Maj Grant V. Frey

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DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
Executive Summary

Title: Transforming and Relevant: Military Police
In The Operating Forces—A Paradigm Shift For The Future

Author: Maj Grant V. Frey

Thesis: As the Marine Corps transitions to an Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) force, it cannot afford the duplication of Marines, equipment and capability dispersed throughout the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Emerging technology, new and improved processes, and developing concepts and doctrine require a new approach to the MP in the operating forces. With a common operational and tactical picture, a single battle focus, and integrated planning, MP can exploit their full range of capabilities in support of the MAGTF.

Discussion: The purpose of this study is to examine the organizational structure, doctrine, employment practices, and future capabilities of the MP in the operating forces. This inquiry hopes to make three contributions. First, by presenting the MP background and problems that are inherent within its structure, it will enable the reader to make comparisons and draw conclusions based on past practices and perceptions. The second goal is to create a greater awareness of how policy decisions, operational needs assessments, and doctrinal changes have better equipped the MP. Third, this analysis seeks to examine the MP and “operators” relationship in the context of future employment practices and possible alternatives to maximize capabilities. In the final analysis, this study will illustrate how MP support of the MAGTF came from obscurity to a possible force multiplier, and a rich source of lessons for MP professionals.

Due to recent initiatives, the MP ability to operate across the force continuum appears to be improving. But substantial progress cannot be made until a paradigm shift occurs. This paradigm shift must occur not in the employment practices of MP assets so much as in the thought process on the part of the operators. The MP community can be further strengthened by becoming more operationally relevant and by developing credibility as a community. Operational relevance can be achieved through several initiatives. First, a MP campaign plan should be published clearly articulating a concept for MP support to MAGTF expeditionary operations that supports the Marine Corps’ primary operational concepts such as OMFTS, ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), and sustained operations ashore. Second, the MP community needs to do a better job marketing its skills to the MAGTF operators and planners they support. The MP community needs to emphasize its adaptability and demonstrate how their capabilities complement the MAGTF as a force multiplier. Third, MP must take the initiative in promoting its capabilities and limitations. It must have more “Marine warrior” thinking and less “cop” thinking. Officers in the MP community must view themselves as MAGTF officers first and foremost.
Conclusions: Through these efforts, the MP should be able to develop a sense of credibility as a community. By establishing operational relevance and standardizing the way MP support operators and planners throughout the Marine Corps, the MP community, over time, should experience a paradigm shift. The MP campaign plan will greatly enhance the MP situational awareness within the MAGTF. The MP leadership has to instill an entirely new and fresh attitude within the community in terms of how they support commanders, operators, and planners. This will require the attention and commitment of all MP professionals, commanders, and staff officers from all of the battlespace functional areas within the operating forces.
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Introduction

Throughout the world, the Marine Corps deploys Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) which must be prepared to conduct expeditionary operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. These MAGTFs provide combatant commanders with forces that are tailored to meet specific mission requirements. Further, “whether supporting stability through forward presence and engagement, reducing human suffering due to natural or manmade disasters, or winning battles,”¹ MAGTFs require an effective organic Marine Military Police (MP)² capability that is responsive to the MAGTF commander’s mission requirements.

The purpose of this study is to examine the organizational structure, doctrine, employment practices, and future capabilities of the MP in the operating forces. The study will briefly consider the historical character and past problems associated within the MP community and then examine its current situation and possible future employment alternatives to better support staff planners and MAGTF commanders.

This inquiry hopes to make three contributions. First, by presenting the MP background and problems that are inherent within its structure, it will enable the reader to make comparisons and draw conclusions based on past practices and perceptions. Additionally, the historical information provided may serve as a reference point for a better understanding and appreciation for the current situation. The second goal is to create a greater awareness of how policy decisions, operational needs assessments, and doctrinal changes have better equipped the MP. Third, this analysis seeks to examine the MP and “operators” relationship in the context of future employment practices and

possible alternatives to maximize capabilities. Proper employment of MP is many things to many people. Depending on one’s definition, expectations as to what MP bring and should provide to the MAGTF commanders vary. Still, it is clear that employment of MP in the operating forces is an evolutionary process. Hence, a significant paradigm shift for the future will be explored. In the final analysis, this study will illustrate how MP support of the MAGTF came from obscurity to a possible force multiplier, and a rich source of lessons for MP professionals.

Assumptions

The future battlefield will see an evolving, interdependent, and capable Marine Corps employed in a principally littoral battlespace characterized by unpredictability, asymmetry, and the requirement for military operations spanning the spectrum of conflict. To that end, a logical foundation has been laid to increase the role of MP in support of certain types of MAGTF operational responses.\(^3\) This assumes that the role of the MP could be expanded in scenarios where the primary focus of operations is the restoration of civil authority, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and similar peacekeeping type operations at the lower end of the spectrum. However, to propose substantial augmentation or the replacement of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) of the MAGTF with MP assets is replete with potential problems.\(^4\) For example, MP are not fully trained in all tactical and technical aspects of forward presence, force projection,

\(^2\) “MP” will be used throughout representing plurals, singualrs, apostrophes and possessives.
\(^3\) For thoroughly reached and documented evidence that MP are invaluable in security-related scenarios such as peacekeeping, see Colonel Kenneth J. Glueck, USMC, Commanding Officer of the Twenty-sixth Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), e-mail interview by author, 12 December 2000 with attachments, subjects: “After Action Summary – Operation Joint Guardian,“ and “26 MEU (SOC) Lessons Learned from Albania, Kosovo and Turkey.”
\(^4\) The proposal to consider employing MP in an enhanced GCE role in future contingencies has been researched, see Colonel Ronald P. Rook, USMC, The Force of Choice in Future Contingencies, Research
and fire support capabilities. Additionally, attempts to compare and structure Marine MP under another Service’s doctrine and employment strategy are assumptions that remain problematic.

There is a cultural and philosophical difference between the Nation’s ground combat Services (i.e., the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps) relative to how they perceive the proper employment and utilization of MP assets. The Army makes greater use of MP to conduct missions that are traditionally handled within the Marine Corps by ground combat arms personnel, most often infantry Marines. There are several fundamental reasons why this differing view exists, the most crucial being a matter of end-strength or size of the force.

The Army is approximately four times larger than the Marine Corps and as such has established a significant MP infrastructure within its ranks. The Army maintains MP operational units ranging in size from MP Companies up to Brigade (Regimental) level and maintains a Corps structure to oversee the management, training, staffing, and utilization of MP within its subordinate units. Concurrently, the MP strength within the Marine Corps has historically averaged, more or less, approximately 3,800 enlisted personnel and 150 officers. The creation of additional MP structure within the Marine Corps is simply not feasible.

The Problem

The MP community is at a very delicate crossroads. In the past, MP have advertised their ability to support the MAGTF commander in combat and contingencies,


yet devoted far too little time and energy to offering a viable and professional program of support. MP have, by necessity, often sacrificed their combat capability, the capability upon which Marines build their existence, for the sake of taking care of the equally important aspects of installation security, a.k.a. garrison law enforcement. This has resulted in the creation of an occupational force which possesses a thorough understanding of police operations at the expense of maintaining combat related skills such as deliberate and crisis action planning, use and coordination of supporting arms, development of operations orders/plans, and like issues essential to being able to effectively change gears from law enforcement (LE) to warfighting. This deficiency was realized when MP in the operating forces, the majority of whom were traditionally assigned to garrison duties under the provisions of the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP), were deployed for combat operations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Fortunately, this eye-opener has resulted in ongoing actions to enhance alignment, training readiness, missions, doctrine, and military occupation specialty (MOS) management of the MP within the operating forces.

Due to these recent initiatives to correct MP warfighting deficiencies, the MP ability to operate across the force continuum with appropriate constraint and authority appears to be improving. But substantial progress cannot be made until a paradigm shift occurs. This paradigm shift must occur not in the employment practices of MP assets so much as in the thought process on the part of the operators. The MP leadership can greatly assist in developing a positive perception of their community by educating the operators on the capabilities and limitations of MP assets. There are two problems that

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require corrective action in order to fully implement the paradigm shift. The first is the correct articulation by the MP leadership about the MP transformation. The former Head of Marine Corps Law Enforcement, Lieutenant Colonel John Wintersteen, wrote:

“…[T]ell the MP story outside our field at every opportunity. (Classes at AWS and CSC, FMF [Fleet Marine Force] MP “Planning Guide” handouts for TBS/AWS/CSC, articles for “Proceedings” and “Marine Corps Gazette,” MP input for Non-MP FMFM’s and other publications, etc.).”

During this educational process, the MP must develop credibility with the operators by demonstrating the operational relevance of MP in support of the MAGTF.

The second is to increase opportunities for senior enlisted MP and officers to serve in billets beyond the MP community. If MP are to educate combat operators, they must be afforded the opportunity to benefit from increased participation in MAGTF level training exercises, increased attendance at all levels of Professional Military Education (PME), and increased command opportunities—all of which will ultimately aid in the development of a cadre of MP which may at some future point be capable of achieving the desired end state of a paradigm shift throughout the operating forces.

**Background**

**Historical Sketch**

History is replete with examples of the use of MP in combat roles. The MP, as known today, were officially organized in the Marine Corps more than fifty-five years ago during World War II (WWII). In the early stages of its history, it was not a formalized occupational specialty. During the initial development period, Marines from various MOSs were detailed to perform duties on a rotational basis, the same manner
used to form shore patrols. Their primary responsibility in peacetime was to assist the commander in maintaining good order and discipline and, in times of conflict, they were primarily responsible for the handling of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). As the utility of having dedicated personnel assigned to “police” the Marine Corps emerged, so too did the expansion and formalization of Marine Corps LE. In addition to the formalized MP units of WWII, MP also performed critical LE and security roles in the Korean Conflict, Vietnam, and various other conflicts. During the Vietnam War, MP battalions were formed to increase the capability of the commander to function effectively on the battlefield. MP roles were significantly expanded beyond those previously performed. They were tasked with the traditional mission of maintaining good order and discipline, but also were called upon to provide dog teams for scout dog duties, to man checkpoints at traffic control points, to provide convoy security, to investigate motor vehicle accidents, to patrol off-limits areas, to protect critical facilities, and to investigate serious criminal offenses involving black market operations, drug offenses and war crimes.

Personnel assigned to perform LE duties operated under the control of dedicated MP limited duty officers who had previously gained credibility and experience as enlisted MP or criminal investigators. During this period the Marine Corps leadership established a formal occupational field to support a continued presence of MP and criminal investigators.

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8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Military Police (Fort McClellan, AL: U.S. Army Military Police School, June 1992), 4.

