will not work unless there is a whole-sale change of policy by the Bush administration and U.S. Congress. This is very unlikely, considering President G. W. Bush’s statements on Taiwan. On April 26\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, President Bush clearly delineated the United States

\textsuperscript{178} McClaran, p. 624.
position on the defense of Taiwan by stating that the United States would “do whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, even to the point of using U.S. troops. The President recanted this statement in a later interview with CNN, stating that those comments should not be seen as an endorsement of independence for Taiwan. "Our nation will help Taiwan defend itself,’ he said. At the same time, we support the one-China policy, and we expect the dispute to be resolved peacefully.”

President Bush’s most recent statement vis-à-vis Taiwan explicitly indicated that his administration plans on continuing the arms sales Taiwan in large quantities and that Beijing’s foreign policy approach of persuading the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan to neutralize their effective has a very low probability of succeeding.

In accordance with Beijing’s foreign policy approach, senior PRC leadership comments have consistently mirrored this approach. On February 29, 2000, Chi Haotian, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and minister of defense, met with Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. This was the first official meeting with a high level U.S. military delegation since the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in the Federation of Yugoslavia in May 1999. According to the PRC news agency Xinhua:

Chi Haotian urged the United States to handle the Taiwan issue appropriately by strictly adhering to the principles and relevant commitments established in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, stop selling arms to Taiwan, and do things that truly promote the great cause of China’s reunification.

Also, comments by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in an interview with the New York Times on August 8, 2001, enunciated Beijing’s policy approach to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. First, Jiang described Taiwan as the most important issue in PRC-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{181}}\text{\textsuperscript{181}}\text{\textsuperscript{181}}}\]
American relationships. He also reflected on the issue of Washington establishing closer relationships with Taiwan by selling more advanced military hardware to it. Then he added:

We are opposed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. After the signing of the Aug. 17 Joint Communiqué’s [of 1982], the U.S. side has pledged to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. But in fact what has happened has been the contrary…

These statements stressed that U.S. arm sales to Taiwan are at the base of the conflict between the PRC and United States. In addition, Jiang stipulated that the United States must stop selling arms to Taiwan in order to truly promote peace and the “one China” principle, which the United States acknowledged in the three joint communiqués.

E. CONCLUSION

Since 1982, the People’s Republic of China’s diplomatic efforts have either tried to persuade the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan or to neutralize their effectiveness and has categorized Beijing’s approach toward U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. These efforts have included increasing pressure on Taiwan, criticizing U.S. policy, engaging in indigenous military research and development, and acquiring arms from abroad. From the PRC perspective, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is the counter-balance to its unwavering sacred goal of reunification. On one hand, the PRC remains committed to peaceful unification, but on the other hand, it is unwilling to rule out the use of force.

[U.S.] arms sales to Taiwan may be more than what the Chinese like to see and may certainly be less than what the Taiwanese hope for. Though this looks like a clever choice, the United States will be unable to control how the Taiwan authorities will interpret this or how the situation in the Taiwan Strait will evolve on such a basis.

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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

This thesis has analyzed the effects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan after 1979 as a politically stabilizing factor in the Taiwan-China cross-strait relationship. It focused on the degree to which arms transfers deter China’s resort to military force and further the U.S. goal as defined in section 2b of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) regarding peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Now U.S. arms sales will be set within the broader framework of the current cross-strait relations and examine implications for U.S. policy.

It is my firm belief that American policy-makers have consistently viewed the Chinese government as being inadequate to or incapable of plausibly representing the will of its people, primarily because of the pervasive corruption of official China. As a consequence of this phenomenon, its legitimacy diminished in the eyes of American policy makers. Beginning in the 1840s the Western world (primarily Britain) used superior military technology to exacerbate China’s inability to govern its sovereign territories for politically charged strategic security concerns in lieu of gaining economic advantages, and now this tradition is continued by the United States.\(^\text{184}\) From the Ch’ing dynasty to the communist regime that presently rules China, this has been the consensus in U.S. foreign policy decisions. This relationship has endured and is what presently forms the base of the United States’ current arms sales policy to Taiwan.

Prior to 1949 most Americans did not know, understand or care about the revolutionary forces working within China, but after the communist regime emerged victoriously, most Americans realized that its emergence symbolized a disaster for U.S. policies in Asia.\(^\text{185}\) Shortly after the communist victory in 1949, the American public began to rely on foreign press for the

\(^{184}\) The British Empire’s relative status in the 1840s and its uses of superior military technology to impede on China’s sovereign claim parallels the United States’ present status and uses of superior military technology in the Taiwan issue.

majority of its information on the PRC. However, U.S. policy-makers did not have to rely on the foreign press for its information on the PRC because their resources were much more robust and empirically based.

