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Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
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**MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

*Symbiosis: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTERS IN MILITARY SCIENCE**

**Major Michael P. Killion**

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**Abstract**

The Policy of Containment served as the philosophical foundation of Americas interaction with the world, providing continuity between nine administrations. Of greatest consequence, Containment required America to break all ties with the historical traditions of her foreign policy. Although the how of containment, as represented by national security strategy, differed from administration to administration, the why of containment remained consistent. For the first time in her history, America actively leveraged her national power to shape the long-term destiny of the globe. As a result, the United States emerged as the victor of the Cold War having achieved her stated national objectives, so containing communism and eliminating its security threat. With her victory came the demise of her foreign policy. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, America has struggled to define her place in the new-world order. As the worlds remaining superpower, should she assume certain responsibilities? This paper defines, develops, and outlines American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. As the history of American foreign policy charts the evolution of a fledgling political experiment to a world power, so the history of international relations charts the transformation of the international order from the central control of the emperor to the emergence of political concepts. Accordingly, the roots of Symbiosis are planted in the Lineage of American Foreign Policy (Chapter 2) and the Evolution of International Theory (Chapter 3). Armed with a common understanding of the historical and conceptual roots of American and Global Symbiosis, the statesman must fully understand the Contemporary Context of Symbiosis (Chapter 4) to define an effective foreign policy and international order. In doing so, he examines, analyzes, and determines the priorities of his generation. Once defined, the statesman fully understand and articulate the Implications of Symbiosis (Chapter 5), to develop an effective and compelling implementation strategy.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Symbiosis: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

**Author:** Major Michael P. Killion

**Thesis:** With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has struggled in defining her long-term relationship with the world. This paper presents “*Symbiosis*” as the replacement of “*Containment*” as America’s long-term foreign policy.

**Discussion:** The Policy of Containment served as the philosophical foundation of America’s interaction with the world, providing continuity between nine administrations. Of greatest consequence, “Containment” required America to break all ties with the historical traditions of her foreign policy. Although the “how” of containment, as represented by national security strategy, differed from administration to administration, the “why” of containment remained consistent. For the first time in her history, America actively leveraged her national power to shape the long-term destiny of the globe. As a result, the United States emerged as the victor of the Cold War having achieved her stated national objectives, so containing communism and eliminating its security threat. With her victory came the demise of her foreign policy. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, America has struggled to define her place in the new-world order. As the world’s remaining superpower, should she assume certain responsibilities?

Historically, Americans have focused on actual situations as opposed to potential consequences. The impetus of “Containment”, with the required break from historic tradition, was the insecurity that resulted from a threatening international environment. The brutal suppression of Central Europe, the Soviet attainment of nuclear capability, and communist victory in China all challenged the strength and security of America. With the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the implementation of NSC-68, America redefined her relationship with the world. Her vital national interests expanded to include the universal application of her values, while her concept of the citizen-soldier transformed into a national security state. Although replete with its bumps and blemishes, the success of Containment is a matter of recorded history. With the demise of the Soviet Union, one must ask, will America react to actual situations or influence potential consequences? With no near-term threat, America faces a serious strategic dilemma: Does she return to her isolationist roots, or does she stay at the forefront of the international stage?

**Conclusion:** Although America currently enjoys unparalleled global dominance, history is replete with examples of the rise and fall of the great powers. From Pericles’s Athens to Queen Victoria’s Britain, dynasties are temporary. Whether as the result of a failure to change, exhaustion from over-extension, or resistance against hegemony, empires rise and perish due to the fleeting nature of absolute power. Additionally, unlike domestic politics, the international environment has no central authority that, through governance, legislation, and enforcement, controls state interaction for the benefit of global harmony. Therefore, the international environment is a “self-help” system, where coercion, counterforce, and conflict are the principal moderating forces of the individual state’s unregulated pursuit of power. Although America will continue to maintain preeminence in the near future, in the long-term, the international community will strive to reestablish parity. Historically, hegemons, whether real or

perceived, have a tendency to spark collective resistance. Regardless of her druthers, America has no option but to remain internationally engaged. If one accepts the supposition, then one is compelled to ask, should America play an active or passive role on the international stage?

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the international environment is transitioning from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world. The current uni-polar world of American dominance, as outlined above, is but a step in the process. The future international environment of multipolarity, complicated by emerging and declining states, sets the conditions for an extremely unstable security environment. Combine this environment with the complications of economic interdependence, the proliferation of lethal technologies, the growth of illicit non-state actors, and a potential resource mismatch in the developing world and the United States faces a threat far more daunting than that of the communist ideology of "Containment". One must agree that the world of 2015 would be a dramatically more secure place with active American engagement, than without. Additionally, one must understand that active American engagement is not simply the "moralistic" pursuit of the "white-man's 21<sup>st</sup> century burden", but also the very tangible requirement to shape an environment of potentially unprecedented instability. The complexity of this potential situation precludes action after the fact; it is not a question of policy, but of what form policy should take.

*Symbiosis: American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The Policy of Containment served as the philosophical foundation of America's interaction with the world, providing continuity between nine administrations. Of greatest consequence, "Containment" required America to break all ties with the historical traditions of her foreign policy. Although the "how" of containment, as represented by national security strategy, differed from administration to administration, the "why" of containment remained consistent. For the first time in her history, America actively leveraged her national power to shape the long-term destiny of the globe. As a result, the United States emerged as the victor of the Cold War having achieved her stated national objectives, so containing communism and eliminating its security threat. With her victory came the demise of her foreign policy. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, America has struggled to define her place in the new-world order. As the world's remaining superpower, should she assume certain responsibilities?

This paper will define, develop, and outline American foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment. As Henry Kissinger states in *'Diplomacy'*, "the free world's greatest fear is not America's overweening involvement but, once again, its withdrawal. The sadness of the memories of Indochina should serve to remind us that American unity is both a duty and the hope of the free world."<sup>1</sup> Another perspective of "the sadness of the memories of Indochina" may be the role that policy played in justifying military intervention, leading to the "watershed" event of late 20th century American history. Obviously, a long-term policy facilitates the integration of the elements of national power to achieve a desired international end state; the challenge lies in gaining a national consensus on both a desired end-state and acceptable approach to achieve it. As some American decision-makers would actively embrace global responsibility, so others would question if the United States had the moral justification to determine the destiny of the globe. In a pluralistic society, influential opponents with impressive credentials can undercut the credibility of any long-term policy. Nevertheless, only through a clearly articulated long-term policy can America garner unity of effort.

Kissinger states that "in America, the combination of strength and distance inspire a confidence that any

challenge could be overcome after it presented itself.”<sup>2</sup> Historically, Americans have focused on actual situations as opposed to potential consequences. The impetus of “Containment”, with the required break from historic tradition, was the insecurity that resulted from a threatening international environment. The brutal suppression of Central Europe, the Soviet attainment of nuclear capability, and communist victory in China all challenged the strength and security of America. With the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the implementation of NSC-68, America redefined her relationship with the world. Her vital national interests expanded to include the universal application of her values, while her concept of the citizen-soldier transformed into a national security state. Although replete with its bumps and blemishes, the success of Containment is a matter of recorded history. With the demise of the Soviet Union, one must ask, will America react to actual situations or influence potential consequences? With no near-term threat, America faces a serious strategic dilemma: Does she return to her isolationist roots, or does she stay at the forefront of the international stage?

Although America currently enjoys unparalleled global dominance, history is replete with examples of the rise and fall of the great powers. From Pericles’s Athens to Queen Victoria’s Britain, dynasties are temporary. Whether as the result of a failure to change, exhaustion from over-extension, or resistance against hegemony, empires rise and perish due to the fleeting nature of absolute power. Additionally, unlike domestic politics, the international environment has no central authority that, through governance, legislation, and enforcement, controls state interaction for the benefit of global harmony. Therefore, the international environment is a “self-help” system, where coercion, counterforce, and conflict are the principal moderating forces of the individual state’s unregulated pursuit of power. Although America will continue to maintain preeminence in the near future, in the long-term, the international community will strive to reestablish parity. Historically, hegemony, whether real or perceived, has a tendency to spark collective resistance. Regardless of her detractors, America has no option but to remain internationally engaged. If one accepts the supposition, then one is compelled to ask, should America play an active or passive role on the international stage?

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the international environment is transitioning from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world. The current uni-polar world of American dominance, as outlined above, is but a step in the process. The future international environment of multi-polarity, complicated by emerging and declining states,

sets the conditions for an extremely unstable security environment. Combine this environment with the complications of economic interdependence, the proliferation of lethal technologies, the growth of illicit non-state actors, and a potential resource mismatch in the developing world and the United States faces a threat far more daunting than that of the communist ideology of “Containment”. One must agree that the world of 2015 would be a dramatically more secure place with active American engagement, than without. Additionally, one must understand that active American engagement is not simply the “moralistic” pursuit of the “white-man’s 21<sup>st</sup> century burden”, but also the very tangible requirement to shape an environment of potentially unprecedented instability. The complexity of this potential situation precludes action after the fact; it is not a question of policy, but of what form policy should take.

Kissenger identifies that:

**What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. The United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities. One of the new necessities is that a world comprising several states of comparable strength must base its order on some concept of equilibrium – an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable.<sup>3</sup>**


Kissenger’s observation clearly highlights the three defining factors of America’s current foreign policy conundrum. First, America’s ability to control the international environment will never match its unparalleled power, which is transitional. Accordingly, America must leverage her current advantage to shape the international environment of the future. Second, the implication of stages suggests an evolutionary, vice revolutionary, approach to the shaping of the international environment. America may be required, in the short term, to subjugate a portion of her ideological construct to facilitate the geopolitical necessity of security. The ability to achieve meaningful short-term goals, within the context of a long-term policy, requires time, patience, perseverance, and vision. Finally, to support an evolutionary approach, America must reconcile, both nationally and internationally, her ideological underpinnings with the requirements of the real world. Nationally, America must find a pragmatic middle ground between her isolationist tendencies and an international audience that demands her attention. Internationally, America must facilitate the creation of an environment that effectively

reconciles the pursuit of state interest with global security in a “nuclear-tipped” age. In response to America’s foreign policy conundrum, I offer Symbiosis.

“*Webster’s Dictionary*” defines Symbiosis as follows:

- 1) The relationship of two or more different organisms in a close association that may be but is not necessarily of benefit to each other.
- 2) Mutual cooperation between persons and groups in a society when ecological interdependence is involved.<sup>4</sup>

By Webster’s definition, Symbiosis is the solution to America’s foreign policy conundrum. In the first count, Symbiosis is the theoretical bridge that melds the foreign policy traditions of Alexander Hamilton and Theodore Roosevelt, with those of Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson to create a new strain of American foreign policy for the post-Cold War environment (*Figure 1*). In the second count, Symbiosis is the theoretical bridge that melds the international relations theory of the realist with those of the liberal internationalist to create a new strain of international structure for the post Cold-War environment (*Figure 1*). Finally, on a third level, Symbiosis defines the harmonious relationship between the implementation of American foreign policy and the solidification of an effective international order. Unlike “Containment”, Symbiosis is not a single set of principles to uniformly drive a prescribed foreign policy solution to a monolithic threat. Symbiosis is a descriptive philosophy that requires judgment in application, based on the circumstances of the situation.



*Figure 1*

If Symbiosis is the fusion of the divergent traditions of American foreign policy at the national level, and the disparate theories of international relations at the global level, than one must fully understand the intricacies of both in defining the principles that facilitate harmony between each, in a contemporary environment. Kissinger observes that:

**The study of history offers no manual of instruction that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations. But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable.<sup>5</sup>**

As the history of American foreign policy charts the evolution of a fledgling political experiment to a world power, so the history of international relations charts the transformation of the international order from the central control of the emperor to the emergence of political concepts. Accordingly, the roots of Symbiosis are planted in the *“Lineage of American Foreign Policy”* (Chapter 2) and the *“Evolution of International Theory”* (Chapter 3). Armed with a common understanding of the historical and conceptual roots of American and Global Symbiosis, the statesman must fully understand the *“Contemporary Context of Symbiosis”* (Chapter 4) to define an effective foreign policy and international order. In doing so, he examines, analyzes, and determines the priorities of his generation. Once defined, the statesman fully understand and articulate the *“Implications of Symbiosis”* (Chapter 5), to develop an effective and compelling implementation strategy.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE LINEAGE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

If America is to play a formidable role in the post-Cold War order, she must first appraise the defining factors that have shaped her interaction with the world. Kissinger observes:

**In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable.<sup>6</sup>**

Only through an understanding of the lineage of American foreign policy can one appreciate both the dichotomy of America's actions, and the significance of her contributions. For the United States, the American Revolution, closing of the frontier, and World War II are the "watershed" events that mark the transformation of foreign policy from the preservation of domestic values, to the attainment of continental power, to the emergence of global influence (*Figure 2*). Between the American Revolution and the closing of the frontier, the phase that this paper identifies as '*Manifest Destiny I*', the principal objective of American foreign policy was the development of continental power. In evaluating this phase, one must examine the context, circumstances, and implications of Washington's '*Farewell Address*', which provided the blueprint for American foreign policy until the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Between the closing of the frontier and World War II, the phase that this paper identifies as '*Manifest Destiny II*', the principle objective of American foreign policy was her emergence as an equal, amongst many global powers. In evaluating this phase, one must contrast the internationalist policies and perspectives of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson. In the wake of World War II, the phase that this paper identifies as '*Manifest Destiny III*', the principal objective of American foreign policy was initially global cooperation, but unintentionally transformed into global dominance. In evaluating this phase, one must understand the early development of the "Containment Policy". In addition to historical analysis, one must also explore the consistent tension between interest and ideology in the development of foreign policy, the most discernible thread that transcends all phases.