More recently, MP have been employed in a variety of missions—which serves to underscore their continued role in future contingencies. Examples include, *inter alia*, MP support in Grenada; support of Operation Just Cause in Panama; riot and looting control in Los Angeles following the controversial Rodney King court ruling; MP support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm (especially handling Iraqi EPWs); Haitian refugee support in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, and during Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo.\(^{10}\)

**Early Warnings**

MP have long suffered from the perception that they are insufficiently prepared and organized compared to the majority of the Marine Corps.\(^{11}\) Part of the problem was expressed by Major James Donovan while serving as the Executive Officer of the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, Second Marine Division in 1944, when he wrote “Many officers, and men too, are dissatisfied with our M.P.’s yet there is little evidence of their improvement.”\(^{12}\) Although an infantry officer by MOS, Major Donovan appeared to be interested and concerned about the quality and performance of MP during their early stages of development. With the expansion of the Marine Corps during the Second World War into numerous divisions, the need for specially trained MP followed accordingly. However, the published opinions early on suggest that the requirement for qualified MP was met for the most part by improvisation and lack of deliberate planning.

The disagreement among the Marine Corps’ leadership on MP qualifications and limitations has continued since the formation of its first MP units. Major Donovan further suggested through publication in the *Marine Corps Gazette* that “…very few of

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our Marine MP are either specially picked or trained…[therefore] give them a period of special training as a unit….” According to the Provost Marshal (PM) of a Marine Division in 1945 “…a training school [for MP] is an absolute necessity—not, however, because of any failure to come up with a standard…but to provide additional and replacement material.”

Clearly, training was recognized as a priority to vastly improve the MP capabilities and knowledge of traffic control, maintaining law and order, security against subversive activities, handling EPWs, shore party functions in amphibious operations, and various other initial mission requirements. Training as a unit provides cohesion, synergy, and confidence, which directly relates to mission accomplishment. In the early years, MP brought vital skills to assist the warfighters. But not being trained to meet those early requirements, they then became a burden to the commander. The mission essential task list and training standards were not yet developed; MP leadership would have to wait over twenty-five years for their genesis.

During the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War, the task organization of MP units was problematic. The PM normally was not located in a central position within the Command Post (CP) so as to have immediate liaison and notification of all movements in order to be able to promptly notify the MP commanders of changing mission requirements. During combat operations, MP unit leaders made recommendations that separate and independent MP Companies should be formed in order to maintain

12 Donovan, 9.
13 Donovan, 9.
14 LtCol Lewis N. Samuelson, USMC, “To the Editor—Improvement of Discipline in the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette (February 1945): 93.
15 The first official charter for the MP community was developed and programs established in 1968, see LtCol James H. Olds, USMC, “Military Police ‘Directions’,” Chief of Staff Project Study No. 12-68, subject: Reestablishment of Military Police, 1968.
centralized command and control of its forces while effectively directing its decentralized employment.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, in an attempt to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of MP LE units assigned to the operating forces, commands studied the feasibility of standardizing and combining all of the MP detachments into one organization at the operational level. In 1967, the First Marine Aircraft Wing Criminal Investigative Division (CID) officer, reported that “…by organizing and utilizing a Wing Provost Section the offense rate for the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Aircraft Wing will decrease…”\textsuperscript{17}

The most significant problems during the early foundation setting of the MP field were commanding officers’ level of confidence in, and cooperation with, the PM or MP commander. One of the MP early visionaries, and author of the first MP charter, Lieutenant Colonel James Olds, stated that there was a general lack of support, Corps-wide, for the PM and his MP.\textsuperscript{18}

The Marine officer today who finds himself as a Provost Marshal sees himself on the lower end of a rungless [sic] ladder and his job involves climbing up…[H]e considers himself a success if he wasn’t relieved; much less making any progress…Fellow officers look down their noses on the billet [PM] and belittle the job. This type of moral support is a traumatic experience for the uninitiated and can be devastating upon the internal morale of the MP unit.\textsuperscript{19}

Stage Setting Impact

Being second-rate, in any area, is not acceptable to the high standards of the Marine Corps. However, this is exactly the position the MP were placed in during their

\textsuperscript{16} 1stLt Nye G. Rodes, USMC, Military Police Detachment, Headquarters & Service Battalion, 1\textsuperscript{st} Provisional Marine Brigade (Reinforced)—In the Field Report, subject: “Special Action Report on MP Detachment in Korea,” August, 1950, 3.

\textsuperscript{17} Wing CID Investigative Officer, Memorandum to Assistance Chief of Staff (G-1), subject: “1st MAW Provost Marshal Section, Staff Study; report of,” 56: RSB: drg 29 November 1967.

\textsuperscript{18} Women were not allowed to serve as MP until circa 1972. LtCol Olds appropriately refers to MP using the male gender; author uses male gender for continuity though he recognizes the contributions of women Marines to the MOS since 1972.
early history. There were numerous indications of the lack of continuity due to the negative perceptions of the MP community. Rapid attrition severely hampered MP performance and training in which “…100% turnover [MP units] within periods of three or four months…[and] [O]fficers assigned to MP duties request mast all the way to the CG....” Consequently, due to poor stability and the lack of recognition that there was a fundamental need and requirement for MP within the Marine Corps, pride in unit and individual professionalism was missing. The Marine Corps was not necessarily alone in not giving proper recognition and support to LE during the turbulent 1960s. The United States as a whole consistently grappled with the civilian populace’s general apathy toward, and interaction with, police forces.

The newly formed MP field failed to fully develop and articulate to the Marine Corps’ leadership a program outlining initial goals and objectives with a plan to accomplish them. To have done so would have: ensured an acceptable level of attainment for the immediate future, which would build confidence in the MP abilities and provide a solid foundation for the future; eliminated initial fears of overspecialization and dominance of the MP field per se; and, provided stated objectives for doctrine, training, and a focused direction.

**The Past**

**Overview**

The dispersion of MP assets throughout the MAGTF adversely affected achieving any synergy and the resultant decentralization within the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) created MP units which had extremely limited capabilities to support

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19 LtCol James H. Olds, USMC, “Military Policeman’s Lot: Rifle Company Annihilated.” *Marine Corps*
commanders. The majority of the MP in the operating forces were not training for or contributing to successful expeditionary operations. Instead, they were performing LE duties for a base or station commander. This situation existed because LE missions aboard bases and stations were an important quality of life issue. In addition, the division and combat service support (CSS) MP units were small, with limited capabilities, encouraging the FAP to base. Finally, the Marine Air Wing (MAW) assigned almost all of its MP to air station billets because the number of station MP were insufficient to accomplish the LE mission.

Organization

MP were organized into companies with one company supporting a division and a force service support group (FSSG). The air wings had MP units supporting air-base ground defense at the expeditionary airfields during war and contingency operations. During peacetime, MP were assigned under the FAP to the air stations to support garrison LE. (See Appendix A, MP Organizational Charts) Additionally, each Marine base had its own garrison MP to provide LE. This organizational structure supported the decentralized command and control and decentralized execution well.

Each major subordinate command (MSC) had its own MP organization to support mission requirements. Although individual T/O mission statements may be different, MP organizations can provide identical support to the MSCs. The FSSG MP Company provides security support to the FSSG and the MEF, including battlefield circulation control (BCC), area security, EPW management, and support for the maintenance of LE.

The Division MP Company provides LE and security activities, to include rear area security where appropriate to the Marine Division. In the MAW, MP provide security and LE services, including security of flightline and critical airfield facilities (area security); traffic control and enforcement, convoy escort, and traffic investigations; straggler collection and refugee control; and criminal investigations, physical security surveys, and related activities.\(^ {22}\)

In the operating forces, MP were not organized for combat. They were, however, organized efficiently for peacetime – garrison LE – operations. There were significant problems with this task organization. MP units were mutually supporting but did not function efficiently with the cohesion desired by commanders. The coordinated MP effort required for the MAGTF commander’s intent in the single battle concept could not be accomplished. Further, MP units divided among the MSCs could not have the synergistic effect or the capability to conduct their mission-essential tasks as organized.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine for MP in the operating forces is a relatively new development. For years, the MP community relied on information based on the U.S. Army doctrine of the early 1980’s. In 1989, the MP field developed Operational Handbook (OH) 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat*, which set forth both the doctrinal and organizational basis for the proper employment of MP units in support of the MAGTF in combat. The handbook also provided the doctrinal foundation for all subsequent Marine

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\(^ {21}\) All organizational charts are taken from, Webber, subject: “FDP Organization Description for the Military Police Company (Division and Force Service Support Group) and Headquarters, Marine Air Wing,” attachments to e-mail from Head, Military Police Unit, HQMC, to author, 16 August 2000.

Corps publications on MP and was used as the interim draft for the anticipated Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM). Although not directive, OH 3-5 did provide commanders and staff planners doctrinal guidance and more importantly gave the MP leadership a published handbook to be used as the basis for instruction to MP in the operating forces. This handbook was generally valid, but modifications and clarifications were required based on the density of MP personnel available to the MAGTF commander in most situations and the changing requirements in warfighting concepts and weapon systems.

FMFM 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat*, the first Marine Corps formal doctrine, was published by the Warfighting Center in 1992. The manual cited the historical precedent for MP in combat and the techniques for utilizing this small but valuable asset. It also identified four combat missions of the MP: BCC (measures such as traffic control and route reconnaissance that aid in the orderly flow of personnel and equipment on the battlefield); LE operations (traditional police functions to include criminal investigations); EPW operations (the collection, processing, and administering of captured enemy personnel and displaced persons/refugees); and rear area security (the protection of designated critical facilities such as ammunition storage points and command and control centers).23

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the newly developed doctrine was tested and validated.24 Despite the frequent misuse of MP assets, on the occasions where MP were

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23 As a result of the need for an identifiable and viable combat role, the MP prepared the OH 3-5 and subsequently FMFM 3-5 with their target audience being the MP leadership. The doctrinal foundation was documented, see U.S. Marine Corps Operational Handbook (OH) 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 27 February 1989). Cited hereafter as U.S. Marine Corps OH 3-5; and U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 3-5.

24 During the Gulf War, FMFM 3-5 was a coordinating draft under the final review process.
employed in accordance with doctrine, MP performed satisfactorily and provided the required support to the commanders. The Head of Marine Corps Law Enforcement reported in December 1991, that “Existing MP FM doctrine is sound…MPs should be employed in accordance with doctrine…[and commanders] should take the time to become familiar with the contents…”

While portions of FMFM 3-5 remained accurate and relevant to MAGTF operations, it did not maintain satisfactory currency regarding emerging Marine Corps tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for MP support to the MAGTF. Additionally, the doctrine did not provide the required overview of the operational aspects of MP while considering joint warfighting and the emerging applications of peacekeeping operations, operations other than war (OOTW), force protection, humanitarian assistance, and the nonlethal use of force. Therefore, FMFM 3-5 was too narrow in scope and did not adequately articulate the MP contributions, capabilities, and limitations.

Training

To develop skills, confidence, and demonstrate capabilities, MP must train individually, as a unit, and participate in exercises along with other Marine organizations. The training evolution starts with developing proficiency with individual weapons, and then progresses through the use of weapons systems, tactics and teamwork. Finally, the MP must understand how their unit integrates with other Marine units to perform proficiently.