Policy-makers and academic[ians] did not rely on the foreign press to inform them about China, although it played a role. What the intelligence community (IC) used to inform policy-makers were translations of Chinese press and magazines [plus official statements by senior leadership, government planning documents, and government affiliated documents] together with the usual 'national technical means.'

Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that the United States’ rapprochement with China was not based on America’s top decision-makers cynic political ambitions, but it was based on the pragmatic strategic indicators provided by the intelligence community. As Kusnitz observed,

in an international environment perceived to be anarchic, survival of the state was seen as the prime goal of a nation’s foreign policy. Individual interests and opinions had to be subordinate to the state’s survival, since this was—by definition—a precondition for societal progress.

Consequently the U.S. government temporarily sacrificed its political interest in Taiwan by signing the Shanghai communiqué in order to challenge the Soviet Union’s campaign for world hegemony. Thus, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan dwindled and were at their lowest levels during the late 1970s.

For the United States, the domestic functions that arms sales to Taiwan provided were more important than their overt political implications after the implementation of the of the 1979 TRA and the signing of the 1982 joint communiqué by the Reagan administration. This relationship endured until 1992, when the United States broke the long-standing deadlock and upgraded Taiwan’s weapon systems when President George H. Bush sold Taiwan 150 F-16

186 Context of the statement was received via email from Professor Paul H. B. Godwin (godwin@prodigy.net) at Chico State University, Chico, CA 95926 on March 13, 2002.
fighters, “thereby modifying the U.S. position as expressed in the August 1982 communiqué with the PRC.”

Although, this decision was made in the wake of the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the United States’ domestic industry and for political gains. Thus, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 have been primarily brokered in reaction to domestic political apprehensions instead of the same type of pragmatic strategic indicators that were used by the United States in its rapprochement with China.

Therefore, the decision by America’s top policy-makers to join the Chinese civil war in 1950 was fundamentally a political decision, as is the decision for the present administration to continue participating in it. The political ramifications of these decisions will not end after the fighting has stopped, but they will continue to influence the political calculus of all the states involved until either Taiwan capitulates, the war becomes too expensive for the PRC to continue fighting, or a peace settlement is reached. The United States’ realpolitik approach toward the Chinese civil war is a clear example of this because it has indefinitely extended the hostilities of the Chinese civil war primarily through its foreign policy decisions in support of Taiwan.

War duration is a key factor influencing the cost of war. In a more political vein, wars and their duration have important effects on leaders’ popularity and the stability of national regimes. Anticipating the outcome, duration, and cost of possible wars, leaders choose what wars to fight, leading to possible selection bias in the analysis of international conflict.

Currently, the PRC’s analysis of the Taiwan issue is skewed because of the ulterior political implications and tangible effects of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979. They have indefinitely lengthened the Chinese civil war by moving it to another level, meaning that it is no longer a direct civil war. As a result, the PRC has not abandoned its sacred goal of reunifying

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Taiwan with the mainland. But, in the interim it has linked its goal of reunification closer to the tangible results of its ongoing military modernization effort in preparation for a contingency with Taiwan that will most likely involve the United States instead of diplomacy.

The ulterior political implications of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan after 1979 continue to affect the PRC’s political calculus in such a way that it has indefinitely deferred its sacred goal of reunifying Taiwan until this issue is resolved. Fundamentally, the PRC has chosen not to use military force because the cost of failure is presently too high in terms of military, economic, and political factors. It is reported that Admiral Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command,

…expressed that in the event that the PRC decided to attack Taiwan, neither the island's own military forces nor those of the U.S. would be able to prevent a great deal of damage being caused…Blair stated that such damage could come from missiles, long-range aviation and sabotage. The reality, however, is ‘that China cannot attain its stated goal of reunifying Taiwan by military force,’ he said. ‘They do not have the military capability to take and hold Taiwan.’ This situation, in Blair's view, will remain unchanged as long as the U.S. adheres to the Taiwan Relations Act. Blair maintained that the situation across the Taiwan Strait, from a military point of view, is relatively stable, largely based on the continued U.S. pledge to support Taiwan militarily. Blair also commented, ‘In the meantime, I think we can hold the military ring to make that very unattractive for China to conduct military aggression, and we can have a good outcome for that part of the world.’

Currently the PRC exhibits no overt signs of trying to end the Taiwan question by military means because the use of force against Taiwan would have uncertain consequences for the PRC in terms its “national development strategy.”