#### MANIFEST DESTINY I

Although the basic values of self-reliance, individual liberty, and self-government were rooted in the




Figure 2


Enlightenment thinking of Europe, they could only come to full fruition in 18<sup>th</sup> Century America. As Walter McDougall observes in *Promised Land, Crusader State*, “the American colonies as a whole were, by 18<sup>th</sup> Century standards, as diverse and hospitable to dissent as any place in the history of the world.”<sup>7</sup> Born in response to the inconsistencies between European ideals and monarchical actions, the early dilemma of American foreign policy was the reconciliation of domestic values with international actions. As an infant nation, the uniqueness of America’s geo-strategic position allowed her greater freedom in defining her relations with the world. Post-revolutionary America, occupying a third of the North American landmass, found neither

immediate threat to her physical security, nor insurmountable obstacle to her potential expansion. Although continental expansion was the universally accepted goal of early American foreign policy, the revolutionary generation had competing visions of how to achieve it. In the immediate after-math of the American Revolution, the “Founding Fathers” struggled to define a relationship between domestic ideology, national development, and foreign policy. During America’s initial decade, a single strategic paradox defined the nature of a new American society: the requirement for a centralizing force “to secure the revolution and stabilize its legacy” balanced against an abhorrent fear of consolidated power.<sup>8</sup> The central issue of the nation’s early paradox was in defining the role that the revolutionary principles assumed in the development of a new American society. Based on conflicting perspectives of the meaning of the revolution, two alternative visions of America, as defined by the relationship between domestic ideology, domestic institutions, the national interest, and foreign policy, emerged from the revolutionary generation, with Washington as the proponent of one and Jefferson as the proponent of the other.

### **The Timeless Argument**

Joseph Ellis observes in *‘Founding Brothers’*, “for twenty years, over the entire life span of the revolutionary war and the experiment with republican government, Washington stood at the helm of the ship of state.”<sup>9</sup> Washington, the country’s preeminent military and civilian leader during the formative years of America’s early development, held a much wider perspective of America’s destiny than that of his revolutionary colleague. As Ellis states, “Washington was the core of gravity that prevented the revolution from flying off into random orbits.”<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, he clearly understood the intimate relationship between domestic ideology, the national interest, and foreign policy. For Washington, the revolutionary principles served as the spine of America’s domestic ideology; although philosophically powerful, they required protection during their early gestation. The national government, empowered by domestic institutions, protected and solidified the revolutionary principles, while directing their energy towards national development and expansion (national interest). Foreign policy, constructed to facilitate development and expansion, served as the outer protective shell, shielding domestic ideology and the national interest from external influence (*Figure 3*). From the opposite side of the philosophical spectrum, Thomas Jefferson offered an alternative vision for America. As


opposed to requiring protection, Jefferson considered manipulation of the revolutionary principles to be a violation of their true nature. From this philosophical difference, an opposing view of American society emerged.



*Figure 3*

Well-versed in the social contract theory of Locke and Voltaire, Jefferson's vision for America was rooted in the absolutism of ideology. As Ellis identifies, "Jefferson viewed the world in terms of an ideological battle, in which the American Revolution was the first step in a global struggle against tyranny".<sup>11</sup> As such, Jefferson viewed domestic institutions, the national interest, and foreign policy as a direct reflection of the revolutionary principles; inconsistency was tantamount to ideological heresy. For Jefferson, the strength of the country rested on the vitality and perpetuation of the revolutionary principles. Domestically, any contrived institution that obstructed the unabated growth of the revolutionary principles was inherently detrimental to the philosophical wealth, and therefore national interest, of the country. Internationally, Jefferson viewed the world in terms of countries that stood either for, or against, America's revolutionary principles. As such, America

assumed a moral responsibility to sweep the horizon clear of tyranny. Accordingly, the international support of America’s revolutionary principles, as the national interest, was the basis of foreign policy (*Figure 4*).



*Figure 4*

Clearly, the differing perspectives of the revolutionary principles resulted in separate designs for the construction of a new American society (*Table 1*). In comparing both designs, one must explore the relationship between domestic ideology, the national interest, and foreign policy, as implied in each. For Washington, the revolutionary principles, in a metaphorical sense, were the “vital organs” of American society. To protect the “vital organs”, domestic institutions, the national interest, and foreign policy served as the cardio-pulmonary, skeletal, and muscular systems of American society. Similar to a complex organism, ideology, institutions, interests, and policy served distinct, but mutually supporting functions in American society. As reflected in *Figure 3*, during the initial phases of American national development, domestic institutions, the national interest, and foreign policy provided a series of protective shells to facilitate the transformation of the revolutionary principles to a legitimate form of government. Conversely, for Jefferson, the revolutionary principles served as the source of energy for American society. As reflected in *Figure 4*, when magnified through the prism of the national interest, they etched and defined both domestic institutions and foreign policy.

In contrasting the two designs, one is compelled to explore the source of theoretical and practical difference.

	<b>WASHINGTON</b>	<b>JEFFERSON</b>
<b>DOMESTIC IDEOLOGY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES ARE FRAGILE AND REQUIRE PROTECTION.</li> <li>* CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS CRITICAL IN SOLIDIFYING PRINCIPLES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES ARE THE STRENGTH OF THE COUNTRY.</li> <li>* ANY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL PRINCIPLES WOULD ULTIMATELY TARNISH THEM.</li> </ul>
<b>DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO HARNESS / LEGITIMIZE THE REVOLUTION</li> <li>* TAXATION</li> <li>* STANDING ARMY</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* LIMITED GOVERNMENT / REVOLUTION AS A FUNCTION OF THE PEOPLE</li> <li>* NO ARMY / NO TAXATION</li> <li>* FREE STATES</li> </ul>
<b>NATIONAL INTEREST</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* WESTERN EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT</li> <li>* SOLIDIFY REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES INTO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* NATIONAL INTEREST ALIGNED WITH DOMESTIC IDEOLOGY.</li> <li>* AMERICAN REVOLUTION WAS THE FIRST STEP IN A GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST TRYANNY</li> <li>* AMERICA MUST BE ON THE CORRECT SIDE OF HISTORY</li> </ul>
<b>FOREIGN POLICY</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* NO LONG TERM ALLIANCES / ONLY INTERESTS</li> <li>* NATIONAL INTEREST DEFINES A NATION-STATE'S ACTIONS</li> <li>* NATIONAL INTEREST AS A DISCRETE PRODUCT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES SHAPING POLICIES AT A SPECIFIC MOMENT IN HISTORY.</li> <li>* NEUTRALITY</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* LONG TERM ALLIANCES BASED ON DOMESTIC IDEOLOGY</li> <li>* CONSISTENCY BETWEEN DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS.</li> <li>* COUNTRY'S WERE EITHER FOR OR AGAINST AMERICA'S REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES</li> <li>* NEUTRALITY</li> </ul>

**TABLE 1**<sup>12</sup>

Concisely, Washington's military service provided him with a pragmatism, stability, and patience that proved essential to the maturation of theoretical concepts to republican government. Conversely, Jefferson, who lacked the practical experience of Washington, viewed the world in the absolute terms of ideology. Jefferson's early contributions to the revolutionary cause, although significant, were principally philosophical. Although no less an idealist than Jefferson, Washington differentiated between theoretical possibility and practical reality. Applying the lessons of his Revolutionary War experience, Washington fully understood that the ability to adapt to the conditions and circumstances of the time, as opposed to the application of absolute principles, determined success.<sup>13</sup> As Washington scanned the strategic landscape of the time, he determined that, until America achieved parity with the European powers, she could not afford her revolutionary principles, in an unbridled form.

**"The Farewell Address"**

Washington's uncanny ability to adapt the revolution principles to the circumstances of the time defined

his tenure as president. Internationally, Washington exchanged his military strategy of protracted war for a foreign policy of “Enlightened Procrastination”, based on the principles of strict neutrality and the avoidance of conflict to achieve similar ends.<sup>14</sup> Through “Enlightened Procrastination”, he attempted to keep the European powers at an arms distance, while allowing domestic institutions to solidify, economic development to thrive, and western expansion to commence. Domestically, Washington leveraged his widely held acclaim to serve as the centralizing force in transforming the revolutionary principles into a viable form of government, while relying on his stature and character to prevent the perception of consolidating power. Through his actions, particularly his resignation, Washington signaled, “the American presidency was fundamentally different from a European monarchy, that presidents, no matter how indispensable, were inherently disposable.”<sup>15</sup> During the waning months of his presidency, Washington crafted his “Farewell Address” to “advise his fellow countrymen on how to sustain national unity and purpose, not just without him, but without a king”.<sup>16</sup>

The “Farewell Address”, submitted as an open letter to the newspaper, was “addressed” to the private citizen, not the statesman. Written in simple language, his message portrayed the clear counsel of the most highly regarded leader of the time. Framed within the context of a pragmatic middle ground, Washington designed it to intellectually equip the public to discount the extremist policy of a potential successor. He attempted to place the destiny of the country into the hands of the public, as opposed to a governing elite. As his final official act, Washington legitimized the revolutionary principle of self-government by empowering the public with his insight, perspective, and experience. Concisely, the gist of the “Farewell Address” was “unity at home and independence abroad” to facilitate national development and western expansion.<sup>17</sup> Based on Washington’s understanding of the “philosophical and physical wealth” of the United States, this single maxim reinforced the two required elements for America to achieve her potential – national unity and international neutrality.<sup>18</sup>

In anticipation of Washington’s retirement, the political boundaries, drawn along the lines of regional orientation and dissension amongst a federalized central government, were already under construction, with John Adams at the head of one party and Thomas Jefferson at the head of the other. Concerned with the implications of such a political environment, Washington feared that the revolutionary principles would collapse

under their own weight. In the “Address”, Washington denounced excessive partisanship, which encouraged political parties pursuing an ideological agenda at the expense of cooperation”.<sup>19</sup> Again, applying the lessons of his wartime experience, Washington identified national unity as the strategic center of gravity, requiring protection at any cost. As long as the United States maintained domestic unity, she would continue to move towards her destiny. Washington advised that, in the short term, both political parties must subjugate their ideological agendas in striking an acceptable compromise to nurture the national purpose.

With a solidified national purpose at its core, Washington understood, that as long as America remained clear of European intrigue, she possessed the opportunity to expand at her own pace, with no foreseeable obstacle to limit her growth. However, as evidenced by the deep-seated, philosophical divide in response to the Jay Treaty of 1794, Washington feared that ideological pursuits, devoid of national development and expansion, would dominate foreign policy. In the “Address”, he strongly encouraged neutrality, “immune from sentimental and ideological attachment”.<sup>20</sup> Again, reflecting his wartime experience, Washington advised that, in the short term, the United States must subjugate its ideological yearnings in developing a foreign policy to facilitate the maturation of domestic institutions and national power. Once fully developed, he predicted “the United States would become an actor on a most conspicuous theatre ... designated by Providence for the display of human greatness and felicity”.<sup>21</sup> In essence, Washington recommended the same pragmatism, stability, and patience, of both his fellow statesman and citizen, as he had demonstrated in the implementation of a military strategy to win the Revolutionary War, and a foreign policy to nurture national development.

### **Blueprint for Continental Power**

Raised in the shadow of England, early American foreign policy would bare a striking resemblance to the British model. As William of Orange defined English foreign policy to prevent a European hegemon, so George Washington defined American foreign policy to prevent European influence on the American continent, while transforming principles to government. Between 1788 and 1832, in accordance with Washington’s blueprint, the principles of Exceptionalism, Unilateral Action, and the Monroe Doctrine emerged as the conceptual pillars of American foreign policy.

As previously outlined, Washington and Jefferson offered alternative visions of American foreign policy, as defined by their perspective of the revolutionary principles. For Washington, the revolutionary principals, as the vital organs, required protection by foreign policy; for Jefferson, the revolutionary principles, as the source of strength, defined foreign policy. From this philosophical divide, two central issues emerged. First, appraising the requirement for consistency between domestic values and international actions, America had to determine the way, either political affiliation or geo-political necessity, in which she would define her interests. Second, appraising the uniqueness or universality of her values, America had to define her obligation to the pursuit of global democracy. In the wake of the Jay Treaty, Exceptionalism emerged as the solution to the problem.<sup>22</sup>

Based on Washington's perspective of the vital, but vulnerable, nature of the revolutionary principles, his primary foreign policy objective was social and economic development. To facilitate such growth, "Enlightened Procrastination" dictated strict neutrality in order to avoid conflict. Based on his strategic assessment, Washington viewed England as the emerging European power. In essence, the Jay Treaty institutionalized pro-English neutrality by placing America's economic and security interests within the British sphere. Conversely, Jefferson considered the Jay Treaty as a "betrayal of the independence won in the revolution".<sup>23</sup> Based on his strategic assessment, Jefferson viewed the French Revolution as the initial step in a European struggle against monarchical tyranny. In essence, the Jay Treaty placed the United States on the wrong side of both historical and ideological legitimacy. From the deliberation of the Jay Treaty, Exceptionalism emerged as the first conceptual pillar of American foreign policy. America's exceptional nature was a function of the revolutionary values that served as the basis of her social and political institutions. Accordingly, as demonstrated by the Jay Treaty, America would define both the national interest and foreign policy in terms of geo-political necessity, "immune from sentimental and ideological attachment", to facilitate the transformation of her principles into a legitimate form of government and society. As Alexander Hamilton observed:

**If American foreign policy was different or better than that of the Old World powers, it was solely by virtue of the fact that the United States is a republic; hence, its policies reflected the peoples' interest and not those of some dynasty.**<sup>24</sup>

Based on great faith in her domestic ideology, foreign policy would ardently pursue the national interest, as a true reflection of the peoples' desire. In the end, this is how America reconciled her moral dilemma. To support the peoples' desire, which laid to the west, while protecting its domestic institutions, America must maintain her freedom of action.

The second principle of American foreign policy, Unilateral Action - commonly referred to as isolationism, is a logical extension of exceptionalism. McDougall observes, "as exceptionalism represented liberty at home, so unilateral action represented foreign policy at liberty from European toil."<sup>25</sup> The concept of unilateral action, based on Washington's strict neutrality, was a mere imitation of the British posture towards continental Europe.<sup>26</sup> As England manipulated the European balance of power, so America would between Britain and France. As the lead European colonizers with claims in North America, both Britain and France offered the only obstacle, although constrained by geography, to unimpeded American expansion. In limiting French and British influence on the continent, America could grow as natural conditions dictated. Nevertheless, the first step for America in achieving her potential was the development of trade, commerce, and industry. However, the road to economic prosperity was through Europe, particularly Britain and France, whom which the United States was economically interdependent.<sup>27</sup> Unilateral Action provided a pragmatic solution to balancing economic development, an area of cooperation, with territorial expansion, an area of competition.