Historically, MP units failed to train effectively for combat. The training syllabuses in MP Companies in the operating forces were not reviewed for subject matter,

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25 Memorandum 3-91, 15.
continuity, standardization, or professional relevance.\textsuperscript{26} Since 1992, the U.S. Army’s MP school has formally trained the majority of MP. The school’s efforts are concentrated on combat missions and de-emphasize LE. The Army performs LE duties because it is a doctrinal mission; however, their focus is on support to the combat mission. Ostensibly, Marine MP who completed the “school house” curriculum should have been prepared to conduct their four MP missions to support the MAGTF. However, school graduation was generally where training ended as far as the MP community was concerned unless the Marines were assigned LE duties at a base or station Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO).

Continued and contemporary combat related training for MP in the operating forces was virtually nonexistent. The MP field chose to focus instead on the LE mission. This lack of insight, not to emphasize combat training, put the MP field at a distinct disadvantage in the contribution it could have made to the MAGTF commanders.

Training as a unit and supporting MSCs during exercises was another problem. Concentrated training efforts toward the particular need of the supported command often were at the exclusion of other training requirements. This decreased flexibility and encouraged specialization. For example, the wing trained MP in air base ground defense, division MP trained for BCC, and FSSG MP concentrated on handling EPWs and area security. Base MP stressed LE. This practice of each separate MP unit concentrating on their unique mission was counterproductive to unity of effort for preparation in combat operations.

Training problems were also evident in the officer ranks. Company commanders and platoon leaders were assigned to the billets and expected to perform. These junior

company grade leaders had few mentors or teachers. The MP units did not have an experienced, middle level leadership to ensure the officers were training properly and developing professionally. Young MP officers in the operating forces were trying to train themselves. Consequently, the majority of MP officers have been viewed as LE specialists rather than MAGTF officers who have an appreciation for and proper understanding of the warfighting concepts and functions.

Following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Law Enforcement Section at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), hosted an MP conference to submit lessons learned to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System database. The following observations and lessons learned in MP training were presented:

(1) MP noncommissioned officers (NCO) and staff NCO’s were not adequately skilled in warfighting and basic field craft. As a group, MP NCO’s and Staff NCO’s have for years concentrated on their primary MP skills (garrison) to the detriment of their basic Marine skills.

(2) Prior to Southwest Asia (SWA), some active duty FMF MP units did not regularly train/exercise as a unit in their FMF role. Unit and individual FMF skills were lacking and FMF MP units had to scramble to get their MP’s up to speed on warfighting skills and MP combat missions.

(3) MP roles/missions are not regularly programmed/planned into training exercises. Regular participation in realistic training exercises improves proficiency.

(4) While most MP units in SWA were able to support the commander by performing missions in accordance with doctrine, several MP detachments were employed improperly (guarding the tents, courier service, “palace guard”, etc.). Many Marine commanders and staff officers know little about MP combat missions or the best way to employ MP in the MAGTF. 27

To further illustrate the deficiencies in MP training, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Broussard pointed out in his article, “Military Police for the MAGTF Commander” that, “Out of 2,345 after-action reports in the Marine Corps Lesson Memorandum 3-91, 27-29.
Learned System, only 4 reports have been submitted dealing with MPs in [combat] support. If MP do not conduct unit training and participate in training exercises, they will not develop into a cohesive unit. They will fail to learn their role within the MAGTF. They will not perfect their combat missions and, consequently, they will never gain the confidence of the commanders in the operating forces.

The MP units in the operating forces were not prepared technically or tactically to conduct combat operations based on the lack of training. Commanders were cognizant that MP were only marginally trained for their doctrinal missions. Operationally, the answer to the demand for MP related skills was “send a rifle company” instead of “send the MP company.” MAGTF commanders have not asked for support because they have not seen an organization that could provide it.

**Employment**

As discussed, MP were not organized or trained properly to support the MAGTF commander during tactical exercises, contingencies, and combat operations. The problem was due to employment considerations dictated by the organizational structure. According to FMFM 3-5, there are three command and control options: (1) centralized control/centralized execution, (2) centralized control/decentralized execution, and (3) decentralized control/decentralized execution. Centralized control/centralized execution is the least traditional method of employment whereby the MP unit is under a single

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29 Colonel Carlos R. Hollifield, USMC, Commanding Officer of Chemical, Biological Incident Response Force (CBRIF), e-mail interview by author, 14 September 2000.
commander. The unit provides general support to the MAGTF. This method is ideal when the MAGTF mission is within a limited area of responsibility (AOR) such as peacekeeping operations or humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{30}

The second option, centralized control/decentralized execution, retains a single MP commander but allows MP units to provide general support to the MAGTF or direct support to MSCs. This method of employment provides the MAGTF commanders a single MP commander to analyze, prioritize, and coordinate all MP activities. Normally, MP units do not provide direct support below the GCE, aviation combat element (ACE), or combat service support element (CSSE) levels.\textsuperscript{31}

The third option, decentralized control/decentralized execution, allows MSCs to retain tactical control of their organic MP units. This option is employed best when the MAGTF elements have wide geographical separation. This is the most viable option when the MSC mission requires MP units to establish different priorities for each MSC. However, the MAGTF MP capability is diluted, and the ability to rapidly mass MP assets is difficult to coordinate.\textsuperscript{32} This traditional method was normally used for employing and organizing MP in the operating forces. MSC commanders are comfortable with this option because they retained control of the MP and maintained established command relationships. As a result, commanders normally received quick and effective employment in support of MSC training exercises and operations.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 3-5, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{31} U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 3-5, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{32} U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 3-5, 2-2—2-3.
\textsuperscript{33} Draft Organizational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Military Police Company (Washington, DC: Head, Law Enforcement Section (POS-10), 1 October 1997), n.p.
This third option, decentralized control/decentralized method of employment, allows the MP to consistently provide direct support to the MSC, and does not force the commander to rely on external MP resources. Although decentralized control/decentralized execution is responsive and affords the supported unit control during small scale training deployments, this option—driven by the MP organization—is not best suited for MAGTF operations.

**Conclusions**

The majority of MAGTF commanders have never employed MP in a battlefield capacity. The Operations Officer for Marine Corps Forces in the Pacific, Colonel Timothy Conway, clearly articulated the problems with the MP in the operating forces when he said, “As an infantry officer of over 28 years, I have not seen MPs effectively integrated in any scale in an operational concept at the MAGTF or tactical level.” As such, most MP have never gained the MAGTF commander’s confidence that they can, in fact, perform their doctrinal missions. Subsequently, MP units are not regularly included in training exercises and deployments. This underutilization in a combat role has led to many of the MP in the operating forces being pulled away from their primary duties to perform non-tactical missions and participation in the FAP. Therefore, most of the MP units were too dispersed to facilitate their effective participation in training and deployments. This lack of availability to the MAGTF commander rendered the MP incapable of maintaining proficiency.

The current MP unit T/Os are not aligned with doctrinal missions and result in limited and ineffective support to MAGTFs, operational missions, and exercises.

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34 Colonel Timothy Conway, USMC, Operations Officer of Marine Forces, Pacific, e-mail interview by author, 4 December 2000.
Doctrinally, MP cannot perform their four combat missions simultaneously. The MP cannot accomplish the coordinated effort required to meet the commander’s intent or function independently within its framework without a significant shift in the distribution of MP within the operating forces. Not surprisingly, a comprehensive doctrinal revision must be conducted that is supportable by the reorganizing of MP resources. The greatest challenge for the MP community will be to convince key decision makers that MP can provide the balance and depth needed across the spectrum of conflict in support of the MAGTF.

The Transformation

Overview

The current MP organization, which has served MAGTF commanders for over fifty-five years, provides each element of the MAGTF with its own support capability. Though the MP are considered to be a CSS function, all three of the MSCs contain MP units that provide a CSS capability. This decentralization of MP assets within the operating forces creates MP units that are reduced in size. This results in MP units that have extremely limited ability to support the commander.

As the Marine Corps transitions to an Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) force, it cannot afford the duplication of Marines, equipment and capability dispersed throughout the MAGTF. Emerging technology, new and improved processes, and developing concepts and doctrine require a new approach to the MP organization in the operating forces. With a common operational and tactical picture, a single battle focus, and integrated planning, MP can exploit their full range of capabilities in support
of the MAGTF. The realignment of MP structure in the MEF under the FSSG should take full advantage of consolidated support functions. The MP leadership has recommended that the optimal structure of the realigned organizational MP unit be battalion size.

Current operational trends that now focus on OOTW have increased the need for MP relative to force protection and the measured escalation and application of force. Thus, the MP battalion not only provides an alternative to correct personnel, employment, and training deficiencies, but also increases capabilities without additional growth.

Studies and Approval

Since 1985, several studies have recommended combining the operating force MP assets, doctrinal changes, and structure realignments (1985 Advanced Amphibious Study Group, 1993 and 1994 Mission Area Analysis for Security, 1996 Organizational and Capability Issues Resolution Group, and the 1998 OMFTS Final Report). The 1999 Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) recommended, as part of the overall concept of Total Force Combat Service Support (CSS) Migration, a reorganization of the operating force MP. The October 1999 General Officer’s Executive off-site (EOS) approved in principle many of the 1999 FSPG recommendations to include the MP reorganization.

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36 The CSS Migration exploits the full potential of CSS resources and organization, focuses the MAGTF elements on respective core competencies, and organizes CSS to more effectively support the warfighter, see Webber, “Military Police Reorganization,” information paper and briefing slides presented at the Annual Operating Forces & Garrison Military Police and Corrections Conference, 6 December 1999 (Honolulu, HI: Marine Corps Base, Kaneohe Bay, 1999), 3-4.
However, the EOS also decided that the Integrated Logistics Concept (ILC) would be implemented first. Therefore, the MP reorganization was tabled for further study.\(^{37}\)

Prior to the EOS in January 2000, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (D/C PP&O), Major General Emil Bedard, contacted the EOS General Officers advocating that the MP reorganization did not require further study and should be addressed separately from the ILC. Moreover, the D/C PP&O recommended to the EOS attendees that the MP reorganization should move forward for implementation by fiscal year 2002 as one of the first CSS Migration initiatives.\(^{38}\) As a result of the EOS attendee’s concurrence, the D/C PP&O directed the Head of Law Enforcement, HQMC to implement the proposal.\(^{39}\)

The proposal combines the MP functions currently spread and fragmented throughout the MEF. The reorganization provides peacetime and wartime assets that support operating force MP requirements, while augmenting the base and station LE and security needs. The initiative retains MP in the operating forces and increases MP capabilities in support of the MAGTF operational missions.

**The Arguments on Consolidation**

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\(^{37}\) The General Officer’s EOS is a Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) initiative attended by all Lieutenant Generals on a regular basis. The focus of the ILC is a review of current maintenance and supply policies, procedures and logistics information systems and the changes needed to bring about a reengineering of major segments of Marine Corps logistics.