However, the increased military apprehension between Taipei and the Beijing has left the PRC with a huge dilemma because,

189 Bennett and Stam, p. 239.
...no nation nowadays can elude the laws of economics in all spheres of social life, decisions regarding the merger or separation of states are also a matter of calculating the gains and losses in an economic equation. China now is facing two alternatives in resolving Taiwan’s sovereignty issue: an imperialistic approach or a modern political approach.\textsuperscript{192}

In lieu of the alternatives that the PRC faces, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979 have been the primary factor affecting the PRC’s political calculus. From this view, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan must be maintained at a high level in order to encourage the PRC’s pursuit of a modern political solution instead of an imperialistic one that might include the uses of force for the following reasons:

1. “First and foremost is its need to defend itself against any threat to its survival...In other words Taiwan should not be deprived of the possibility of possessing a capable and modern military to sustain its claim to autonomy.”\textsuperscript{193}

2. “If Taiwan should engage in negotiations with the PRC, the possession of credible military capability would protect it from unwanted and unreasonable demands.”\textsuperscript{194}

3. “While economic strength is increasingly important in the modern world, it still cannot substitute for military power in serving as the final resort of diplomacy or as the staunch guard of territorial integrity.”\textsuperscript{195}

4. The level of military technology that the United States sells Taiwan sends a clear undiluted message to the PRC on its level of support and commitment for Taiwan.

5. “The acquisition of new weapons can be a significant source of ‘reverse engineering’ or ‘copy cat’ indigenous development for domestic reproduction and accommodation.”\textsuperscript{196}

6. “Taiwan’s democratization has...enhanced its ability to resist the infiltration of Chinese Communism ideology.”\textsuperscript{197}

7. With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and China’s rise as a regional threat to U.S. interest, Taiwan’s strategic location has resumed its importance.

8. The PRC has not rescinded its right to use force against Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{192} Mei-ling Wang, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{193} Wei-chin Lee, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p. 55.
Accordingly, the Bush administration’s hard line stance has defined a new level of support for Taiwan and has also increased the tensions in U.S.-PRC relations.\footnote{198} Currently the most urgent need that the Bush administration has to address is the PRC’s dynamism because it has and will continue to create the most complex and perplexing problems that the United States will face in Asia.\footnote{199} The Bush administration must leverage the present momentum for Taiwan and incorporate it into a well-defined long-term policy designed to advert a military clash between Taiwan and the PRC. This can be done by using U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to either induce cooperation in the cross-strait negotiation process or by using them to sabotage the momentum of the PRC’s military modernization by supplying Taiwan with advanced technology until the Theater Missile Defense Systems (TMD) is developed and deployed.

As the PRC’s military modernization continues to gain strength Taiwan’s ability to preserve its democratic ways, its self-defense capability and a limit amount of parity in the cross-strait military balance of power has become increasingly more dependent on the level of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. This will serve as a litmus test for the Bush administration as well as future administrations in terms of how well they will be able to look at the past, but grasp the present and future challenges that the PRC poses. As more technologically advanced weaponry is sold to Taiwan by the present Bush administration, the PRC will continue to procure more

\footnote{198} In the wake of Taiwan’s defense minister visit to the United States from March 10-12, 2002 to attend a private "defense summit" in Florida, which was the first time that its defense minister visited the U.S. in 23 years in an official capacity, the PRC was outraged. On Saturday March 13, 2002 “PRC Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing summoned U.S. Ambassador Clark T. Randt…to demand the U.S. reverse course on ties with Taiwan. Li stated, ‘The Chinese government and people express their strong indignation and resolute opposition to acts that interfere in China's internal affairs and undermine China-US relations.” See Daily Report 3/18/2002. Available [Online]<NAPSnet@nautilus.org> [18 March 2002].
\footnote{199} Barnett, p. 1.
advance weaponry from Russia to maintain this relationship, consequently leaving its operational military effectiveness in question.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{200} The mere acquisition of frontline military equipment and technology does not equate to instance military effectiveness and this is the core issue for the PRC. “The timely, efficient, and effective use of nonindigenous weapons presupposes a level of familiarity not easily achieved even by producers, because it takes time to assimilate new weapons. Therefore, if assimilation is necessary for the states producing these weapons, it should also be considered a factor for the states purchasing them. For these reasons, conventional proliferation does not necessarily constitute a shift in the balance of power. Rather, a shift in the balance of power concomitant with the receipt of nonindigenous weapon demands that they be used efficiently, which makes this a question of military effectiveness.” Christopher S. Parker, “New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States, \textit{International Security}, 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 120-121.
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