Unilateral Action, or the American perspective of Washington's neutrality, provided her the freedom to pursue economic and territorial aspirations, while avoiding the obtrusive obligations of foreign commitments. The two critical reasons for forgoing formal commitments reflect a delicate balance between the shield of liberty and the sword of interest. First, as the "junior partner" in any alliance with a European power, America might find both her national interest and domestic values jaded by European intrigue. Second, the prospect of a European war expanding to the American homeland compromised her territorial potential; Europeans, historically unwelcome guests, do not leave upon request. By 1820, America had transitioned from an infant to a well-developed nation; her latent potential was becoming apparent. European recognition of this geo-political dynamic, coupled with its preoccupation with European affairs, laid the foundation for the ascendance of American interest in the Western Hemisphere.

The third and final principle of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, was a logical extension of Unilateral Action. As Unilateral Action limited the involvement of America in European affairs, so the Monroe Doctrine limited the involvement of Europe in American affairs. Although the latent power of a monolith was clearly visible, the America of 1823, when Monroe issued his edict, paled in comparison to the military capability of the European powers.

Nevertheless, as McDougall observes:

**The Monroe Doctrine, in its original inception, was an ambiguous proclamation of U.S. determination to defend whatever vital national interests it had, or might in the future identify, in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>28</sup>**

The roots of the Monroe Doctrine stemmed, in an indirect fashion, from the Congress of Vienna.<sup>29</sup> With the threat of joint Spanish and French intervention pending, England's foreign minister contacted the American Ambassador to negotiate an accommodation. The English proposed a joint proclamation that condemned the transfer of colonial holdings to a third power as a violation of their collective interest. In exchange, both the British and the United States would renounce any claims to the same colonial holdings. Shortly after a joint session between Jefferson, Adams, and Monroe, America responded with the unilateral proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine:

**The United States would view any effort to transfer such colonies to third powers or re-impose colonial status on any regions that had won independence as the manifestation as an unfriendly disposition towards the United States...The United States would not intervene in the internal concerns of any of the holdings of the powers.<sup>30</sup>**

The major difference between the American proclamation and the British proposal was America's exclusion of herself as a third party. If in fact she renounced claim, she would stand to lose the potential rights to a large portion of continental North America. America was not concerned with the political self-determination of South and Central America, but with the opportunity for continental expansion. As America made unilateral claim to the purview of the Western Hemisphere, she was betting that England, as a function of her own foreign policy, would prevent the transatlantic aggression of a European power. In the end, "the continental powers accepted Anglo-American domination of the Western Hemisphere, and preferred to

fence Europe off from the quarrels, troubles, and dangerous ideologies of North and South America”.<sup>31</sup> In essence, the Monroe Doctrine, a mere refinement of the Jay Treaty, institutionalized Washington’s vision of western expansion, as outlined in the Circular Letter of 1783.<sup>32</sup> With the opportunity for expansion secured, America could now achieve her “Manifest Destiny”.

Based on Washington’s blueprint, American foreign policy, defined by the principles of Exceptionalism, Unilateral Action, and the Monroe Doctrine, served as the lynchpin of America’s emergence as a world power. Given the British model, viewed through the filter of American culture, the early American statesman pragmatically balanced domestic institutions against economic and territorial expansion. As America approached the edges of her continental empire, a new national purpose and foreign policy would lead her in a different direction.

### **MANIFEST DESTINY II (BLUEPRINT FOR GLOBAL POWER)**

By the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to unprecedented growth and expansion, the United States emerged as a global power, in sheer mass alone. Similar to her emergence as a nation, her emergence as a global power was a uniquely American ordeal. Her historically unprecedented development resulted from the collision of social, technological, scientific, and economic phenomena, which could only grow in mutual coexistence within the incubator of American democracy. As McDougall observes:

**Raw statistics prove that the United States became a world power in the generation after the Civil War. ... population doubled to 71 million by 1900, making it more populous than any European power, except Russia. ... industrial revolution matured to the point that by 1900 Americans produced 244 million tons of coal per year (an output equal to Britain’s) and 10 million tons of steel, nearly twice the total of second-place Germany. ... the United States became a leader in the secondary industrial revolution ...the homesteading of the Great Plains and the availability of cheap bulk transport made the United States a bread-basket to the world ... exports quadrupled between 1865 and 1900 providing the first positive balance of trade in the country’s history ...millions of miles of railroads connected giant, electrically lighted cities packed with people who rode trolleys to work and read one-penny newspapers ... and marveled at skyscrapers.<sup>33</sup>**

As Washington predicted, the appropriate nurturing of America’s “physical and philosophical wealth” placed her squarely in the center of the international stage. As she occupied the last stretches of her continental empire,

America turned her attention towards “foreign outlets for her goods and energies”, in search of a new frontier.<sup>34</sup> Kissinger observes, “two factors projected America into world affairs: its rapidly expanding power and the gradual collapse of the international system centered on Europe.”<sup>35</sup> As America adjusted her sights from continental power to global influence, she was required to reassess the interrelationship between ideology, interest, and foreign policy. Although global influence was the universally accepted goal of early 20<sup>th</sup> century foreign policy, the generation that lead America into the new century had competing visions of how to achieve it. Based on conflicting perspectives of the interrelationship of ideology, interest, and foreign policy, two alternative vision’s of an internationalist America emerged, with Theodore Roosevelt as the proponent of one, and Woodrow Wilson as the proponent of the other.

### **Power with High Purpose**


In the 30 years before Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, the international environment changed rapidly. Prussian victory in the Battles of German Unification (1870-1871) and the continued spread of nationalism seriously threatened the Congress of Europe. Although averting great power war for another 50 years, European competition translated into vigorous colonization and protective trading practices, policed by iron-sided navies populating the world’s oceans. America could no longer take for granted her safety and access to overseas markets. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy began lobbying for Captain Mahan’s battleship navy. Between 1890 and 1898, the United States commenced the development and fielding of a two-ocean navy.<sup>36</sup> In the wake of the Spanish-American War, in which the navy played the critical role of American power projection, the United States found herself as a colonial power. With the assumption of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, the United States had achieved Mahan’s required conditions for her emergence as a global power. As president, Theodore Roosevelt leveraged these capabilities to catapult America into the center of the international ring.

Kissinger observes, “Roosevelt shared the view of his countrymen that America was the best hope of the world. But, unlike most of them, he did not believe that it could preserve the peace or fulfill its destiny simply by practicing civic virtues.”<sup>37</sup> As a colonial power with global interest, Roosevelt fully understood that the United States would have to play, if it were to influence global events. From Roosevelt’s perspective,

although domestic ideology was, in fact, what made America “the world’s best hope”, he consciously separated it from the national interest. The national interest, defined in terms of tangible influence and power, served as the principal medium of American international interaction. If American interests collided with those of another state, America would rely on its strength to prevail. Accordingly, American foreign policy, as opposed to preventing entanglement, unilaterally proclaimed its national interest to the world.

As reflected in *Figure 5*, Theodore Roosevelt’s definition of the interrelationship between domestic ideology, the national interest, and foreign policy was a logical extension of Washington’s early model. Like Washington, ideology, national interest, and foreign policy served distinct, but mutually supporting functions in Roosevelt’s model. Domestic ideology, institutions, and national power, as opposed to being vulnerabilities in the Washington model, served as a source of strength in the Roosevelt model. Accordingly, the national interest and foreign policy would function in a more mature capacity. As Washington identified continental expansion as the national interest, so Roosevelt proclaimed hemispheric domination and Asian influence as the new American frontier. Accordingly, American foreign policy transitioned from Washington’s neutrality towards Roosevelt’s Unilateral Action. As reflected in the Roosevelt Corollary and arbitration of the Russo-Japanese War, geo-political necessity and relative power relationships drove Roosevelt’s brand of American foreign

policy.<sup>38</sup>




America would leverage her power to defend that which she perceived to be her interest. As Kissinger observes, “Roosevelt believed that what a nation could not protect by its own power, could not be safeguarded by the international community.”<sup>39</sup> Similar to Washington, Roosevelt maintained control of the country’s destiny through the pragmatic evaluation of relative power and national interest. Nevertheless, in amassing that power, Roosevelt believed that the United States was still the “world’s best chance”. Accordingly, he reconciled the pursuit of interest, leveraging of power, and international responsibility “by enlisting the United States, with moderation and wisdom, to work on behalf of stability, peace, and progress”.<sup>40</sup> Through the Roosevelt Model, the United States entered the international arena and emerged as an equal amongst many global powers. From the opposite side of the philosophical spectrum, Woodrow Wilson provided a vision of an American international order to replace the European system, shattered in World War I.

### **Wilsonianism**

As an intellectual and political scientist, Woodrow Wilson hoped that foreign policy would dominate his presidency. His professional training, intellectual capability, and deep personal faith all played a critical role in his perspective of the international order. As president, he attempted to use his “power to influence and nudge international institutions and people along the appointed road to perfection”.<sup>41</sup> Although his ideas would not result in substantial change during his tenure, they would have an indelible mark on America’s perspective of international leadership. In Wilson’s opinion, authoritarian government, decrepit alliance system, and balance of power were the causes of World War I. As a disciple of Jefferson, Wilson firmly believed that America’s domestic ideology should serve as the basis of world peace. He strongly believed that the removal of the inherent tension of the European system would provide the opportunity for a new type of international order. Based on a belief in the regulating force of freedom and the role of international justice, Wilson envisioned the principles of self-determination, international law, and collective security as the basis of a new international structure.

As exceptionalism was the founding principle of American foreign policy, so self-determination was for a new international order. Based on his belief in the moderating effect of freedom, Wilson believed that the authoritative governments of Europe, who traded provinces and people as possessions, created the conditions for

continual conflict. Only through the universal application of American liberty, where popular sovereignty defined the interest of the state, could the world benefit from the inherent moderation of freedom. With the universal acceptance of self-determination, international law, as opposed to a balance of power, guaranteed justice and sovereignty. Once established, international law provided the framework for state interaction and international relations; unlike the balance of power, it did not bend to the circumstances of the situation. A violation of the law, adjudicated by an international organization, was subject to the censure and reprimand of the international community. In effect, international arbitration replaced war as the means of conflict resolution. As the enforcement mechanism of the international law, collective security, as opposed to the shifting alliance, provided the international community the means to deliver retribution on a violator of the law. Unlike the shifting alliance, collective security represented a moral obligation as a reflection of principle. If one operated within the traditions of the new international environment, he could depend on the collective security of the international community.



*Figure 6*

As America’s first attempt at global leadership, Wilson’s principle-based international structure was too revolutionary a step for both the European community and the American people (*Figure 6*). “The depth of Wilson’s own beliefs was for him evidence enough that he spoke for the nation.”<sup>42</sup> The exchange of American

interest for values, as the basis of both foreign policy and international structure, dramatically altered America's global role. As reflected in the Congress's refusal to ratify the Charter of the League of Nations, Wilson's new approach entailed more responsibility than America was willing to accept. The Europeans, having just completed the most violent of their numerous, bloody conflicts, were to traumatize to relegate security and interest to mere principle. The unprecedented cost in manpower, treasure, prestige, and energy ensured that the European traditions of international relations dominated the Treaty of Versailles.


The failure of Wilsonianism was not as much a reflection of the validity of its conceptual tenants, but more the grave disparity between those tenants and the actual environment of application. The universal acceptance of social values, radically different from one's culture, history, and perspective, usually requires some type of catharsis or catastrophe. Another World War, claiming again unprecedented expenditure of manpower, treasury, prestige, and energy, was required before the principles of Wilsonianism could reemerge on the world stage. Nevertheless, it was not the universal acceptance of America's values, but more the acknowledgement of America's power, that led to the integration of Wilsonian principles into the post-war international structure. As the shield of Western Civilization, America found herself in an unprecedented position. In response, she contributed in an unprecedented fashion.

### **MANIFEST DESTINY III (BLUEPRINT FOR GLOBAL COOPERATION)**

#### **An American System**

During the latter stage of World War II, with the defeat of Germany considered a matter of time, the original coherence of the Grand Alliance began to fray under the diverging views of a post-war international order. Winston Churchill, returning to the traditional balance of power, preferred a post-war international order based on an Anglo-American alliance to offset Soviet hegemony. Stalin, returning to the traditions of Russian foreign policy, preferred to convert the gains of the Red Army into a Soviet security buffer. President Franklin Roosevelt's "Four Policemen" was the American perspective of the post-war international structure.<sup>43</sup> Inspired by the principles of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt envisioned a fully represented international organization to serve as the governing body of global peace.

The executive committee of the international organization (security council) would function as the enforcers of world peace. As reflected in *Figure 7*, each of the major powers assumed responsibility for a global sector. United by a common set of principles, the major powers established, reinforced, and policed acceptable behavioral standards (collective security, arbitration, and self-determination). In addition to the executive committee, the international organization also accommodated the representation of the individual sovereign nation. Membership in the organization’s general assembly mandated the unconditional support of the organizational principles as the basis of the international order. Roosevelt considered shared purpose, legitimacy, and collective security to be the critical elements to any successful post-war order. Unfortunately, both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman overestimated the capability of the British, French, and Chinese nationalist, while miscalculating the intentions of the Soviets. Although the creation of the United Nations signaled the international communities acceptance of the “Four Policemen”, the Soviet subjugation of Poland undercut the common purpose required for the system to operate. Within a year of its creation, both Soviet politics and the reality of relative national power threatened the validity of the American System.



*Figure 7*

### *Containment Policy*

In February 1946, George Kennan's long telegram "provided the philosophical and conceptual framework for interpreting Stalin's foreign policy."<sup>44</sup> He identified the fundamental principles of Stalin's foreign policy to be a unique blend of "communist ideology and old fashioned tsarist expansionism".<sup>45</sup> The Soviet-style "liberation" of Eastern Europe was not a function of "misunderstanding or faulty communications between Washington and Moscow, but inherent in the Soviet Union's perception of the outside world."<sup>46</sup> Kennan identified the incompatibility of Soviet foreign policy and the American system of world order. In Eastern Europe, as the United States committed to the principles of self-determination, collective security, and arbitration, the Soviets committed to the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes, the creation of a security buffer, and heavy-handed negotiation from positions of strength. As a function of communist expansion, Kennan predicted the export of Soviet influence in the developing world, through political subversion and sabotage. In response, Kennan proposed the application of counterforce, along the current periphery of Soviet influence, containing its expansion. The tenants of Kennan's telegram served as the foundation of the Truman Doctrine, developed in response to communist revolution in Greece and Turkey.