\(^{39}\) For detailed discussions on the deliberate planning for the MP consolidation and the approval process from the EOS and MARFOR Commanders, see CMC (POS) memorandum to Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific & Atlantic and others, subject: “Military Police Battalions (MPBn),” POS, 15 May 2000; and the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (POS) memorandum to Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific & Atlantic and others, subject: Military Police Battalions (MPBn),” POS, 18 August 2000.
The MP perform a CSS mission that supports the MAGTF commander. The MP leadership adamantly believes that the consolidation of smaller MP units into a larger, more capable battalion should be implemented to receive the benefit of this function.

Resistance to change is always a hurdle to progress. The MSC commanders are reluctant to release control of their MP for fear of losing related support. Concerns have been raised regarding the ability of units to accomplish some aspects of their mission when they no longer have MP assets internal to their respective organizations. An example of that was the issue of force protection. With the consolidation under a single resource provider, MP can be more responsive to the MAGTF commander’s focus of effort. MP can provide support to the ACE, GCE, CSSE or Command Element (CE), depending upon the situation, the threat, and the criticality to mission success.

Future MP support will normally be available to aid a commander in providing security in and around his area of operation (AO). The lack of MP support that might arise—depending on the phase of an operation, or a change in the MAGTF commander’s focus of effort—does not relieve any commander of the responsibility of providing for security of his force. While the area security mission is a MP core competency, force protection will certainly require the efforts of all personnel of the MAGTF. As with any change there may be difficulties, but commanders should realize that they would continue to receive support and that the support will be more responsive and effective under the centralized command and control of the MP battalion.

There are, however, advocates who support the formation of the MP battalion under the MEF CE. During an Organization Needs Statement (ONS) study, the II MEF

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40 MP SME Conference Notes, 2-4.
commander, wrote that “…the need to apply limited assets consistent with II MEF priorities and focus of effort, it is critical that [MP]…be either organic or under the operational control of the Command Element.”42 Conversely, the logisticians, including the Director of Logistics for Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility Division (LPM-1), Brigadier General Paul Lee, Jr., emphasized that placing a consolidated MP unit in the MEF CE puts a maneuver unit in the CE which requires oversight and burdens the MEF commander with additional operational decisions that are unnecessary. Alternatively, Brigadier General Lee stated, “[T]he FSSG commander can provide operational and administrative oversight to the MP battalion, as with other CSS functional organizations.”43 Clearly, the CSS leadership believes that the MP should remain within the operational and tactical control of the MSC and be further designated as a battalion under the FSSG as part of the Total Force CSS Migration Plan. This recommendation was predicated on the assumptions that the new MP battalion would require no organic administrative and supply support and would be capable of performing first echelon maintenance on organic equipment.44

The most significant arguments not to consolidate MP into a battalion were offered by the ACE. The ONS study identified that the perceptions of the aviators were that removing the MP from the direct support mission degrades support and would require commanders to obtain external MP for airfield security. Additionally, the Commanding Officer of Marine Wing Support Group 27, wrote:

41 The MSC Force protection concerns were discussed at length, see Maj Webber, e-mail interview, 12 December 2000.  
The Military Police mission is by nature decentralized…[D]eveloping an organization to centralize command while decentralizing assets does not…serve the MAGTF commander well. It is a compromise that has proven to be unsuccessful (i.e. SRIG).\textsuperscript{45}

The supporting establishment provided justification in favor of consolidation based on the idiosyncrasies and perceived future reductions of FAP personnel. The current FAP is a work-around that attempts to provide day-by-day support but is not entirely successful or evenly applied throughout the Marine Corps. Non-MP qualified Marines have been assigned as MP FAPs. FAPs from the operating forces are vulnerable to immediate recall to their parent command. That leaves a fundamental gap in the ability of the base and station commander, especially the station commanders, to provide LE or flightline security functions in peacetime or wartime.\textsuperscript{46} The FAP methods do not deal with the root causes of the problem, namely, the fragmentation of the MP assets throughout the MEF and the lack of permanent MP structure to provide dedicated support to bases and stations. This leads to an unstable workforce and causes continuous competition for resources between the operating forces and the supporting establishment.

Although the ONS and numerous other studies over the last fifteen years have articulated dissenting arguments on forming a MP battalion in the operating forces, it was the 31\textsuperscript{st} Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Charles Krulak, who provided the impetus to consolidate. The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) stated, “We must determine whether the current…structure and organization meet the needs…[and] we need to be sure that we are organized to be ready, relevant, and capable….”\textsuperscript{47} Based on the Commandant’s guidance; the FSPG was conducted in 1999 to

\textsuperscript{45} Draft ONS for MEF MP Company, n.p.  
\textsuperscript{46} Draft ONS for MEF MP Company, n.p.  
\textsuperscript{47} Draft ONS for MEF MP Company, n.p.
evaluate the structure of the Marine Corps. This comprehensive study recommended realignment of the MAGTF MP functions, equipment, and personnel into a MP battalion within FSSG.

**The Battalion**

The new MP battalion achieves an affordable and efficient MP force by reducing redundancies and creating a single source manager capable of providing centralized control/decentralized execution of MP support to the MAGTF ground, aviation, CSS, and supporting establishment elements. According to Major General Bedard, “Simply stated, this [MP] battalion is the best way to provide MP support to the warfighter.” The formation of a MP battalion ensures that the MP capabilities can be brought to bear in support of the MAGTF commander’s focus of effort. The MP battalion commander would have the ability to provide effective combat support (CS) in the single battle concept and would ensure that his MP units are synchronized with the MAGTF commander’s intent and concept of operations.

The MP battalions will consist of a command element, a Headquarters & Service Company and three (lettered) MP companies. (See Appendix B, Notional MP Battalion Organization) Each company consists of four doctrinal platoons; each comprised of one officer and forty enlisted personnel. This composite forms twelve operational platoons to support MAGTF operations, exercises, and contingencies. Additionally, platoons will be available to support base and station LE and airfield security

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49 POS memorandum, 18 August 2000.
augmentation. This organization was created through the complete consolidation of all of the MP structure within each MEF utilizing existing MP allowances. The battalion structure allows for the flexibility and synergy of effort to accomplish assigned doctrinal missions throughout each phase of the battle.

The Provost Marshal

Each of the three standing MEFs has a T/O billet for the MEF PM. Until the Gulf War, these billets have gone unfilled. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the I MEF PM provided the Commander of the U.S. Marine Forces Central Command with a Liaison officer (LNO) knowledgeable in MP employment and made sure that MP taskings were in accordance with the concept of operations and the priorities established by the commander. The LNO coordinated MP activities throughout both operations and was heavily involved in EPW planning. This proved to be critically important when the ground war began and Marine forces were inundated with Iraqi EPWs.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the importance of having the MEF PM involved in every stage of deliberate planning and execution for all functions involving MP. The following insight from SWA illustrates this:

Each MEF should designate a MOS 5803 Lieutenant Colonel as the MEF Provost Marshal. The MEF Provost Marshal should be a special staff officer to the Commanding General while remaining under the staff cognizance of the MEF G-3.

51 Colonel Ronald P. Rook, USMC, Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, e-mail interview by author, 7 September 2000.
52 Col Rook, e-mail interview.
53 Memorandum 3-91, 17.
As Lieutenant Colonel Broussard pointed out over three years later, “…except during the Gulf War, those billets [MEF PM] have never been filled. The MEF PM billets need to be filled during peacetime as well as in wartime.”54

The implications of this further complicated the MP situation in not being able to effectively educate and influence commanders about the capabilities and limitations of the MP in the operating forces. Without a PM assigned to the MEF CE, there was no experienced (field grade) staff officer responsible for the direction, planning, and coordination of up to Corps-level operations of assigned MP forces. Consequently, MEF staff officers consulted the senior MP Lieutenants and Captains at the MSCs on deliberate and crisis action planning issues pertaining to MP employment. This practice provides limited utility as the young officers are tactically focused, influenced by their parent command, and normally have inadequate operational experience to provide credible input.

One of the most important advantages the MEF commander gains by ensuring the PM remains on his staff is the ability to coordinate with Army MP and Host Nation (HN) LE officials. Since most of the conflicts on a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or MEF scale will be conducted in the joint, combined, or coalition arenas, the MAGTFs will not fight alone. They will have to use some assets from other Services and the HN. Therefore, the PM is a vital asset to the MEF CE and would effectively coordinate all MP activities with appropriate staff sections, would ensure that all MP tasks are continuous, and would ensure all MP functions support the commander’s intent and operational plans.

During the early stages of the MP transformation, there were differing opinions about where the PM should be assigned on the MEF staff. According to the MEF CE

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54 Broussard, 15.
T/O, the PM is assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration (G-1).\textsuperscript{55} Doctrinally, the former OH 3-5 and FMFM 3-5 did not address where the PM should be assigned. Accordingly, MCWP 3-34.1 states, “Each MAGTF commander may designate a MAGTF provost marshal under the cognizance of the MAGTF assistant chief of staff, operations staff officer (G-3).”\textsuperscript{56} Further, the Head of Law Enforcement and Operating Forces MP (POS-10) falls under the direct guidance of the D/C PP&O and not the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (D/C M&RA). Therefore, one can logically conclude that MP should fall under the cognizance of the AC/S G-3 vice the AC/S G-1.

The mission capabilities of the MP are operational, not related to manpower and personnel. The most popular reason why the MEF PM is an AC/S G-1 billet by T/O, according to Major William Webber, Head of the MP Unit at HQMC, is “…the EPW mission that the MP have, but while potentially manpower intensive, EPW operations is one of four main doctrinal missions. The other three are operationally directed by the G-3.”\textsuperscript{57} Finally, the MEF PM has been routinely called upon for LE and MP expertise during numerous MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) exercises and actual contingency operations by the Future and Current Operations sections of the MEF G-3. Historically, the MEF PM at all the standing MEFs have been located under the direct cognizance of the AC/S G-3, regardless of where the billet was located on the official T/O.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Doctrine, Training, and Equipment}

\textsuperscript{55} Webber, “FDR Organization Description for the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element (CE),” e-mail attachment.
\textsuperscript{56} MCWP 3-34.1, 1-4.
\textsuperscript{57} Maj Webber, e-mail interview.
The principal existing Marine Corps doctrinal publication dealing with Marine MP in combat is FMFM 3-5, *Employment of Military Police in Combat*, dated 11 February 1992. By 1998, FMFM 3-5 was out of date, not fully relevant to current operational concepts, and devoid of the necessary guidance or direction that would provide MAGTF commanders a doctrinal basis for the employment of MP. The first step in addressing this deficiency came from targeting the correct audience for the new doctrine. FMFM 3-5 was primarily written for the MP community and was not adequately advertised and distributed throughout the operating forces. Due to FMFM 3-5 limitations, the publication evolved over time into a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual for the MP rather than a doctrinal directive for the MAGTF operators and planners.59

The Head of Marine Corps Law Enforcement directed in 1998 that a doctrinal development conference be held to begin forging ahead with doctrine efforts, ensuring that concepts for the new doctrine were synchronized and coordinated. Accordingly, experienced MP officers and senior enlisted Marines from the operating forces were tasked to write the new doctrine. The coordinating draft was completed in early 1999 and was formally distributed throughout the operating forces as a Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) for comment. During the review process, professionals from all elements of the MAGTF provided input which ensured that the doctrine was not MP parochial and was supportable within the TTP framework. On 13 October 2000, the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) approved MCWP 3-34.1, *Military Police in Support of the MAGTF*, for publication.

58 Maj Webber, e-mail interview.
59 Webber, interview by author, 18 September 2000.
This publication provides essential information needed to understand the employment of MP in support of the MAGTF. It provides commanders and staff planners with a broad perspective of MP functions, missions, and objectives. The doctrine addresses MP capabilities and limitations in peace, conflict, and war. It also describes how MP functions interact with and support operations within the MAGTF as a force multiplier at the tactical level, from MEF operations down to MAGTFs the size of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF).\textsuperscript{60} The new MP doctrinal publication was released for Marine Corps wide distribution in October 2000.

The MP community has faced challenges correcting training and equipment deficiencies. All MP come from the same MOS producing process. There is no special MOS for combat related duties or LE duties. There is no special secondary MOS requirement for airfield security for MP assigned to the MAW. In the past, MP have received their formal training from the U.S. Air Force primarily concentrated on LE with limited exposure to combat scenarios. To worsen the situation, MP did not have adequate tables of equipment (T/E) to support combat operations and subsequently could not train with equipment they were doctrinally required and expected to be proficient with during operations. Captain Chris Ajinga, Commander of the First Marine Division MP, made this observation regarding the deficiencies: “All things considered, it’s remarkable the FMF MP units are even able to provide the current level of support to their

\textsuperscript{60} For the complete doctrinal staffing process and review of the published doctrine, see Webber, “Marine Corps War-Fighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1: Military Police in Support of the MAGTF,” information paper and briefing slides presented at the Annual Operating Forces & Garrison Military Police and Corrections Conference, 7 December 1999 (Honolulu, HI: Marine Corps Base, Kaneohe Bay, 1999), 1-3; and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1, \textit{Military Police in Support of the MAGTF} (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 13 October 2000). Cited hereafter as MCWP 3-34.1.
commanders.”61 In 1992, the MP formal school moved from the Air Force to the Army where the emphasis is focused primarily on combat related training.

The training and equipment situation has considerably improved due to the MP transformation. The battalion operations officer (S-3) will coordinate standardized training and operating procedures, focus specialized support for MP operations, and provide a single source reference for all MP support to the MAGTF. The results will be improved unit and individual readiness through realistic training evolutions—validated during exercises. The overall training requirements for MP remain unchanged by the consolidation. However, the S-3 will have the ability to rotate platoons through training cycles that enhance effectiveness, confidence, and readiness. There will be, however, specialized training which has traditionally only been conducted by garrison MP units to support LE activities. These specialized functions and capabilities will enhance the MAGTF commander’s ability to protect forces, assets, and to prosecute effective operations.62

Training is a command responsibility. The reorganization into a battalion has provided the vehicle needed to overcome the constraints that formally inhibited training. The most significant constraint for optimal training of MP historically has been availability and continuity of personnel. Due to external commitments, MP have been limited in their ability to conduct tactical unit training. The battalion commander will have centralized command and control of his personnel that will maximize training opportunities and significantly enhance unit cohesion. In the final analysis, it is critical

that the MP battalion train to and meet all mission and support capabilities articulated in MCWP 3-34.1. Through an aggressive doctrinal training program, the battalion can develop a sense of credibility as an MP community and can demonstrate to the commanders their utility as a MAGTF force multiplier.

As the MP battalions begin to form under the FSSG, an on-going effort to correct the T/E deficiencies has been conducted. In order to properly perform missions, MP must have three things—vehicular mobility, effective communications, and adequate firepower. A recent Subject Matter Expert (SME) Conference, composed of representatives from all MEFs, was held to review and develop a comprehensive and viable MP battalion T/E from existing MP allowances. The resulting document adequately equips the MP with a dynamic mix of vehicles, weapons, and communication equipment that allows the battalion to perform its doctrinal mission of providing support to the MAGTF.63

Missions, Capabilities, and Employment

The formation of a MP battalion in the FSSG will not change the existing missions. The missions identified for the separate MP organizations in the MSCs are unchanged and can be performed by the consolidated MP battalion. The mission statement for the MP battalion is designated to provide a brief description of MP capabilities; specifically, “…[T]o provide security support, to include maneuver mobility support operations [MMSO], area security, prisoner internment [EPW], and law and

62 The MP occupational field has secondary MOSs that are vital to the performance of combat related MP duties: Military working dog handler, accident investigator, physical security specialist, special reaction team member, and MP investigator. There is also a primary MOS of criminal investigator.

order operations to the MAGTF.’

Excluding the manpower intensive EPW operations, MP can normally conduct these missions simultaneously due to the battalion’s ability to mass its assets and apply economy of force.

The MP warfighting capabilities are applicable across the range of military operations and support combat, CS, and CSS operations. In combat operations, MP keep main supply routes (MSR) and lines of communications (LOC) open and MP may be formed into a response force or augment the security force conducting rear area security operations. To allow the MAGTF commander to keep the GCE concentrated and operating in the main battle area, MP assist in defeating as much of the rear area threat as possible. MP provide CS to facilitate the movement of GCE forces and supplies to the main battle area by conducting route reconnaissance, MSR regulation, and dislocated civilian and straggler control and by aiding in the evacuation of EPWs from the main battle area. In addition, MP conduct sustainment operations to the MAGTF as part of the CSSE. The MP MMSO and area security operation missions are instrumental to the success of the CSSE. MP also provide LE capabilities to assist commanders in maintaining good order and discipline as a secondary CSS mission.

Doctrinal missions have not changed by consolidation. However, the MP capabilities have increased exponentially. (See Appendix C, MP Battalion Support Capabilities) The battalion optimizes the capability to task organize MP support in the MAGTF single battle by establishing appropriately organized, trained, and equipped

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64 The revised doctrine of MCWP 3-34.1 maintained the MP four-fold missions; however, the terminology has slightly changed to remain current with joint doctrine, see “Notional Military Police Battalion Mission Statement,” Security and Law Enforcement Branch Homepage (HQMC).

65 The objectives of the MP in support of combat, CS, and CSS were obtained from doctrine, see MCWP 3-34.1, chapter 1.

66 MCWP 3-34.1, chapter 1.
general and direct support MP units. This consolidation of MP personnel and resources creates a more robust MP unit capable of executing a wider range of operational capabilities while allowing greater support flexibility for the MAGTF AO. To maintain the full range of MP capabilities, a MP platoon (one officer and forty enlisted) is normally the lowest level unit employed.

The MP battalion will optimize the centralized control/decentralized execution method of employment. The MAGTF commander retains the ability to shift MP assets as the situation dictates. This method of employment provides for the timely response to the supported element’s needs, yet allows the MP battalion commander to analyze and direct MP activities as required.

The MP battalion will reside in the FSSG. The FSSG provides sustained CSS to the MAGTF. As part of the Total Force CSS Migration, the FSSG will provide permanently organized and task organized CSSEs to the GCE, ACE, and other smaller MAGTFs. The permanently organized Direct Support Group (DSG) provides direct liaison with the MSC commanders, or designated representative, for execution of CSS support. The task organized CSSDs are assigned in DS of specified elements within the GCE and ACE. Based upon specific mission requirements, the FSSG can expand or contract the capabilities of the CSSDs using resources from its functional battalions. The MP battalion will assign MP units to the permanent DSG and the task organized CSSDs established to support the MSC commanders.67

**Conclusions**

67 Lieutenant Colonel Randy R. Smith, USMC, Head, Security and Law Enforcement Branch, HQMC, e-mail interview by author, 7 September 2000.
Force structuring is a continuous, dynamic, and interactive process. The ongoing reduction in available personnel, budget realities, and political considerations mandates a prudent and well-planned approach from the MP community to support the MAGTF commander. Fundamentally, the MP realignment of assets will not affect the MP structure and manpower of base and station PMOs. The bases and stations will continue to be augmented by operational MP forces that will enhance the force protection posture of the PMOs, especially when MP FAPs are returned to their parent commands for deployment.

The MP can provide a viable, combat-capable force once the battalions form under the FSSGs. The battalion is organized to plan, coordinate, and supervise MP functions and is structured to facilitate task organization in support of the MAGTF. Developing the relevancy of the MEF PM, updating doctrine, correcting T/E deficiencies, standardizing training, and broadening capabilities has positioned MP effectively to meet current missions requirements and to support future warfighting concepts.

As the Marine Corps prepares its force for OMFTS, it is imperative that MAGTF elements focus on “core competencies” and divest themselves of functions more appropriately provided by another MAGTF element. Consolidation of all MP units from within the MAGTF achieves the tailored, mission essential support desired under the single battle concept. To that end, the MP transformation is consistent with the current MAGTF employment and organizational realities that facilitate the evolution toward a ready, relevant and OMFTS-capable 21st Century Marine Corps.

The Future
Overview

As the world population grows and migrates to urban areas in the littoral regions, the Marine Corps future will include challenges in homeland defense, peacetime engagement, forward presence, and crisis response. As national boundaries become less distinct, the face of the enemy will become more unconventional and the criminal element will become a greater threat.

Future operations will be characterized by increased interaction between Marine forces and noncombatants. To keep pace with these challenges, the demand for MP skills will increase. The MP ability to operate across the force continuum with appropriate restraint will provide the MAGTF commander with a host of capabilities that can contribute to the accomplishment of any mission.

Changes in the operational environment will cause a shift in the current execution methodology that supports future operational concepts. The MP capabilities such as continuing use of emergent technologies in the area of nonlethal controls, physical security, and electronic security systems provide an adaptive force that can keep pace with these changes. In the future, MP will also enhance the MAGTF antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) posture while complementing a reduced logistical footprint.

Encroachment

The lines which exist between the traditional roles of combat, CS, and CSS are not etched in stone and are sensitive to the circumstances present at a given point in time and operating environment. When “shelling” commences or insurgent fighting occurs in the rear AO, the role of all Marine forces within that zone of operations quickly shifts.