The security of Greece and Turkey, presented in the context of a global, ideological battle, became the lynchpin of European stability. As the capstone, the Truman Doctrine proclaimed America's moral responsibility to protect the fledgling nations from communist aggression. Between 1947 and 1949, with the implementation of Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and the NATO alliance, America broke from her historic traditions by assuming responsibility for the free world. With respect to exceptionalism, the Truman Doctrine presented American liberty, not just as the basis of foreign policy, but as the foundation of an international system. With respect to unilateral action, the Truman Doctrine obligated the United States to a protracted, ideological war, fought in the periphery, with the ultimate objective of transforming Soviet society. With respect to the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, the Truman Doctrine extended America's sphere of interest from the hemisphere to the globe, and proclaimed her intention to police it. In effect, the Truman Doctrine was a militarized version of Wilsonianism.

As the Roosevelt Corollary put teeth in the Monroe Doctrine, so “NSC-68” provided muscle to the Truman Doctrine. Developed in response to the events of 1949, “NSC-68” transformed the Truman Doctrine to the Containment Policy, guiding American foreign policy until the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>47</sup> Based on the assumption that a monolithic communist state was controlling events through a client state, and given the political objective of the transformation of Soviet society, America embarked on an ideological, unconditional war. Accordingly, conventional military force and economic assistance, the lessons learned from the New Deal and World War II, were leveraged to create the “positions of strength” required to erode the Soviet challenge. With the implementation of the Containment Policy, the United States exchanged its historical tradition of unilateral action for that of global engagement and influence. Although the means of implementation would change from administration to administration, the “Containment Policy” effectively reconciled American principles with geo-political realities.

As liberty was a source of pride and consternation for the “Founding Fathers”, so idealism was for the “Cold Warrior”. As a source of pride, American idealism provided the philosophical justification for an unconditional obligation to principle - an undertaking unprecedented in the history of mankind. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the world emerged under conditions and institutions of American design, having completed the second longest period of sustained peace in modern history. As a source of consternation, American idealism resulted in the presumption of influence as the mere result of power. Unwilling and unable to compromise on value, America had a difficult time differentiating between the anti-communist and anti-liberalist, and disengaging from a potentially lost cause. With a policy based on value, in a world based on interest, America had to frequently pick between the worse of two evils - whether the choice be an ally or a policy. America learned that both she and her values had limitations.

### **AMERICAN SYMBIOSIS**

The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the completion of the first phase of Manifest Destiny III. However, as Kissinger observes, America has a historical tendency to react to situations as opposed to shaping possibilities. With the immediate threat to global cooperation eliminated, one is compelled to ponder if America will continue to drive global events, or attempt to withdraw within the solace of its frontier. As one reviews the


lineage of American foreign policy, the “myth” of American isolationism becomes clearly apparent. From its earliest days, the United States has been a global, maritime nation, with international concerns and interests. Washington’s “Enlightened Procrastination”, based on the principle of strict neutrality, provided an outer protective shell to shield and nurture domestic solidification, economic growth, and western expansion. From his “Farewell Address”, the principles of exceptionalism, unilateral action, and the Monroe Doctrine emerged as the conceptual tenants of American foreign policy to achieve continental empire.

With the closing of the frontier, having achieved Washington’s vision, America, by sheer mass alone, joined the ranks of the global powers. As Washington had predicted, the United States was postured “to display human greatness and felicity.” As America transitioned from a continental to a global power, Theodore Roosevelt, as the 20th century disciple of Washington, leveraged national power to achieve a tangible national interest. Under Roosevelt, America emerged on the international stage as “a country of strength, who with moderation and wisdom, worked on behalf of stability, prosperity, and peace”. From Roosevelt’s perspective, America would “display human greatness and felicity”, only under certain circumstances, and always from a position of strength. In the wake of World War I, as the international system centered on Europe evaporated, Woodrow Wilson attempted to construct a new international order based on American domestic ideology and cultural tradition. Although failing in the immediate after-math of WWI, Wilsonianism, when militarized by “NSC 68”, served as the theoretical basis of both the “Containment Policy”. In the end, America’s Cold War victory was a combination of Washington’s pragmatism, Roosevelt’s power, and Wilson’s virtues. In the post Cold-War order, a similar combination would serve us just as well.

As reflected in *Figure 8*, the first priority of Symbiosis is national unity and purpose. As Washington observed, America’s philosophical wealth, as reflected in her revolutionary principles, has proven to be her most valuable national resource. As a result, national governance, economic vitality, domestic priorities, and homeland security are the driving considerations of Symbiosis. In order to continue to light the path, America must continue to maintain her strength and vigilance. However, her strength and vigilance are not merely a function of gross domestic product and weapons procurement. Her strength is additionally defined by her

international reputation.

The current international order is the exclusive creation of the United States. In the wake of the Soviet demise, democratic ideals continue to gain legitimacy in an ever-increasing audience. As the lead democratic country, Symbiosis must facilitate the continued expansion of democratic ideals. Accordingly, it must balance



*Figure 8*

the pursuit of interest to maintain strength, and the encouragement of ideals to maintain legitimacy. Finally, as the Cold War victor, America has the right and responsibility to redefine the post-Cold War international order. America's uni-polar status is temporary. With moderation and wisdom, the United States must shape the international environment to facilitate the responsible, controlled, and cooperative emergence of new global powers. Unlike the ideological and unconditional nature of "Containment", Symbiosis offers America the opportunity to carefully select whom "joins her at the big table". In making that decision, she must first understand the "Evolution of International Theory" to assist her in the development of an effective international order.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL THEORY

**International relations is a competition of groups with no consensus amongst them and no power above them.**<sup>48</sup>

The dilemma of the statesman is to create a structure that facilitates stability in an environment where the competitive interest reigns, with no central authority acknowledged. History reflects that the success, or failure, of an international order is a function of how well, or poorly, it accommodates the conventional wisdom and security environment of the time. If “global shaping” is the defining international characteristic of Symbiosis, than one must understand the driving factors of the evolution of international theory to construct an effective, contemporary international order.

Similar to the lineage of American foreign policy, the evolution of international theory has been forged in the cauldron of history and experience. Although detailed historical analysis is beneficial, it exceeds the scope of this paper. However as a “thumbnail sketch”, *Figure 9* provides a graphic portrayal of the driving factors in the evolution of international theory. For Western Civilization, the Thirty Years’ War, Napoleonic War, and World War I are the “watershed events” that mark the transformation of international theory from the central control of an emperor, to the unbridled competition of the state, to coordination amongst the great powers, to the emergence of international institutions and political universalism. In reviewing *Figure 9*, the *Theory* and *Structure* categories designate the international theory and supporting international structure that defined the era prior to, and as a result of, the designated hegemonic war. The *Change Agent* category identifies the driving force(s) of modernization (social, political, technological, and economic) that spawned the designated hegemonic war, fought to redefine the international order (structure + theory).

### TOUR DE JOUR OF THE MODERN ERA

#### *Empire and Universalism*

Before the Thirty Years’ War, the notion of empire, rooted in the medieval concept of universalism, represented the international theory, structure, and order; as one God ruled in heaven, so one emperor ruled on earth. The cohesion of the empire was based on a universal devotion to religious principle, obliging the feudal



*d' e'tat* and the competitive interest emerged to fill the void. As Kissenger observes:

***Raison d' e'tat* asserted that the well being of the state justified whatever means were employed to further it; the national interest supplanted the medieval notion of universal morality. The notion of competing interest replaced the nostalgia of universal monarchy with the consolation that each state, in pursuing its own self-interest, would somehow contribute to the safety and progress of all the others.<sup>52</sup>**

As the father of the state and diplomacy, Richelieu “might well have preferred a world of more refined moral sensibility, but he was convinced that history would judge his statesmanship by how he used the conditions and factors he was given to work with.”<sup>53</sup> The national interest served as the adhesive between the people and the legitimate government, solidifying the state as the basic political entity. In its infancy, the national interest was the expansion of territorial, economic, and political power. A state pursuing its interests provided predictability, which when organized through shifting alliances, prevented the emergence of a hegemon. Almost through “an invisible hand”, the collective states established equilibrium through the pursuit of their individual national interest.<sup>54</sup>

### **The State and Competitive National Interest -**

Because of the Peace of Westphalia, the state emerged as the basic political entity in Europe, reflecting a shift from central to local authority. In an attempt to prevent religious war, reason, the seeds of modern diplomacy, replaced religious universalism as the means of state interaction. The adoption of “state” and “reason” resulted in the concept of sovereignty, whereby each individual state had the right to regulate both internal and external affairs, forming the basis of a new international order. In the immediate after-math of the Peace of Westphalia, the “legitimate government” was not the duly elected representative, but the recognized monarch. The years after the Peace of Westphalia were punctuated by conflict that stemmed from the exercise of *Raison d' e'tat*. As an absolute ruler, the king oriented foreign policy towards the calculated expansion of power through limited war and colonization. In the immediate aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia, France emerged as the strongest of the European states. Louis XIV, as the inheritor of Richelieu’s *Raison d' e'tat* combined pure power and opportunity to the continued expansion of power. As Kissenger observes:

**For all the glory it bought France, it amounted to a never ending treadmill, pushing France's boundaries outward, arbitrating the conflicts of the German states and thereby dominating central Europe, until France was drained by the effort and progressively lost the ability to shape Europe according to its design.<sup>55</sup>**

Ironically, France, the original architect of the shifting alliance based on common interest, served as the impetus for the solidification of the European balance of power, setting the social and political conditions for the French Revolution.<sup>56</sup>

Like the Hapsburgs, Napoleon masked political motives behind a veil of universal idealism, attempting a return to the time of empire. Under the guise of fraternity and liberty, exported through the advance of the *Grande Arme*, Napoleon systematically expanded France's control and influence through Europe. As Richelieu was the father of the state, Napoleon was the father of the nation-state, with the national interest as the adhesive bond between the people and government. As a function of *levee en masse*, with its social message of liberty, fraternity, and equality, Napoleon was the first of the European powers to mobilize all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) towards the pursuit of the national interest. Napoleon's unique and devastating combination of *Raison d' e'tat* and *levee en masse* would again, under English tutelage, mobilize the collective power of a united Europe as a counterweight. As the second phase of the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars solidified the European concepts of representative government, sovereignty, and structured international relations. The resulting international system would "keep dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party would seek to overthrow the order."<sup>57</sup> In this light, the Congress of Vienna convened to formalize the European balance of power.

### **Nation-State and Balance of Power**

The Congress of Vienna, consisting of the major European powers, developed an international system that prevented general war for 100 years.<sup>58</sup> As Kissinger observed, "paradoxically, the international order, which was created more explicitly in the name of the balance of power than any other before or since, relied the least on power to maintain it."<sup>59</sup> The emergence of the nation-state, defined by culture and empowered by representative government, transformed domestic and international political systems. From this perspective, the Congress of Vienna convened to forge a lasting order, based on the principles of shared purpose, equitable

power, perceived justice, and legitimate enforcement.

As defined by Clausewitz's "holy trinity", the nation-state was capable of leveraging power, of a magnitude previously unimaginable, in support of the national interest. The devastating effect of such a system, as demonstrated by Napoleon, required regulation and constraint. Accordingly, the unbridled pursuit of the national interest gave way to the collective pursuit of security and stability. Based on this shared purpose, the great powers recognized the importance of subjugating the short-term interest to the long-term gain; only an equitable distribution of power would ensure security and stability. In the aftermath of the war, the physical redistribution of power centered on the solidification of Central Europe at the expense of Napoleonic France. The German Confederation, which effectively balanced, yet integrated, Prussian military power and Austrian prestige, created a Central Europe too strong to attack, but too dilute to threaten.<sup>60</sup> With the Central European question settled, only a common perspective of justice, shared by both victor and vanquished, backed by a legitimate means of enforcement would solidify the precisely calculated distribution of power.

From initiation through completion, the Congress of Vienna understood and accommodated the fears, concerns, and perspective of both vanquished and victor. The French, exonerated from reparations, were required to cede all Napoleonic conquests, returning to its ancient frontiers. Given the violent nature of the war, this was an exceptionally generous offer. Additionally, fairly represented at the Congress of Vienna, the French became a voting member of the Concert of Europe in 1818. As reflected in the distribution of power in Central Europe, the Congress satisfied the opponents of a unified Germany, while enhancing the prestige and power of both Prussia and Austria. Based on incredible insight and a shared purpose, the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna effectively satisfied all parties. The Quadruple Alliance, an obligatory treaty between England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, provided the means to enforce the peace in the event of a dissatisfied France. In effect, the Congress of Vienna designed a balance of power that was virtually impossible for France to overcome.

To augment the Congress of Vienna, the Concert of Europe provided an "international" mechanism to facilitate the peaceful arbitration of future interstate competition and rivalry. The Concert of Europe, as the first international organization, represents a significant shift in international relations. The active participation of the

great powers in the Concert signified a universal acknowledgement that central coordination was required to manage the security of the continent. As the Congress of Vienna effectively resolved the post-Napoleonic issues, so the Concert of Europe would effectively manage the security of Europe. Through this collective and collaborative process, international norms and expectations were established to further dampen the short-term, individual interest for long-term stability.

Although effective for 100 years, the combination of expanded popular sovereignty and German Unification changed the social and political dynamic of Europe.<sup>61</sup> It would be Germany, not France, who would eventually fracture the balance of power in World War I. Von Bismarck, employing *Realpolitik*, the Prussian brand of *Raison d' e'tat*, manipulated the balance of power to gain German Unification in 1870. With the emergence of the German state under Prussian leadership, the central piece of the balance of power was shattered. The failure of the Great Powers to reface the balance of power, based on the new geo-political dynamics, placed Europe on a collision course with World War I. In the wake of World War I, the conceptual tenants of Liberal Internationalism were born in Wilsonianism.<sup>62</sup> With a basic understanding of the historical underpinnings of the evolution of international relations, one is prepared to evaluate the spectrum of theory.