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68 The MP battalions will phase-in beginning FY02 thru FY04 at II, I, and III MEFs respectively, see PO message R281320Z; and Webber, “Military Police Reorganization Update,” 10.
from one of CS or CSS to combat operations. The same holds true for peacekeeping operations. While a force may be built, deployed, and eventually put ashore to maintain peace, thereby assisting in the restoration of the host government infrastructure and protection of the populace, one cannot ignore the ever-present and likely potential for the situation to escalate into combat operations. A prime example of this can be seen in operations conducted in both Haiti and Somalia where peacekeeping forces were required to rapidly shift to warfighters.69

The essence of the Marine Corps, which distinguishes it from every other fighting force in the world, is the core principle that “all Marines are riflemen”. While there is a potential that the MP community could realize a closer alignment with combat roles as a result of its ongoing realignment effort and through increased assignment of MP to some elements historically staffed with infantry personnel, it is not a view shared by some in the combat arms. Lieutenant Colonel R. Scott Moore, an infantry officer with twenty-four years experience, made this observation: I am…equally bothered by the growing notion that combat troops, because they are warriors, lack the skills for peacekeeping missions. While Military Police…units perform critical roles, they are only part of the equation.”70 Additionally, in June 1999, Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8 was ordered to conduct “presence” operations in order to facilitate a cessation to violence between the Albanian and Serb populations. The commanding officer, Maj Timothy E. Winand, reported:


None of us had much of an idea of how to play the role of police officer in an environment that desperately needed it. We relied upon...our warrior spirit and aggressive nature...and our sense of mission accomplishment. As long as we continue to train with these concepts in mind, we will be well-prepared...to handle [peacekeeping] situations that require us to do something less than acquire an enemy target and destroy it.\(^{71}\)

Peacekeeping operations are hardly peaceful, especially in their initial stages. Marine units committed to places like Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti were deployed because wars in those places could not be controlled or stopped without the use of force.\(^{72}\) Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Moore believes “peacekeeping demands types of self-discipline, field skills, and small-unit leadership resident in elite, predominantly infantry units” within the Marine Corps.\(^{73}\) Massed firepower and information dominance mean little to a patrol trying to protect innocent—and sometimes not so innocent—civilians caught in the middle of hostilities. Success often depends on a young Marine making instant decisions that could have national strategic implications. If peacekeeping operations require disciplined, well-trained, effective forces able to apply directed combat power quickly, who will perform these missions if not the infantrymen?

The argument against including MP in the force mix has been that infantrymen can learn the doctrinal MP missions and infantry units are organized effectively for mission accomplishment. The MP leadership acknowledges that infantry units can and do learn to execute MP missions. However, some degree of specialization should be

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\(^{73}\) Moore, 62.
maintained within the MAGTF to increase the overall capabilities of the force as a whole.  

Captain James Flatter, a MP analyst at Marine Corps Headquarters wrote:

> Military Police Marines are ingrained with an “escalation of force” mentality...infantrymen can be taught this concept, but doing so consciously backs them away from the “gunfighter” mentality….MP are also trained and capable of conducting full-throttle offensive combat….

The training focus for both the infantry and MP units should not encompass the core competencies of the other MOS. Allowing Marines to focus on their specialties not only acts as a combat multiplier, but also increases the likelihood of success for both forces. Conversely, teaching combat units the use of the escalation of force, nonlethal weapons, and detention techniques, which MP train to employ, may have added benefits for the MAGTF.

In order to properly conduct shaping operations and influence a threat capability or decision, the MAGTF commander can use both lethal and nonlethal activities to set the conditions for decisive operations across the entire battlespace, whether in peacekeeping or combat operations. By ensuring adequate cross-pollination of MOS related skills are exchanged between the infantry and MP units, the commander gains flexibility. With the emergence of OMFTS, an ever-greater interdependence and close integration between MAGTF elements will be required. Infantry and MP Marines must immerse themselves in each other’s tactics, capabilities and limitations to foster a shared vision and to develop a trust between the units. Regardless of what composite force is employed for peacekeeping operations, planning considerations and a clear commander’s intent remain critical. Doctrinal terms usually associated with a textbook infantry commander’s

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74 LtCol Smith, e-mail interview.
intent—center of gravity, critical vulnerability and the like need to be carefully scripted so as not to confuse or diffuse the Marine’s focus.

All of the foregoing considered, there are areas within the Marine Corps where a greater use of MP may warrant consideration and could additionally contribute to the relief of infantry personnel to fill more traditional combat related roles. MP could be effectively employed in support of the Marine Security Guard program, within selected training billets in the MEF Special Operations Training Group (i.e., for nonlethal training), and within Marine Corps Security Force Battalion, most specifically with the unit’s Fleet Antiterrorist Security Teams (FAST) whose mission somewhat parallels the tasks performed by the MP Special Reaction Team (SRT).

The Tip of the Spear

Forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), or MEU (SOC), embarked aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping operate continually in AORs of numerous Unified commanders. The MEU (SOC) provides an effective means of dealing with the uncertainty of future threats by providing forward deployed units that offer unique opportunities for a variety of quick reaction, sea-based, crisis response options. The MEU (SOC) is capable of a wide range of contingency operations and must be balanced, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible in order to execute a broad range of mission requirements. The knowledge, skills, and abilities that MP bring to the MEU (SOC) directly fulfill many of these requirements.

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76 SRT is a specialized tactical MP unit employed during high-risk LE operations. The civilian equivalent is the special weapons and tactic team (SWAT).
Long lumped into the broad category of “peacekeeping,” police work is becoming commonplace for units frequently tasked with operating in urban environments. Just as humanitarian missions have moved to the forefront during the last twenty years, policing is poised to become a significant portion of future assignments. During basic peacekeeping operations, infantry Marines are typically prepared to respond to threats like rioting, looting, and terrorist or sniper attacks. But as the 26th MEU (SOC) experience in Kosovo showed, with those problems comes a variety of policing problems that could be better handled by a MP detachment.

The commanding officer of the 26th MEU (SOC), Colonel Kenneth Glueck, Jr., made a statement so perceptive that it has validated the expectations of the MP community. During the debriefing in Greece on the Kosovo operation, the MEU commander told CMC that:

I only had six MP and one CID trained force protection officer with any law enforcement training or experience. If we would have stayed [in Kosovo] any longer, we probably would have had to have at least a company of MP. 78

With just thirty days on the ground in Kosovo, Colonel Glueck was forced to put his unit’s policing abilities to the test. With no other form of government to turn to, Serbs and ethnic Albanians alike turned to the Marines for help. In addition to more traditional roles of securing the area and suppressing civil unrest, the unit recreated basic elements of daily life: restoring law and order and reopening schools and hospitals. The Marines also evolved into a police force for the American sector, patrolling at night and
responding to emergencies—somewhat like the civilian police officers in the United States. 79

Then Defense Secretary William Cohen commented on the deteriorating situation in Kosovo when he told reporters in January 2000, “They [military forces] are not, for the most part, trained to carry out police work. They are not trained…[or] competent really to carry out police work.” 80 They could be, MP leaders argue, if the commanders had enough police-trained Marines deployed with the MEU (SOC). Lieutenant Colonel Randy Smith, head of Marine Corps security and LE, believes that his community is ready to give the MEU commanders the MP support required due to the recent transformation. Lieutenant Colonel Smith emphasized, “I’ve got a MEU commander [Col Glueck] who needs a company of MP. We are capable to provide him with a company of MP, or more if necessary.” 81

Currently, the MEUs deploying from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina—the 22nd, 24th and 26th—continue to carry only six MP, typically led by a sergeant or, on occasion, a staff sergeant. The MP cannot perform their doctrinal missions with this limited force structure. Accordingly, the same problems that faced Col Glueck during his Kosovo peacekeeping operations are likely to continue. Units deploying from Camp Pendleton, California, however, have adopted a new strategy, one that, according to Lieutenant Colonel Smith, may shape the entire MP community in the coming years. 82 At I MEF, the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs have restructured and increased the deploying MP presence

79 Glueck, “26 MEU (SOC) Lessons Learned from Albania, Kosovo, and Turkey,” e-mail attachment.
80 Brinkley, 12.
81 LtCol Smith, e-mail interview.
82 LtCol Smith, e-mail interview.
with a vision for the future. The west coast MEUs take fourteen MP led by a trained MP First Lieutenant and staff noncommissioned officer. The ultimate objective of the I MEF is to employ a representative half slice of a MP platoon and all of its equipment—20 enlisted and 1 officer—in the MEU. The remainder of the platoon would be available for a fly-in echelon if the situation required additional MP.\(^{83}\)

Commanders aboard the MEU discovered that having the enhanced MP detachment aboard the west coast MEUs significantly expanded the MEUs capabilities. In an after-action report on the MP concept, the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) commander voiced his approval for increasing the MP presence. “There is no standing force protection asset dedicated to MEU elements operating in the rear area,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hudson, commander of the 11th MEU MSSG, in his after-action report.\(^{84}\) His observation demonstrates the dilemma commanders face during the planning and execution phases of rear area operations. In order to reduce or eliminate an enemy’s ability to interfere with rear operations, the MEU must normally task organize a provisional security force from personnel on hand or depend on the infantry to supply the forced required. This situation, however, potentially degrades the ability of those in the rear area elements to conduct their primary mission by taking Marines, with unique MOS-specific skills, away from their tasks. Likewise, assigning infantry units to conduct a mission ideally suited for the MP potentially degrades the abilities of the GCE.

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\(^{84}\) Brinkley, 12.
Lieutenant Colonel Hudson stressed that, “An increased MP detachment provides a solution to this dilemma.”

In summary, a quick analysis of the potential missions and crisis response actions the MEUs will most likely encounter clearly demonstrates that a formidable MP unit can be easily justified. However, just as artillery batteries routinely become provisional rifle companies, a MP force would be required and expected to do the same—“every Marine is a rifleman” must hold true. A MP force could easily cross-train as the primary nonlethal weapons (NLW) platoon, the primary embassy reinforcement platoon, and the camp security (external and internal) force, as well as conduct cross training on NLW and force protection to other BLT and MSSG Marines. As later expressed by Col Glueck, “As a MEU commander with two deployments under my belt…I see great utility for a MP platoon. I would gladly re-task organize to ensure available embark space…. “

The only way this concept will work is if the MEU commander wants additional MP, which, in turn, will only happen if the MP detachments currently on the MEU (SOC) continue to impress their commanders. Also, commanders will only request larger MP detachments if MP work to leave behind the “us against them mentality” that may have been fostered between garrison MP and Marines in the operating forces in the past. The CMC has said publicly that MP should be helping fellow Marines. The best way possible.

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85 Brinkley, 12.
86 Glueck, “26 MEU (Soc) Lessons Learned from Albania, Kosovo, and Turkey,” e-mail attachment; Colonel Christopher J. Gunther, USMC, Commanding Officer of the 13th MEU (SOC), e-mail interview by author, 14 December 2000; Colonel Charles S. Patton, USMC, Commanding Officer of the 11th MEU (SOC), e-mail interview by author, 8 December 2000; and Colonel Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC, Commanding Officer of the 15th MEU (Soc), telephone interview by author, 7 December 2000.

87 Glueck, “26 MEU (Soc) Lessons Learned from Albania, Kosovo, and Turkey,” e-mail attachment.
to do so is to forward deploy on a MEU (SOC) in significant numbers to make a true contribution to the MAGTF.