### THE SPECTRUM OF THEORY

	<i>REALISM</i>	<i>STRUCTURAL REALISM</i>	<i>LIBERALISM</i>
<b>MAIN THEORY</b>	SELF-INTERESTED STATES IN A CONSTANT COMPETITION FOR POWER AND SECURITY	INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES CAN DAMPEN AND INFLUENCE THE PURSUIT OF THE SELF-INTERESTED STATE	CONCERNS FOR POWER ARE OVERRIDDEN BY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (DESIRE FOR PROSPERITY AND COMMITMENT TO LIBERAL VALUES)
<b>BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS</b>	STATES	STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
<b>MAIN INSTRUMENTS</b>	MILITARY, ECONOMIC	MILITARY, ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC	VARIABLES (INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC EXCHANGE, PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY)
<b>POST-COLD WAR PREDICTION</b>	RESURGENCE OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION	RESURGENCE OF COMPETITION, REDUCTION IN GREAT POWER CONFLICT	INCREASED COOPERATION AS LIBERAL VALUES, FREE MARKETS, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS SPREAD.
<b>MAIN LIMITATION</b>	DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR INTERNATIONAL CHANGE	DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE RAPID SHIFT IN NATIONAL POWER	TENDS TO IGNORE THE ROLE OF POWER

*Table 2*

International relations theory provides the conceptual framework for structures, institutions, and norms to facilitate an international order. At the basic level, international relations theory examines the causes of great

power conflict. From a diverging view of the reason for great power conflict, realism, structural realism, and liberalism emerge as the dominant schools of international theory (*Table 2*).

### **Realism**

Realism, based on the assumption that conflict is an inherent element of man's nature, embraces power and the pursuit of the national interest as the basic motivation of the modern state. In the realist's structure, anarchy and clashing interest define the nature of the international order. The realist, convinced that national interest far outweighs universally accepted political concepts, implements foreign policy through the predictable pursuit of the national interest. Conflict, a legitimate means of pursuing national interest, is the defining characteristic of his national power. However, free from the constraints of moral imperative, political prudence moderates the use of conflict. In pursuit of the interest, there is no sense of morality. "Moralism as an aspect of policy engenders the distortion of judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nation and civilization in the mere pursuit of moral principle, ideal, and God."<sup>63</sup>

Historically, Richelieu and Louis XIV represent the realist's perspective of international relations. Kissinger's analogy of the "never-ending tread mill" is most appropriate. Given America's relative power differential, the naked pursuit of power would be the quickest path to engendering an international coalition of resistance. The apparent flaws in the realist's theory, as an American approach to international structure, are the inherent use of conflict and the lack of international credibility.

### **Structural Realism**

A second school of realism, the structural realist, applies systemic (external) structure to influence the state's pursuit of power. Designed to create stability and security, the structural realist integrates relative power relationships, international institutions, collective purpose, and formal obligation, to physically construct and maintain equilibrium. In essence, the structural realist leverages the threat of conflict to moderate the unconstrained pursuit of the national interest, thereby reducing the chance of great power conflict. Indirectly, the international institution provides opportunity for the exercise of the national interest, within an acceptable limit of conflict. In the structural realist's international construct, both interest and value can serve as the basis for common purpose.

Historically, the Concert of Europe and the Cold War represent the structural realist's perspective of international order. The Congress of Vienna designed a balance of power that was virtually impossible for France to overcome; as long as the geo-political dynamics remained relatively constant, the mechanisms of the Concert of Europe would remain relevant. With the emergence of the German state under Prussian leadership, the central piece of the balance of power was shattered. The failure of the Great Powers to reface the balance of power, based on the new geo-political dynamics, placed Europe on a collision course with World War I. Conversely, NATO, organized as a counterweight to Soviet hegemony in Europe, continues to function as a viable regional and international organization. NATO, built more along the lines of shared values and purpose, continues to exercise collective action long after the demise of the Soviet Union.

The grafting of a balance, based on pure power relationships, requires continuous care and nurturing. Particularly today, with the influence of modernization and globalization, the relative distribution of power, historically difficult to assess, can change ever quicker. Additionally, the greater the number of powers integrated into the balance, the greater the difficulty in assessing relative power relationships. Conversely, a balance augmented by common purpose has a greater chance of enduring the inevitable shifting of power. Although structures and institutions built on common purpose are preferred, ones built upon common security may provide the initial step for further cooperation.

### **Liberalism**

The liberal's construct of international order is rooted in his concept of man. Based on the assumption of man's basic equality, regardless of culture, his primary motivation is the pursuit of self-preservation and material well-being. Accordingly, regardless of culture, man has an inherent basis for cooperation. "In sum, liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration."<sup>64</sup> To facilitate and capitalize on this abstract nature of man, democracy and liberalism are the superior form of domestic political institution and social ideology. From the liberal's perspective, the forces of political, technological, economic, and social modernization will continue to drive international cooperation. Accordingly, integration dampens short-term interest, as the individual state participates in the "global village". Similar to the structural realist, the liberal embraces international institutions and structures as essential mechanism for the peaceful resolution of the

competitive interest and the collaborative management of security. Rather than a world of competitors, the liberal democracy sees a world of fellow democracies and non-democracies. Accordingly, the pursuit of domestic ideology and value become a critical element of foreign policy. Based on the liberal's construct of international order, the full force of modernization can only be achieved through the elimination of the dictatorial regime.

Historically, Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and Roosevelt's "Four Policemen" represent the liberal's construct of international order. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, Wilson's principles were discarded because the United States did not have the international legitimacy to enforce them. In the wake of World War II, it was not the universal acceptance of America's values, but more the acknowledgement of her power, that led to the integration of Wilson's principles into the post-war international structure. However, for all her power, America's System, threatened by Soviet *RealPolitik*, transformed into a balance based on a relative distribution of power, solidified by ideology. The challenge to liberal internationalism is not so much the utility of common value, but more the process required to achieve social and political universalism.

### **GLOBAL SYMBIOSIS**

Based on a review of the spectrum of international theory, there is no "perfect fit" to support Global Symbiosis. As a result, the statesman must synthesize to define an international order to suit the contemporary environment. From the liberalist camp, modernization provides a venue for building a wider area of common purpose. As the area of cooperation exceeds the area of competition, common sense would dictate that the opportunity for conflict diminishes. Nevertheless, liberal democracy, as defined by structure, social norms, and perception, is not readily exportable. The tenants of liberal democracy, rooted in Western social experience as defined by the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment, required 400 years, four hegemonic wars, and the Cold War to come to full fruition. Given the difficulty of export, a series of concerns emerge. Is liberal democracy exportable to a Middle Eastern, Central Asian, or African country, already jaded by the experience of colonization? Is liberal democracy only importable upon request? Can liberal democracy be packaged to align with the social, cultural, and historic conditions of the buyer? Additionally, the universal spread of democracy, although perhaps not requiring 400 years and four hegemonic wars, will require time and probably

conflict.

From the realist camp, the sole responsibility of the duly appointed government, whether by election, birth, or *Coup*, is “to maintain the defense and provide for the general welfare” of the state and society. Regardless of the domestic institution and reigning ideology, the national interest and the relative distribution of global power will continue to play a central role in international politics. Accordingly, the prudent analysis of the national interest and the global distribution of power, as the basis of policy, prevents the pursuit of “political folly”. However, common sense would dictate a world of “Hitlers” and “Stalins” would be appreciably different than a world of “Wilson’s” and “Roosevelts”. The latter option offers a world of security and stability, where the liberal ideals of democracy may take root and grow. “States that enjoy a high degree of security, like Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, can afford the more minimalist state political structures of classical Anglo-American liberalism, because there is no imminent external threat that necessitates a powerful government apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes.”<sup>65</sup> However, most countries do not enjoy the geographic isolation that engenders the perception of security.

Power transition theory, integrating elements of the structural realist’s balance of power and the liberal internationalist’s democratic peace theory, provides the most cohesive and compelling basis for the creation of a contemporary international order. Power transition theory identifies the major states, or great powers, as the driving force of international behavior and interaction. As such, the dominant state(s) define both the context of the international order and potential for conflict by establishing the rules of behavior that define acceptable diplomatic, economic, and military interaction. The establishment and exercise of norms and expectations, known as the status quo, provides a centralizing force to international interaction and order. “The status quo codifies how the dominant country would like the other states in the world to behave.”<sup>66</sup>


Because of the dynamic nature of national power, the relative advantage of the dominant state may erode as other states attempt to achieve parity. As an emerging power reaches parity with the dominant state, the challenging country may demand a redistribution of power in the international order. In power transition theory, great power conflict results from a contention over the distribution of power and influence between

the standing and emerging power. The two preconditions for great power conflict are relative parity between the standing and emerging power, coupled with dissatisfaction of the status quo. A dissatisfied state that does not have parity lacks the ability to influence the international order. A state that achieves parity, but is satisfied with the international order, lacks the motive to compel change. In addition to the dissatisfaction of the emerging power, the dissatisfaction of the greater community of states also influences the chance of major conflict. The dissatisfaction of a portion of the community of states provides alliance opportunities for the emerging power. “A general relationship between dyadic parity with war and dyadic preponderance with peace has been reported by many scholars.”<sup>67</sup>

When contrasted with the structural realist’s balance of power, one can observe both similarities and differences. Like the balance of power, the most powerful states determine the context, rules, and behavior of the international order. Additionally, any modification to the existing international order can only occur through power. As a result, national power and interest continue to play a critical role in the individual state’s international interaction. However, unlike the balance of power, the individual state’s satisfaction with the international order also plays a significant role in its international interaction. As a result, in an international environment perceived to be legitimate by the greater community of states, international expectations and norms modify the pure pursuit of national power and interest.

When compared with the liberal internationalist’s democratic peace theory, again, one can observe both similarities and differences. Like the democratic peace theory, the individual state’s satisfaction with the international order provides a means for the creation of a “zone of peace”. However, state satisfaction results from a perception of a legitimate international order, as opposed to commonality in domestic institutions - a clear distinction that has significant ramifications. A foreign policy based on power transition theory, as opposed to democratic peace theory, is principally concerned with fostering an environment of legitimacy, as opposed to the export of democracy. By creating a legitimate international order, as perceived by the greater community of states, international expectations and norms replace domestic institutions as the genesis of peace (*Figure 10*).

The power transition theory provides a viable means for constructing a lasting international order. As the dominant country, the United States establishes the status quo through the creation of international standards and norms. As reflected in Figure 10, the United States serves as the geo-strategic center of the political, economic, and security “orbits”. Based on the perceived legitimacy of the expectations and standards, the individual state places itself in a functional orbit. Through international, regional, and bi / multilateral agreements and institutions, the United States creates and supports mechanism for the peaceful resolution of



*Figure 10*

competition, collaborative management of security, and collective basis for action concerning critical issues.

The Global Symbiosis, created by the interrelationship of a structured international order that promotes security, and the growth of liberal ideas because of security, is the synthesis of the liberalist and realist camps. As the world’s only super power, America’s actions will have the greatest impact on the nature of the Global Symbiosis. Accordingly, action at the ends of the continuum, either pure interest or pure value, will be

perceived as a grab for hegemony, either physical or cultural. Historically, hegemons elicit collective resistance. In a metaphorical sense, America must be careful not to make “big arm movements”. Consistent and patient progress, although less dramatic, is historically more enduring. America, if she so chooses the path, must chart her course in accordance with the future security dynamic.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF SYMBIOSIS

The global security environment defines the context and nature of the international order. As the world's only superpower, America's actions, whether intentional or unintentional, will play the critical role in defining global relations. Only through a detailed evaluation of the future security environment can America implement Global Symbiosis, while preventing the international perception of hegemony. Through detailed analysis of the physical and institutional aspects of national security architecture, the National Intelligence Council has identified the critical factors that will influence the world of 2015. As identified in the study, "taken together, these drivers and trends intersect to create an integrated picture of the world in 2015, about which we can make predictions with varying degrees of confidence and identify some troubling uncertainties of strategic importance to the United States."<sup>68</sup> As opposed to an intelligence summary to drive tactical decision-making, *Global Trends 2015* provides a conceptual template to drive long-term policy development.

#### "DRIVERS, TRENDS, AND FUTURES"

Using the *Global Trends 2015* methodology, the six "drivers" function as the critical variables in the emerging global security equation. The six drivers, *Demographics*, *Natural Resources*, *Technology*, *Globalization*, *Governance*, and *Conflict*, are physical phenomena that facilitate objective analysis and reliable prediction. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the drivers and trends. The potential influence and interaction of the drivers and trends frame the context in which Global Symbiosis must function. Because of the unique complexion of individual countries and regions, the drivers and trends will elicit a wide variety of potential impacts. The continuum of impacts, determined by governmental and societal responses, will define the spectrum of "future worlds".

Based on the potential influence and interaction of the drivers and trends, *Global Trends 2015* defines four potential security environments. The "four futures", further categorized into two sets as defined by a principal variable, provide a viable means of analysis, interpretation, and forecasting. In the first set of futures, *Inclusive and Pernicious Globalization*, globalization is the driving variable, playing either a positive or a negative role in global relations (**Table 3 of Appendix B**). In the second set, *Regional Competition* and *Post-*

***Polar World***, regionalism is the driving variable in global relations (**Table 4 of Appendix B**).

***Inclusive Globalization.***

"A virtuous circle develops amongst technology, economic growth, demographic factors, and effective governance, which enables the majority of the world's people to benefit from globalization."<sup>69</sup> As the principle variable, globalization plays a positive force in the interaction of the other major drivers. From a ***technological*** perspective, science, industry, and government develop and diffuse technology, in response to "environmental and health crises"<sup>70</sup> to offset the significant problems of population increase and resource allocation in the developing world. From an ***economic*** perspective, internationally constructed policies that facilitate economic liberalization enlarge the number globalization beneficiaries. Specifically, the greater diffusion of wealth to the developing world facilitates the absorption of population increases, while solving resource allocation. From a ***governance*** perspective, strong organizations and institutions will be required at both the national and international level. Nationally, governments will be required to implement policies that accommodate the challenges associated with economic and technological modernization. Internationally, institutions will be required to formalize the cooperation required to facilitate the expansive growth and diffusion of security, wealth, and technology. From a ***conflict*** perspective, the effects of economic interdependence and the general spread of prosperity will limit conflict to those developing countries that do not benefit from globalization. In these areas, discontents will leverage ethnicity, religion, and ideology to promote greater instability.

***Pernicious Globalization.***

Although globalization is the principal variable, it plays a negative role in the interaction of the other major drivers. In pernicious globalization, the divide between the "winners" and "losers" is made wider and clearer. In the developing world, the inversely proportional relationship between population and resource allocation serves as the major source of friction and instability. From a ***technological*** perspective, economic stagnation and political uncertainty slow the diffusion of technology. Accordingly, as opposed to mitigating the problems of the developing world, it serves to exasperate them. From an ***economic*** perspective, mercantilist principles result in the continued expansion of the developed countries and economic stagnation in the

undeveloped countries. Unable to participate in licit globalization, illicit economic growth will rise dramatically (WMD Proliferation, Narcotics, Organized Crime). From a *governance* perspective, political and social discontent, resulting from resource allocation mismatch, compromises the integrity of domestic political institution. In response, less established states either return to autocratic government, or succumb to the illicit power. Internationally, unable to find the basis for common purpose, institutions weaken dramatically. From a *conflict* perspective, the combination of political instability, discontent from resource allocation mismatch, influence of illicit power, and the ineffectiveness of international institutions give rise to failed states, WMD proliferation, regional instability, and increased chance of great power conflict.

### **Regional Competition**

Regionalism, as defined by geography and culture, particularly in East Asia and Europe, grows in “response to American global preponderance and American driven globalization”<sup>71</sup>. In search of a counterweight to America’s disproportionate power and influence, East Asia and Europe will attempt to define common political and economic priorities. In response, America disengages from East Asia and Europe, but commits to Central and South America. The remainder of the developing world, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, will be too weak to participate in the new regional order. From a *technological* perspective, each region will develop and diffuse technology based on “commonly accepted perspective of intellectual property and biotechnology”<sup>72</sup>. Accordingly, regional perspectives will drive the diffusion of technology in offsetting the developing world’s resource allocation mismatch. With no international proponent, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa will continue to face resource allocation mismatch. From an *economic* perspective, regional integration replaces the international initiatives of *Inclusive Globalization*. Although characterized by rapid economic growth, regional competition and protectionism dampens economic globalization. Additionally, regional perspectives will drive the diffusion of wealth. Again, with no international proponent, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa will experience economic stagnation. From a *governance* perspective, the developed and emerging nations within the regional spheres will grow stronger. The developing nations within the regional sphere will be subject to regional perspectives, while those outside the regional spheres will fall prey to the social and political discontent of economic stagnation and resource

mismatch. Internationally, the international institutions will give way to the growth and empowerment of regional institutions. From a *conflict* perspective, the strengthening of regional purpose and state power will minimize the chance of intra-region power. However, regional competition may provide the incentive for inter-region power. Because of the weakening of international institutions and collaboration, WMD may proliferate rapidly. Because of economic stagnation, resource mismatch, and poor governance, intra-state violence in the developing world will be frequent.

### **Post-Polar World.**

The construct of the *post-polar world* is similar to *regional competition*, except the American *economy* stagnates. As a result, the United States disengages from the rest of the world to face her domestic problems. Based on estrangement with both Europe and Asia, she withdraws her troops from both regions. As a result, the regionalism described above occurs with virtually no American influence. In the American region, because of the sagging American economy, *crisis of governance* occurs in Central and South America. In response, the United States is required to step in. Although East Asia is prosperous, historic rivalries ignite a Pacific-rim arms race. The United States is required to reassert herself in the region on the verge of a *great power war*. Even more than the *regional competition* construct, developing countries, immersed in social, political, and economic stagnation, experience intra-state conflict and instability.

## **IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**


The National Intelligence Committee anticipates that “the United States will continue to enjoy global economic, technological, military, and diplomatic power unparalleled among national, regional, and international organizations through 2015”.<sup>73</sup> To appropriately leverage such power, the statesman must fully understand the implications of the “four futures”, for they provide a vehicle to analyze the influence, interpret the interaction, and forecast the potential ramifications of the drivers and trends. Through analysis, interpretation, and forecasting, three critical themes emerge. If America hopes to “enlist her power with moderation and wisdom” in the shaping of the future global environment, she must accommodate these emerging themes in the creation of an international order.

First, globalization, as defined by economic interdependence and modernization, does not automatically translate into universal benefit. In three of the four cases, globalization, because of the international perception of American economic and cultural hegemony, served as an impediment to international collaboration. America will continue to be perceived as the leading proponent and beneficiary of globalization. As the lead agent, America's leadership in international trade and economic organizations will play the primary variable in determining whether globalization exercises a positive or negative influence on the international order. Accordingly, the American economy will be a critical driver of the global economic future. Because of the tight integration of the global economy, American monetary and fiscal policy, manipulated in response to domestic concerns, will have far-reaching, international ramifications.

Second, strong national and international governance remains critical to maximizing the potential of economic interdependence and technological modernization. In the three cases where international governance was either nonexistent or relegated to regionalism, the proliferation of WMD, illicit business, non-state actors, and terrorism rapidly expanded. In such an environment, diplomacy will be both difficult and complex. With no direct threat, the United States may have difficulty in mobilizing the elements of national power to achieve foreign policy objectives. Additionally, with the erosion of the international security threat, the United States will have less direct influence in the integration of American economic and cultural values abroad. Again, American leadership in international, regional, and bilateral organizations and agreements will serve to facilitate, support, and reinforce national governance and diplomacy as the legitimate means of state interaction.

Third, the developing countries, representing two-thirds of the world population, will suffer significant resource mismatch, unless consciously included as a beneficiary of globalization. Without the economic and technological ability to offset the pending resource mismatch, the developing world, rife with social and political discontent, could spawn a "brand" of ethnic, religious, and ideological instability that could unravel any international or regional structure, institution, or agreement. The combination of non-state actors, ideological ferment, and advanced technology present a significant security concern to the United States. These dynamics will dramatically influence American access, strategy, force deployment, and organization in the conduct of operations.

As reflected in *Figure 11*, the emerging themes define a complex international environment. When viewed from the perspective of the individual country or region, the drivers, represented by the interior circles, as influenced by culture, history, and geography, interact with each other in defining the national priorities and interests. The priorities and interest, as influenced by the regional and/or international forces, interact with each other in defining the context, nature, and interrelationship of the elements of national power. In the world of 2015, the functional areas of economics, politics, or security, as opposed to being significant as an individual unit of measure, can only be considered relevant as a mutually supporting and




*Figure 11*

interrelated function of a complex organism (future state). In the international environment of 2015, the successful initiative will require an interagency approach, with detailed interagency coordination at the national, regional, and international level. Finally, in all scenarios, American power and influence wane from its current

uni-polar status. The other world powers, either individually or regionally, will attempt to close the huge gap in relative national power. This could occur as either a tactical alignment for a specific issue or a more long-term, strategic anti-American coalition, depending on the perceived legitimacy and acceptance of the international order.

**GLOBAL SYMBIOSIS REVISITED**



**Figure 12**

Upon review of the emerging themes and issues that dominate the future security environment, power transition theory appears to provide the best conceptual approach for the creation of a contemporary international order. As the dominant state, the United States assumes the responsibility of establishing the

norms and expectations that determine the “status quo”. Once articulated, through international, regional, and multilateral agreements and institutions, the status quo defines acceptable diplomatic, economic, and military interaction and behavior. Acceptance of the status quo is acknowledged by state behavior, and continuously reinforced through membership and support of institutions and agreements. Because of the complex and interdisciplinary nature of the emerging international order, expectations and standards must be established in terms of a level of commitment, as opposed to specific factors in a functional area. As reflected in *Figure 12*, the United States continues to function as the geo-strategic center, but the individual nation must agree to political, economic, and security factors that define a level of commitment to the status quo. As the level of commitment increases, so does the individual nation’s access, influence, and opportunity to integrate with the developed nations of the world. In effect, the United States leverages its uni-polar status in the short term to create a legitimate and widely accepted status quo for the future.

## CHAPTER 5

### IMPLICATIONS OF SYMBIOSIS

The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the successful completion of the first phase of Manifest Destiny III, global cooperation. As one reviews the lineage of American foreign policy, the “myth” of American isolationism becomes clearly apparent. From its earliest days, the United States has been a global, maritime nation, with international concerns and interests. Washington’s “Enlightened Procrastination”, based on the principle of strict neutrality, provided an outer protective shell to shield and nurture domestic solidification, economic growth, and western expansion. From his “Farewell Address”, the principles of exceptionalism, unilateral action, and the Monroe Doctrine emerged as the conceptual tenants of American foreign policy to achieve continental empire. With the closing of the frontier, having achieved Washington’s vision, America, by sheer mass alone, joined the ranks of the global powers. As Washington had predicted, the United States was postured “to display human greatness and felicity”. As America transitioned from a continental to a global power, Theodore Roosevelt, as the 20th century disciple of Washington, leveraged national power to achieve a tangible national interest. Under Roosevelt, America emerged on the international stage as “a country of strength, who with moderation and wisdom, worked on behalf of stability, prosperity, and peace”. From Roosevelt’s perspective, America would “display human greatness and felicity”, only under certain circumstances, and always from a position of strength. In the wake of World War I, as the international system centered on Europe evaporated, Woodrow Wilson attempted to construct a new international order based on American domestic ideology and cultural tradition. Although failing in the immediate after-math of WWI, Wilsonianism, when militarized by “NSC 68”, served as the theoretical basis of both the “Containment Policy”.

As reflected in *Figure 13*, Symbiosis is a natural extension of America’s foreign policy traditions. Symbiosis recognizes that, in order for America to continue to light the path, she must maintain her strength and vigilance. However, the current international order is the exclusive creation of the United States. In the wake of the Soviet demise, democratic ideals continue to gain legitimacy in an ever-increasing audience. As the lead democratic country, Symbiosis must facilitate the continued expansion of democratic ideals. Finally, as the Cold War victor, America has the right and responsibility to redefine the post-Cold War international order.

## Symbiosis

### American Foreign Policy

\* **PRINCIPLES** –

- National unity and strength
- Pragmatic balance between interest and value
- With moderation and wisdom, enlisting American power to shape the environment of the future.

\* **GOALS** –

- Economic and military preeminence
- Reliable and durable allies
- Predictable relations with the remainder of the world

\* **NATIONAL INTEREST**

- Physical and economic survival, safety, and vitality of the nation (Vital)
- Physical survival, safety, and vitality of our allies (Vital)
- Maintaining global / regional stability and security (Vital)
- Counter proliferation (Vital)
- Interests that affect our national well-being and the character of the world (values) (compelling)
- Interests that require our response because of our values and legitimacy (values) (humanitarian interest).

### International Structure

#### Power Transition Theory

- \* The United States as the dominant state establishes the status quo, which defines acceptable international interaction (economic, diplomatic, military).
- \* Through bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international organizations and agreements, the United States articulates and supports norms and expectations.
- \* Power and influence is distributed by an individual states demonstrated behavior and acceptance of norms and expectations (pay as you go system).
- \* In accordance with the Table, greater commitment implies greater influence and integration with the developed nations.

LEVEL	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	SECURITY
<b>I</b>	* INTERNATIONAL LAW * THE RULE OF LAW	* FREE TRADE * RULES OF COMMERCE & TRADE	* WMD PROLIFERATION / * TERRORISM * NARCOTICS TRAFFIC * ORGANIZED CRIME
<b>II</b>	* POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY * REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT	* ECONOMIC COORDINATION AND COOPERATION	* REGIONAL STABILITY
<b>III</b>	* HUMAN / INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS	* ECONOMIC INTEGRATION	* MILITARY ALLIANCE / COALITION PARTNER

**Figure 13**

America's uni-polar status is temporary. With moderation and wisdom, the United States must shape the international environment to facilitate the responsible, controlled, and cooperative emergence of new global

powers. Unlike the ideological and unconditional nature of “Containment”, Symbiosis offers America the opportunity to carefully select whom “joins her at the big table”. In making that decision, power transition theory provides a conceptual approach to assist her.

As the dominant country, the United States establishes the status quo through the creation of international standards and norms. Once articulated, through international, regional, and multilateral agreements and institutions, the status quo defines acceptable diplomatic, economic, and military interaction and behavior. Because of the complex and interdisciplinary nature of the emerging international order, expectations and standards are established in terms of a level of commitment, as opposed to specific factors in a functional area. Accordingly, the United States functions as the geo-strategic center, but the individual nation must agree to political, economic, and security factors that define a level of commitment to the status quo. As the level of commitment increases, so does the individual nation’s access, influence, and opportunity to integrate with the developed nations of the world. In effect, the United States leverages its uni-polar status to create a legitimate and widely acceptable status quo for the future, requiring individual nations to “pay as they go”. If one does not act within the context of the status quo, they receive no access and integration with the great powers. In implementing Symbiosis, the statesman must accommodate a series of critical emerging implications.

The interagency texture of the future environment, coupled with the lack of a pervasive security threat, makes the development of a codified, long-term foreign policy difficult. In order to create the appropriate inertia to implement Symbiosis, the president will be required to develop and articulate a compelling case. Although the benefits are self evident, it will be difficult to develop a national consensus. However, historically, the American public has shown a tendency to follow, when properly motivated and led. If the message resonates with the American people, consensus to support a long-term policy can be developed.

With the establishment and articulation of a national vision, the elements of national power can be integrated through the development of long-term, mutually supporting agency plans. Currently the Department of Defense is the only of the major national agencies that has developed and articulated long-term vision to drive policy, research, development, and budgeting. Using the national vision as the baseline document, and with National Security Council oversight and direction, the effected national agencies and organizations should be

required to develop a cohesive, functional, long-term plan (military, economic, diplomatic, informational). Through this process, related agencies will be required to conduct cross boundary agency coordination and operating procedures. Additionally, similar to the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC), the plans should require strategic review on a bi-annual basis. To facilitate the execution of multi-agency plans, multi-agency organizations must be established on either a permanent or ad hoc basis.