A Paradigm Shift

The MP have made enormous strides to improve their posture in the operating forces through the transformation process and the legitimate attempt to develop the MP detachment of the MEU (SOC). The MP community can be further strengthened by becoming more operationally relevant and by developing credibility as a community throughout the Marine Corps. This will require a paradigm shift in order to reduce the “institutional prejudice” MP have garnered over the last fifty-five years of the community’s existence. Operational relevance can be achieved through several initiatives. First, a MP campaign plan should be published clearly articulating a concept for MP support to MAGTF expeditionary operations that supports the Marine Corps’ primary operational concepts such as OMFTS, ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), and sustained operations ashore. Any of the completed MP initiatives—whether doctrine, structure, or training – must be directly tied to operational concepts and initiatives in order to clearly demonstrate significance to the MAGTF. Building an overarching concept of MP support to operations and planning will provide the basis for future MP requirements to support the MAGTF.

Second, the MP community needs to do a better job marketing its skills to the MAGTF operators and planners they support. To do this, MP officers and staff noncommissioned officers need to be more aggressive with their audience, whether that is the MEF PM or AC/S G-3, the commander, or the subordinate commanders and staff. Too often silence is misconstrued as satisfaction when, in actuality, if the operator does
not obtain or know exactly what he needs from the MP, he is more inclined to go elsewhere to accomplish the mission (i.e., an infantry unit).

The MP community needs to emphasize its adaptability compared to a rifle company and demonstrate how their capabilities complement the MAGTF as a force multiplier. To do so, MP integration into the functional cells of operations, plans, logistics, and intelligence must occur. Embedding experienced MP personnel in the functional cells of the MEF G-2 (counter and human intelligence), G-3 (current and future operations, plans, force fires), G-4 (plans), G-5 (future plans), and G-7 (special operations) reduces the risk of miscommunication, improves MP support, and ensures MP requirements and support are articulated early in the deliberate planning process. The same process of embedding MP personnel into the functional cells of the MSC staff is also recommended during exercises, operations and contingencies.

Third, MP must take the initiative in promoting its capabilities throughout the Marine Corps. It must have more “Marine warrior” thinking and less “cop” thinking. With current assignment policies, too many young officers are assigned to base and station LE duties, promoting the “cop” mentality. These officers need to be assigned to MP billets in the operating forces where they can learn about warfighting. Then, as they become senior lieutenants or captains, they have some credibility when advising commanders or staffs on the capabilities of MP. Today, most young MP officers don’t see the operating forces until they are captains. In addition, the MP senior leadership should encourage more of their officers to attend Marine Corps formal schools such as Amphibious Warfare School (AWS), Command and Staff College (CSC), and the School
of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). Due to the absence of MP officers in these schools, the MP community is not able to explain its capabilities and limitations among peers who will be future commanders. By not attending these schools or obtaining an assignment on the permanent staff instructing, MP officers are hard pressed to advise their future commanders on MP capabilities because those future commanders may not be aware of what MP do in the operating forces to support the MAGTF.

Through these efforts, which need to be addressed Corps wide, the MP should be able to develop a sense of credibility as a community. The MP field is filled with many superior officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and young enlisted Marines who are innovative, creative, and energetic. Their commanders speak highly of them as individuals yet remain critical of the community as a whole. Colonel Gary Miller, the Operations Officer at I MEF, made this observation: “MP’s are to support our MAGTF’s with the vigil on CT [counter-terrorism] and Force Protection and during combat. We don’t need extra MP’s with badges…we need MP’s for all of the functions they were intended for…to support the MAGTF.”

By establishing operational relevance, standardizing the way MP support operators and planners throughout the Marine Corps, and by ensuring MP officers attend and teach at formal schools, the MP community, over time, should experience a paradigm shift. The MP campaign plan will greatly enhance the MP situational awareness within the MAGTF. The MP leadership has to instill an entirely new and fresh attitude within the community in terms of how they support commanders, operators, and planners.

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88 This assignment practice has proven highly successful for the career progression of infantry officers. Young lieutenants are assigned as platoon leaders in rifle companies to learn their warfighting profession before they go to the supporting establishment for follow-on assignments (i.e., “B” billets).
Officers in the MP community must view themselves as MAGTF officers first and foremost. This will require the attention and commitment of all MP professionals, commanders, and staff officers from all of the battlespace functional areas within the operating forces.

**Takeaways for the Military Police Community**

The analysis presented in this paper does not provide any startling revelations about the MP community in the operating forces. It does provide a different framework by which to analyze institutional deficiencies and the decision making process which can lead to a transformation and possible paradigm shift for the future. In the end, MP professionals and MAGTF commanders alike can learn from the insights offered here. Specifically:

- **Before MP can contribute efficiently to the MAGTF during combat and contingency operations, they must organize, train and equip for combat.** Historical precedents indicate a need for reorganizing and consolidating MP assets in the operating forces.

- **MP can no longer focus on performing LE duties to the neglect of the battlefield missions.** MP must be relevant and support the mission of winning the Nation’s battles. The Marine Corps does not need only police; they need MP providing CS to the warfighter.

- **Improve training at all levels.** Ensure a strong emphasis on MP combat-related skills at both MOS and follow-on schools. Once assigned in the operating forces, continue to maintain unit cohesion and train toward MP core competencies. MP commanders must actively seek training opportunities with other units and latch on to every opportunity to show that “military” still exists in MP.

- **MP have been misused and underutilized because the commands to which they were assigned traditionally viewed them as “gate guards.”** Similar examples in other MOSs have occurred in the past. The fire support community experienced similar misuse or underutilization on a number of occasions. If allowed to continue, it received the standard

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89 Colonel Gary W. Miller, USMC, Operations Officer of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, Command Element, e-mail interview by author, 3 December 2000.
“no support from combined arms” statement during after-action briefs. If, however, the LNO/FSC took a proactive approach—selling the commander on what the capabilities are, how those capabilities can most effectively be used in the current scenario, and generally knowing the commanders “job” better than he did—experiences on all fronts were much more positive. The MP community must take the same aggressive approach to convince the MAGTF commanders of their relevance to combat operations as a force multiplier.

**• Implement having MP on all deployments and field exercises to maintain doctrinal proficiency and to advertise the MP value throughout the MAGTF. Continue to maintain the MEF PM billet with an experienced Lieutenant Colonel to advise the MAGTF commander on matters pertaining to MP operations and to “mentor” the MP officers at the MSC level. MP must maintain a warfighting ethos consistent with expeditionary maneuver warfare and joint concepts.**

**• During joint and multinational operations, host nations may be more receptive to a foreign “police” presence rather than a foreign “combat” presence. Additionally, MP can perform liaison duties with local police forces and are specifically trained to interact with noncombatants.**

**• With a partial wartime mission of area security and LE, MP specialize in reasserting control of geographic areas in which organized resistance has ceased. While MP are quite capable of conducting limited combat operations, their central orientation is toward the suppression rather than the application of violence. MP offer realistic hope against oppressive hegemony and for ameliorating conditions in future contingencies—thereby possibly preventing escalation to full-scale war. It would be hard to find a closer match to the challenges facing today’s peacekeepers.**

**• While all forces are information gathers, the MP could be especially useful when it comes to providing the intelligence community the basic material with which to work and analyze information. This is accomplished through contacts with the local population, reconnaissance, and by executing various control measures.**

**• MP, by their professional education and the nature of their responsibilities, are ideally suited to be the staff experts in force protection. The design of AT/FP plans, particularly in environments other than actual war, is becoming an increasingly important function and MP can play a vital role.**

**• If too much effort is made to turn MP more into combat ready**
warfighters, one could logically conclude that a case has been made for merging the MP community into the combat arms arena. The trend of merging MOSs has been in vogue of late. Proposals to develop MP combat capabilities should be explored, but cautiously, for if not properly laid out, the resultant effect could be the demise of the MP field rather than an expansion of opportunities for it to play a greater role within the operating forces.
Appendix A

Military Police Organizational Charts

Figure 1

Division, Headquarters Battalion, Military Police Company

Figure 2

Force Service Support Group, Military Police Company
Figure 3
Appendix B

Notional Military Police Battalion Organization

Notional MPBn Organization

Figure 1
Appendix C

MP Battalion Support Capabilities

Antiterrorism/Force Protection Operations Support

Planning, Assessments, and Training
Protective Service Operations
Crime Prevention and Physical Security
Law and Order Operations
  Military Working Dog Support
  Information Operations

Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

Route Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Main Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement
Main Supply Route Control Measures
  Defiles, Vehicle Holding Areas, and Roadblocks
  Checkpoints, Traffic Control Points, and Route Signs
Support for River Crossing Operations
Support for Passage of Lines
Support for Area Damage Control
Straggler and Dislocated Civilian Control Operations
Information Collecting, Reporting, and Dissemination

Area Security Operations

Command Post Security
  Motor and Foot Patrols
Rear Area Security
  Support and Liaison
Airfield Security
  Support and Coordination
  Aircraft Avenue of Approach Security
  Water Obstacle Security
  Night Operations
Forward Arming and Refueling Point Security
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Hazard Monitoring and Surveying Operations
Port Operations Security
Logistic Convoy Security

Law and Order Operations

Law Enforcement
Military Working Dog Operations
Traffic Enforcement, Accident, and Criminal Investigations
Crime Prevention and Physical Security
Customs Support Operations
Joint, Combined, and Host Nation Police Operations

**Internment Operations**

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations
Security, Control, and Collection Measures
Processing and Evacuation
Dislocated Civilian Internment Operations
U.S. Military Prisoner Internment Operations

**Support to a Marine Expeditionary Unit or Special Purpose MAGTF**

Nonlethal Weapons Employment Training
Operational and Support Capabilities
Flexible Deterrent Options
Effects on Human Abilities
Military Working Dog Employment
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Planning and Assessments
Criminal and Accident Investigations
Physical Security Training and Assessments
Task Organized MP Detachment
MP Officer with Force Protection Training
Military Working Dog Handler
Accident Investigator
Physical Security Specialist
Special Reaction Team Member
MP Investigator
Criminal Investigator
Corrections Specialist

**Support During Military Operations Other Than War**

Crisis Response
Humanitarian Assistance
Peace Operations
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Counterdrug Operations
Disaster Relief and Military Support to Civil Authorities

**Future Operations**
Appendix D

Glossary

Section I

Acronyms

Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications were used as authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