As Kissinger observes, “the United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geo-political necessities.”<sup>74</sup> In the end, the “amalgam of geo-political necessity and American values” has been the historical calling card of American foreign policy. For the United States to implement Symbiosis, she must possess the pragmatism, stability, and patience of Washington, the courage of Theodore Roosevelt, and the virtue of Woodrow Wilson. The United States need not look beyond her past to determine her future.

## APPENDIX A

### DRIVERS AND TRENDS

**Demographics.** World population will experience an eighteen percent increase, of which 95% will occur in the developing world. Because of expansive population growth, the developing world will experience rapid urbanization. Additionally, most countries will experience an increase in lifespan. Because of population surge, urbanization, and increased life span, the following trends emerge:

- a) In the developed countries, “declining birth rates and aging will combine to increase health-care and pension costs while reducing the relative size of the working population, straining the social contract, and leaving significant shortfalls in the size and capacity of the work force.”<sup>75</sup> Because of domestic fiscal requirements, some developing country may be constrained in their ability to invest in the future. Additionally, the work force shortages may require changes to existing immigration policies, thereby challenging national identities.
- b) In the developing countries, “these same trends will combine to expand the size of the working population and reduce the youth bulge – increasing the potential for economic growth and political stability.”<sup>76</sup> Economic growth and political stability will depend upon the government’s ability to accommodate urbanization and industry’s ability to accommodate the work force. An inability to do either may lead to both instability and economic depression.

**Natural Resources and Environment.** The world will have both sufficient food and energy to provide for the anticipated requirements of 2015. Conversely, the world will experience water shortages in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and northern China. Because of natural resources, the following trends emerge:

- a) Although the world will have sufficient food, “poor infrastructure, distribution, political instability, and chronic poverty will lead to malnourishment in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.”<sup>77</sup>
- b) “The global energy market is likely to encompass two distinct patterns of regional distribution: one serving consumers (including the United States) from Atlantic Basin reserves; and the other meeting the needs of primarily Asian customers (increasingly China and India) from Persian Gulf supplies.” As China emerges as a world power, she may define, as we have, a secure energy supply as a vital national interest. If she does, we can anticipate a more active Chinese presence in Middle Eastern Affairs.
- c) Control and distribution of water may arise as a likely source of conflict by 2015.

**Science and Technology.** “The world will encounter quantum leaps in information technologies. The continuing diffusion of information technologies and new applications of biotechnology will be at the crest of the wave.”<sup>78</sup> Information technology will provide the basic building block to economic modernization and

integration. Because of science and technology, the following trends emerge:

- a) Information technologies will represent a double edge sword. As it provides access to the world's economic community, it also facilitates the flow of ideas, values, and culture. In autocratic regimes, this will present a significant strategic dilemma.
- b) As information technologies facilitate the efficiency and modernization of the licit government and corporation, so it does for the illicit and illegal organization. The double-edged sword of information technology will emerge as a critical security concern for the developed countries, particularly the United States.
- c) "The integration of continuing revolutions in information technology, biotechnology, materials science, and nano-technology will generate increased investment and innovation in the advanced countries."<sup>79</sup> Accordingly, the advanced countries, especially the United States, will continue to be the "winners" of globalization.

**Globalization** "The networked global economy will be characterized by the rapid and largely unrestricted flows of information, ideas, cultural values, capital, goods, services, and people."<sup>80</sup> Of all the drivers, the management and impact of globalization will play the largest role in shaping the future security environment. Although many will benefit from globalization, there will be a clear differentiation in the distribution of wealth, while others will not benefit at all. The clear divide that result from globalization may serve as a future source of conflict. Because of Globalization, the following trends emerge:

- a) Overall, the global economy should experience sustained economic development and growth, driven by "political pressure for higher standards of living, improved economic policies, rising trade and investment, and the diffusion of information technologies."<sup>81</sup>
- b) Any disruption to energy supplies may prove catastrophic to economic productivity. Accordingly, Middle Eastern security and stability will play a critical role in globalization.
- c) Those left behind by the process of globalization could use extremism (ethnic, religious, and ideological) as a means to stagnate continued economic growth. This source of discontent, coupled with improved technological lethality, provides a critical security concern for regional stability.

**National and International Governance**. Although the nation-state will continue to be the primary international political structure, both technology diffusion and globalization will facilitate the emergence of international institutions and transnational organizations. The transnational forces, labeled as non-state actors, could be both licit, such as business and non-governmental organizations, and illicit, such as organized crime and terrorism. "The quality of governance, both national and international, will substantially determine how well states and societies cope with these international forces."<sup>82</sup> Because of governance, the following trends

emerge:

- a) Because of the changing global environment, national security architecture will require a more comprehensive approach. “Semiautonomous government agencies will increasingly intersect because of the transnational nature of priorities and the clear requirement for interdisciplinary policy responses.”<sup>83</sup> The future global environment will require flexible, adaptive, and integrated responses to new problems. “Not all, but most of the governments who succeed will be representative democracies.”<sup>84</sup>
- b) Poor and inflexible governance will result in a failure to capitalize on the benefits of globalization, “spawning regional conflict”.<sup>85</sup>
- c) As previously highlighted, globalization will challenge autocratic regimes. The influx of information, ideas, and values, combined with the requirement for decentralized decision-making, will require the modification of domestic political institutions.
- d) Transnational actors and issues will “increase the requirement for international cooperation.”<sup>86</sup>

**Future Conflict.** As previously highlighted, all of the drivers provide an incentive for potential conflict. Factors such as globalization, effective governance, secure energy sources, rapid population increase, and urbanization can all provide fertile ground for the seeds of religious, ideological, and ethnic extremism. In response to these challenges, the international community may be required to intervene to limit regional instability. Although the United States will continue to maintain military preeminence, particularly in battlefield technology and precision-guided weapons, the following trends emerge for American security concerns:

- a) Asymmetric threats where national and transnational actors integrate enhanced technologies to attack perceived US vulnerabilities.
- b) The proliferation of missile technology, WMD, and terrorism will increase the chance of attack on the US Homeland or against facilities and personnel abroad.
- c) The possibility of regional conflict where a few countries maintain large forces. The most likely areas to experience conflict are Asia and the Middle East, due to long-standing rivalry.

## ANNEX B

	<i>Inclusive Globalization</i>	<i>Pernicious Globalization</i>
<b>Population</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>1 billion increase</i> in global population is <i>mitigated</i> by <i>high economic growth</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Urbanization</i> in most countries is <i>manageable</i>. <i>Some cities</i> with <i>rapid growth</i> become <i>politically unstable</i>.</li> <li>* <i>High migration beneficial</i> for <i>sending and receiving</i> countries. Controversial in <i>Europe and Japan</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>1 billion increase</i> is burdensome because of <i>economic stagnation and unemployment</i> prevents absorption.</li> <li>* <i>Inadequate infrastructure and social services</i> in most cities create <i>conditions for instability</i>.</li> <li>* <i>South – North migration</i> becomes the major source of controversy <i>forcing US and Europe to disengage from developing world</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Population increase</i> and <i>economic growth stress global ecosystem</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Advanced countries</i> easily <i>resolve resource problems</i>, while <i>poorest developing countries suffer resource scarcities</i>.</li> <li>* In particular, <i>water scarcities</i> will worsen in <i>South Asia, northern China, Middle East and Africa</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Population increase</i> will contribute to <i>scarcities in arable land and scarce resources</i>, exacerbated by <i>policies of subsidy and protectionism</i>.</li> <li>* Resource shortages, in particular water will be a <i>major problem in both emerging and developing countries</i>. Lower agricultural production rates force <i>greater urbanization</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Technology</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Conditions will facilitate the <i>diffusion of IT, Bio, and Materials Technology</i>.</li> <li>* <i>IT will promote productivity</i> and high levels of <i>non-inflationary growth</i> for many countries.</li> <li>* <i>Some countries fall farther behind</i> because of insufficient <i>education, infrastructure, and regulatory systems</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Diffusion of Technology</i> will be <i>slow</i> because of <i>economic stagnation &amp; political uncertainty</i>.</li> <li>* The <i>destabilizing effects of technology</i> will predominate: <i>WMD proliferates</i> and IT empowers <i>terrorist and criminals</i>.</li> <li>* Benefits of <i>technology realized by only the rich states</i>, while most countries fall behind.</li> </ul>
<b>Economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>US Global leadership and economic power</i>, further <i>liberalization of trade, broad acceptance of market reforms, rapid diffusion of IT, and absence of great power conflict</i> generate an average of <i>4% annual global economic growth</i>.</li> <li>* Emerging markets – <i>China, India, Brazil</i> – and developing countries will <i>benefit</i>. Some states in <i>Africa, Middle East, Andean Region, Central Asia, and the Caucasus will lag</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>US economic downturn</i> leads to economic <i>stagnation</i>. Global economic reforms erode and <i>America</i>, particularly vulnerable, <i>disengages from the world</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Emerging markets and developing countries</i> are hit hard by <i>economic stagnation</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Ethnic heterogeneity</i> challenges <i>cohesion of some states</i>, migrant workers create chronic tension in ethnically homogenous Europe and Asia, and <i>communal tensions and violence increase</i> in countries with poor governance.</li> <li>* <i>Integration of economic modernization and IT</i> will cause the <i>decentralization</i> of state governments. <i>Some states</i>, unable to transform, will <i>lose the ability to effectively govern</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Ethnic and religious identities</i> sharpen in many heterogeneous states. Communal <i>tension and violence</i> increase in Africa, Asia, and Middle East. <i>Islam grows</i> and likelihood of <i>terrorism increases</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Weakening capacity</i> at all levels in both the <i>developed and developing nations</i> to govern. <i>Russia and China face territorial fragmentation</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Conflict</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Absence of great power conflict</i> because of <i>economic prosperity</i> and wider acceptance of <i>democratic norms</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Internal / cross-border conflicts</i> persist in Africa, Asia, and the Andean region due to <i>ineffective governance, population growth, and resource shortages</i>.</li> <li>* Developed countries <i>allow conflict</i> in <i>strategically remote</i> areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Risk of regional conflict in Asia</i> rises <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>China’s territorial integrity</i></li> <li>- <i>India’s ability to govern</i></li> <li>- <i>Future of democracy in Russia</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>* Frequency of interstate <i>conflict rises because of tension in developing world</i> and <i>unwillingness</i> of the <i>developed countries to cooperate</i>.</li> <li>* <i>WMD restraints erode</i> increasing potential use in <i>terrorism or regional conflict</i>.</li> </ul>

*Table 3<sup>87</sup>*

	<i>Regional Competition</i>	<i>Post Polar World</i>
<b>Population</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>1 billion increase</i> is burdensome because of slow economic growth and regional protectionism.</li> <li>* <i>Inadequate infrastructure and social services</i> in most cities create <i>conditions for instability</i>.</li> <li>* Increased <i>border migration</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>1 billion increase</i> is burdensome, <i>destabilizing some countries &amp; some cities ungovernable</i>.</li> <li>* Population dynamic creates <i>opportunities for China and Latin America</i>, reordering the power relationships in Asia.</li> </ul>
<b>Resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Population increase</i> contribute to <i>scarcities in arable land &amp; scarce resources</i>, exacerbated by <i>subsidy and protectionism</i>.</li> <li>* Resource shortages, in particular water will be a <i>major problem in both emerging and developing countries</i>. Lower agricultural production rates force <i>greater urbanization</i>.</li> </ul>	* <i>Same as Regional Competition</i>
<b>Technology</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Technology <i>advances and commercializes rapidly</i>, regional <i>protectionism reduces economies of scale</i> and promotes trade barriers. .</li> <li>* <i>Conflict</i> over market for <i>high technology sectors</i> break out. Developing countries <i>unable to compete</i> in the global economy fall into <i>technological backwardness</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Widespread <i>regional protectionism</i> and conflict over <i>access to high technology</i> develop.</li> <li>* Regional and <i>great power relations in Asia become more contentious</i>. Demand for <i>militarily-relevant technology</i> in Asia increases.</li> </ul>
<b>Economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Growth is robust</i>, but <i>minimized</i> by the effects of <i>regionalism and protectionism</i>. <i>US maintain advantage</i> over Europe and Japan through ability to <i>assimilate foreign workers</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Emerging markets</i> are targets of developed country <i>mercantilist competition</i>. <i>Other</i> developing countries are <i>neglected</i>.</li> </ul>	* <i>Same as regional protectionism</i> .
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Globalization, assertions of US hegemony, and cultural changes</i> challenge national identities. <i>Leads to US-European and US-Asian estrangement</i>, but <i>US-Latin America engagement</i>.</li> <li>* Labor <i>migration continues to cause internal violence</i></li> <li>* Communal pressures in the developing world leads to internal conflict.</li> <li>* <i>Mercantilist competition</i> strengthens the state.</li> <li>* <i>Regional organizations are strengthened</i>, while <i>global institutions weaken</i> due to European / Japanese resentment of American preeminence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* <i>Globalization and cultural changes</i> contribute to <i>US-European estrangement</i> and increases <i>US engagement in Latin America</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Labor mobility</i> sharpens <i>ethnic and religious identities</i> in countries where <i>immigrants can not be absorbed</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Communal pressures</i> increase in developing countries and <i>conflict persists in some regions</i>.</li> <li>* <i>Mercantilist competition</i> and growing <i>prospect of interstate conflict</i> in Asia strengthens the <i>developed and emerging market states</i> in their ability to <i>command resources, invest in military technology and defend borders</i>.</li> <li>* Both <i>global and regional intergovernmental institutions weaken</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>Conflict</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Increased <i>regionalism results in conflict over markets, investment flows, and resources</i>, further <i>reducing international collaboration on terrorism, crime, cross-border conflicts, and WMD</i> proliferation.</li> <li>* <i>WMD proliferates</i> rapidly and dangerously.</li> <li>* <i>High levels of internal and cross border conflict persists in developing countries</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* As <i>US concentrates on Western Hemisphere</i> and <i>downgrades its presence in Europe and Asia</i>, <i>China drives towards regional dominance</i>, <i>Japan rearms</i> and the risk of great power conflict increases as <i>US contemplates reasserting influence</i>.</li> <li>* <i>WMD proliferates</i> rapidly and dangerously, particularly in <i>Asia</i>.</li> <li>* High levels of <i>internal and cross border conflict</i> persists in <i>developing countries</i>.</li> </ul>

Table 4<sup>88</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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### CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

- <sup>1</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon and Shuster, 1994, Page 702  
<sup>2</sup> IBID, Page 31  
<sup>3</sup> IBID, Page 19  
<sup>4</sup> Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass., 1984  
<sup>5</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simons and Shuster, 1994, Page 23

### CHAPTER 2 THE LINEAGE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

- <sup>6</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon and Shuster, 1994, Page 18  
<sup>7</sup> *Promised Land, Crusader State*, Walter McDougall, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997, Page 18  
<sup>8</sup> Joseph Ellis, *Founding Brothers – The Revolutionary Generation*, Borzoi Books, 2000, Page 127  
<sup>9</sup> IBID, Page 122  
<sup>10</sup> IBID, Page 124  
<sup>11</sup> IBID, Page 140  
<sup>12</sup> IBID, Page 136-144  
<sup>13</sup> As Commanding General, Washington understood the Continental Army, personifying the revolutionary cause, to be the strategic center of gravity of the United States. As long as the Continental Army remained as a cohesive fighting force, the British could not squelch the revolution. Accordingly, Washington adopted a strategy of protracted war to exhaust the British fighting forces, only fighting when he had the advantage, while eroding popular support in England. Although treacherous, given the military conditions, it was the only approach that offered victory.  
<sup>14</sup> Ellis, Page 135  
<sup>15</sup> IBID, Page 148  
<sup>16</sup> IBID, Page 148  
<sup>17</sup> IBID, Page 129  
<sup>18</sup> IBID, Page 134  
<sup>19</sup> IBID, Page 128  
<sup>20</sup> IBID, Page 134  
<sup>21</sup> IBID, Page 133  
<sup>22</sup> In 1794, President Washington dispatched Chief Justice John Jay to broker a treaty of neutrality with England. In response for recognized neutrality, the United States accepted English naval and commercial superiority, English tariffs on American exports, provided most favored nation status to English imports, established payment schedule for pre-revolutionary war debts. In exchange, the British would accept arbitration of confiscated cargo and evacuate its troops from the western frontier (Treaty of Paris 1783).  
<sup>23</sup> Ellis, Page 137  
<sup>24</sup> McDougall, Page 37  
<sup>25</sup> McDougall, Page 39  
<sup>26</sup> McDougall, Page 41 The British policy was to exploit the advantages of insularity, nurture the balance of power on the continent, see to its navy, and conquer the trade of the world. America's insularity was enviable even by British standards. The territorial and economic potential of the continent, enhanced by the security of the Atlantic Ocean, provided a staggering opportunity for America.  
<sup>27</sup> McDougall, Page 50 "Much of the technology driving the American Industrial Revolution, and the woolen and cotton clothes on American backs, came from abroad. Between 1820 and 1850, American imports quadrupled to \$144 million per year, over two-thirds from Europe. The customs receipts from that trade remained the principal source of federal revenue. Nearly two-thirds of the American state and municipal bonds in the 1830s were held by Europeans, and as late as 1853, Europeans still owned a third of American public debt."  
<sup>28</sup> McDougall, Page 75  
<sup>29</sup> Of the European powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria were the most conservative and autocratic, fearing the social message of the French Revolution more than the advance of the *Grand Arme*. In addition to the Quadruple Alliance, Prussia, Russia, and Austria also signed the Holy Alliance, legitimizing monarchy at the expense of popular sovereignty. In effect, the Holy Alliance provided an obligatory requirement to "stamp out revolution whenever possible". With revolution flaring in both Spain and her American colonies, the Congress of Troppau invoked the Holy Alliance to justify French

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intervention. When the French reinstated King Ferdinand in Spain, both the British and Americans were concerned that the European Congress might extend the obligation to her colonies.

<sup>30</sup> McDougall, Page 71

<sup>31</sup> McDougall, Page 73

<sup>32</sup> The Circular Letter of 1783 was the last of Washington's annual letters to the state governors as commander of the army. In the letter, Washington clearly defined western expansion and continental dominance as the key to American national power.

<sup>33</sup> McDougall, Page 102

<sup>34</sup> IBID, Page 103

<sup>35</sup> Kissinger, Page 29

<sup>36</sup> Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power on Maritime Nations" provided a historical evaluation of the relationship between trade, naval power, and national power. As a maritime nation, Mahan proposed the development of overseas markets, excess production, and an international transportation system. To support transportation, Mahan proposed the development of a merchant fleet, battle fleet, and interim territorial possessions to provide maintenance and coal for the merchant and battle fleets.

<sup>37</sup> Kissinger, Page 39

<sup>38</sup> In 1904 the government of the Dominican Republic went bankrupt and Roosevelt feared that Germany and other nations might intervene forcibly to collect their debts. In response, Roosevelt issued the Roosevelt Corollary as part of a 1904 message to Congress. The Roosevelt Corollary provided the justification for American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico.

<sup>39</sup> Kissinger, Page 40

<sup>40</sup> IBID, Page 40

<sup>41</sup> McDougall, Page 142

<sup>42</sup> McDougall, Page 147

<sup>43</sup> Diplomacy, Kissinger, Page 395 - The Four Policemen was a reflection of America's deepest wartime convictions. With Hitler and the militant Japanese oligarchy removed from the international order, Roosevelt believed that the world could exist in harmony, as opposed to a constructed equilibrium. Roosevelt envisioned peace, in the post-war world, "would be preserved through a system of collective security maintained by the Allies acting in concert and sustained by mutual goodwill and vigilance. In effect, the wartime victors, in addition to China, would act as a board of directors governing the security of the globe.

<sup>44</sup> Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, 450

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 450

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 452

<sup>47</sup> In 1949, Mao Tse Tung's Communist victory in China and the Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon dramatically altered America's security environment. In response to these events, President Truman commissioned a panel of State and Defense policy makers to assess America's ability to implement the Truman Doctrine in the new security environment. The results of the commissions study became the foundation of NSC-68. NSC-68 recommended an immediate build-up of both conventional and strategic forces to counter the enhanced communist threat. At the estimated cost of 50 billion dollars, the recommendations of NSC-68 required a peacetime mobilization of the nation. The Korean Conflict provided the galvanizing force to implement NSC-68.

### **CHAPTER 3 THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL THEORY**

<sup>48</sup> Fareed Zakaria, Is Realism Finished?, The National Interest, Winter 92/93, Page 31

<sup>49</sup> In reality, the degree of allegiance was proportionally to the distance from the capitol. The embryonic communications, transportation, and administrative systems limited the strategic reach and influence of the emperor. During the medieval period, the Holy Roman Empire was the dynasty of Europe. The Holy Roman Empire, founded by Charles the Great (Charlemagne) in 800, unified the territories of Germany, Northern France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Northern Italy, with papal approval as the supreme ruler of Christendom. The German princes selected each successive emperor, crowned by the Pope until 1356. The change to electors and the discarding of the religious coronation indicated a growing schism between the papacy and the emperor. The Pope, being a political power in his own right, competed with the emperor for influence through the empire. The emperor held jurisdiction over his immediate hereditary family domains, the imperial free cities, and controlled the remainder of the empire only to the extent that he influenced the imperial Diet. In 1438, the Hapsburgs, although not electors, were selected to rule, expanding the empire to the east. During the beginning of the

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16<sup>th</sup> Century, Charles V expanded the empire to include Spain through marriage. As a result, the Holy Roman Empire emerged as the hegemonic power of Europe.

<sup>50</sup> Inspired by the Renaissance, the Reformation openly challenged the doctrines of Catholicism, emphasizing individual faith as opposed to the sacraments and alms, compromising the authority of both church and emperor.

<sup>51</sup> Between 1520 and 1617, Europe was embroiled in a constant state of conflict, setting the stage for major social and political change. The Thirty Years' War, inspired by both value and interest-based motives, compelled the involvement of every European power, dramatically altering the traditions of international relations, culture, and society. Under the auspice of religious freedom, the Hapsburgs intervened in Bohemia to stamp out the Reformation and centralize political control of the Germany, attempting to regain the dynastic legitimacy of Charlemagne. In response, Europe split along both religious and political lines to prevent the resurgence of a hegemon. The Hapsburgs, controlling the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and the Catholic princes of Germany, would eventually face the remainder of Europe, on behalf of the Protestant princes of Germany. After defeating the Protestant princes of Bohemia in 1623, the Hapsburgs attempted to expand their control of Germany. Alarmed by the Hapsburg's incursion into Northern Germany, both the Danes and the Swedes, indirectly supported by France, intervened on behalf of the Protestant princes until the Peace of Prague in 1635. Unwilling to see the Hapsburgs retain power, France openly entered the war, beginning its final and bloodiest phase.

<sup>52</sup> Kissenger, Page 61

<sup>53</sup> IBID, Page 65

<sup>54</sup> Cardinal Richelieu, the father of the modern-day state, was the first to formulate and implement the competitive national interest as the basis of foreign policy. France, liberated from the religious restraint of morality in her foreign policy, exploited the rivalries of the Reformation to progressively weaken the Hapsburg regime. Richelieu saw the Hapsburg attempt to re-establish the empire as a political, not religious, endeavor; Hapsburg hegemony threatened French security and prestige. Accordingly, Richelieu developed and implemented a foreign policy to overextend, exhaust, and eventually defeat the Hapsburg regime. After the initial defeat of the Protestant princes of Bohemia in 1622, Richelieu engineered active resistance against the expansion of Hapsburg control of Germany. On behalf of the Protestant princes, Richelieu negotiated a series of agreements that encouraged and supported military intervention and insurrection against the Hapsburgs in central Germany. By appealing to both religious pluralism and pending security threat, Richelieu convinced the Danes and Swedes to do his bidding for over 13 years. Because of the Peace of Prague in 1635, France openly entered the war, in alliance with England, to prolong the war until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Through a series of shifting alliances, based on geopolitical necessity and common national interest, Richelieu was able to mobilize the collective power of Europe towards the systematic erosion of the Hapsburg regime.

<sup>55</sup> IBID, Page 68

<sup>56</sup> In response to French expansion into the European "low country", England emerged as a continental "player". As the "swing man" in the set of the five European powers (France, Hapsburg, Prussia, Russia), England would intervene on the continent in order to prevent the emergence of a dominant power. Under William of Orange, England developed the three pillars of its foreign policy that would serve it through World War II – European balance of power, security of the European low country, and dominance of the seas. <sup>56</sup> Security of the European "low country" effectively prevented a cross-channel invasion of England. The maintenance of a European balance of power prevented the resurgence of a dominant continental adversary to challenge the economic and physical security of England. The maintenance of naval supremacy would secure the sea lines of communications, ensuring both the physical security and economic prosperity of the homeland. Accordingly, she could "take as much or as little of war as she pleased", allowing her to function as the "bearer" of the European balance of power for 250 years. As France had engineered the demise of the Hapsburgs a century earlier, so England engineered the demise of imperial France.

<sup>57</sup> IBID, Page 21

<sup>58</sup> Austria, Prussia, England, and Russia were the four great powers, while the recently reinstated Louis XVIII represented a "new" France.

<sup>59</sup> IBID, Page 79

<sup>60</sup> IBID, Page 81-88 As highlighted by history, the stability of the continent was contingent on the stability of Central Europe. If Central Europe was to have peace and stability, they would have to undo Richelieu's work of the 1600s. Richelieu had fostered a weak, fragmented Central Europe, providing France with a standing temptation to encroach." Not only imperial and republican France, but also Prussia, Austria, and Russia ceded to the temptation of a diluted Central Europe. As Central Europe was the key to continental stability, so Germany was to Central Europe. The German dilemma reflected the fine balance between the requirements of consolidation, while preventing unification. As a weak Germany offered the continuous temptation of incursion, so a unified German offered the intimidating specter of a potential indomitable power. The German question determined the future stability of Central Europe. The solidification of Central Europe consolidated the 300 pre-Napoleonic, German states into 30, with both Austria and Prussia gaining territory, as the lead agents in the confederation. The 30 German states were all members of a confederation, diplomatically tied by formal alliance.

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In accordance with the alliance, the attack of one state would automatically precipitate the response of all. Conversely, an outward commitment of the Confederation would require the agreement of all.

<sup>61</sup> When Central Europe was reconfigured around the German Confederation, political boundaries were defined by tangible national power, as opposed to ethnicity and culture. The German Confederation was designed as a balance of power between Austria and Prussia. Under the guise of religious protection, von Metternich proposed the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria) to prevent the spread of popular sovereignty through Central Europe.

<sup>62</sup> The emergence of Wilsonianism has already been addressed in Manifest Destiny II.

<sup>63</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition, Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1973, Page 38

<sup>64</sup> John M. Owen, *How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace*, *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 2, Fall 94, President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, Page 95

<sup>65</sup> Christopher Layne, *Kant or Cant, The Myth of Democratic Peace Theory*, *International Security*, Volume 19, No. 2, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and MIT, 1994, Page 44

<sup>66</sup> Douglas Lemke, *The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War*, *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 34, No.1, February 1997, Sage Publications, Page 24.

<sup>67</sup> IBID, Page 25

#### **CHAPTER 4 THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF SYMBIOSIS**

<sup>68</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts*, 2000-02, United States Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000, Page 5.

<sup>69</sup> IBID, Page 83

<sup>70</sup> IBID, Page 83

<sup>71</sup> IBID, Page 84

<sup>72</sup> IBID, Page 84

<sup>73</sup> IBID, Page 13

#### **CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS OF SYMBIOSIS**

<sup>74</sup> Kissenger, Page 19

#### **ANNEX A**

<sup>75</sup> National Intelligence Council, Page 8

<sup>76</sup> National Intelligence Council, Page 8

<sup>77</sup> IBID, Page 9

<sup>78</sup> IBID, Page 9

<sup>79</sup> IBID, Page 9

<sup>80</sup> IBID, Page 10

<sup>81</sup> IBID, Page 10

<sup>82</sup> IBID, Page 10

<sup>83</sup> IBID, Page 11

<sup>84</sup> IBID, Page 11

<sup>85</sup> IBID, Page 11

<sup>86</sup> IBID, Page 11

#### **ANNEX B**

<sup>87</sup> IBID Page 86

<sup>88</sup> IBID, Page 86