2. MCRP 5-12D, *Organization of the Marine Corps*.
3. MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*.
4. MCWP 3-34.1, *Military Police in Support of the MAGTF*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>aviation combat element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>amphibious ready group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT/FP</td>
<td>antiterrorism/force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>amphibious warfare school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>battlefield circulation control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>battalion landing team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>command element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>command general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>civilian internee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>criminal investigation division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>commandant’s planning guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>command and staff college</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<td>CSSD</td>
<td>combat service support detachment</td>
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<td>CSSE</td>
<td>combat service support element</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counter-terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>critical vulnerability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>direct support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOS</td>
<td>executive off-site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
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</table>
FAP       fleet assistance program
FAST      fleet antiterrorist security force
FM        U.S. Army filed manual
FMF       fleet Marine force
FMFM      fleet Marine force manual
FSC       fire support coordinator
FSPG      force structure planning group
FSSG      force service support group
FY        fiscal year
GCE       ground combat element
G-2       intelligence and counterintelligence division
G-3       operations and training division
G-4       logistics division
G-5       future plans division
G-7       special operations training division
HA        humanitarian assistance
HN        host nation
HQMC      Headquarters, Marine Corps
ILC       integrated logistics concept
LE        law enforcement
LNO       liaison officer
LOC       lines of communications
MAGTF     Marine air-ground task force
MAW       Marine air wing
MCCDC     Marine Corps combat development command
MCDP      Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCRP      Marine Corps reference publication
MCSF      Marine Corps security forces
MCWP      Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEB       Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF       Marine expeditionary force
METT-T    mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU       Marine expeditionary unit
MEU(SOC)  Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MMSO      maneuver and mobility support operations
MOOTW     military operations other than war
MOS       military occupational specialty
MP        military police
MSC       major subordinate command
MSR       main supply route
MSSG      MEU service support group
MSTP      MAGTF staff training program
MWD       military working dog
NCO       noncommissioned officer
NEO       noncombatant evacuation operations
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NLW</td>
<td>nonlethal weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps operational manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMFTS</td>
<td>operational maneuver from the sea</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>operation needs statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>professional military education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>provost marshal’s office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>school of advanced warfighting</td>
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<td>S-2</td>
<td>operations and training section</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCO</td>
<td>staff noncommissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPMAGTF</td>
<td>special purpose Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>special reaction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRIG</td>
<td>surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOM</td>
<td>ship-to-objective maneuver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>southwest Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBS</td>
<td>the basic school</td>
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<td>T/E</td>
<td>table of organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>T/O</td>
<td>table of equipment</td>
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<td>TPP</td>
<td>Marine Corps tactics, techniques and procedures</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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Section II
Definitions

Note: Definitions change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications were used as authoritative sources for official military definitions:

2. MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*.
3. MCWP 3-34.1, *Military Police in Support of the MAGTF*.

A

antiterrorism—Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operation—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility—That geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (Joint pub 1-02)

area security—The measures taken by individual units to reduce the probability or minimize the effects of enemy attacks on friendly installations and areas. It is similar to rear area security, but encompasses those areas within the boundaries of the GCE, CSSE, and ACE, as well as the MAGTF rear area. Every unit must be able to provide local security with organic assets. MPs operating throughout the parent commands’ AO may respond to augment or reinforce those forces as necessary. (MCWP 3-34.1)

asymmetry—Unconventional, unexpected, innovative or disproportional means used to gain advantage over an adversary. (MCWP 0-1)

aviation combat element—The MAGTF element that is task organized to provide all or a portion of the functions of Marine Corps aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and the MAGTF mission and size. These functions are reconnaissance,
anti-air warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. The element is organized around an aviation headquarters and varies in size from a reinforced helicopter squadron to one or more Marine aircraft wing(s). It includes those aviation command (including air control agencies), combat, combat support, and combat service support units required by the situation. Also called ACE. (MCWP 0-1)

**B**

**battalion landing team**—In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements; the basic unit for planning an assault landing. Also called BLT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**battlefield circulation control**—The process by which MPs assist in maintaining the security and movement of traffic along MSRs and LOC. MPs use four methods to make sure personnel, equipment, and supplies move along the MSRs with as little interference as possible. MPs conduct motor patrols, establish traffic control, establish and monitor MSR signs, and perform other measure as needed. Also called BCC. (MCWP 3-34.1)

**battlespace**—All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCWP 0-1)

**C**

**center of gravity**—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COG. (MCWP 0-1)

**civilian internee**—A civilian who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. Also called CI. (MCWP 3-34.1)

**Combatant commander**—A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President of the United States. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combat service support**—The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combat service support element**—The MAGTF element that is task organized to provide the full range of combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. It can provide supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineer, health, postal, disbursing, enemy prisoner of war, automated information systems, exchange, utilities, legal, and graves registration services. Also called CSSE. (MCWP 0-1)
**combat support**—Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. Also called CS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**command and control**—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (MCWP 0-1)

**command element**—The MAGTF headquarters. The element is a permanent organization composed of the commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications and service support facilities. It provides command, control, and coordination essential for effective planning and execution of operations by the other three elements of the MAGTF. Also called CE. (MCWP 0-1)

**commander’s intent**—A commander’s clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCWP 0-1)

**concept of operations**—A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counter-terrorism**—Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**crisis action planning**—The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occur in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**critical vulnerability**—An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCWP 0-1)

**D**

**deliberate planning**—A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**direct control**—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**E**

**economy of force**—The reciprocal of the principle of mass. The commander allocates the minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. This requires the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the decisive time and location with the main effort. (MCWP 0-1)

**end state**—What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of the other instruments of national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**enemy prisoner of war**—Members of the enemy armed forces as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. Members belonging to an enemy power and operating in or outside their own territory, even if the territory is occupied. The following conditions must be fulfilled: 1) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 3) that of carrying arms openly; and 4) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Also called EPW. (MCRP 3-34.1)

**F**

**FMF**—A balanced force of combined arms comprising land, air, and service elements of the U.S. Marine Corps. A Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of a U.S. Fleet and has the status of a type command. Also called Fleet Marine Force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**forward deployment**—A basic undertaking which entails stationing of alert forces with the basic stocks for extended periods of time at either land-based overseas facilities or, in maritime operations, aboard ships at sea as a means of enhancing national contingency response capabilities. (MCWP 0-1)

**force protection**—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other security programs. Also called FP. (MCWP 0-1)

**G**

**general support**—That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**ground combat element**—The MAGTF element that is task organized to conduct ground operations. It is constructed around an infantry unit and varies in size from a reinforced infantry battalion to one or more reinforced Marine division(s). The element also includes appropriate combat support and combat service support units. Also called GCE. (MCWP 0-1)

**humanitarian assistance**—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by the U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. Also called HA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**law and order operations**—Criminal activities do not cease during combat. They are detrimental to the entire military effort and cause severe deterioration in morale and esprit de corps. MPs assist commanders in curtailing and eliminating criminal activities by enforcing law and order. MPs functions are to conduct law enforcement, criminal and accident investigations, crime prevention and physical security. (MCWP 3-34.1)

**line of communications**—A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (MCWP 0-1)

**major subordinate command**—A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. Also called a MSC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**main supply route**—The route or routes designated within an area of operations upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. Also called MSR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**maneuver and mobility support operations**—Reconnaissance, security, and mobility functions conducted by MP across the full range of military operations. MP expedites forward, lateral, and rear movement of forces on the battlefield. They operate traffic control points and conduct mobile patrols to help stragglers return to their respective units. MPs help clear LOC by directing and controlling the movement of civilians whose location or direction of movement may hinder military operations. Also called MMSO. (MCWP 3-34.1)
Marine air-ground task force—A task organization of Marine forces (division, aircraft wing, and service support groups) under a single command and structure to accomplish a specific mission. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGFT) components will normally include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy Support Elements). Three types MAGTFs that can be task organized are the special purpose MAGTF, Marine expeditionary unit, and Marine expeditionary force. Also called MAGTF. (MCWP 0-1)

Marine expeditionary brigade—A task organization which is normally built around a regimental landing team, a provisional Marine aircraft group, and a logistics support group. It is capable of conducting amphibious assault operations of a limited scope. During potential crisis situations, a Marine expeditionary brigade may be forward deployed afloat for an extended period in order to provide an immediate combat response. Also called MEB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine expeditionary force—The Marine expeditionary force, the largest of the MAGTFs, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. Also called a MEF. (MCWP 0-1)

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)—A forward deployed, embarked U.S. Marine unit with enhanced capability to conduct special operations. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) is oriented toward amphibious raids, at night, under limited visibility, while employing emission control procedures. It is not a Secretary of Defense-designated special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities and/or the theater commander, may conduct hostage recovery or other special operations under in extremis circumstances when designated special operations forces are not available. Also called MEU (SOC). (MCWP 0-1)

Military operations other than war—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (MCWP 0-1)

Noncombatant evacuation operations—Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEO. (MCWP 3-34.1)
**O**

**operating forces**—Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational control**—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational maneuver from the sea**—The concept is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept, applicable across the range of military operations, from major theater of war to smaller-scale contingencies. It describes a new form of littoral power projection in which maneuver warfare is applied—at the operational level of war—in the context of amphibious operations. The force focuses on an operational objective, using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against enemy critical vulnerabilities. It provides increased operational flexibility through enhanced capabilities for sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control. Also called OMFTS. (MCWP 0-1)

**P**

**peacekeeping**—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (MCWP 0-1)

**physical security**—That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (MCWP 3-34.1)

**S**

**shaping**—The use of lethal and nonlethal activities to influence events in a manner which changes the general condition of war to an advantage. (MCWP 0-1)

**ship-to-objective maneuver**—The tactical implementation of OMFTS. It is the application of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations at the tactical level of war. It treats the sea as maneuver space, using the sea as both a protective barrier and an unrestricted avenue of approach. This concept focuses the force on the operational objective, providing increased flexibility to strike the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. Also called STOM. (MCWP 0-1)
**single battle**—Under the single battle, the AO consists of three major areas—deep, close, and rear—in which distinctly different operations are performed. A commander must always view his AO as an indivisible entity—operations or events in one part of the AO may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas or events. While the AO may be conceptually divided to assist planning and decentralized execution, the commander’s intent ensures unity of effort by fighting a single battle. (MCWP 0-1)

**special purpose MAGTF**—A non-standing MAGTF temporarily formed to conduct a specific mission. It is normally formed when a standing MAGTF is either inappropriate or unavailable. Also called SPMAGTF. (MCWP 0-1)

**support**—The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sustained operations ashore**—Those extended operations, usually of a significant scale, in which Marine Corps forces fight not as amphibious or sea-based forces, but as land forces. This concept envisions Marine Corps forces as a part of a larger joint or combined force, with Marine Corps forces executing operations under the Marine Corps component commander or a functional component commander, if designated. (MCWP 0-1)

**synchronized**—The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**synergy**—The simultaneous action of separate military units which, together, have greater total effect than the sum of their individual effects. (MCWP 0-1)

**tactical control**—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**task-organizing**—The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistics package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unified command**—A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the
Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unity of effort**—It emphasizes the need to ensure all activities of the command are directed against a common objective. Seek unity of effort in every operation. This principle is derived from unity of command. (MCWP 0-1)

**warfighting functions**—The six mutually supporting activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations. The functions are command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. Also called WF. (MCWP 0-1)
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